Cool Minds in Heated Debates? Migration-related Attitudes in Germany Before and After a Natural Intervention

Claudia Diehl, Institute of Sociology, University of Göttingen, Germany
Jan-Philip Steinmann, Institute of Sociology, University of Göttingen, Germany

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Data from the *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* survey was used to investigate whether the debate surrounding Thilo Sarrazin's immigration-skeptical *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (Germany abolishes itself) had any impact on migration-related attitudes in Germany. The book was published in August 2010 and fieldwork took place during the evolving debate, providing a unique opportunity to study the impact of a major media event on public attitudes. Descriptive findings on the aggregate level show no substantial change in migration-related attitudes in the months after publication. More detailed findings reveal a significant increase in skepticism only for respondents with low levels of education, whose assessment of Muslim migrants' integration became more negative during the debate. There are two possible reasons for the lack of more substantial attitudinal change. Firstly, the debate was highly polarized and lacked the consonant national media coverage that is an important precondition for media effects on public opinion. Secondly, there were no additional "external shocks" prior to the book's release, such as a high levels of immigration, that could have made the public more susceptible to criticism of the impact of migration.

In the late summer of 2010, the German debate on the topic of immigration suddenly gained great momentum when the book *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (Germany abolishes itself) was published. Written by Thilo Sarrazin, then a board member of the German Bundesbank, the book was the number one bestseller for twenty-one weeks (www.buchreport.de) and according to media data the top-selling political book in post-war Germany (www.buchmarkt.de). Many political leaders including the Chancellor and the Federal President commented on the case, and for weeks it was almost impossible to switch on the TV or open a newspaper without hearing or reading about Sarrazin's book. The public debate was not focused only on its substantive claims. It also discussed whether the author was "finally" telling the truth that the German public had not been allowed to hear out of political correctness – or whether he was hiding blatantly racist ideas under a blanket of distorted scientific facts. Some reviewers – though a minority – pictured the book as a "fearless" attempt to at last enlighten the public about the failed integration of Muslim migrants (Kelek 2010), while others applied Sarrazin's picture of migrants to his book: "uneducated, rapidly proliferating, and way too fat" (Bernard 2010).

In this article, we examine whether and to what extent the debate had a short- or medium-term impact on migration-related attitudes. As already mentioned, the debate was very visible in the media (even though the book was probably bought by many but read by few). Given the importance of news reports in shaping public attitudes on this topic (Schlueter and Davidov 2011; Boomgarden and Vliegenthart 2009; Lubbers, Scheepers, and Vergeer 2000), it is an interesting question whether Germans became more skeptical in their assessment of the economic and cultural impact of immigration on Germany and of migrants' integration, or if at-

titudes remained stable throughout the debate. We also consider whether education, political orientation, and exposure to the debate had a mediating effect on the influence of this event on migration-related attitudes.

We analyze data from the cross-sectional survey "Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (TTI)" that has been conducted annually since 2008 by the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). While many surveys collect data on public attitudes toward migration-related issues, this one is unique in asking much more specific questions on topics such as the perceived success of Muslims' integration; the economic and cultural impact of immigration; attitudes about high- and low-skilled migration; and satisfaction with government performance in this field. By chance, the fieldwork for the 2010 wave started just a few days before the publication of Sarrazin's book. This coincidence of a heated public debate about the consequences of migration with the collection of public opinion data on the same topic turned TTI 2010 in Germany into a natural experiment.

We will begin by outlining Sarrazin's position on immigration and integration, before presenting the relevant theoretical explanations for migration-related attitudes and the mechanisms through which the debate may have affected them. After describing the data, measurements, and methodology used in our analyses we will show if and how public attitudes changed over the course of the debate.

1. The "Sarrazin Debate"

Deutschland schafft sich ab was officially published on August 30, 2010, but excerpts began appearing in the mass-circulation *Bild* newspaper from August 23. The debate gained momentum in September when Sarrazin appeared in several talk shows, the Bundesbank prepared his removal from office (he resigned on September 9), and the Social Democratic Party looked into the possibility of expelling him. By September 13 the book was a number one bestseller, and remained so until February 5, 2011. By early October – only one month after publication – more than one million copies had been sold.

The book's general strategy is to formulate emotive and provocative statements and to "prove" them with allegedly

"hard" but – convoluted and distorted – data and facts. The main topics relevant for this paper are immigration; its impact on Germany's culture, demography, public services, economy, and crime rates; and the supposed failure of integration of Muslim migrants. Sarrazin considers the immigration of Muslims to be a direct threat to German liberal culture and lifestyle (2010, 266) and claims that this cultural threat is even more problematic because this group does not make any meaningful contribution to the German economy. When it comes to explaining Muslim migrants' allegedly failing integration, he discusses cultural and motivational aspects (260–65, 286–99). According to Sarrazin, discrimination is not a contributing factor in this group's lagging integration (287). Instead, cultural backwardness and Islam itself are held responsible, in combination with a lack of interest in becoming independent and being successful: "*A lack of integration is due to the attitudes of Muslim immigrants*" (289, translated, italics in the original). Sarrazin expects this situation to worsen in the future because he considers second and third generation migrants to be even more likely to apply for social benefits instead of engaging in the labor market (264, 284). Moreover, Muslim migrants have higher fertility rates than native Germans, especially when compared to more educated German women (347). In essence, the allegedly adverse effects on Germany's culture, economy, demography, and crime rates, as well as Muslim migrants' supposedly failing integration even in the second and third generation are the focus of the migration-relevant chapters of the book. As we will show below, several items included in the TTI survey capture public attitudes on these very issues. Before describing the data in greater detail, we need to consider why one would expect these attitudes to be affected by the Sarrazin debate at all.

2. The Debate and Migration-Related Attitudes: Two Possible Mechanisms
2.1. The Impact of the Media on Perceptions of Economic and Cultural Threat
Theoretical approaches focusing on perceived or real competitive threat feature prominently when it comes to explaining migration-related attitudes. After all, they offer explanations for *differences* across contexts or *changes* over time in the strength of anti-immigrant sentiment. Theories of realistic group conflict emphasize the role of threat to *real* group interests, practices and resources; group-threat theory

emphasizes more strongly "the *perception* of threat to dominant group prerogatives" (Quillian 1995, 588, italics added). Increased group competition enhances ingroup solidarity and susceptibility to outgroup devaluation (Sherif and Sherif 1979, 11). The latter is met with collectively shared feelings of superiority, social distance, and fear of status loss (Blumer 1958, 3–4). These dynamics have been shown regarding migrants in general (Schneider 2008, 62) as well as regarding Muslims specifically (Velasco González et al. 2008, 678). Competitive threat can take different forms, most importantly economic or cultural. Rising numbers of migrants and worsening economic conditions have been identified as important factors increasing (perceived) group threat (Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009; Quillian 1995).

Not all individuals are affected to the same degree by changes in these conditions; rather, the impact of macro-level changes on individual attitudes is mediated by individual characteristics. Perceptions of economic threat are influenced by socio-structural variables such as education or occupational status: "Individual-level characteristics indicate in part which individuals are most vulnerable to expressing prejudice when they perceive that their group is threatened" (Quilian 1995: 591). Cultural threat, i.e. perceived threats to collective identity and national homogeneity, is mostly mediated by individual-level variables such as political orientation or type of national identity (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006, 428).

Negative reports about immigrants in the media have also been shown to foster perceptions of economic or cultural threat and to increase anti-immigrant attitudes. Blumer already demonstrated in the 1950s that attitudes about a seemingly subordinate and distant group are not the result of personal experiences but formed in the "public arena": "public figures of prominence … are likely to be the key figures in the formation of the sense of group position and in the characterization of the subordinate group" (1958, 6). Sarrazin, who already had acquired a certain reputation – and popularity – for talking "frankly" about societal problems during his time as Berlin's Finance Minister, certainly was such a "public figure." In a similar vein, the media debate sparked by the publication of his book could have affected how people thought about migration (rather than

just the topic's general salience), a phenomenon called second-level agenda setting (Balmas and Sheafer 2009). The "evaluative tone in the media" about a certain issues causes what Sheafer calls the "affective priming" of political issues (or candidates) (2007). At least some media outlets, most importantly the high-circulation German tabloid *Bild*, repeatedly framed Sarrazin's statements as a brave attempt to address problems no one dares talk about, most importantly Muslim migrants' supposedly failing integration.

Different effects of the media on migration-related attitudes have been identified: direct effects, through exposure to different types of newspapers that cover, for example, the topic of "ethnic crime" in various ways (Lubbers, Scheepers, and Verger 2000), and indirect effects concerning the relationship between changes in the general media coverage of migration issues and migration-related attitudes (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009). The idea behind indirect effects is that even those who do not follow news reports on migrants themselves are affected by media debates on the issue because they talk about this issue with friends and relatives. The empirical studies reviewed so far provide at least some empirical evidence that negative reports on the topic of migration in the media increase levels of perceived migration-related threat. A lag of one or two months is considered to be the most relevant time period for the impact of news reports on migration-related attitudes (Schlueter and Davidov 2011; Boomgarden and Vliegenthart 2009). Even if the debate under consideration here is certainly a special type of media coverage, it seems quite plausible that Sarrazin's book would have affected the attitudes under consideration. On the one hand, it could have increased perceptions that native Germans and migrants compete for scarce resources such as social benefits. On the other hand, Sarrazin's statements about "culturally distant" Muslim migrants unwilling to integrate but rapidly becoming demographically ascendant may have strengthened fears that "Germanness in Germany is getting more and more diluted" (Sarrazin 2010, 393, translated).

2.2. Shifting Perceptions About the "Right" Answers to Migration-Related Survey Questions

There is, however, another mechanism by which the book could have affected not necessarily native Germans' migration-related attitudes but their answers to survey ques-

tions about the issue. The latter can be biased by "social desirability": If there are strong norms about seemingly appropriate answers to questions on a certain topic, some respondents are likely to skew their answers accordingly. As outlined above, Sarrazin's supporters claimed that he had finally said out loud what no-one dared to say because it was "politically incorrect." This element was, for example, very strong in the arguments put forward by supporters such as Necla Kelek (2010). The issue of "Denkverbote" ("political taboos") played an important role in the debate, so it is quite possible that the perception of social norms about "appropriate" answers to migration-related survey questions changed in the course of the debate. Theoretically, these norms might be seen as the standard against which respondents' answers are evaluated before they are reported (Strack 1994). Consequently, a shift in perceptions of these norms may have led to more "honest" answers because the formerly perceived gap between the answers respondents want to give and the answers they perceive as being socially acceptable could have narrowed during the debate. This could have been the case especially for those who have always been skeptical of immigration but did not want to admit it because they felt that this violated the norm of positive attitudes on the issue. As research has shown, this feeling is shared by respondents with higher levels of education and political liberals in particular (Janus 2010; Stocké 2007).

The two mechanisms presented in this section lead to different conclusions about which subgroups of natives should have been affected by the debate: As already mentioned, perceived economic and cultural threat is usually stronger among individuals with low levels of education, conservative political ideologies, and an ethnic national identity. Changing perceptions of what it is socially desirable to think about migrants and immigration should, in turn, mainly affect the highly educated and liberals. We thus expect both groups to have been affected by the debate, even though the underlying mechanisms may differ. And finally, we expect attitudinal change to have been most pronounced among those who have had a high direct or indirect exposure to the debate, i.e. who followed migration-related topics closely in the news or discussed them frequently with friends. We will now turn to the analysis of changes in respondents' answers to migration and integration-related questions over the course of the Sarrazin debate.

3. Data, Measurements, and Methodology

As already mentioned in the introduction, the following analyses are based on data from the survey "Transatlantic Trends: Immigration" (Gustin and Ziebarth 2010). The main aim of this cross-sectional survey is to collect data on public attitudes to migration and integration-related issues. It has been conducted by the German Marshall Fund of the United States every year since 2008 in six European countries as well as the United States and Canada (the number of countries included in the survey changes slightly between years). Computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI) with one thousand randomly sampled adults per country were conducted by TNS Opinion.

Depending on the item under consideration, the analyses presented here are based on data collected in Germany between 2009 and 2011. Our main focus lies on data collected in 2010: the book was officially released on August 30, 2010, three days after the beginning of the fieldwork, and a heated public debate evolved during the two weeks in which the fieldwork continued. Furthermore, the survey was repeated two months later in November 2010 (with different respondents) when it became clear that this would offer an opportunity to study the medium-term impact of the Sarrazin debate on migration-related attitudes. Furthermore, many items asked in 2010 were also used in 2009 and 2011. Taken together, these data allow for a detailed analysis of the debate's short- and medium-term impact on public perceptions of immigration and integration in Germany. Only respondents with at least one parent born in Germany are included in the analyses[1]. This reduces the number to about nine hundred.

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1 We excluded Germans and non-Germans from the analyses where both parents had immigrated to Germany so that it is clear to which group our findings refer. Unfortunately, there were not enough members of minorities in the dataset to analyze their attitudes separately (see discussion).

3.1. Dependent Variables: Attitudes on the Impact of Migration and on (Muslim) Migrants' Integration

Since the choice of dependent variables follows the relevant content of the book, we analyze public attitudes on the impact of immigration and on (Muslim) migrants' integration. Attitudes on the impact of immigration are frequently measured with item batteries that ask about respondents' perceptions of the impact of migration on national culture, on the economy, and on public safety (Zick, Küpper, and Wolf 2010; Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; McLaren 2003; for Germany: Fertig and Schmidt 2011; Rippl 2008). Items on the impact of migration often focus on job competition between native Germans and migrants. However, since Sarrazin's point is not that migrants take jobs away from native Germans but that they tend to abstain from work and live on benefits instead, we concentrate on the following aspects of perceived cultural and economic threat:

Impact of Migration:
(a) Culture: *Some people think that immigration enriches German culture with new customs and ideas. Others think that these new customs and ideas negatively affect German culture (two-point-scale: immigration enriches German culture – immigration negatively affects German culture)*
(b) Social benefits: *Legal immigrants are a burden on social services like schools and hospitals (four-point scale: strongly agree – strongly disagree)*

Items about integration measure respondents' perceptions of how well migrants should or do adapt to their new context. Available data suggest that it is important to differentiate between specific groups of immigrants when it comes to public perceptions of integration. In Germany, perceived cultural and social distance is much greater towards Turks than towards other immigrant groups (Blohm and Wasmer 2008). This is most likely related to Turks' mostly Muslim background. Survey research shows that a large majority of Germans thinks that Muslim migrants prefer to segregate (Leibold and Kühnel 2006, 144). Moreover, recent studies show that Muslims are perceived as a group that tends to be aggressive, egoistical, arrogant, and intolerant, as well as supporting terrorist activities and showing fundamentalist tendencies (Fischer et al. 2007, 379; Wike and Grim 2010, 18; Zick and Küpper 2009, 3). About

one third of the German public holds Islam-critical attitudes (Leibold and Kummerer 2011, 321). This general skepticism about Muslims could have been fueled by Sarrazin's book: As outlined above, Sarrazin makes a point of drawing a line between "good" migrants and "bad" Muslim migrants who are allegedly responsible for "70 to 80 percent of all problems in the fields of education, labor market, public transfers, and criminal behavior" (2010, 262, translated). In a second step, we will thus focus on items that capture native Germans' assessment of (Muslim) migrants' integration:

Evaluation of Integration:
(c) *Generally speaking, how well do you think that (split sample: Muslim immigrants / immigrants in general) are integrating into German society? (four-point scale: very well – very poorly)*

Half of respondents were asked about Muslim migrants' integration and half about migrants' integration in general. This enables us to analyze whether Sarrazin's differentiation between "good" and "bad" migrants found increasing support during the course of the debate.

3.2. Independent Variables: Education, Political Orientation, Direct and Indirect Exposure to the Debate

As mentioned above, the differentiation between native Germans with high and low levels of education is crucial for our analyses. Native Germans with low levels of education can be expected to feel more threatened by migrants economically, while skilled native Germans are more likely to give socially desirable answers to migration-related survey questions, a tendency that may have decreased during the debate. Here we draw the line between those who have attained university entrance qualifications *(Abitur)*, and those who have less school education. A closer look at this variable reveals that the sample is skewed towards the better-educated native Germans in both waves (see Table 1). This does not cause a severe problem for our analyses, though, since we are interested in change over time and not so much in the absolute level of migration-related skepticism.

Starting out from a cultural threat perspective, additional independent variables gain importance: Migration-related threat to ingroup integrity and status is higher for

those who see migrants as outgroup members per se. This is expected to be more strongly the case for individuals with an ethnic national identity than for those with a civic-cultural national identity (Diehl and Tucci 2010; Lewin-Epstein and Levanon 2005; Hjerm 1998). In TTI 2010, national identity is captured by asking respondents which preconditions they consider to be most important for migrants' naturalization. Since this question on national identity yields a very skewed distribution, we take a closer look at respondents' political orientation in our analyses instead (center/right versus left). This variable is not only closely related to national identity, it can also be expected to be an important predictor of perceived migration-related cultural threat (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006, 428).

In order to capture respondents' exposure to the debate we include in our analyses the following two items that can serve as proxies for direct and indirect exposure, respectively:

How closely do you follow news about immigration and immigrant integration issues in Germany? When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss immigration matters frequently, occasionally, or never?

As control variables we include age, sex, and – since East and West Germans still differ in terms of migration-related attitudes (Diehl and Tucci 2010) – region in our analyses. With regard to age we compare young and middle-aged with elderly respondents since age is only included as a grouped variable in the data set.

In the empirical section we analyze whether and how the answers to the aforementioned items changed over the course of the Sarrazin debate – at the aggregate level and separately for native Germans with high versus low levels of education, for those with a center/right versus a left-wing political orientation, and for those who have had more or less exposure to the debate, either directly (following news) or indirectly (talking with friends). This will tell us whether attitudes that typically vary between these subgroups became more polarized in the course of the debate. In order to study change over time, we built a time-dependent variable grouping two to four days of interviewing, so that we ended up with eight time units spread over the first wave (before and directly after publication of the book) and the second wave (two months later) of data collection. Table 1 presents a descriptive overview of the dependent and independent variables.[2]

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2 The differences between wave 1 and wave 2 are not statistically significant, except for education (p < .05).

Table 1: Distribution of model variables by wave (percentages)

	Wave 1	Wave 2
Dependent variables		
Share of native Germans thinking that immigration negatively affects German culture	32.1	34.7
Share of native Germans "strongly" or "somewhat" agreeing that immigrants are a burden on social services like schools and hospitals	26.8	30.9
Share of native Germans thinking that that immigrants in general are integrating "very poorly" or "poorly" into German society	57.4	50.9
Share of native Germans thinking that Muslim immigrants are integrating "very poorly" or "poorly" into German society	74.0	72.0
Independent variables		
Education (lower level of education)	53.5	46.4
Political orientation (center-right)	56.6	61.1
Discussing immigrant matters with friends (frequently)	11.5	11.0
Following news about immigration (very closely)	32.7	28.9
Control variables		
Age (55–65+)	43.4	43.8
Sex (male)	46.9	47.3
Region (eastern Germany)	19.8	20.3

Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010, own calculations.

4. Findings

4.1. Was There Any Attitudinal Change on the Aggregate Level?

We will first take a closer look at the development of direct and indirect exposure to the Sarrazin debate. During the period under consideration, no other migration-related issue was very prominent in the media. We can thus safely assume that any change in intensity with which respondents followed the news on the issue or talked about it with friends must be related to the Sarrazin debate (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Share of native Germans following the topic in the news "very closely" and talking with friends "frequently" about migration issues by date of interview (percent)

* Answer categories: very closely, fairly closely, not very closely, not closely at all; ** Answer categories: frequently, occasionally, never
Source: *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* (TTI) 2010, own calculations

In fact, we can see that after the book launch in late August, Germans followed the news on this issue significantly more closely and discussed the topic with friends more often than before. By mid-November at the latest, levels had returned almost back to "normal" again: The topic seems to be less prominent in the media or was at least not followed very closely any longer, and the issue was no longer discussed significantly more often with friends than before the official book release.[3]

If we now turn to the perceived cultural impact of migration we find that migration-related attitudes remained relatively stable throughout the course of the debate. Even though many respondents did obviously follow the debate, Sarrazin's worries that his offspring will live in a country that has lost its "cultural and intellectual capacity" (2010, 392) were not shared by the German public, at least not more strongly than before the publication of the book (Figure 2).

Figure 2: Share of native Germans thinking that immigration negatively affects German culture and "strongly" or "somewhat" agreeing that immigrants are a burden on social services like schools and holspitals by date of interview (percent)

* Answer categories: immigration enriches German culture, immigration negatively affects German culture; ** Answer categories: strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree
Source: *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* (TTI) 2009, 2010, and 2011, own calculations

The slight increase between late August and early November 2010 is statistically insignificant. This overall rather optimistic view about the impact of migration on German culture is also demonstrated by other studies (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2008, 12). As outlined above, the claim that many Muslim migrants show little inclination to work but prefer to live on social benefits features prominently throughout the book. The graph shows a (statistically significant) increase in worries about migrants being an economic burden between the beginning of wave 1 and the beginning of wave 2. It should also be noted, however, that overall approval of this item was lower in 2010 than in the year after the debate, which raises the ques-

tion whether this increase can really be attributed to the "Sarrazin debate." Furthermore, the comparatively high instability in attitudes might be caused by the examples of social services given in the question wording ("schools and hospitals"). These two issues are less prominent in the public debate in Germany than in many other countries surveyed by TTI, e.g. the United Kingdom or the United States. In the German context, this item may thus measure so-called "non-attitudes" that are usually instable and thus hard to "explain" (Converse 1964).

The items presented so far refer to migrants in general. As outlined above, Sarrazin draws a sharp distinction between

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3   For all bivariate analyses, statements about statistical significance are based on comparisons between interviews conducted during August 27–30 – i.e. before the official publication of the book – with those conducted during one of the seven later interview periods (p < .05).

"good" and "bad" (i.e. Muslim) migrants. We therefore analyze whether the German public follows Sarrazin's differentiation – and whether it gained salience during the course of the debate. Fortunately, a closer look at the TTI data can settle this question, because in 2010 a new item was inserted into the questionnaire asking about the perception of migrants' integration. Half of the sample was asked about migrants in general, half of the sample about Muslim migrants in particular. The distribution of answers to these questions is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Share of native Germans thinking that Muslim immigrants/immigrants in general are integrating into German society "very poorly" or "poorly" by date of interview (percent)

* Answer categories: very well, well, poorly, very poorly
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (TTI) 2010 and 2011, own calculations

We can see, first of all, that Muslim migrants' integration is regarded with substantially greater skepticism than the integration of migrants in general, a finding that has also been shown for other European countries such as Spain and the United Kingdom (Transatlantic Trends: 2010, 29). While the size of the gap between the attitudes toward migrants in general and toward Muslim migrants in particular widened in the course of the debate, this was mostly because attitudes towards immigrants in general became slightly more positive over time (p < .10).

4.2. Did Subgroups of Native Germans React Differently to the Debate?

We have already been able to show that overall assessments of the impact of migration and of migrants' integration did not change substantially in the course of the debate. This may seem surprising given that we deliberately analyzed those items that refer to the specific issues raised by Sarrazin: Migrants as a threat to German culture, a burden on social services, and not willing or able to integrate. However, before we rush to the conclusion that the debate made no difference to migration-related attitudes, we need to take a more detailed look at how specific subgroups reacted. According to the theoretical arguments outlined above, it is quite possible that native Germans with low levels of education, conservative political orientations, and more exposure to the media debate were more susceptible to Sarrazin's arguments than others who may even have started – in defiance of the book's claims – to feel more positive about the issue. In order to look into this possibility, we ran several regression models on the variables analyzed so far (models including standard errors can be found in tables 2A–4A in the appendix). The first model contains the independent variables described above, while models 2 to 4 contain additional interaction terms between date of interview and education (model 2), political orientation (model 3), and exposure through debates with friends (model 4). Since direct exposure did not have any significant effect on attitudes we concentrate in the following on the variable "talking with friends frequently about migration issues."

Table 2: "Immigration negatively affects German culture" (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Independent variables				
Education (ref. = high level of education)	0.985***	1.351***	0.997***	0.989***
Political orientation (ref. = left)	0.927***	0.929***	1.104**	0.959***
Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)	1.137***	1.131***	1.164***	1.739*
Control variables				
Age (ref. = 18–54)	–0.036	–0.035	–0.035	–0.067
Sex (ref. = female)	0.386**	0.386**	0.388**	0.374**
Region (ref. = western states)	0.609***	0.616***	0.606***	0.626***
Date (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10)				
Wave 1: 31.08.–02.09.10	–0.343	–0.057	–0.212	–0.457+
03.09.–06.09.10	–0.395+	–0.225	–0.579	–0.392
07.09.–10.09.10	–0.415+	–0.154	–0.462	–0.451+
Wave 2: 09.11.–11.11.10	0.242	0.435	0.311	0.322
12.11.–15.11.10	–0.353	–0.081	–0.313	–0.258
16.11.–19.11.10	–0.314	0.073	0.033	–0.137
20.11.–24.11.10	–0.108	0.026	0.254	–0.102
Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × variable)				
31.08.–02.09.10 × Education		–0.511		
03.09.–06.09.10 × Education		–0.312		
07.09.–10.09.10 × Education		–0.446		
09.11.–11.11.10 × Education		–0.340		
12.11.–15.11.10 × Education		–0.491		
16.11.–19.11.10 × Education		–0.662		
20.11.–24.11.10 × Education		–0.235		
31.08.–02.09.10 × Political orientation			–0.209	
03.09.–06.09.10 × Political orientation			0.232	
07.09.–10.09.10 × Political orientation			0.058	
09.11.–11.11.10 × Political orientation			–0.116	
12.11.–15.11.10 × Political orientation			–0.086	
16.11.–19.11.10 × Political orientation			–0.539	
20.11.–24.11.10 × Political orientation			–0.575	
31.08.–02.09.10 × Talking with friends				0.612
03.09.–06.09.10 × Talking with friends				–0.464
07.09.–10.09.10 × Talking with friends				–0.255
09.11.–11.11.10 × Talking with friends				–1.050
12.11.–15.11.10 × Talking with friends				–1.206
16.11.–19.11.10 × Talking with friends				–1.890+
20.11.–24.11.10 × Talking with friends				–0.397
Constant	–2.044***	–2.251***	–2.165***	–2.080***
Nagelkerke R^2	0.174	0.176	0.177	0.185

Note:+ p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010, own calculations.

With respect to the perceived impact of migration on German culture (Table 2), the picture outlined above is overall confirmed. The basic model reveals that migration-related attitudes do not show a clear pattern over the course of the debate: The variable "date of interview" yields only a few statistically significant negative (!) effects. Along with the characteristics that increase perceived migration-related cultural threat in general (low levels of education, conservative political orientations, living in eastern Germany), talking with friends about migration-related issues is associated with a substantially more negative assessment of the cultural impact of migration. The models including interaction terms show that attitudinal stability over the course of the debate is also found for subgroups differentiated by level of education and political orientation. Contrary to our theoretical expectation that exposure to the debate would render respondents more immigration-

skeptical in their attitudes, model 4 shows that those who talked about migration-related issues with their friends became slightly less rather than more skeptical in the course of the debate. Of course, we do not know what kind of causality is at work here, but in this case it seems unlikely that the effective theoretical mechanism is that those talking to friends had more exposure to the debate. It seems more likely that those respondents who are more immigrant-friendly started to talk about the issue more often, most likely because they were outraged by the debate. This would also explain what we briefly mentioned above: that direct exposure ("following the news on the issue very closely") does not have an effect – as models not presented here show. Given the very specific conditions under which media effects on public attitudes become evident (Zaller 1996) this finding should not come as a surprise, as we will discuss in more detail in the last section.

Table 3: "Immigrants are a burden on social services like schools and hospitals" (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Independent variables				
Education (ref. = high level of education)	0.503**	0.565	0.518**	0.492**
Political orientation (ref. = left)	0.354*	0.356*	0.358	0.353*
Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)	0.420+	0.422+	0.470+	1.227+
Control variables				
Age (ref. = 18–54)	0.170	0.168	0.191	0.189
Sex (ref. = female)	0.100	0.109	0.088	0.064
Region (ref. = western states)	0.086	0.096	0.101	0.085
Date (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10)				
Wave 1: 31.08.–02.09.10	0.253	0.359	0.606	0.211
03.09.–06.09.10	0.174	0.189	–0.082	0.393
07.09.–10.09.10	–0.686+	–0.477	–0.950	–0.619
Wave 2: 09.11.–11.11.10	0.496	0.473	–0.162	0.684*
12.11.–15.11.10	0.083	–0.095	–0.017	0.145
16.11.–19.11.10	–0.169	–0.016	0.285	0.004
20.11.–24.11.10	0.268	0.329	0.491	0.347
Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × variable)				
31.08.–02.09.10 × Education		–0.212		
03.09.–06.09.10 × Education		–0.026		
07.09.–10.09.10 × Education		–0.321		
09.11.–11.11.10 × Education		0.076		
12.11.–15.11.10 × Education		0.319		
16.11.–19.11.10 × Education		–0.263		
20.11.–24.11.10 × Education		–0.115		
31.08.–02.09.10 × Political orientation			–0.522	
03.09.–06.09.10 × Political orientation			0.408	
07.09.–10.09.10 × Political orientation			0.429	
09.11.–11.11.10 × Political orientation			0.954	
12.11.–15.11.10 × Political orientation			0.135	
16.11.–19.11.10 × Political orientation			–0.802	
20.11.–24.11.10 × Political orientation			–0.367	
31.08.–02.09.10 × Talking with friends				–0.003
03.09.–06.09.10 × Talking with friends				–1.813+
07.09.–10.09.10 × Talking with friends				–0.628
09.11.–11.11.10 × Talking with friends				–2.302+
12.11.–15.11.10 × Talking with friends				–0.480
16.11.–19.11.10 × Talking with friends				–1.494
20.11.–24.11.10 × Talking with friends				–0.677
Constant	–1.681***	–1.723***	–1.703***	–1.761***
Nagelkerke R^2	0.062	0.064	0.079	0.077

Note: + p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010, own calculations.

The models on migrants' perceived economic impact (see Table 3) yield similar results, though the model fits the data less well. This confirms the above-mentioned suspicion that the survey question does not capture the debate on this issue in the German context.

Notwithstanding this note of caution, we can see in model 3 that those who hold conservative or moderate political attitudes became somewhat more skeptical in the course of the debate with a peak in skepticism at the beginning of wave 2. However, this finding is again not statistically significant. Model 4 shows once more that

those who talked about migration-related issues with friends became less skeptical in the course of the debate whereas at the beginning of wave 1, those who talked about this issue with their peers had been significantly *more* skeptical.

Our multivariate analyses on attitudes about Muslim migrants' integration show that these are unrelated to respondents' education (see Table 4). This finding is in sharp contrast to what we know about the factors influencing the sort of anti-immigrant attitudes that are mostly captured in surveys (Coenders and Scheepers 2003).

Table 4: "How well do you think that Muslim immigrants are integrating into German society?"[1] (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients)

|	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Independent variables				
Education (ref. = high level of education)	0.251	–0.624	0.253	0.247
Political orientation (ref. = left)	0.519**	0.544**	0.020	0.537**
Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)	0.274	0.308	0.264	0.335
Control variables				
Age (ref. = 18–54)	0.071	0.053	0.032	0.072
Sex (ref. = female)	0.466**	0.496**	0.456*	0.457*
Region (ref. = western states)	0.746**	0.791**	0.802**	0.743**
Date (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10)				
Wave 1: 31.08.–02.09.10	0.155	0.273	0.385	0.123
03.09.–06.09.10	0.293	–0.026	–0.190	0.217
07.09.–10.09.10	0.064	–0.129	–0.488	–0.014
Wave 2: 09.11.–11.11.10	–0.124	–0.879*	–0.325	0.055
12.11.–15.11.10	0.161	–0.300	–0.393	0.189
16.11.–19.11.10	–0.385	–0.857+	–0.743	–0.350
20.11.–24.11.10	0.026	–0.755	–0.256	–0.032
Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × variable)				
31.08.–02.09.10 × Education		–0.057		
03.09.–06.09.10 × Education		0.750		
07.09.–10.09.10 × Education		0.528		
09.11.–11.11.10 × Education		2.146**		
12.11.–15.11.10 × Education		1.021		
16.11.–19.11.10 × Education		1.025		
20.11.–24.11.10 × Education		1.739*		
31.08.–02.09.10 × Political orientation			–0.453	
03.09.–06.09.10 × Political orientation			0.936	
07.09.–10.09.10 × Political orientation			1.134	
09.11.–11.11.10 × Political orientation			0.417	
12.11.–15.11.10 × Political orientation			0.988	
16.11.–19.11.10 × Political orientation			0.674	
20.11.–24.11.10 × Political orientation			0.543	
31.08.–02.09.10 × Talking with friends				0.508
03.09.–06.09.10 × Talking with friends				0.508
07.09.–10.09.10 × Talking with friends				0.511
09.11.–11.11.10 × Talking with friends				–1.438
12.11.–15.11.10 × Talking with friends				–0.337
16.11.–19.11.10 × Talking with friends				–0.322
20.11.–24.11.10 × Talking with friends				0.780
Constant	0.199	0.562	0.465	0.194
Nagelkerke R^2	0.064	0.094	0.079	0.076

[1] "very well" or "well" = 0; "very poorly" or "poorly" = 1
Note: + p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001; Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010, own calculations.

However, we can see in model 2 that the attitudes of native Germans with high and low levels of education became more polarized during the debate. Native Germans with low levels of education became significantly more skeptical, more educated native Germans less so. This polarization peaked at the beginning of wave 2. With respect to respondents' assessment of Muslim migrants' integration, there is no evidence that political orientation influenced reactions to the debate. Talking with friends about migration issues did not have any significant impact on integration-related attitudes either, even though the coefficients show a similar pattern as in tables 2 and 3.

For ease of interpretation, the predicted values for educated and uneducated native Germans' attitudes towards Muslim migrants' integration are shown in Figure 4. We calculated these separately for the groups that run a high versus a low risk of being skeptical about Muslim migrants' integration in term of the other independent variables included in the model: The "low risk group" includes younger, female, liberal Germans living in the western part of the country who talk about migration issues rarely or occasionally whereas the high risk group includes older conservative males living in Eastern Germany who talk about migration issues with friends frequently.

Figure 4: Share of native Germans thinking that Muslim migrants are integrating into German society "very poorly" or "poorly": predicted probabilities by date of interview and level of education (percent)

* "low risk group": liberal female from West Germany between 18 and 54 who is talking "occasionally" or "never" about migration issues
** "high risk group": conservative or centrist male from East Germany at least 55 who is talking "frequently" about migration issues
Note: Predicted values were calculated based on Model 2 in Table 5.
Source: *Transatlantic Trends: Immigration* (TTI) 2010, own calculations

We can see that the increase in skepticism was strongest for uneducated individuals in the low-risk group, while individuals in the high-risk group were already so skeptical about Muslim migrants' integration before the debate started that a further increase was by nature limited. In both groups, educated respondents became more positive in their assessment of Muslim migrants' integration during the debate. Apparently they either wanted to distance

themselves from Sarrazin's statements or they received new information on the issue during the debate (e.g. from those criticizing Sarrazin) that rendered their assessment of Muslim migrants' integration more positive.

5. Summary and Discussion

We used data from the "Transatlantic Trends: Immigration" survey to investigate whether and to what extent the heated German debate about Thilo Sarrazin's *Deutschland schafft sich ab*, published in late August 2010, had an impact on migration-related attitudes. We analyzed public opinion data from 2009, from the days before and the first weeks after the release of the book in 2010, from about two months after the end of wave 1, and from 2011, one year after the publication of the book.

Our most important finding is that there was no substantial and enduring change in migration-related attitudes during the period considered here. The slight increase in general worries about migrants being a burden on social services is most likely unrelated to the debate, but reflects instead a general instability in responses to this question. We further analyzed if overall attitudinal stability can also be found for specific subgroups that usually differ in their evaluation of the consequences of migration, i.e. native Germans with high and low levels of education, with right and left wing political orientations, and with weak or strong exposure to the debate. Most importantly, these analyzes reveal that native Germans with low levels of education were evaluating Muslim migrants' integration significantly more negatively by mid-November (i.e. by the beginning of wave 2) than at the time of the book's prerelease or one year before. With regard to both topics, migrants being an economic burden and Muslim migrants' integration, the moderate increase in migration-skeptical attitudes peaked by the beginning of wave 2. This finding is in accordance with results from earlier studies which show that news reports on migration are most likely to affect attitudes with a time lag of about one to two months. In fact, it is quite possible that skepticism was temporarily even higher between the end of wave 1 and the onset of wave 2.

Overall, however, public opinion on the issue is not as volatile as one might think. People seem not to have taken the alleged "facts" the book claims to have "revealed" at face value. Those who were skeptical about immigration and integration before the book's appearance probably felt confirmed by Sarrazin's statements while those with a more

positive opinion remained optimistic and joined the broad alliance of those who met its publication with criticism. While both sides held onto their beliefs, there is only limited evidence that they became more polarized during the debate. In terms of their attitudes, the societal subgroups differentiated here did not in most cases react *differently* to the debate. One exception is the polarization of attitudes on Muslim migrants' integration between native Germans with high and low levels of education. Our findings do not support the idea that educated and liberal native Germans became more likely to express immigration-skeptical attitudes during the debate, as might have been expected on the basis of research on social desirability.

Even though we are confident that the modest dynamic in attitudes we found, mainly with regard to uneducated native Germans' perceptions of Muslim migrants' integration, was in fact related to the debate that evolved during fieldwork, it is, strictly speaking, difficult to link the debate causally to attitudinal change using the indicators at hand. Rigorous empirical proof that whatever change we found was caused by the publication of the book and the subsequent debate would require more detailed information on respondents' indirect and direct exposure to the debate via discussions with friends and consumption of different media outlets – plus a content analysis of the way the debate was covered in these various outlets. Research shows that what is important is not whether migrants are present in the media, but whether they are evaluated positively or negatively in news reports (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009). Unfortunately, the data we used contained no information on the kind of news outlets respondents were exposed to.

The fact that we found little overall increase in migration-related skepticism raises the question of why these attitudes remained rather stable in the course of a debate that was in many regards unique in its intensity. There are two possible explanations for this: First of all, it is possible that the "Sarrazin debate" was perceived not so much as a debate about migrants being a problem for the country but more about whether or not Sarrazin's assumptions were racist. As we describe in the introduction, this led to a polarized debate with some media outlets asserting that Sarrazin was bravely

discussing fundamental problems and others criticizing the book and commenting on the positive aspects of migration for the country. An important precondition for media effect on public opinion was thus missing: overall consonant coverage of the issue in the national media (Peter 2004; see also Zaller 1996). Secondly, it is known that news reports affect attitudes on immigration primarily when there are additional external shocks such as high levels of immigration (Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart 2009). As outlined above, the topic of migration was not very salient in Germany before the book was published, so it did not fall on very fertile ground in terms of already heightened levels of perceived threat.

One rather unfortunate shortcoming of our analyses is the fact that TTI data enabled us to study the impact of the debate on the attitudes of native Germans only. As in many surveys, the number of migrants included in TTI is too small to analyze them separately, especially if one is interested in migrants with a Muslim background (for exceptions see Fassmann 2011; Kühnel and Leibold 2003). What it meant to Muslim minority members living in Germany to be the focus of a debate on their adverse impact on the society to which they belong is hard to say though easy to imagine. Our analyses thus cannot answer the tricky question of whether the debate had a negative impact on integration processes in Germany. Given native Germans' overall attitudinal stability it seems unlikely that there will be a direct effect, for example, in terms of increasing levels of discrimination against Muslims. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that Muslims' perceptions of their social acceptance have become more pessimistic. Being sociologists we know that this can itself have an impact on societal reality, according to Thomas' famous dictum "if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences."

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Claudia Diehl
cdiehl@gwdg.de

Jan-Philip Steinmann
j.steinmann@stud.uni-goettingen.de

Appendix

Table 2A: "Immigration negatively affects German culture" (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Independent variables				
Education (ref. = high level of education)	.985* (.125)	1.351* (.352)	.997* (.126)	.989* (.126)
Political orientation (ref. = left)	.927* (.128)	.929* (.129)	1.104* (.357)	.959* (.130)
Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)	1.137* (.184)	.131* (.184)	1.164* (.185)	1.739* (.856)
Control variables				
Age (ref. = 18–54)	-.036 (.121)	-.035 (.122)	-.035 (.122)	-.067 (.123)
Sex (ref. = female)	.386* (.121)	.386* (.121)	.388* (.121)	.374* (.122)
Region (ref. = western states)	.609* (.149)	.616* (.150)	.606* (.150)	.626* (.151)
Date (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10)				
31.08.–02.09.10	-.343 (.239)	-.057 (.366)	-.212 (.405)	-.457 (.254)
03.09.–06.09.10	-.395 (.240)	-.225 (.385)	-.579 (.434)	-.392 (.255)
07.09.–10.09.10	-.415 (.246)	-.154 (.420)	-.462 (.417)	-.451 (.264)
09.11.–11.11.10	.242 (.241)	.435 (.348)	.311 (.418)	.322 (.252)
12.11.–15.11.10	-.353 (.244)	-.081 (.368)	-.313 (.457)	-.258 (.254)
16.11.–19.11.10	-.314 (.243)	.073 (.380)	.033 (.402)	-.137 (.251)
20.11.–24.11.10	-.108 (.228)	.026 (.347)	.254 (.373)	-.102 (.239)
Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × var.)				
31.08.–02.09.10 × Education		-.511 (.485)		
03.09.–06.09.10 × Education		-.312 (.494)		
07.09.–10.09.10 × Education		-.446 (.520)		
09.11.–11.11.10 × Education		-.340 (.492)		
12.11.–15.11.10 × Education		-.491 (.494)		
16.11.–19.11.10 × Education		-.662 (.495)		
20.11.–24.11.10 × Education		-.235 (.465)		
31.08.–02.09.10 × Political orientation			-.209 (.502)	
03.09.–06.09.10 × Political orientation			.232 (.523)	
07.09.–10.09.10 × Political orientation			.058 (.516)	
09.11.–11.11.10 × Political orientation			-.116 (.513)	
12.11.–15.11.10 × Political orientation			-.086 (.544)	
16.11.–19.11.10 × Political orientation			-.539 (.503)	
20.11.–24.11.10 × Political orientation			-.575 (.470)	
31.08.–02.09.10 × Talking with friends				.612 (.1.019)
03.09.–06.09.10 × Talking with friends				-.464 (.966)
07.09.–10.09.10 × Talking with friends				-.255 (.974)
09.11.–11.11.10 × Talking with friends				-1.050 (1.001)
12.11.–15.11.10 × Talking with friends				-1.206 (1.017)
16.11.–19.11.10 × Talking with friends				-1.890 (1.019)
20.11.–24.11.10 × Talking with friends				-.397 (.986)
Constant	-2.044* (.218)	-2.251* (.291)	-2.165* (.308)	-2.080* (.222)
Nagelkerke R^2	.174	.176	.177	.185

Note: * p < .05, SE in parentheses.
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010, own calculations.

Table 3A: "Immigrants are a burden on social services like schools and hospitals" (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Independent variables				
Education (ref. = high level of education)	.503* (.168)	.565 (.471)	.518* (.170)	.492* (.170)
Political orientation (ref. = left)	.354* (.173)	.356* (.174)	.358 (.482)	.353* (.176)
Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)	.420 (.246)	.422 (.247)	.470 (.250)	1.227 (.726)
Control variables				
Age (ref. = 18–54)	.170 (.164)	.168 (.165)	.191 (.166)	.189 (.167)
Sex (ref. = female)	.100 (.165)	.109 (.165)	.088 (.166)	.064 (.166)
Region (ref. = western states)	.086 (.212)	.096 (.213)	.101 (.214)	.085 (.214)
Date (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10)				
Wave 1: 31.08.–02.09.10	.253 (.315)	.359 (.461)	.606 (.526)	.211 (.348)
03.09.–06.09.10	.174 (.315)	.189 (.488)	-.082 (.526)	.393 (.337)
07.09.–10.09.10	-.686 (.369)	-.477 (.602)	-.950 (.612)	-.619 (.405)
Wave 2: 09.11.–11.11.10	.496 (.327)	.473 (.468)	-.162 (.597)	.684* (.345)
12.11.–15.11.10	.083 (.335)	-.095 (.519)	-.017 (.602)	.145 (.359)
16.11.–19.11.10	-.169 (.339)	-.016 (.518)	.285 (.521)	.004 (.362)
20.11.–24.11.10	.268 (.310)	.329 (.466)	.491 (.502)	.347 (.337)
Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × var.)				
31.08.–02.09.10 × Education		-.212 (.633)		
03.09.–06.09.10 × Education		-.026 (.639)		
07.09.–10.09.10 × Education		-.321 (.761)		
09.11.–11.11.10 × Education		.076 (.663)		
12.11.–15.11.10 × Education		.319 (.683)		
16.11.–19.11.10 × Education		-.263 (.148)		
20.11.–24.11.10 × Education		-.115 (.625)		
31.08.–02.09.10 × Political orientation			-.522 (.656)	
03.09.–06.09.10 × Political orientation			.408 (.659)	
07.09.–10.09.10 × Political orientation			.429 (.769)	
09.11.–11.11.10 × Political orientation			.954 (.720)	
12.11.–15.11.10 × Political orientation			.135 (.728)	
16.11.–19.11.10 × Political orientation			-.802 (.690)	
20.11.–24.11.10 × Political orientation			-.367 (.639)	
31.08.–02.09.10 × Talking with friends				-.003 (.920)
03.09.–06.09.10 × Talking with friends				-1.813 (1.008)
07.09.–10.09.10 × Talking with friends				-.628 (1.038)
09.11.–11.11.10 × Talking with friends				-2.302 (1.337)
12.11.–15.11.10 × Talking with friends				-.480 (1.093)
16.11.–19.11.10 × Talking with friends				-1.494 (1.111)
20.11.–24.11.10 × Talking with friends				-.677 (0.949)
Constant	–1.681* (.292)	–1.723* (.387)	–1.703* (.413)	–1.761* (.306)
Nagelkerke R^2	.062	.064	.079	.077

Note: * p < .05, SE in parentheses.
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010, own calculations.

Table 4A: "How well do you think that Muslim immigrants are integrating into German society?"[1] (unstandardized logistic regression coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Independent variables				
Education (ref. = high level of education)	.251 (.183)	-.624 (.491)	.253 (.185)	.247 (.185)
Political orientation (ref. = left)	.519* (.182)	.544* (.185)	.020 (.482)	.537* (.184)
Talking with friends (ref. = occasionally or never)	.274 (.290)	.308 (.294)	.264 (.293)	.335 (1.135)
Control variables				
Age (ref. = 18–54)	.071 (.183)	.053 (.185)	.032 (.186)	.072 (.184)
Sex (ref. = female)	.466* (.179)	.496* (.182)	.456* (.181)	.457* (.180)
Region (ref. = western states)	.746* (.265)	.791* (.270)	.802* (.268)	.743* (.267)
Date (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10)				
Wave 1: 31.08.–02.09.10	.155 (.349)	.273 (.523)	.385 (.516)	.123 (.359)
03.09.–06.09.10	.293 (.356)	-.026 (.519)	-.190 (.512)	.217 (.372)
07.09.–10.09.10	.064 (.362)	-.129 (.539)	-.488 (.504)	-.014 (.379)
Wave 2: 09.11.–11.11.10	-.124 (.344)	-.879* (.447)	-.325 (.532)	.055 (.365)
12.11.–15.11.10	.161 (.361)	-.300 (.495)	-.393 (.550)	.189 (.376)
16.11.–19.11.10	-.385 (.334)	-.857 (.468)	-.743 (.496)	-.350 (.349)
20.11.–24.11.10	.026 (.343)	-.755 (.468)	-.256 (.512)	-.032 (.354)
Interactions (ref. = 27.08.–30.08.10 × var.)				
31.08.–02.09.10 × Education		-.057 (.710)		
03.09.–06.09.10 × Education		.750 (.712)		
07.09.–10.09.10 × Education		.528 (.729)		
09.11.–11.11.10 × Education		2.146* (.783)		
12.11.–15.11.10 × Education		1.021 (.724)		
16.11.–19.11.10 × Education		1.025 (.666)		
20.11.–24.11.10 × Education		1.739* (.702)		
31.08.–02.09.10 × Political orientation			-.453 (.699)	
03.09.–06.09.10 × Political orientation			.936 (.710)	
07.09.–10.09.10 × Political orientation			1.134 (.730)	
09.11.–11.11.10 × Political orientation			.417 (.697)	
12.11.–15.11.10 × Political orientation			.988 (.732)	
16.11.–19.11.10 × Political orientation			.674 (.668)	
20.11.–24.11.10 × Political orientation			.543 (.685)	
31.08.–02.09.10 × Talking with friends				.508 (1.598)
03.09.–06.09.10 × Talking with friends				.508 (1.398)
07.09.–10.09.10 × Talking with friends				.511 (1.397)
09.11.–11.11.10 × Talking with friends				–1.438 (1.330)
12.11.–15.11.10 × Talking with friends				-.337 (1.432)
16.11.–19.11.10 × Talking with friends				-.322 (1.317)
20.11.–24.11.10 × Talking with friends				.780 (1.573)
Constant	.199 (.288)	.562 (.362)	.465 (.369)	.194 (.293)
Nagelkerke R²	.064	.094	.079	.076

[1] "very well" or "well" = 0; "very poorly" or "poorly" = 1; Note: * p < .05, SE in parentheses.
Source: Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 2010, own calculations.