Focus: Discrimination

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The International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV) is a new peer-reviewed periodical for scientific exchange and public dissemination of the latest academic research on conflict and violence. The subjects on which the IJCV concentrates have always been the subject of interest in many different areas of academic life. Consequently, the journal encompasses contributions from a wide range of disciplines including sociology, political science, education, social psychology, criminology, ethnology, history, political philosophy, urban studies, economics, and the study of religions. The IJCV is open-access: All text of the IJCV is subject to the terms of the Digital Peer Publishing Licence.

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The IJCV is open-access. All the articles are available to anyone on the internet, free of charge and without restriction. This is a response to the developments of recent years, where dissemination of knowledge has undergone rapid change that has led conventional printed media to become an obstacle to communication within (and beyond) the scientific community. A printed journal requires a great deal of time to prepare, thus causing delays, consumes scarce financial and human resources, and restricts access to subscribers only. An open-access web-based electronic publication is the up-to-date response to the need for swift, open, and free dissemination of knowledge as a common good.

This media shift notwithstanding, IJCV will naturally exercise quality control through peer reviews by international experts in the field using the established criteria. Reviewers assess the relevance, contribution to knowledge, methodological adequacy, clarity of presentation, and validity of the conclusions of submitted manuscripts.

The IJCV is published twice a year, in spring and in fall. Each consists of two sections. In order to promote debate on questions that deserve heightened attention, each issue begins with a “Focus on…” section featuring contributions addressing a selected field of topical interest. A second open section of equal significance serves as a platform for general contributions – theoretical and/or empirical – on conflict and violence. Eligibility to this section is not bound by any thematic criteria.

The first issue focuses on the causes and effects of discrimination. While the passing of the European Union racial and gender equality directives raised considerable political interest in Europe, the issue has still not attracted the attention it deserves in scientific debate, even though discrimination is known to have adverse consequences for integration of minorities. Calls for papers for upcoming issues can be found on www.ijcv.org.

January 2007

Wilhelm Heitmeyer        Douglas S. Massey        Steven Messner        James Sidanius        Michel Wieviorka
The Road to Negative Behavior: Discriminatory Intentions in the German Population

Frank Asbrock, University of Bielefeld, Germany
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This study analyzes discriminatory intentions shared by members of the German majority against several outgroups in Germany. Patterns of discriminatory intentions against various minority groups were investigated for several indicators, including gender, age, and political orientation, by means of a representative survey (N = 1,778). The relationship between prejudices and discriminatory intentions against different target groups was also analyzed. Prejudice and discriminatory intentions show moderate but consistently positive correlations in relation to one and the same target group. Moreover, it was found that discriminatory intentions against one outgroup are related to hostile attitudes towards other outgroups, too. The results support the hypothesis of a syndrome of group-focused enmity.

Discriminatory behavior against different minority groups in Germany is visible in everyday life. Official reports show that members of ethnic minorities in Germany experience discrimination in housing, education, and in the workplace (European Monitoring Centre 2005). The latest annual report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution indicates that right-wing violence increased in 2005. This violence is directed against various groups, in particular foreigners, homeless people, homosexuals, and left-wing activists (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2006). It has been shown that victims of xenophobic violence or verbal attacks tend to lose confidence in the German legal system (Salentin and Wilkening 2003) since they sometimes experience additional discriminatory treatment by legal instances after having been attacked for xenophobic reasons (Strobl, Lobermeier, and Böttger 2003). Blatant anti-Semitism is manifested in desecration of Jewish memorials (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2006). Even though women today have more rights than ever before, they still experience discrimination (Schwarzer 2002). For example they earn less money than men do (Statistisches Bundesamt 2006). Pressure groups for homosexuals and disabled people document discriminatory acts against members of their groups and call attention to their specific problems. Soccer fans in Germany convey racist, anti-Semitic, and sexist messages by banners and songs to denigrate and offend the opposing team (Dembowski and Scheidle 2002). Most discriminatory acts are not recognized as such by the general public because they are not blatant: A Turkish-looking couple had to resign from a fitness center because they refused to speak German (Heiser and Wiesmann 2006). This case would not have aroused public interest if it had not been embedded in a recent public discussion and debate on integration and assimilation of immigrants in Germany. The owner of the studio called this compulsion an act of integration. More evidence for rejection and distancing behavior as a kind of discrimination is given by Klink and Wagner (1999). In a series of fourteen field experiments they showed that distancing behavior was found more frequently against foreigners than against Germans. There was a significant overall effect for ethnic group membership in contact situations like helping (explaining the way, giving money for a phone call) and renting apartments.

It could be said that the most striking evidence that discrimination is a major societal problem is that political ac-
tion is taken against it. In 2000 the European Community enacted two directives to prevent people in the European Union from being discriminated against on grounds of race, gender, ethnic origin, religion or faith, disability, age, or sexual orientation. In seventeen out of twenty-five European Union member states an anti-discrimination law is already in place (Cormack and Bell 2005). The German government recently published a draft anti-discrimination law just in time to avoid a penalty from the European Community (Bundesministerium der Justiz 2006). However, there still is an extensive political and public discussion on the necessity of such a law for the groups named in the directive (Preuß 2006).

**Research on Discrimination**

Discriminatory behavior manifests itself on at least two levels: individual and institutional discrimination (Dovidio and Hebl 2005; Feagin and Feagin 1986; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). Individual discrimination can be defined as to “deny to individuals or groups of people equality of treatment which they may wish” (Allport 1954/1979, 51). It is expressed between individuals on the basis of their salient group identities – a person discriminates against another on the grounds of his or her group membership. Allport also suggested five gradations of negative outgroup behavior: antilocution (verbal discrimination), avoidance, discrimination, physical attack, and extermination. Graumann and Wintermantel (1989) extended Allport’s definition by the phrase “on a categorical basis” to emphasize the category or group as the main focus of discrimination. Taking Allport’s definition further, his entire list of behavioral expressions of inequality can be seen as discriminatory acts (Fiske 2004 a). Even the more subtle acts of discrimination, like antilocution or avoidance, can be an expression of discomfort, rejection, or even hostility towards minority groups (Crosby, Bromley, and Saxe 1980; Klink and Wagner 1999; Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000).

Institutional discrimination describes manifested forms of unfair treatment of minority groups in society’s institutions, which can be largely independent of individual attitudes (Antonovsky 1960; Levin and Levin 1982). This kind of discrimination is rooted in rules, procedures, and actions of social institutions (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). The more the discrimination is embedded in institutional structures, the less freedom of action an individual has to choose if he or she is willing to discriminate (Feagin and Feagin 1986). Therefore institutional discrimination is not totally independent of individual discrimination. The rules of an institution – for example unequal wages for men and women or racial discrimination in selection of personnel – are implemented and enforced by individual members of the institution who have a certain degree of room for maneuver.

Pincus (1998) distinguishes structural discrimination as another form of negative outgroup behavior. This describes those forms of discrimination that are embedded not only in institutional but also in societal structures. An example is unfair educational opportunities for white and black people in the United States, which keep black people out of certain jobs.

Discriminatory behavior has been extensively researched by social psychologists and sociologists. However, there are certain gaps in this field (Mackie and Smith 1998). Sociological research has concentrated on forms of institutional discrimination while, on the other hand, social psychological research has focused on individual behavior and its relationship to stereotypes (Bodenhausen 1998), prejudice (Dovidio et al. 1996, Schütz and Six 1996), and emotions (Cottrell and Neuberg 2005; Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000). Much research in this area is based on the social identity approach (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Turner et al. 1987) and uses experimental settings like the minimal group paradigm (Mummendey and Otten 2001). This experimental research analyzes fundamental processes of discriminatory behavior. However, some researchers question the extent to which these laboratory experiments are comparable to discrimination or prejudice in the real world (Duckitt et al. 1999). The high internal validity of experimental research is often achieved at the expense of external validity – the generalization of the results to different contexts. Moreover, most experimental studies are conducted with college students as participants (Sears 1986), which makes generalizing the results even more complicated. In order to back up the laboratory data the results must be validated with representative samples. In the present paper we analyze individual discriminatory intentions toward different outgroups using recent representative German survey data.
The phenomenon of discrimination can be observed in connection with various different groups. Almost any characteristic of a person can be used as a basis for differentiating ingroups and outgroups and for discrimination (Schneider 2004), but discrimination based on race and gender receives most attention in the public and scientific spheres. Since most research on prejudice and discrimination has been conducted in the United States there is a strong emphasis on race discrimination. Allport, for example, concentrates on racial discrimination, as indicated by his specification of discrimination: “Here we are interested only in differential treatment that is based on ethnic categorization” (Allport 1954/1979, 52). Schütz and Six (1996) state that forty-six out of sixty studies in their meta-analysis refer to ethnic minorities as the target of prejudice and discrimination. Even though discrimination can be directed against many different groups, there is a lack of research on this diversity of discrimination. Most studies concentrate on one specific group at a time (Lott and Maluso 1995; Schütz and Six 1996). But there is reason to believe that discriminatory behavior against one group is not totally independent from attitudes toward other groups. This assumption is based on the interrelation of prejudices towards different outgroups.

A Syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity

Prejudice can be described as a mostly negative evaluation of an outgroup and its members (Fiske 2004a). Even though many researchers define prejudice as an overall attitude, including affective, cognitive, and behavioral correlates (e.g. Dovidio et al. 1996), recent research emphasizes affect as the core element of prejudice (Fiske 2004a, Mackie and Smith 2003). The observations of discrimination listed above demonstrate that discrimination and prejudice are not restricted to specific groups. Moreover, there is reason to believe that prejudices against different groups are interrelated. In his seminal work on the nature of prejudice, Allport states that “one of the facts of which we are most certain is that people who reject one out-group will tend to reject other out-groups. If a person is anti-Jewish, he is likely to be anti-Catholic, anti-Negro, anti any out-group” (Allport 1954/1979, 68). Even though subsequent research mostly concentrates on prejudice against one outgroup at a time, several studies show a relation of different prejudices (for an extensive review see Zick et al., forthcoming). The interconnectedness of different prejudices is the central idea of Group-Focused Enmity (GFE). The degree of GFE and its societal and individual causes and consequences in Germany are being analyzed in a ten-year research project that began in 2002 (Heitmeyer 2006). Empirical analyses convincingly show that prejudices against different societal groups are interrelated. This interrelationship between different prejudices is based on a common core, the syndrome of group-focused enmity (Zick et al., forthcoming). This syndrome includes the hypothesis that people who hold prejudices against one group are likely to be prejudiced against other groups, too. It manifests itself in a rejection of social groups if their personality, appearance, behavior, or lifestyle is seen as deviant. Currently, the syndrome includes homophobia, prejudices against the homeless, prejudices against the disabled, sexism, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, racism, and preferential rights of the established (for detailed definitions see Heitmeyer 2002; Zick et al., forthcoming). However, the syndrome is not restricted to these prejudices. Any feature that differentiates outgroups from the normative consensus of a dominant group can serve to indicate deviance, while also confirming the normality of the ingroup (Heitmeyer 2002; Zick et al., forthcoming).

Norms and standards defined by the majority or shared beliefs in a majority can establish such a normality. Hence, any target group marked as “special” in a negative sense seems likely to become a victim of prejudice and discrimination – either because of a particular religion, gender, sexual orientation, physical appearance, or ethnic-cultural background, or simply because they are strangers. However, outgroups are not entirely arbitrary. Members of the groups analyzed here are common victims of prejudice and discrimination in Germany. This reflects the wide range of group-focused enmity. For example, women – unlike the other groups – are not a minority. Sexist discrimination relies on emphasizing inequality and specific role allocations for men and women. This is clearly indicated by discrimination at work (Cleveland, Vescio, and Barnes-Farrell 2005). Sexist beliefs are not only held by men but also by women (Endrikat 2003, Glick and Fiske 1996; Viki and Abrams 2003). Therefore, prejudice and discrimination against women can be analyzed on the same basis as bias against other outgroups in Germany. We should add that the expression of prejudice and discrimination is
not limited to majority group members. Any group (e.g.,
dominant or subordinate) can do this, even though it is
more likely for majority group members. As Jost and Bur-
gess (2000) argue, minority groups often express ambiva-
 lent attitudes with both ingroup and outgroup favoritism,
due to a psychological conflict between group justification
and system justification tendencies (for a review see Jost,
Banaji, and Nosek 2004).

Empirical analyses indicate that the degree of prejudice
differs substantially between certain demographic groups
in Germany. For instance, it has been shown that eastern
German respondents show more prejudice against for-
eigners than western Germans (Brähler and Angermeyer
show that men demonstrate a higher degree of (tradi-
tional) anti-Semitism (Brähler and Niedermayer 2002;
Zick and Küpper 2005) and heterophobia (an indicator for
prejudices against homeless people, disabled people, and
homosexuals; Küpper and Heitmeyer 2005) than women.
On the other hand, results concerning other prejudices are
not consistent. North American studies show that men are
more racially prejudiced than women (Sidanius and Pratto
1999), while German data indicates that women show
greater agreement with indicators of xenophobia, racism,
and Islamophobia than men do (Küpper and Heitmeyer
2005). In addition, Rommelspacher (2000) notes that there
are only small differences in right-wing extremist attitudes
between men and women. Concerning the connection
between formal education and prejudice, there is a well-
documented negative covariance (Heyder 2003; Wagner

The Relationship between Prejudice and Discrimination
The relation between prejudice and discrimination can
be seen as subdimension of a general attitude-behavior
relationship. The hypothesis that people act as they feel has
been analyzed for decades (Eagly and Chaiken 1993), but
the disillusioning outcome is that behavior is not always
guided by attitudes. Moreover, Wicker (1969) shows that
there is only a very weak correlation between attitudes
and behavior. Subsequent research reveals that this view
was too pessimistic, and the application of certain speci-
fications made it possible to find substantial and reliable
relationships between attitudes and behavior (Eckes and
Six 1994; Six 2005). Research on the relationship between
prejudice and discrimination reflects this development.
Early studies (Kutner, Wilkins, and Yarrow 1952; La Piere
1934; Saenger and Gilbert 1950) indicate that the correlation
between prejudice and discrimination is quite weak, but
these studies have been criticized for methodological prob-
lems, e. g., for comparing general attitudes and situation-
specific behavior (Duckitt 1992). In a review of sociological
and psychological studies on prejudice and discrimination
Duckitt concludes that there is a substantial correlation
between prejudice and individual discrimination. Dovidio,
Brigham, Johnson, and Gaertner (1996) report a correlation
of $r = .32$, while Schütz and Six (1996) find a correlation
of $r = .36$ for prejudice and discrimination and $r = .45$ for
prejudice and discriminatory intentions in their meta-
analyses. These results are comparable to those for the atti-
ditude-behavior relationship in general (Eckes and Six 1994).
In addition, the causal hypothesis that prejudice leads to
discrimination has been confirmed both by experimental
methods (Dovidio et al. 2004) and longitudinal data (Wag-
ner, Christ, and Pettigrew, forthcoming). However, this
does not mean that there is no effect at all in the opposite
direction. There is evidence that prejudice and stereotyping
can be used to justify or legitimize discriminatory behavior
(Jost and Banaji 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1999). The rela-
tionship between prejudice and discrimination seems to be
quite complex and anything but straightforward.

Certainly, prejudice is not the only possible predictor of
discrimination. Behavior is influenced by several other
factors, such as emotions, group norms, and opportunities
(Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Terry, Hogg, and Black-
wood 2001). Taking these factors into account can improve
and differentiate the prediction of prejudice, especially for
qualitatively different expressions of discriminatory behav-
ior (Christ et al., forthcoming).

In this study we use survey data, which confronts us with
a major problem. Since it is not possible to measure actual
discriminatory behavior in a survey, we have to use dis-
criminatory intentions instead (Sheeran 2002).
Discriminatory intentions have the structure of “I intend to do X.” As a preliminary cognitive stage they are very close to discrimination (Ajzen and Fishbein 2005; Gollwitzer 1993) and are often used in survey studies as a substitute for actual discriminatory behavior. It has been shown that behavioral intentions and behavior correlate closely (Schütz and Six 1996; Sheeran 2002) and that a reduction in the correlation between intention and behavior is contingent on situational or societal restraints. It is quite obvious that other influencing factors intervene between such intentions and actual behavior. Nevertheless, for the interpretation we have to keep in mind that our results are based on discriminatory intentions.

The Present Study

The aim of the present study is to analyze discriminatory intentions against those groups in Germany that are actually at the focus of GFE: homosexuals, homeless people, disabled people, women, Jews, foreigners, and Muslims. In the first place we are interested in the question of whether the differences in prejudice between demographic groups can be found for discriminatory intentions, too. Secondly, if prejudices towards different groups are related due to an underlying syndrome of group-focused enmity (Zick et al., forthcoming) and discrimination at least partly correlates with prejudice (Dovidio et al. 1996; Schütz and Six 1996), it can be expected that there will be a relationship between prejudice against one group and discrimination against other groups. There are some indications of a correlation between prejudice and discrimination across the different outgroups. Wagner, Christ and Kühnel (2002) show that prejudice against a specific outgroup is clearly correlated to discriminatory intentions against the same group. However, their data shows some quite high correlations between prejudice against one group and discriminatory intentions against different groups, too. In addition, qualitative research on right-wing extremists indicates that they show violent discriminatory behavior against several outgroups (Neumann and Frindte 2002). These results are confirmed by the recent report of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2006; see above). These theoretical assumptions and empirical examples make it reasonable to assume that prejudices and discrimination against diverse target groups are interrelated.

Table 1: Frequencies of agreement with items measuring discriminatory intentions (N=1,778)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Do not agree at all</th>
<th>Rather disagree</th>
<th>Rather agree</th>
<th>Fully agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>As landlord I would not rent out an apartment to homosexuals.</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Als Wohnungseigentümer würde ich meine Wohnung nicht an Homosexuelle vermieten.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If a homeless person sat down next to me on a bench, I would leave.</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Wenn sich ein Obdachloser neben mich auf eine Bank setzt, würde ich gehen)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I try to keep away from disabled.</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ich versuche, mich von Behinderten möglichst fern zu halten.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would never take a job where a women is my superior.</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ich würde keine Stelle annehmen, in der ich eine Frau als Vorgesetzte hätte.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would advise my son or daughter not to marry into a jewish family.</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ich würde meiner Tochter oder meinem Sohn davon abraten, in eine jüdische Familie einzuheiraten.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would let myself be treated by a foreign doctor, as well.</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Ich würde mich auch von einem ausländischen Arzt behandeln lassen.) (foreigners, reverse coded)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I would feel uncomfortable moving to an area with a high percentage of Muslims.</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| (Ich hätte Probleme, in eine Gegend zu ziehen, in der viele Muslime leben.)

Notes: All values are in percent. Sample weighted to represent population proportions. Values in bold indicate discriminatory intentions.
1 This item was only presented to half of the sample (N = 867).
Method
The data originate from a recent probability telephone survey \(N=1,778\) representative for the adult (16 years or older) German population with no migration background (German citizens whose parents and grandparents were born in Germany; for details see Heitmeyer 2006). The field phase of this survey was in the summer of 2005. For each outgroup one item was developed to measure discriminatory intentions. Each item focuses on a typical situation of discrimination for the respective group. All indicators were rated on a four-point scale from “do not agree at all” to “fully agree”. Table 1 shows the exact verbalization of the items.

The data was analyzed in two stages. First we ran descriptive analyses to give an impression of the degree of discriminatory intentions in Germany. Here we used weighted data to provide a representative analysis. Using multivariate analyses of variance we then compared the unweighted mean differences in discriminatory intentions for different demographic groups. In these analyses higher means indicate more discrimination for all items. In a second step we used unweighted data and replaced missing values by expected maximization estimates to test our hypotheses on the interrelation of prejudice and discrimination across groups (cf. Enders 2001). As indicators for prejudiced attitudes we used short scales of the facets of Group Focused Enmity (Zick et al., forthcoming). Table 2 shows the items and the internal consistency of each scale.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Indicators for prejudiced attitudes ((N=1,778))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GFE facets and items</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriages between two women or two men should be permitted (reverse coded). It is disgusting when homosexuals kiss in public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devaluation of homeless people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Begging homeless people should be removed from pedestrian areas. I find homeless people in the cities unpleasant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Devaluation of disabled people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Germany, too many efforts are being made for disabled people. In my view many demands of disabled people go too far. Disabled people receive too many benefits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women should bethink themselves more of their role as wives and mothers again. It is more important for a wife to support her husband’s career than to have a career herself.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Semitism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have too much influence in Germany. As a result of their behavior, Jews are not entirely without blame for being persecuted. Many jews today try to take advantage of the history of the Third Reich. I like it that increasingly more Jews live in Germany (reverse coded).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xenophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There are too many foreigners living in Germany. When jobs get scarce, foreigners living in Germany should be sent back home.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamophobia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With so many Muslims living here in Germany, I sometimes feel like a stranger in my own country. Immigration to Germany should be prohibited for Muslims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German re-settlers should be better off than foreigners because they are of German origin. The white race is deservedly the leading race in the world.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preferential rights of the established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Someone who is new somewhere should be satisfied with less. Someone who has always been living here should have more rights than someone who arrived later.</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Cronbach’s alpha</th>
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<tr>
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Results

Individual Discriminatory Intentions in Germany

To get an impression of the level of agreement on individual discriminatory intentions in German society we first analyzed the total representative sample. Table 1 shows the rates of agreement with different items measuring discriminatory intentions in the 2005 GFE survey. There is a substantial degree of acceptance of these discriminatory statements within the representative sample. Especially, agreement with items measuring discriminatory intentions against homosexuals (20.2%), Jews (24.8%), and Muslims (46.8%) is quite high. Avoidance of permanent/long-term contact with members of these groups seems to be a very distinctive feature. Agreement with the item measuring discriminatory intentions towards homeless people is also substantial (13%), but the item refers to contact for a short time only. Overall, the results show that there is a substantial willingness to behave in a discriminatory way towards several outgroups in Germany. However, one has to be careful with comparisons of the discriminatory intentions towards different target groups. Since the items refer to distinct situations they cannot be compared to each other in terms of more or less discrimination (i.e. one cannot from this data say that there is more discrimination against Muslims than against women). In this study comparisons can only be made between different subgroups in terms of their attitudes and behavior toward one and the same outgroup.

Comparison of Demographic Groups in Germany

To analyze differences in discriminatory intentions relating to social circumstances we compared different demographic groups. As already indicated, there are substantial differences between these groups with regard to prejudice, so it seems reasonable to test whether these differences could be found for discriminatory behavior, too.

East-west differences: Prejudice is higher in eastern Germany than in western Germany for most facets of the GFE syndrome (Heitmeyer 2005). Figure 1 shows the mean differences for discriminatory intentions. In general, discriminatory intentions are higher in eastern Germany, too. There is a significant multivariate east-west effect in discriminatory intentions ($F(7, 817) = 3.23, p = .002, \eta^2 = .03$). $\eta^2$ indicates the amount of variance explained by the independent variable and is an indicator for effect size.

According to Cohen (1988) $\eta^2 = .02$ indicates a small effect, $\eta^2 = .13$ a medium effect, and $\eta^2 = .20$ a large effect.

Additional univariate analyses reveal that people from eastern Germany show higher means for discriminatory intentions against homosexuals ($F (1, 823) = 4.48, p = .04, \eta^2 = .005$), homeless people ($F (1, 823) = 5.00, p = .003, \eta^2 = .011$), disabled people ($F (1, 823) = 2.84, p = .002, \eta^2 = .011$), Jews ($F (1, 823) = 11.79, p < .001, \eta^2 = .016$), and foreigners ($F (1, 823) = 2.28, (p = .007, \eta^2 = .009$). There are no differences for discriminatory intentions against women ($F (1, 823) = 1.03, ns$) and Muslims ($F (1, 823) = 1.80, ns$).

Even though these results are not as clear as for prejudice, they are similar.

Gender: With regard to gender differences, the results show an ambiguous pattern for the GFE syndrome. Women show higher values than men in some facets of the GFE syndrome (Küpper and Heitmeyer 2005). For discriminatory intentions there is a multivariate effect of gender ($F (7, 817) = 3.02, p = .004, \eta^2 = .03$). But, as can be seen in Figure 2, the differences are only very small. Men indicate more agreement with items measuring discriminatory intentions against the disabled ($F (1, 823) = 5.83, p = .02, \eta^2 = .007$) and against women ($F (1, 823) = 7.81, p = .005, \eta^2 = .009$). There are no statistical significant dif-
ferences for discriminatory intentions against homosexuals ($F(1, 823) = 3.62, \text{ns}$), the homeless ($F(1, 823) = 1.29, \text{ns}$), Jews ($F < 1$), foreigners ($F < 1$), or Muslims ($F < 1$).

**Age**: Endrikat (2006) shows that young people in Germany are less prejudiced than older people, comparing Germans aged 16 to 25 with those over 25. To analyze and differentiate this result for discriminatory intentions we compared five age groups (see Figure 3) and found a significant multivariate effect of age ($F(28, 3256) = 4.14, \text{p < .001, } \eta^2 = .03$). As can be seen in Figure 3, univariate analyses reveal differences in discriminatory intentions against homosexuals ($F(4, 817) = 14.94, \text{p < .001, } \eta^2 = .068$), women ($F(4, 817) = 5.99, \text{p < .001, } \eta^2 = .028$), and Muslims ($F(4, 817) = 2.92, \text{p = .02, } \eta^2 = .014$). Further post-hoc analyses indicate that the agreement with items measuring discriminatory intentions against homosexuals increases significantly with age. Elderly people (65 and above) agree more with items measuring discriminatory intentions against women than people aged 22 to 34. There are no univariate differences for homeless people ($F(4, 817) = 1.00, \text{ns}$), disabled people ($F < 1$), Jews ($F(4, 817) = 1.86, \text{ns}$), and foreigners ($F(4, 817) = 2.24, \text{ns}$).

**Formal education**: As mentioned above, there is a well-documented negative relation between education and prejudice (Wagner and Zick 1995), so we were interested in the question of whether discriminatory intentions decrease with greater education, too. We compared four levels of formal education in Germany (listed here in order, beginning with the most advanced): university degree, Abitur (university entrance qualification, usually taken at the end of the thirteenth school year), mittlere Reife (the middle-level school-leaving examination, usually taken at the end of the tenth school year), and Hauptschulabschluss (lowest-level school-leaving examination, usually taken at the end of the last of the compulsory nine years of schooling). Our data shows a multivariate effect of educational degree on discriminatory intentions ($F(28, 3244) = 4.22, \text{p < .001, } \eta^2 = .04$). As can be seen in Figure 4, there are statistical significant differences for discriminatory intentions against homosexuals ($F(4, 814) = 12.80, \text{p < .001, } \eta^2 = .059$), women ($F(4, 814) = 6.81, \text{p < .001, } \eta^2 = .032$).
Jews ($F(4, 814) = 15.40, p < .001, \eta^2 = .070$), foreigners ($F(4, 814) = 4.16, p = .002, \eta^2 = .020$), and Muslims ($F(4, 814) = 4.26, p = .002, \eta^2 = .020$). No differences were found for discriminatory intentions against homeless people ($F(4, 814) = 2.11, ns$) and disabled people ($F(4, 814) = 1.71, ns$).

**Political orientation:** With very few exceptions, it has been consistently shown that the more strongly people categorize themselves as being on the political right, the more likely they are to display hostile attitudes (e.g. Zick and Küpper 2006). As Figure 5 shows, this pattern holds for discriminatory intentions, too, although the effects are quite small. Participants were asked for a self-categorization of their general political opinion on a scale ranging from “left-wing,” “slightly left-wing,” “just in the center” to “slightly right-wing” and “right-wing.” The results indicate a significant multivariate effect of political orientation ($F(28, 3160) = 3.93, p < .001, \eta^2 = .03$). We detected a clear “more discrimination from left to right” pattern for discriminatory intentions against homosexuals ($F(4, 793) = 10.03, p < .001, \eta^2 = .048$) and Jews ($F(4, 793) = 12.84, p < .001, \eta^2 = .061$). Additionally, there are significant differences for all other outgroups: homeless people ($F(4, 793) = 3.38, p = .009, \eta^2 = .017$), disabled people ($F(4, 793) = 2.45, p = .05, \eta^2 = .012$), women ($F(4, 793) = 3.65, p = .006, \eta^2 = .018$), foreigners ($F(4, 793) = 3.75, p = .005, \eta^2 = .019$), and Muslims ($F(4, 793) = 8.03, p < .001, \eta^2 = .039$). Post-hoc analyses indicate that it is not always the firmest right-wingers who show most discriminatory intentions, but in some cases (toward homeless people, disabled people, and Muslims) those who characterize themselves as slightly right-wing. However, except for homosexuals and Jews, the differences are rather small.
The Relationship between Prejudice and Discriminatory Intentions

As we indicated before, Wagner, Christ, and Kühnel (2002) found substantial correlations between prejudice against a target group and discriminatory intentions against the same target group. Even though they did not concentrate particular attention on these findings, they also found quite strong correlations between prejudice and discrimination for different target groups. However, they analyzed only discriminatory intentions against foreigners, Muslims, women, disabled people, and a self-report on past discriminatory behavior against Jews. Here we examined discriminatory intentions against all seven GFE target groups.

To analyze the relationship between prejudice and discrimination we correlated the items for discriminatory intentions and the elements of group-focused enmity. Table 3 shows the results. According to Cohen (1992) correlations of $r = .10$ indicate small effect sizes, $r = .30$ medium, and $r = .50$ strong. As the table shows, all correlations but one are positive and statistically significant. This means that for all target groups, discriminatory intentions increase with increasing prejudice. As expected, the highest correlations can be found for prejudice and discriminatory intentions relating to the same target group. This confirms the findings of Wagner, Christ, and Kühnel (2002). However, our aim was to analyze the relationship between prejudice and discrimination if the target group is not identical. As Table 3 shows, there are high correlations here, too. For example discriminatory intentions against Muslims show substantial correlations not only with Islamophobia ($r = .37$), but also with xenophobia ($r = .30$). Discriminatory intentions against women correlate with sexism ($r = .25$) and nearly as strongly with racism ($r = .22$) and prejudice against disabled people ($r = .21$). Discriminatory intentions against foreigners correlate clearly with xenophobia ($r = .25$), racism ($r = .24$) and even more strongly with Islamophobia ($r = .29$). But the strongest connections across group boundaries can be found for discriminatory intentions against Jews (correlations range from .26 to .45) and homosexuals (from .19 to .53). These items show clear correlations with all elements of GFE, indicating that discriminatory intentions against Jews or homosexuals are strongly related to several facets of prejudice. Overall, the results show that prejudice and discriminatory intentions correlate not only when the target group is the same. There is also a substantial correlation across group boundaries, which can be even stronger than when the two phenomena are examined in relation to a single target group.

Discussion

The aim of the present study was to analyze discriminatory intentions against different outgroups in Germany. Previous research focused mainly on one or two outgroups. We compared discriminatory intentions against seven outgroups for several demographic indicators and detected specific differences. Further, we analyzed the relationship between prejudice and discriminatory intentions in terms of a syndrome of prejudice. On the basis of the theoretical arguments that prejudice towards different outgroups is correlated due to an underlying syndrome of

Table 3: Correlations between prejudice and discriminatory intentions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Discrimination</th>
<th>Prejudice against homosexuals</th>
<th>Prejudice against disabled people</th>
<th>Sexism</th>
<th>Anti-Semitism</th>
<th>Xenophobia</th>
<th>Islamophobia</th>
<th>Racism</th>
<th>Preferential rights of the established</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homosexuals</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeless</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.08$^b$</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disabled</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreigners</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Muslims$^a$</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.11$^b$</td>
<td>.04$^c$</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $a$ This item was presented only to half of the sample ($N = 867$). Pearson correlations, $p < .001$, $b p = .002$, $c$ n.s.
group-focused enmity (Zick et al., forthcoming) and that prejudice and discrimination are correlated (Dovidio et al. 1996; Schütz and Six 1996), we assumed that there must be substantial correlations between prejudice against one group and discriminatory intentions towards other target groups.

The group comparisons indicate that the analyzed demographic groups show only small differences in their discriminatory intentions. Even though there are statistically significant differences in discriminatory intentions against many outgroups between eastern and western Germany and between left-wing and right-wing political orientations, the effects are very small and do not allow for unambiguous interpretation. The small differences between age groups indicate that it is not the young, but rather older people who show more discriminatory intentions (at least against homosexuals). This confirms recent findings by Endrikat (2006), showing that young people are less prejudiced than older people. Our results give strong support to the demand that attempts to reduce prejudice and discrimination should not concentrate solely on young people. A possible reason for the rather small differences found within demographic categories might be that behavioral intentions depend more on individual psychological and situational factors than on demographic indicators. General attitudes, like prejudice, seem to be more closely related to sociological indicators than the intention to behave in a particular way toward an outgroup member. The conscious decision to perform a discriminatory act seems to depend on additional factors besides the demographic ones analyzed here. Taken together, these results indicate that discriminatory intentions differ substantially from prejudiced attitudes.

The analysis of the relationship between prejudice and discriminatory intentions confirms our assumptions: prejudice and discriminatory intentions are clearly correlated in terms of a syndrome of group-focused enmity. Prejudice against any specific target group in our analysis correlates with discriminatory intentions against almost all other outgroups. However, there is need for further analyses. Even though we found strong correlations between discriminatory intentions against Jews and homosexuals and prejudices against all other target groups, we do not know the exact reason for this. One reason might be the context of the discriminatory intentions items. The item focussed on Jews raises the question of marriage to a target group member, while the item focussed on homosexuals is about renting an apartment. So both items involve a long-term, intimate or close relationship with many opportunities for contact. Prejudiced people are not interested in such contacts and so they avoid these situations. Another explanation might be that the discriminatory intentions against Jews and homosexuals are very emotionally charged. Rejection of homosexuals as tenants might be driven by disgust (Cottrell and Neuberg 2005), while rejection of a Jewish person as a family member might be driven by fear or anger. Both emotions are central elements of prejudices against many outgroups (e.g. Cottrell and Neuberg 2005; Dijker 1987; Fiske 2004a; Fiske et al. 2002; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Schaller, Park, and Faulkner 2003), so discriminatory intentions against these groups might be expected to show strong correlations with prejudice against other groups. However, in order to understand the underlying processes, more detailed analyses with more discriminatory intention items per target group will be necessary.

It should be remembered that the results presented here are subject to several limitations. First, we used survey data. This limited us to measuring discriminatory intentions, which is often used as a substitute for actual behavior, but which is not the same. Nevertheless, research has shown that there is a substantial correlation between behavioral intention and behavior (Sheeran 2002). Moreover, individual discrimination is mostly intentional (Fiske 2004b). However, we are interested in actual discriminatory behavior. There is a fundamental lack of research on actual discriminatory behavior, especially on hot discrimination, such as approach behavior and attacks (Mackie and Smith 1998). Further research should take this into account. The second limitation lies in the limited number of items. Since there is only one item per outgroup, results may depend on the specific content of the item, i.e., the situation. Having more than just one item per group would provide the opportunity to use latent variables and short scales to test our hypotheses.

Finally, what are the implications of this study? Our results indicate a substantial tendency for people to agree
with items measuring social exclusion directed against different outgroups in everyday situations. This confirms results from North American studies on individual discrimination against women (Lott 1995), black people (Hacker 1995; Maluso 1995), and homosexuals (Fernald 1995). The implementation of an anti-discrimination law in the European Union also suggests that discrimination is a problem in Europe (even though many German politicians and business lobbyists do not seem so agree on this point).

Our data also show that no particular group is singled out as a preferred victim, so intervention programs focusing on a single outgroup might merely displace the problem of discrimination. However, further research is needed to analyze whether programs against prejudice and discrimination should widen their spectrum of target groups.

The relationship between prejudice and discriminatory intentions across group boundaries indicates that prejudice against any outgroup should be regarded as an alarming warning sign. Those who are prejudiced against a specific outgroup are likely to discriminate against other outgroups, too. The ideology of inequality, manifested in the syndrome of group-focused enmity (Zick et al., forthcoming), seems to have a broad influence on discriminatory intentions.

Prejudice does not only result in individual discrimination. Widespread prejudice creates a hostile climate for minority groups and leads to a normalization of minority rejection and separation. Such normality is one basis of institutional forms of discrimination, which operationalize individual prejudices in institutional settings. Institutional discrimination cannot be understood without individual discrimination. Firstly, it is always a single individual or a group of individuals who decide to implement discriminatory treatment at the institutional level. And secondly, institutional discrimination is often actually carried out by individuals, e.g. blocking promotion for women. Although there are forms of institutional discrimination that operate without negative intentions by the institutional members, people often do have a choice, so it would seem that there is a chance of changing institutional procedures (Fiske 2004b). The intention not to discriminate might be a chance to get rid of these forms of discrimination.

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Influences of Discriminatory Incidents on Immigrants’ Attitudes Toward German Society
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Influences of Discriminatory Incidents on Immigrants’ Attitudes Toward German Society

Jan Döring, University of Bielefeld, Germany

This article presents findings from a quantitative survey to evaluate the impact discriminatory incidents have on the attitudes of immigrants towards the majority society in Germany. The findings show that there is a strong relationship between experiences of discrimination and a hostile or alienated attitude towards German society. As an attempt to explain this generalization from single incidents to the macro relation between immigrants and autochthonous Germans in general a theory of framing, taken from developments in the field of rational choice theory, is applied. The reasoning is that a generalizing and rather hostile framing in terms of the attitude towards Germans can minimize psychic, emotional and social costs resulting from acts of discrimination.

Introduction
The treatment of the issue of “discrimination” by German sociologists of migration is usually restricted to the investigation of theories that explain the genesis of prejudices or that deal with the anticipated profit that discrimination may bring for particular groups or society as a whole. There is a dearth of quantitative research examining the phenomenon from the perspective of those affected, the immigrants. Taking that as its starting point, this article presents the results of a standardized survey that might contribute a number of insights to the scanty existing research and indicates some interesting fields that are yet to be explored. The focus is on the attitude changes brought about by the experience of discrimination rather than on delivering descriptive material.

The main thesis is that experiencing discrimination leads immigrants to reinterpret the issue of discrimination itself, abandoning the idea that they are facing isolated incidents only. A generalization of the expectation of discrimination will take place, accompanied by loss of trust in institutions, a perception of meager opportunities for social advancement, perception of economic exploitation, and the idea that the larger part of German society is xenophobic: a general hostility towards the majority population will arise. Put into the context of public discussion on failed integration and “parallel societies” in Germany, this thesis has political relevance insofar as at least a part of the burden of integration is shifted back onto the German majority.

In this essay the term “discrimination” is used to denote negative and unequal treatment caused by the belief of the discriminating person (or several of them) to belong to a superior group than the person that is being discriminated against. This definition excludes unequal treatment that results solely from laws that ascribe unequal rights to citizens and foreigners. For example, the fact that individuals without German citizenship cannot become civil servants in Germany can be considered to be discriminatory under some definitions of the term. Such institutional aspects are excluded here. Under the definition used here the act

\footnote{For an insightful German study that explicitly includes institutional discrimination see Terkes-sidis 2004.}
of discrimination has to be located on the level of interaction. This requires that the discriminating person has the choice to select from several options of action. If this is not the case, the discrimination is institutionalized and not the result of individual choice in the situation, and not the interaction but institutions like the law would have to be investigated. That is not the intention of this study, although I would not wish to deny the necessity of such research.¹

The empirical data that will be analyzed in the empirical part of this essay was collected using a standardized questionnaire. Only immigrants were interviewed. The interpretation and classification of the incidents of discrimination is based exclusively on the interviewees’ own assessments. Since I cannot evaluate whether these assessments are correct and complete, I am dealing only with the phenomenon of “perceived discrimination.” In the following, the terms “discrimination”, “experienced discrimination” and “discriminatory experiences/incidences” are all used in the sense of “perceived discrimination” unless specifically stated otherwise.

Research on Discrimination in Germany

Kühnel and Leibold (2000) analyze the ALLBUS data of 1996 to present findings on discrimination and related attitudes among immigrants.² They state that there is a general lack of empirical data in this field of research (pp. 111, 145). Taking rational choice theory as a starting point, they derive hypotheses concerning the perception and evaluation of discrimination among Germans and several immigrant groups, including Aussiedler.³ The dataset does not offer any variables that directly measure discriminatory incidents, but it does include a number of variables for which the respondents were asked to say how often several types of discrimination generally occurred (p. 122). Kühnel and Leibold come to the surprising conclusion that Germans believe incidents of discrimination to occur more frequently than immigrants do (p. 125). When the interviewees were asked to evaluate the severity of such acts, immigrants regarded them more seriously than western Germans, who in turn regarded them more seriously than eastern Germans. Among the groups of immigrants, the authors find the Turkish subgroup to be the most critical: Turkish immigrants perceive a greater number of discriminatory incidents and they are also more critical of them (p. 131). The authors do not investigate relationships between these assessments and general attitudes, probably because personal experiences were not available.

The DJI 1997 survey on foreigners (Weidacher 2000a; summary: Weidacher 2000b) is another study that explores immigrants’ attitudes to Germany.⁴ Here, individual experiences of discrimination were measured by asking the immigrants how much they felt disadvantaged in various social fields and subsystems (Weidacher 2000a, p. 109). Additionally, a large amount of data was collected to measure political attitudes and trust in institutions. Weidacher points out that the experience of disadvantage has strong negative effects on satisfaction with individual rights and opportunities. Also, Turkish teenagers were generally far more dissatisfied than Italian or Greek teenagers (p. 111).

A study by Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (2001/2002), funded by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, concentrates on Turkish immigrants (summary: Häußler 2002). It also included German citizens of Turkish origin, whereas for the two former studies only immigrants without German citizenship were interviewed. Concerning discriminatory incidents, the author concludes that Turkish immigrants have strong trust in German democracy and German institutions but still perceive a large amount of discrimination (p. 9). With respect to a causal relationship between experienced discrimination and attitudes of trust, Häußler makes the following statement: “Apparently, a clear distinction is drawn between the level of individual behavior and the level of society. Experiences on the individual level do not impact negatively on attitudes on the level of the society” (p. 9).⁵ This would

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² ALLBUS is a national representative survey carried out by the Zentralarchiv für Sozialforschung (Cologne) and the Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen (Mannheim) with varying focuses. ALLBUS 1996 focused on immigration and integration.

³ Aussiedler are people of German ancestry who have moved back to Germany from eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where their families have been living for generations.

⁴ The DJI survey is carried out by the Deutsches Jugendinstitut (Munich).

⁵ All quotes from German studies translated by the author.
contradict the hypothesis outlined above, and will be challenged in the empirical section below. The results of Salentin and Wilkening (2003) also contradict Häußler’s assertion. Their results demonstrate that discriminatory incidents erode trust attitudes. They asked about experiences of racist insults, threats and attacks in the past twelve months (p. 89) and related this data to trust in the police and the court system. A regression of 20 percent was found; furthermore the feeling of safety in public places was reduced by 15 to 30 percent: “Apparently, trust in the provision of safety by the state is severely damaged among victims of xenophobic violence” (p. 93). The same edition of the same journal also contains two articles with a qualitative methodology that prove loss of trust due to discrimination (Strobl, Lobermeier, and Böttger 2003; Wendel 2003).

Altogether there is not an abundance of quantitative material on the issue in Germany; the essays that have been quoted investigate survey data in which discrimination is treated as just one issue among others. Specialized survey data does not exist.

An exemplary study on the issue of discrimination was carried out in Sweden at the initiative of the government (Lange 1997). It seems noteworthy that interviewees were asked about eighteen types of discriminatory incidents. This allows a much more detailed picture than we so far have of the German situation. Lange constructs a scale of discrimination that is used to examine relationships involving many different attitudes. This is done with great care, and space does not permit the results to be discussed in detail here. A negative relationship is found between discrimination and trust in the system (p. 47). Furthermore, Lange claims that low trust in the system in turn has negative effects on immigrants’ “identificational assimilation” (Esser 1980): “The following – very cautious – conclusion can be formulated: to some extent experienced discrimination causes reduced trust in authorities, etc. and contributes to the view that Sweden is (to some extent) a xenophobic society. These attitudes in turn cause a weaker feeling of belonging to Sweden” (p. 76–77).

**Hypothesis: Generalized Attitudes Function as Stress-Neutralizing Framing**

The attempts to expand the system of rational choice theory have produced a model for social theory that can explain the circumstances under which individuals will abstain from thorough analysis of situations. Adaptation to a situation is called framing when an individual activates a mental program that includes patterns of interpretation and action that are employed without exhaustive reflection and attention (Esser 1996a, Esser 1996b). A frame is a model that can be used to deal with situations in a cost-saving way. When an individual faces situations for which they have a model that fits well and has proved adequate, they will activate this model without much thinking. “The learned situational models with their ‘chronic attitude accessibility’ reflect ‘evolutionarily’ successful and therefore habitualized procedures of problem solving in the past” (Esser 1996a, 14).

My hypothesis is that immigrants who have experienced discrimination will frequently frame interactions with Germans in a way that will minimize psychic, emotional, and social costs. When an individual is affected by discrimination for the first time he/she will normally be seriously disturbed by the incident, because he/she has no rationale for such incidents that could help to neutralize the negative effects for the immigrant. These effects can include: doubts about personal identification and group membership due to exclusion and the construction of group frontiers that become apparent through the act of the discrimination; doubts arising about the sincerity and stability of existing relations to Germans; the necessity to reinterpret past situations in the light of the experience (these might have also been discriminations when seen from a new point of view). Under such circumstances, most individuals will not be able to absorb the negative effects with a strain-relieving rationale even if they have not themselves suffered it. I leave this out of consideration in order to keep the hypotheses as simple as possible. Nevertheless, the discourses on discrimination are an important field for future research.

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6 It is likely that there are also neutralizing rationales within the discourses of the immigrant groups and in the media. Therefore most immigrants will have a rationale for discrimination even if they have not themselves suffered it. I leave this out of consideration in order to keep the hypotheses as simple as possible. Nevertheless, the discourses on discrimination are an important field for future research.
if they have one. The effective employment of a rationale requires a high degree of matter-of-factness, which is inhibited by the strain that follows the discriminatory act. Therefore, the first experiences of discrimination will cause high emotional, psychological, and possibly social costs. The latter might occur when the discriminating person is a member of a group of which the immigrant is also in some way a part. The result would then be a re-evaluation of their position in this group and of their relationship to some, if not all, of the other members of the group. Some forms of interaction might become suspicious of containing degrading elements that had not been noticed before and that might have been rather common in everyday life. Jokes about ethnicity can be considered an example: they can be harmless and funny for a person who feels safe in a group, but this can change rapidly when a person no longer feels secure.

When discriminatory incidents become more frequent the individual will have to develop situational models that keep the costs of the incidents as low as possible. I assume that a suspicious, skeptical stance towards the majority can be such a situational model in the sense of Esser’s approach: first of all it has the advantage that the occurrence of incidents does not surprise the individual very much, as they are included in the model. Secondly, the model enables the individual to shift at least a part of the effect of discrimination from the self to the ethnic group: the target of the aggression is not really the individual but rather the group that he/she is considered to belong to (for the theoretical concept of “representative victimization” see Strobl, Lobermeier and Böttger 2003). The person is being discriminated against as a representative of the group. With this model, the individual can at least avert the very dangerous situation of starting to explain acts of discrimination as resulting from personal “inferiorities” such as poor German language skills, deviant behavior, or strange appearance. It could be said that this model is an ethnic definition of the situation: the major cause for discrimination is the conflict between the ethnic groups.

Conservative commentators, in particular, often claim that one “function” of the attitude that one might be subjected to ethnic discrimination at any time is that it prevents the individual from taking personal responsibility for individual failure, for example in schools or labor markets. While I would not deny that situations are sometimes falsely defined as discriminatory, I would dispute that such definitions are frequently chosen although the individual actually “knows better”.

Which elements will be involved in an ethnic framing that develops after a series of discriminatory incidents? Future interactions with Germans that resemble the situations in which the degrading events occurred will be watched very carefully. When the number and the heterogeneity of the experiences increase, this skepticism will begin to encompass the whole range of interactions with the majority. It will become harder and harder (and will seem less reasonable) to ring-fence the phenomenon to certain places, persons/position-holders, or organizations/subsystems. During all interactions with the majority, the mental model will supply the individual with the cognitive option to interpret the interaction as “discrimination.” With this increasing skepticism, attitudes toward the German majority society will become negative. As the individual assumes that discrimination may happen at any time when interacting with Germans, the institutions of German society will be regarded more critically. Framing will cause a loss of trust in the system and a growing feeling of systematic economic disadvantage or even exploitation.

All other things being equal, the ethnic framing will also increase the number of subjective experiences of discrimination: when the stance becomes more critical but the number of contingent interactions stays constant, the number of interpretations identifying discrimination increases. This suggests that a “build-up process” may be set in motion. This does not necessarily imply that there will also be an increasing number of false-positive interpretations (though this is possible and not unlikely, of course). A growth in perceived discrimination can also arise when intensified awareness makes the individuals notice degrading treatment where they did not feel any before: the threshold value has changed.

On the basis of these arguments the following thesis can be postulated: immigrants who frequently experience discrimination will be more negative in their attitudes
than will be immigrants who do not feel themselves to be greatly affected by discrimination. The greater the number of personally experienced discriminatory incidents, the greater the generalized suspicion that Germans are xenophobic, the greater the feeling of economic disadvantage and perceived constraints to social advancement, the greater the perception of xenophobia in public institutions and the smaller the trust in public institutions. Following Lange (1997), I additionally assume that discrimination will affect identification with the German society as transmitted through the above attitudes. I do not expect a direct relationship between discrimination and identification with Germany when the effects of the attitudes are controlled.

**Description of the Survey**

The empirical data analyzed in the following chapter was collected in the summer and winter of 2004 in Bielefeld, a German town with about 330,000 inhabitants. The instrument was a standardized questionnaire that contained questions to measure experienced discrimination, sociodemographic factors, personal migration history, political attitudes, social networks, leisure activities, self-identification, household size, language skills, education, vocational training, and income. The interviewees were randomly sampled from the group of second-generation Turkish and Greek immigrants aged between 18 and 35 (so all these interviewees were born in Germany). Additionally first-generation Aussiedler of the same age group were randomly sampled. Details on the survey concept and sampling and interview procedures are included in the methodological report of the survey (Salentin 2005). Most of the interviews were carried out face-to-face with the help of address lists provided by the town administration. At the end of the survey phase some of the remaining interviews were carried out using an accumulative “snowball” process. Table 1 presents the gender and group distribution of the sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Distribution of gender and group membership</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
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**Scale Construction**

Experienced discrimination ($\alpha = 0.782$): for this scale several types of personal experiences of discrimination were measured directly. The items cover a wide range of social interactions in which discrimination can occur. These were added together to form an unweighted scale. All items (including the ones for the following scales) are listed in the appendix.

A certain degree of unreliability in the data stems from the point that this instrument can measure only perceived discrimination. The objective fact of discrimination, according to the definition given at the beginning of the essay, cannot be measured. The theoretical perspective of an ethnic framing that supplies individuals with the cognitive option of interpreting an act as discrimination supports the assumption that there will be a relationship between the sensitivity of the individual and the frequency of incidents of discrimination they will report. Some respondents will be less critical than others and might not report rather subtle incidents. They might report fewer experiences than they actually experienced according to the definition. The data is polarized by this measurement problem: rather “tolerant” persons report fewer incidents than they have “objectively” been “victims” of, while skeptical persons report more incidents, maybe including some false-positives. Therefore the scale has to be interpreted carefully. In particular, descriptive values should not lead to false conclusions. Anyway, this problem does not affect the explanatory power that the scale might have (very forthright on the issue: Lange 1997, p. 21; more critical: Salentin and Wilkening 2003, p. 95). As the subjectivity of the interpretations is included in the theory

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7 Unweighted addition can be considered to be a theoretical problem, as equal severity of the incidents has to be presupposed. For a rational weighting procedure, however, there was no adequate criterion.
of ethnic framing (in the form I have developed), polarization represents no problem for testing the hypotheses: all incidents that are interpreted as discrimination affect attitudes toward the majority society. All other incidents have no such influence.

For the measurement, respondents were first asked if a particular type of situation had already been experienced, not yet considering motives. If the answer was positive, the interviewee was also asked whether they thought that the incident had occurred because of their immigration background. Time ranges such as “in the last 12 months” were not used, in order to produce more variance in the data. One disadvantage of this method is that a possible reduction of the effect of an incident on attitudes with growing distance in time cannot be controlled.

In all three groups there are individuals who have not experienced any of the discriminatory incidents that we asked about. Figures larger than 1 cannot be interpreted as the number of incidents, since several incidents of the same type have always been counted as two incidents. If all types of discrimination had been experienced at least twice, the maximum value of the scale would have been reached (30). Luckily there was no such case, although the maximum values for persons of Greek and Turkish descent are only slightly lower (27 and 26 respectively). It is striking that the mean value of the Turkish subgroup is twice as large as those of the other groups.

Generalization of xenophobia (α = 0.711) measures how strongly “the Germans” are suspected to be xenophobic. The questionnaire asked respondents about their willingness to generalize xenophobia and ignorance among the German majority. A strong tendency to do this can be interpreted as an indication for the adoption of an ethnic framing.

Economic discrimination (α = 0.829) contains questions that asked about systematic hindrance of social advancement. Here the term “economic” should be understood in a wider sense, because it intentionally includes immigrants’ perceived chances of advancement within the social structure. In this case the term “discrimination” deviates from the definition that was given at the outset, since it measures general attitudes rather than specific experiences. Furthermore, the scale includes social phenomena that could be called “institutional discrimination.”

Trust in the system (α = 0.843) is comprised of factors that a “vital” democracy should make available. Besides general trust in the system, the questionnaire also asked about perceptions of the commitment of the police and the institutions of the political system to fight against xenophobia. While this may not be an important aspect of trust in the system for the majority, for immigrants it can be considered to be a major part of their trust in the system (Weidacher 2000a; Wilamowitz-Moellendorff 2001 and 2002).

Xenophobia in public institutions (α = 0.704) can be understood as a kind of reversal of the trust in the system scale. It contains questions in which the respondents assessed the extent of xenophobia in three public institutions.

Identification with Germany (α = 0.719) allows to examine what impact experienced discrimination and the above attitudes had on self-identification with Germany; this scale measures “identificational assimilation” (Esser 1980).

Testing the Hypotheses

Multivariate analysis was used to investigate the influence of selected variables on the attitudes towards the majority

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8 The response scale in the questionnaire offered only a rough division into “yes, in one case,” “yes, in all cases,” and “yes, in several cases.” The two latter answers were treated as identical information.

Apart from the information that more than one incident had occurred, the two responses contain no information that could be implemented in the scale. Overall, the scale is therefore a cautious estimate that will be too small rather than too large. It is possible that the data polarization mentioned above was diminished by this fact.
society, all of which were described in the previous section. In the following regressions the dependent variables are the attitudes. “Perceived discrimination” is one of the independent variables and also the one of greatest interest. In the last regression with the target variable “identification with Germany,” the attitudes of the preceding regressions are also included as independent variables, as I assume that the effect of discrimination on identification with Germany is predominantly mediated through the attitudes towards the majority society. Other variables included in the regressions are gender, ethnic origin, citizenship, age, education, and weighted household income per person. For reasons of space, tables 3 and 4 both show two regressions each. Table 3 presents the results of multivariate regressions for the target variables “economic discrimination” and “generalization of xenophobia.”

The discrimination scale is the best predictor for both attitudes. The beta coefficients are around 0.5 in both cases and highly significant. Respondents who reported more discriminatory incidents are more negative in their attitudes towards the majority society. They feel economically exploited and feel that Germans are generally xenophobic. The coefficients are also equal in size for the gender variable. For women the average scale values are almost 0.1 higher than for men (B-value). When we take into account that the range of the attitude scales is from 0 to 1 this is a very strong effect. Interesting are also the variables that relate to ethnic origin. The Turkish interviewees feel more strongly discriminated against economically than do the Aussiedler or the Greeks; the latter have the lowest average values. The Turks and the Aussiedler have coefficients of comparable size for generalization of xenophobia, while Greek respondents seem to see German society as not being very xenophobic. This is a strong and highly significant negative correlation. The other variables are small and insignificant, and are therefore not discussed in any further detail. Spontaneously, one might expect that people with more education or higher income would not see German society as largely xenophobic. The data clearly shows that this is not the case.

| Table 3: Regressions for “economic discrimination” and “generalization of xenophobia” |
|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Economic discrimination                  | Generalization of xenophobia              |
| B   | Beta  | B   | Beta  |
|------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|
| Constant                                | 0.29                                      | 0.32                                      |
| Perceived discrimination                | 0.02 (0.51****)                           | 0.02 (0.47****)                           |
| Female                                  | 0.09 (0.23****)                           | 0.08 (0.23****)                           |
| Turkish origin                          | 0.06 (0.15*)                             | -0.03 (−0.09)                            |
| Greek origin                            | -0.05 (−0.11)                            | -0.17 (−0.44****)                        |
| German citizenship                      | 0.00 (−0.01)                             | 0.01 (0.02)                              |
| Age                                      | 0.00 (−0.03)                             | 0.00 (0.03)                              |
| Post-16 education                       | 0.00 (0.01)                              | 0.00 (−0.01)                             |
| Income                                  | 0.00 (0.01)                              | 0.00 (0.03)                              |

Comparative group: male Aussiedler without post-16 education

In the same way, Table 4 presents the results for “trust in the system” and “xenophobia in public institutions.” For both equations the total explained variance is lower than in the equations of table 3. This manifests itself in a lower number of significant factors. Perceived discrimination strongly lowers trust in the system, about to the same extent that it increases the perception of xenophobia in public institutions. Female respondents had less trust in the system than male respondents. Just like in Table 3, neither the German citizenship nor post-16 education have a significant effect. In this case, the ethnic group is not of importance either.

9 These variables are “dummy” variables: they can only be 1 or 0. The variable “education” was dichotomized after the data collection. The value 0 applies to respondents who hold a degree that is usually acquired after ten years of school by the age of 16 (including „mittlere Reife“). The value 1 identifies individuals who hold at least „Abitur“ or „Fachabitur“, degrees that are obtained after 12 or 13 years of school and that are required for applying for university admission.

10 The weighted household income per person is calculated from the number of people in the household and the total income. Combining the two figures allows different sources of income to be combined and also takes into account the lower per-person costs in larger households. The equation is: total income per household divided by the square root of the number of persons in the household. The total income was measured on an ordinal scale only. The variable “income” has to seen as just a rough estimation.
In conclusion, it can be said that all four regressions yield relatively homogeneous results. In all cases perceived discrimination was a significant variable with the strongest influence in the equation, so it explains the attitudes of the respondents very well. Another constant result is that women are more critical in their attitudes towards the majority society.

The factor indicates that the younger the immigrants, the less they identify with Germany in general. This could be an age effect where immigrants’ identification assimilation (with Germany) generally gets stronger as they become older. If this age effect does not apply here, then the coefficient implies that identification with Germany is generally weaker in the younger generation. Both explanations are plausible; this data cannot identify which one is correct. Another point to be considered in this equation is the rather low $R^2$. A large part of the variance could not be explained. Therefore identification with Germany is also subject to other strong influences.

Now let us turn to “identification with Germany” in Table 5. The left-hand column uses an equation that includes only those variables that were also used in the above regressions. Here, three significant factors can be found: perceived discrimination, Greek ethnic origin, and age. The more discriminatory incidents the immigrants have perceived, the less they identify themselves as Germans. Of course, the causality can be turned around, too. Persons of Greek origin identify less with Germany. As Greece is a member of the European Union, Greeks in Germany have similar rights like German citizens, although they are not allowed to vote or to be elected, besides in local elections. For this reason, they do not have to make the attempt to assimilate. It could be speculated that this is the cause of the low level of identification with Germany. The age variable is more difficult to interpret. It must be recalled that the dataset only includes people who were aged between 18 and 35 at the time of the interviews.

The second equation in Table 5 additionally includes the attitude variables. Here the “perceived discrimination” variable loses virtually all of its explanatory power and becomes insignificant. Primarily, this seems to be the result of the strong effect of the “economic discrimination” variable. The close relationship between discriminatory incidents and
the feeling of economic discrimination has already been demonstrated in Table 3. Now there are two possible ways to interpret the results in combination, depending on which causality is assumed to be operating. These causalities are: discrimination leads to increased perception of economic discrimination which in turn negatively affects identification with Germany (the effect of discrimination is mediated through economic discrimination); or people define situations as discriminatory because they already have the feeling that they are economically disadvantaged. That cannot be judged here, but it is reasonable to assume that both are correct to some degree. Of course it would be very interesting to know the “explanatory shares” of each causality.

There are no significant coefficients among the other attitude variables. “Generalization of xenophobia” might turn out to be a significant factor if the sample size were larger. The importance of this attitude was stressed by Lange (1997). Lange’s conclusion that discrimination indirectly affects identification with the “host country” is confirmed, although most influence in my model seems to be transmitted through the “economic discrimination” attitude which Lange did not measure in his survey. The effects of the remaining variables are unchanged in comparison to the first regression in Table 5 and do not need further discussion.

**Descriptive Results for “Generalization of Xenophobia”**

If ethnic framing (as described above) provides individuals with the cognitive option of defining acts as discriminatory in many or all of their interactions with “ethnic” Germans, the scale for “generalization of xenophobia” can be considered as a measurement of the intensity of the framing. Only when xenophobia is ascribed to a large proportion of Germans can this interpretation option be present enough in the mind to lead to an increased number of incidents of perceived discrimination.

The means of the Aussiedler and the interviewees of Turkish origin are comparable in size while the Greeks obviously ascribe much less xenophobia to the Germans. The results show that Aussiedler and Turks generally chose the categories in the middle of the response scales (see the appendix for the scales). Since even these categories indicate rather negative attitudes, both groups can be said to ascribe xenophobia to a large part of the German society. Therefore many members of these groups should be very critical and sensitive in interactions with Germans.

Alarmingly, this measurement shows that each group contains respondents who believe that almost the whole of German society is xenophobic. This suggests intensive ethnic framing among these persons. When individuals have such an image of Germans they will strongly tend to interpret contingent situations of conflict as discrimination. Another result that has already been presented underpins this thesis: the people of Turkish origin who have the highest mean for “generalization of xenophobia” also reported the greatest frequency of experiences of discrimination.

**Discussion and Summary of the Results**

The preceding sections outlined the relationships between the scale measuring discrimination and several attitudes, also including some social demographic variables. In all equations – except (as predicted) the last one for identification with Germany – there was a strong relationship between discrimination and attitudes towards the majority society. Can it be said that such experiences lead to a shift in attitudes that could indicate an ethnic framing?

The hypothesis includes a directed causality that cannot be tested with this data, although the relationships that were found suggest that it does exist. Instead of assuming that discrimination erodes attitudes towards the majority society, one could insist that the causality operates in
the opposite direction. This may seem less plausible, but most probably there will be such an effect. To evaluate the strength of the two directions longitudinal data would be required. Of course discrimination is not a “social fact” but depends on the interpretations and definitions of the interacting individuals, even more so when the contingency of these interactions is rather high. It certainly makes sense to investigate the individual traits and factors that favor interpretations of contingent situations as discrimination. The discourse in the ethnic and social networks will be of salient importance, and on the other side the discourse of the German public sphere. But the hypothesis that the experience of discrimination leads to a more critical stance, encompassing rather negative attitudes and (interconnected with the latter) a higher individual likelihood of perceiving discrimination in the future, is theoretically plausible. It is strongly – although not conclusively – supported by the results of this study.

Although it is necessary to critically examine the respondents’ interpretations, the results of the survey show that many immigrants have experienced very overt discriminatory behavior that is virtually independent of personal sensitivities. The reports included unambiguous racist insults and physical attacks. The overall level of perceived discrimination could never be explained by considering only the social and psychological traits of the affected individuals and of their social ecology.

Even if the veracity of the respondents’ reports was questioned, the high level of perceived discrimination would still remain. It undoubtedly has social consequences, for instance weaker identification with Germany. In this sense, this study confirms the findings of Lange (1997) that the effect of discrimination on the identification is mediated through attitudes toward the majority society. The perception of economic discrimination is very important, here, while other attitudes played no significant role. This result requires further explanation and research.

The strong relationship between perceived discrimination and negative attitudes speaks for the phenomenon of an ethnic framing. The experience of discrimination leads individuals to be more skeptical and cautious when dealing with the German majority society. From this we can conclude that a generalizing and critical set of interpretations is constructed after a discriminatory incident. The expectation of xenophobia among the Germans could become established as a stable social institution, one that cannot be easily falsified or deconstructed once it is adopted. It probably has already been established as such among some immigrant groups. This is indicated by the high means on the “generalization of xenophobia” scale. The interpretations can have a stress-neutralizing effect for the individual, as discrimination no longer has to be experienced as a very disturbing personal incident. Instead, it validates the expectations as an everyday theory.

Group discourses will play an important role in the construction of such a framing, but it is unlikely that it will be adopted by an individual who has never experienced relatively overt discrimination. Although the ethnic framing can have a cost-saving function, it also produces its own costs. For example it becomes harder to establish the inter-ethnic ties that are inevitable for the overwhelming majority of immigrants living in Germany. From the means of “generalization of discrimination” and the discrimination scale, we can conclude that ethnic framing is generally unlikely to be found among Greek immigrants, and most likely to be present among Turkish immigrants where attitudes towards the majority society are more negative and a very high level of discrimination is perceived.
References


Appendix

Scale: perceived discrimination

“You were not allowed to enter a discotheque.”

“A club that you wanted to join refused to admit you.”

“You were turned away by an employer when searching for a job.”

“A colleague received better pay for worse performance.”

“You were not considered for promotion when others were.”

“You unfairly received a bad grade from a teacher.”

“You were treated badly by an instructor.”

“A landlord chose a different applicant.”

“When using public transportation your ticket was checked more thoroughly than normal.”

“You were asked by the police to show your identity card without apparent reason.”

“An insurance company refused to insure you.”

“You were insulted.”

“When entering a room you were scrutinized.”

“Have you ever been physically attacked in Germany?”

Response scales for the following questions

scale 1: almost nobody / less than half / about half / more than half / almost all

scale 2: not at all / partly / rather strongly / strongly / very strongly

scale 3: totally agree / partly agree / partly disagree / strongly disagree

Scale: generalization of xenophobia

What do you think, how many Germans …

“explicitly or tacitly accept extreme right-wing groups?”

“are xenophobic?”

“accept Aussiedler?”

“regard Aussiedler to be Germans?”

“are respectful of Aussiedler?” (all scale 1)

“Germans are interested in the culture of Aussiedler.”

“The Germans see Aussiedler as an enrichment of their culture.”

“Germans do not want to have contact with Aussiedler.” (all scale 3)

Scale: economic discrimination

“What do you think, how much is there a justified distribution of wealth for Aussiedler in Germany?” (scale 2)

“Germans only want Aussiedler to do the work that the Germans do not want to do.”

“Aussiedler are only tolerated in Germany because their contribution to the workforce is required.”

“A German employer employs Aussiedler only for badly paid jobs.”

“In German schools children of Aussiedler receive worse grades for equal performance.”

“Germans do not want Aussiedler to climb up the social ladder.”

“Aussiedler in Germany have worse chances than Germans to climb the social ladder.”

“Where really important issues are concerned, Aussiedler in Germany will always be excluded from decision-making.” (all scale 3)

For reasons of simplicity only the Aussiedler are mentioned in the question here. The term can be replaced by “Greeks” or “Turkey.”

Jan Döring: Influences of Discriminatory Incidents on Immigrants’ Attitudes Toward German Society]
"Do Germans have better career opportunities than Aussiedler who are German citizens?" (yes/no scale)

Scale: trust in the system
"How strongly do the following institutions in Germany fight against xenophobic attitudes?" police; political institutions (both scale 2)
"How much trust do you have in the following institutions? Police; political institutions; courts." (all scale 2)
"What do you think, how strongly are the following things provided for Aussiedler in Germany? Political participation; protection against crime; individual life choices." (all scale 2)

Scale: xenophobia in public institutions
"How strongly are xenophobic attitudes present in the following institutions? Police; political institutions; courts." (all scale 2)

Scale: identification with Germany
"I feel good in Germany." "I want to stay in Germany." "I have something in common with most Germans." "Germans have typical traits that I have, too." (all scale 3)
"How strongly do you feel... that you are German?" "connected to Germany?" (both scale 2)
Determinants of Experience of Discrimination in Minorities in Germany

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3 Editorial

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This study examines perceived ethnic discrimination (as opposed to “objective” discrimination). It includes a discussion of definitions of discrimination and attempts to measure it, and a review of findings on the distribution of discrimination experiences among minorities. The aim of the study is to determine the influence of factors that increase the risk of exposure to situations in which discrimination can take place (exposure hypothesis), and those that sensitize perceptions and give rise to different frequencies of subjective feelings of discrimination (sensitization hypothesis). A standardized questionnaire was administered to a random sample of German-born persons of Turkish and Greek origin and Aussiedler (ethnic Germans born in the former Soviet Union) (total N = 301). Minorities of non-German, especially of Turkish origin reported significantly more discrimination than Aussiedler in a set of nineteen everyday situations. A bivariate correlation was found between number of incidents reported and employment status with homemakers reporting the fewest incidents. However, multiple regression analysis yielded no significant effect, thus lending no clear support to the exposure hypothesis. Frequency of contacts with German friends has no effect and seems not to entail an increase in exposure opportunities, but may lead to a desensitization to discrimination due to the erosion of the relevance of ethnic categories. On the other hand, an influence through intra-ethnic contacts clearly occurs, as frequency of contact with co-ethnic friends exerts a strong positive effect on experienced discrimination. A similar effect was found for ethnic self-awareness. The latter finding confirms the sensitization hypothesis.

1. What is Discrimination?

This article sets out to show that when young people with migrant backgrounds experience discrimination this is not by chance but is embedded in certain social backgrounds and displays categorizable features. The aim is to show the influences that come into play in the experience of discrimination. Before examining this question, however, one must first critically analyze the subject itself. Although social actors, including some scientists, are quite happy to use the term discrimination without a second thought, closer observation shows that it is hard to arrive at a precise idea of what discrimination actually represents. This article focuses especially on the situation of minorities in Germany. Germany is a special case because, despite a long history of immigration, it has developed only a weak legal and institutional structure for monitoring and penalizing discrimination compared with other European and non-European countries.

It seems easy to define discrimination as unequal treatment on the basis of criteria for which no objective justification exists, especially unequal treatment to the detriment of an individual or a group. Traditional definitions of the concept, such as that of Antonskovy (1960: 81), who speaks of “effective injurious treatment of persons on grounds rationally irrelevant to the situation,” are worded along these lines. The weaknesses in this type of conceptualization are not hard to identify. First, for instance in caste-type stratified structures, discrimination may indeed be “objectively” justified by a certain class of actors, in fact it may even be “rational” if it serves to defend privileged access opportunities to status hierarchies. Paradoxically, Antonskovy himself cites some pertinent examples. Generally, however, he seems to assume the validity of a socially shared material rationality in the Weberian sense (Weber 1964: II, § 9) which requires collectively uniform goals and overlooks the omnipresent conflict in modern societies over asserting the legitimacy of formal (egoistical, individual) claims to ratio-
nality that sometimes run counter to material ones. Social psychologists (for example Bourhis 1994: 172 following on from Tajfel and Turner 1986) explain discrimination in an analogous manner as the striving of social groups for positive social identity. Specific rationality, if one wants to use this term here, exists in that prejudice toward the outgroup (at least cognitively) and discrimination (sometimes in real terms) are very effective at generating favorable status differences between the ingroup and the outgroup, thereby helping to strengthen the individual’s social identity. Moreover, sooner or later the discussion must disengage from actors’ situative actions and take on structural dimensions. For if genetic causes are not to be held ultimately responsible for social inequalities that remain stable over time, the structures must contain embedded mechanisms that regulate the allocation of status positions even without intentional acts (for an overview of this discussion see Pettigrew and Taylor 2000). What this position ultimately boils down to is that all social inequality is the result of past discrimination, or discrimination occurring in parallel function systems. Consequently, society should not stop at superficial antidiscrimination interventions, but should adopt targeted affirmative action measures to redress the situation.

1.1 Contingency of the Phenomenon

Yet apart from the enormous political conflict potential of calling for something like this, which would entail considerable costs (not only financially), the underlying positions on which such calls are based often suggest a clarity about the existence of inequality that does not actually exist in practice, as Pettigrew and Taylor (2000) demonstrate by means of examples. Since supposedly disadvantaged groups are multi-dimensionally different from others, it is often unclear whether differences exist ceteris paribus and therefore represent disadvantages. The decomposition approach, which involves the use of statistical methods to differentiate the proportion of legitimate and illegitimate inequality numerically, is also ultimately based on value choices on the part of the researcher. Finally, though legislative provisions often have considerable normative influence, they only reflect social trends and power relations without contributing anything intrinsic to the concept of discrimination. Thus, locally specific ordinances are enacted as regards women, gays and disabled people, but not left-handed people or vegetarians. Moreover, without public pressure no ordinances at all are passed. Germany has managed to delay implementation of European Union antidiscrimination law for years, even though no-one seriously maintains that no discrimination takes place here. These comments are intended to show that when it comes to the question of what discrimination is we are always skating on thin ice because the definition must take many factors into account. Yet the very contingency of the phenomenon suggests that social scientists ought to investigate the conditions that give rise to the perception of discrimination.

1.2 Illegitimacy at the Heart

This is not the place to develop a comprehensive theory of this subject, because at the social level that would necessitate taking into account inter alia historic changes, pressure groups, democracy potentials, the efficiency of the welfare state and, at the interaction level, the actors’ intentionality and other elements. Rather, I plan to develop some ideas on discrimination against migrants and ethnic minorities and on its cognitive presence in the victims that can be taken to exemplify discrimination experiences in general. My deliberations pick up on the above definition but emphasize the central role of the idea of legitimacy and I do not attempt to arrive at my own substantial and complete definition of discrimination itself. I regard it as indisputable that in modern societies ascriptive disadvantages such as those based on origin are commonly regarded as illegitimate because the merit principle is meant to be the only factor determining social position. Again, the linking of a perception of discrimination to ascriptively characterized phenomena is certainly contingent on social history, because the grounds for this kind of unequal treatment are not regarded as illegitimate in every society. Thus, in feudal societies it was generally accepted that access to positions of leadership was made difficult for, or denied to, persons of lowly origin, regardless of their ability or merit. Only in the modern age did bourgeois classes question the nobility’s ascriptive privileges. In caste societies, mobility beyond inherited boundaries is still hardly possible, yet this circumstance does not give rise to extensive tensions within society because it is not perceived as discrimination. Thus it seems to me to be justified to conclude that illegitimacy is the key factor that gives rise to the experience of discrimination. Some types of breach of the principle of equal treatment are
almost indisputably illegitimate and objectionable and are consequently monitored. For example, most western states have established institutions to monitor and enforce rules on gender equality. However, the fundamental feature of legitimacy is that it is subject to change and negotiation – as clearly demonstrated by the historic development of the question of women's equality, for example. Age discrimination, for example in recruitment practice, is still widely tolerated, and although placing disabled people at a disadvantage is frowned upon in many areas of life, in Germany it was not open to legal challenge until recently.¹

1.3 The Position of Members of Minorities in Germany

The treatment of minorities in Germany is an interesting case. I would like to discuss it briefly because no consistent set of opinions has yet emerged from discrimination discourse in Germany, which is in any case behind the times, and the ambivalent attitude of society and politicians inevitably has repercussions on the sensitivity of minorities to inequality and their appreciation of the right to equal treatment. The situation in this country is particularly complex in that a contradictory system combiningelements of legally backed disadvantage and codified precepts of equality (the latter for instance in many pieces of special legislation such as the German Works Council Constitution Act; for an overview of these regulations, see Mahlmann 2002) coexists with a situation of informal ideals of equal treatment that conflict with widespread practice of unequal treatment. A major basis for the way society deals with these groups is the legal categorization into Germans versus foreigners, which largely removes the witholding of political rights from social negotiation and as a result largely predetermines a categorization into ingroup and outgroup that would in principle be avoidable. This situation is exacerbated by Germany’s comparatively very restrictive naturalization practice. That cognitive categorization almost inevitably leads to discriminatory behavior has been known since Sherif, White, and Harvey’s study on minimal groups (1955) and Tajfel’s work on the link between social identity and outgroup attitudes (Tajfel 1974, 1982; Tajfel and Turner 1986, Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, Flament 1971). If the law defines groups of individuals as not belonging to the nation, social outgroup attributions based on physiognomical features or other ascriptive characteristics are more likely to become established. Ironically, Germany deems its historical “national minorities” (Danes, Frisians, Sinti and Roma, and Sorbs) as worthy of special protection under the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and the constitutions of some federal states (Länder) make special provision for these minorities, yet the state “has left numerically much larger ethnic groups without any specific protection, in particular, members of those ethnic groups who have long-term residence status or who have become German citizens” (CERD 1997: 2). We must assume that in Germany both the majority society and the non-protected minorities have to a considerable extent internalized the idea that Germans and foreigners do not have equal value. This surely has enormous bearing on the perception of inequality as discrimination.

The intention here is to discuss discrimination in everyday interactions between individuals; interactions that do not necessarily attain justiciable dimensions but fall into the category of daily hassles (Lazarus and Folkman 1987) and are in the nature of ethnic harassment (Schneider, Hitlan, and Radhakrishnan 2000). There is a further problem with conceptualizing or recording them. If contentious supraordinate legitimacy aspects make it difficult to judge the admissability of a type of unequal treatment in principle, in individual cases this makes it difficult or impossible for individual actors and observers to attain knowledge of the situative circumstances. For it is by no means a rare exception for the recipient of unequal treatment (the individual at risk of discrimination) to possess both ascriptive and merit-related treatment characteristics that may determine the action of the potential discriminator. For example, if a job applicant of Turkish origin is rejected in favor of an autochthonous German, it is not easy to tell whether his/her origin or professional capability was the deciding factor, because, despite certificates, the evaluation of job-related competence is largely at the employer’s

¹ Comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz) was passed by the Bundestag in August 2006.
This extensive relativism is not intended to deny the warning against making the naive assumption that unilateral interviews, the standard medium of survey research, could be used to come to grips with a phenomenon that is subject to such diverse social fictions. On the other hand, the elaborate process customarily practised by the courts, audiatur et altera pars, must be reserved for case studies. A survey will have to take its lead from the political realities: An action is not discriminatory per se but only becomes so through social discourse. Thus Lange (1997: 21) does not go far enough in citing “incorrect perceptions” as a source of error when surveying discrimination. Though incomplete information may impair a respondent’s ability to judge and in this sense – only – produce an incorrect perception, the main problem is that sensitivity to discrimination and thus the threshold of perception are closely linked with ideas of legitimacy. Talk of incorrect perception may be dangerously open to misunderstanding, something that is surely alien to Lange, because it could also refer to a person’s basic way of thinking, which is something that social scientists are not entitled to judge. This realization injects epistemological confusion into empirical research when it comes to assessing the accuracy of survey findings on discrimination. The question of accuracy is misplaced if for no other reason than because it is per se impossible to validly measure an unclearly defined object.

The complex of reasons for examining discrimination also provides a good argument for making subjective assessment the central focus of interest. The interest of both politicians and social scientists in curbing discrimination has always fed on the fear that it may cause a withdrawal into the ethnic (reaction formation, Antonovsky 1960: 87) and create obstacles to the integration of minorities. The German council of experts on immigration and integration (Sachverständigenrat für Zuwanderung und Integration 2004:385) has stressed that disadvantage based on ethnic origin can render integration in central areas of life considerably more difficult, or even prevent it entirely. Moreover, as Heitmeyer, Müller, and Schröder (1997: 162), for instance, surmise, “[experience of discrimination in the public sphere] produces a tendency to withdraw” into one’s own ethnic group. Dutch anti-discrimination legislation expresses the fear that disadvantage will result in members of minorities becoming aggressive and isolated and that, as fertile ground for extremist and fundamentalist groups, they will become a threat to society at large (Goldschmidt 2004:66). Yet necessary as clear orientation points might be politically, general standards of justice are immaterial unless violations of them are registered by relevant groups of people. Conversely, certain discrimination experiences are marked by a feeling that there has been a
deliberate failure to codify minority rights (such as equal legal status for non-Christian religious communities). Admittedly, in the medium term political compromises such as the differentiated definition of discrimination in European Union Directive 2000/43 on equal treatment (Council of the European Union 2000) will impact on ideas of legitimacy, but in the final analysis only discrimination that is understood as such can have a social impact. Without consensus regarding the perception of legitimacy, any attempt to lay down what discrimination is in a factual definition at best runs the risk of being “ahead of time,” and in the worst case of being discredited as exaggerated and illegitimate (merely exploiting a minority position for tactical reasons). Besides, compromise clauses such as that in the EU directive permitting unequal treatment for what are said to be objective reasons does not exactly help to clarify the issue because whether a credible case can be made for the need to exclude categories of people from insurance, turn down job applicants, or otherwise discriminate on the basis of ascriptive criteria is ultimately only a matter of the extent to which “legitimate interests” can be asserted. While this may reinforce the tendency to legitimize unequal treatment, an opposite viewpoint claims that the mere failure to promote groups of individuals with unfavorable status distributions compared with society as a whole constitutes discrimination (Sachverständigenrat für Zuwanderung und Integration 2004: 388).

This article will not deal with concepts such as indirect discrimination (see, for example, the aforementioned EU directive) or institutional discrimination (Gomolla and Radtke 2002). Given the statistical evidence from the field of education, the labor market, etc., arguments that certain groups, though formally accorded equal treatment, are disadvantaged due to unequal starting conditions, cannot be dismissed out of hand. Yet the extent to which ethnically unequal distributions are perceived and, if so, whether they are felt to be unjust, is usually unclear. When this happens because of a public debate on social inequality this process certainly contributes toward a generalized conviction that discrimination is occurring.

1.5 Object of the Study: Subjective Experience of Discrimination

The above considerations have led to the conclusion that it is not meaningful to try to survey discrimination as such, at least outside controlled laboratory conditions. Rather, the object of this study will be personal experience of discrimination resulting from an uncertain perception of events and based on subjective ideas of legitimacy. From a sociological point of view, this question is no less exciting because it is then a matter of which social factors impact on this experience. The experience of discrimination is a prime example of the effect known as the Thomas theorem (Thomas 1923, Thomas and Thomas 1928), according to which peoples’ actions are guided by what they perceive as real. This – and not objective circumstances – is what they react to; the social environment shapes patterns of perception (in Thomas’ terminology, the definition of situations).

As an aside, one can also add that at the level of social discourse analogous unclarities exist as to whether discrimination represents a social problem. In this respect, discrimination is a completely typical example of a social problem (Albrecht 1999 : 769 f.), because social problems always pass through an interwoven process of constitution, only at the end of which are they seen as such. During the course of this process they are turned into objects of scandal and discredited (even by researchers) because, even more than in other social areas, individual group interests are promoted or questioned. Social scientists argue over the power of definition with those affected and with powerful social actors who realize that recognizing a phenomenon as a social problem inevitably entails establishing resource-intensive bodies for dealing with and monitoring that problem.

Returning to our research, logically this should begin with exploratory studies to establish what incidents are felt to be discriminatory. We chose a pragmatic way of doing this and drew up a shortlist based on everyday experience and incidents discussed in the literature. We then measured how persons with a migration background assessed these. Discrimination against migrants can assume different forms, all of which, according to Antonovsky’s definition, involve unequal treatment to a person’s disadvantage on the basis of that person’s origin. This may involve holders of official posts or actors in economic life withholding resources or access to positions of status. In addition, we had to take into account the complete range of incidents in private intercourse from subtle to blatant, from minor slights
to grievous physical injury. Here the strategy chosen is to ask about exemplary experiences with a finite number of typical incidents (more on this in Section 3). As originators, we consider only the “established” population, that is, those who claim membership of the ingroup of Germans and potentially derive privileges from it. Discrimination between members of different minorities is not dealt with, nor is discrimination against members of the majority by members of a minority.

1.6 Putative Determinants

We assume two classes of determinants of the extent of experienced discrimination. The first is factors that increase the risk of exposure, that is the probability of becoming involved in situations in which discrimination can take place. Second, we assume that certain social and personality-structure influences shape patterns of perception and give rise to different frequencies of subjective feeling of discrimination.

The risk of exposure increases in line with the extent first to which contacts with potential discriminators take place and second to which the individual plays the role of an outgroup member in interactions. In this, interethnic contact patterns, especially the circles in which people move, work and engage in leisure activities, and the scope and make-up of personal networks come into play, as does the physical and/or physiognomical visibility of the migration background. I discuss indications as to the impacts of this last factor in Section 2.

The question of which factors influence perception is comparatively less trivial. First, one can probably expect a change in comparisons drawn and rights claimed to take place between the first and second generation of migrants because those who grow up in the host country as descendants of the actual migrants are more likely to lay claim to equal treatment with those who regard themselves as established as a matter of course than do people who were born abroad, especially those who were recruited for a temporary job, who do not yet acknowledge that they have become immigrants, and who adopt a fundamentally “deferential” attitude that concedes sweeping privileges to the autochthonous population (Esser 1980). Ethnicity in general, that is the awareness of belonging to a group by descent (Weber 1964:307), ought to be associated with an increased propensity to categorize the social world from the point of view of origin. This attitude provides interpretation models for ambiguous situations and steers the attribution of causes to ethnic origin if no clear indications of other reasons exist. Similarly, an effect of the generalized conviction that there is discrimination can be expected. Anyone who believes that his group of origin is generally disadvantaged will in an individual instance be more likely to see himself as a mere personification of a social breed that is discriminated against. Similar considerations are raised by Sellers et al. (2003:304) and Sellers and Shelton (2003:1079), who see discrimination as a stressor and explain the link between ethnicity and increased incidence of stress by greater sensitivity of perception. However, the causal connection is unclear. Certainly, an attitude-forming generalization takes place on the basis of experience. Dion (2002:4), on the other hand, argues that effects take place not at the individual, but at the group level. He states that an external threat to the ingroup regularly leads to increased identification with this group. Thus if discrimination is seen as a form of threat to a social category, ethnicity, which after all constitutes emphatic identification with the respective ingroup, can also be interpreted as a consequence of generalized perception of discrimination. These two causal models are not mutually exclusive.

Finally, in line with the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954, Amir 1969), regular interethnic interactions should not only lead to a reduction in general prejudices toward members of outgroups, but also to a reduced willingness to impute discriminatory intentions in ambivalent confrontations. Thus the role of intergroup contacts is obviously ambivalent, since on the one hand it ought to reduce discrimination experiences by making outgroup attitudes more reconcilable, while on the other increasing such experiences due to increased risk of exposure.

2. State of Research

What is known about the spread of discrimination experiences among migrants and members of minorities? Representative surveys conducted by the German Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs of recruited migrants and their families, and surveys of migrants of Turkish origin conducted by the Center for Turkish Studies in Essen,
reveal, first and foremost, considerable sociodemographic variation. The nationwide survey conducted by the Ministry of Labor in 1995 (Mehrländer, Ascheberg, and Ueltzhöffer 1996:320ff) found that Turks were twice as likely to be subjectively affected by insults, abuse, threats, and physical attacks than Italians and Greeks. Former Yugoslavs (not differentiated by post-break-up citizenship) were also more frequently affected than Italians and Greeks, but less frequently than Turks. In all groups, men were more likely to report such incidents than women, and younger people (under 24s) were more likely to do so than older people. Young male Turks are identified as the preferred targets of xenophobic acts. Overall, one in four Turks and one in eight Greeks and Italians had suffered insults, while in each group the proportion reporting having experienced the more severe varieties of incidents in the twelve months preceding the survey was markedly less than 10 percent. The difference between the groups narrows when it comes to everyday experiences of discrimination, for example being refused admission to bars or discotheques or being disadvantaged on the labor and housing markets, though Turks and Yugoslavs usually report more frequent adverse experiences.

A further survey of a comparative random sample asking the same questions in summer 2001 (Venema and Grimm 2002:72ff) found that the number of discrimination experiences reported had hardly changed, nor had the relative distribution by ethnic origin, gender, and age range. However, while the incidence of individual everyday types of incident such as refusal of entry increased, in the case of Turks and Yugoslavs the frequency of insults and abuse decreased, in some cases notably. This suggests that the difference in visibility of the migration background explains the different experiences of discrimination in different groups of origin. Canadian surveys support this assumption. There, members of “visible” minorities, especially Black and South Asian, perceive discrimination twice as frequently (Dion 2002:5; Jedwab 2004, 2005). US data (Kessler, Mickelson, and Williams 1999:213), while based on a different methodology, confirms this trend impressively, particularly in the case of black people.

In a German study of 15- to 21-year-olds of Turkish origin in North Rhine-Westphalian cities, Heitmeyer, Müller, and Schröder (1997) asked about unequal treatment of Germans and foreigners in different areas of daily life and used factor analysis to categorize their findings into public and private spheres. Discrimination occurs more frequently in the public than in the private sphere. The proportion affected by incidents in public offices, housing, at work or school, in contacts with the police, with German youth groups, in discos, and in their neighborhood ranged between 30 and 40 percent, while the figures for sports clubs and youth clubs were below 20 percent. Young males were more likely than females to experience unequal treatment from public authorities and the police, though not at school or at work. The authors attribute this to marked gender-specific role patterns and to the greater assertiveness of this sub-group.

The Center for Turkish Studies in Essen conducts an annual multi-topic survey of people of Turkish origin in North Rhine-Westphalia. This includes a question without temporal reference about personal experience of unequal treatment of Germans and foreigners in various areas of life (Goldberg and Sauer 2004). The wording of the question is somewhat unfortunate for the present purpose of comparison, because it does not distinguish clearly between experiencing for oneself and observing in one’s personal environment on the one hand, nor between the interviewee’s own ethnic group and “foreigners” in general on the other. The general trend, however, can still be clearly recognized. From 1999 to 2001, 2002 and 2003 there was evidently a sharp increase in all types of discrimination experience, for instance from 38.8 to 56.6 percent of the random sample at the workplace or during training, and from 31.3 to 48.6 percent in public authorities. The proportion of those affected on more than one occasion rose from 51.8 to 70.5 percent. In 2004, incidents declined again markedly in most fields of life and overall. The steep rise around the turn of the millenium is surprising since there are no indications of a sudden change of behavior in the German environment between 1999 and 2001 that would be of significance to discrimination (roughly half the increase took place during this period). Obviously, an increase in discriminatory behaviour following September 11, 2001, cannot be ruled out. At the same time, given the increase in the attention paid by the media to anti-Muslim resentment and assaults follow-
ing the attacks in New York, it appears that there was an increase in sensitivity in people of Turkish origin, which is now returning to its previous level. As regards the cross-sectional sociodemographic variation in discrimination experience, the authors found their expectations borne out only to a limited extent. The authors expected second- and third-generation family members to be more sensitive to disadvantageous treatment on account of their internalization of principles of equality and their partial integration with German society (Goldberg and Sauer 2004:137ff). For the same reason, they assumed that experiences would decline with age. To a certain extent this was true of women, but among men, who are generally more frequently affected, it was the middle-aged groups who reported the highest rate of harassment, and the numbers only dropped markedly among those aged 60 and over. Moreover, second-generation men reported discrimination experiences more rarely than those in the first generation. There is no linear relationship with schooling. Worst affected were graduates of the Realschule, the middle of the three streams in the German secondary school system, followed by graduates of the Gymnasium (the school type leading to university entrance qualifications). Individuals who graduated from the bottom stream (Hauptschule) and those who failed to gain any school-leaving qualifications felt least affected. In this respect, the ratios resembled those among Mexican immigrants in the United States (Finch, Kolody, and Vega 2000:300). Finally, attitudes had some interesting bivariate impacts. Religious people with traditional cultural attitudes and those attached to their native country reported more discrimination than their respective opposites. The authors attribute this to different aspirations to equal treatment and to the fact that the appearance of these groups is more conspicuous to German eyes (Muslim dress code).

Anders Lange presented an important European study in 1997. In Sweden, he interviewed a range of immigrants from numerous countries in Africa and Asia, and from former Yugoslavia. A clear ranking of reported incidences of unequal treatment on the ground of geographical origin emerged. Africans were targets almost twice as frequently as Yugoslavs, while the rates for Arabs and Asians lay between these two. Men were always worse affected than women. In addition, Lange (1997:11) found that more discrimination was felt in metropolitan areas than in rural residential environments. Increasing age and duration of stay usually had a slight negative impact, education tended to be positive though not consistently so, and income almost without exception had no effect.

In Britain, the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (Modood et al. 1997:259ff.) looked at experience of racial harassment in four major immigrant groups. The survey did not deal with everyday discrimination. It found no clearly contoured origin-related differences in the perceived incidence of acts of violence against the person or against property. On the other hand, this survey again revealed a clear gender difference along the lines described above. A steep decline in rates was noted in the 45-plus age group. Tenants were more exposed to harassment than homeowners, which could be an effect of the social environment of the residential location. The differences observed in Sweden according to urbanity of the residential location did not emerge. Finally, persons in residential areas with low proportions of migrants (less than 5 percent) were especially at risk, while only half as many incidents were registered in localities where the local minority concentration was more than 50 percent. This can be assessed as indicating the effects of opportunity structure.

At the European level we have the Eurobarometer 57, which was commissioned by the European Union and collected data in 2002 in fifteen countries (Marsh and Sahin-Dikmen 2003). This survey looked at whether the participants had personally been victims of a discriminatory incident. In many respects, this data is not comparable with the other findings referred to here, because only EU nationals were questioned, thus, one assumes, not the very people who are most frequently victims of discrimination (and those participants who were from minorities that suffer particular discrimination were not identified separately). Nonetheless, since this survey looked at discrimination not only on the grounds of ethnic origin but also for other reasons, it is possible to draw comparisons between these reasons. By far the most frequently reported form of discrimination was discrimination on grounds of age. Incidents of discrimination on grounds of race and ethnicity were only half as frequent, but were much more
widespread than discrimination on grounds of religion, mental or physical disability, or sexual orientation. Thus it is clear that racial discrimination is of considerable significance internationally. There were practically no differences between genders, but the figures for younger age groups were very much higher. Fifteen- to 34-year-olds were five times as likely to report incidents as the over 55s. People on the political left were twice as likely to report discrimination as those on the political right. Dion (2001:1) reports a marked increased in perceived discrimination in Canada between 1980 and 1990. He also confirms that young people in particular regard discrimination as a problem, and assumes that claims to equal treatment are increasing and that the willingness to tolerate inequality is decreasing. The significance of these findings is discussed further below.

3. Data and Method
The analyzed data was collected in summer 2004 within the framework of the teaching research project "Discrimination Against Migrants" in Bielefeld. The target groups were persons of Turkish and Greek origin born in the Federal Republic of Germany, regardless of their current citizenship, and Aussiedler aged between 18 and 35 who were born in Russia, Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan. There were practical reasons for limiting the random sample to a specific age group and to second-generation migrants. First, the researchers used a German-language instrument. Second, given the size of the sample, the aim was to avoid additional heterogeneity. The survey was based on a random sample from the register of residents of the city of Bielefeld (details in Salentin 2005). Face-to-face interviews were conducted using a standardized 35-page instrument. With a response rate of approximately 30 percent, the net sample realized was 301 cases.

Experienced discrimination and severity of situations. With a subject like discrimination, which is a political issue and prominently relayed by the media, it is naturally difficult to separate collectively formed convictions from individual experiences. The label discrimination as such is unsuitable for survey purposes on account of the hazy way it is used in everyday life. For this reason and to avoid priming effects, this term was not used at all in the questionnaire. Instead, the concept presented above, which sees discrimination as unequal treatment based on origin, was verbalized. A conceptual distinction was drawn between experienced discrimination on the one hand and generalized perception of discrimination on the other. Experienced discrimination was surveyed with reference to concrete incidents, while the items on generalized perception of discrimination referred to a social category. Experienced discrimination was surveyed in two stages so as to simplify the cognitive demand on the respondents and to lend sharper contours to the conceptual separation between unequal treatment for whatsoever reason and ethnically based discrimination. The subjects were first presented with sixteen descriptions of everyday situations in which unequal treatment of this kind occurs (see Table 1). The items were drawn up during pretests on the basis of press reports and descriptions by migrants. It was important that the situations selected for the questionnaire be situations that were experienced frequently. Respondents were asked to state whether they had experienced a situation on one occasion, more than once, or never. Since subjectively these events could be explained in different ways, in the cases where the respondent had been affected at least once, this supplementary question was asked: "Do you believe that happened to you because you were seen as a foreigner [or an Aussiedler]?" The possible answers were "yes, in one case | yes, in all cases | yes, in some cases | never." The present analysis takes into account the sum total of only those incidents that were experienced on one or more occasions and at least one of which was attributed to the respondent’s origin.

Severity of situations. A subsequent question presented the above concrete incidents of discrimination in the same wording and asked the subjects to rate the severity of these situations on a seven-point scale ranging from “not at all bad” (1) to “very bad” (7). A total index was produced from the items on severity (Cronbach’s alpha 0.87). Generalized perception of discrimination. A total index

2 Aussiedler are ethnic German immigrants from the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
made up of the following items was used to analyze perceived discrimination against the own group of origin:

“To what extent do you think the following statements are true? In German schools, children of Turkish origin [Greek origin/children of Aussiedler] get worse grades for the same performance. A German employer only employs persons of Turkish origin for poorly paid work. Germans don’t want persons of Turkish origin to rise in society. The German police control persons of Turkish origin more strictly than Germans. In Germany, persons of Turkish origin have worse opportunities to get on than Germans. In German discotheques, persons of Turkish origin are often refused admittance. German landlords prefer German tenants. Even with a German passport, persons of Turkish origin are treated as foreigners in Germany. In really important matters, persons of Turkish origin in Germany will always be excluded from decisions. Unjust treatment of persons of Turkish origin has increased in Germany in recent years. Persons of Turkish origin are disadvantaged in Germany. 

Ethnic identity. From nine items, a total index for identification with the group of origin and the country of origin was calculated: “I have a lot in common with most Turks [Greeks/Aussiedler]. I am interested in events in Turkey. Turks have typical characteristics that I share. It is important to me to belong to an ethnic group because it reflects who I am. The way I see myself has always to do with the fact that I am of Turkish origin. It is important for me as a person to be of Turkish origin. I prefer the company of Turks to Germans. It is important to me to be able to speak Turkish.” A four-point response scale ranging from “agree completely” to “don’t agree at all” was used. Cronbach’s alpha for this total index is 0.82.

Social demography. All the different types of school certificates were recorded, but for the sake of clearer presentation they were reduced to the dichotomy of Abitur (including

Table 1: The situations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Severity</th>
<th>Experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>You are refused admission to a discotheque.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A club or association you want to join won’t admit you.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An employer turns you down when you are searching for a job.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are “eyed up” when you enter a room.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A colleague is paid more money for the same work.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are passed over for promotion.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A teacher wrongly gives you a low grade.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A trainer supervises you poorly.</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are treated impolitely in a shop.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You receive inadequate medical care from a doctor.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A public authority makes decisions to your disadvantage.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A landlord gives preference to another candidate for an apartment.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbors fail to return your greeting.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On a public transport journey your ticket is checked for longer than normal.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In a public place, the police ask you to produce your ID for no apparent reason.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When crossing a border, you are checked at customs for no apparent reason.</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An insurance company refuses to insure you.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are given an insulting nickname.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You are threatened.</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

X surveyed. Severity and experience were not surveyed for all situations.

* Wording altered slightly. 

3 Differing scale 
4 Abitur is the school-leaving qualification required for university entrance.
Fachabitur) versus all other certificates (including the category “no school certificate”). In the case of persons still in education, the qualification they were working toward was recorded. The age is the person’s age at the time of the interview. Employment status distinguishes between full-time, part-time, and marginal employment, persons undergoing training (school, vocational training, higher education), persons in training/retraining, those on maternity or parental leave, short-time workers, unemployed persons, housewives and househusbands, and others.

Social contacts. Since close communication can be expected to be found primarily in elective contacts, contacts with friends are drawn on as indicators of personal networks. The questions were: “How often do you meet with friends of Turkish origin?” and “How often do you meet with friends of German origin?” and the answer scale was “every day,” “several times a week,” “once a week,” “occasionally,” and “never.”

Since prior calculations for subsamples produced some differences in level but for the most part no serious differences in effects, the further analysis was carried out using the total sample. Differences between Aussiedler and the two other subsamples were represented using dummies.

Figure 1: Number of incidents experienced, by subsample

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4 Abitur is the school-leaving qualification required for university entrance.
4. Results

4.1 Extent to which Groups are Affected and Severity of Situations

Let us start with an initial overview (Fig. 1) showing the proportion of respondents who said they had experienced the situation at least once. The proportion fluctuates considerably from situation to situation, but also from group to group. Approximately four out of five participants in the survey have been refused admission to a discotheque at least once. The rarest experience was refusal of insurance (27 percent being the mean for all samples), which is probably connected with the young age of the interviewees. Incidents of this kind can be expected to be more widespread in older age groups, because the opportunity structure (the wish to take out insurance) changes as people move into later stages of their lives. Nonetheless, the bulk of the different types of incident had been experienced by two thirds of respondents, and on average 58 percent of respondents had been affected by the discrimination experiences outlined. Marked differences come to light when we examine the extent of discriminatory incidents differentiated by origin. Most incidents happened far more often to people of Turkish origin (dotted line) than to other persons, and Aussiedler generally had to undergo fewer such experiences than Greeks. On average, 66 percent of people of Turkish origin, 53 percent of those of Greek origin and 42 percent of the Aussiedler experienced the individual situations. However, there is no consistent pattern of differences. Thus the Turks, for instance, feel insulted, badly looked after, and turned away from discotheques noticeably more often than the two other subsamples, while a larger proportion of respondents of Greek origin feel that they had been turned down for insurance. No Aussiedler reported being turned down for insurance or having the impression that they had been rejected by a club. In contrast, a consistent one in two of every subsample reported having received unfair grades in school.
The second overview shows the perceived severity of the incidents presented (see Fig. 2). A physical threat, inferior treatment in relation to payment (at work), promotion, grading, visits to the doctor, and appointments with public authorities are felt to be especially bad. The average values are close to the “very bad” end of the scale (7.0). The subjectively most harmless incidents, extended ticket and passport checks and refusal of admission to a discotheque, still score above the middle of the scale (4.0) with people of Turkish and Greek origin. Aussiedler experience these situations less negatively, while in other respects assessment does not differ substantially between the subsamples.

4.2 Frequency of Discrimination

A central question that this article aims to clarify is what factors impact on the extent of perceived discrimination. To do this, the following analysis examines the number of incidents presumed to have occurred because of origin. In line with the considerations outlined above, it is assumed that both indicators associated with increased risk of exposure and those associated with sensitization will lead to a rise in the incidence of experienced discrimination. The exposure risk is tracked here by age, origin, frequency of encounters with German friends, and employment status. In the present sample the probability of experiencing certain situations at all increases with age, as the aforementioned example of insurance shows. Younger people necessarily have more rarely had occasion to be treated unequally in this particular way. While all three groups of origin are partially recognizable as immigrants due to the way they speak and their non-German-sounding names, many Germans identify persons of Turkish origin as “foreigners” on the basis of physiognomical traits. Combined with the prevailing reservations about Islam, with which all Turks are stereotypically associated in Germany, experiences of discrimination are to be expected most frequently in this group. Meeting with German friends always also means spending time in environments where one encounters longstanding residents who are not one’s own friends and are potential discriminators. To a certain extent, the same surely applies to the friends themselves.

Yet there are problems involved in applying an analytical categorization into exposure versus sensitization to observable circumstances, since ambivalences sneak in. Contact with German friends certainly increases the risk of also coming into contact with persons who discriminate, but at the same time it promotes familiarity with members of outgroups and could thus lessen the salience of origin as a determinant of the way a situation is interpreted. It is a similar case with language fluency. If this is limited, it undeniably discloses the migration background, if it is well developed it makes it possible to recognize subtle discrimination that would otherwise be hidden.

Employment status is expected to have an impact because it has a lasting and determining effect on how long a person regularly spends in which social environment. Housewives and persons on maternity or parental leave (who often move in ethnically homogeneous circles) have least contact with longstanding residents and should therefore display the lowest incidence of discrimination. Perceived discrimination should be highest among job seekers, who are permanently in a labor-market-related state of competition with Germans (and others), which can incidentally lead to a generalized sensitization. All other employment status manifestations should rank between housewives and househusbands and those bringing up children on the one hand and the unemployed on the other. A count of the number of experienced situations by employment status confirms a close connection with the number of experienced incidents (Table 2). Unemployed people and

### Table 2: Number of incidents by employment status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment status</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full-time employment</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-time employment</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal employment</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>(2.88)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apprenticeship, higher education, school</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training, retraining</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternity, parental leave</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short-time working</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed, seeking employment</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeper</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>(4.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>290</td>
<td>3.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 290, F = 2.567 p = .007
Figures in brackets: cell content N < 10
job seekers experienced discrimination most frequently, with a value of 5.5, and housewives and mothers (2.36 and 2.73) least frequently. Since employment status is a categorical variable, dummies are inserted for unemployed people, housewives and mothers in the following regression. A possible connection with the means of transport used most frequently for everyday journeys was investigated but not confirmed empirically.

Increased sensitization is to be expected in those with a strong ethnic awareness, those who are particularly aware of their own ethnic origins. They will be more likely to associate the behavior of longstanding residents toward them with their ethnic origin. Anyone with a high level of school education (Abitur or Fachabitur) can be expected to pay more attention to the principle of merit than the poorly educated and to expect equal treatment and be alert to ascriptive discrimination. Finally, it is presumed that interaction in one's own ethnic milieu, recorded here by the frequency of interaction with friends from the country of origin, can steer attention to problems of equality, because a wide range of everyday problems are dealt with in these milieus and co-migrants' experience of similar problems and discourse about them suggest causal attribution to the alien origin. For women (as against men) and for Turkish and Greek origin (as against the Aussiedler category), 1/0-coded dummies were included in a linear regression on the number of incidents attributed to origin. The results are shown in Table 3. First, the significant impact of gender, which had only been included in the regression equation for control purposes, is surprising: women experienced almost one situation less (b = -0.81). It is unlikely that this can be explained by broad implementation of the principle of equal treatment toward women with a migration background. It is more likely, first, that women have lower expectations, which conflict with reality more rarely than those of men. Second, the differences in employment status between men and women, which are only incompletely contained in the model, and which also entail unequal exposure risks, are reflected in the gender effect. The gender effect observed here tallies with the findings of Heitmeyer, Müller, and Schröder (1997) and with US findings (Kessler, Mickelson, and Williams 1999: 224; Finch, Kolody, and Vega 2000: 300) but cannot be described as universal because according to Canadian data (Jedwab 2005: 4) women almost always see themselves as more burdened. However, a precise comparison of the findings is not possible due to differences of methodology. Kessler, Mickelson, and Williams (1999) assume that women tend to deny discrimination because discrimination stigmatises, as noted by Allport (1954). Given the contradictory findings, however, a comprehensive theory of gender-specific perception of discrimination is yet to be developed.

Age has a clearer impact. Older people reported more frequent experiences of discrimination than younger people (beta 0.18). There is a clear difference between people of Turkish origin on the one hand and those of Greek origin and Aussiedler on the other. This effect is the strongest in the model (beta 0.56). Thus the trend suggested by Fig. 1 is confirmed in multivariate analysis. Even when other unfavorable factors are controlled for, persons with a Turkish background see themselves as treated unequally significantly more frequently. There is no significant difference between Greeks and Aussiedler. Schooling has no impact, which may be due to the fact that although highly educated people may on the one hand feel that they are treated unequally in comparison with longstanding residents who are formally of the same rank, on the other hand they always also see themselves as privileged in relation to co-migrants. While the bivariately obvious impact of unemployment has been lost, the impact of the role of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Sig T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly educated</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>-0.90</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact, friends from country of origin</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact, German friends</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-4.49</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=290, R² .34
Reference category: Aussiedler, male
housewife and mother shows the expected trend but is not significant. Contact with German friends has no impact. Apparently, it does not entail, or at least not exclusively, an increase in exposure opportunities, but possibly leads to a desensitization due to the erosion of the salience of ethnic categories. The presumed sensitization through intraethnic contacts is clearly confirmed, because the second-strongest effect (0.21) is computed for this covariate. Finally, there was a positive connection between ethnicity and perceived discrimination (beta 0.17).

4.3 The Subjective Severity of Discrimination
An unweighted average was calculated from the assessment of the severity of individual situations (17 items, Cronbach’s alpha 0.906). The following analysis deals with factors associated with this assessment. Given the very similar subsample distributions (see Table 2) a group effect is not to be assumed. With more advanced school education a greater degree of sensitivity is, however, assumed, as also with people with a strong sense of ethnicity. Frequent confrontation with experiences of discrimination might lead to habituation, but sensitization cannot be ruled out. That is why the number of situations experienced is included in the regression model. Finally, a generalized conviction of being subject to discrimination seems likely to lead to a strong sense of unequal treatment of all kinds. In this connection a higher assessment of the severity of the situation is to be expected. The results of regression are in Table 4.

First, contrary to expectations, membership of the Greek group has an impact. In otherwise identical conditions, Greeks assess the incidents as somewhat more severe than Turks and Aussiedler. Further analyses also revealed that this impact is lost when oral language fluency is controlled for, for Greeks speak the best German on average. Since the ability to speak German is an indicator of cognitive assimilation, the effect is plausible. As assimilation increases, so does the expectation of equal treatment and violations are taken correspondingly severely. The extent of experienced discrimination has no impact. Consequently the data proves neither habituation nor sensitization. In contrast, the impact of generalized conviction of discrimination is enormous. As presumed, it amplifies the perceived severity of incidents.

4.4 Experience of Discrimination and Generalized Perception of Discrimination
Cross-sectional data sheds no light on the extent to which stable attitudes shape acute perceptions and, reciprocally, attitudes emerge under the impact of everyday experiences. The framing of a regression model is subject to the fundamental problem of whether to postulate a causal impact of generalized conviction of discrimination on the situative perception of discrimination or vice versa, for both seem to be able to lay claim to a certain plausibility. On the one hand there will be real, intense, low-level incidents of unequal treatment (singular or cumulative) that shape expectations and at some time or other lead to a stable conviction regarding discrimination. On the other, perception does not consist solely of a purely physical reception of environmental stimuli but always includes selection, interpretation, and evaluation. Thus the stability of an initially “naively” developed world view can sometimes feed on what is then a selective perception of events that now only permits consistent experiences and is self-perpetuating.

Table 4: Severity of incidents (regression result)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE B</th>
<th>Beta</th>
<th>Sig T</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highly educated</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalized conviction of</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discrimination</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of situations expected</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=293, R²=.15
Reference category: Aussiedler, male

5 The effect of language proficiency is then beta = 0.15 at a significance level of 0.023.
Empirically, however, this gives rise to the question – to be answered at least in cross-section – as to the degree of independence of conviction and perception. The number of discrimination situations experienced at least once correlates with the index of discrimination conviction to $r = 0.63$ ($p = 0.000$). This very strong interrelation casts doubt on the possibility of realizing a conceptual differentiation between attitude and experience at the level of empirical measurement. Obviously, either the recorded experience is clearly colored by a discrimination-related attitude, or the latter is shaped very directly by experiences undergone – or both. If only a part of the variance of the “own” experiences recorded is explained by underlying patterns of perception, one will have in any case to abandon the now naive-seeming idea that questionnaire surveys record what outsiders would understand by discrimination.

A regression model of discrimination experience that uses generalized perception of discrimination as a covariate (similar to Table 3), thus produces a much higher proportion of explained variance ($R^2 = 0.55$ in contrast to 0.34 previously, further details not included here for reasons of space) but in terms of content hardly any additional insight. In contrast, it is interesting to track how the new predictor changes the impacts of the other explanatory variables. While the betas of the sociodemographic characteristics hardly change, the impacts of Turkish origin and of ethnicity drop sharply, although both remain significant. Apparently, persons of Turkish origin report personal experience of discrimination so frequently partly because they are convinced that their own group is generally discriminated against, while ethnic consciousness in the surveyed groups is accompanied per se by the conviction that discrimination takes place. Nonetheless, in addition to these factors there must be other circumstances to account for the Turks’ marked sense of discrimination.

Determinants of the experience of discrimination were separated analytically into circumstances that impact on the risk of exposure on the one hand and those that heighten sensitivity to equal treatment on the other. Although this is plausible, many measurable variables tend to have a dialectic effect on the explanandum, displaying contradictory impacts. Still, it was possible to show that employment status has a significant impact and that the level of ethnicity and close contact with persons of the identified factors that are connected with the experience of discrimination. In view of the very existence of impacts of distal attitudes known from the literature and calculated here, and in view of the strength of the impact of sociodemographic variables on reported discrimination, we must abandon the idea of being able to record inter-individually valid “genuine” discrimination using the simple means of survey research. For instance, it is hard to explain why (according to the Eurobarometer) individuals who are politically on the left are discriminated against twice as frequently as those on the right and young people five times more often than old people by differences in behavior or other features that correspond to the risk of exposure. Yet quite obviously sensitivity to equal rights varies along with these factors and the threshold of tolerance for violations is more easily crossed in the younger generation and with correspondingly egalitarian political education. Thus Marsh and Sahin-Dikmen (2003:17) also conclude: “Attitudes to discrimination may be expected to be influenced by political ideology, but the actual experiences of individuals would not necessarily be expected to differ by their political views. Nevertheless, this may suggest that those on the left perhaps are more likely to acknowledge that discrimination exists and therefore more able to recognise and report it.”

This realization may initially disappoint the reader interested in social policy. Nonetheless, I am convinced that the findings help, first, in better understanding the minority viewpoint and variations within it. Second, social policy makers must be interested in whether their clientele assumes discrimination or the absence thereof as a reality because this is an important index of subjective integration, albeit no substitute for taking an inventory of origin-dependent social inequality.
same origin make it more probable that a member of a minority will report discriminatory experiences. People of Turkish extraction consistently feel personally discriminated against more frequently, even when the circumstance that they display a stronger ethnic self-image and generally are more likely to think that their own group is socially disadvantaged is statistically controlled for. Yet it remains the case that to a considerable extent second-generation Greeks and Aussiedler of German origin also feel disadvantaged in everyday life on account of their origin.

Theoretical and empirical deficits became apparent, which will have to be dealt with by further research. A strong correlation was established between the perception of individual occurrences of discrimination and attitudes about general prevalence of discrimination. There are grounds for assuming that this is due to an interaction. Attitudes are modified not least under the impact of experiences, while the perception of events always takes place under specific, attitude-dependent prior assumptions (frames, Esser 1996). What is lacking is, first, a theoretical model of the impact of experiences on attitudes and then an investigation of this and the opposite impact using longitudinal data. Second, the question has been thrown up as to how, under the above fundamental epistemological considerations, it may be possible to optimize scales for recording interviewees’ own experiences. For there are several possible explanations for the close correlation between generalized conviction that discrimination exists and reported experience of discrimination, and they are not mutually exclusive: 1. Personal experiences shape the attitude. 2. Operationalization through questions about specific events activates real personal experiences that had been previously encountered and interpreted against the background of specific attitudes. 3. Operationalization does not penetrate as far as concrete personal experiences but only taps opinions and the extent of the experience is simply estimated. Version 1 is unproblematic for measuring experiences. An improved survey instrument cannot solve the problems resulting from Version 2. However, Version 3 leaves room for progress in minimizing the greater or lesser proportion of attitude component measured involuntarily in the experiences. Thus it is presumably advisable to avoid wording associated with attitudes as far as possible. The term discrimination itself should not be used on account of its effect in activating attitudes. One should refer expressly to contemporary, concrete, and personal situations. It is necessary to examine whether precise recording of additional parameters such as the reasons why respondents conclude that motivation was racist will lead to more independent measurement.

References
Kurt Salentin: Determinants of Experience of Discrimination in Minorities in Germany


Transformations in French anti-Semitism
Nonna Mayer, Centre de recherches politiques de sciences Po, France

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Transformations in French anti-Semitism*

Nonna Mayer, Centre de recherches politiques de sciences Po, France

The increase in the number of anti-Semitic acts since the start of the Second Intifada has sparked off a broad debate on the return of anti-Semitism in France. This article focuses on the question whether this anti-Semitism is still based on the alleged superiority of the Aryan race as in the time of Nazism, or if it represents the birth of a “new Judeophobia” that is more based on anti-Zionism and the polemical mixing of “Jews,” “Israelis,” and “Zionists.” One supposed effect of this transformation is that anti-Semitism is in the process of changing camps and migrating from the extreme right to the extreme left of the political arena, to the “altermondialistes,” the communists, and the “neo-Trotskyists.”

1. New anti-Semitism or new Judeophobia?
The increase in the number of anti-Semitic acts since the start of the Second Intifada has sparked off a broad debate on the return of anti-Semitism in France. In two recent works, Pierre-André Taguieff takes the view that this represents the birth of a “new Judeophobia” aimed exclusively at Jews, unlike the old anti-Semitism that signifies rejection of “Semitic” – both Jews and Arabs (Taguieff 2002; 2004b). In his opinion, the radical novelty of this phenomenon lies in the mode of argument and grounds for accusation. Judeophobia, he says, is no longer based on the alleged superiority of the Aryan race as in the time of Nazism, but on anti-Zionism and the polemical mixing of “Jews,” “Israelis,” and “Zionists.” It turns the accusation of racism against the victims of yesterday, making Ariel Sharon a substitute Hitler and glorifying Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims as the “victims” of Zionism. While this new Judeophobia is developing mainly in the Arab-Muslim world with its radical Islamist networks, it also affects western countries, supported by militant third world supporters, anti-Zionists and anti-Americans in the very name of anti-racist and anti-imperialist struggle. In short, he says that anti-Semitism is in the process of changing camps and of migrating from the extreme right to the extreme left of the political arena, to the “alter”-globalizers, the communists, the “neo-Trotskyists” (see chapter “Dangerous convergences” [Dangerous Convergences] in Prêcheurs de haine [Preachers of Hatred] Taguieff 2004b, 819 –945). Moreover, it is said to be developing amid relative indifference, without triggering strong counter-mobilizations of the kind that were seen when the Jewish cemetery in Carpentras was desecrated in 1990.

Taguieff is interested in discourse and supports his arguments with quotations from the press, from interviews with political leaders, from websites and from militant literature. In this article, I will focus rather on public opinion, rewording the starting question as follows: Does one observe a rise in anti-Jewish opinions in France today? Do these opinions correlate or not with negative opinions of other minorities, notably Maghrebians and Muslims? Do they tend to develop among voters and sympathizers of the very name of anti-racist and anti-imperialist struggle.

* This article was first published in the Journal für Konflikt- und Gewaltforschung (Journal of Conflict an Violence Research), 7 (2) 2005, p. 91 – 104.
1 On the debate around the “new Judeophobia” see also the collective work of Balibar et al 2003 and the special issue of Revue internationale et stratégique devoted to French society and the Israelo-Palestinian conflict, edited by Pascal Boniface (Boniface 2005).
of the extreme right or on the extreme left of the political spectrum? And how are they related to opinions concerning Zionism and the Israelo-Palestinian conflict?

To evaluate the transformations in French anti-Semitism, I will rely on two types of data. The first is police and gendarmerie statistics published by the National Consultative Committee on Human Rights (CNCDH), which is charged with presenting the prime minister with an annual report on the struggle against racism and xenophobia in France. The other is data from surveys, notably surveys commissioned by CNCDH for its annual report and surveys conducted at the Center for Political Research (CEVIPOF) at Sciences Po (Paris Institute for Political Research). They show that anti-Semitic opinions follow a different logic from acts, that the social, cultural and political profile of anti-Semites remains very close to that of other types of racists, and that anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism do not overlap exactly.

2. The rise in anti-Semitic acts

One does indeed note in mainland France an unprecedented increase in attacks on individuals thought to be Jews, their places of worship, their schools and their property. This increase coincides with the start of the Second Intifada in the occupied territories and with the intensification of the Israelo-Palestinian conflict. Interior ministry statistics list 970 incidents in 2004, of which 200 were acts of violence (attacks on persons or property) and 770 were “threats” (graffiti, pamphlets, acts of intimidation). That is a year-on-year increase of 61% in acts and 58% in threats and is the highest level of anti-Semitic violence ever recorded by this instrument in France, with a marked increase in cemetery desecrations and incidents in schools.

Figure 1: Proportion of antisemitic acts in total of racist acts (1993–2004)
Moreover, since the year 2000 anti-Semitic acts and threats have accounted for the majority of racist incidents recorded in France. From 37% in 1999, the proportion rose to 82% in 2001, 71% in 2002, 72% in 2003 and 62% in 2004 (Figure 1).

In addition, the aggressors’ profile has changed. Whereas previously this violence was initiated almost exclusively by the extreme right, and continues to be so in the case of desecrations, since 2000 a significant proportion of the perpetrators identified were youths of Arab-Muslim immigrant origin in revolt against society and full of resentment toward a community that they see as more privileged, as investigations conducted by Michel Wieviorka among youths in working-class districts of Roubaix (Wieviorka 2005) have found. These youths are especially reactive to the international context, given that the peaks of violence correspond very closely to the start of the Second Intifada (September – October 2000), to 11 September 2001, to Operation Rampart conducted by Israel in the Jenin refugee camp (April 2002), to the American intervention in Iraq (March – April 2003) and to the Madrid bombings (March 2004) (see Figure 2). As a recent CNCDH report underlines, “thus events in the Middle East have led a number of youths to identify openly with the Palestinian fighters who are felt to symbolize the brutalities of which they see themselves as the victims in western society” (CNCDH 2004, 51).

### 3. The decline in prejudices

Still, these acts are carried out by a minority of individuals and analysis of surveys, notably the annual CNCDH surveys, shows that French public opinion in general is not anti-Semitic.

#### 3.1. Growing severity toward anti-Semitic acts

One observes no tolerance by French society of racist acts in general and anti-Jewish acts in particular. On the contrary, such acts of violence have never been so clearly condemned. The dominant feeling is that courts are not tough enough, especially when dealing with cemetery desecrations and damage to places of worship (Table 1).
Attitudes as regards racist or anti-Semitic remarks are even more striking. In two years, the proportion of respondents thinking that a person who calls someone a “dirty Jew” or a “dirty Arab” should be condemned rose spectacularly, by twenty percentage points. In the former case (“dirty Jew”) it rose from 59% in 2002 to 81% in 2004 and in the latter (“dirty Arab”) from 47% to 67%. This growing severity is explained both by the extent, gravity and spectacular nature of the violent acts recorded in 2004 (serial cemetery desecrations, blade weapon attacks) and by the fact that they were very widely broadcast and blown up by the media (CNCDH 2005, 121) and condemned by all political leaders. The greatest call for sanctions is against those in charge of racist or anti-Semitic publications. Eighty-five percent of the sample thought that a person in charge of a publication that had disseminated a racist or anti-Semitic writing should be prosecuted by the courts. This figure rises to 89% in the case of a person responsible for a website. If anti-Semitic acts and incitement are multiplied, public opinion is by no means indulgent toward them (see the detailed report, Mayer/Michelat 2005).

### 3.2. The decline in anti-Semitic opinions

Over the long term there has been no progression in hostile opinions as regards Jews. Rather, the feeling that they are wholly citizens has gained ground if one is to believe the last, very detailed investigation carried out by the French Association of Friends of the University of Tel Aviv. In 1946, just over one third of the adult population thought that a “French person of Jewish origin” was just as French as another French person. In 2005, 92% considered that a “French person of Jewish origin” was just as French as another French person. The proportion had fallen to 17%. Memories of the Shoah remain vivid and one discerns no upsurge in negationism, as a recent survey of remembrance of the Holocaust commissioned by the American Jewish Committee shows. The old stereotype that says “Jews have too much power,” is also on the wane after a brief resurgence in 1999 at the time of the debate around reparations for despoliation suffered by Jews during World War II followed by another in 2000 when the Second Intifada was launched (Table 2).

#### Table 1: Opinions on the severity of courts in dealing with racism and anti-Semitism in 2004 (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Not harsh enough</th>
<th>Too harsh or just right?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grave desecrations and damage to cemeteries</td>
<td>72</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage to a place of worship such as a synagogue [Split A]*</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damage to a place of worship such as a mosque [Split B]*</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public pronouncements of a xenophobic, racist or anti-Semitic nature</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An attack of an anti-Semitic nature on a person [Split A]*</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An attack of an anti-Maghrebian nature on a person [Split B]*</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insults of a racist nature</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acts which they [the courts] have to judge</td>
<td>54</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BVA/CNCDH poll conducted from 22 to 24 November 2004 of a nationwide sample of 1,036 persons representative of the population living in France and aged 18 or over.

* Split: Half of the sample was asked question A and the other half question B, at random.

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3 Split sample technique. At random, the question is put to half of the sample in respect of Jews and to the other half in respect of Arabs. The 2004 sample was split into thirds with a further question about terms such as “dirty queer”.

4 IFOP (Institut français d’opinion publique) poll, the first wave was conducted face to face on May 3 and 4, 2005 with a nationwide representative sample of the population aged 18 and above (N = 1000).

5 IFOP poll for CRIF (Representative Council of Jewish Institutions in France), February 13 – 20, 1946 (N = 1132).

6 IFOP poll for Nouvel Adam.

7 TNS-SOFRES poll was conducted on May 3 – 4 and 11 – 12, 2005 with nationwide representative samples of the population aged 18 and (N = 1000), face to face, in France, Germany, Austria, Poland, Sweden, the US and the UK. On the evolution of negationist attitudes in France see also Duhamel 1999.
of views on the subject, and a growing rejection of the anti-Semitic stereotype. During the same period the proportion of respondents who said they “tended not” to agree or did “not agree at all” with it rose from 52% to 67% (Table 2).

### 4. Similarity of the profile of anti-Semites and racists

If it has not gained ground, has anti-Semitism nonetheless changed in nature? Does it now, as Taguieff suggests, sport the colors of antiracism and anticolonialism? Is it more pronounced on the left and the extreme left? This is not the case, either. For example, adherence to the stereotype of Jewish power is coupled with a negative image of Islam and of immigrants, belief that certain races are superior to others, acceptance of discrimination against black people and Maghrebians, etc. Anti-Semitism, as all works on racism regularly show, fits into a more general attitude of “ethnocentrism” in the sense of over-valuation of ones own group and rejection of difference, whether ethnic, religious or cultural.\(^8\) Those who think Jews have too much power do not like Arabs or Muslims either, and anti-Semitic prejudices develop in the same milieus as racist prejudices, that is among poorly educated people in a situation of economic insecurity and social inferiority who make minorities the scapegoat for their problems. Thus adherence to the stereotype of Jewish power is most pronounced among blue-collar workers and among the lower middle class (small farmers, small shopkeepers and artisans which form the majority of the “Employers” group), among people without qualifications and the unemployed, regardless of the period taken into consideration (Table 3). Finally, as regards politics, if these prejudices are found at all in the political spectrum, they are always more developed on the right than on the left, where there is more support for egalitarian, universal values. Now as always it is on the extreme right and not the extreme left that one finds more anti-Semites, among people close to the FN (Front National) and people who voted for Jean-Marie Le Pen (Table 3). Moreover, between 1988 and 2002 the biggest increase in the proportion of anti-Semites was not on the left, but on the right.

### 5. Anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism

To what extent does the Israelo-Palestinian conflict influence the perception of Jews in France? How are anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism articulated? In the Middle East conflict, French public opinion is increasingly pro-Palestinian. In November 2004, French people said that in general they had “more sympathy” for the positions of the latter than for those of the Israelis (34% and 13% of responses respectively). The head of the Palestinian

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Authority, now deceased, was seen as a “national resistance hero” rather than as “the head of a terrorist movement” (43% as opposed to 27% of responses). Moreover, since the start of the Second Intifada the proportion of sympathisers with the Palestinian cause has nearly doubled, from 18% in October 2000 to 34% November 2004, while sympathy for the Israelis has remained stable at around 13–14%. Nonetheless, opinions concerning Israeli and its leaders do not tally exactly with opinions concerning French Jews. One sees this first from the French Electoral Panel 2002, a three-phase investigation initially designed to study electoral change and realignment in the four rounds of the 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections. It captures the “earthquake” triggered on 21 April by the elimination of the socialist candidate in favour of Jean-Marie Le Pen until the crushing victory of the right in the general election (see the first results in Cautrès/Mayer 2004). The second wave, conducted on the day after the second round of the presidential election and soon after Israeli troops moved into Jenin, also includes a question about people’s liking four heads of state, among them Yasser Arafat and Ariel Sharon, and a question on the stereotype “Jews have too much power in France.” Neither of the two leaders really aroused people’s liking. Ariel Sharon scored 3.2 out of ten and Yasser Arafat 3.7, markedly less than George Bush (4.5) and Tony Blair (5.7). However, contrary to what one might have expected, there is no relation between the feelings expressed for Arafat and for Sharon. While anti-Semitism varies in an inverse proportion to the liking expressed for the Israeli prime minister, even among people who are most hostile to him a clear majority rejects the anti-Semitic stereotype (60% reject and

| Table 3: Adherence to the stereotype “Jews have too much power in France” by social and political profile (%) |
|----------------------------------------|-------|-------|
|                                      | 1988  | 2002  |
| Total                                 | 21    | 25    |
| Sex                                    |       |       |
| Male                                   | 24    | 27    |
| Female                                 | 20    | 22    |
| Age                                    |       |       |
| 18 – 24                                | 11    | 12    |
| 25 – 34                                | 16    | 14    |
| 35 – 49                                | 19    | 20    |
| 50 – 64                                | 27    | 30    |
| 65 and over                            | 33    | 40    |
| Qualification                          |       |       |
| Primary                                | 30    | 39    |
| Higher primary                         | 20    | 27    |
| Baccalauréat                           | 11    | 20    |
| Bac +2                                 | 11    | 19    |
| Higher education                       | 10    | 11    |
| Individual profession                  |       |       |
| Farmer                                 | 26    | 38    |
| Employer                               | 25    | 35    |
| Senior executive                       | 15    | 21    |
| Member of a profession                 | 18    | 20    |
| White-collar worker                    | 21    | 26    |
| Blue-collar worker                     | 29    | 30    |
| Vote cast in presidential election first round 2002 |       |       |
| Extreme Left                           | 21    | 18    |
| Left                                   | 20    | 18    |
| Right                                  | 20    | 24    |
| Extreme right                          | 37    | 37    |
| Party proximity                        |       |       |
| Extreme Left                           | 19    | 18    |
| Communist party                        | 27    | 22    |
| Socialist party                        | 20    | 18    |
| UDF (Union pour la démocratie française)| 19    | 20    |
| RPR (Rassemblement pour la république) | 25    | 28    |
| Front national                         | 40    | 40    |

9 Polls conducted by the BVA (Brulé Ville Associé) institute of nationwide representative samples of the French population aged 18 and over (N = 1000). For the details of this evolution, see Mayer 2005, 143–144.

10 “What degree of liking do you feel for each of the following foreign personalities as measured with this thermometer on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 corresponds to a strong dislike and 10 to a strong liking)?” Scores were calculated from the proportion of respondents. The proportion refusing to respond amounted to 4%, 1%, 2% and 2%. For a detailed presentation see Mayer 2004.

11 Pearson r of –0.03 insignificant on the threshold of .01.

12 In each case the sample was split into thirds, by the growing level of sympathy for Sharon (score 1/2–4/5 and more), Arafat (scores 1–2/3–4/5 and more) and Bush (scores 1–2/3–4/5 and more).
32% approve it in the group which feels most antipathy toward Sharon, as against 71% and 20% respectively in the group that like him most). At the same time, the proportion of anti-Semites is higher among anti-Arafat than among pro-Arafat respondents (28% and 24% respectively of adherence to the stereotype concerning the power of Jews). If one crosses the popularity of the two leaders with adherence to that same stereotype (Table 4) one sees that those who like neither Sharon nor Arafat manifest an equally high level of anti-Semitism to those who like Arafat and hate Sharon (32%), while the least anti-Semitic are those who score highest on the two scales of liking (18% agree).

Table 4: Adherence to the stereotype “Jews have too much power in France” by the degree of liking for Arafat and Sharon (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of liking for Sharon</th>
<th>Degree of liking for Arafat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: French Electoral Panel 2002, second wave. The figures in parentheses are the numbers on the basis of which the percentages of cases were calculated.

A recent survey conducted in parallel of the French population of voting age and a representative sample of French people of African and Turkish immigrant origin of the same age group (Brouard/Tiberj 2005)13 crossed classic indicators of anti-Semitism (“Jews have too much power,” “There is too much talk about the extermination of Jews during the Second World War,” “For French Jews, Israel matters more than France”) with questions on positive or negative perception of Israel and its responsibility in the Middle East conflict. While the level of anti-Semitism is 10 to 15 points higher among French people of immigrant origin and correlates to the degree to which they are practising Muslims, the level of negative attitudes toward Israel is the same in both groups (Table 5).

Table 5: Opinions concerning Jews and Israel (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>French people of immigrant origin</th>
<th>French population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is too much talk about the extermination of Jews (agree completely/trend to agree)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have too much power in France (agree completely/trend to agree)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For French Jews, Israel matters more than France (agree completely/trend to agree)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel (evokes something rather negative)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israelis bear most responsibility in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Analysis of the correlations between the answers to these various questions, if one confines oneself to the control sample, confirms that opinions concerning the Jews of France on the one hand and the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians on the other do not totally overlap (Table 6). Those who judge that “Jews have too much power” also think that there is too much talk about the Shoah and that for French Jews Israel matters more than France (correlations of .338 and .346 respectively, upper left quadrant). There is a much lower correlation between these three questions and a negative perception of Israel (.155, .137 and .102), and no correlation at all between them and the feeling that Israel bears most responsibility in the conflict, a feeling associated, on the other hand, with a negative image of that country (.215) (lower left quadrant). People may criticize Israel and condemn its policy toward the Palestinians without holding the Jews of France responsible and without necessarily being “anti-Semitic” in the classic sense of the term. Only in the sample of French people of African and Turkish immigrant origin, the majority of them Muslims, anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism seem to be more closely matched. The correlations between the

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13 This telephone survey, the first of its kind, was conducted at CEVIPOF by Sylvain Brouard and Vincent Tiberj and run by TNS-SOFRES (Société française d’études par sondages) from April 8 to May 7, 2005 with a nationwide representative sample of 1,003 French people aged 18 or over of African or Turkish immigrant origin (immigrants themselves or with at least one immigrant parent or grandparent), compared with a control sample of 1,006 French people of voting age (April 8 – May 16, 2005).
Table 6: Correlations between opinions concerning Jews and Israel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items relating to Jews</th>
<th>Items relating to Israel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There is too much talk about the extermination of Jews during World War II</td>
<td>Israel evokes something rather negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have too much power in France</td>
<td>Israel bears most responsibility in the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For French Jews, Israel matters more than France</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews have too much power in France</td>
<td>Israel bears most responsibility in the conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For French Jews, Israel matters more than France</td>
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<th>Items relating to Israel</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Israel evokes something rather negative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel bears most responsibility in the conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French of immigrant origin</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Items relating to Jews</td>
<td>Items relating to Israel</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Jews have too much power in France</td>
<td>Israel bears most responsibility in the conflict</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel bears most responsibility in the conflict</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Pearson r significant on the threshold of .01 (**) or 0.5 (*)
two questions about the perception of French Jews and the two questions about the image of Israel (lower left quadrant) are higher than in the control group (.218 versus .137, .145 versus .072, .113 versus .102 and .169 versus .031).

6. Conclusion

Of course, opinion polls have their limits. More detailed questions on the perception of Zionism, of Israel and of its policies, and other techniques (non-directive interviews, projective tests, participant observation) would be required to analyse in depth the affective repercussions in France of the Israelo-Palestinian conflict and to take account of the multiple ways there are of living as a Jew, Arab, Muslim, Catholic or atheist. For all their weaknesses, the surveys commissioned nonetheless show that despite the deterioration in Israel’s image and despite the multiplication of acts of violence against Jewish French people, their schools and their synagogues, anti-Semitism in the classical sense of prejudice against Jews is not gaining ground, but rather the contrary. Moreover, its nature does not seem to have changed fundamentally. It primarily affects the same milieus as previously, milieus that are socially and culturally disadvantaged, and it is more frequently found on the extreme right than on the extreme left of the political arena. “New” Judeophobia is still very much like the old kind.

References

Is There a Culture of Violence in Colombia?
Peter Waldmann, University of Augsburg, Germany

Editorial

The Road to Negative Behavior: Discriminatory Intentions in the German Population. Frank Asbrock, Oliver Christ, Ulrich Wagner

Influences of Discriminatory Incidents on Immigrants’ Attitudes Toward German Society. Jan Döring

Determinants of Experience of Discrimination in Minorities in Germany. Kurt Salentin

Transformations in French Anti-Semitism. Nonna Mayer

Is There a Culture of Violence in Colombia? Peter Waldmann

Democracy Concepts of the Fundamentalist Parties of Algeria and Tunisia — Claim and Reality. Khadija Katja Wöhler-Khalfallah
Is There a Culture of Violence in Colombia?

Peter Waldmann, University of Augsburg, Germany

During the past decade, economic factors have been given a prominent role in explaining political violence. The example of Colombia shows that economic factors can explain the ubiquitous nature of violence in that country only in the context of a socio-culturally rooted propensity to use violence. The study draws on relevant published research to identify evidence of a culture of violence in Colombia and discusses the structural conditions that allow or cause such a culture to arise. It is shown that violence in Colombia cannot be explained without taking into account cultural factors that are in turn dependent on other explanatory factors, including economic ones.

Introduction

In the discussion on the background causes of political violence, economistic approaches currently predominate. Since François Jean and Jean-Christoph Rufin drew attention to “the economy of civil wars” in their anthology around ten years ago, there has been a steady stream of empirical studies and attempts to conceptualize this topic (Jean and Rufin 1999; Eppler 2002; Elwert 1997; Kurtenbach and Lock 2004). People have rediscovered the scheming warlord, who uses violence without hesitation for purposes of enrichment, have talked about the “privatization” of violence and the emergence of “markets of violence,” and have seen “shadow globalization” as a main driving force of armed conflicts. In line with this trend, the World Bank presented an analysis of civil wars that drew much attention, highlighting “greed” as their central cause (Collier and Hoeffer 2001; Collier et al. 2003). My intention is not to dispute the sense of and justification for all these efforts. In an increasingly secularized world, material motives for social acts obviously gain significance, both in general terms and specifically where the use of violence is concerned. Yet I wonder whether the pursuit of economic advantage and power is in itself a sufficient explanation for violent phenomena. Particularly when violent conflicts and crimes of violence become a permanent characteristic of a society, there is much to suggest that they are anchored in that society’s culture (as previously Waldmann 1997). A case study, Colombia, will be used to test this hypothesis. There are at least two reasons to believe that Colombia is a suitable test case for proving the existence of a culture of violence:

- The first is the enduringly high level of violence in that country. Due not least to the vigorous security policy adopted by incumbent President Alvaro Uribe, the annual homicide rate has declined markedly since the early 1990s, when it peaked at more than 70 per 100,000 inhabitants. Nonetheless, it remains alarmingly high by international comparison, at more than 50 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. (See for example Fundacion Seguridad y Democracia 2004, 5 ff., 57 ff. For detailed data see Appendix.)
- The second reason for choosing Colombia is that the hypothesis that there is a culture of violence and the existence of other, especially material, motives for the use of coercion and violence are not necessarily mutually exclusive. All experts agree that the most recent upsurge of violence in Colombia, which began in the 1980s, has its origins largely in the narcotics trade (Richani 1997). Thus one could argue that if a culture of violence can be proven as an additional causal factor
even in Colombia – where the relevance of economic motives to the spread of violence is beyond doubt – this would strongly support the idea that such a culture of violence is an important factor in other violent conflicts where material interests are of lesser importance.

How should one approach a difficult subject like this, how to form an empirically substantiated judgment about the Colombian population’s proneness to and acceptance of violence? To arrive at reliable results one would have to conduct a comparative analysis of opinion polls and carry out extensive analyses of the coverage of Colombian newspapers and magazines. The author has neither the time nor the resources for this. What he can offer is a few tentative ideas and conclusions that might help to open up this topic, which so far has been little explored. In doing so, in addition to his own observations and experience, he draws on a careful reading of selected works by (mostly Colombian) colleagues who have concerned themselves, in some cases for decades, with violence in Colombia and are therefore far better acquainted with the underlying norms, taboos, and unspoken assumptions than it is possible for an “outsider” to be.

When we speak of a culture of violence in a country, we must first clarify what we mean by the term. This essay therefore starts by considering whether and how the concept of a “culture of violence in society” can be defined and operationalized. There follows a discussion of some empirical findings that suggest that elements of a culture of violence do actually exist in Colombia. Thirdly, it looks in more detail at two extreme forms of violence, the massacre and the sicariato. This is followed by an attempt to identify some structural conditions that are responsible for the emergence of a culture of violence. A brief comment assessing the importance of cultural factors within the context of other factors explaining violence rounds off the article.

It will become clear that while a culture of violence plays an important role as an underlying condition for currently observable manifestations of violence, it is also a phenomenon that is itself dependent on historical and social factors.

On the Concept of a “Culture of Violence”
To put it simplistically, we can use a relatively broad concept of a culture of violence, or one that is reduced to its core content. In the broader sense, a culture of violence includes all socio-cultural structures and symbols that are connected with, produced by, and perpetuate violence. Obviously, in a country like Colombia with a history of civil wars and violence that goes back roughly 150 years, almost every aspect of life has been shaped and marked by this in one way or another. That is the principal theme of Daniel Pécaut, who asserts that violence has given rise to a peculiarly Colombian system of order (Pécaut 1987, especially part two). In addition to numerous illegal violent actors, counteracted in the sphere of legality by the state security forces and legal private security services, this system includes a highly complex network of coalitions and confrontations between these actors, along with never-ending negotiations of pacts and compromises (often of only limited duration from the outset or later broken). It also features a market order adulterated by pressure and coercion and a legal system devoid of its enforcement component, that is, essentially amputated. Pécaut says that violence and coercion are now fixed components of Colombia’s social and political machinery and can no longer be simply removed from it (Pécaut 2001, 91). This means that, along with all social sub-systems, violence too is constantly replicated in that country.

This broad concept of a culture of violence is not very helpful because basically it amounts to the trivial assertion that violence and coercion, as constantly employed means of enforcement, have created their own social and institutional environment that supports them and keeps them alive. It appears more interesting and less tautological to ask whether specific factors in the collective consciousness, such as certain ideas of values and norms, contribute to-

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1 A sicario is a [hired] assassin. For a more detailed explanation of the term, see the section entitled “Extreme Forms of Violence: Massacres and Sicarios” below.
wards the persistence of violence; that is, whether cultural makeup in the narrower sense – understood as the general view of what is desirable, worthwhile, and normatively acceptable – is responsible for the difficulties of putting a stop to escalating violence. If we focus on the problem in this way, we immediately have to add two brief explanations that will help us to come to a realistic conclusion.

First, “subcultures of violence” must be differentiated from a generally prevalent culture of violence in society. Violent subcultures that depart from the prevailing consensus on norms and values in society exist all over the world. However, they have come to attention especially in modern industrial societies such as the United States. These subcultures are usually confined to particular parts of the cities and are found among adolescents from the poorer classes with limited opportunities for social advancement and success. This leads them to adopt an attitude of resistance and protest against society in general, and especially against the middle and upper classes. The swift, spontaneous recourse to violence as a means of enforcement that is widespread in these subcultural formations is not least an expression of this protest and of distance from established society. The idea presupposes the existence of largely non-violent spaces, whence the description “subcultures” of violence that are by no means representative of the society as a whole.

However, it is a fundamentally different matter to put forward the hypothesis that a widespread acceptance of violent methods of conflict resolution exists in society as a whole. Unlike violence-oriented subcultures in which reference to coercion and violence often creates a sense of identity, modern societies as entities virtually never subscribe to a basic attitude that is pro-violence or promotes violence. There are two reasons for this. First, in modern nations it is assumed that the state has a monopoly on the exercise of violence. If in fact the state has failed to monopolize violence, this circumstance is played down and presented as a temporary state of affairs that can be resolved. In this there are undertones of the not unjustified idea that for modern societies based on a division of functions, arbitrary exercise of violence by individuals or organized groups, unless a marginal phenomenon, might represent a stress factor with which society would be unable to cope for long. If the “war of every man against every man” in the Hobbesian sense were an obstacle to the functioning of even primitive societies, that war, if it persisted, would lead developed societies to the brink of collapse.

The second reason why the political and social representatives of modern societies will be reluctant to admit that unchecked exercise of violence by citizens is the order of the day in their countries has to do with the current international rules of political correctness. NGOs that specialize in monitoring human rights violations have now assumed a kind of international watchdog and control function. In these circumstances, if the representatives or the media of a country spoke too often about violence as a customary means of enforcement there, this would amount to voluntary character assassination of that nation. Their frankness would be punished, and the country in question and its representatives would be stigmatized and relegated to the margins of the international community.

My line of argument boils down to the conclusion that – unlike in the case of violent subcultures – where violent practices are accepted by society as a whole, we should not expect any open avowal or forthright justification of such practices. Instead, to track down such patterns of acceptance or a normatively approved disposition toward the use of violence we will have to look for indirect or covert indications. Often, the facts of violence speak eloquently for themselves. To find out something about how they are supported by and embedded in a culture, we are well ad-

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2 Culture in a comprehensive, general sense is to be understood as the “complex whole that includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and practice and all other activities and habits that the individual has acquired as a member of the society” (see Nohlen 2005, p. 503). In this article, a narrower concept of culture is preferred. This takes into consideration the prevailing ideas as to values and norms on the one hand and the generally accepted habitual modes of behavior that these give rise to on the other.

3 On the following see for example Albrecht 2003 and Kühnel 2003. The classical work on this topic is Wolfgang and Ferracuti 1969.
vised to pay less attention to statements that refer directly to coercion and violence, and more to exploring the conceptual and ideological settings in which they are made. There is in fact a general sociological argument supporting this more indirect approach. Sociological system theorists realized quite early that a society’s central value premises and norm orientations are by no means continuously emphasized. Rather, they tend to be mentioned in passing precisely because they are unquestioned matters of course. Not by accident did Talcott Parsons, the best-known system theoretician of the 1950s and 1960s, describe the strategy for maintaining the social value base as “latent pattern maintenance” (Parsons 1951, 26ff.; 1967, esp. 165). What he meant was that values have the greatest impact if they remain latent and are accepted unquestioningly and unspokenly. If they come under discussion or are explicitly asserted and avowed in a society, as a rule this is not proof of a society that is keenly aware of its values, but rather betrays insecurity and a crisis of values.

As regards the problem of a culture of violence in Colombian society in general, it would therefore probably be futile to seek clear, positive evidence of an affirmation of recourse to violence for whatsoever purpose. At best, one might expect tacit tolerance of coercive methods. To reiterate, indirect indicators around the topic of violence should be no less helpful than indicators referring directly to violence in providing evidence of this.

Indicators of a Culture of Violence

We can identify three types of indicators that point to a culture of violence. These are structural indicators that arise from the nature of violence in Colombia (frequency, intensity, etc.); mental indicators that suggest that there is a widespread propensity to violence; and a lack of taboos and prohibitive rules that would limit the use of violence.

Among the structural factors concerning violence itself we must mention first its ubiquity in this country. There is hardly a single social sphere, geographical location, or group that has been spared it for any longer period. Be it in the cities or remote rural areas, the social microsphere of the family or the macrosphere of politics, the lower, middle, or upper class, the judiciary or any business sector, violence is everywhere. Certainly, it occurs in different escalatory sequences and forms. Yet it would be wrong to conclude that different forms of violence were based on different causal origins. On the contrary, if people resort to physical coercion in all conceivable situations for all possible ends, the obvious conclusion is that they must share an underlying disposition that gives rise to this standard approach. And how would such a pervasive underlying disposition come into being if not by way of attitudinal patterns that are ultimately culturally determined?4

Another circumstance suggests that there is a propensity to violence that is socioculturally anchored in the widest sense. This is the multiplicity of collective violent actors and their routinized modus operandi. Certainly, one encounters groups that take the law into their own hands and kill people at will in other Latin American countries, too. The striking thing about Colombia is that a host of organizations and groupings operate outside the law and employ coercion and violence in pursuit of their aims.5 In doing so, they generally operate in a way that is both cold-blooded and professional. This professionalism is partly the result of mutual imitation and learning processes. For example, it is obvious that the paramilitary forces learned mainly from the guerrilla organizations, which already had years of previous involvement in partisan struggle and dubious sources of funding before the paramilitar-ies came into existence. In any case, the development of a wide range of techniques of violence, whether based on personal experience or adopted from others, presupposes a sociocultural ambience that does not stigmatize the unauthorized use of violence but accepts it as one of several ways of attaining esteem and success.

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4 The only alternative would be the anthropological hypothesis that “the Colombian” has an innate propensity to violence, which I consider to be nonsense. On this complex see Waldmann 1997, 143 f., 155 ff.

5 Ibid., 144 ff. See also Sánchez 2001, 10: “… what is remarkable in Colombia is the extraordinary diversity of violence.”
As the final structural indicator for the probable existence of a culture of violence, the frequency and ease with which a transition from “simple,” rationally comprehensible acts of violence to violent excesses takes place in this country should be mentioned. Extreme forms of violence and their sociocultural significance are dealt with in a separate section below. Here it will suffice to note that a glaring discrepancy between the brutality of means and the modesty of the ends pursued, along with torture, the mutilation of corpses, and the like, are by no means exceptional in this country, but an everyday occurrence. Such excesses, which in individual cases can escalate into orgies of violence, are only possible in the context of a society in which the taboo limiting the unauthorized use of violence has not only been broken but, in some social groups and sectors, has been practically removed and replaced by a cult of annihilation of enemies.

The annihilation of enemies is the cue for moving on to the second complex of indicators, the way in which violence-promoting patterns of thinking and emotive concepts are anchored in the collective consciousness: first and foremost the friend-foe dichotomy that enjoys a central place in the Colombian realm of imagination, in all social classes. (On the emergence of the friend-foe culture in the nineteenth century see Krumwiede 1980, 87 ff.; Uribe 2004, 43 ff., 62 ff., 124 f. etc.). Originally associated with the rivalry between the two traditional political parties, conservatives and liberals, thinking in terms of friend and foe has now become a matter of course and permeates social discourse on all social planes, from micro to macro. There is no urban district, region, or village without a sworn enmity between two or three main actors, be they individuals, family clans, or organized groups, that shapes the life of society and compels the remaining actors to take sides and fall into line. Even in new settlements founded by war refugees far away from the central civil war action, the well-known pattern of division is reproduced almost automatically, resulting before long in confrontations and moves by mutually hostile groups to disassociate themselves from one another.6

According to Gonzalo Sánchez, in Colombia, the historical continuity with which enmities are cultivated and war is repeatedly waged is on its own sufficient to identify the existence of a culture of violence. Massacres, abductions, the circulation of lists of victims before the actual act of violence is committed, and the key role played by informers are not new phenomena spawned by the most recent wave of violence but patterns of behavior and role models that can be traced back far into the past (Sánchez 2003, 36, 83ff.). What is remarkable, he says, is that these have survived almost unchanged through the transition from a primarily rural to a highly urbanized social structure and the associated radical transformation in values from a highly religious to a largely secularized society. This, he says, can only be explained by their being firmly anchored in Colombians’ cultural memory.

The friend-foe model as a pattern of perception is frequently overlaid by a quasi-moral discourse about honor and the need to retaliate, along the lines of “tit for tat.” Many young men are unable to forget that they lost their fathers in an arbitrary act of violence. Even if they do not know the killers, the recollection of this crime is stored in their memory and fills them with a dull, aimless hatred that can discharge at random. Killing someone because of an insult to one’s honor is not only considered legitimate but is essential in some groups and circles if one wishes to avoid jeopardizing one’s reputation (Uribe 1992, 54 ff.).

A further consequence of dividing the social environment into friends and enemies is the tendency to be intolerant and Manichean, to think in categories of black and white and to disdain nuances and compromises. On the one hand, this leads people to seek the solution to problems in direct confrontation with the opponent (or, if an impasse is reached, in direct negotiations with him), that is, to

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6 For example Maria V. Uribe and Teófilo Vásquez give an impressive description of how fighting flared up between the supporters of different party factions and other groups in the Departamento Meta resettlement zone (Uribe and Vásquez 1995, 49 ff.). The author knows from his own experience, too, that the various districts on the outskirts of Bogotá constitute a microcosm that faithfully reflects the conflict situation characteristic of the entire country.
reject outside mediation, whether by an arbitrator or in court. On the other, it casts a dubious light on all those who fail to clearly take the side of one party or the other. As a bandit interviewed by Victoria Uribe once said: "I'd like to have two hearts, one for the good people and one for the bad." Asked who the "bad" were, he said, "Those who don't attack their enemies. They are dangerous traitors." (Ibid., 25) The traitor, the alleged or actual informer ("sapo"), and the collaborator are established figures in the realm of collective imagination, and they are directly connected with the rigid friend-foe pattern. The sinister aspect of the social labeling processes that these figures give rise to is that they proceed in a largely uncontrolled and arbitrary fashion, so that any outsider runs the risk of being given one of these labels that can then cost his or her life.

A second pattern of behavior that promotes the arbitrary use of violence is the macho cult that is widespread in Colombia and, closely linked to it, the tolerance of a ruthless individualism that shirks no means of enforcement. Uribe observed the version of this reverence for imperious, brutal individuals that is customary in rural regions when she visited a cemetery in southern Colombia. She found that special deference was paid to people who had gained reputations as cruel butchers and inhuman monsters during their lifetime (Uribe 2004, 16). Studies on the Violencia period, too, describe how gang and guerrilla leaders who committed repeated massacres not only inspired fear and terror among the peasants, but were also admired by them (Sánchez and Meertens 1983, 53).

The modern version of the self-confident macho who shows no scruples as he works his way up is the shrewd businessmen, or someone like Pablo Escobar who came from humble beginnings and succeeded in rising to become head of a famous and notorious drug cartel and became popular with the general public not least on account of his generous donations. In the end, it was not so much the use of violence balking at no human sacrifice that sealed his fate, as the fact that he developed further-reaching ambitions and planned to culminate an essentially criminal career legally by standing for parliament.7

Generally, on perusing the literature in search of motives and attitudes that stimulate violence, one gains the impression that broad strata of Colombia society have little regard for either life or death (Uribe 1992, 94: «... lo que menos cuesta, desde luego, es la vida...»). Evidence is plentiful that people are very generous with the lives of others (and sometimes also with their own). Take, for example, the small sums for which sicarios are prepared to kill any stranger, the frequent massacres, the kidnappings that not infrequently end in the death of the kidnapped person, the fact that homicide is the most common cause of death among young men between the ages of 15 and 35, and much more besides. Yet this disregard for life somehow extends to death as well. Only that explains why in the Violencia period, the mutilation and desecration of corpses was nothing unusual, or why after massacres the dead were (and still are) often left lying on the ground or buried hastily in a pit, that is, without any kind of funeral rite. Now, when sicarios ordain that when they die there should be no lamentation and no funeral service, but that their friends and relations should mark the occasion by holding a party with music, dancing, and alcohol, this, too, reflects a banalization of their demise (Osorno 1993, 126f.). It is as if they were saying, “Don’t worry about my and your future, all that counts is the moment, the present, which should be made as eventful and pleasurable as possible.”

A third set of factors encouraging the spread of a culture of violence is the lack of restrictive taboos and informal sanctions against the unauthorized use of violence. This shortcoming is apparent in Colombia in the way the subject of violence is treated, both generally in public discussion and in relation to specific individuals.8 First, as far as general discussion, in public and especially in the mass

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7 On the cult of the macho see Borda 1999, 20: „In Kolumbien blüht ein hemmungsloser Kult des starken Mannes...“ See also Restrepo 2001, 98: “There predominates in Colombia an extreme individualism. ... Each individual confronts society as if it were a menacing jungle.”

8 Restrepo 2001, 98: “… I do not believe that there exists a spontaneous and permanent inclination toward the exercise of force ... Instead, I believe that we share a 'culture of social indifference toward violence.'”
media, is concerned, the absence of systematic efforts to criticize and delegitimize the illegal use of violence is striking. It may be possible to explain this as a reaction of fatigue to the never-ending series of hold-ups, kidnappings, and murders, and it may reflect a certain resignation and submission to the inevitable. Anyhow, the fact is that the media only adopt a critical tone in exceptional cases of particularly brutal or spectacular acts of violence. They are more preoccupied with and pay more attention to the conflict narrative than to the use of violence. They warn against possible further escalation and polarization, speak about an increased willingness to negotiate and compromise on all sides, and give expression to the general longing for peace by calling for an end to the hostilities. However, they hardly question the use of violence as such, which is the mode in which the conflict is played out.

This has two consequences. Since acts of violence are reported only in a routine tone, no public discussion takes place about the extent to which they can be described as fair or unfair, courageous or cowardly, legitimate or illegitimate. Whether certain minimum rules of engagement were adhered to, whether the violence is directed at innocents or combatants, whether people are attacked frontally or shot dead from behind, is all seemingly uninteresting (Sánchez 2003, 121). The only thing that matters is the outcome of the fighting. Who won, who is the victor in a zone, who must vacate it? The second consequences is that fixing attention on negotiations and a possible peace deal leads to past injustice being largely blanked out and played down (Ibid., 61). Somehow, the inflation of illegal acts of violence and the swift forgetting of them are two sides of the same coin. Where all hope is directed toward an early end to a violent conflict, little space is left for reviewing, analyzing, and expiating past crimes. Naturally, dispensing with punitive justice involves the risk that some time later the violent monster, which has been lulled by a peace deal but by no means stripped of its lethal claws, will reawaken and strike.

These general comments also apply to a large extent to the way the careers of individual violent actors are seen from the point of view of the general public. In this case, too, it is primarily the outcome that counts, the demonstrable success, and not the path, the dubious means, that led to it. That someone ordered or committed a murder does not necessarily turn out to be a hindrance to a career in politics or elsewhere. True, criminal law says that murder must be punished, but the judiciary is corruptible. Even in the unlikely case that sentence were to be passed, the possibility of a pardon would still beckon (Rubio 1999, 33 ff., 199ff.).

My deliberations so far can be summarized as follows: The unauthorized use of violence in Colombia is neither an emphasized right nor a generally decried outrage. Basically, there is no public discourse on violence. People are generally aware of it primarily because it is constantly, and not infrequently excessively, perpetrated. This in turn is only possible because of a widespread tacit tolerance and acceptance of the use of physical force to solve private and social problems, an attitude that one can certainly describe as a culture of violence. This is based on mental stereotypes and models that stimulate aggression and independent, unauthorized enforcement on the one hand and on the absence of taboos and informal norms that inhibit or limit violence on the other.

Extreme Forms of Violence: Massacres and Sicarios

The two forms of violence referred to in the heading differ from one another in their processes and the aims they serve. Massacres spread terror and are a form of show of strength, while the sicario, or contract killer, offers violence as a service for sale. However, as we will see, they have a number of features in common, the most important of which is that they constitute extreme forms and each carry a specific motive for violence to its extreme. They are included here on the assumption that extremes and excesses are neither alien to nor untypical of the societies involved, but definitely say something about their normal constitution and the attitudes of the average citizen. Here a brief outline of each of these two forms of violence, is followed by an exploration of the structural features they have in common and their significance in a wider social context.

Acts of violence in which more than four people die are termed massacres. (On the following see especially Uribe and Vásquez 1995; Uribe 1992; 2004.) The dead may be a family, a youth group, or an entire village. Sometimes the number of victims can run into hundreds. Back in the
days of La Violencia, Colombia was already the scene of numerous massacres committed by a wide range of groups. This horrendous practice was revived during the course of the most recent wave of violence. The death squads and paramilitaries in particular have a reputation for spreading fear and terror by means of selective massacres. Victoria Uribe counted a total of 1,230 massacres during the period from 1980 to 1998. She differentiates between massacres with economic, social, and political aims, but regardless of the specific aim the fact remains that massacres are first and foremost an extreme demonstration of strength by means of violence.

Massacres often follow a specific sequence of events (Uribe 2004, 88 ff.). They do not befall the unsuspecting victims out of the blue but announce themselves, or are announced, through vague rumors, threats, and forewarnings. The collective act of violence often takes place in the evening, when the inhabitants of a farm, several houses, or a village are surprised over supper or when engaging in some other communal activity. Not infrequently, the attackers wear uniform, and they are always heavily armed. In the countryside, the targeted group of houses is often surrounded so that no-one can escape. All the occupants are then herded into the central square and a list of names provided by informers is read out. The accused, usually men, are singled out and taken elsewhere. Shots and cries of pain signal to the remaining villagers that these men have been butchered. When the attackers have made off and the survivors make their way to the scene of the murderous events, what awaits them is a heap of lifeless, often badly disfigured, corpses. In an isolated settlement it can be days before neighbors notice that a massacre has taken place.

In addition to this “normal” pattern there are versions involving even greater cruelty. Sometimes, the butchers take their time and torture victims before killing them. While women and children are generally spared, there are instances of women being raped and children being killed to prevent the possibility of revenge (when they grow up). During La Violencia it was customary to cut the dead into pieces like slaughtered animals or to mutilate and disfigure them in quasi-ceremonial fashion (Ibid., 72 ff.).

The violence of the sicarios, on the other hand, usually takes the form of assassinations of individuals rather than large-scale carnage. In cities, victims are generally attacked with firearms from the back of a motorcycle. (On this and the following see Osorno 1993; Salazar 1990; Sánchez 2001, 7 ff. On the phenomenon of criminal juvenile gangs in Central America see Peetz 2004.) The killer, riding behind the driver, aims for the victim’s head because he can only be sure of receiving his money if the victim dies an instant death. Sicarios are young men between the ages of 15 and 25 – working in groups – who specialize in earning their money from contract killings. The institution of contract killing originated in Medellín but has now spread to most Colombian cities. Yet the gangs of young men who actually perform the violent business are only the tools of people behind the scenes who organize and coordinate the entire action. These may be individuals, but often an agency is behind the attacks. These agencies – which are disguised to a greater or lesser degree depending on their geographical location and social affiliation – act as mediators between the “customers” and the sicarios who perform their murderous wishes. They arrange the assassination contract, fix the fee (usually payable in advance) in line with the anticipated difficulties (for instance, if someone is heavily guarded), and identify among the gangs of young killers which is best suited to undertake the violent transaction in question.

Every sicario’s dream is to be hired for a “mega attack” that would allow him and his family to live without worries about the future. Yet his wages are only a fraction of the sum paid for the contract killing. The lion’s share goes to middlemen and people behind the scenes who prepare the assassination and ensure its smooth execution. Al-

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9 Three arguments support this hypothesis. First, those who commit the excesses are not social deviants but represent an average type, at least in certain social groups and classes. Second, they do not act in isolation but, as will be seen, are embedded in a wider context of social planning and organization. Third and last, the wider public’s calm reaction to the crimes enables them to be, if not approved, at least ultimately accepted.
though sicarios are prepared to commit any violent act for money, one cannot describe them and the subculture they form as materialistic in the narrow sense. This subculture includes its own language, a love of certain types of film and rock music, dance, narcotics consumption, black humor, and a fundamentally macho attitude featuring a cult of weapons and motorcycles. Sicarios do not reject loyalties and ties out of hand. They venerate the Virgin Mary and often idolize their own mothers. They also make firm friends. Their philosophy of life combines an antibourgeois hedonism with an absolute fearlessness of death in any form.

Though they differ widely in conduct and aims, massacres and sicario killings share several defining characteristics:

- Both are organized undertakings that presuppose a high degree of planning, preparation, and coordinated action. The initiative of an individual or a handful of people does not usually suffice. Rather, the cooperation of a larger group, a team, is required to carry out operations of this kind.
- This is also reflected in the cold-bloodedness and professionalism with which victims are executed. Pleas for quarter or mercy fall on deaf ears. At most they trigger scornful incomprehension. This indicates that the actual act of killing is preceded by a mental dehumanization of the victims, who before they are killed are no longer counted as human. (Uribe (2004, 75) particularly emphasizes this aspect.)
- Thus the perpetrators and the people behind them scorn all the Western world’s humanitarian criteria. They apparently live in an enclave that has abandoned the shared values of the civilized world, one where the fundamental values of respect for physical integrity of others, compassion, and elementary social solidarity have been suspended.

Disregard for the life of others is also reflected in the structure of the acts of violence as experienced by the victims. Two features are particularly striking:

- The first is the unpredictable and arbitrary way in which the calamity befalls the victims. They are left no time to prepare themselves either inwardly or outwardly for their imminent fate. There is no question of a humane death. What is more, their corpses are often subjected to additional maltreatment.
- Second, the means are often glaringly disproportionate to the ends. This is especially evident in the case of massacres, where the mere suspicion that a social group or village has cooperated with the opposing side suffices to gun down indiscriminately all inhabitants of a particular settlement. In the case of the sicariato, the disproportion is based on the fact that human life has become a mere marketable commodity. Everyone has his or her price. The possibility of buying the death of any chosen person has considerably expanded the circle of potential initiators of violence. If someone is out to kill another person, he or she no longer has to overcome the inhibitions that prevent most people from committing acts of violence themselves. He or she just has to engage a routine killer who does not even require an explanation of the motive for the murderous plan.

Both the massacre and the setting up of assassination agencies are extreme cases of the use of violence for specific purposes, in the former case to demonstrate and assert power, in the latter to secure material gain. At the same time, however, they transcend these ends, undermining them in the process. What lesson is the general population of a province or region meant to learn when entire villages are extinguished on the pretext of complicity with one of the warring camps? And what is the appropriate price for an act of violence aimed at gunning down an unsuspecting person from behind on the street? In many cases, violence has obviously become detached from its purpose and has become an end in itself. Massacres are for the most part bloody ritual sacrifices without any further-reaching symbolic value, in which the butchers celebrate themselves and their gruesome deeds. The same goes for the parties that a gang of sicarios holds to mark the completion of a “successful,” well paid contract killing. Here, too, only superficial homage is paid to life and its pleasures, while the underlying tone is of a death cult and a vague awareness of their own mortality.
The final shared feature of massacres and paid contract killings is the perpetrator structure. In both cases, the killers are mainly young men from the lower class aged between fifteen and thirty who have trouble finding a regular job or simply prefer to earn a relatively easy living from the business of violence. However, this common feature should not be overestimated. After all, the young men in each case are only the last link in a chain of middlemen and sponsors, some of whom are from completely different social strata. The organized nature of both extreme forms of violence means that each is integrated into extensive social networks. Therefore it is not enough to hold the “militia soldiers” and paid “killers” who actually carry out the violent work primarily responsible for inhuman acts of violence. They are only the most visible representatives of a multitude of different groups and organizations that support, provide cover for, and in some cases also finance these practices because they profit from them in one way or another.

A much more difficult question is whether and to what extent the wider public – the man on the street and the media – approves of these excessive forms of violence. Why is there no public denunciation of assassination agencies? Why do attempts by the paramilitaries, who are widely known to be responsible for most massacres, to become reputable and gain recognition as a political force, not encounter more protest? These questions are difficult to answer. On the one hand, popular sayings such as “por algo será” (“it will be for something,” in other words, “he won’t have been killed for nothing”) and “el que la debe la paga” (“he who has a debt pays it”) point to a very wide general tolerance of even gruesome and apparently unjust acts of violence. On the other hand, Colombia has always had groups of people who insist on compliance with international humanitarian law, and victims’ associations have repeatedly called for the guilty to be punished. However, in a general atmosphere of mistrust and intimidation, expectations as regards the population’s willingness to moblize and protest should not be set too high. To some extent, public opinion probably fluctuates depending on the events and the political constellation. Spectacular murders or a rash of cynical massacres provoke outrage and focus people’s wrath on the perpetrators. However, if the latter signal willingness to compromise and signs emerge of a possible end to the conflict, the majority of people are prepared to brush aside past crimes against humanity in order to reach an amicable, peaceful solution.

Looking for an Explanation

Much consideration has been given to the causes of violence and an eventual culture of violence in Colombia, and much has been written. I will therefore confine myself here to giving a brief account of the most important explanatory factors, disregarding cultural variables in order to avoid the trap of a tautological circular argument.

Generally, the lack of a state monopoly of violence in Colombia counts as one of the main reasons for violence running out of hand. Some say that the state relinquished this monopoly only in recent times. However, this overlooks the fact that ever since the state of Colombia was founded, the country’s political elites have not only been unable to secure for it the sole power of disposal over physical means of force, but have not even tried in earnest to enforce this monopoly. The scope of the central state enforcement and security apparatus has remained decidedly modest. Evidently, the state’s leaders shunned the cost of maintaining stronger armed forces, preferring instead to wage conflicts using ad hoc militias recruited on a voluntary basis (Krumwiede 1980, 79ff). Looking at earlier European history, we see that elimination contests between regional princes generally led to an increasing concentration of military and political power, until all domination was concentrated in a single institution, the state. In contrast, regional conflicts in Colombia, of which there were a good number, always ended in an arrangement, a compromise, that left existing decentralized structures in-

\[1\] Uribe (2004 21), too, denies that massacres have any symbolic significance.

\[2\] The paramilitaries, for their part, complain that the state that created and supported them suddenly wants nothing more to do with them.

\[13\] Kurtenbach (1999, esp. 396ff) states that the Colombian state has secured a monopoly neither on violence nor on taxes. See also Waldmann 1997, 145f., 149f.
The state, and the state security forces, were always involved, and were often especially brutal. On the role of the police and the army during La Violencia see Sánchez and Meertens 1983, 75. For the development of the army in general see Gilhodes 1986.

14 The state, and the state security forces, were certainly comparable with the former, produced no impartial force obligated only to the good of the state and the common good. Instead, they led to a perpetuation and consolidation of the friend-foe dichotomy until it finally became the shared mental property of all social classes. To summarize, the Colombian state is certainly present in public consciousness as an intellectual and physical entity, but it has remained a weak state incapable of enforcing the laws it passes and incapable of disciplining its own officials and citizens. Though it may be able to establish a certain degree of public order, its power is insufficient to guarantee public security, which as Hobbes said is the most important good for everyone.

The main initiative within Colombia’s political system still lies with the two traditional political parties, Conservatives and Liberals. Generally speaking, the dominant axis of conflict in this country is “horizontal” (conflict between political parties, between armed actors such as guerrilla organizations and paramilitary associations, etc.) as opposed to the “vertical” relations of power between the state and its citizens. Some interesting analyses of the different implications of horizontal, “symmetrical” violent conflicts and vertical, “asymmetrical” conflict constellations have been published recently. Iván Orozco in particular has given much consideration to this topic (Sánchez 2003, 58 ff; Orozco Abad 200315). He writes that the circumstances are significantly clearer in the case of vertical abuse of power, vertical “barbarisms” as he puts it, of the kind customarily perpetrated by authoritarian or totalitarian states, than in the case of “barbarisms” committed in the context of horizontal conflicts, for instance during civil wars. This applies first to the extent of the groups involved in the misuse of violence, which in the case of violent excesses committed by the state tends to be limited, secondly to role differentiation between perpetrator and victim, which in this case are clearly separated, and thirdly to the duration of violent processes of this kind, which are temporally limited. In the case of horizontal, “symmetrical” violent conflicts, everything is much more complicated. First, they engender greater mobilization, i.e. broader sections of the population become involved in them in one way or another. Where armed confrontations are of longer duration, this in turn makes it difficult to draw a clear separating line between “perpetrators” and “victims,” because an individual can alternate between the two roles depending on the conflict constellation and power relations. Finally, it is difficult to bring civil-war-like conflicts to a definitive conclusion. If those who have committed serious human rights violations during the fighting face the threat of criminal proceedings after its cessation, in case of doubt they will prefer to carry on fighting. Yet if they are granted an amnesty the misuse of violence goes apparently unpunished and there is the risk of violence flaring up again at the first opportunity. Orozco summarizes the dilemma facing responsible statesmen and peacemakers in civil wars or civil-war-like situations in terms of the need to make a twofold transition (Ibid., 27). The dilemma is how to achieve peace on the one hand while on the other effecting the transition from a state of lawlessness and authoritarianism to a democracy under the rule of law. In any case, Orozco’s studies show that the dynamics of violence emanating from the horizontal conflict constellations characteristic of Colombia are much harder to check and “rein in” than asymmetrical, vertical “barbarisms.”

A third complex of causes that has recently escalated the violence and fostered a generalization of the culture of violence is the narcotics trade. Most experts agree that the production of and trade in narcotics has broken the longstanding tie between violence and party politics, leading to a situation where violence has penetrated all areas of life as a means of power and enforcement (Pécaut 2001, 103 ff.; Kurtenbach 1999, 387 ff. with reasons). In other words, the drugs trade has turned violence into something banal...
and commonplace. This happened for a variety of reasons, among others because a rare, coveted commodity like cocaine inevitably incites competition for its possession and because the profit that this lucrative trade yields makes it easy to recruit young men who definitely prefer easy work with a weapon to a monotonous, badly paid job in some other business. Probably the most important structural reason is that there are no binding informal rules governing dealings between leading figures in the drugs trade, so there is no basis for mutual trust. This forces each to acquire a private army as a potential threat in order to ensure that agreements are observed.

I will tentatively mention a fourth possible complex of reasons for violence and a culture of violence in Colombia. This is the continuing marked tension between the upper and the lower class, combined with an inadequately developed middle class and urban middle-class culture. In doing so, my starting assumption is that in general – and especially in rural areas where the state is hardly present – both the big landowning class and the class of small farmers and agricultural laborers share a predominantly instrumental, pragmatic understanding of violence. Colombia’s agrarian history has seen numerous violent confrontations between, and within, these classes in which legal considerations certainly carried weight but the availability of means of coercion determined the ultimate outcome (Le Grand 1986). In Latin America in general, consistent condemnation of violence and its banishment from public life did not come about until urbanization processes established the urban lifestyle, and in many cases this applied only in the cities for a long time. Within the cities, in turn, it was primarily the middle classes who, due to their specific resources (they had educational goods and professional knowledge at their disposal, but little expertise in the use of physical force), their socialization and their general orientation, had the greatest interest in the emergence of non-violent spaces governed by the rule of law.

The author suspects that in Colombia this kind of genuinely urban ambience that rolls back violence to the margins emerged only at a relatively late stage, and never to its full extent. There is no lack of testimony to art and culture in the country’s major cities, from impressive works of architecture to a flourishing publishing industry and numerous universities, of which not a few are of an excellent standard. However, one cannot avoid the impression that many lower class migrants from the countryside have only completed the urbanization process half-heartedly and that their mentality, and this also applies to other classes, has remained rural and parochial in some important respects. Class struggles in the city are still fought in a rough, physical manner and there is hardly any question of their being switched to a more symbolic plane. As yet, no typically urban middle-class political party exists. Populist revolutions, a typically urban phenomenon throughout Latin America, have never taken place. The traditional parties – born in a predominantly rural context – along with their clientelist appendages still have the say.

The urbanization process the country has undergone in recent decades has not actually suppressed violence as a means of conflict resolution, but has only changed its appearance. It is no longer openly on show and no longer employed visibly as a means of domination and strength. Nobody in the central districts of the big cities disputes the right of the state and local authorities to keep the public peace and general order. Yet violent plots are still hatched covertly in back rooms. In the cities people are killed or kidnapped on a daily basis, while in areas on the urban periphery the law of the jungle prevails in any case. Violence has become more anonymous and selective, but whether it has declined during the course of the urbanization and modernization process is an open question that should probably be answered in the negative.

This article has shown that the incidence of violence in Colombia cannot be comprehended without understanding the existence of a culture of violence as expressed in high

17 It should be noted that although there is a large degree of social inequality as measured by the Gini index, for example, it does not exceed the customary dimensions in other Latin American countries (Bulmer-Thomas 2003, 11).

18 The author is thinking primarily of the Cono Sur, of Chile and Argentina for instance.
homicide rates, the existence of institutionalized violent actors, the prevalence of certain norms such as those of the macho and of revenge, and the absence of other norms, taboos, and prohibitive rules. The ubiquity of violence is not plausible unless a propensity to violence is socioculturally anchored. In this respect, the hypothesis that a culture of violence exists is helpful in explaining conditions in Colombia, and the culture of violence can been seen as a causal factor. Nonetheless, this is not to assert that when seeking explanations one can stop at culture. For culture itself is determined by historical and contemporary factors: by the lack of a state monopoly of violence, by the dominance of horizontal axes of conflict, by the rules of the narcotics trade (which creates strong economic incentives for excessive use of violence), and by the class structure of Colombian society, which is characterized by class tensions combined with a weakly developed urban middle class. In this respect, the culture of violence in turn is only a dependent variable that requires explanation. Cause and effect interact and interweave. Since the real practice of violence as perceived by social actors shapes social expectations of behavior, influences definitions of cost and risk, etc., it sets cultural parameters. And in this cultural environment violence is more likely to be used.

References


Appendix: Homicide Statistics in Colombia and South America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total number</th>
<th>Number per 100,000 inhabitants</th>
<th>Of these, absolute numbers attributable to political conflict</th>
<th>Political murders as a proportion of the total number (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>25,379</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>3,730</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>23,096</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>3,633</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>24,358</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4,003</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>26,540</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6,987</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>27,841</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>7,637</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>28,780</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>4,625</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pizarro Leon Gómez 2004

Crude rates of homicide in the Americas (per 100,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Last available year between 1988 and 1995</th>
<th>Last available year between 1994 and 1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil*</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia*†</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador*</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador*</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States*</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>not available</td>
<td>not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala*</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>not available</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico*</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Paraguay</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<td>Puerto Rico*</td>
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<td>22.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>not available</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago*</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela*</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average*</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Rates higher than 10 per 100,000 people are considered high and are printed in bold.† Country with the highest rates in the Americas.

Source: Bergquist et al. 2001, 276.
Democracy Concepts of the Fundamentalist Parties of Algeria and Tunisia — Claim and Reality
Khadija Katja Wöhler-Khalfallah, University of Trier, Germany

3 Editorial

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76–88 Democracy Concepts of the Fundamentalist Parties of Algeria and Tunisia — Claim and Reality. Khadija Katja Wöhler-Khalfallah
In a Caliphate the Caliph, the head of the Muslim community, sees himself as the Prophet's successor, yet he is only entitled to wield secular power over his subjects. He must ensure that the community lives in compliance with the religion, but his religious role cannot be compared with that of the Pope in Christianity. Theoretically, the Caliph is just as much subject to Islamic law as the community he leads.

Yet the fundamentalists juxtapose concepts that ought not really to be comparable. Islam is without doubt a religion, while democracy is not. Though the latter in its liberal form is able to assign religions to private life, it is first and foremost a construct designed to stop despotism and abuse of power. Thus fundamentalists use concepts that, while they may suggest a great deal and arouse expectations, are anything but unambiguous and therefore require definition.

This article will show that when fundamentalists talk about “democracy” they mean at best a limited democracy that only serves the purpose of establishing opinions within a group that subscribes to the same basic idea while denying other groups the right to exist. As a rule it...
is reduced to a mere election mechanism stripped of its actual purpose, which is to limit abuse of power. Moreover, it may not be apparent either to other, nonreligious parties or to potential voters that when fundamentalists talk about democracy in general they do not necessarily mean liberal democracy in the sense of freedom of religion, political pluralism, equal rights, legal certainty, and division of powers. It is important to ascertain what kind of democracy is at stake because, contrary to what is often assumed in the West, societies in countries with a majority Muslim population are very heterogeneous, be it in their political alignments or in their religious affiliations. Consequently, social peace in those countries would only be ensured if all were really to be assured of equal fundamental rights and of equal entitlement to participate in politics. When a fundamentalist leader such as Rached al-Ghannouchi, a Tunisian celebrated in the West as a liberal, makes media attention-grabbing statements that suggest he supports laicism, that feeds expectations and generates trust among political opponents. For instance, he once said: “We entered the political arena in Tunisia to fight for freedoms and not to establish an Islamic state. … We must respect the will of the masses if they decide to choose a different path from ours. We are not people’s guardians. Consequently, if our society were to opt one day to become atheist or even communist, what could we do?” (el-Af-fendy 1987). He thus lays down liberal democracy as the yardstick for the political system he proposes, and must be measured by that yardstick.

Likewise, talk of “Islam” is not unambiguous. A look at the history of the Islamic world shows that it has gone through various epochs of religious interpretation, ranging from decidedly liberal, tolerant, and secular (e.g. during the Abbasid dynasty in the East or under the Moors in Andalusia) to puritanical, backward-looking, anti-development, and intolerant (e.g. in Saudi Arabian Wahhabism). Present-day fundamentalists’ claim to be acting in accordance with “Islamic teaching” howsoever they interpret it is often accepted at face value without any critical analysis. To examine the political goals of fundamentalist parties it is not enough to consult the source texts of Islamic religion. One must also refer to the published political program or the publications of the groups in question. Max Weber concluded that the special interpretations applied by some particularly ascetic forms of Protestantism such as Calvinism, Pietism, and Methodism were conducive to the emergence of a special form of capitalism (Weber 1993, 53) only after he had studied the interpretations of the respective groups with a view to identifying in them the values that led to a particular behavior, rather than basing his views only on the Bible as the foundation of Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox Christian interpretations.

This article will examine the political system proposed by the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS, Islamic Salvation Front) in Algeria and ANNA HDA (Renaissance) in Tunisia in the light of their own claims to be committed to a democratic system. This analysis is being undertaken because many of their followers and many traditional Muslims assume that Islam stands for the realization of true democracy and one must therefore assume that those claims will have aroused corresponding expectations among the fundamentalists’ supporters. In addition, it is important to ascertain the fundamentalists’ willingness to be measured in fair competition with the other political and intellectual movements in their respective societies, since that is the fundamental prerequisite for ensuring social peace.

2. Democratic Elements in Islam and in its Early History
Confusion among western academics, especially as regards the FIS, can be explained by contradictory propaganda. On the one hand Ali Ben Hadji, the more populist of the FIS’s two leaders, has written books and newspaper articles with titles such as “The massive offensive to wipe out the religion of democracy” and “Warning to the inattentive and notification to the undecided that reintro-
duction of the Caliphate is one of the main duties of this religion.” On the other, the FIS called for a democratic contest in order to come to power, even promising to allow Muslims to elect its leaders in future.

Interviews conducted by Abdelasiem El-Difraoui (1994) for his report on the FIS and its critical stance toward democracy show that the FIS deliberately relies on the ignorance of its followers and their hazy ideas. He ques-
tioned around thirty FIS supporters and found among them almost without exception great confusion concerning the political conceptualities and a widespread inabil-
ity to distinguish between an Islamic and a democratic order. The majority even equated the two systems. Thus an unemployed nineteen-year-old from the Algiers casbah (old city) said, "I'm opposed to democracy because it's a western invention. It isn't Islamic. I support the FIS, so I support the shura." Asked what the shura was, the same respondent said, "The shura is Islamic. It means that the people can decide their own destiny" (El-Difraoui 1994, 121).

Ali Ben Hadj, the second leader of the FIS, holds a completely different view from that young man, at least on that particular point. He believes the people are too ignorant to identify suitable representatives who have their eye on quality and the long-term good (El-Difraoui 1994, 114). Another sympathizer interviewed even said, "Only a FIS government will establish true democracy, because Islam is true democracy." (El-Difraoui 1994, 121) The statement given by a twenty-five-year-old bookkeeper in this connection is revealing. He voted FIS less out of conviction than as an act of protest, in order to get rid of the FLN (Front de Libération National), Algeria's dictatorial post-colonial unity party, which was heavily influenced by the military. He said, "I'm pro-FIS because I've had it up to here after thirty years of the FLN and I can't earn a living. So I'm 100 percent behind the FIS. But all that will come of it is the sharia. That's bound to be a bit too severe for us young people" (El-Difraoui 1994, 121).

Many Muslims fail to identify the invocation of a Caliphate as a call for a theocratic dictatorship because some of the conceptualities used do have democratic features. It should be noted that the fundamentalists invoke especially the idealized Caliphate of the Prophet Mohammed’s first four successors. Most politically and historically uneducated Muslims regard that as the period when true democracy was born. All four Caliphs were chosen to lead the Muslims by the unanimous consent of tribal chieftains. The great Sunni theologian al-Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, 1058 – 1111, noted back in the eleventh century that only election by the umma conferred legitimacy on the person who held supreme state power (Meier 1994, 507). Omar, the Muslims’ second Caliph, had this to say on the subject: "He who renders obeisance (bai'a) to a man without consultation (maswara) with Muslims has rendered no obeisance, nor has he to whom it was rendered received any obeisance" (Meier 1994, 507). One can also cite the following rhetorical question posed by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, founder of the Hanbalite school of law: "Do you know who the imam is? The imam is the man all Muslims have agreed on. He is the imam" (Meier 1994, 507).

The principle of shura (consultation) also has democratic features. According to Hamid Sulaiman, it is that the circle of those involved in drafting an order or a law of public interest should be drawn as widely as possible (Meier 1994, 511).

One can find arguments in Islamic religious sources (the Koran and the sayings and deeds of the Prophet) in support of freedom to form and develop attitudes and opinions on questions of pure dogma, too. Thus it is said that the founder of the Malikite school of law refused to have the Caliph promote his school of law to the only valid legal standard, arguing that the existence of different opinions was a blessing for Muslim people (Ramadan 1980, 81). Likewise, contrary to the view widely held in Europe, the sharia is not a rigid legal canon that must remain unchanged through the centuries. The sources of Islamic jurisdiction should be seen rather as moral and ethical guidelines to be adapted to circumstances as they evolve. Islamic philosophy itself shows that some earlier interpretations were wrong because, while God has foresight, human beings are still too backward in their development. In his "Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam," Iqbal observes that the principles of the Koran by no means prohibit human thought and legislative activity. Instead, he says, in spirit they in fact prompt people to think. Early Islamic scholars mainly used this foundation as a starting point for developing a series of legal systems. Although these legal systems are very comprehensive they are nothing but individual interpretations and can therefore lay no claim to conclusiveness. This follows from the

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2 Consultation by the head of the Muslim community. Traditionally, this was never a binding requirement.

3 Islamic law
Koran teaching that life is an ongoing process of creation (Ramadan 1980, 57).

Ali Abdarraziq, 1888–1966, who worked at a sharia court in Egypt, several decades ago reached the conclusion that no-one has the right to curtail people’s freedom of choice. He argued that the Caliphate is not only unnecessary but even contrary to the essence of the Islamic message. He was able to prove that even the Prophet was not granted political power over Muslims and did not lay claim to such power. Abdarraziq cites five verses from the Koran, commenting that it states clearly that Mohammed had no rights over his community beyond his religious revelations (Meier 1994, 112). The sole authority the Prophet had over his people was a spiritual authority, the origin of which is heartfelt belief. Consequently, obedience to him is based on a purely spiritual origin from which physical obedience follows. In contrast, the secular ruler’s authority is a material authority. “The former belongs to religion, the latter to the world. The former is God’s business, the latter the business of human beings. The former is based on the religious principle of guidance, the latter on political leadership” (Meier 1994, 109).

If Ali Abdarraziq denies even the Prophet political power over people, then all the more so the Caliph. In his view, religion did not envisage a Caliphate, jurisdiction, or any other state or government departments. These are subject only to the judgment of reason and experience. Accordingly, nothing prevents an Islamic society from constructing its polity on the basis of new forms of state (Meier 1994, 114). This proposition can certainly be taken to mean that in the final analysis a human being is obligated only to God and that no-one may claim the right to denounce his decision or to impose worldly punishment for it. In other words, it can be taken to mean that human beings alone are responsible for deciding for or against God without having to fear worldly persecution. One might also deduce from this proposition that Islam as a religion would even be capable of tolerating liberal democracy.

The above examples are intended to give an indication of the expectations awakened in supporters of fundamentalist parties when people talk about an Islamic Caliphate as a system of state. In addition, the Islamic religion is agreed to incorporate a high degree of social justice. For instance, it bans corruption, usury, enrichment of the few at the cost of others, and the exploitation of labor, from all of which people in most Muslim countries have to suffer on account of those countries’ dictatorships.

Before we move on to the extent to which the FIS and ANNAHDA are capable of democracy or are utilizing the most liberal interpretation possible of Islam, it should be pointed out that a distinction should be drawn between democracy and liberal democracy. The former meets the standard of introducing a fair decision-making process in a group that aspires to one and the same goal by different means. The latter permits all life concepts in a society a role in shaping politics, provided that there is none among them with the goal of swapping the free, democratic constitutional basis agreed by the majority for a dictatorship. In this context, liberal democracy is an entirely relevant standard for comparison against the ideas of state of fundamentalist parties, because the heterogeneous nature of society in many countries with majority Islamic populations makes state-guaranteed equality of different life concepts an essential prerequisite for social peace. Alongside religious Muslims, other large groups such as Christians, Jews, laicists, socialists and atheists exist even in these societies.

3. The FIS’s Ideas on the State

Far from having a clear line, the FIS is an umbrella organization in which different currents have come together, all of which claim a connection in some form with Islam. Nonetheless, one can identify and highlight three basic orientations, the Algerianists, the moderate Salafis and the radical Salafis. This alone is a highly explosive combination, given that Algerianists and Salafis practice diametrically opposed interpretations of religion.

The Algerianist leadership consists almost exclusively of academics with a science or engineering background who took their diplomas at Francophile universities (Tawil 1998, 14). A key leader was Malek Bennabi, who was in favor of a democracy that took account of Islamic values. His first principle was that God does not change the situation of a people until that people is prepared to do something about the situation itself. He was also known
for seeking to hold his own society responsible for the sorry state of affairs. His criticism was aimed especially at the Algerian elite, which he accused of failing to look after ordinary Algerians. He also criticized fundamentalists in the Middle East, who he said should not ascribe evil only to the materialistic, colonizing West but also to the East, which had meekly allowed itself to be colonized without putting up much resistance. In 1945, he followed his words with deeds and parted company with the Muslim Brotherhood, accusing them of misusing religion to pursue directly political aims. This, he said, had caused them to degenerate into a political instrument devoid of any civilizing character (Labat 1995, 76ff.).

Nearly all the moderate Salafi leaders graduated from the Ben Badis Institute and most were born in the 1940s. Almost all had a religious education and they categorically refuse to speak French, which is seen as the language of the former colonists. Although their name suggests otherwise, their teachings no longer have anything to do with those of the founders of the Salafiyya, who endeavored to adapt their interpretation of Islam to the modern age. This new ideological mixture combines elements of the writings of Ibn Taimiyya4, Hanbalism5, Wahhabism6, and Sayyid Qutb (Labat 1994, 44). Sayyid Qutb held the view that a human being may serve God alone and that people must not accept each other as masters in the place of God (Qutb 1994, 199). This Muslim Brother was also responsible for the terrorizing interpretation of Islam that excludes from the faith any Muslim society that does not live under a Caliphate (Qutb 1995), which would make it easy for militant forces to deliver it up to the terror of fanaticism. The new Salafis believe the West is to be seen solely as a threat to be repulsed. Their ideal is no longer the heyday of Islamic civilization in the High Middle Ages, but the original Muslim community of Mohammed and the four Rightly-Guided Caliphs. Philosophical and scientific tradition in Islam is rejected as heathen. Their Islam is an Islam that is simply bereft of the component of civilization. Their efforts are directed solely at establishing an ideology of struggle. Both moderate and extremist Salafis reject democracy because they believe that God alone can hold power, not the people (Tawil 1998, 15).

This conveys how explosive a construct the FIS was, given that the groups that joined it have very great problems even to accept each other. Many would have preferred to overthrow the state by force, but hoped that the FIS’s success would give them an easy road to power.

3.1 Election process purely a choice of candidates

On closer scrutiny the apparent confusion that the FIS sows even in its program as regards its attitude to democracy can be interpreted without ambiguity (cf. al-Munquid7, October 19, 1989).

What the FIS is willing to give Algerians is a one-time election to choose between a theocracy and a secular state. If they were to choose a theocracy, there would be no legal way back. Certainly, this theocracy would permit elections with a choice of candidates. At best, the Algerians could choose between different parties with a connection to Islam, but a socialist and laicist or liberal party, for instance, would no longer be permissible. Arguments generally put forward against a multi-party system include the fear that political parties will fracture the unity of the umma. In this context it should be noted that Islam emerged in a region inhabited by tribes that were often involved in centuries-old feuds. For a time, at least, Mohammed succeeded – in the name of unity of the umma – in overcoming the never-ending wars that had often rent entire families apart (Faath and Mattes 1992, 19). By using the fear of splits, dissension, and fratricidal war the fundamentalists succeed in portraying the party system as divisive rather

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4 Under the influence of the Christian crusades and the Mongol invasion, Ibn Taimiyya developed a theological line ascribing a special significance to jihad (holy war).

5 The most recent and the smallest of the four officially recognized schools of law within Islam. Its founder leaned toward the Abbasids and the conservatives among them. Regarded as the strictest school, it placed severe restrictions on the use of rational methods to find justice and tried to align itself as closely as possible to the source texts. Wahhabism is based on this doctrine.

6 A sect that originated in the eighteenth century, which takes Islam back to an idealized, primitive “original” form, declares all post-Mohammedan interpretations of the source texts as null and void, proscribes any form of drug or intoxicant, and insists on archaic Arab methods of punishment such as the stoning of adulterers and chopping off the hands of thieves.

7 FIS party publication
than conducive to peace, as a system in which personal vanities are nurtured while sight of higher national goals is lost (al-Munquid, February 22, 11–12).

Ali Ben Hadj, the second in the FIS’s two-man leadership, even said that democracy is based on the view of the majority without taking account of the quality of that majority. He leveled the criticism that, because truth is established by the majority view, the leaders of democratic parties are only concerned with developing a program to satisfy the largest possible number of voters and that faith, honor, religion, etc. fall by the wayside in the process. In contrast, for supporters of the Sunna and the community, truth is established solely by way of legitimate reasoning and argumentation and not by the total influence exerted or the total votes cast (al-Munquid, August 9, 1990).

3.2 Who will interpret Islam?
FIS statements do not clarify whose job it is to interpret Islam or which body will be given the power to specify what conforms to Islam, nor whether or not this body would be subject to scrutiny by the people. The FIS political program says nothing about this. However, suspicion is aroused by Ali Ben Hadj’s comments that the people lack the political maturity, the wisdom, and the far-sightedness to be allowed to decide this, so he could imagine a council of theologians with the job of settling these matters. However, he fails to mention who would be allowed to elect this council and whether it would be subject to any form of popular scrutiny (Ben Hadj, alias Abu Abd al-Fattah, al-Munquid, August 9, 1990, 3–4).

3.3 Who will oversee the overseers?
The only surveillance mechanism mentioned in the FIS program is the so-called hisba market police, which is to be upgraded to a force that polices morals. As well as checking civil servants’ integrity, it would examine the morality of the lifestyle of single mothers whose husbands have died or left them before they receive any entitlement to welfare benefits. Bassam Tibi places the meaning of hisba in its proper context. He writes: “In classical Islam, hisba means that the Caliph can watch to make sure his ra’iyya (subjects) follow the rules of Islam, primarily that they do not deceive or defraud, and can call them to account. In present-day Egypt, however, hisbah means that every Muslim can “snoop around” in the life of another Muslim and accuse him of breaking the shari‘a.” Tibi says this amounts to encouraging people to inform, which is a punishable offense in Islamic law (Tibi 2000, 103 and 106).

The problem with this kind of surveillance is that anyone who does not concur with the state doctrine can be swept aside as having deserted the faith, however good a Muslim he may be. With the exception of one single article, no issue of al-Munquid contains any differentiated discussion of the advantages of division of powers, the rule of law, equal rights, and political equality, nor does the FIS party program. Yet not even from the viewpoint of Islam can there be any objection to these control mechanisms, given that they support just treatment of individual members of society and ensure that arbitrary use of power is averted (discussed in detail in Wöhler-Khalfallah 2004).

3.4 The sharia as a constitution
As long as the issue of genuine control mechanisms is ignored the best legislation is of no avail unless it is guaranteed to apply to all and to be implemented in an equal manner.

This insight alone enables one to imagine the flaw in the thinking of many fundamentalists when they insist that only a higher, divine law that is above human weaknesses (such as corruptibility, arbitrary use of power, etc.) will be able to bring justice to Muslims. Whether deliberately or not, they overlook the fact that this law, too, will have to be interpreted by humans and can fall victim to abuse in the process, and that people can force their own opinion on others in the name of a higher being. It might be almost impossible to stop that type of abuse in the absence of entirely earthly control mechanisms.

The example of Sudan shows the ease with which the sharia can be abused. Traditionally, prior to contact with European influences, the principle of repentance always played a role in the application of the sharia. Even in cases of adultery there was seldom recourse to stoning because the culprit was given the opportunity to repent. In Numeiry’s interpretation of the sharia, which Hassan al-Turabi, who is often seen in the West as modern and liberal, also approved – despite initial reservations – after
being brought into government, even small-time thieves have their limbs chopped off for petty theft (one more limb for each offense). Meanwhile, new legislation has benefited the Muslim Brotherhood, with new banking regulations giving it economic power that it has channeled into targeted loans to members of the Brotherhood and speculation on the grain market (Köndgen 1992, 46).

In Iran the Islamic regime’s potential for abuse lies primarily in the circumstance that the heart of the Iranian constitution, the wilayat faqih, or guardianship of the jurists, gives absolute authority to a single theologian. Although the state founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini accepted the formal institutions of a parliamentary democracy, he created for himself an office that stands above all elected bodies, thereby neutralizing the constitution’s republican element (Kermani 2001, 46). That has given rise to the unusual situation where “followers of the party of God” (Ansar-e Hezbollah) the radicals among Islamist groups in Iran, now violently storm theological institutions because these institutions are calling ever more audibly for a separation between religion and state (Kermani 2001, 32). Kermani suggests that the arguments put forward by these new theologians mark the decline in religiousness that has been noticeable since the Islamic Revolution. If Islam is identified with the state, he says, “it is held responsible for every injustice for which the state is responsible. This results in the spread of atheism, society loses its moral values and religious hypocrisy and open bigotry are omnipresent. They analyze the ideologization of Islam, in which they themselves were involved, as a misunderstanding that arose during the course of forced, superficial modernization under the Pahlavi dynasty. This smacks of the march through Hell that is necessary in order to return to Paradise by the back door. By turning away from the Islamism of their own intellectual fathers the self-styled religious enlighteners are returning under completely changed auspices to the apolitical religiousness of their grandparents” (Kermani 2001, 51).

At this point it should be noted that even with the best of wills the “democracy” the FIS talked about until 1992 cannot be described as such. It renounces any form of counterchecks, and that would open the door wide to arbitrary use of power and ideological despotism. In any case, in Algeria after three years of civil war, the remains of the FIS that had refused to condemn GIA terrorism came to the conclusion that only a liberal democracy with all its control mechanisms could bring peace to the country. Even the bitter opponent of democracy Ali Ben Hadj conceded at negotiations in Rome that the Koran and the Sunna could not serve as a constitution and should only to be referred to for inspiration in drafting a constitution with which all Algerian groups could agree. The FIS also recognized the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Impligazio and Giro 1998, 121 and 136).

We are unable to clarify here whether these concessions were made out of realization and conviction rather than merely for reasons of political pragmatism, because the FIS has been banned since 1992 and forbidden to participate in politics. Its two leaders Abassi Madani and Ali Ben Hadj were released from a twelve-year jail sentence only on July 2, 2003, on condition that they refrain from future political activity.

4. Rached Ghannouchi’s and ANNAHDA’s Ideas on the State

Unlike the FIS, which was an umbrella organization bringing together very different orientations, Tunisia’s MTI (Mouvement de la tendance islamique), now known as the ANNAHDA party, was consistent within itself. The MTI was not founded directly. It came into being when three sympathizers with Pakistan’s Tabligh Group\(^8\), which began missionizing in Tunisia in around 1966 – 67, joined forces. They were Sheikh bin Milad, Rached Ghannouchi, subsequently their president and their most important thinker, and Ahmida Enneifar.

Interest in Ghannouchi was aroused especially by the fact that, unlike other fundamentalist movements’ leaders, he

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\(^8\) These itinerant preachers who went out into the world in the 1960s to spread their interpretation of Islam were for a long time looked on benevolently as “Jehovah’s Witnesses of Islam” (Der Spiegel, January 10, 2005). However, the history of how they originated and the careers of their spiritual leadership show a striking link with the Deoband schools, where the Taliban among others were educated (cf. http://islamonline.net/fatwa/arabic/FatwaDisplay.asp?f=FatwaID=113001).
declared himself to be in favor of liberal democracy in a spectacular way that grabbed the media’s attention. He comes across generally as very pragmatic and life-affirming. He insists that the arts must not be neglected and criticizes people who pursue religious studies in an outmoded way so that young people fail to see the sense of religion. His insistence on social justice made the movement attractive to young people and earned him a reputation as a closet Marxist among his critics. He likes to make play of this accusation in order to underscore that his politics are relevant to the present day.

He warns against the oft-repeated assertion that the West is in decline. This charge, he says, only serves as a sedative for Muslims. Although he, too, believes that West is in a process of breakdown, at least on the moral plane, he sees little comfort in that for those whose decline is even further advanced. Unlike his colleagues, he warns against rejecting outright all ideas that come from the West, especially democracy. At the very least, he says, they must be given proper scrutiny. He starts by explaining the guiding thought that drives the West. The central idea in the West, he says, is belief in human beings, belief that human beings exist in themselves and for themselves and are the measure of all things, that humans can control their world and their destiny, understand their world and master it completely.

The positive fruits of that kind of belief, he says, are that it liberates human beings from the feeling of powerlessness and steers their thoughts into practical, functional paths. It gives them belief in progress, tenacity in mastering the unknown, and a sense of the values of the day and the importance of human dignity and freedom that is reflected at the political level in the form of democracy and respect for human rights. Ghannouchi qualifies this by saying that this belief also has negative aspects such as the lack of interest in anything beyond the material. The consequence, he says, is that the intellectual and spiritual life of the West lags remarkably behind its material progress, which is why life takes its course amid a decadent hedonism devoid of any convincing vision of the true meaning of life. This indicates that Ghannouchi is discovering democratic mechanisms for his concept of a state based on Islamic values, while rejecting democracy’s secular side because it allows a permissiveness that he sees as jeopardizing, if not destroying, civilization.

However, Ghannouchi levels the criticism that liberal democracy is only applied within national boundaries, whereas internationally the laws of nature apply (Ghannouchi 1993, 85 f.). He is alluding to globalization mechanisms and Western interventionism. As he sees it, the problem lies not in the ideals or mechanisms of democracy but in some aspects of the philosophy in which these ideals originated. His view is that liberal democracy is influenced by western philosophies such as those of Darwin, Hegel, and Nietzsche that justify and legitimize this kind of conduct by the stronger toward the weaker. He says that democratic governments all over the world are involved in oppression and even genocide, showing the inhuman side of western democracies (Tamimi 2001, 87). Ghannouchi complains that democracy has not yet succeeded in preventing peoples from attacking each other or deception and economically motivated encroachments and predation. Ghannouchi believes it is essential for nations to overcome their egoisms and to strive for a single humanity, in other words that all people all over the world, regardless of nationality, are entitled to the same rights, in practice as well as in theory. In his view, materialist philosophy is seen as the only basis for the values of the liberal democratic system and is thus responsible for the West’s oppressive behavior outside its own borders. As an Islamic alternative, he supports a democracy built on ethical, that is religious, values.

He calls for an attack on one person to be considered as an attack on the whole of humanity. For Ghannouchi it is clear that democracy can contribute toward, indeed is fundamental to, developing one of the best political systems, as long as it is accompanied by a universal philosophy that respects human life. According to him it is still the best political system that the human mind ever created, even without having been realized in an Islamic democracy. He says it was unforgivable of fundamentalists to reject it wholesale on the grounds that it originated in Western minds. On the contrary, he says, consideration should be given as to how it could be put to the use of the Islamic mind so as to put its values to best advantage (Ghannouchi 1993, 87).
4.1 Discrepancy between Ghannouchi’s public statements and his writings

When Ghannouchi was once asked at a reading whether he would allow a communist party to remain politically active if he came to power, he castigated the questioner, saying that his question could only come from a paternalistic way of thinking. He said he had no intention of imposing a guardianship on the people and it was time for fundamentalists to break away from this paternalistic attitude and to start crediting people with the ability to make the right choice (el-Affendy 1987). In an interview with a Kuwaiti magazine he said: “We entered the political arena in Tunisia to fight for freedoms and not to establish an Islamic state.” To the horror of his interviewer, a traditionalist fundamentalist, he added: “We must respect the will of the masses if they decide to choose a different path from ours. We are not people’s guards. So if our society decides one day to become atheist or even communist, what could we do?” (el-Affendy 1987).

All these comments certainly helped to reinforce his reputation as a champion of liberal values. However, a somewhat critical look at his well-known book “Al-Hurriyat al-‘amma fi d-daula al-islamiya” (General freedoms in the Islamic state) leads one to envisage something rather more restrictive.

Ghannouchi’s explicit attitude toward the apostate is revealing. He regards voluntary, deliberate turning away from Islam to unbelief, on the basis of which fundamental guidelines of Islam as regards faith, law, or rite are rejected, as a political offense. The Islamic right to freedom and security does not include the freedom to turn away from the faith. The offense lies in the splitting away, an act of “mutiny” and “treason” that must be punished within the context of the state’s responsibility to maintain the community and law and order (Tamimi 2001, 78). This opinion shows that he is not really at all willing to accept the consequences of giving society the freedom to choose between opposing social concepts.

4.2 Islamic democracy within the limits of what is permissible under the sharia

Ghannouchi’s statement on the role in his “Islamic democracy” of the limits set by the sharia is unmistakable, because in his view no political concept that moves outside the sharia can be regarded as Islamic. From an Islamic view, such a concept would be plainly illegitimate (Tamimi 2001, 90). According to Ghannouchi the authority of the sharia is higher than any other authority in Muslim society. That statement is unequivocal.

4.3 A multi-party system that permits only parties that accept the Islamic order and act according to it

Ghannouchi is very cautious in his utterances about the multi-party system. Like many other fundamentalists, he expresses concerns that the plethora of movements could split the umma. However, he sees in it a positive aspect of competition, albeit one that must follow the basic rules of constructive cooperation. Yet unmistakably audible is the caveat that he has no intention of allowing parties that reject the religious order of Islam as the highest regulatory element of a society to participate in any way in shaping political life. In his view, the only option for anyone who wants to be involved in political events is to convert to Islam. On the other hand, he will allow non-Muslims to be involved in Muslim parties provided that they respect the value concepts of Islamic society. However, they are not to be given access to leading posts in government (Ghannouchi 1993, 292ff.).

4.4 Ghannouchi’s design for an Islamic division of powers

The above remarks should have demonstrated that Ghannouchi does not intend to establish a liberal democracy in the western sense. Nonetheless, he has certainly given very considerable thought to how the rule of law can be ensured, at least theoretically, in a religious system that has been shown in this study to be particularly susceptible to abuse of power. Ghannouchi recognizes the danger arising from the circumstance that the sharia has to be interpreted and that there is therefore a risk of abuse of power through interest-led interpretation. His proposed solution for stopping this monopolization is for parties with different kinds of ijtihad (judgment) to compete with each other and to leave it to the people choose the version that suits them (Tamimi 2001, 83 and 99ff.). In the event that only interpretations are proposed that the people refuse to accept at any price, they are be provided with a means to reject the proposals.

Thus, on critical reflection, what Ghannouchi intends is a state regulatory element with power-limiting mechanisms
to ensure legal certainty within the framework of religious laws. The only logical explanation for his statements concerning his willingness always to give Tunisians the full right to opt, if need be, for atheism or communism is that this decision-making freedom is to be granted only for the first election that Tunisians face, that is the election for or against a religiously motivated state system. If in this election they were to opt for a secular model, he would respect their choice. However, if they chose an Islamic model, its laws would come into force irrevocably. In principle, given his religiously oriented starting point he cannot be reproached for holding this opinion. He can only be accused of keeping his followers in the dark and of leading them astray with spectacular, media attention-grabbing statements that convey the impression that he is a liberal thinker. Above all, a state that defined itself by way of a certain religion would only be the state of those citizens who professed their faith in the state religion. This would give rise to a permanent potential for arbitrary use of power against minorities. That state’s democracy would be an Islamic democracy, but it would certainly not be a liberal democracy.

Ghannouchi’s less well-publicized activities show that, as regards his attitude toward democracy and his call for a universal humanity, caution is called for. He has lived in exile in London since the early 1990s and is now a member of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, which is headed by Yussuf al-Qaradawi and is close to the Muslim Brotherhood. The council’s main aim is to regulate the life of Muslims in Europe according to the stipulations of the sharia (European Council for Fatwa and Research 2006). The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI) reports that as recently as 2004 Qaradawi himself issued a fatwa that allows the killing of Muslim intellectuals as apostates, published in Al-Ahram Al-Arabi on July 3 that year. Some self-styled liberal Arab thinkers report that Ghannouchi himself recently issued a fatwa permitting the killing of all Israeli civilians. The justification given was that there are no civilians in Israel because the population – men, women and children – are reserve soldiers of the army and therefore to be killed (MEMRI 2004).

It can be assumed that approaching 30 percent of Tunisians now sympathize with Ghannouchi’s ANNAHDA movement. Torture is the order of the day in Tunisia’s prisons and is aimed at all forms of opposition, both liberal and religious. Students and the middle class especially follow the Palestinian-Israeli conflict with keen interest, which makes these groups susceptible to radical ideas (Schirra 2002). Added to this is the desolate economic situation. A mere glance at the ANNAHDA website gives a sense of the strong radicalization. It reproduces a tract by Hassan al-Banna (1906 – 1948), the founder of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, entitled “Are we a people capable of action?” This not only legitimizes jihad as a defensive war, but also makes campaigns of conquest socially acceptable again (Al-Banna 2006). The French investigating judge Jean-Francois Ricard foresaw back in 2002 that Tunisian terrorists would before long provide the coming generation of al-Qaida (Schirra 2002).

5. Summary and Outlook
This article has discussed democratic elements in early Islamic sources and in the programs of the FIS and ANNAHDA. According to historic writings, Islam includes the principle of democratic consensus, the principle of consultation, freedom of opinion, and an understanding that the sources of Islamic jurisdiction are subject to interpretation, that the sharia can be changed, and that religious authorities’ power to issue instructions on worldly matters is limited. These are the type of expectations that fundamentalist parties arouse when they speak of an Islamic Caliphate as a state system. However, in practice democracy as it features in the ideas of the FIS provides for only a one-time choice between a theocracy and a secular state. There is no way back from a theocracy, and in a theocracy it is only possible to elect different individuals and parties from an Islamic spectrum. The interpretation of Islam is to be left to a clergy in power. There is no provision for mechanisms to control the organs of state or to prevent arbitrary use of power. Ghannouchi, the spiritual leader of ANNAHDA, recognized long ago the importance of democratic institutions and, especially, the need for a division of powers as the only effective means of preventing despotism. Yet he vehemently rejects a separation of religion and state even though he often presents himself in a media attention-grabbing way as a supporter of liberal characteristics of democracy. In fact, he regards apostasy as an offense that he would like to see punished. He sees
The above examination of the fundamentalist parties of Algeria and Tunisia conveys an idea of the process of self-discovery that the Islamic world is currently engaged in. It should not be forgotten, however that groups relating to political Islam only constitute one part of the population of the Muslim world, even though it currently seems to be becoming more and more significant.

If they are to achieve social peace in the long term, they will not be able to avoid coming to terms with other political groupings. Likewise, in the long term the path to liberal democracy will be unavoidable. Yet this does not mean that the values by which different Eastern societies are guided will have to correspond to Western approaches in every respect. Not all democracies are identical, even in the West. Each country has agreed standards that best suit its nature, its culture, its history, its national character, and its ethnic make-up. In the same way, Muslim societies too will find their own way and may have to fight to secure it. However, rather than assist this process, self-serving Western intervention can only reverse fragile advances and hand the arguments to the fanatics.

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