Internal and External Collective Memories of Conflicts: Israel and the 1948 Palestinian Exodus

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The general category of collective memory of conflicts includes several kinds of memories (e.g., official, autobiographical, and historical – of scholars) that the literature typically discusses as a unified phenomenon. This contribution demonstrates that each of these kinds of memory comprises two types of sub-memories: internal (how the holders of a sub-memory actually view the history of a conflict) and external (how they publicly express their views of that history). Empirically, the research is based on an examination of Israeli official, autobiographical, and historical memories from 1949 to 2004 concerning the causes of the 1948 Palestinian exodus. Methodologically, it uses content analysis of documents and interviews with key Israeli figures. Theoretically, the article proves the existence of these two sub-memories, discusses their different characteristics and implications, addresses their reciprocal relations, and explores self-censorship and external censorship as the causes for the differences between them.

The new millennium has begun with conflicts raging in various parts of the globe. Of special importance are the seemingly intractable conflicts: those that are violent, long-standing, and perceived as irresolvable and of zero sum nature. These conflicts significantly damage the lives and the countries of the involved parties and also occasionally other countries in the region (Coleman 2006). They concern concrete issues that have to be addressed, such as territories, natural resources, and self-determination. They also involve wide-scale socio-psychological dynamics which develop among the involved parties and play an important role in the outbreak continuation and resolution of conflicts. These dynamics include mainly the ethos,[1] the collective emotional orientation,[2] political attitudes (e.g., right-left), aspects of social identity (Liu and Hilton 2005), and the collective memory (all these dynamics pertain to the conflict).

Collective memory is an important phenomenon which significantly influences countries and societies. It touches upon nationalism, leadership, and culture, and is a major factor in intractable conflicts. Collective memory research has experienced significant growth in the recent period, mostly regarding conflicts. This is mainly due to the prevalence of conflicts worldwide and the realization that collective memory of conflicts plays a big part in shaping all the other socio-psychological dynamics regarding conflicts (emotions, etc.) (Booth 2001; Devine-Wright 2003; Olick 2007; Shelter 2010; and Winter 2010). The literature about collective memory of conflicts (as well as of other topics), addresses collective memory as a unified phenomenon (for example, Devine-Wright 2003; Hagopian 2009; Zheng 2008; see also section 1., "Background"). This article challenges that unified approach, hypothesizing that collective

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[1]   Ethos of conflict is defined as the configuration of central societal beliefs that provide particular dominant orientation to a society experiencing an intractable conflict. These beliefs involve, for example, the importance of security, patriotism to the country, unity of the society, and peace as the ultimate desire (Bar-Tal 2007a).

[2]   Collective emotional orientation refers to the characterizing tendency of a society to express particular emotions in conflict situations, for example fear, anger, or hatred (Bar-Tal Halperin and De Rivera 2007).

memory of conflicts comprises two types of sub-memory, internal and external (what people think and what they express in public). The hypothesis is tested using empirical material on the Israeli collective memory about the causes for the 1948 Palestinian exodus.[3] The exodus is the major historical event in the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict, highly violent for most of its time (Lustick 2006). This division between internal and external sub-memories has broad theoretical implications for memory studies (of conflicts, and of other topics).

1. Background: Memory, Israel, War

1.1. Collective Memory

Collective memory is generally defined as representations of the past assembled in collectively adopted narratives (Kansteiner 2002). It is a general category which includes several main kinds of memories. To name the most significant, the first is *popular* memory, defined as representations of the past held by the society's members, best manifested directly by public opinion surveys. It significantly influences the socio-psychological dynamics mentioned above and the behavioral reactions of those holding it, and is therefore accorded great importance (Liu and Hilton 2005; Midelton and Edwards 1997; Schuman and Rodgers 2004; Shelter 2010). The second kind is the *official* memory: the representations of the past adopted by the institutions of the state. This memory is manifested, for instance, in publications of state ministries and the army, national museums, and textbooks approved for use in the educational system (Connerton 2009; Wertsch 2002; Zheng 2008). Third is the *autobiographical* memory, namely that of the people who experienced the discussed events first hand, which is typically manifested in memoirs and story-telling. This is a primary historical source (alongside documents) and therefore usually accorded importance (Hackett and Rolston 2009; Jenning and Zhang 2005; Schumann, Akiyama, and Knaupper 1998). Fourth and final is *historical* memory, the way the research community – mostly academics, but also independent scholars – views the events of the past (Winter and Sivan 1999).[4]

The prime significance of the latter three kinds of memories is their influence on popular memory, the importance of which was explained above (Nets-Zehngut 2012a; Wemheuer 2009; Wertsch 2002). Official memory has its own separate importance: it represents countries in the international arena and thereby influences their interactions with other countries (Lustick 2006; MacDonald 2010; Malksoo 2009).

Focusing on collective memory of *conflicts*, this consists of the narrative held by a party to a conflict that describes the origin and course of the conflict. Rather than setting out to provide an objective history, it typically relates it in a manner that is functional to the society's present existence and future aspirations (Booth 2001; Lawsin and Tannaka 2011; Olick 2007; Zheng 2008). This memory is usually selective, biased, and distorted and thus provides a simplistic and black-white outlook. As such, it plays an important role in the course of conflict by shaping the psychological reactions of each party towards the rival (negatively) and towards the in-group (positively). Studying this memory is therefore essential in promoting peace (Bar-Tal 2007a; Conway 2008; Devine-Wright 2003; Paez and Liu 2011).

Use of the memory of conflict tends to be instrumentalized during the climax of intractable conflict since it provides each party with the socio-psychological basis needed to meet the enormous challenges of such a conflict. Significantly, this memory also inhibits de-escalation, peaceful resolution, and reconciliation. Thus, the more significantly a party's memory can be transformed to being less biased and distorted – when there is factual basis for such a transformation, and usually there is – the more the party's psychological reactions will accommodate the rival and view it in a more legitimized, humanized, and differentiated manner. This will increase the likelihood of achieving peace and reconciliation between rival parties (Booth 2009; Lawsin and Tannaka 2010; Lustick 2006; Nets-Zehngut 2012b; Volkan 2001).

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3 The term "exodus" is used here in the sense of a neutral designation for the combination of expulsion and flight.

4 Ian Assmann also developed two concepts: cultural memory (manifested in rituals, images, monuments, and buildings, dealing with long periods, and characterized by stability) and communicative memory (daily discussion about the past, dealing with short periods, and characterized by instability) (1995).

In summation, all of the above literature about collective memory, and other relevant studies not described above, discuss it as a unified phenomenon. The current article hypothesizes that each kind of has two types, internal and external (e.g., internal official sub-memory and external official sub-memory). Internal sub-memory is how the holders of a memory actually view the history of the conflict. External sub-memory, in contrast, is what these holders express publicly as their views of that history. The analysis described below tests this hypothesis for three kinds of memories (official, autobiographical, and historical). Space constraints prevent further discussion of popular memory. Since the suggested distinction will be discussed in relation to the Israeli collective memory of the 1948 exodus, some historical background is required.[5]

1.2. Israel and Its Memory of the Conflict

The roots of the Israeli-Arab/Palestinian conflict (hereafter "the conflict") lie in the late nineteenth century, when Jewish Zionist pioneers from Europe settled in a part of the Ottoman Empire designated Palestine by the Palestinians and Eretz Israel by the Jews (in Hebrew: "the Land of Israel"). Beginning in the early twentieth century, under British rule, the Palestinian and Zionist national movements began to realize that they were competing for the same territory. This led to violent clashes between the Zionist pioneers and the Palestinians, escalating over the years. In 1947, the United Nations voted for the establishment of neighboring Palestinian and Jewish states, after which the 1948 War broke out. Israel won the war, in which some 650,000 Palestinians became refugees (the 1948 exodus) and were displaced, for the most part, to various Arab countries. Over the years, several further wars were fought between Israel and Arab countries, in 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, and 2006. The 1967 Six Days' War led to Israel's seizure and occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, whose Palestinian residents rose up in mass protests (Intifadas) in 1987 and 2000. Numerous peace initiatives were initiated, leading to two peace agreements

(in 1979 with Egypt and in 1994 with Jordan), and in the mid-1990s interim agreements with the Palestinians (Bickerton and Klausner 2009).

Especially since the 1948 War, the conflict has become the major issue in the existence, ideology, and identity of the Israeli Jews (hereafter "the Israelis"). Since the foundation of Israel, its institutions have exclusively disseminated among the Israelis the Zionist narrative of all the major events of the conflict ("inclusive" narrative).[6] Generally, this inclusive narrative portrayed the Arabs/Palestinians and the Jews/Israelis as narratives of conflicts typically do. It was selective, biased, and distorted, presenting a simplistic black-and-white description of events. The Arabs/Palestinians were blamed for the outbreak and continuation of the conflict, delegitimizing them, while the Jews/Israelis were portrayed positively as peace-loving and moral, merely victims of the conflict (Bar-Tal 2007b; Caplan 2010; Podeh 2002).

The central historical event of the conflict in this narrative is the Palestinian exodus during the 1948 War. This event created the Palestinian refugee problem, and has great political, psychological, and social importance for both parties. Since 1949, the refugees have been the subject of a major Arab/Palestinian diplomatic campaign demanding their return, backed by a United Nations resolution; and since the 1990s this has been a major obstacle in the peace negotiations between the parties – the Palestinians demand the return of their refugees and Israel refuses. The Zionist narrative took no responsibility for this exodus, placing exclusive blame on the Arabs/Palestinians. The exodus, it argued, was caused mainly by blanket appeals by Palestinian and Arab leaders to leave their homes, and due to fear of the Jews. Acts of expulsion by Jewish and later Israeli military forces were ignored and even denied. The Palestinians, in contrast, largely argue that the exodus was caused by forced expulsion, for example in history textbooks and studies (Abdel Jawad 2006; Firer and Adwan 2004; Nets-Zehngut 2011a).

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5 This background is provided with no distinction between internal and external sub-memories, since this is the way the literature usually treats it.

6 There are various Zionist narratives. The article focuses on the political Zionist narrative which was dominant in the first period after the establishment of Israel.

The Israeli state disseminated the Zionist narrative, for example regarding the 1948 exodus, through the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), the Publications Agency at the National Information Center, and the education system.[7] Until the late 1970s, the state was extensively supported in its dissemination effort by various Israeli societal institutions. For example, research community's studies (Nets-Zehngut 2011b) and Jewish 1948 war veterans' memoirs (Nets-Zehngut unpublished-a) largely presented the Zionist narrative regarding the exodus (see also in general: Caplan 2010; Ghazi-Bouillon 2009; Zand 2004).

The dominance of the inclusive Zionist narrative began to be challenged by Israeli societal institutions in the late 1970s. Members of these institutions started writing critical publications confronting various topics relating to this narrative. For example, many scholarly studies and some 1948 Jewish war veterans' memoirs (respectively, Nets-Zehngut 2011b, unpublished-a) presented a critical narrative regarding the exodus (sometimes called a "post-Zionist" narrative).[8] According to this narrative, some Palestinians left voluntarily (e.g., due to fear, societal collapse, or calls by Arab leaders to leave some localities), while others were expelled by the Jewish/Israeli fighting forces. The expulsions sharply contradicted the Zionist narrative.

This societal change intensified in the late 1980s with the commencement of a historical revisionist period commonly called the "New Historians" era (Caplan 2010; Ghazi-Bouillon 2009). New historical studies criticized additional aspects of the Zionist narrative not criticized earlier, or supported criticism raised earlier. The historian Benny Morris was a major figure among these critics. His most discussed findings focus on the 1948 exodus, published in a wide-ranging book in 1987. He objected to Palestinian claims about a Jewish master plan to expel the Palestinians, while supporting the critical narrative regarding the causes for the exodus. Moreover, since the late

1980s more critical studies of the exodus (Nets-Zehngut 2011b) and critical 1948 war veterans' memoirs (Nets-Zehngut unpublished-a) have been published, providing a solidly basis to conclude that the critical narrative is more accurate than the Zionist narrative (Bar-On 2004; Caplan 2011; Ghazi-Bouillon 2009; Zand 2004).

As for the *state* institutions, the IDF (Nets-Zehngut unpublished-b) and the Publications Agency (Nets-Zehngut 2008 and forthcoming) continued at least until 2004 to present largely the Zionist narrative. The situation in the Ministry of Education, though, was partly different (Nets-Zehngut unpublished-c). While until 1999 its approved history and civics textbooks for the most part presented the Zionist narrative, from 2000 they presented the critical narrative (at least until 2004). Let us now turn to describe the research upon which the theoretical arguments of this article are based.

2. Methodology

The described research examines the way in which the causes of the 1948 exodus were presented in *all* the publications of five Israeli institutions over fifty-six years – between 1949 (right after the end of the 1948 War) and the end of 2004 (when the research began).[9] Three state institutions represent the *official* memory: (1) The Information Branch in the IDF Education Corps, which the main unit for disseminating information among soldiers; (2) The Publications Agency in the National Information Center, the main institution in Israel for disseminating information among its citizens; (3) The Ministry of Education, which approves history and civic textbooks for use in middle and high schools in the national secular educational system (the biggest in Israel). The two societal institutions examined are: (1) Memoirs by Jewish war veterans who participated in the 1948 War (*autobiographical* memory); (2) Studies of the research community (*historical* memory). Thus this contribution examines

three kinds of memories: official, autobiographical, and historical (hereafter "the exodus research").

All of the analyzed publications from these five institutions were written by Jews in Hebrew. The texts were analyzed to identify the narratives they presented regarding the exodus, for example, the Zionist narrative or the critical one. Other characteristics of the publications were also analyzed, for instance, the scope of discussion of the exodus (Glassner and Moreno 1989). Interviews were also conducted with key people who worked in the institutions during the research period: for example, directors of the Publications Agency, national history supervisors in the Ministry of Education, renowned scholars (e.g., Benny Morris), and 1948 war veterans. The interviews were conducted using semi-structured questionnaires, allowing the interviewees to comment on various issues on their own initiative (Mac-Craken 1988).

The research is based on 1,076 bibliographical items and 96 interviews (with 60 subjects, some of whom were interviewed more than once). Publication analysis provided most of the *descriptive* findings (e.g., what were the characteristics of the various memories?), while the interviews largely provided the explanatory aspect. The interviews clarified the reasons for the diagnosed characteristics of the memories, for instance, why a particular state institution presented the Zionist narrative and not the critical one. They also explored the extent of actual knowledge in these institutions regarding the causes of the 1948 exodus. In this regard, this research is different from many other memory studies whose explanatory aspect is often not based on actual evidence such as the current interviews.

3. Findings
It is widely accepted that people or institutions may internally hold one narrative, and externally present the same narrative or a different one (i.e., that two sub-memories exist, internal and external). Here, we are dealing with a

situation in which each of the two sub-memories contains a different narrative (and this will be applied to the three kinds of memories).

Starting with the *internal official* sub-memory, the staff at the three state institutions were highly informed about topics related to their work, including the 1948 exodus. Accordingly, they were aware of the critical narrative about the exodus, and regarded it (and not the Zionist narrative) as accurate. This was even true also in the early period (up until the late 1970s), when the critical narrative had minimal public presence in Israeli societal institutions. Institutions' staff learned about this narrative via sources such as personal experience in the 1948 War, stories told to them about it, critical studies published by scholars living outside of Israel, or articles in the Israeli maverick weekly *Haolam Haze*. They had many more chances to learn about the critical narrative after the late 1970s, when it became publicly very present in these societal institutions, where it has been dominant since the late 1980s (Publications Agency: Nets-Zehngut 2008, forthcoming; IDF: Nets-Zehngut unpublished- b; Ministry of Education: Nets-Zehngut unpublished-c).

Specifically, starting with the Education Corps: Yeshahayau Tadmor, a senior figure from 1959 until 1971, who attained the rank of Deputy Chief Officer of the Corps, said about the approach at the Corps at that time regarding the causes for the exodus: "I knew that a big part [of the Palestinians in 1948] were expelled … it was clear that there was an expulsion … of course we knew" (interview with Yeshahayau Tadmor, Tel Aviv, June 2007, 7 and 10). Likewise, Avner Shalev, a major figure in the Corps from 1969 until 1980, who became Chief Officer, said: "There were events that led to the War of Independence … [the 1948 War] part of it was the Haifa case of [the Jews asking the Palestinians to] 'remain,' and they ran away, villages that they ran away from since they were afraid of the approaching IDF, and incidents when they were expelled. …

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10 For similar support, see, for example : Mordechai Bar-On, Deputy Chief Officer and Chief Officer of the Corps from 1961 until 1968 (interview with Mordechai Bar-On, Jerusalem, June 2006), and Mati Greenberg, who served in senior positions in the

Publicity Branch and in the History Department – which supervised the IDF's publications – from 1969 until 1988, as well as later as a reservist (interview with Mati Greenberg, Tel Aviv, December 2006). Other officers who served later in the Edu-

cation Corps held the same approach to the exodus. For example: Yoav Spiegel (interview with Yoav Spiegel, Tsrifin, June 2007) and Orna Kotler (interview with Orna Kotler, Tel Aviv, June 2007).

We knew, mainly in the south, that they were expelled" (interview with Avner Shalev, Ramat Hasharon, June 2007, 6).[10] Similarly, in the Information Center: Shlomo Rosner, who worked in various senior positions in the Publications Agency and other departments from 1963 until 1999, asserts: "Twenty years after 1948 there were many people here [in Israel], thousands of people, who knew that there had been expulsions [in 1948]. So what, did we [in the Information Center] live in a bubble? … The fact that we were working for the Information Center did not isolate us [meaning, we knew about the expulsions]" (interview with Shlomo Rosner, Jerusalem, January 2009, 3 and 4).[11] The situation was the same in the Ministry of Education, for example, regarding Yehoshuha Mathias, Ada Moshcovits, and Shifra Kulat who wrote textbooks and worked in the Ministry roughly from 1970 until the mid-1990s, and regarding Ya'acov Landau, who co-authored a history textbook for the Ministry in 1964 (interviews with Yehoshuha Mathias, Jerusalem, September 2007, and Tel Aviv, May 2009; with Ada Moshcovits, Jerusalem, September 2007; with Shifra Kulat, Jerusalem, September 2007; phone interview with Ya'acov Landau, June 2009).[12] The staff at these three state institutions also communicated among themselves, *within* their institutions, the critical narrative.

In summation, the internal official sub-memory of the three state institutions was critical, at least until 2004. By contrast, as we saw in the "background" part of this article, where the Israeli official memory of the exodus was described, the external official sub-memory of the three state institutions was largely Zionist (except for the Ministry of Education, which became critical after 2000) (IDF: Nets-Zehngut unpublished-b; Publications Agency: Nets-Zehngut 2008, forthcoming; education system, through textbooks approved by the Ministry of Education: Nets-Zehngut unpublished-c).

Moving to *autobiographical* memory, the analysis covered sixty-eight memoirs addressing the 1948 exodus that were published from 1949 to 2004. Some of the memoirs are personal (about the experiences of their individual authors), while others are collective (e.g., of battalions and brigades, usually written by veterans' committees). Many of these veterans were already dead by the time the exodus research was conducted. Thus, while these memoirs provide the *external* autobiographical sub-memory of the exodus, it is in most cases impossible to determine the corresponding *internal* autobiographical sub-memory. However, it *is* possible to diagnose the existence of internal and external autobiographical sub-memories in certain cases where war veterans externally presented the Zionist narrative, while internally holding the critical narrative. It is thus reasonable to assume that if this phenomenon occurred with these specific war veterans, as demonstrated below, it probably also occurred with more veterans.

Specifically, several 1948 war veterans presented the Zionist narrative in earlier memoirs, but later shifted to the critical one (Nets-Zehngut unpublished-a). For instance, Moshe Carmel, commander of the Northern Front in 1948, provided the Zionist narrative in his 1949 memoir, but in a 1978 newspaper article and a 1989 memoir followed the critical narrative (Carmel 1949, 1978, 1989). There can be no doubt that in 1949 he was already aware of the critical narrative from personal experience (as he wrote later, and also because in 1948 he gave written orders to expel Palestinians, which were traced in the 1980s), but did not present it publicly (Morris 2001). The same applies to Shmuel (Mula) Cohen, commander of the Iftach Brigade in 1948 (the 1970 and 1978 Brigade memoirs in contrast to the 1989 and 2000 memoirs) (Respectively: Even-Nur 1970, Hashavya 1978, Cohen 1989, Cohen 2000); and Nahum Golan, commander of the Golany Brigade in 1948 (the 1950 and 1980 Brigade memoirs in contrast to the 1989

11 The same was said by other members of the Information Center staff, for example, by Nurit Braverman who worked in senior positions from 1970 until 2003, including as the Publications Agency Director (written interview with Nurit Braverman, April 2007); by Haiim Ofaz who worked in senior positions from 1961 until 2000, including as the Publications

Agency Director (interview with Haiim Ofaz, Jerusalem, December 2006); and by Doron Shohet who was the Director of the Center from 1996 until 2003 (interview with Doron Shohet, Herzelia, December 2006).

12 The situation was also the same regarding the National History and Civics Supervisors who took part in approving the textbooks, see: Shlomo Netser,

history supervisor from 1970 to 1993 (interviews with Shlomo Netser, Tel Aviv, September 2007, May 2009); Michael Yaron, history supervisor from 1993 to at least 2007 (interview with Michael Yaron, Jerusalem, December); and Dan Gilady, civics supervisor from 1973 to 1993 (interview with Dan Gilady, Tel Aviv, September 2007).

memoir) (Respectively: Etsyony 1950, Batelhaim 1980, Golan 1989). Likewise, Ben Dunkelman, commander of the 7th Brigade in 1948, included in the draft of his memoir a paragraph saying that he was given an order to expel the residents of the Palestinian city of Nazareth (which he refused to carry out), but ultimately omitted it from his 1977 memoir (Dunkelman 1977; Kidron 2001). Similarly, in 1978 there was controversy in Israel over the memoir of Yitzhak Rabin, previously Israel's Premier but in 1948 a mid-level officer. In the draft of his memoir Rabin included a section describing the 1948 expulsion of the residents of the Palestinian towns Lydda and Ramle. The section was censored by a special ministerial committee in the published memoir, but leaked to the public sphere. Yigal Allon, a senior officer in 1948, disputed in the media the content of the section, saying that these residents were not expelled. However, not only were documents found that prove the expulsion, but Allon's biographer Anita Shapira argues that he knew about it (Allon 1978; Kidron 2001; Shapira 2004).[13] Many additional studies describe similar cases of censorship or self-censorship by 1948 veterans regarding the exodus (e.g., Bar-On 2004; Ben-Ze'ev 2010; Morris 1996; Nave and Yogev 2002; Shapira 2000).

Thus, keeping in mind the description of the Israeli external autobiographical memory in the "Background" section above, we can talk about two general periods of autobiographical memory: until the 1970s, and from then until at least 2004. In the first period, the *internal* sub-memory was at least partly critical, while the *external* one was exclusively Zionist. In the second period, though, the situation changed: while the *internal* sub-memory may have remained unchanged, the *external* one became fairly significantly critical. This was due to various macro-level changes in Israel (feeling more secure in its existence in the context of the conflict, economic development, becoming less collectivist and conformist) and a decrease in the Arab/Palestinian diplomatic campaign against Israel, as well as micro changes among the veterans (they grew old and retired, and felt they needed to tell the truth in

their memoirs before they pass away) (Nets-Zehngut unpublished-a).

Lastly the *historical* memory was researched similarly to the autobiographical memory (i.e., by analyzing all relevant publications). Given that these two kinds of memories are also similar in their characteristics (and different than the official memory), the historical memory will be discussed following the same pattern as for autobiographical memory.[14] For example, Natanel Lorech, a leading historian of 1948, published at least four books between 1958 and 1978 that dealt in part with the 1948 exodus, all presenting the Zionist narrative (Lorech 1958, 1961, 1976, 1978). However, as Mordechai Bar-On demonstrates (2001, 2004), Lorech was aware of the critical narrative and actually presented it in his 1997 memoir, as well as admitting he had self-censored his writings (Lorech 1997). Similarly, while Elhanan Oren completed a PhD dissertation presenting the critical narrative in 1972, his book (based on the dissertation) published in 1976 contains a more moderate, largely Zionist, narrative of the exodus. At a conference in 1989 he explained that he was more conservative in the book due to external censorship (Oren 1972, 1976, 1989). Likewise, Meir Pail, in general a critical scholar, was at times less critical in his writings in order to avoid damaging Israel's international image (interview with Meir Pail, Tel Aviv, January 2009). Many additional studies describe similar phenomena of academic self-censorship regarding the conflict and the 1948 exodus; this was in part due to the peer review process (regarding self-censorship and external censorship see section 4.5., "Discussion") (e.g., Bar-On 2004; Ghazi-Bouillon 2009; Morris 1996; Nave and Yogev 2002; Pappe 1993; Shapira 2000; and Zand 2004).

Thus, here too, we can talk about two periods of memory: until the late 1970s, and from then until at least 2004. In the first period, the *internal* historical sub-memory was at least partly critical, while the *external* one was exclusively Zionist. In the second period, though, the situation changed: while the *internal* sub-memory maybe remained

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13 That is, both Rabin's and Allon's external sub-memories presented the Zionist narrative, while their internal sub-memories held the critical one.

14 For a general discussion of the relevant findings about historical memory see: Nets-Zehngut 2011b.

as before, the *external* one became mostly critical (and since the late 1980s almost exclusively so). The causes for this change were largely the macro-level ones discussed above regarding the autobiographical memory (e.g., the conflict's situation, economic development and less collectivism; Nets-Zehngut unpublished-a).

In summary, evidence was found for the existence of internal and external sub-memories in each of the three kinds of memory investigated. Thus, the research hypothesis was confirmed.

4. Discussion

We now turn to the various theoretical contributions that flow from realizing the existence of internal and external sub-memories. These contributions are discussed in relation to the common circumstances in which two main narratives are present in the public sphere, dominant and alternative. Nonetheless, the discussion is also relevant to the rarer situations in which more than two narratives are involved. The two main narratives are: the *dominant* as a typical narrative of conflict portraying the given country positively, while the *alternative* is more critical towards the country, portraying it less positively (e.g., respectively, the Zionist and critical narratives). The discussion distinguishes, where necessary, between the three kinds of memories.

4.1. The Type of Memories the Literature Discusses

When the literature discusses collective memory (and its official, autobiographical, and historical kinds), it is actually typically discussing the *external* sub-memory. Examples include: textbooks regarding the official memory, memoirs regarding official memory, and studies regarding historical memory. This shows the need to place more emphasis on the upcoming discussion on the *internal* sub-memory of the three memories.

4.2. The Importance of the Internal Sub-Memory

One of the topics that the literature typically discusses regarding the *external* sub-memory is its importance. It influences the popular memory of citizens and a country's relations with the international community. These are indeed two important aspects of the external sub-memory, since due to its external manifestation it allows for these impacts.

However, *internal* sub-memory is also important, for two main reasons. *First,* the way we view the past may lead to us to express these views externally. In other words, the *internal* sub-memory in each case influences the *external* sub-memory. Therefore, the internal sub-memory has indirect connections to the abovementioned importance of the external sub-memory. For example, critical internal autobiographical and historical sub-memories promoted the change in their external counterparts to become critical since the 1970s (see related discussion in section 4.7. "The Narratives That the Two Sub-Memories Hold" regarding the second situation). *Second,* the internal sub-memory is what actually directly influences the behavior of the entities which hold that sub-memory. For example, the behavior of war veterans or scholars towards Arabs/Palestinians (e.g., collaborating in projects, voting on peace agreements, or in daily life) is influenced by their internal (and not external) sub-memory. It is influenced by what they actually think about the past. This is similar in institutions, for instance, regarding the official memory. For example, the Israeli internal official sub-memory (of the diplomatic service) largely adopted the critical narrative regarding the exodus in the late 1990s. This contributed to their willingness at the 2001 Taba conference with the Palestinians to discuss aspects of the Palestinian refugee problem that had not been discussed before (e.g., the possibility of some kind of statement acknowledging the Palestinian 1948 tragedy and implicitly and indirectly Israel's partial responsibility) (Ben-Josef Hirsch 2007; Lustick 2006).

The above discussion related to the *general* importance of the internal sub-memory. Specifically, the importance of each internal sub-memory is also determined by the importance of the kind of memory it is part of. For example, official memory is important since it influences, for instance, students in their formative years (through the textbooks of the Ministry of Education) or soldiers (via IDF publications). Autobiographical memory is important as a primary source about the past (via memoirs and testimonies), while the historical memory is important because it uses autobiographical memory and documents in formulating an authoritative description of the past in the studies that scholars write.

4.3. Mutual Influence of Internal-External Sub-Memories

The previous point related to the impact of the *internal* sub-memory on its counterpart *external* sub-memory, for instance, the impact of internal historical sub-memory on external historical sub-memory. However, there is also influence in the opposite direction: external sub-memory influences its parallel internal sub-memory. For example, critical studies (external historical sub-memory) may lead some scholars to internally adopt the critical narrative, in other words to change their internal sub-memory. A partial exception to such a direction of influence is autobiographical memory, where people with direct experience are less likely to change their internal sub-memory about an event because of reading a memoir with a contradicting description. They *know* what happened since they were there. Thus, we can talk about significant reciprocal influences of both types of memories.

This leads us to the conclusion that what the literature describes as "transformation of the collective memory in order to promote peace" (see literature review above) is actually transformation of the *internal* sub-memory. This memory is the one that directly influences psychological and behavioral reactions. However, this *internal* sub-memory is influenced by the external sub-memories of various memories. Through their external manifestations of the past they influence the internal sub-memories and lead to this transformation.

4.4. General Characteristics of the Two Sub-Memories

The characteristics of the internal sub-memory are largely similar to those of the external sub-memory, except for the following main differences. *First*, with regard to the extent of homogeneity: both sub-memories might not be homogenous, in the sense that they can hold more than one narrative at the same time. For example, relating to the *internal* sub-memory – state officials, people with direct experience and scholars, each group may hold the dominant and alternative narratives in different compositions (e.g., 60 percent of the scholars hold the dominant narrative and the remaining 40 percent the alternative one). Sometimes, however, memories can be very homogenous. As we saw, the *external* official, autobiographical, and historical sub-memories regarding the exodus were basically exclusively Zionist

until the late 1970s (and in the case of the official memory also on until 1999). It can generally be said that the external sub-memory will tend to be more homogenous than the internal sub-memory (in relation the three kinds of memories discussed). This is due to self-censorship and external censorship (e.g., state censorship of publications or lack of media coverage of a critical book) that can make the external sub-memory conservative (see below).

Second, with regard to the extent of accuracy: as described above, the *internal* sub-memories of the three kinds of memory tend to hold a narrative which presents the exodus more accurately (critical), than the Zionist narrative which was held at earlier times by the three *external* sub-memories. For autobiographical and historical memories this was the case until the late 1970s, for the official memory at least until 2004 (except for the Ministry of Education, critical since 2000). However, the accuracy of the internal *autobiographical* sub-memory decreases as significant time passes, with the deterioration of the memory of the people with direct experience (Gelber 2007; Nets-Zehngut, 2012b). Thus, we can theoretically conclude for these three kinds of memory, that the internal sub-memories will tend to be more accurate than the external (aside from the autobiographical memory, which might deteriorate as significant time passes). *Third*, internal sub-memory is much less influenced by self-censorship and external censorship than external sub-memory, which is highly influenced by these two mechanisms (see 4.5.).

4.5. The Mechanisms Which Lead to the Differences Between the Two Sub-Memories

When people or institutions hold in their *internal* sub-memory a certain narrative of an event, some things might prevent them from also holding or presenting the same narrative in their *external* sub-memory. Two main mechanisms lead to this phenomenon: self-censorship and external censorship.

Self-censorship in the context of the current discussion relates to situations of abstention from full expression of what is thought about the history of a conflict, without explicit instructions to do so (Antilla 2010; Maksudyan 2009). The exodus research identified broad self-censorship of the

critical narrative in the five analyzed Israeli institutions. There are two main causes for this self-censorship (Nets-Zehngut 2008, 2011b, unpublished-a, unpublished-b, unpublished-c, forthcoming; for (1) also Bar-On 2004; Shapira 2000, 2004): (1) Support for Israel's international image. In light of the Arab/Palestinian diplomatic campaign against Israel, adhering to the Zionist narrative regarding the exodus was perceived as supporting Israel's positive international image. (2) Mobilizing the citizens. Portraying Israel positively to its citizens was aimed at fostering high identification with and patriotism towards Israel. This would allow them to better cope with the security and economic difficulties and boost their patriotism.

Six additional causes contributed to the use of self-censorship (Nets-Zehngut 2008, 2011b, unpublished-a, unpublished-b, unpublished-c, forthcoming; for (3), (4), (5), 8 also Bar-On 2004; Gelber 2007; Nave and Yogev 2002; Shapira 2000): (3) The impact of the Zionist ideology. Until the late 1970s, Israelis from across the political spectrum were highly influenced by the Zionist ideology that views Eretz Israel as the homeland of the Jewish people. Therefore, many of them were biased in their approach to the conflict, including the exodus, and inclined to see Israel as just and moral in its conduct. Unconsciously influenced by this ideology, they were blind to the critical narrative of the exodus, and saw only the Zionist narrative. (4) Psychological difficulties. Some of the war veterans who personally witnessed or took part in the expulsion of Palestinians in 1948 found it hard to write about the expulsions. These were difficult scenes, especially for those who had been raised on values of humanism and peace with the Palestinians, as many veterans were. (5) Concern among veterans who expelled Palestinians. Some of these veterans were concerned that their public status might be harmed if their actions were revealed. (6) It was obvious. Many members of the 1948 generation knew that some of the Palestinians left in 1948 voluntarily while others were expelled. It was obvious so they saw no need to discuss it. (7) Institutional norms. The staff at the Education Corps adopted the norm of "transmitting unequivocal messages." Due to the IDF's vital role in protecting Israel, no risks were to be taken, and the norm was therefore to present the soldiers with simple, clear, black-and-white mess-

ages. Messages that would not raise doubts during combat, as the critical narrative would, being complex and attributing responsibility to both parties. (8) Sanctions. People were aware of the possibility of external censorship should they write critically (see below). This inhibited critical writing among some of them.

Some of the eight empirical causes listed above, including the two main ones, support the "politics of memory" theme (see below): support for Israel's international image, mobilizing the citizens, concern among veterans who expelled Palestinians, institutional norms, and sanctions. These eight causes can be conceptualized as the following seven *theoretical* causes: (1) Support for international image; (2) Mobilization of citizens; (3) Ideology; (4) Psychological difficulties; (5) Obviousness; (6) Institutional norms; (7) Sanctions (due to the exposure of participation in activities that might be perceived as improper, or due to presenting such activities that were done by others, and therefore being exposed to external censorship).

One of these causes influenced the external sub-memory in all three kinds of memory: international image support. As for the other causes, the official memory was also influenced by the theoretical causes 2, 3, 6, and 7 (mobilization of citizens, ideology, institutional norms, and sanctions due to the *presentation* of expulsions done by others). The autobiographical memory was also influenced by causes 3, 4, 5, and 7 (ideology, psychological difficulties, obviousness, and sanctions due to *participation* in expulsions). Lastly, the historical memory was also influenced by causes 3 and 7 (ideology and sanctions due to the presentation of expulsions) (Nets-Zehngut 2008, 2011b, unpublished-a, unpublished-b, unpublished-c, forthcoming). In the Israeli context, the official memory was the one most influenced by self-censorship. That is why it remained Zionist largely throughout the research period, in contrast to the autobiographical and historical memories, which were so only until the 1970s.

Moving to *external* censorship, this mechanism relates to various societal and state activities aimed at preventing the exposure or dissemination of an alternative critical narrative. It is a wide concept that includes many types of ac-

tivities, such as military censorship, publishers' refusal to publish critical books, or reluctance of academic institutions to finance critical studies or to hire scholars who critically research sensitive topics. It also includes social criticism, newspapers' failure to cover the publication of alternative critical books, withholding paper from critical publishers and newspapers, classification of archival documents, and workplace sanctions such as job termination or transfer to a less desired job. Israelis' awareness of possible external censorship inhibited many from critical activity regarding the exodus (Nets-Zehngut 2008, 2011b, unpublished-a, unpublished-b, unpublished-c, forthcoming).[15]

In summation, self-censorship and external censorship significantly influence the *external* sub-memory, especially in the case of official memory.[16] They reduce its accuracy in presenting the past, compared to the internal sub-memory. In contrast, the *internal* sub-memory is not influenced by external censorship and only partly by self-censorship (via ideology and psychological difficulties, only in the case of autobiographical memory). Thus, we can see that self-censorship and external censorship are the main mechanisms that lead to tension between internal and external sub-memories.

4.6. The Politics of Memory

The major theme in recent memory studies is the "politics of memory" (also referred to as "a usable past"), meaning that the past is portrayed in a certain way to promote the present interests of the holder of a certain memory. These interests can be establishing a patriotic and cohesive nation-state, preventing riots among minorities, or fighting the country's rival. They are promoted by state and societal institutions, such as academia, media, and cultural channels (Radstone and Schwartz 2010; Olick 2007; Wertsch and Karumidze 2009; Winter 2006).

The distinction between the two sub-memories, however, suggests, that the politics theme relates mostly to the *external* sub-memory. This is the memory which is highly influenced by political interests. A scholar, for instance, does not have to change his internal sub-memory of a conflict because of a diplomatic campaign against his country or because he would like to mobilize his fellow-citizens. Such a campaign or war, though, might strongly influence his external sub-memory. The two main causes for self-censorship of the external sub-memory – international image support and mobilization – underline this point.

4.7. The Narratives That the Two Sub-Memories Hold

As described, each of the two sub-memories might be homogenous to different degrees. In a highly homogenous situation, there are two most plausible situations regarding the relations between the narratives that the two sub-memories hold: (1) Both hold the same ones. In such a situation, the narrative that the two sub-memories hold will have strong grip on the whole memory (e.g., official or historical memories). Its grip will not be challenged by either of the two sub-memories. (2) The internal sub-memory holds an alternative narrative and the external the dominant narrative. In such a situation, there is tension between the two sub-memories. The alternative narrative at the internal sub-memory might challenge the hegemony of the dominant narrative at the external sub-memory, and at times even overcome it. Such a phenomenon might partly be caused by psychological unease of people presenting an external sub-memory which they know is not accurate. They feel that they are not presenting the truth about the history. In a period of historical reassessment this unease might increase, since these people might be concerned that their inaccurate descriptions will be exposed.[17] The situation in Israel until the late 1970s regarding the autobiographical and historical memories of the exodus

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15 Support for this tendency can also be found in the Spiral of Silence and Groupthink theories (respectively: Noelle-Neumann 1989; Janis 1982), as well as in Bar-On 2004, Mathias 2005, Pappe 1993, and Zand 2004 (describing this mechanism).

16 See, for example, the earlier discussion of Dunkelman's memoir (self-censorship) and Rabin's memoir (external censorship).

17 For example, in an article published in Tikkun in 1988, Benny Morris accused the Israeli "old" historians of falsifying the history of the conflict, including the exodus, by presenting the Zionist inaccurate narrative (Morris 1988). Shabtai Teveth, a leading "old" historian, was highly offended by this accusation and initiated a long historical controversy with Morris (Nets-Zehngut 2011b, in preparation). Natanel Lorech, another "old" leading histori-

an, was also offended by these accusations (Lorech 1997). However, since that accusation, both Teveth and Lorech have presented – e.g., in newspaper articles and a book – the critical narrative regarding the exodus (even though they previously presented its Zionist narrative).

probably exemplifies such a situation. There is no evidence that these *internal* autobiographical and historical sub-memories were exclusively critical or alternative during that period. However, even if they were only partly critical, as they probably were, they led to challenges to the *external* autobiographical and historical sub-memories, which were Zionist. And indeed, after the 1970s these external sub-memories became more critical.[18]

4.8. Methods of Research

The discussion above points out the need to use different methods in researching the external and the internal sub-memories. The external sub-memory is researched by examining its external manifestations (e.g., textbooks, monuments, memoirs, and studies). In contrast, researching the internal sub-memory cannot use external manifestations since they might be influenced by self-censorship and external censorship. Therefore, it should be researched in more private and anonymous settings, such as interviews or anonymous questionnaires.

5. Conclusion

While the literature regarding collective memory typically discusses it as a unified phenomenon, this contribution suggests that each kind of memory includes internal and external components. The research proves the existence of these two sub-memories regarding the Israeli official, autobiographical, and historical memories of the 1948 exodus. Based on these findings, various additional theoretical contributions were obtained: it was found that the literature usually addresses the external sub-memory of each of the three memories, and the different importance of each sub-memory were discussed. The external influencing the

popular memory and the country's relations with the international community, and the internal as influencing the external sub-memory and the behavior of the entities that hold the memory. Then, the reciprocal relations of the two sub-memories were discussed, as well as the general differences between them with regard to homogeneity, accuracy, and the impact of self-censorship and external censorship. Self-censorship and external censorship were identified as the two mechanisms that cause the difference between the two memories, and the "politics of memory" theme was diagnosed as influencing mostly the external sub-memory. Lastly, two situations and their consequences were addressed: when both sub-memories hold the same narrative, and when the internal holds an alternative narrative and the external a dominant narrative, and the different methods for researching both types of memories were described.

While the above analysis relates to collective memory of an intractable conflict, it is also relevant to the collective memory of tractable conflicts, as well as to that of other topics such as nationalism, leaders, and identity. Selective and biased narratives are also constructed regarding these topics. For instance, typical national narratives in the past two centuries describe nations heroically, as unique entities positively differentiated from "other" nations. This was done to mobilize the citizens to the national projects of building and nurturing their countries, and thus plays a major role in national politics (Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; Rosoux 2001). In terms of future research it is thus recommended that memory studies pay more nuanced attention to these two sub-memories, and explore their characteristics.

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18 Theoretically there could be a third situation, the opposite to the second, where the internal memory holds a dominant narrative and the external the alternative narrative (e.g., internal = Zionist, and external = critical). In reality, though, this situation is not common.

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