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The International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV) is a new peer-reviewed periodical for scientific exchange and public dissemination of the latest academic research on conflict and violence. The subjects on which the IJCV concentrates have always been the subject of interest in many different areas of academic life. Consequently, the journal encompasses contributions from a wide range of disciplines including sociology, political science, education, social psychology, criminology, ethnology, history, political philosophy, urban studies, economics, and the study of religions. The IJCV is open-access: All text of the IJCV is subject to the terms of the Digital Peer Publishing Licence. The IJCV is published twice a year, in spring and in fall. Each issue will focus on one specific topic while also including articles on other issues.

Editorial

Letter from the editors

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The IJCV is open-access. All the articles are available to anyone on the internet, free of charge and without restriction. This is a response to the developments of recent years, where dissemination of knowledge has undergone rapid change that has led conventional printed media to become an obstacle to communication within (and beyond) the scientific community. A printed journal requires a great deal of time to prepare, thus causing delays, consumes scarce financial and human resources, and restricts access to subscribers only. An open-access web-based electronic publication is the up-to-date response to the need for swift, open, and free dissemination of knowledge as a common good.

This media shift notwithstanding, IJCV will naturally exercise quality control through peer reviews by international experts in the field using the established criteria. Reviewers assess the relevance, contribution to knowledge, methodological adequacy, clarity of presentation, and validity of the conclusions of submitted manuscripts.

The IJCV is published twice a year, in spring and in fall. Each issue consists of two sections. In order to promote debate on questions that deserve heightened attention, each issue begins with a „Focus on ...“ section featuring contributions addressing a selected field of topical interest. A second open section of equal significance serves as a platform for general contributions-theoretical and/or empirical-on conflict and violence. Eligibility to this section is not bound by any thematic criteria.

This 2nd issue focuses on the subject of terrorism. Terrorism has long been a worrisome phenomenon with serious impacts on and implications for the affected societies. Now, since 9/11, fighting international terrorism has moved to the very top of the agenda of the international community, or at least its western members. The special ICJV issue is intended to foster a deeper understanding of this critically important topic. Calls for papers for upcoming issues can be found on www.ijcv.org.

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From Classical Terrorism to 'Global' Terrorism

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This article examines the history and the development of terrorism as a research subject for social sciences. It gives an impression of how the subject's theoretical remit has changed over the last decades – explicitly taking into account the characteristics of a modern and global world and their impact on current understandings of terrorism. Terrorism is a minor object for the social sciences; it was even long considered "illegitimate" and neglected by researchers. There are several explanations for this, which I think my long experience in research authorizes me to evoke here.[1]

Terrorism as an "Illegitimate" Subject for Research

Some of the explanations relate to the very working of the disciplines concerned. As terrorism is not included in the list of the themes classically recognized as important, it has only rarely been listed in the contents of the dictionaries and other traditional publications of the "Encyclopedia," "Manual," or "State of the Art" type, and the tendency of academic disciplines to conformism consequently made it somewhat unattractive. Students who chose it as a subject for a thesis would run the risk of setting themselves at a distance from the academic community in their discipline and of being less well placed than others on the academic market; this risk is all the greater as terrorism constitutes a problem at the crossroads of political science, history, sociology, and even law and it is difficult to set it at the center of any one of these disciplines. As far as the recognized researcher – who chose to study it was concerned – which was my situation in the 1980s – there was the risk of becoming over-conspicuous in relation to one's professional circle and of not obtaining the financing required for one's surveys and, furthermore, of being the focus of all sorts of doubts and misunderstandings. The researchers' peers questioned whether the researcher would not become fascinated by the subject, the public authorities questioned what the actual relationship with the "terrorists" involved was or expected the researcher to turn into a secret service agent, and, finally, the players whom he studied were always liable to endeavor to use to their advantage the relationship which the researcher was attempting to establish with them.

Other explanations concern the phenomenon itself. Terrorism was long considered as sporadic, a stranger to the usual working of societies, ultimately as a curiosity, even if some of its expressions did impress the contemporary public or, thereafter, a few great minds: the Russian populists who fascinated Albert Camus;[2] the French anarchists at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century; the Macedonian, Armenian, and Bosnian nationalists, and others in the same period; extreme left

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groups (and sometimes, but less frequently, extreme right groups) in several societies during the period of post-industrialization beginning in the the 1970s; Palestinian nationalists and also, in the same period, Basque and Irish nationalists, etc. Experiences of this sort have given rise to countless texts, but only rarely have they been considered primarily from the angle of terrorism and with the tools of the social sciences. Apart from news-type texts which tend to be dominated by the quest for the sensational, they have at best given rise to a crop of articles, reports, or books which come under the heading of assessment – a business which flourishes particularly in the United States and especially in Washington, D.C., where the number of "think tanks," specialized journals, and consultants in this area are legion, not to mention the official and unofficial production of the services specialized in anti-terrorism. Nevertheless, a few respectable researchers, such as the historian Walter Laqueur, have on occasion produced useful texts on terrorism. But on the whole, the best publications, those which genuinely contributed new and serious consideration were, for many years, those which tackled the theme of terrorism but which did not make it their main subject, tending instead to study phenomena of which terrorism was an offshoot, an extreme point, a specific dimension of a more general action – such as a national movement or a political struggle. If, for example, I take the bibliography of my own book, *Sociétés et terrorisme,* I find it easy to check that the references which I found the most useful are of this type. Moreover, given the lack of any great investment in the social sciences, it is perhaps in literature that the most informative texts on terrorism are to be found – one only has to read Dostoyevsky to realize this.

Finally, if terrorism is an "illegitimate" subject it is also certainly because it refers to forms of action which are themselves "illegitimate" and which correspond to methods of political action and repression which are themselves somewhat unsavory. The term "terrorism" is indeed particularly negative, there is nothing noble about it, and it is even used to discredit or to criminalize those to whom it is applied. I only know of one period in which

the players have sometimes used this term to describe themselves without the slightest qualms: that of Russian populism and its Socialist Revolutionary extensions, such as Vera Zasulich who wounded a Russian officer known for his brutality towards detainees. She declared to the jury (who moreover acquitted her): "I am not a criminal, I'm a terrorist." Or again, twenty years later, Boris Savinkov – one of the Socialist Revolutionary leaders in the Russia of the beginning of the twentieth century – who wrote the extremely interesting *Memoirs of a Terrorist*.[3] The ill repute which is associated with the use of the term "terrorism" turns it into a common-sense category which it is not easy to transform into a sociological category. It is all the more difficult to effect a transformation of this type given that the very image of the terrorist is usually that of the barbarian, the madman, or the pathological personality – which various apparently scientific pieces of work periodically labor in vain to prove. To speak of terrorism in different terms, for example to seek meaning behind the apparent madness, involves at the outset coming up against a consensus which massively rejects any attempt to understand in this area – in common parlance, endeavoring to understand and explain terrorism is said to be a way of justifying it. However, in colloquiums and specialized publications it is frequently stated that it is impossible to resolve an inescapable difficulty, namely that those who are terrorists in the eyes of some are freedom fighters or resistance fighters in the eyes of others. But in fact this is just one more way of not approaching the phenomenon scientifically and of refraining from offering a satisfactory definition.

The move from everyday vocabulary to a scientific concept is an extremely delicate operation here and one which implies a capacity for distancing and reflexivity which it is difficult to promote. Indeed, at least until the 1990s, terrorism was characterized by the fact that it only hit the headlines occasionally. Outside periods of intense terrorist activity there was no social or political demand for it to be studied and researchers were not encouraged to take an interest in it. In periods when bombs were exploding, or when there were numerous attacks, hijacking of planes or

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3 Cf. his memoirs, Boris Savinkov, *Memoirs of a terrorist.*

kidnappings, the researcher was approached by the media, or even by political leaders, and enjoined to explain what was at stake, *hic et nunc,* and therefore to act as an expert much more than to suggest that a degree of distance be taken, to analyze the long-term processes which may have led to this extreme violence or to reflect on the scope of the term "terrorism." Moreover, the anti-terrorist action of public authorities, usually accompanied by a high degree of media exposure, encouraged the proliferation of expert competences, not all strictly serious, which resulted in scholarly production being drowned in a sea of a usually mediocre specialized literature and of being discredited – in this respect, bad money drove out the good. Journalists surfing on the wave of the news; consultants informed by secret service agents; lawyers, magistrates, and political personalities all of whom were fairly manipulative and themselves working in a closed circuit obtaining their information from journalists and consultants; essayists carried along by ideology more than by the concern to produce documented, in-depth knowledge, etc.: all sorts of actors contributed to making of "terrorism" an object which appeared to belong to people other than social science researchers.

All this can only go to reinforce the idea that, ultimately, in matters of terrorism, those who know do not speak and those who speak do not know. This remark can be extended by another which is dependent on the very functions of anti-terrorist discourse: as I observed during a research visit to Washington, D.C., in the mid-1980s, anti-terrorism is in fact a set of proposals which are the outcome of the interaction of all sorts of players, pressure groups, government agencies, the media, etc., whose interests are not restricted, and this is the least one can say, to the battle against this special form of violence alone. Understanding what is said about terrorism and the way in which it should be countered in a given society may be, consequently, a way of seeking to understand how this

society functions, much more than an analysis of terrorism properly speaking.[4]

2. The Concept of Terrorism

But today terrorism seems to be established on a long-term basis as a danger and, frequently, as a reality which is sufficiently important to justify systematic consideration in which the social sciences must fully participate. It is acknowledged that in confronting a challenge of this sort it ceases to be a minor or an "illegitimate" subject. Now it in no way suffices to advance serious and well-documented historical analyses: it is essential to go to the core of the theoretical difficulties which hinder its understanding and to formulate the concept.

Formulation of the concept must enable us to go beyond the insoluble difficulty which consists in relativizing in advance any judgment about a "terrorist" experience by bearing in mind that, in opposition to those who hold this view, there are those who refute this perception and, on the contrary, place value on violence. In fact, this aporia functions by combining two defining elements which it is urgent to separate analytically even if it means articulating them at a later stage in the approach specific to terrorist experiences. Terrorism must be approached from the angle of the methods to which it resorts, on the one hand, and on the other, from that of the meaning which it is endeavoring to express, but also, as we shall see, subvert.

In the first instance, terrorism falls within the sphere of instrumental action; it can be defined as the implementation of tools and resources whose costs are modest in relation to the effects expected by its promoter. As this, terrorism frequently faces states that rely on military and police forces while it will itself use only cheap, easily accessible tools that it can find within the market and the civil society, and that usually belong to very narrow repertories. Each organization has its own tools, which will appear as

4 Michel Wieviorka, "Defining and Implementing Foreign Policy: the US Experience in Anti-Terrorism," in *The 1988–1989 Annual on Terrorism,* ed. Yonah Alexander and H Foxman (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), 71–201; cf. also Michel Wieviorka, "France Faced with Terrorism," *Terrorism* 14 (3): 157–70.

a kind of signature in the eyes of specialists in charge of identifying the authors of an attack. The notion of "terrorist methods" cannot be understood as a list of techniques, since they vary from one case to another. It can only mean a huge disproportion, an important asymmetry, since mobilizing limited resources will enable the terrorists to deal with political powers that master powerful resources. With a few hand arms or a few kilos of explosives, for example, a terrorist group can destabilize a regime, put an end to a governing power, and in short obtain results out of all proportion to the means used. This first part of the definition of terrorism has the merit of stressing its highly rational character. In this instance, the actor is capable of elaborating a strategy, of calculating, of equipping himself with tools which are within his reach and, if need be, of putting a state which is infinitely more powerful than he is in difficulty. He almost appears to be more intelligent in this respect than the authorities he confronts. Thus, while for years American strategists were working out very sophisticated approaches and imagining particularly elaborate scenarios of nuclear, chemical, or bacteriological terrorism, the perpetrators of the attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11 as it is now known in the United States) boarded commercial aeroplanes after having acquired elementary skills in flying, their only arms being simple penknives or cutters.

Instrumental rationality is not foreign to the world of terrorists. But we still have to introduce here a recent element which complicates analysis of this dimension of the phenomenon: the increase in suicide attacks. For when the terrorist does more than risk his life, when he gives it, without reserve, and when that is at least partly due to a personal decision, it then becomes difficult to speak of a modest investment out of all proportion to the expected results. In this instance, rationality can no longer be the object of a calculation of the cost/benefit type, except if we consider that the choice of suicide operations and the decision of who will be the martyr are attributable not to those

who are going to commit suicide but to the leaders of the organizations who either manipulate or instrumentalize people who are prepared to kill themselves. Now, even if the vast majority of Islamist suicide operations imply an organized process,[5] research, and we shall come back to this point, precludes us from systematically and exclusively postulating this scenario of absence of autonomy and meaning for the person who is going to commit suicide.

This brings us straight to the second constituent dimension of terrorism, which is its relationship to meaning. As a very specific kind of political violence, the political dimensions of terrorism are permanently fueled or invaded by other logics where meaning is lost or overloaded by new elements, religious for instance. This leads violence to be either infrapolitical (and then dominated by economic or purely criminal goals), or to be metapolitical (and then dominated by religious goals, including life after death). The approaches which reduce the phenomenon to its dimensions of instrumental violence alone, of means therefore at the service of an end, must never allow us to forget that, from the point of view of the protagonist, the terrorist act is meaningful. Whether the actors express themselves or not, their action is imbued with meaning for them. The characteristic of these meanings is that they are always different from what they would be if they were not implemented violently. In terrorism, the resort to violence is always associated with distortions or deviations when compared with the meaning of the same action without the use of arms, explosives, etc.

In some cases what strikes the researcher first and foremost is the loss of meaning purely and simply, with the terrorist acting because the meaning escapes him and he wishes to maintain it artificially. Thus, for example, in Italy in the 1970s and 1980s there was a wave of extreme left terrorism in which the only issue was the working-class movement even though the latter was declining and losing its historical centrality and the workers no longer

5 Cf. for example Robert Pape, who suggests the figure of 95 percent in *The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*. And, by the same author, the book often quoted *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (2005).

recognized themselves in the slightest in this violence. The greater the gulf between the figure of reference – the working-class movement – and the discourse claiming to represent this figure at the highest revolutionary level, the greater the limitless violence of the bearers of this discourse. This loss of meaning can lead to the nihilism of the "devils" so well described by Dostoyevsky. Though we do have to be careful here and not apply this schema too rapidly to the facts: the philosopher André Glucksman (2002) was mistaken in interpreting the 9/11 attacks in the light of this model, because, in this instance, the violence was not so much lacking in meaning as simply overflowing with it.

In other cases, what we see is the impossibility of continuing to reconcile elements of meaning which could formerly function together without great difficulty. Thus ETA, the organization for independence in the Basque country, emerged under Franco and expressed the shared hopes of those who wished to liberate the (Basque) nation from the oppression of Franco, to end the political dictatorship, and to express the expectations of a working class which was powerful at the time but severely repressed. At the time, the violence of ETA was limited and primarily symbolic. Then democracy was reinstituted, the Basque nation obtained a considerable measure of autonomy and deindustrialization ended the centrality of working-class struggles. It was at this point that the violence of ETA took a genuinely terrorist turn which at times knew no limits; it was the only way of maintaining alive the myth of an action which spoke at one and the same time in the name of an oppressed nation, a working class with no voice and mobilization against the repression of the Spanish state which was said to be democratic merely in appearance.

In yet other cases violence is associated with an overload of meaning in which the actors attribute a religious, meta-political meaning to their political and social expectations – this is the case, to which we shall return, in instances of terrorism linked to radical Islamism. On occasion, the terrorist act includes, or liberates, dimensions of gratuitous violence or sadism which have nothing to do with the meanings of the action and which have no import of an instrumental type – for example when the guards of people who have been kidnapped, and who will be liber-

ated in return for the payment of a ransom, indulge in humiliating and cruel practices.

Violence seems to be more instrumental and there is less justification to talk in terms of terrorism when meaning is not entirely lost or is closer to what it would be without resort to violence. Terrorism therefore appears in all its conceptual purity when, on the contrary, it no longer maintains the slightest link with the real world, or with a social, national, cultural, or political figure of reference which might be recognizable in its actions. The notion of "pure" terrorism may appear strange. It is true that in reality the phenomenon is political. But the concept, in its pure form, is no longer political. In fact this concept is related to the extreme aspect of the phenomenon, when the logics of releasing or overloading meaning reach their ultimate conclusion, cease to have any relationship to reality, when violence becomes its own end. At that stage, terrorism is the just a question of military or police repression towards groups that have no other legitimacy than the one they themselves decide to have. But in real life the phenomenon is usually "impure," it manages to maintain some contact – even if very limited – with a population it refers to, a social reality, some sympathy or comprehension within the people. Therefore it is this practical "impurity" that makes it political.

Terrorism is in keeping with its concept in extreme – perhaps even exceptional – cases in which only its perpetrator is capable of conferring a legitimate meaning to its action and in which no figure of reference whatsoever can be recognized. In all other cases it is "impure," imperfect, and incomplete. When al Qaeda organized the 9/11 attacks, it aroused revulsion throughout the world, but also guarded approbation amongst the Muslim masses in some countries: in these instances we cannot speak of "pure" terrorism. When the Italian Red Brigades killed employers or political leaders in the name of a working-class proletariat which rejected their violence and when, apart from their members, they had no symbolic or ideological recognition, they became genuinely terrorist – it is moreover at that point that they weaken and become vulnerable to the repression which will put an end to this experience.

3. Classical Terrorism

As a historical reality, terrorism is like many other social or political phenomena: it has undergone considerable transformations since the period between 1960 and 1980. To be more precise, it has moved from the classical era to the global era. Some observers challenge this image of distinct change or break. Hans Magnus Enzensberger, for example, while not minimizing the innovations brought in by radical Islamism which has, in his words, "replaced the omniscient and all powerful Central Committee by a flexible network," insists on recalling that "modern terrorism is a European invention dating from the nineteenth century… In recent years," he points out, "its main source of inspiration has been the extreme left terrorism of the 1960s and 1970s" (Enzensberger 2006, 29f.). He considers that the techniques of the Islamists, their symbols, the style of their communiqués, etc., borrow on a wide scale from the extreme left groups of the past. One might add, to go for a moment in his direction, that the practice of suicide is not a novelty in terrorism. The terrorists of the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century took risks which verged on suicide in approaching their target with a bomb, a pistol, or a knife. Bobby Sands in 1981, other members of the (Irish) IRA, Ulrike Meinhof in 1976, Andreas Baader in 1977, and other members of the (German) Red Army Fraction all committed suicide in prison – although it is true that their gestures did not involve the deaths of anyone other than themselves.

The fact remains that Enzensberger himself, a few lines later in the book quoted above, weakens the thesis of historical continuity by noting that the Islamist terrorists "are in reality pure products of the globalized world which they are fighting" and that "in comparison to their predecessors, they have gone considerably further, not only in the techniques which they use but in their use of the media" (ibid., 31). While it would be absurd to postulate an absolute break, it nevertheless does seem to us more relevant to insist on the elements of a move from one era to another, rather than those which indicate a degree of continuity. This move can be observed in material terms by analyzing the forms and the meanings which terrorism assumed yesterday and by comparing them with present-day forms and meanings. It also involves the considerable changes in the categories

which we can now use in considering this phenomenon. In the period 1960 – 1980 terrorism came in the main within the province of the analytical framework of the nation-state and its extension, international relations. Within the nation-state – or, at least, the sovereign state – it corresponded to three major registers. It could be on the extreme left, the extreme right, or nationalist and in favor of independence.

By far the most widespread expression of extreme left terrorism was played out in Italy, but it was also to be found in numerous other societies in varying stages of industrialization: West Germany with the Red Army Faction and the Revolutionary Cells, France with *Action Directe,* Japan with its Red Army, Belgium with the Revolutionary Communist Cells, Greece, Portugal, etc.). It was the outcome of what I termed, at the time, an *inversion* in which the perpetrators of violence, in a deviation of post-68 leftism, took over the categories of Marxism-Leninism to subvert them in the name of a working-class proletariat which they in no way represented. In each instance terrorism challenged the authority of the state, even if in some cases the state had endeavored to become international and to establish itself in a space other than national, and even if it did denounce American imperialism in no uncertain terms. Extreme right terrorism, which was less widespread, was also prompted by projects to take over the state, often associated with the presence in the machinery of the states concerned of sectors which were themselves open to projects of this type. Finally, still internal to sovereign states, terrorism could be the mode of action of nationalist movements wishing to force the independence of a nation, where it might also be a question for them of awakening by means of violence. In Europe, the Basque and Irish movements were thus characterized by their resort to the armed struggle and by comparable forms of organization with, in particular, the same type of tensions between bellicose "military" rationales and "political" rationales which were more open to negotiation.

Elsewhere, international terrorism was in the main carried out by actors claiming to adhere to the Palestinian cause, whether it be at the center – for example with the killing of Israeli athletes carried out by El Fatah in 1972 in the Olympic village in Munich – or on the periphery with, in these

instance, the intervention of groups possibly manipulated by state "sponsors" (Syria, Libya, Iraq) endeavoring to weaken the central rationale of the PLO and to prevent any negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In some respects, the terrorism of the ASALA (Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) resembled that of the Palestinian groups on which it was modeled in particular as, like them, it found in Lebanon in crisis a territory propitious to its short-lived prosperity.

The specificity of classical terrorism, that of the period between 1960 and 1980, is that it unfolded in a "Westphalian" world, as some political analysts call it today – a world which it was possible and legitimate to approach in terms of the categories of what Ulrich Beck (2006) calls "methodological nationalism." Terrorism originated within societies which are themselves established within states; it conveyed political and ideological deviations which referred to projects for taking power at state level or for the construction of a state; and it was conveyed by an avant-garde who saw themselves as being the direction of history, the working class, and the nation. In counterpart, the campaign against terrorism was an affair in which each of the states concerned became involved for itself – which did not exclude appeals to international solidarity. Classical terrorism was conceived of and described as being primarily a danger threatening states, their order, and possibly, their territorial integrity.

4. 'Global' Terrorism

The 9/11 attacks revealed what could in fact be glimpsed almost ten years previously: the entry into the 'global' era of terrorism. This era had been inaugurated by various episodes bearing the mark of radical Islamism with, in particular, the first attempted Islamist attack in New York in 1993, even then aimed at the World Trade Center towers, or again the hijacking of an Air France plane in Algiers in December 1994 by Islamists who planed to crash the plane on Paris – a hijacking which was followed a few months later by a series of attacks in France falling within the same 'global' rationale since international dimensions (the extension of the Algerian Islamist struggle outside Algerian national space) were combined with dimensions internal to French society (crisis in the *banlieues,* social exclusion, and the transformation of the experience of racism into violence).

It is even possible to go further back in time to find the first signs of 'global' terrorism in the attacks using a suicide bomber in a delivery truck which destroyed the American Embassy in Beirut (April 1983) and then the barracks of the French contingent of the multinational force in Lebanon and the local headquarters of the United States Marines (October 1983): many believe that these were the first actions of the Hezbollah, a movement which described itself as planning an Islamist revolution throughout the region, which also intended to destroy the state of Israel and which, from then on, was capable of mobilizing people destined to kill themselves in their action.

Whatever the case may be, the 'globalization' of terrorism was demonstrated in spectacular fashion by the 9/11 attacks. "Globalization" means that the phenomenon can no longer be thought of in the categories of "methodological nationalism" as it blurs the classical frontiers between rationales which are internal to sovereign states and the external or international rationales. The perpetrators of the 9/11 attack circulated in what had become a global space, their career paths took them from the society in which they were born, in this instance Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to other societies, Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan where they met, were formed and trained, creating links of solidarity which again fanned out to form networks all over the world and in which they had the advantage of total freedom of action in the state of the Taliban, which they subjugated. They were at ease in several countries in Europe – in Germany, where some of them attended university; in the England of "Londonistan" and its mosques, where the most radical opinions were expressed freely; and in the French *banlieues.* These players, contrary to popular opinion, were not the spokespersons of an actual, to some extent traditional, community from which they issued forth expressing directly the expectations of the community; on the contrary, they were the products of rootlessness and were far from a community of this type; they were the products of a *transnational neo-umma,* to use the words of Farhad Khosrokhavar (2002), of an imaginary community which tended to be constructed in the poorer areas of the major 'global' cities in the modern world rather than in traditional rural areas. There were rationales in their action which mirrored the most modern possible capitalism – Bin Laden, the leader of al Qaeda, was even said to have committed the offense of "insider dealing" by

speculating on the stock exchange on the consequences of the attacks which his organization was preparing.

Actors of this type are highly flexible. Functioning in networks, they know how to connect and disconnect themselves without difficulty and, instrumental rationality being to the fore, they use the most advanced communication technologies, beginning with the Internet. Their terrorism is also 'global' by definition and is not restricted to a single state in which it would be a question of taking power, or separating therefrom. Their aims are indeed global and go even further than the context of the world in which we live, to be projected into the next. Having broken with the traditional forms of community life, their Islamism, inseparable from the notion of *jihad* – the holy war – transcends national frontiers and aims – including through martyrdom and therefore through sacred death – at destroying the West which at one and the same time fascinates them and excludes and despises Islam and the Muslims.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, were not the first expression of this terrorism perpetrated by transnational actors and probably to be transcended in future, but a climactic moment, an extreme case. For thereafter, numerous attacks were made in the name of al Qaeda, or at least associated with this organization, but without presenting the same transnational purity, in other words, mixing world level dimensions with others, more classically established in the context of the state targeted. Moreover it is to these hybrid expressions, which conjugate world and supranational aspects with aspects which are internal to the states concerned that the idea of globalization of terrorism best applies. Whether it be a question of the attacks in Riyadh, Casablanca, and Istanbul in 2003, of those in Madrid (March 2004), or yet again in London (July 2005), on each occasion, and along lines which vary from one experience to another, the actors combine the two dimensions which constitute 'global' terrorism. On one hand at least some of them are at one and the same time to some extent immersed in the society in which they act, and are then subjected to rationales of social exclusion and contempt and express a strong sense of not finding their place in this society, or else they express their rejection of its international policies. On the other hand they are bear-

ers of transnational, religious rationales and if need be are connected to global networks. They are therefore simultaneously part of an imaginary community of believers with no material basis and of a real community, for example of Moroccan immigrants (in Spain) or Pakistanis (in England), or yet again of the impoverished masses living in the most deprived areas of Casablanca and Istanbul. Their action is neither solely internal and classical nor solely transnational, it is both at once. This moreover is why the answers to 'global' terrorism themselves combine the two dimensions, one being military ensuring defense in relation to the outside world and the other involving policing and internal security.

But is 'global' terrorism really new? In the past, terrorists could have transnational trajectories and appear to be far from having solid roots in the national society they come from. For instance, the three Japanese terrorists who killed twenty-six persons at the airport in Lod, Israel, on May 30, 1972, were acting in name of the Palestinian cause – nothing to do with Japan. And the German activists belonging to terrorist organizations that joined Palestinian extremist groups or collaborated with "sponsor states" (i.e. Iraq, Syria, Libya) during the seventies did not relate their acts to Germany. There was some transnationalism, and some networking then too. But what was at stake was international support for a national cause, and not 'global' action. And networks, which many experts considered to be organized from communist countries, could exist only due to the will or tolerance of some states.

However, in some cases of "global terrorism" the transnational dimension itself is weak, even non-existent, and terrorist action is mainly restricted to its classical dimensions. The suicide attacks by the Palestinians against targets in Israel are of this type. The practice of martyrdom is an innovation in Palestinian action and the latter only recently became Islamist. But above all, this violence proceeds directly from a specific community – the populations in the territories placed under the control of the Palestinian Authority – and the references to Islam remain subordinate to the national struggle. The transnational dimensions of the action are of little import and, while it is possible to speak of terrorism, it must be clearly understood that the latter remains classical and not global.

'Global' terrorism unfolds in a space which is therefore bounded by two poles. At one extremity, it is purely transnational – this was the case with the September 11, 2001, attacks; and at the other extremity, it is classical, at least as far as its framework of reference is concerned – this is the case with the Palestinian attacks in Israeli territory.

Is this 'global' terrorism the monopoly of radical Islamism? It is true that terrorist players other than Muslim do exist today in the world and that many armed movements, be they nationalist, ethnic, or the product of another religion (Hinduism, for example), do resort thereto. But radical Islamism is the only one to combine global, metapolitical aims and a possible foothold within a sovereign state in various parts of the world. As a result, this leaves less space for violent actors other than Islamist, as was seen in spectacular fashion in Spain: the terrible attacks on March 11, 2004, in Madrid (191 persons killed) were in the first instance attributed by the government to ETA before it became clear that they were the work of North African migrants. Not only did José Maria Aznar's *Partido Popular* lose the elections which took place a few days later for having wrongly accused ETA, but the Basque separatist organization found itself in a way the victim of Islamist terrorism, forced as they also were to refute such extreme violence. Henceforth their legitimacy to resort to arms or explosives was weakened. For this reason it has been said that al Qaeda, by its intervention in Spain, could signify the beginning of the historical decline of ETA.

More generally, if we consider classical terrorism, that of the 1960s and 1970s, one may have an image of a form of fragmentation. The rationales of yesteryear were indeed political, obsessed, it was said, by taking state power or by the setting up of a new state. In the present-day world terrorist action has either become more than political, overdetermined by its dimensions of sacred world-level struggle, with no possible negotiation – radical Islamism reigns here, it is metapolitical – or else less than political, concerned in these instances with economic profit, as is the case, for example, of many of the guerrilla movements in Latin America, which become infrapolitical forces. This does not prevent nationalist, or comparable, movements from continuing to exist, still liable to resort, classically, to

terrorism, but necessarily restricted and reduced to their local-level issues.

5. The Subjectivity of the Victims and of the Actors

In the classical age, no great concern was shown for the victims of terrorism other than to hastily lament them. A count was made of the dead but the number of wounded and traumatized was in the main unknown. Hardly anything in the way of either immediate or long-term care was provided. After an attack or a hijacking, once the emotional effects had settled there was very little recognition for those whom extreme violence had left in pain, destitute and often alone. Terrorism was primarily a problem for the state concerned, for its politics and its diplomacy, to the extent that in the name of reasons of state, it often happened, especially in matters of international terrorism and including in the most advanced democracies, that it was impossible to obtain the completion of serious inquiries and that the courts really and truly fulfill their role. In the words of Françoise Rudetzki, the founder of the NGO SOS Attentats-SOS Terrorisme:

> Twelve years after the hijacking of the Airbus 300 [in Algiers in December 1994, already referred to above] we still do not know the true perpetrators or who ordered the operation… I know it and I check it on each occasion, reasons of state prevent any inquiry. Even for the dreadful attacks in 1986 the "henchmen," Tunisian mercenaries, have been judged, whereas those who gave the orders, the Iranians who are really responsible, have never been judged (Rudetzki 2006, 14f.).

But today, thanks precisely to the mobilization of people like Françoise Rudetzki, who created her association in 1983 after the attack at the Grand Véfour Restaurant in Paris, in which she was gravely wounded, the victims are beginning to be recognized and compensated by a fund set up by law (this is the situation in France), taken care of at once, including their psychological suffering, and the courts are under greater pressure from public opinion than in the past to carry out inquiries to completion. Now, as Françoise Rudetzki very rightly observes, "recognition by the courts is essential to enable the victims to reconstruct themselves. The trial is the last phase in the process which will enable them to emerge from the status of vic-

tim, which is painful, uncomfortable, and where sometimes people are made to feel they are to blame" (ibid., 15).

This evolution is part of a much wider tendency of present-day societies to take an interest in individuals, in subjects whose physical or intellectual integrity is affected by violence individually or collectively, in the present or in the past, which has marked them for life. It constitutes the first dimension of the dramatic entry of the subject into any consideration and analysis of terrorism.

The second dimension is related to the terrorists themselves. Classically, as we have seen, their subjectivity is usually ignored by the analysis which either reduces this aspect to their calculations and their instrumental rationality, or else strives to show the pathological nature of the terrorist personality. In my work in the 1980s I had begun to criticize this tendency seriously and even suggested a reversal of the conventional discourse. It is the prolonged experience of illegality, of living amongst themselves in small exclusive groups, of the practice of the armed struggle, and of the right which they assume to dispose of the lives of others that shapes the potential terrorist personality. This is not so much a point of departure and therefore an explanatory element of violent action but instead a culmination, the consequence of deviations which have resulted in the practice of violence. But the present-day generalization of suicide attacks forces us to go much further in our consideration of the subjectivity of terrorist actors even if numerous specialists strive to prioritize the categories of instrumental, calculated, tactical action in Islamist suicide attacks.[6] This mode of approach may be relevant if it is a question of the organizations implied but ceases to be so when it is a question of individuals; it is difficult to perceive the nature of the cost/benefit calculation they might be envisaging.

In the first instance, the issue is one of rejection of an elementary sociologism. Contrary to the commonly held belief, most radical Islamists, those who best personify the image of 'global' terrorism and who are ready to give their lives, do not necessarily come from the most socially deprived circles, they are not all underprivileged, some also belong to the educated middle classes. They are Muslims – on occasion converts – who know the West as a result of living, or of having lived there or, at the very least, from having been confronted with it, if only through the media. They do not constitute a homogeneous set of people, and while they may share important features – the very pronounced sense of humiliation which must be ended, hatred of Jews, the conviction of being at war with the West – it is nevertheless possible to distinguish, on the basis of the subjectivity of each individual, several major types of actors. Thus, Farhad Khosrokhavar, a researcher who is outstandingly well-qualified since he has studied young Muslims in the French *banlieues* (suburbs), as well as Muslim detainees in British prisons and elsewhere in Europe, revolutionary Iran, and Islam in various countries of the Middle East, suggests that we distinguish four types of *jihadists* which he names Islamo-nihilist, Islamo-plethorist, Islamo-individualist, and Islamo-fundamentalist.[7] In an earlier book Farhad Khosrokhavar was concerned with: "how to understand this drive until death of groups of men who kill themselves and also target the death of others" (id. , 331). His explanation is as follows: the move to 'global' martyrdom takes place primarily in situations where the big city and the loss of bearings creates a sense of loss of self and of disarray amongst the migrants and enhances the project of a world-level form of Islam in which the difficulty of participating in modernity and the feeling of being faced with a sharp rejection of Islam combine in an explosive mixture of revolt and hatred.

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6 "Suicide bombing is the signature tactic of the fourth or 'religious wave' of modern terrorism" read the opening lines of the editor's preface to an important book on the subject, "No contemporary terrorist method is more important to understand" (Pedahzur 2006, XV).

7 Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Quand Al Qaïda parle: Témoignages derrière les barreaux* (Paris: Gras-

set, 2006). The "Islamo-nihilist" is an individual without roots, "in search of an Islam which will provide an existential answer to the sense of misfortune which overcomes him" (ibid., 332); the "Islamo-plethorist" has a "much greater religious foundation," he is educated, and gives "a religious meaning to all his acts" in his life (ibid., 334–35); the "Islamo-individualist" would like to be fulfilled as a believer and as an individual and

challenges the West which deprives him of the possibility of this type of fulfillment; finally, the "Islamo-fundamentalist" comes from a neo-communitarian group which has provided him with "a closed conception of the religious" (ibid., 344), he turns from fundamentalism, usually a factor of reassurance, to terrorism as a result of radicalization which is due to humiliation or to repression.

From the moment one adopts this type of approach, the terrorist constructs his subjectivity as he lives an unusual experience, a path which brings him face to face with the 'globalized' world as described by Saskia Sassen (2001), which reinforces the justification of our use of the term 'global' in describing it. Marc Sageman, who established a corpus of biographical data on 172 participants in the Salafi jihad, also stresses the diasporic nature of this experience (84 percent joined the jihad in a country other than the one in which they were born). He notes that they are on the whole educated, many of them being trained in technical subjects (medicine, architecture, engineering, information technology, and business); three-quarters of them are in the "professions" (physicists, lawyers, engineers, teachers) or are "semi-professionals" (business-men, information technologists, etc.), and very few have had a genuine religious education. In the words of this psychiatrist who was for long associated with the CIA, it is "this combination of technical education and lack of religious sophistication that made them vulnerable to an extreme interpretation of Islam" (Sageman 2006, 127). Marc Sageman, in a manner fairly comparable to the work of Khosrokhavar, sets out a typology of trajectories which lead to jihad, in which he distinguishes seven types. Here too, the actors are defined in terms of their subjectivity, their endeavors to construct themselves as actors and to give meaning to their experience. Like Khosrokhavar he also asks the question: "how do they come to a point at which they wish to kill ordinary people and themselves at the same time?" He stresses the social dynamics at work in the small groups of jihadists, their sense of moral superiority, and their belief in a collective future. He speaks of a change in values – from the secular to the religious, from the immediate to the long term, from traditional morality to a new morality and, there again, to the overpowering hatred of the Jews.

Approaches of this type tackle the question of subjectivation and desubjectivation, a dialectic which leads to terrorism and martyrdom; they give us a view of the sources of commitment and the existential meaning assumed by belief, the extent of anti-Semitism and of the demonization of the West. The terrorist is neither reduced to some sort of social role, possibly even an essence, nor to his calculations, decisive as these may be. Nor is he reduced to the indoctrination or manipulation implemented by the organization which sends him to his death, as if he had no personal reason for acting – as if he was not a subject. To understand his action we are invited to take an interest in him as a subject, to endeavor to know and to understand his intentions, his representations, and his religiosity.

The sociology of 'global' terrorism thus creates a relation between what, at first sight, may seem extremely distant: on one hand, the major transformations in the world, transnational rationales and the way in which they link up with rationales which are more restricted because they are rooted within the framework of a state; and, on the other hand, the subjectivity of the actors which borders on the most intimate, their most private personal experiences, their dreams and their despair. But the creation of this relation, which is not unlike a balancing act, is possible and necessary quite simply because the subjectivity of the actors – the way in which they mentally construct themselves, produce their personal and collective imaginary world – owes a great deal to their exposure to the most 'global' modernity, to their belonging but also to their peregrinations in the universe of globalization which simultaneously fascinates and rejects them.

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Post-9/11 Terrorism Threats, News Coverage, and Public Perceptions in the United States

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Terrorists, policy-makers, and terrorism scholars have long assumed that the mere threat of terrorist strikes affects societies that have experienced actual acts of terrorism. For this reason, most definitions of terrorism include the threat of violent political acts against civilians. But so far research has neither validated this conventional wisdom nor demonstrated how actual and mass-mediated threat messages by terrorists and terror alerts and threat assessments by government officials affect the public in targeted states. This paper fills the gap providing evidence that who conveys such messages matters and that mass-mediated threat messages by al Qaeda leaders and announced alerts and threat assessments by U.S. administration officials had a significant impact on the American public's threat perceptions in the post-9/11 years.

Post-9/11 Terrorism Threats, News Coverage, and Public Perceptions in the United States

Commenting on Americans' reactions to the attacks of 9/11, Osama bin Laden said with obvious satisfaction, "There is America, full of fear from north to south, from west to east. Thank God for that!" Since then, bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders have frequently warned of more devastating anti-American attacks inside and outside the United States. Well versed in the psychology of fear, terrorists know that violent incidents and the mere threat of terrorism in the aftermath of major strikes accomplish one of their primary goals – to intimidate their target publics and force governments to react and often over-react.

Indeed, whether they actually stage or merely threaten violent spectaculars, terrorists win instant access to the news media. But government officials who are responding to terrorist attacks are also in excellent positions to utilize the media to enlist public support for their policies.

Terrorists, decision-makers in targeted countries, and students of terrorism have long assumed that not only actual terrorist attacks but also serious threats of such strikes can and do increase targeted publics' fears and anxieties. Our research tests this conventional wisdom by examining the actual threat communications by Osama bin Laden and other al Qaeda figures, the alerts and threat assessments by President George W. Bush and members of his administration as well as the TV-network coverage of these pronouncements and by comparing them with trends in the American public's perceptions of threat in the post-9/11 era.

There is a growing body of research on the importance and effectiveness of the media in the terrorist scheme to get the attention of and intimidate their various target audiences – friends and foes alike (Schmid and de Graaf 1982; Alali and Eke 1991, Paletz and Schmid 1992; Weiman and Winn 1994; Nacos 1996, 2002). But with few exceptions (Kellner 2005; Nacos 2002; Miller 1980; Crelinsten 1997) there is a dearth of sound research that illuminates the roles of

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public communication, mass media, and public opinion in the politics of counterterrorism. As for public reaction to terrorism news, some researchers have concluded that exposure to television is less predictive of high levels of fear than are viewers' personal characteristics (Rubin et al. 2003), but there is also evidence that heavy consumers of TV news are far more likely to perceive the threat of terrorism in the United States as high than are people who pay less attention to the news (Nisbet and Shanahan 2004). Moreover, recent research has demonstrated that individuals' assessments of the terrorist threat affect their support for or opposition to counterterrorist policies (Nisbet and Shanahan 2004; Huddy et al. 2005; Kushner 2005).

1. News as Predominant Source of Public Affairs Information

More than eighty years ago, before the advent of radio and television, Lippmann ([1922] 1997) observed that what people know about the world around them is mostly the result of second-hand knowledge acquired by reading newspapers. In modern-day mass societies, people are even more dependent on the news; they have "nowhere else to turn for information about public affairs and for cues on how to frame and interpret that information" (Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992, 2). Even when individuals witness events, such as a devastating terror attack or massive anti-war demonstrations, or when people are affected by socio-economic developments, such as high unemployment or increasing energy costs, they are still likely to depend on the news to explain the reasons, consequences, and political significance of what they have experienced personally. As Page and Shapiro (1992, 340) put it, the public "often responds not to events or social trends but to *reported events*."

Decisions on what and whom to present in the news and how to present them are often influenced less by ideological bias than by news organizations' focus on authoritative voices that they find at the most influential places of the executive branch. Administration officials dominate foreign policy and national security news, especially during international crises that involve the United States (Nacos 1990; Dorman and Livingston 1994; Cook 1994; Mermin 1999; Entman 2004). As Page and Shapiro (1992, 367) pointed out before Americans became the targets of catastrophic terrorism:

In matters of foreign policy, the executive branch of government often controls access to information, and it can sometimes conceal or misrepresent reality without being challenged. The political opposition is often intimidated or co-opted. Journalists, even when they are aware of what is going on, sometimes willingly hold back awkward truths in the name of "national security."

2. Propaganda of Fear and Terrorism as Media Event

Nineteenth century anarchists and radical social reformers recognized that they were able to send powerful messages to audiences by committing violence; they therefore defined terrorism as "propaganda by the deed" or "propaganda of the deed." Their idea was that terrorist strikes would drive fear into targeted societies and make them amenable to the revolutionary changes they sought. Spreading fear is central to terrorist and counterterrorist rhetoric and persuasion directed at audiences in whose interest the leaders of terrorist organizations and the governmental leaders of targeted countries claim to act. According to Pratkanis and Aronson (1991, 165), such fear persuasion is especially effective when it accomplishes the following, "(1) it scares the hell out of people, (2) it offers a specific recommendation for overcoming the fear-arousing threat, (3) the recommended action is perceived as effective for reducing the threat, and (4) the message recipient believes that he or she can perform the recommended action." Before and after 9/11, Osama bin Laden's demagoguery aimed often not only to threaten Americans and Westerners but also to accomplish the four objectives of fear propaganda among potential sympathizers. President George W. Bush and his administration, too, made their fear appeals along the four propaganda objectives in order to enlist broad public support for their post-9/11 agenda. To be sure, not all fear appeals succeed – but in the face of violent events that rise to the level of "media events" or "media spectaculars," the mass public pays attention to appeals that boil down to persuasion of fear.

Communication scholars distinguish between communication as transmission and communication as ritual. Whereas transmission communication means disseminating information "farther and faster, eclipsing time and transcending space" (Carey 1992, 17), ritual communication refers to the "sacred ceremony that draws persons together in fellowship and communality" (Carey 1992, 18).

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Communication as ritual has been discussed in the context of terrorism with respect to what Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz (1992) defined as "media events." In its original meaning, a media event is televised live and preplanned (e.g., John F. Kennedy's funeral, the royal wedding of Charles and Diana, Olympic Games) and in fact is co-produced by television networks and organizing governments or other public bodies. Considering terrorist spectaculars during the 1980s, Gabriel Weimann (1987, 21) suggested that "there are attributes shared by certain terrorist events and the conceptualization of media events." More recently, Elihu Katz and Tamar Liebes (2007) concluded that disruptive, threatening events, such as disaster, terror and war have actually upstaged the ceremonial "media events" and that terrorism events "are obvious co-productions of perpetrators and broadcasters" (Katz and Liebes 2007, 164). Unlike Weiman, Katz, and Liebes, Douglas Kellner calls the 9/11 attacks explicitly "shocking global media events" that were used by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda on the one hand and President George W. Bush and his supporters on the other to advance their respective agendas and geopolitical designs (Kellner 2007, 25).

Following the events of 9/11, it was President Bush who "articulated the escalating patriotism, vilification of the terrorists, and demand for stern military retaliation," as Kellner (2006, 165) put it. The news media, too, followed a melodramatic storyline that pitted the victimized nation against the ultimate villain. Based on a qualitative content analysis of Fox News on the afternoon of September 11, 2001, Anker (2005, 35) concluded, "Melodrama defined America as a heroic redeemer with a mandate to act because of an injury committed by a hostile villain." While the virtuous nation and its heroes received copious and prominent news coverage, so did the villain-in-chief Osama bin Laden and those of his followers who killed themselves to kill thousands of innocent Americans. Indeed, in the months following the 9/11 attacks, bin Laden received more attention in television news than President Bush (Nacos 2002). This high degree of attention to bin Laden's messages of hate and threat fit perfectly into the story about "the evil-doer," as President Bush called the al Qaeda chief, and the patriotic warriors dispatched to hunt down bin Laden and, later on, to remove another threatening "evil," Iraq's Saddam Hussein, from power.

Both entertainment and news media have always paid extraordinary attention to violence regardless whether in the form of crimes or acts of terrorism (Bok 1998; Shanahan and Morgan 1999). Especially in television network news and local news programs terrorism outpaced by far other important events, issues, and problems. According to Iyengar (1991, 27), "Between 1981 and 1986, more news stories were broadcast [by the three TV networks ABC, CBS, and NBC] on terrorism than on poverty, unemployment, racial inequality, and crime combined. Hijackings, hostage situations, and similar events have been emblazoned on the public consciousness." Research has also established that both the volume of terrorism coverage and the placement of terrorism stories within a broadcast affect the public agenda (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Nacos 1996): when the number of terrorism stories increased, the public's perception of terrorism as a major national problem went up. Lead stories in TV newscasts proved even more potent in putting terrorism high on the public agenda. Although already over-covered in the 1980s, terrorism was far more in the news in the 1990s, when major anti-American attacks took place inside the United States (the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995) and abroad (the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996, the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the suicide attack on the USS Cole in 2000). But the post-9/11 terrorism-related news outpaced all records previously set by high volumes of terrorism coverage. With terrorism high on the news agenda, the public followed the media's lead. For the eighteen months following the events of 9/11 Kern, Just, and Norris (2003) found a correlation between the number of terrorism stories in the three TV networks' early evening news broadcasts and the public's ranking of terrorism as the country's most important problem. Our study covers a significantly longer time period.

Research has also established that "[b]y calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, television news influences the standards by which governments, presidents, politics, policies, and candidates for public office are judged" (Iyengar and Kinder 1987, 63). Moreover, the news also cues audiences to judge a president's character in the context of heavily and prominently covered events, problems, or developments. Given that American

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presidents are widely regarded as the nation's protectors-in-chief and managers of major crises, one would assume that this priming effect of the media provides citizens with the news parameters within which they grade the performance of their presidents in the face of terrorist strikes and threats. In the past, the approval ratings of presidents increased – often significantly – during and after terrorist incidents and in the wake of military responses to terrorism (Nacos 1996, 2002, 2006).

3. Mass-Mediated Threat Messages and the Public: Three Hypotheses

Based on the literature in the field and our recollections of the news after 9/11 we expected our research to provide evidence for the following:

(1) That threat messages from both Osama bin Laden and his closest associates as well as the Bush administration's official terror-alerts and other threat messages were heavily covered and prominently placed by the news media, including TV newscasts. Since bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders were in hiding and only able to communicate via audio and video tapes, we expected to find that President Bush and other administration officials were the dominant news sources covered with respect to threat warnings, right behind media personnel such as news anchors, reporters, and correspondents.

(2) That the news about the threat of further terrorist attacks influenced how Americans perceived the severity of the terrorist threat to the United States in general, to their communities, and to their own well-being and that of their families in particular. We also expected to find that the overall volume of threat messages affected how the public ranked terrorism as a major problem the country was facing.

(3) That Washington's official terror alerts and the news coverage of them as well as other mass-mediated threat messages conveyed by administration officials affected the public's evaluation of President Bush's job performance in general and his handling of terrorism in particular. In the early months of the Iran Hostage Crisis in 1979–80,

Iranians' rhetorical attacks on President Carter and the United States contributed to the significant increases in Carter's public approval (Nacos 1996, chapter 5); we therefore hypothesized that threat messages from bin Laden and others in the al Qaeda leadership would have positive effects on President Bush's approval ratings.

4. Research Methodology and Data

Television news is the most important source of information for the majority of the public. While the overall audience of cable TV news has steadily grown in the last decade, the nightly network news broadcasts of ABC News, CBS News, and NBC News still outpace by far all individual news programs on cable television. For this reason, we chose the early evening TV newscasts of the three networks for our content analysis. Because the number of pertinent news segments was high, we did not work with full transcripts but coded abstracts available from Vanderbilt University's Television News Archive. Our reading of the abstracts indicated that they contained the basic information on reports about the threat of terrorism. We searched for segments that contained the terms threat(s), alert(s), or warning(s) in the context of terrorism for a thirty-nine-month period (October 1, 2001, to December 31, 2004). We also searched for reports that mentioned messages, statements, or tapes as well as bin Laden or al Qaeda themselves. A close reading of a sample of abstracts and full transcripts of nightly network news convinced us that literally all of these bin Laden/al Qaeda messages contained threats or warnings of future terrorist attacks. We retrieved a total of 373 relevant story abstracts, of which ABC News broadcast 32 percent, CBS News 34 percent, and NBC News 34 percent. We also retrieved a small number of newscast transcripts from the Lexis/Nexis news archives for a qualitative analysis of pertinent segments.[1]

In our quantitative content analyses we coded the network that broadcast a particular segment, the placement of each item as a lead or non-lead story, and the length of the

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1 Because the Vanderbilt TV news summaries provide the air times for each segment but the Lexis/Nexis transcripts do not, we compared the length of news segments about changes in the official terror alert levels either in terms of minutes and seconds or word counts.

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segment. Coders identified the sources of threat messages, such as the President, the Secretary of Homeland Security, members of Congress, experts, members of the general public, foreign sources, Osama bin Laden, and media sources (anchors, correspondents, reporters, etc.), who have come to make up the bulk of news sources in both broadcast and print media (Nacos 1990, 1996). Finally, our coders categorized the type(s) of message(s) contained in each news segment: for example, increase or decrease of the national terrorism threat alert level; announcements of official threat warnings without increasing the color-coded alert scheme; and broadcasts of and reporting on bin Laden/al Qaeda. Given the fairly uncomplicated coding task, our coders achieved high reliability in their test coding. After a first reliability test in which our coders agreed in their coding of 90 percent of message sources and 82 percent of the types of messages, the coders then achieved 96 percent agreement for both in a second set of codings.

In addition, looking at the broader media environment, we searched open sources on the Internet for dates, abstracts, and transcripts of audio and videotaped messages released by bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders, and for statements by U.S. administration officials alerting the public to specific terror threats or speaking of terrorism threats against the American homeland in more general terms. We coded these segments parallel to our TV coding, identifying the sources and categorizing the types of messages, in order to examine the effect of these mediated realities. Here, the British *Guardian*'s timeline of bin Laden tapes was helpful as were the online archives of the White House and the Department of Homeland Security.

Finally, we retrieved public opinion survey questions about Americans' fears, concerns, worries, and assessments of the terrorist threat as well as questions on President Bush's overall and terrorism-specific approval rating from September 11, 2001 through December 31, 2005. It is worth noting that a search for "terrorism" produced four hundred survey items (from the iPOLL archive of the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connect-

icut), during the whole of the more than twenty-one-year period from January 1, 1980, when the Iran Hostage Crisis made headlines, to September 10, 2001, the day before the 9/11 attacks. But for the just over four years from September 11, 2001, to December 31, 2005, the same keyword search produced a total of 3,235 survey questions.[2] From the iPOLL archive, the "Polling the Nations" archive, the Marist College Institute for Public Opinion, and several other polling institutions we collected identical questions, preferably asked by the same survey organizations and repeated over time, in order to determine short- and long-term trends.[3]

In the retrieval process, we selected polls that revealed the public's more general concerns about future terrorism, catastrophic terrorist attacks in particular, and how these perceptions related to their own communities and to themselves and their families. Out of thirty-five repeated questions through the years, we focused further on responses to seven questions dealing with: concern about terrorist attacks over different time horizons at the national level, terrorism affecting one personally, terrorism as most the important issue facing the country, and approval of Bush in general and in his handling of terrorism.[4]

We used these questions to explore the relationship between public perceptions about terrorism, threat pronouncements by al Qaeda leaders and U.S. administration officials, and the news coverage of such threats.

5. Research Findings
5.1. Television News: Covering and Magnifying Terrorist Threats
"The United States is back on orange alert," Dan Rather said at the top of the CBS Evening News on May 20, 2003. According to Rather, "President Bush today approved raising the national terror alert from yellow, meaning an elevated risk of a terror attack, to orange, meaning there is now considered to be a high risk." In the following 3½ minutes Washington correspondent Bob Orr explained that officials in Washington "say they have no concrete information pointing to any imminent terror attack any-

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[2] Searching on "terror%" the corresponding numbers are 976 and 6,718 respectively.

[3] When we had more then one time point in a month, we took a monthly average.

[4] Complete question wordings and time points are available from the authors.

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where in the U.S. But it's fair to say here in Washington, the level of worry is as high as it's been since September 11th." After comments by Asa Hutchinson, the Undersecretary of Homeland Security, and Randall Larson of the Anser Institute for Homeland Security, Rather asked CBS News Pentagon correspondent David Martin, "David, how imminent is a possible terror attack believed to be?" Martin's alarming answer: "Very imminent, Dan, if you believe the intelligence, which consists primarily of intercepted conversations among known al-Qaeda operatives talking among themselves about something big that is going to happen in the next two or three days." Ten days later, Jane Clayson, sitting in for Dan Rather as anchor of the CBS Evening News announced, "In this country, the terror alert level, raised to orange after the attacks in Saudi Arabia this month, was lowered today to yellow, elevated risk. The Department of Homeland Security says intelligence indicates the threat of an imminent attack has decreased." Forty-three words in two sentences in a non-lead segment were devoted to inform the audience that there was less reason to worry about a terrorist attack compared to the 642 words that were spoken to alarm Americans ten days earlier that there was an "imminent" threat of terrorism in the United States. ABC's World News Tonight and NBC's Nightly News covered these two official announcements in similar ways. On World News Tonight, the heightened terror alert of May 20, 2003, was dramatized by correspondent Pierre Thomas who revealed:

> An FBI bulletin obtained by ABC News points to two recent e-mails, intercepted by US intelligence. One message warns of a possible devastating attack in the next 48 hours and urged all Muslims to leave all cities, especially Boston, New York and the commercial coastline. A separate intercepted message targets Washington, and again points to possible attacks against New York and the nation's beaches. The FBI made an immediate decision to share the e-mails with police across the country.

In what followed, current and former federal and local officials then commented on the raised threat alert. In all, 734 words were spoken. When the official terror alert was lowered ten days later, Peter Jennings announced it in two sentences and twenty-five words: "The Department of Homeland Security has lowered its terrorist threat

level today from orange to yellow. Ten days ago, you will recall, they raised it." Over at NBC News, anchor Tom Brokaw introduced the comprehensive lead story by telling his audience that the decision to once again jack up the nation's security alert had been made in the White House. Reporting from Washington, correspondent Pete Williams revealed that intelligence leading to the higher terror alert was received during the interrogation of suspected Al-Qaeda members arrested in Saudi Arabia after recent bombings in Riyadh; the segment then turned to Hutchinson of the Department of Homeland Security and New York's Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly for comments. Finally, reporting from the State Department, Andrea Mitchell spoke about possible terrorist targets inside and outside the U.S. When the threat level was lowered ten days later, the Nightly News did not bother to mention the change.

Figure 1: TV coverage of official terror alert changes by placement

Taken together, the three networks aired eighteen reports on the Bush administration's decisions to raise the national terror alert level and fifteen segments on the lowering of

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the color-coded alarm. In addition, the networks reported three times on raised terror alerts for New York and two times for other cities, while two newscasts mentioned the lowering of regional alerts. True to the media's tendency to highlight shocking, sensational, disconcerting news, all twenty-three announcements of increases in the national or local terrorism alert levels were reported as lead stories (fig. 1). Conversely, ABC, CBS, and NBC reported decreases in these threat levels far less prominently airing only 13 percent of such announcements as lead stories and 87 percent further down in their particular broadcasts. When the Bush administration raised nation-wide terrorism alerts, the networks devoted on average 5 minutes and 20 seconds to such reports; when the national terror alert was lowered, the average news segment lasted only 1 minute and 34 seconds (fig. 2). The difference was even more pronounced with respect to local threat alerts in that the average airtime for raised terror levels was 2 minutes and 56 seconds versus only 20 seconds for segments reporting on the lowering of official terror alerts. When the three

networks aired reports about official terror alerts and advisories that did not involve changes in the color-coded alert status, the average length of these segments was still 2 minutes and 20 seconds.

No doubt, then, that the news magnified the administration's terrorism alerts by reporting such announcements mostly in lead stories and very long segments, while downplaying the new lower alert levels or not covering such changes at all.

How did the networks cover the frequently released audio- and videotaped messages by bin Laden and his close associates? In the 305 instances, in which the release of a new bin Laden/al Qaeda message was reported or the content of these communications was analyzed, commented on, or referred to in the networks' evening broadcasts, about half of these messages (51 percent) were contained in lead stories. When bin Laden/al Qaeda messages were not dealt with in lead stories, they were typically referred to or analyzed by experts, administration officials, other domestic actors and, on a few occasions, by foreign sources. The average length of news segments that contained bin Laden/al Qaeda messages was close to four minutes (3 minutes and 51 seconds). Only 25 percent of these explicit and implicit threat messages were translated statements by bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders or summaries of these communications by anchors and correspondents, 6 percent were comments attributable to foreign sources, and more than two thirds (69 percent) originated with domestic sources responding to hostile remarks by al Qaeda's leaders. In the TV newscasts we examined, 28 percent of President Bush's statements concerning terrorism threats and alerts were reactions to communications by bin Laden or other al Qaeda leaders as were 22 percent of those by experts and 100 percent by CIA officials. This high degree of attention to al Qaeda's communications is powerful evidence for the tendency of target societies to perpetuate the propaganda of their terrorist foes and thereby, even if unwittingly, assist terrorists in their efforts to spread their intimidating messages.

Typically anchors, correspondents, and reporters describe public affairs news, characterize the importance of events or developments, and paraphrase what political actors have stated. As a result, more information is conveyed by

Figure 2: TV coverage of official terror alert changes by airtime

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
Figure 3: TV coverage of official terror alert changes by airtime

media-based sources than by newsmakers and by those who react to and comment on whatever news unfolds. As figure 3 shows, this was also the case in the years after 9/11 with respect to terrorism threat messages in that media personnel comprised 30 percent of the sources reporting on terror threats regardless of whether the warnings and threat assessments came from the Bush administration or from al Qaeda leaders. Administration officials accounted for 20 percent of all domestic and foreign sources with President George W. Bush (3 percent) and the Secretary of Homeland Security (4 percent) combining for 7 percent of all sources. Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge or other high officials in his department issued terror threat warnings and announced up and down changes in the color-coded terrorism alert system. But following administration officials, terrorism and counterterrorism experts comprised the most often selected non-media group, accounting for 14 percent of all sources. This was hardly surprising because the television networks had signed these experts up in droves as news consultants after 9/11. While not identified as experts, former government officials (4 percent of all sources) and members of the military (1 percent) were actually also cast in the roles of experts.

Although far less involved in the mass-mediated terror threat debate, members of Congress made up 4 percent of the total news sources.

When it came to reporting on terror threats, all three networks paid attention to ordinary Americans (8 percent of all sources) and offered them opportunities to express their feelings about the usefulness of such warnings. And whereas federal departments and agencies issued all threat warnings, local and state officials were reacting to announcements from Washington since the alerts were on some occasions issued for particular areas (i.e. New York City, Los Angeles). As a result, mayors, governors, police commissioners, and others in the emergency response communities constituted 7 percent of all sources.

All in all, television news on specific and general terror threats was the domain of American sources (91 percent) – only 9 percent of all sources were foreigners. But of these non-Americans, bin Laden and other al Qaeda leaders together represented 5 percent of all foreign and domestic sources and were more frequently newsmakers in the threat debate than were members of the U.S. Congress. More

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important, television network news presented bin Laden as a news source as often as President Bush, each "capturing" a 3 percent share of the total number of sources cited.

5.2. The Terrorist Threat and Public Opinion

Terrorism experts agree that modern terrorism began in 1968, when Palestinian groups began to hijack commercial airliners to advertise their grievances against Israel. In the following decades, many terrorist incidents targeted citizens of the United States and other countries. As a result of anti-American terrorism abroad, four of five Americans believed in the second half of the 1980s and in the 1990s that terrorist attacks inside the U.S. were very likely or somewhat likely. In April 1995, shortly after the Oklahoma City bombing, a case of domestic terrorism, 86 percent of the American public thought that an act of terrorism in the United States within the next twelve months was "very likely" (48 percent) or "somewhat likely" (38 percent) (Nacos 2006, 261–62). At that time, the terrorism that most Americans had in mind was probably of domestic origin, not of the international variety. After 9/11, however, the focus of public officials, the news media, and presumably the public was on international terrorism. When asked about the likelihood of another terrorist attack in the United States within the next few months, the majority of Americans felt consistently that more terrorism was "very likely" or "somewhat likely." In the weeks after 9/11, up to 88 percent of respondents believed that additional terrorist strikes were "very likely" or "somewhat likely" within a few months. As time went by without further acts of terrorism, there was a downward trend especially in the "very likely" category. Thus, by the summer of 2005 and early 2006 only 52 percent and 53 percent of the public, respectively, thought terrorist attacks within the next few months were "very likely" (9 to 10 percent) or "somewhat likely" (43 percent).[5] When interviewers did not specify a time frame for possible terrorist strikes (i.e. "a few months" or "soon") when inquiring about the level of respondents'

concerns that there would be more major terrorist attacks in the United States, the number of those who said they worried "a great deal" declined from 41 percent in early October 2001 to 24 percent in August 2005, shortly before the fourth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The number of Americans who were "somewhat" or "not too much" worried increased from 53 percent a few weeks after 9/11 to 65 percent as the fourth 9/11 anniversary approached. But a modicum of worries remained: only between 4 percent (several weeks after 9/11) and 10 percent (nearly four years after 9/11) of Americans were "not at all" worried about another major terror attack in the United States.[6] In the nearly four years after 9/11, between one third and one fourth of all Americans thought it "very likely" that "in the near future" another act of catastrophic terrorism "causing large numbers of American lives to be lost" would occur; between 38 and 46 percent believed that such a terrorist catastrophe was "somewhat likely;" and only 3 to 6 percent were confident that another act of *catastrophic* terrorism was "not likely at all."[7] It is telling that Americans' expectations of catastrophic terrorism in the "near future" fluctuated a bit in the years after 9/11 but did not subside; on the contrary, in early October 2001, less than a month after 9/11, 71 percent of Americans thought another incident of catastrophic terrorism was "very likely" or "somewhat likely," and in July 2005, a few days after the quadruple suicide attacks on the London transit system, 75 percent of Americans – 4 percent more than shortly after 9/11 – expressed this expectation.[8]

While the overwhelming majority of Americans was to one degree or another worried about the likelihood of additional terrorism sometime in the future, they were far less concerned that terrorists would strike in their own communities. In the days following the events of 9/11, about four of ten Americans were personally concerned about terrorism in the area where they lived. But these sentiments weakened during the next months and years, so that between

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5 This analysis is based on thirty-one national surveys conducted by CBS News and the CBS News/New York Times polling partnership. The first of these polls was conducted in September 2001 and the last in late January 2006.

6 We examined thirteen national surveys conducted by ABC News and ABC News/Washington Post.

The first of these polls was conducted in October 2001 and the last in August 2005.

7 Fox/Opinion Dynamics surveys contained the same question nine times. The first of these polls was conducted in October 2001and the last in July 2005.

8 Ibid.

9 This conclusion is based on surveys conducted by CBS News and the CBS News/New York Times polling partnership. The first of these polls was conducted in September 2001 and the last in late May 2003.

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Figure 4: Concern about terrorist attacks

Legend:
——— Terrorism as the most important problem
– – – Very concerned about major terror attacks
–·–·– Worried that you or your family will be a victim
– ·· – ·· Terror attack very likely next few months
·········· Very worried about terror attack soon

two thirds and three fourth of the public were no longer worried about terrorism in their own neighborhoods.[9]

The story was different for residents of New York City, the site of the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center and the complete destruction of the whole World Trade Center complex in September 2001. In the spring of 2004, two of three residents of New York City were convinced that the risk of another terrorist attack was higher in their own community than in other big cities around the country.[10] No wonder, then, that the majority of New Yorkers remained for years "very worried" or "worried" about another major act of terrorism in their city. And while one third to one half of Americans around the country said they were not worried at all about terrorism in their own area, only 9 to 16 percent of New Yorkers were without such worries.[11]

In the days and weeks immediately following the events of 9/11 more than half of all Americans were "very worried" or "somewhat worried" that they themselves or a member of their family would become a victim of terrorism. While these personal concerns waned during the following years, typically one of three or two of five Americans feared that terrorists could harm them or their loved ones. Personal concerns about the terror threat seem to rise after major terrorist acts and when official terrorism alerts were issued. Thus, following the bombings of London's transit system 47 percent of Americans were worried about the possibility that they or their families could become victims of terror strikes whereas only 38 percent expressed these concerns before the events in London. After Washington officials warned of possible terror attacks in the United States before the presidential elections in early 2004, Americans' level of concern about their own well-being and that of their fami-

10 The poll was conducted by the New York Times in April 2004. At that time, 65 percent of New Yorkers believed their city to be the highest risk area in the country and 72 percent said that they were very concerned about another terror attack in their city.

11 The Marist College Institute for Opinion Research polled New York City residents on this four times from October 2001 to March 2005.

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lies increased from 34 percent in early August to 42 percent in early September and 47 percent in mid-October.[12]

Finally, the American public did not buy into the Bush administration's claim that the Iraq War was part of the post-9/11 efforts to rid America and the world of terrorism. Instead, at all times after the invasion of Iraq more Americans believed that the war had increased the threat of terrorism against the United States than that it had decreased it. Whereas a majority or plurality of Americans thought initially that the terrorist threat had remained the same, this changed for good around the first anniversary of the Iraq invasion, when more Americans thought that the terror threat against America had increased rather than remained about the same.

5.3. Dynamics of Public Opinion and the Media
In examining the dynamics of public opinion and the media we focused on seven questions dealing with the following: concern about terrorist attacks over different time hori-

zons at the national level, terrorism affecting one personally, terrorism as most the important issue facing the country, and approval of President Bush's performance as president in general and his handling terrorism in particular.[13]

As we see in figure 4, the boldest line tracking the public's perceptions of terrorism as the most important issue facing the country today reveals that since 9/11, unsurprisingly, this perception decreased noticeably (we will discuss some of the peaks further below). This trend correlates significantly with the trends of the three questions dealing with concern about terrorist attacks: great concern about major terrorist attacks (r=.77, p<.005), worries about an attack occurring soon (r=.51, p<.01), and thinking that an attack will occur in the next few months (r=.79, p=.000). Interestingly, the correlation with personal worry about being a victim of terrorism is much less (r=.41, ns.).[14] Figure 5 shows that the public's belief that terrorism is the most important issue facing the country correlates significantly with Bush's approval ratings, in general (r=.736,

Figure 5: Terror threat: Bush approval and terrorism

Legend: ——— Terrorism-specific approval   —·—·— General approval   ·········· Terrorism as the most important problem

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Figure 6: Most important issue? Terrorism. October 2001 – December 2004

Legend:
— Terrorist attack very likely in few months
– – – Missing
-·-·- Reality: officials, gen. threat / increase alert
········ Media: Bush, gen. threat / increase alert

p<.001) and with regard to terrorism (r=.715, p<.001), showing a similar systematic drop every year since 9/11.[15]

We examine these public opinion data more closely for the first thirty-nine-month period where we compare them with the trends in media (television) reporting or content on threats and alerts, and also trends in the threat assessments and terrorist alerts by U.S. administration officials that were almost certainly conveyed to, and likely to influence, the public through the full range of mass media outlets. In one instance, we include the timeline for the actual video- and audio-taped communications by bin Laden during this period. To avoid confusion over the threats and alerts that were covered by network news and the actual threats and alerts by administration officials and the al Qaeda leadership, we refer in the following discussions to "mediated reality" as the complete set of "actual," or "original" statements and pronouncements by administration officials or bin Laden/al Qaeda. We emphasize

the most notable effects based on correlation coefficients and multiple regression analysis results (treating public opinion as the dependent variable and media content and actual statements as independent variables).

We first examine the extent to which the news media's coverage of terrorism is related to how the American public perceives the graveness of the terrorist threat to the United States. We begin with the simple hypothesis that the volume of threat coverage affects how the public rates terrorism as a major national problem. Since research has demonstrated the agenda setting function particularly with respect to terrorism (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Norris, Kern, and Just 2003; Nacos 1996), one would expect that the total volume of mass-mediated threat messages has an impact on the public's perceptions of the importance of terrorism as the major national problem. Surprisingly, this does not occur in our case. We found that it is not the total volume of threat messages that matters but *who* conveys

15 The two Bush approval questions correlate significantly with each other (r=.937).

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such messages. On second thought, this finding is less surprising because our measure of the total of mass-mediated threat messages represent only a fraction of the complete public debate on terrorism. And it is the complete volume of reporting on terrorism that has been found to affect the public's agenda. So, what did we find? On the issue of how the public ranks terrorism as a major national problem, we found that media content and the "mediated reality" measure had the strongest impact. Specifically, President Bush's statements in the media concerning terrorist threats and alerts were highly correlated with responses to this survey question (r=.63, p<.001). Among all the media variables these messages by Bush that were reported on television news had a very strong correlation with public perceptions, a phenomenon we will see again in relation to other aspects of public concern. In addition, statements by U.S. administration officials alerting the public to specific terror threats or speaking about such threats against the American homeland in more general terms had the strongest impact of all variables in this case (r=.83, p<.001; regression coefficient, b=2.69 p<.001). There was, not surprisingly, a strong correlation (r=.62, p<001) between television coverage of what President Bush said about terrorist

threats and alerts and actual threat and alert statements by administration officials.

As depicted in Figure 6, all the variables shown decrease over time in the same direction and also show increases during some of the same short-term periods. When Bush's reactions to and comments about terrorist threats are reported in television news and when administration officials make these statements, the public is more likely to perceive terrorism as most important. This happened at several time points: In June 2002 the peak in the public's threat perception followed several terrorism alerts the previous months, when administration officials initiated a heightened state of alert for railroads and other transit systems and warned of a special threat against the Statue of Liberty and the Brooklyn Bridge. Moreover, in early June U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft made the dramatic announcement that Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen and alleged al Qaeda associate, had been arrested while plotting to acquire and explode a "dirty bomb" in an American city. As television news covered these threat announcements heavily, the public's view of terrorism as a major problem for the country increased from 22 percent in May to 33

Figure 7: Concerned about major terrorist attacks. October 2001 – December 2004

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
percent in June. It is noteworthy that there was a dearth of mass mediated threat messages and actual threat and alert statements in the preceding period.

In February 2003, the month before the invasion of Iraq, terrorist threat statements by President Bush were reported on TV three times, and there were five original statements by administration officials during that month. The following month, we see a slight increase in the public's perception of terrorism as the most important threat (from 10 percent to 13 percent) after a decrease in the previous months (from 18 percent to 10 percent). In December 2003, when Saddam Hussein was captured, the same pattern occurred. One might think that this success would lead to a decreased level of threat (no correlation was found between these types of messages with responses to any of our survey questions) and a smaller percentage of people thinking that terrorism is the most important issue facing the country. But two heavily covered domestic events could have affected the public: First, the chairman of the 9/11 Commission, Thomas Kean, said publicly that

the 9/11 attacks could have been prevented. Three days later, Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge raised the terror threat alert for the upcoming holidays. Finally, in the months before the presidential elections the same pattern occurred: from June 2004 (and even earlier) the public's perceptions regarding terrorism as the major problem strengthened steadily with a peak in September/October 2004 – reaching the same level as in November 2002 (when the American-led coalition had made progress in the fight against al Qaeda and the Taliban).[16]

In the case of the public's concern about more major terrorist attacks in the U.S, we find that the media had the only apparent influence on people's perceptions. Specifically in this case, we identified the influence of TV news anchors, correspondents, and reporters describing the terrorist threat in general terms or reporting on increases in the level of terrorism alerts (r=.54; b=1.20, p<.01). This reframes an earlier finding (Page and Shapiro 1992) that identified TV news commentary as the strongest influence on the public's policy preferences. In this case media professionals collectively appeared to be potent influences on public attitudes.

Figure 8: Worry about another terrorist attack soon. October 2001 – December 2004

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Figure 7 shows several concurrent peaks in the trend: when media professionals, the "voices of the news," talk about terrorism threats or increased levels of alert, the public accepts this and becomes more concerned. This occurred particularly around February/March 2003 with 27 to 29 percent of the public very concerned that another major terrorist attack will happen in U.S. (rising from 22 percent in previous opinion polls). This happened for a reason: in February, network TV mentioned the threat of terrorism and the increased levels of official alerts twenty-five times, followed up by six messages in March, when the Iraq invasion was launched. The emphasis on the threat of terrorism in the media continued reaching a high peak of fifty-five threat messages in August 2004, a month later 25 percent of the public was very concerned about another major terrorist attack in the U.S. – two months before the presidential election.

When pollsters mentioned a particular time frame asking respondents whether they worried that another terrorist attack would occur "soon," we found that the actual statements by U.S. administration officials alerting the public

to specific terrorist threats or speaking in more general terms about the threat had the strongest impact on public opinion (r=.49, p<.05; b=1.64 p<=.1). Figure 8 shows that the public's perceptions fluctuated noticeably, as did the original statements by officials in a somewhat corresponding pattern. In June 2002, when there were more official statements about the terrorist threat and the increase in the alert level, the public reacted with a sharp increase (from 20 percent in January, the last time the question was asked, to 32 percent) in the level of worry. In February 2003 there were several actual statements by officials following a couple of quiet months, which were followed by a sharp increase in the percentage of the Americans revealing that were very worried about a terrorist attack occurring soon. – with the percentage nearly doubling from 18 percent in January 2003 to 34 percent in February.

Next, focusing on the issue of how likely there will be another terrorist attack in U.S. within "*a few months,*" we find an apparent impact of both the media's coverage of President Bush's comments and assessments concerning the terrorist threat (r=.58, p<.005) as well as the actual

Figure 9: Likelihood of attack in the next few months. October 2001 – December 2004

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statements by U.S. administration officials alerting the public to specific terror threats or speaking in more general terms (r=.73, p<.001; b=2.86, p<.01). It is interesting to note in Figure 9 the corresponding high and low levels in all three variables. In June 2002 more people – 36 percent compared to 29 percent in May – believed it "*very* likely" that another terrorist attack would happen within the next few months. In the same month, there were seven original statements by administration officials about the terrorist threat and higher alert level (as opposed to an average of three or four in the previous months), and television news reported one pertinent comment by President Bush. Another peak occurred in October-November 2002 with 27 percent of the public responding that a terrorism attack was "very likely" in the next few months; this coincided with two actual statements by officials in October followed by six such pronouncements in November. In February 2003, 29 percent of the public, up from 14 percent in January, believed a terror attack was very likely to happen within the next few months. During that time, television

news carried three threat messages by President Bush and administration officials made five actual threat statements. Not surprisingly, from July to September 2004, during the build-up to the final phase of the presidential election campaign, 19 percent of the public, up from 12 percent in April, thought it very likely that another terrorist attack would happen within a few months. During this time, television news frequently carried threat and alert messages by President Bush, and administration officials made similar pronouncements just as often.

Looking at perceived threats at the personal level, as shown in Figure 10, we find a slightly different picture. When it comes to the public's own deepest concerns, it is perceptions about Bin Laden that may matter most: specifically, the variables related to comments on TV by public officials (including President Bush) about threats by bin Laden or al Qaeda (r=.44, p<.05); news anchors, correspondents, or reporters describing threats by bin Laden or al Qaeda (r=.46, p<.05); the actual warnings or threats of more terrorist at-

Figure 10: Worry thar you will be victim of terrorism. October 2001 – December 2004

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
tacks by bin Laden and his al Qaeda associates themselves (r=.44, p<.05), and U.S officials' actual statements about the threat of terrorism (r=.40, p<.1; b=.781, p<.11).

Figure 10 shows that even as time passed, a relatively high percentage of the public continued to be (very or somewhat) worried that they and their loved ones would be affected personally by a terrorist attack. Though we see spikes in the trend, the overall pattern is fairly steady. It is interesting to note that in this case, unlike the others we examined, just mentioning bin Laden or al Qaeda in TV news or the appearance of bin Laden or al Qaeda in tapes seemed to matter. Apparently, the architects of the 9/11 attacks continued to have a hold on the public's mind, causing people to be apprehensive not just about protecting the nation but even more so worrying about their and their families' security – although the likelihood of any individual being harmed by terrorist attacks is very low. These are very likely emotion-driven responses. When members of the administration, including President Bush, refer to bin Laden by name and this is reported on TV network news, such references are often more numerous than the actual communications by bin Laden or al Qaeda.

For example, in April 2002, when two al Qaeda tapes were simultaneously released, the TV newscasts we examined carried three reactions by administration officials to these tapes, and there was one pertinent comment by a media professional. Whether connected to the threats on these tapes or not, the same month was marked by four actual statements by U.S officials announcing an increase in the terrorism alert level. A month later, more Americans were worried about their personal safety in case of a terrorist attack (increasing from 35 percent to 40 percent). When in February 2004, a month after al Qaeda released an alleged bin Laden audio-tape, several comments were made on TV news regarding this communication, and one administration official issued an actual threat warning, there was a sharp increase in the public's personal fear from 28 percent to 40 percent. Later, during the election campaign, we see similar patterns as described earlier: from August to October 2004 the percentage of the public worried rose from 34 percent to 47 percent – with nearly half of the public expressing concern about becoming a victim of terrorism. In September 2004, another bin Laden tape

surfaced and administration officials spoke about the threat of terrorism. In October, the month before the elections, two bin Laden tapes were released and generously covered by the TV networks, and there were two actual statements by public officials with respect to a heightened threat of terrorism. It is no wonder that Americans worried increasingly about their own and their families' vulnerability.

How did all this affect President Bush's approval rating? First, it appears that both his overall approval ratings and the public's rating of his handling of terrorism were affected by news reports of President Bush's statements about the terrorist threat and increases in the alert level (overall approval: r=.42, p<.05; approval in handling terrorism: r=.37, p<.1), and administration officials' public statements on this issue (overall approval: r=.68; p<.01; b=3.93, p<.01; approval on terrorism: r=.64, p<.05; b=4.03, p<.01).

As we see in Figure 11, even though the general pattern is one of a gradual decrease in both approval ratings (and, no doubt, other factors were influencing President Bush's overall approval rating), certain brief spikes in these ratings occur roughly in tandem with increases in the number of administration statements and news reports citing President Bush on the terrorist threat. It seems that as long as the administration planted fear in the public, the President's approval ratings benefited. For example, in July 2002 we found one statement by Bush about the terrorist threat reported on television, and there were seven actual public statements to this effect by administration officials coinciding with a four point increase to 83 percent in the President's rating on handling terrorism. During September/October 2002, this approval declined to 74 percent. In September, there were three comments by President Bush reported on television during the same months as there were four public statements by administration officials emphasizing the terrorist threat; this was followed in October by only two such statements issued by administration officials. In contrast, there were six statements the following month that preceded a five point increase (to 79 percent) in the public's approval of Bush's handling of terrorism in December 2002. During February 2003, three television-reported statements by Bush along with five actual statements by administration officials occurred in tandem

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Figure 11: Terrorism and approval of Bush. October 2001 – December 2004

with a slight increase of three points (to 74 percent) in Bush's terrorism-specific approval. There had not been statements of this sort during the preceding months of December 2002 and January 2003, when the Bush rating dropped by eight points to 71 percent. By April 2003 the approval rating for Bush's handling of terrorism reached 79 percent. The same pattern occurred for Bush's overall approval as well: an increase from 59 percent in February to 65 percent in March 2003 and to 70 percent in April 2003 as administration officials continued to emphasize the terrorist threat during these months, while the public rallied to support the President during the invasion of Iraq. Moving forward into June and summer 2004, there was an increase in TV coverage of Bush's comments on the terrorism threat along with more actual statements by administration officials. During this time there was an increase in Bush's public approval for handing terrorism from 50 to 57 percent from June to July 2004; Bush's general approval rating increased from 47 percent in May to 53 percent in September 2004.

Overall, then, it seems that emphasizing the terrorist threat and official alerts tended to buoy the President's approval ratings – both his terrorism-specific rating and his overall approval. Further, while it is not surprising that we found a correlation between public perceptions of the terrorist threat and mass-mediated or actual terrorism alerts, this is a one-sided effect. When it came to reporting about the official *lowering* of terror alert levels, such coverage was not prominent – if it occurred at all. One does not have to be a cynic to suspect that pronouncements of a relaxed state of terrorism threats are not politically beneficial.

6. Discussion

True to the media's appetite for sensational and dramatic "breaking news" to engage their audiences, network TV newscasts devoted generous airtime and prominent placements to attention-getting, disconcerting threats communicated by Osama bin Laden and his associates on the one hand and terrorism alerts issued by administration officials on the other. Indeed, television network news

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– and, no doubt, cable TV, radio, and the print media as well – did not simply report this news but magnified it. In comparison, the non-dramatic and presumably calming news of administration decisions to relax terror alerts was under-covered and thus minimized.

These coverage patterns arguably played into the hands of the al Qaeda leadership whose communications left no doubt about its goal to strike fear into Americans.

But President Bush and others in the administration, too, benefited from the prompt and significant coverage of their terror alerts and threat assessment thereby continuously reminding the American public why the "war on terrorism" had to be fought. It seemed that the White House did not in effect mind the prominent coverage of bin Laden and al Qaeda threats. Whereas the administration protested against the airing of bin Laden video-tapes by U.S. television outlets shortly after 9/11, no such complaints were filed thereafter. Albeit belatedly, President Bush himself told a White House reporter that he believed "his 2004 re-election victory over Sen. John Kerry was inadvertently aided by Osama bin Laden, who issued a taped diatribe against him the Friday before Americans went to the polls."[17] As the President put it, "I thought it was going to help. I thought it would help remind people that if bin Laden does not want Bush to be president, something must be right with Bush."[18] Of course, it was perhaps equally or even more likely that bin Laden wanted Bush to be re-elected. Not surprisingly, Senator Kerry, too, told an interviewer soon after the election that he lost to President Bush because of the bin Laden video.[19]

After the end of the Cold War, some media scholars expected that the disappearance of the long Cold War consensus would free the media from the dominance of presidents and administration officials in security and foreign policy news (Entman 2000; cf. Shapiro and Jacobs 2000). Since the predominant terrorist threat of our time

has both international and domestic dimensions, our study offers a partial test of the hypothesis of the press's liberation. If there was a short period in which the news media were more independent of Washington's decision-makers, it did not last past the events of 9/11. Instead, just as during the Cold War, authoritative sources (the President, other administration officials, members of Congress, state and local officials, former military and government figures) were the predominant news sources.

Americans' concerns about the threat of terrorism within their own borders remained quite high during the post-9/11 years and actually increased frequently in the wake of increases in reporting of threats and terrorism alerts. The public's worries about "catastrophic" terrorism in their country were particularly persistent, and in the wake of the July 7, 2005, bombings of the London transit system it was actually more pronounced than in the weeks after the 9/11 attacks. Not surprisingly, New York City residents were significantly more worried than their compatriots that their community was a more likely target of future terrorism than other areas.

Last, we found strong correlations between mass-mediated terror alerts and threat messages and the public's evaluation of terrorism as the country's major problem. However, it was not the total volume of threat news but rather the influence of particular sources that moved public opinion. Here, the President and administration officials apparently had the greatest effects on Americans' collective assessment of terrorism as the nation's top problem. Interestingly, different public perceptions appeared to be affected by different news sources. Thus, media professionals' reporting on terror alerts and threats appeared especially influential on public concerns about major acts of anti-American terrorism occurring *some time in the future*. Americans reacted to actual statements by administration officials when it came to their worries that terrorism would happen *soon* – after all, the administration's official

17 Reuters, "Report: Bush says bin Laden aided in elections," February 28, 2006. http://www.msnbc.com/id/11604530/, accessed June 19, 2006.

18 Ibid.

19 "Exclusive: Kerry Says UBL Tape Cost him Election," Fox News.com, November 21, 2004. http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,139060,00.html, accessed June 20, 2006.

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terrorism alerts were covered heavily and were likely to be perceived as signaling imminent terrorist attacks. Not unexpectedly, bin Laden's actual threat messages and their press coverage affected public opinion as well – especially Americans' concerns that they and their families could become the victims of this sort of political violence.

Whereas bin Laden's threat messages did not win (nor aim for) the sympathies of Americans, President Bush's overall job performance and the public's rating of his handling of terrorism improved in the short term as the result of official alerts or threat assessments and related press coverage. Revelations by Tom Ridge, who resigned as Secretary of Homeland Security in early 2005, suggest that perhaps some people in the administration were aware of these effects. In an effort to "debunk the myth" of his department's responsibility for repeated terror alerts, Ridge said, "There were times when some people were really aggressive about raising it [the color-coded terror alert level], and we said, 'For what?'"[20]

To summarize, then, in the wake of the long lasting "media event" of 9/11, both bin Laden with other al Qaeda leaders and President Bush with other administration officials utilized the mass media to communicate their propaganda of fear. By over-covering in particular the frequent "fear messages" by administration officials, the media contributed to what one critic described as "creating a culture of hysteria" (Kellner 2005, 28), or what one might call a climate of fear that conditioned Americans to rally around the President and his "war on terrorism." At the same time, the media "served in a perverse way as instruments of al Qaeda and terrorism, since one of the goals of terror attacks is to spread fear and anxiety" (Kellner 2005, 28).

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20 Ridge's session with journalists was reported by Mimi Hall, "Ridge reveals clashes on alerts," USA TODAY, May 10, 2005. http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-05-10-ridge-alerts_x.htm?POE=NEWISVA, accessed March 10, 2006.

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Attributions of Responsibility for Terrorist Attacks: The Role of Group Membership and Identification

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Three studies examine how people's attributions of responsibility for terrorist attacks depend on their group membership and their identification with the victim (study 1) or their identification with the victim's or perpetrator's ingroup (studies 2 and 3). We observe that people's group membership (perpetrator group versus victim group) determines the judgments of responsibility for recent terrorist attacks. Members of the perpetrator group hold the direct perpetrators responsible, while members of the victim group perceive the perpetrator world as a whole as relatively responsible as well. Identification with the victim (study 1) or victim group (studies 2 and 3) strengthens attributions of responsibility to the whole perpetrator group, and this relationship is partially mediated by the perceived typicality of the perpetrator for the whole group. We discuss possible explanations for this pattern, and indicate the implications of these results in terms of improving intergroup relations.

Tension between the "Islamic world" and the (non-Islamic) "Western world" has increased over the last few years, partly due to the impact of terrorist attacks (Bar-Tal and Labin 1998; Doosje, Kateman, and Mathyi, forthcoming; Pettigrew 2003; Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen 2004). In three studies, we examine how attributions of responsibility for terrorist attacks may depend on group membership (studies 1 to 3: perpetrator vs. victim group membership), perceived typicality of the perpetrator (studies 1 and 3), and level of identification with either the victim (study 1) or victim or perpetrator ingroup (studies 2 and 3). In studies 1 to 3, we examine these attributions in relation to attacks perpetrated by Islamic people. In addition, study 3 also explores how attributions are made in relation to attacks committed by non-Islamic people.

Our most basic argument is that people's attributions of responsibility for terrorist attacks depend on their group membership. Specifically, we propose that the typical in-

tergroup attribution bias will be observed in this context, in which members of the perpetrator group will attribute less responsibility to their own group than members of the victimized group do. We extend this work in two ways: by investigating the role of victim identification (study 1) and victim or perpetrator group identification (studies 2 and 3), and the role of perceived typicality of the perpetrator for the group as a whole (studies 1 and 3). In the case of Islamic terrorists, we expect the victimized group (i.e., non-Islamic respondents) to make stronger attributions to the Islamic world to the extent that they feel a bond with the victim (study 1) or the victimized ingroup (studies 2 and 3), and have stronger perceptions of the perpetrators as typical Islamic group members. In contrast, we propose the hypothesis that members of the perpetrator group (i.e., Islamic participants) will perceive the Islamic perpetrators of terrorist attacks as "black sheep," and focus on the responsibility of the non-Islamic world for creating tension between the groups.

1. Social Identity Theory and Beyond

People have a general motivation to display a favorable attitude towards the ingroup in comparison to relevant outgroups. Throughout the history of humankind, people have been favorably predisposed towards their own group (McNeill and McNeill 2003). Some people explain this general ingroup-bias in terms of evolutionary origins, while others stress the importance of a positive social self-image – e.g., Tajfel and Turner's social identity theory (1986) or a need to reduce uncertainty about one's position in the world.

We argue that other motivations may have arisen from this general tendency. One such motivation is coined the "intergroup attribution bias" (Hewstone 1990; Maass 1999; Maass, Ceccarelli, and Rudin 1996; Pettigrew 1979). According to this theory, people are likely to explain positive ingroup behavior in terms of own qualities (rather than pure luck or other external factors), while the same positive behavior by an outgroup is perceived as less internally controlled. With respect to negative group behavior, the reverse pattern has been observed (Hewstone 1990; also Maass 1999). In other words, people tend to perceive their own group as better than outgroups, and to make internal attributions for positive ingroup behavior and negative outgroup behavior, while making external attributions for unfavorable ingroup behavior and favorable outgroup behavior. Furthermore, Doosje and Branscombe (2003) have shown than this typical intergroup attribution effect becomes stronger when identification with one's own group increases. Ingroup identification or attachment can be defined as the cognitive, affective, and emotional ties between an individual and the ingroup. Doosje and Branscombe showed that people are more likely to attribute negative ingroup behavior externally and negative outgroup behavior internally when they identify strongly with their ingroup (see also Doosje et al. 1998). Similarly, Pennekamp et al. (2007) show how members of disadvantaged groups make stronger attributions of responsibility to the perpetrator outgroup for previous misdeeds as ingroup identification (and the associated relevance of the subject for people) increases.

When we apply these ideas to our context of terrorism and increased tension between the Islamic and non-Islamic worlds, this leads to a general prediction that non-Islamic respondents will attribute more responsibility for the terrorist attacks and increased intergroup tension to Islamic people as a whole than do Islamic participants. Islamic respondents are more likely than non-Islamic participants to perceive non-Islamic people as responsible for increased tension. In line with this hypothesis, we found the following comment by a non-Islamic person on the internet:

"Are the Muslims done yet? I'm so sick of turning on the news or hearing on the radio about them protesting this or rioting over that… . I mean come on … get a life! All these people do is fight and hate!" (posted on www.SFGate.com, accessed February 15, 2006).

In addition, we predict this intergroup attribution bias will be stronger for people who identify highly with their group. Specifically, when explaining negative behavior by an Islamic person, non-Islamic participants are more likely to attribute the behavior to the Islamic outgroup as a whole, the more strongly they themselves identify with their own group. Islamic respondents are more likely to attribute negative ingroup behavior externally the more strongly they themselves identify with their own group. Thus, we predict that when Islamic people feel a strong bond with their own group, they are more likely to point to the role of the non-Islamic outgroup in causing the harm done by Islamic people.

2. The Black Sheep Effect

The second motivation in intergroup contexts that is highly relevant in our research is the "black sheep effect" (Abrams et al. 2002; Marques, Yzerbyt, and Leyens 1998). According to this idea, negative ingroup members are perceived as atypical or, in other words, as black sheep by other ingroup members. Research has shown that people judge ingroup deviants more harshly than outgroup deviants. One way to explain these tendencies is that people want to maintain a positive image of their ingroup. By excluding antinormative deviants from their group, the image of the group as a whole stays intact. This black sheep effect has been demonstrated in a wide range of studies, in different contexts, using different sorts of samples (Abrams et al. 2000; Abrams, Rutland, and Cameron 2003; Marques and Yzerbyt 1988; Marques et al. 1998). In addition, it has been shown that the black sheep effect is stronger when identification is relatively high (Abrams et al. 2003; Branscombe et al. 1993).

In our context, we expect Islamic participants to perceive Islamic perpetrators as less typical of the Islamic group than non-Islamic people do. We found the following quote by an Islamic person posted on www.mkuk.wordpress. com (accessed February 15, 2006), nicely illustrating our basic hypothesis:

"I felt that I had to explain that the embassy burning and flag burning were in no way representative of Muslims as a whole or Islam. Islam forbids these kinds of acts… . As Muslims we now have a huge responsibility to portray Islam in its true form, by this I mean we need to show that the Islam as portrayed by the extremist fringe and certain media outlets is an abnormality, not the norm."

Thus, this Islamic person aims to portray the perpetrators as black sheep and atypical of their group.

In addition, we predict that high identification results in more extreme judgments, leading to higher black sheep scores for Islamic respondents (i.e., perceiving Islamic perpetrators as atypical ingroup members), and higher "white sheep" scores for non-Islamic participants (i.e., perceiving Islamic perpetrators as typical outgroup members). This latter prediction can also be derived from work on outgroup variability perceptions as a function of level of ingroup identification (Doosje and Branscombe 2003; Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears 1995; Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 1997). Here we show that people with strong ingroup identification have a homogeneous perception of the outgroup. Thus, non-Islamic people are likely to perceive Islamic terrorists as typical, in order to maintain a homogeneous and coherent perception of the outgroup, and they are expected to do this more strongly when they identify strongly with their group.

3. Study 1
In this study, we investigated the immediate reactions to a terrorist attack in the Netherlands, in which the nationally famous Dutch film maker and Islam critic Theo van Gogh was murdered by an Islamic terrorist (Mohammed B.). We expected a stronger tendency for Islamic people than for non-Islamic people to create an image of this perpetrator as a black sheep. In addition, we expected Islamic people to attribute *less* responsibility to the *Islamic group as a whole* than non-Islamic people do (i. e., the general attribu-

tion bias). Moreover, we expected these patterns to emerge more strongly, the more strongly non-Islamic people identified with the victim. Although identification with the victim is not the same as identification with a group, it is possible to predict that high identification with a victim may lead people to be better able to take the victim's perspective, and as such make stronger internal attributions to the perpetrator and his Islamic ingroup, while attributing less responsibility to the victim. Finally, we expect that the perceived typicality of the perpetrator for his ingroup will mediate the path from victim identification to attributions of responsibility to the Islamic world among non-Islamicrespondents.

3.1. Method
Participants
Our participants were forty-nine males and thirty-one females recruited in Amsterdam. Three to six days after the nationally famous Dutch filmmaker and critic Theo van Gogh was shot and murdered on November 2, 2004, we recruited seventy-one participants at the university and nine at the crime scene. The mean age of participants was twenty-seven. On the basis of religion, participants could be divided into four groups: thirteen were Muslim, sixteen were Christian, ten stated another (unspecified) religion, and forty-one participants were not religious.

Design
We created one between-participants variable: group membership. The thirteen Islamic respondents formed one group and all the other people were included in a second, non-Islamic group (n=67). We treated identification with the victim as a continuous independent variable. As dependent variables we assessed attributions of responsibility for the terrorist attack on Theo van Gogh (five items: perpetrator, surrounding group of perpetrator, Islamic world, victim, Western world) as well as judgments of the typicality of the perpetrator for his group.

Procedure and Dependent Variables
Potential participants were requested to take part in a study about the "recent shooting of Theo van Gogh." Those who agreed to participate were given a questionnaire that started off with a set of questions about participants' attributions of responsibility for the deadly attack on Theo van

Gogh. People were asked to indicate to what extent they considered (a) the perpetrators, (b) the surrounding group (e.g., friends and family) of the perpetrator, (c) the Islamic world as a whole, (d) the victim himself, and (e) the Western world as a whole responsible. Perceived typicality of perpetrator was assessed by a question about the extent to which they perceived the perpetrator as a typical Muslim. One question measured the extent of identification with the victim: "How much did you feel connected with Theo van Gogh *before his death?*" Participants rated all questions on four-point scales ("not at all," "a little," "much," and "very much." The questionnaire ended with questions about age, gender, and nationality.

3.2. Results and Discussion

First, we performed a general linear model (GLM) mixed design analysis of variance with five levels (perpetrator, surrounding group of perpetrator, Islamic world, victim, and Western world), with group membership (Islamic

and non-Islamic) and identification with the victim (continuous) as independent variables and attribution of responsibility as a within-subject variable. Due to large cell differences in sample size, we used the type I sum of squares, which takes into account differences in cell sizes, and thus is advised by Tabachnik and Fidell (2001, 296–97; see also Zebel et al. 2007; it is important to note that the results presented below do *not* differ substantially if we use the standard type III sum of squares). We observed a significant main effect of target of responsibility, $F_{(4, 73)}$ = 108.88, p ' .0005, eta squared = η^2 = .86. In line with the predictions, there was a significant interaction between target and group membership, $F_{(4, 73)}$ = 9.66, p' .0005, η^2 = .35. In addition, there was a significant interaction between target and identification with the victim, $F_{(4, 73)}$ = 3.34, p ' .014, η^2 = .16, as well as the hypothesized significant three-way interaction between target, group membership, and identification with the victim, $F_{(4, 73)}$ = 3.46, p ' .012, η^2 = .16.

Table 1: Means, standard deviations, sample sizes (n), and beta values between variable and victim identification for study 1, and ingroup identification for studies 2 and 3, for Islamic and non-Islamic people.

	Islamic People					Non-Islamic People			
	M	SD	n	B		M	SD	n	B
Study 1									
Attribution perpetrator #	3.51a	0.65	13	−.38		3.75a	0.42	67	−.03
Attribution friends / family	2.36b	0.94	13	.48		2.22b	1.05	67	.18
Attribution victim #	2.82b	0.55	13	−.41		1.80c	0.73	67	−.01
Attribution Islamic world #	1.55c	0.75	13	.03		2.30b	0.92	67	.52*
Attribution non-Islamic world	1.73c	0.43	13	−.10		1.55d	0.79	67	.07
Typicality perpetrator #	1.15	0.55	13	−.12		1.91	1.10	67	.50*
Study 2									
Attribution perpetrator	4.18a	1.03	62	.20		3.84b	1.11	74	.24
Attribution al Qaeda #	2.66c	0.94	62	−.12		4.36a	0.63	74	.48*
Attribution Islamic world #	1.77d	0.84	62	−.50*		3.07c	0.84	74	.79*
Attribution non-Islamic world #	3.45b	0.79	62	−.01		2.64d	0.81	74	−.21
Study 3: Islamic perpetrator condition									
Attribution Islamic world	1.90a	2.00	20	−1.05*		2.94a	1.83	34	.77*
Attribution non-Islamic world #	3.75b	2.31	20	−.68		3.26a	1.46	34	−.27
Typicality perpetrator #	2.17	1.18	20	−.42		3.04	1.61	34	.43*
Study 3: Non-Islamic perpetrator condition									
Attribution Islamic world	3.13b	2.01	24	.24		3.93a	1.85	29	−.07
Attribution non-Islamic world #	3.96a	2.03	24	.19		3.17b	1.80	29	.33
Typicality perpetrator #	3.10	1.79	24	−.02		2.26	1.20	29	.03

Islamic and non-Islamic people differ on this variable (p' .05).

* B-values p' .05; within columns, attributions of responsibility with different subscripts within each study differ from each other (p' .05).

The means corresponding to the two-way interaction between target and group membership are summarized in table 1. In addition, in this table, we present all the relationships (i.e., betas) between level of identification with the victim and the five types of attributions of responsibility, for the Islamic and non-Islamic respondent group separately, corresponding to the significant three-way interaction. We performed specific contrast analyses (within the full design) to test for differences between Islamic and non-Islamic people and for differences between the different types of attributions within each respondent group.[1]

Inspecting the means first, it can be seen that non-Islamic participants attributed more responsibility to the perpetrators than did Islamic respondents. Unexpectedly, we did not find an effect of group membership on attributions of responsibility to the direct surrounding group of the perpetrator (family/friends). In line with the expected general intergroup attribution bias, Islamic participants attributed less responsibility to the Islamic world as a whole than did non-Islamic respondents. In line with the prediction, Islamic participants attributed more responsibility to the victim himself than did non-Islamic respondents. However, unexpectedly, there was no significant effect of group membership on the attribution of responsibility to the Western world, even though the means were in the predicted direction.

When we consider the relationships (beta values) between identification with the victim and attribution of responsibility separately for Islamic and non-Islamic respondents (see table 1), it should be noted first that the number of Islamic participants (thirteen) was too small for a reliable estimate of the relationships. However, the relationships for non-Islamic respondents were based on a sample size of sixty-seven, and were thus reliable. In this group, identification with the victim was positively related to attributions of responsibility to the Islamic world as a whole. This indicates that when people felt a bond with the victim, they placed more blame on the group to which the perpetrator belongs.

A GLM analysis on the *perceived typicality* of the perpetrator showed the predicted main effect of group membership, $F (1, 76) = 6.38$, $p = .014$, $\eta^2 = .08$. Non-Islamic respondents ($M =1.91$: SD $=1.10$) perceived the perpetrator as more typical of the Islamic group than did Islamic participants ($M = 1.15$; SD $= 0.55$). In addition, the interaction between group membership and identification with the victim showed a trend, $F (1, 76) = 3.08$, $p = .083$, $\eta^2 = .04$. In line with the predictions, there was a positive and significant relationship between victim identification and perceived typicality in the non-Islamic sample, while this relationship was slightly negative (albeit non-significant) for Islamic participants.

To test the prediction that typicality of perpetrator would mediate the effect of victim identification on attributions of responsibility, we conducted regression analyses in the non-Islamic sample: identification predicted attributions of responsibility to the Islamic world ($b=.52$, p'.0005) and identification predicted perceived typicality ($b=.50$, $p=.002$). In the final analysis, we included both identification and perceived typicality as predictors of attributions ($R^2=.37$, $F (2, 64) = 18.93$, p'.0005). Perceived typicality predicted attributions ($b=.36$, p'.0005), and the path from identification attributions remained significant ($b=.35$, $p=.006$). However, this latter path dropped in strength, resulting in a significant Sobel test for mediation, ($z=2.90$, $p=.004$). Thus, attributions of responsibility to the Islamic world were predicted by typicality, but the direct path from identification with the victim remained significant as well, indicating not a full, but partial mediation of perceived typicality.

Finally, in order to provide a further test of the notion that perceived typicality is related to a homogeneous perception of the outgroup, we created a difference score between attributions to the perpetrator and the Islamic world (a high score denotes a bigger difference, thus a stronger attribution to the perpetrator than to the Islamic world). In the non-Islamic sample, we observed a substantial negative correlation between this variable and perceived typicality ($r=-.50$, p'.0005).

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1 Considerations of space led us to restrict the methodical information provided. The authors would be pleased to provide further information on statistical details.

4. Study 2

In study 1, we observed that people are more likely to generalize the negative behavior of one outgroup member to the outgroup as a whole (and as such implicitly explain the behavior as typical of that group) than to generalize the negative behavior of one ingroup member to the ingroup as a whole. In addition, results showed that members of a victim group perceived the perpetrator as more typical of his group than did the perpetrator group. Finally, the level of identification with the victim intensified the observed patterns: non-Islamic people perceived the perpetrator as more typical of Islamic people, and attributed more responsibility to the Islamic group as a whole when level of their identification with the victim was greater. Regression analyses and a significant Sobel test revealed partial mediation: the link between identification and attributions to the outgroup as a whole can be partly explained by the perceived typicality of the perpetrator.

It is important to note that in this study we focused on identification with the victim. The limitation of this measure is that it was a single item, and it was a retrospective item. In the second and the third study, however, we administered a multi-item measure of level of *identification with the respondent's own group.* For reasons both theoretical (Smith 1993; Tajfel and Turner 1986) and empirical (Doosje et al. 1998, 2006; Gordijn et al. 2006; Johns, Schmader, and Lickel 2005; Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Pennekamp et al. 2007) we hypothesize that identification with one's own group is likely to codetermine reactions to (harmful) behavior by members of one's group.

As in study 1, we proposed that non-Islamic people were more likely than Islamic people to attribute responsibility for the occurrence of Islamic terrorist attacks and increased intergroup tension to the Islamic group. In addition, we expect these different judgments to be related to level of ingroup identification, such that the more people identify with their group, the more likely it is that they display this intergroup attribution effect.

In addition, as in study 1, we expected that the groups might differ in the extent to which they perceive the perpetrators of attacks performed by Islamic people to be typical group members. Unfortunately, because we did not

measure typicality directly, we have to rely on inferences here: when attributions of responsibility for the attacks to the perpetrators and to the whole Islamic group are positively related, we can infer a perceived typicality of the perpetrator. This idea is in line with the final findings in study 1, where we observed a negative correlation between perceived typicality and the difference between attributions to the perpetrator and the group as whole. Thus, we expected stronger relationships between attributions of responsibility for the attacks to the perpetrators and the whole Islamic group for non-Islamic than for Islamic participants.

4.1. Method
Participants
We included seventy-four non-Islamic participants and sixty-three Islamic respondents in this study, of which about two-thirds were female. They all lived in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and were approached in mosques and in their homes. Most Islamic people were of Turkish or Moroccan origin. The mean age of the non-Islamic sample was thirty-four, and of the Muslim sample twenty-five years.

Design and Procedure
The design consisted of one between-participants variable, group membership (Islamic versus non-Islamic), and one continuous variable, identification with the ingroup (either the Islamic group, or the native Dutch group). The most important dependent variables included attributions of responsibility for terrorists attacks and for increased tension between Islamic and Western world. This was done in December 2002, after the United States and Britain took control of Afghanistan but before they invaded Iraq.

Dependent Variables
All items were answered on five-point scales ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." We first measured identification with the ingroup using seven items derived from various sources (including Doosje et al. 1995; Leach et al. in press; alpha for the sample was .86). For example, one item was: "I feel a bond with Islamic people" or "I feel a bond with native Dutch." Another was "I see myself as a member of the Islamic people" or "I see myself as a member of the native Dutch." We measured attributions of responsibility of the terrorists attacks "such as in the US

and in Madrid" using two items that are similar to study 1: one is about attribution of responsibility of the perpetrators and one about "al Qaeda" (similar to "surrounding group of perpetrator" in study 1). For attributions to the "Islamic world," we used two questions: "To what extent do you perceive the *Islamic world* as responsible for the terrorist attacks" and the same question about responsibility for the increased tension between the Islamic world and the Western world (correlation $r=.53$, p'.001). The same two items were administered for attributions to the "Western world," replacing the italized words in the above questions with "Western world" (correlation $r=.33$, p'.001). Finally, we recorded participants' religion (if any), their nationality, and their parents' nationality.[2]

4.2. Results and Discussion

We performed a general linear model analysis on the attribution of responsibility items for the attacks (four, treated as a repeated measure) with group membership of participant (Islamic versus non-Islamic) and level of ingroup identification as independent variables. In terms of hypotheses, there was a strong main effect of target of attribution of responsibility, $F (3, 130) = 50.41$, p ' .0005, $\eta^2 = .54$, that was qualified by the expected interaction between group membership and target of attribution of responsibility, $F (3, 130) = 55.37$, p ' .0005, $\eta^2 = .56$. The means are depicted in table 1. Islamic and non-Islamic participants did not differently attribute responsibility to the perpetrators of the attacks. However, as expected, non-Islamic respondents attributed more responsibility to both al Qaeda and the Islamic world than did Islamic participants, whereas the opposite pattern occurred with attributions of responsibility to the Western world. Finally, the three-way interaction between group membership, attribution of responsibility, and level of ingroup identification was significant as well, $F (3, 130) = 4.80$, $p = .003$, $\eta^2 = .10$. In order to disentangle this three-way interaction, we examined the relationship (in terms of b-values) between level of ingroup identification and each attribution of responsibility, separately for Islamic and non-Islamic people

(see table 1). For non-Islamic respondents, as expected, we observed positive relationships between level of ingroup identification and attributions of responsibility to al Qaeda and the Islamic world. For Islamic participants, there was the expected significant negative relation between level of ingroup identification and attributions of responsibility to the Islamic world.

In terms of correlations *between* attributions of responsibility, we observed that for non-Islamic people there was a correlation between judgments about the perpetrator and about al Qaeda ($r=.36$, p =.002), whereas this link was not significant for Islamic people ($r=.06$, p=.63). In addition, for Islamic people, there was a *negative* association between judgments about the perpetrator and about the Islamic world ($r=-.33$, p =.008), whereas this link was not observed for non-Islamic people ($r=.06$, p=.63). In both groups we observed a correlation between judgments about al Qaeda and about the Islamic world (for Islamic people $r=.34$, p =.008; for non-Islamic people $r=.42$, p = .001). Thus, for non-Islamic people, there was a link between the perpetrator and al Qaeda, and an association between al Qaeda and the Islamic world, supporting the notion that non-Islamic participants treated the outgroup targets as a homogeneous entity. In contrast, for Islamic participants, there was no link between the perpetrator and al Qaeda, even though they perceived a relation between al Qaeda and the Islamic world.

In study 2 we replicated and extended the findings of study 1. We observed a general intergroup attribution bias, according to which both Islamic and non-Islamic people attributed less responsibility for terrorist attacks and increased tension to their own group than to the outgroup. This tendency was, to some extent, strengthened through a high identification with the ingroup. In addition, for non-Islamic people, there were significant correlations between attributions of responsibility to the perpetrator and to al Qaeda, and between al Qaeda and the Islamic world. These correlations suggest that non-Islamic people

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2 The nationality of the parents was not part of the statistical analysis; this question was merely asked to make sure we recruited Dutch people with Dutch parents.

have a coherent perception of the Islamic perpetrators and their group. For Islamic people, even though the attributions to al Qaeda and to the Islamic world were correlated, there was no link between attributions to the perpetrator and to al Qaeda. Moreover, there was a negative association between attributions to the perpetrator and to the Islamic world. These patterns are at least suggestive of a "black sheep effect": Islamic people do not want to consider perpetrators as real ingroup members. They do not want these members to stain the image of their group.

5. Study 3

In the third study, we set out to improve on study 2 in two respects: one was to measure perceived typicality of the perpetrators again (as we did in study 1). Secondly, so far, group membership (Islamic/non-Islamic) has been correlated with the perpetrator/victim dimension. In order to rule out possible confounding effects, we *manipulated* the perpetrator/victim group role in the third study, while still including both Islamic and non-Islamic respondents, by focusing on different real-life episodes of intergroup behavior. The specific Dutch context after the assassination of Theo van Gogh (see study 1) provided a situation in which both groups attacked each other. During the first two weeks after van Gogh's murder both churches and mosques were set on fire. Fortunately, there were no lives lost in these attacks, but the climate became very heated and confused. In that period of uncertainty, it was possible to create different images of the two groups, either as victim or as perpetrator of intergroup violence (although one could argue that an Islamic person instigated all this, and that globally speaking, Islamic terrorists receive quite a lot of attention, and thus, that our manipulation would have had to be stronger than this. We will return to this issue in the general discussion).

We aimed to replicate the intergroup attribution bias, and predicted again that this bias was stronger for people high in ingroup identification. In addition, we expected perceptions of typicality of the perpetrators to mediate this effect of identification on intergroup attribution bias. Specifically, we expected members of perpetrator groups to make black sheep of their negative group members, and do so more strongly, the more strongly they identify with their group. We predicted that members of victimized groups,

however, would hold a coherent and homogeneous picture of the perpetrator group in their head, and thus perceive the perpetrators as typical members of the outgroup, and do so more strongly the more strongly they identify with their ingroup.

5.1. Method
Participants
Twenty-three male and twenty-two female Islamic respondents and thirty-one male and thirty female non-Islamic persons (plus five people who did not indicate their gender) participated in this study in November 2004. Their mean age was twenty-three years for the Islamic sample, and twenty-seven for the non-Islamic sample. Their participation was voluntary and they were informed about the purpose of the study afterwards.

Design and Procedure
The design thus consisted of two between-participants variables: perpetrator group membership (non-Islamic versus Islamic) and respondent group membership (non-Islamic versus Islamic), with ingroup identification as a continuous independent variable.

Participants were approached in public areas (e.g., trains, markets, etc.) and were asked to fill out a short questionnaire concerning the recent tension between Islamic and non-Islamic, autochthonous Dutch people. They were first asked to indicate their religion: Islamic, Christian, other, or no religion. Subsequently, we measured level of ingroup identification, using the same nine items as in study 2. (reliability coefficient .95).

Manipulation of Perpetrator or Victim Role of Group
Subsequently, participants were presented with a text describing a terrorist incident. In the Islamic [non-Islamic] perpetrator condition, we gave an account of a terrorist attack on a Protestant church [mosque] in the Netherlands, explaining that the terrorists had set the church [mosque] on fire and written anti-Christian [anti-Islamic] slogans on the building. According to the text, the attack had *not* resulted in fatalities.

Dependent Variables
Attributions of responsibility for the recent tension were

measured by two items that we used in study 2 as well: "To what extent is Islamic world [Western world] responsible for recent tension between Islamic and non-Islamic people?" answered on a seven-point scale ranging from "not at all" to "very much". *Perceived typicality of the perpetrators* was recorded by two items: "I perceive the perpetrators as prototypical Muslims [autochthonous Dutch]" and the measure of inclusion of the perpetrators in the perpetrator group (i.e., either Muslim or autochthonous Dutch). The latter was measured with seven increasingly overlapping circles representing the perpetrators and their group, adapted from Tropp and Wright (2001). The correlation between these two items was .36 (p'.0005).

5.2. Results and Discussion

We used a general linear model (GLM) procedure in which we treated attributions of responsibility for the attacks to the Islamic world and to the Western world as a within-participants variable (labelled "target"), and included perpetrator group membership (Islamic versus non-Islamic) and respondent group membership (Islamic versus non-Islamic) as between-participants variables, and ingroup identification as a continuous independent variable. We found significant interaction between target, perpetrator group membership, and respondent group membership, $F (1, 99) = 15.82$, p '.0005, $\eta^2 = .14$, as well as a four-way interaction with these variables and ingroup identification, $F (1, 99) = 8.58$, $p = .004$, $\eta^2 = .08$. In order to disentangle this four-way interaction, we decided to break it down by perpetrator group membership, enabling us to examine the relationships as a function of making salient an Islamic perpetrator group (thereby replicating studies 1 and 2) versus making salient a non-Islamic perpetrator group. All the relevant means and relationships with ingroup identification (b-values) can be found in table 1.

Examining the *Islamic perpetrator* group condition first, a GLM of the attributions of responsibility for the attacks (Islamic world and non-Islamic world) showed the expected target by respondent group membership interaction, $F (1, 50) = 5.73$, p '.021, $\eta^2 = .10$, illustrating the classic intergroup attribution bias. Similar to Study 1 and 2, this interaction was again qualified by a significant three-way interaction involving ingroup identification, $F (1, 50) = 5.77$, p '.020, $\eta^2 = .10$. There were no other significant effects. When we broke down the significant three-way interac-

tion, we found strong support for the predicted pattern in that attributing responsibility to the perpetrator group (Islamic people) was related *negatively* with ingroup identification for Islamic participants, while this relation was *positive* for non-Islamic respondents (all relationships are given in table 1). With respect to attribution to the victimized group, there were no significant relations between ingroup identification and the attributions.

Examining the *non-Islamic perpetrator* group condition, a GLM of the attributions of responsibility for the attacks (Islamic world and Western world) showed the expected target by respondent group membership two-way interaction effect, $F (1, 49) = 12.49$, p '.001, $\eta^2 = .20$. Means are given in table 1. In line with the general intergroup attribution pattern, non-Islamic respondents ascribed somewhat more responsibility to the Islamic world than did Islamic respondents, whereas Islamic respondents ascribed significantly more responsibility to the Western world than did non-Islamic people. There were no other significant effects.

We did the same GLM analyses with respect to perceived *typicality of perpetrators* for their ingroup, and found a significant two-way interaction between perpetrator group membership and respondent group membership, $F (1, 101) = 4.35$, p '.040, $\eta^2 = .04$, as well as a trend for the three-way interaction with these variables and ingroup identification, $F (1, 101) = 2.98$, p '.087, $\eta^2 = .03$. In order to disentangle this three-way interaction, we decided to break it down again by perpetrator group membership.

Examining the *Islamic perpetrator* group condition first, a GLM of the perceived typicality of the perpetrator for the group as a whole showed the expected two-way respondent group membership by ingroup identification interaction effect, $F (1, 52) = 5.30$, p '.025, $\eta^2 = .09$. No other significant effects emerged. Perceived typicality of the Islamic perpetrator was related slightly negatively with ingroup identification for Islamic people, although not significantly, possibly due to the small sample, while this relationship was positive for non-Islamic people (see table 1).

Examining the *non-Islamic* perpetrator group condition, a GLM of the perceived typicality of the perpetrators showed no significant effects.

We hypothesized that when people identify with their group, they are more likely to perceive outgroup perpetrators as typical for their group, and consequently attribute more responsibility to the outgroup as a whole. We used the program EQS to assess this model, separately for the Islamic perpetrator group condition and the non-Islamic group condition, and, in both cases, separately for Islamic and non-Islamic people. Because we specified a full model, it was not possible to estimate fit indices. The structural equation models for the Islamic perpetrator conditions are presented in figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1: Study 3 Islamic perpetrators: for non-Islamic people

*p < .05   ^p = .08

As can be seen in figure 1, non-Islamic people perceived Islamic perpetrators as relatively typical to the extent that they identified more strongly with their group ("white sheep"). These perceptions of typicality in turn led to higher attributions of responsibility to Islamic people as a whole. In addition, there was a direct and positive path from ingroup identification to attributions of responsibility. The Sobel test did not meet conventional level of significance and showed a trend (p=.10), but this may have been caused by small size of the sample and thus larger error.

Importantly, quite a different picture emerged for Islamic people (fig. 2), where there was a direct but *negative* path from ingroup identification to attributions of responsibility. At the same time, there was a negative relation between ingroup identification and perceived typicality of the perpetrator for the ingroup. As such, they perceived the perpetrators as "Black Sheep."

Figure 2: Study 3 Islamic perpetrators: for Islamic people

*p < .05

In the non-Islamic perpetrator group condition, we observed a similar ingroup-outgroup pattern, but with notable differences. Although the relationship between ingroup identification and attributions of responsibility to the perpetrator group was, as expected, positive (.23) for Islamic participants, but it was not significant, possibly due to low cell numbers. Similarly, there was a positive and significant path from perceived typicality and attributions of responsibility to the perpetrator group (.40). These two paths were identical to the corresponding paths in the Islamic perpetrator group condition. However, in contrast to previous findings, in this case, there was no path from ingroup identification to perceived typicality (-.02).

Finally, all paths for the non-Islamic participants in the non-Islamic perpetrator group condition were all below .10, and thus not significant.

In general, the third study replicated and extended findings from studies 1 and 2, by showing the role of and links between group membership (Islamic versus non-Islamic), ingroup identification, perceived typicality of the perpetrator in explaining attributions of responsibility to the perpetrator group as a whole, when a terrorist attack points to the Islamic background of the perpetrators, as was the case in the previous two studies. We were also able to show that the traditional intergroup attribution bias is strengthened when the perpetrators are from one's own ingroup and thus the image of one's own group is threatened. However, when we make the *non*-Islamic group the salient perpetrator group, we do find the traditional intergroup

attribution bias, but find no support for the effects of perceived typicality and ingroup identification in this context.

We can think of a couple of reasons as to why this might be the case. First, we do have to acknowledge the fact that in the Netherlands, in the media and daily conversation, the role of Islamic perpetrators is much more salient than the role of non-Islamic perpetrators. As such, making salient the Islamic background of the perpetrators may have fitted in with pre-existing ideas about who is the perpetrator and who is the victim in this context, whereas the opposite manipulation may have been more difficult to integrate with pre-existing notions about victim-perpetrator group membership.

In addition, it may be possible that we observe weaker effects among Islamic people because they may feel attached to the country (the Netherlands), whereas Dutch people are less likely to identify with Islamic people. Alternatively, it might be possible to explain the differences between making salient either the Islamic or non-Islamic perpetrator in terms of the differences between the respondent groups: Islamic versus non-Islamic people, all living in the Netherlands. These groups differ in terms of a number of factors, such as group size, economic status, and political power. These factors may contribute to caution among Islamic people about attributing responsibility to the non-Islamic perpetrator. They may want to avoid possible negative sanctions for placing too much of the blame on the dominant non-Islamic group. From the present set of data, we can conclude that we do find similar patterns in terms of differences between the groups. However, we do not find strong support for the processes underlying the attributions of responsibilities in the first two studies (in terms of victim or ingroup identification, and perceived typicality), when the perpetrators of a terrorist attack are implied to be non-Islamic.

6. General Discussion

In the three studies we focused on attributions of responsibility to the perpetrator group as a whole for terrorist attacks as a function of group membership (Islamic and non-Islamic people), level of identification with the victim (study 1), or victim/perpetrator group (studies 2 and 3), and perceived typicality of the perpetrators for the group.

Across the three studies, we observe the classic intergroup attribution bias when people are requested to indicate the responsibility for the terrorist attacks and the resulting tension between the Islamic and non-Islamic people. More specifically, on average, non-Islamic people perceive the Islamic group as a whole as more responsible than do Islamic people. Islamic people, on average, attribute more responsibility to the Western world than do non-Islamic people. This typical pattern of "blaming the other party" has been well-documented in other contexts (for reviews see Pettigrew 1979; Hewstone 1990), but not in the context of international terrorism.

In this article we have focused on underlying mechanisms of this phenomenon. We argue that ingroup identification intensifies the classic attribution bias. In line with Doosje and Branscombe (2003), we have observed that people display a stronger intergroup attribution bias when they identify more strongly with their own group. More importantly, in our view, we have shown that perceived typicality of the perpetrator for the group as a whole plays a partial role in this context. More specifically, we have shown that when people identify relatively strongly with the victim (study 1) or their ingroup (study 2 and 3), they are more likely (study 1) or they tend (study 3) to perceive the perpetrator as a typical outgroup member, and thus perceive a link between the perpetrator and the group, and consequently attribute responsibility to the group as a whole for the actions of its member(s). Even though the direct path from identification to attribution remained significant, perceived typicality of the perpetrator partly mediates the relationship between identification and attributions of responsibility to the perpetrator group as a whole. This is the most important lesson from our three studies combined.

What can we say about the different opinions that were expressed by non-Islamic and Islamic people in the introduction? When a non-Islamic person argues that " all they do is hate and fight," this is in line with our finding among highly identified members of the non-Islamic group: even though we have not included direct measures of perceived homogeneity, non-Islamic people tend to perceive the Islamic group as a relatively homogeneous group to which it is possible to attribute responsibility for

the actions of its members. In a similar vein, the person who said "I felt that I had to explain that the embassy burning and flag burning were in no way representative of Muslims as a whole or Islam" is most likely a person who identifies quite strongly with the Islamic ingroup, as this person tries to portray the perpetrators as "black sheep."

When taken together, these studies provide a consistent picture of how people form attributions of responsibility for harmful behavior. Members of victimized groups are more likely to perceive the perpetrator(s) as typical of the group, and attribute more responsibility to the group. This pattern becomes more pronounced as identification with the victim or victimized group increases. The psychological consequences of these tendencies point to possible stronger tensions between the Islamic and the non-Islamic world. This may feed back into more negative attitudes towards the outgroup (Doosje, Kateman, and Mathyi forthcoming), and intergroup relations may further deteriorate.

In terms of limitations, we need to acknowledge that the two groups that we compare in our research are in fact difficult to compare. For example, it might be argued that the non-Islamic category is a broad and ill-defined category, while the Islamic category is clearly defined by self-categorization as a Muslim. Similarly, the two groups are likely to differ in demographic background, for example level of education and socio-economic status. At the same time, these possible differences represent real-life differences, increasing the external validity of results. In addition, we were able to replicate most of the basic effects when we manipulated the victim-perpetrator role in study 3, lending support to the notion that this distinction is important in this context of explaining perceptions of intergroup aggression.

Why do people from victim groups make stronger attributions of responsibility to the perpetrator group as a whole? Although again we did not include such measures, one reason may lie in people's need for certainty and predictability. For example, research has shown that reminding people of terrorist attacks increases their "need for closure" (Kruglanski et al. 2006), and that "individuals would like to believe in ideas, form impressions and create categories in order to feel certain and avoid ambiguity" (Orehek et al., forthcoming). More specifically, when American citizens watch images of 9/11, they report a higher need for closure than do control participants (Orehek et al., forthcoming). This shows that people experience uncertainty due to the attacks and that they may respond by being motivated to draw clear distinctions between good and bad, between victim and perpetrator. Creating a homogeneous perception of the perpetrator group, creates certainty: "They are all responsible."

Conversely, ingroup identification is likely to lead people to view the world from their ingroup's perspective: for a real feminist, *all* men are bad. In this sense, ingroup identification may motivate people to perceive the world through a strong ingroup-outgroup categorization (Doosje et al. 1995; Turner et al. 1987). Perceiving the ingroup and the outgroup as homogeneous entities creates these strong intergroup boundaries, that make it easy to place any new social stimulus in clear categories.

These studies also provide insights into how to deal with this issue of generalization of behavior of some members to the group as whole. At the most fundamental level, ingroup identification plays a crucial role. People's identification with their group may fluctuate depending on contexts (Ellemers 1993), but it nevertheless constitutes a relatively fixed and pervasive entity (Billig, 1995). It may be more useful to think about ways to change people's perceptions of typicality of perpetrators.

One way might be to manipulate the variable of reported support for terrorist attacks among the Islamic group, in order to test the hypothesis that when (non-Islamic) people hear that the Islamic group does not support terrorists attacks, this may lead to lower estimates of typicality of the perpetrator. Another strategy that does not directly follow from these studies, but can be derived from other work (Doosje et al., forthcoming; Pysczcynski et al. 2002) might be to examine the emotional reactions to terrorism in terms of fear and anger, and to try to address these emotions in order to reduce the negative effects of the intergroup violence. A final strategy to reduce the perceived typicality of outgroup perpetrators might be through taking the perspective of the surrounding outgroup on this issue. That is, if non-Islamic people could learn how Islamic people strongly wish to disassociate

themselves from terrorists and how they perceive them as deviants (e.g., through reading the quote of the Islamic person in the introduction for example), this may reduce the perceived typicality of the Islamic perpetrators also among the perspective takers. However, previous research shows that the positive social consequences of perspective-taking for the outgroup work especially well for people who are weakly invested in their group (who are relatively flexible in their intergroup perceptions), but not among highly identified group members (Zebel, Doosje, and Spears, forthcoming). The road to intergroup harmony is difficult and uncertain.

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A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Suicide Bombing

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Understanding suicide bombing entails studying the phenomenon on three different dimensions: the suicide bomber, the terrorist organization, and the community from which suicide bombings emerge. Political and social psychology allow us to establish the reciprocal relationships that underpin the exchanges between the three dimensions. This method increases our theoretical understanding of suicide bombing by moving away from the unidimensional models that have previously dominated the terrorism literature.

1. Introduction

Late on the night of Friday June 1, 2001, Saeed Hotary left the Palestinian West Bank city of Kalkilya by car. Two colleagues, who also made the journey, dropped him off at the promenade in Tel Aviv. According to eyewitness reports, Hotary joined a long queue of people awaiting entry into the Dolphinarium nightclub. He mingled with some of the teenagers in the queue and flirted with one girl in particular. Without warning, Hotary detonated an explosive device strapped to his body, which held a large number of metal objects including ball bearings and screws. Within an instant, both Hotary and the girl evaporated. In total, twenty-one people died and one hundred and twenty were injured, the vast majority of whom were teenagers gathering on Tel Aviv's promenade to socialize at the weekend (O'Reilly 2001).

Condemnation from world leaders followed the next day. Despite that, Palestinian terrorist organizations competed for claims of responsibility. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the little known Palestinian Hezbollah claimed the bomber as their own (MIPT Database). Dozens of Palestinians in Ramallah reportedly celebrated the act. Hotary's family and neighbors also celebrated. His father stated he wished he had twenty more sons to become suicide bombers (Khalaf 2001). His neighbors hung pictures of the new martyr holding seven sticks of dynamite around the neighborhood and arranged flowers in the shapes of a heart and a bomb to display. His picture adorned an elementary school entrance in his hometown (Kelley 2001). Two weeks later, an opinion poll showed 68.6 percent support for suicide bombings amongst a sample of over one thousand Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (JMCC Poll no. 41). In a separate poll 82.3 percent of respondents did not view this incident as an act of terrorism (PCPSR Poll no. 3).

Many questions arise from this story. Why would an otherwise normal twenty-one-year-old electrician blow himself up? Why do terrorist organizations use this tactic? Is the death of the perpetrator instrumental to the success of the act? What role do the bomber's colleagues play in the facilitation of suicide bombing? Why do terrorist organizations compete to claim such a violent attack against innocents? How can a suicide bombing and actors involved receive such levels of support from the wider community?

These questions have become more important over the last few years. The Iraqi insurgency has produced more

suicide bombings than the previous twenty-five years.[1] Between 1980 and 2004, suicide bombings accounted for 48 percent of all deaths through terrorism despite its use in only 3 percent of incidents (Pape 2005).[2] Sustained suicide bombings occurred in various Lebanese groups' campaigns to drive American, French, and Israeli forces out of Lebanon, attempts by various Palestinian groups to coerce Israel into leaving Gaza and the West Bank, the Tamil, Chechen, Kashmiri, and Kurdish separatist movements, al Qaeda's sustained efforts against the United States and its allies, and the Iraqi and Afghan insurgencies. Suicide bombers have also emerged from Britain, Belgium, Somalia, Mali, Iran, Syria, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia , the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan.

Current research on terrorism in general, and suicide bombing in particular typically focuses on one of three possible dimensions; the terrorist/suicide bomber, the terrorist organization and to a lesser extent, the community from which suicide bombings emerge. Studies on individual terrorists and suicide bombers seek to ascertain factors driving individuals to engage in terrorism. Various analyses have focused on pathological disposition to violence (Gordon 2002; Post 1990), an authoritarian personality (Lester, Yang, and Lindsay 2004), general socialization factors (Atran, 2003; Post 2005; Sageman 2005; Silke 2003), altruism (Azam 2005), rational choice (Gupta 2004), religious fanaticism (Pipes 2004), cognitive dissonance (Maikovich 2005), revenge for personal suffering (Margalit 2003), and despair (Prusher 2005).[3]

Figure 1: Number of suicide bombing by year

1 See figure 1. Data is derived from my database of incidents of suicide bombing. This database synthesizes information from online internet databases such as MIPT and ICT with general chronologies (Pape 2005; Pedahzur 2005) and LexisNexis searches.

2 This figure excludes 9/11.

3 For a general review of the psychological literature on terrorism, see Horgan (2005) and Victoroff (2005).

Studies on the organizational dimension of suicide bombing generally offer rational-choice explanations. Examples include cost-benefit analyses (Harrison 2001; Pape 2005), suicide bombing's ability to balance power in an asymmetric war (Gupta and Mundra 2005; Luft 2002), domestic political competition and outbidding by different organizations for public support (Bloom 2005), and other strategic motives such as the efficiency with which the terrorist can still activate the charge when captured (Ganor 2000).[4]

Studies on the societal dimension of terrorism and suicide bombing focus on factors such as the degree of political freedom and poverty in a given society (Abadie 2004), frustration caused by social injustice (Bloom 2005; Khashan 2003; Merari 1990), and an attachment to political Islam (Haddad 2004).[5] Hafez (2006a) outlines that a sense of victimization and threat combined with symbolic narratives that venerate martyrdom and legitimate leaders consenting to violence lead to societal support for suicide bombing.

These studies have all contributed to our knowledge of suicide bombing but the literature lacks a framework that ties all three dimensions together to explain the interaction between them.[6] Unidimensional explanations are unconcerned with the wider process that enables suicide bombing. Without incorporating other dimensions, the studies mentioned can often be misleading. Studies focusing on the individual suicide bomber cannot explain organizational motivations and societal support. Organizational approaches concentrating on strategic and tactical advantages cannot explain how a culture of martyrdom is socially constructed. Societal approaches cannot take into account fully the complexity of individual and organizational processes. The point of this article is not to present new empirical data, but instead to synthesize the wealth of existing data into a broad conceptual framework.

Political and social psychology provide insights into behavior within groups, decision-making by individuals, political socialization, conformism, group conflict, and symbolic attachment. These insights underpin the reciprocal relationships outlined in figure 2. They occur unsystematically and can begin on any dimension. (A) depicts the observation that terrorist organizations are ultimately dependent on the social, political, financial, and moral patronage of the constituency they claim to represent. With this in mind, the terrorist organization must calibrate its tactics and the timing of its operations, and its leaders must wield material and/or non-material resources to maximize societal support. (B) + (C) start with the proposition that when feelings of threat are salient, individuals are more likely to be submissive toward certain types of leaders and symbolic narratives. Aggressive policies ostensibly aimed against those who cause the threat and anxiety become more readily acceptable. (D) + (E) focus on how societal support coupled with catalysts and familial and friendship ties are behind the process of an individual joining a terrorist organization. (F) focuses on how the would-be-bomber radicalizes further through the internalization of relevant organizational norms.

Figure 2: Multi-dimensional model

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
4 For a general literature review of the organizational dimension to terrorism, see Cronin (2003, 8–12).

5 For a general review on the societal literature, see Turk (2004).

6. Hafez (2006b) and Moghadam (2006) have both put forward their own multi-causal frameworks but have not focused upon the interactions between dimensions. Pedahzur's model (2004) does account for some interactions but is too systematic and fails to propose an interpretive lens through which these interactions can be explained.

With slight alterations most of the processes described above for this model also have the potential to explain other (non-suicidal) acts of terrorism. However, in explaining suicide bombing this model contains three major differences from a model explaining ordinary terrorism. Firstly, the social construction of a "culture of martyrdom" is not necessary to explain non-suicidal terrorism. Secondly, as will be outlined later, in the Palestinian case, support for orthodox acts of terrorism remained more or less constant over the period examined whereas support for suicide bombing fluctuated. This fluctuation negatively correlated with optimism for the future. Therefore, a sense of threat correlates with support for suicide bombing. Perhaps, the surrounding political conditions are enough for support for orthodox acts of terrorism. Threat salience leads individuals toward escalatory tendencies in conflict and suicide bombing corresponds with this tendency for both normative and strategic reasons. Normatively, suicide bombing violates almost every predominant ethical norm in societies in which it takes place (i.e. not to kill innocents and not to commit suicide). Strategically, suicide bombing causes more casualties. Thirdly, the radicalization process for a suicide bomber within the group setting is a longer and more intense one. Preparation to kill and be killed simultaneously requires a more nuanced psychological conditioning.

2. The Interactions Between Dimensions

2.1 The Terrorist Organization Seeks Societal Support by Creating a Culture of Martyrdom (A)

Prominent in terrorism studies is the argument that all terrorist acts are a rational strategic move vis-à-vis a more powerful opponent (Pape 2005, Crenshaw 1990). This is only partly correct. Terrorist acts are not only an attempt to communicate to the political elites and public opinion of the targeted state. Terrorist organizations also aim to communicate to the community they claim to represent (Hoffman and McCormick 2004). Taking this into consideration, Weinburg and Pedahzur (2003) likened terrorist organizations to political parties because they are both ultimately dependent upon the moral and economic patronage of their supporters. For example, Richardson (2006, 84) argues that the IRA was always mindful not to disaffect the Catholic population of Northern Ireland for fear of losing support. These concerns were reflected in

its targeting strategies. Pape (2005) may be correct in asserting that suicide terrorism is a strategy to compel foreign occupiers to withdraw but he fails to recognize that this is just one part of the strategy. He fails to clarify that, as Tilly (2005, 11) points out, terror is a strategy that involves interactions among political actors at different levels, "and that to explain the adoption of such a strategy we have no choice but to analyze it as part of a political process." This section deals with how terrorist groups use their resources (both material and non-material) to promote suicide bombing by creating a culture of martyrdom. In creating a culture of martyrdom, leaders of terrorist organizations seek to generate support from their constituency of supporters. In the Palestinian, Tamil, Iraqi, Afghan and Chechen cases, this constituency is large and surrounds the organization itself. For al Qaeda and one-off cases such as 9/11, the Bali bombings, and the 7/7 bombings in London in 2005, the constituency mainly entails a "virtual constituency" consisting of global supporters on the internet and a small minority from within their own country holding similar sentiments. Resources utilized by terrorist organizations include; the use of propaganda, charismatic leaders, epistemic authorities, agency-laden institutions, framing justifications, and using euphemistic language. I will now approach each of these resources in turn. The aim is to show that in spite of the heterogeneous political or religious motivations espoused by organizations using suicide bombing, the tactics used to garner support are very similar.

2.1.1 Propaganda

Propaganda is one obvious method by which the terrorist organization seeks support. This includes; communiqués, media coverage depicting suicide bombers as martyrs, websites, public discourses, street posters, pamphlets, and attendance by respected public officials at the funerals or memorial ceremonies for suicide bombers. A full state funeral was held for a suicide bomber in Palestine in 2000. Tamil Tiger suicide bombers have orphanages named after them. A Palestinian suicide bomber had a youth football tournament held in his honor. Hamas calendars herald the "martyr of the month" (Hassan 2001). The Tamil Tigers, PKK, and Hezbollah commemorate the anniversary of their first suicide bombers each year. Chechens commemorate the first Chechen suicide bomber in a popular song.

Together, these acts produce an informal communication network that venerates suicide bombing. They supply the public with moral justifications for suicide attacks and help create a culture of martyrdom.

2.1.2 Leaders and Epistemic Authority Figures

Most terrorist organizations using suicide bombing possess either leaders revered by their followers or epistemic authority figures. Godlike leaders include Osama bin Laden of al Qaeda, Vellupillai Prabakharen of the Sri Lankan Tamil Tigers, Abdullah Ocalan of the PKK in Turkey, and al-Zarqawi in the Iraqi insurgency. Other groups rely on epistemic authorities in the construction of societal knowledge. Religious leaders are one example (Bar-Tal 2000, 65). For example, Hamas, Hezbollah, al Qaeda, Islamic Jihad, Iraqi and Afghanistan insurgents, and other suicide bombers such as those involved in 9/11 and 7/7 rely on the religious rulings of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, Sayid Muhammad Hasayn Fadlalla, Shaikh Yusuf Qardawi, and others to provide a legitimating ideology for suicide bombing.

2.1.3 Agency-Laden Institutions

Utilizing agency-laden institutions, defined as "cultural or organizational resources that can be mobilized to launch collective action" (Morris 2000, 450), is critical for a mass movement to be successful. Coupled with charismatic leadership, these institutions provide fertile ground for the mobilization of a mass movement. Leaders frame the necessity for, and means of, mobilization within these institutions. These institutions are often long-standing resources:

> Such institutions are configurations of cultural beliefs and practices that permeate and shape their social networks. Their cultural materials are constitutive in that they produce and solidify the trust, contacts, solidarity, rituals, meaning systems, and options of members embedded in their social networks. Endemic to some agency-laden institutions is a transcendent and coherent belief system that shape its actors' moral and political views about the kinds of relationships that ought to exist between individuals and social groups. These politically relevant beliefs inspire … actions geared toward the realization of group interests. (Morris 2000, 447)

Some terrorist groups dominate such institutions and exert an informational influence to aid in political socialization. This is important in shaping behavioral compliance. Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Tamil Tigers capitalized on the lack of state structures to set up their own quasi-state systems. For example, Hamas founded hospitals and paid for funerals, medical care, dentistry, scholarships, prenatal care, and other social services. Hamas spokesman Ismail Abu Shanab explains the logic of this well: "The political level is the face of Hamas, but without the other divisions Hamas would not be as strong as it is now… . If nobody supports these needy families, maybe nobody would think of martyrdom and the resistance of the occupation" (cited in Bloom 2005, 27–8). Hamas leader Ibrahim al-Yazuri considered Hamas's intention as "the liberation of all Palestine from the tyrannical Israeli occupation… . This is the main part of its concern … social work is carried out in support of this aim" (cited in Human Rights Watch 2002, 103–4). Other material resources include subsidies and apartments given to the families of suicide bombers (Human Rights Watch 2002, 16 and 100).

2.1.4 Public Discourse and Framing Justifications

Edelman (1971) argues that public discourse is central to evoking cognitive arousal and radicalization within the public. He explains behavior by focusing on what people expect of the future. Readily available evidence does not shape expectations. Instead, expectations based upon cues from legitimately perceived groups are absorbed more easily. This effect strengthens when cues include emotionally persuasive information and when they connect current events to a historical narrative (McDermott 2004, 64–5; Della Porta and Diani 1999, 184). This is especially true in ambiguous situations. Actions by groups perceived as legitimate help to shape and create beliefs and norms, help create perceptions of what is true, and help shape expectations of the future. For example, Prabakharen, the leader of the Tamil Tigers, instrumentally justified suicide bombing because "with perseverance and sacrifice, Tamil Eelam can be achieved in a hundred years. But if we conduct Black Tiger (suicide) operations, we can shorten the suffering of the people and achieve Tamil Eelam in a shorter period of time" (cited in Richardson 2006, 157). Without competing narratives from other sources, the cue effects strengthen further. In

these circumstances, they are a persuasive influence upon behaviour (Edelman 1971, 7).

Language is a key element in the construction of a legitimating ideology or myth. "Language is capable not only of constructing symbols that are highly abstracted from everyday experience, but also of 'bringing back' these symbols and appresenting them as objectively real elements in everyday life. In this manner, symbolism and symbolic language become essential constituents of the reality of everyday life and of the commonsense apprehension of this reality" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 55). Terrorist groups consistently use euphemistic language when referring to suicide bombing. This portrays suicide bombing as heroic and deflects attention from the human suffering on both sides of the conflict. Prior to the attack, the would-be-bomber is a "living martyr" *(al Shahid al hai)*. Afterwards, the funeral of the "martyr" is referred to as a "wedding." In Palestinian Arabic, the phrase for a suicide bombing attack is an *amaliyya istishadiyya,* a "martyrdom operation," or an *amaliyya fida'iyya,* a "sacrificial operation" (Human Rights Watch 2002, 36). The Tamil phrase for suicide bombing is *thatkodai,* meaning "to give yourself" (Richardson 2006; 140, Hopgood 2005, 74). Those who have given themselves to the cause are *mahaveera,* meaning "brave one," and their mother is *veeravati* or "brave mother" (Richardson 2006, 141).

Leaders of terrorist organizations and prominent politicians frame justifications for suicide bombings in a number of ways. All attempt to cast the blame onto the other side or accentuate the success of the suicide bombing. Firstly, leaders frame suicide bombing as a response to state provocation. Hamas labeled one set of bombings "the natural retaliation by a people slaughtered day and night, whose dignity is humiliated by the Zionist enemy's war machine" (cited in Human Rights Watch 2002, 27–8). Hafez's analysis of propaganda emanating from Iraqi insurgents (2007) details how they often present a problem (the United States), a cause of the problem (the subordination of existing Muslim regimes to the United States), and a solution (pious faith and martyrdom). Secondly, suicide bombing is framed as a tactic that balances power in what is an otherwise asymmetric war. Hamas spokesman 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rantisi stated: "We don't have F-16s, Apache

helicopters and missiles… . They are attacking us with weapons against which we can't defend ourselves. And now we have a weapon they can't defend themselves against… . We believe this weapon creates a kind of balance, because this weapon is like an F-16" (Human Rights Watch 2002, 56–7). Similarly, al-Zarqawi, leader of the Iraqi insurgency until his death, stated that his men "faced the strongest and most advanced army in modern times… . When the holy warriors noticed this huge disparity in numbers and armaments between them and the enemy, they looked for alternatives to amend this deficiency" (cited in Hafez 2007, 98). Suicide bombing reduced the deficit. Thirdly, suicide bombing is framed as an act of national struggle. 'Abd al-Rahman described suicide bombings to al-Jazeera as "the highest form of national struggle. There is no argument about that" (cited in Human Rights Watch 2002, 37). Fourthly, death under occupation is framed as inevitable anyway. Al-Rantisi also claimed that "to die in this way is better than to die daily in frustration and humiliation" (cited in Soibelman 2004, 180).

The examples provided show a remarkable similarity between organizations using suicide bombing in terms of leadership, how leaders frame justifications for suicide bombing, and the use of propaganda, euphemistic language, and agency-laden institutions. Organizational leaders harness these non-material resources effectively in creating a culture of martyrdom.

2.2 Societal Support for Bombers and Terrorist Organizations (B + C)

The previous section introduced means by which leaders of terrorist organizations seek societal support for suicide bombing. This section depicts the process whereby audiences become susceptible to symbolic anxiety-reducing narratives and to the influence of leaders who promote the use of suicide bombing. I propose that key to accounting for this is the theory of terror management.

Greenberg et al. (1986, cited in Hogg and Vaughan 2005, 138, and in Gordan and Arian 2001, 208) developed terror management theory. They argue that knowledge of the inevitability of death is the most fundamental threat that people face. Therefore, it is the most powerful motivating factor in human existence. Experimental studies strengthened the concept. When a sense of threat is

salient, positive feelings toward one's belief system and those holding similar beliefs increase while negative feelings toward those perceived to be a threat also increase. The strategy adopted to combat the threat is likely to be inflammatory (Castano et al. 2003, Voci 2006, Gordon and Arian 2001). Under conditions of threat decisions are based on emotion, but when feelings of threat are low decisions made are based on both logic and emotion. Therefore, when one is in a conflict situation, the course of action chosen is more likely to escalate and continue the conflict. Threat salience increases the likelihood of a reliance on stereotypes to characterize the threatening outgroup (Schimel et al. 1999, Arndt et al. 2002). Importantly, Greenberg et al. (1990) and Lavine et al. (2002) found a positive correlation between threat salience and the likelihood of resorting to authoritarian modes of thinking. This may result in a search for an outgroup, thinking in black-and-white terms, and the need for strong leaders to lessen the anxiety produced by the situation (Montuori 2005, 22–24). In other words, under conditions of threat, people are more likely to follow certain types of leaders espousing authoritarian values and symbolic narratives perceived to be legitimate and aggressive toward those who cause the threat and anxiety.

Sustained conflict brings a sense of threat to the fore. This impacts strongly upon the behavior of both individuals and collectives. Bar-Tal (2004) argues that in a conflict situation, individuals and collectives behave in particular ways. From an Israeli perspective, Bar-Tal (2004, 684–90) found that:

- Individuals perceive information supplied by the ingroup's epistemic authorities about the threatening outgroup as valid.
- Violence increases threat perception and feelings of fear and mistrust.
- Violence and threat perceptions cause delegitimization of the rival group.
- Violence, threat perception, and fear increase support of violent means to cope with the rival.
- During times of violence and perceived threat, people support a leader who projects forcefulness.
- Violence, threat perception, and fear lead to group mobilization, patriotism, and unity, cause self-percep-

tion as a victim, increase internal pressure for conformity and a readiness to impose sanctions on dissenting members of society.

The above points indicate that experiences of sustained conflict lead societies toward authoritarian mindsets.

Terror management theorists posit that individuals search for self-esteem through their social identity to counteract feelings of threat. Any act can increase positive ingroup status if members of the ingroup attach a positive role to the act itself (Rubin 2004, 825). Jerusalem Media and Communication Center (JMCC) and Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) survey data show that many forms of violent action toward Israel have a positive value attached to them in Palestinian areas. They show strong support for military actions against the Israeli Defense Forces, Israeli civilians, and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza. Over the course of 16 surveys, undertaken between May 1997 and February 2006, JMCC survey data average 60.9 percent support for military operations against Israeli targets. The PCPSR findings average 88.1 percent support for any military operation against Israeli military targets over 13 surveys between August 1995 and March 2005. Support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians average 51.7 percent over nineteen surveys between August 1995 and June 2006 (PCPSR). Support for armed attacks against Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza average 86.6 percent over twelve surveys between August 1995 and December 2004 (PCPSR). Support for these acts was consistently higher amongst those who were educated, young, female, living in refugee camps, earning a higher income, and Hamas supporters.

As stated earlier, for al Qaeda, and one-off cases such as 9/11, the Bali bombings, and 7/7, the constituency mainly entails a "virtual constituency" consisting of global supporters on the internet and a small minority from within their own country holding similar sentiments. The work of Sageman (2005) and Hafez (2007) reveal the ubiquitous extent of propaganda for suicide bombing on the internet. Opinion polls in many states reveal evidence of small minorities justifying suicide bombings. For example, ICM opinion polls undertaken for the British *Guardian* newspaper reveal that in March 2004, 13 percent of Muslims

polled in Britain were willing to justify future al Qaeda attacks on the United States while in July 2005, 5 percent of Muslims polled were willing to justify future attacks by British suicide bombers in the UK. Populus opinion polls undertaken for the British *Times* newspaper reveal that of the British Muslims polled in December 2005, 7 percent were willing to justify suicide bombings in the UK, 16 percent in Israel, 13 percent in Chechnya, and 15 percent in Iraq. A separate Populus opinion poll in June 2006 showed 13 percent of polled British Muslims considered the 7/7 perpetrators to be martyrs. In the same poll 16 percent were willing to justify suicide bombings in the United Kingdom against military targets, 11 percent against government buildings/workers, 10 percent against the police, and 7 percent against civilians. A major Pew Research Center poll of sixty thousand Muslims living in the United States found that 5 percent justified suicide bombings. Of those aged under thirty, 15 percent saw justification. Pew's "Global Attitudes Project" in May 2006

asked "Can suicide bombing of civilian targets to defend Islam be justified?" Muslim respondents from states in which suicide bombers have emerged showed a small, but significant in its implications, minority who justify suicide bombing. Examples include Jordan (29 percent), Egypt (28 percent), Turkey (17 percent), Great Britain (15 percent), Pakistan (14 percent), and Indonesia (10 percent).

Support for suicide bombings in the Palestinian regions is even higher. Over the course of nineteen surveys undertaken between June 1995 and February 2006, JMCC survey data averaged 52 percent support for suicide bombings against any Israeli target. Support for specific suicide bombings in PCPSR surveys garnered even higher levels. The Maxim Restaurant bombing in 2003, which killed twenty Israeli civilians, received 74 percent support. The Beer Shiva suicide bombing in 2004 received 77 percent support, while 69 percent supported the suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in April 2006 that killed eleven civilians.

Figure 3: Levels of support for suicide bombings versus optimism levels

Date of survey

□ Support for suicide bombing
■ Levels of optimism

Source: Collated JMCC survey data

Support for orthodox (para)military operations against Israeli Defense Forces, Israeli settlers, and Israeli civilians remained more or less constant over the period examined. Support for suicide bombing, on the other hand, fluctuated. JMCC survey data reveals a negative correlation between support for suicide bombing and optimism about the future (see figure 3). This finding corresponds with the terror management hypothesis that anxiety about the future turns individuals toward authoritarian and escalatory tendencies. Suicide bombings correspond with this escalatory tendency for both normative and strategic reasons. Normatively, suicide bombing violates almost every predominant ethical norm in societies in which it takes place (i.e. not to kill innocents and not to commit suicide). Strategically, suicide bombing causes more casualties. Since the first Palestinian suicide bombing in April 1993, suicide bombing has accounted for 78 percent of Israeli deaths through terrorism despite its use in only 12 percent of incidents.[7] Seventeen JMCC surveys included both of the following questions: "Are you optimistic or pessimistic about the future?" and "Do you support suicide bombings?" When optimists outnumbered pessimists, support for suicide bombing averaged 40 percent. When optimists were in the minority, support averaged 65.6 percent.

To sum up, the variables listed in section (A) detailed how terrorist organizations seek to alter public opinion to elicit support. This section, on the other hand, proposed one major variable that stipulates the conditions under which audiences may become susceptible to these tactics. This is not to suggest however, that one psychological variable (sense of threat) by itself determines support. Instead, surrounding political conditions such as harsh anti-terrorism policies, poverty, a sense of relative deprivation and/or the initiation of peace processes may also contribute toward individuals increasing or decreasing support for terrorist organizations or, at the very least, agreeing or disagreeing with their justifications. An example of surrounding political conditions lessening societal support for suicide bombing occurred in Palestine in February 2005. Journalists reported that the suicide bombing

by Abdallah Badran was not celebrated. The surrounding community did not print posters of the new martyr. No social event was planned for his funeral. One local stated; "Things were getting better and then no sooner do we have money coming in again then it is stopped by this suicide bombing" (cited in Urquhart 2005). No suicide bombings emerged from Palestine in the following sixteen months. In other words, surrounding political conditions, coupled with a shared sense of threat (or lack thereof) can contribute toward either increasing or decreasing support for suicide bombing.

2.3 The Individual Volunteers (D + E)

Studies focusing on motivations for joining terrorist organizations have evolved over the past three decades. Early research in the 1970s and 1980s searched for a "terrorist personality." This entailed the search for a deviant personality characteristic within some individuals using psychoanalytic theories. Essentially, the argument was that terrorist group members are born and not made by the surrounding social and political conditions and group processes. Studies of this nature usually contained no empirical data, neither primary nor secondary, and were often condemnatory in nature.

Academic work on terrorism improved in the 1990s. Empirical work increased and there was a shift away from focusing on the terrorist as being deviant in nature. Group processes, the role of leaders, surrounding political conditions and organizational motivations became incorporated into the literature. Despite this improvement, research on individual motivations has been overly simplistic and deterministic. Typically, this work focuses upon a very small number of group members (if any at all) and extrapolates these findings onto the wider terrorist community. Various analyses have focused on pathological disposition to violence (Gordon 2002, Post 1990), an authoritarian personality (Lester, Yang, and Lindsay 2004), general socialization factors (Atran, 2003, Post 2005, Sageman 2005), altruism (Azam 2005), rational choice (Gupta 2004), religious fanaticism (Pipes 2004), cognitive

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7 Mipt database of terrorism incidents (www.mipt.org).

dissonance (Maikovich 2005), revenge for personal suffering (Margalit 2003), and despair (Prusher 2005). Although the above-mentioned studies have all contributed somewhat to our understanding of individual motivations, their generalizations are problematic. The diversity of demographic backgrounds of suicide bombers alone is striking. Bombers are between fifteen and seventy years old, overly educated and uneducated, male and female, from all socio-economic classes, Christian, Hindu, Sikh, and Muslim, religious and secular, single and married. These studies also only focus on the "supply side" and fail to account for the "demand side" of joining a terrorist organization. In other words, by focusing on the underlying conditions that may create a large pool of potential recruits, they ignore the impediments to membership. Organizational leaders carefully choose who can join. This is essential due to the secretive nature of their work. The risk of any new recruit becoming a state informant or reneging on their task is too large. As will be outlined later, the role of familial and friendship ties is key to understanding how a person becomes a member. Motivation to become a suicide bomber should be viewed as a process (depicted in figure 4). The socialized individual is aware of potential increases in social status from membership of the organization. Although this awareness is usually long-standing, it is only after the experience of a catalyst when compulsion to join becomes salient. Pre-existing familial and friendship ties mediate the recruitment process.

Despite the heterogeneity in the demographic backgrounds of suicide bombers, all suicide bombers do share two common characteristics. One is membership in a terrorist organization. Never has a lone suicide bomber carried out an operation in a bout of heavenly revelation or vengeance. Instead, all suicide attacks are coordinated, designed, premeditated and organized by a terrorist organization. Kimhi and Even's typology of suicide bombers (2004) illustrates the second common characteristic. They operationalized sixty Palestinian bombers into four categories: religious, exploited, retribution for suffering, and social/nationalist. Support of the community that

reveres martyrdom was a supportive factor in each ideal type. It was the only common factor included in all four ideal types. By acknowledging the important role a "culture of martyrdom" plays, they strengthen the argument that it is the surrounding social environment rather than a personality flaw that compels people to join terrorist organizations.

The influences mentioned in connection with interactions A, B, and C also affect the would-be-bomber. The role of propaganda, proclamations supporting suicide bombing from leaders perceived to be legitimate, and a sense of threat because of the ongoing conflict may create a pool of willing recruits for terrorist organizations. Propaganda that makes a celebrity of the suicide bomber may play a large role in helping others to make the same decision. Range et al (1997) provide persuasive sociological evidence that "suicidal contagion" exists following an extensively publicised celebrity suicide. Other factors may also play a role and are outlined below.

Through interviews with terrorists, Silke (2003) describes the process of becoming a terrorist as primarily an issue of socialization. Fields (1978) came to a similar conclusion. Her eight-year longitudinal study found exposure to terrorism as a child produces a tendency toward terrorism as an adult. Bloom (2005, 1) points out that suicide bombing campaigns usually occur in the second iteration of violence, citing examples such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Chechnya, and Sri Lanka. When socialized into a society where violence is a regular, highly publicized, and visible experience, one may start to think of violence as a normal part of everyday life. Post et al's interviews with captured terrorists (2005) reveal awareness of the potential of increased social status as a prime motivator in joining a terrorist organization.

Silke (2003) also outlines that catalysts usually precipitate the compulsion to join a terrorist group. This is very true for would-be suicide bombers. The catalyst could be a response to personal suffering,[8] revenge for imprison-

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[8] Wafaa Nour E'Din (23), female. Carried out bombing for Hezbollah on May 9, 1985.

Her husband had been killed in conflict by the IDF earlier that year.

ment,[9] a recent conversion to Islam,[10] an act of violence by opposition forces,[11] a response to restrictions on movement[12], a response to personal desperation,[13] or frustration of personal goals.[14] The list of catalysts and examples of bombers are endless.

Empirical studies of recruitment processes in terrorist organizations highlight the important role of pre-existing familial or friendship ties. Familial ties aid recruitment in the IRA (Toolis 1995), and the recruitment of female ETA members (Reinares 2004). Friendship ties are important for enrolling Italian and German left-wing militants (Della Porta 1992). Mixtures of both are important to the recruitment process of Palestinian groups (Post et al. 2005), global jihadists (Sageman 2005), and Colombian groups (Florez-Morris 2007). Plenty of evidence exists to show the importance of pre-existing familial and friendship ties in recruiting would-be-suicide bombers Examples include husband and wife teams of bombers in Palestine, Chechnya, Iraq, and Jordan, a father and daughter team in Chechnya in November 2002, two Chechen sisters in August 2004, a sister of a top aide to al-Zarqawi in Jordan in November 2005, a sister of a deceased Islamic Jihad militant in October 2003, a sister of an imprisoned Fatah operative in May 2003, a nephew of a prominent leader of Hamas in March 2001, and a nephew of a prominent Fatah leader in May 2005. Of the twenty-one Chechen suicide bombers I have identified, fourteen had direct family members taking part in the conflict. Of the 220 Palestinian suicide bombers I have identified, there is clear evidence of pre-existing familial and friendship ties within the organization in 56 of the cases. Among the 9/11 hijackers there were many pre-existing friendship ties, two sets of brothers, and three hijackers who shared tribal affiliations. One would-be-bomber in the Iraqi insurgency claimed he had fifteen friends who had become suicide bombers themselves (Ghosh 2005). Examples of best friends carrying out

double suicide bombings include Palestine in December 2001, January 2003, September 2003, March 2004, and Chechnya in August 2004. Seven members of the same Palestinian football club carried out a wave of suicide attacks in late 2002, early 2003 (Hammer and Zidan 2003).

Figure 4: The path to becoming a suicide bomber

2.4 The Individual Radicalizes Within a Group Setting (F)

Munir al-Makdah, a trainer of suicide bombers, outlines, "much of the work is already done by the suffering these people have been subject to…. Only 10 percent comes from me. The suffering and living away from their land has given the person 90 percent of what he needs to

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9 Yusef Ali Mohammed Zughayer (22) and Suleiman Musa Dahayneh (24) both served time in Israeli prisons. They conducted a double suicide bombing on November 6, 1998, in Jerusalem.

10 Sergey Dimitriyev, former Russian soldier, who converted to Islam and conducted a suicide truck bombing on June 11, 2000, for the Chechen separatist movement.

11 Taysir Ahmed Ajrami (22) carried out a suicide bombing on the November 26, 2001.The bomber's suicide note said the attack was in response to the killing of five Palestinian children the previous week by an Israeli mine.

12 Abdel-Basset Odeh (25), carried out bombing on March 27, 2002. Restrictions on movement prevented him from seeing his fiancée in Baghdad.

13 Ala Araeshi (17) was a victim of AIDS. He targeted Israeli police using a belt bomb.

14 Three bombers carried out three separate acts over the course of one weekend in Israel. All three had attended Hebron Polytechnic University, which had been closed by IDF forces months beforehand.

become a martyr. All we do is provide guidance and help strengthen his faith and help set the objectives for him" (cited in Davis 2003, 154). This section deals with the extra 10 percent that al-Makdah refers to. Upon joining the group, what behavioral and psychological characteristics of the individual alter?

Social identity theory (SIT) explains how individuals define themselves by their social group memberships. SIT accounts for two dual processes: social comparison and categorization. Both processes have their own underlying motivations – to feel positive about oneself and to reduce the complexity of the surrounding world (Hogg and Grieve 1999, 81). Self-perception of group membership creates psychologically distinguishing effects. From a SIT perspective, groups vie to be different from one another in positive ways because this provides individual group members with positive social identities (Hogg and Vaughan 2005, 410). The improvement of self-esteem in the group setting strengthens the individual's group identification.

Stereotyping within the group creates a group prototype that specifies the mindsets, sentiments, perceptions, norms, and codes of conduct that characterize the group. The stereotype aids in the social categorization process whereby the individual assimilates others into relevant in- and outgroups. This depersonalizes the self, fellow ingroup members, and outgroup members because they are all viewed no longer as idiosyncratic individuals but as members of groups. The individual stereotypes the ingroup as homogenous and coherent. This accentuates the similarities of ingroup members while simultaneously accentuating the differences between ingroup and outgroup members. This also increases subjective certainty and "renders existence meaningful and thus gives one confidence in how to behave, and what to expect from the physical and social environment within which one finds oneself" (Hogg and Grieve 1999, 81). Trust, mutual aid and compassion extend to fellow ingroup members but not to those in the outgroup.

Group norms deepen group bonds by increasing group solidarity and aiding the internalization of a group identity. When this occurs, the individual views the newly acquired norms as normal and therefore legitimate. The effects

strengthen if this "sub-universe" of thought and knowledge contains influential leaders. One obvious example is the influence of religious figures. These leaders may replace significant others who played a role in the individual's primary socialization. In other words, "the socializing personnel take on the character of significant other vis-à-vis the individual being socialized" (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 165). Significant others and group norm acquisition ultimately facilitate the suicide bomber throughout his training, the final process of which is acquiring the willingness to sacrifice oneself for the beliefs and norms internalized.

Group norms include coping strategies for the terrorist to insulate himself from the human suffering of his actions. Bandura (1990) outlines four commonly used strategies. Firstly, they may imagine themselves as saviors. "The Israelis, the enemy itself, they are the ones who caused me to do what I did" argues a failed suicide bomber in an interview. (Schechter 2004). Secondly, they displace responsibility onto the leader or other members. Thirdly, they minimize or ignore actual suffering. "I do not accept responsibility for their deaths. I feel pain, of course. They are little children. But the government of Israel is solely responsible" a captured bomb-maker stated (Schechter 2004). Finally, they dehumanize their victims. Palestinian propaganda is full of imagery of Israelis depicted as pigs, dogs, monkeys, and donkeys (Oliver and Steinberg 2005, 101–2).

Group identity overrides individual identity upon the acquisition of group norms. This leads to a tendency toward group polarization, defined as a propensity for groups "to make decisions that are more extreme than the mean of individual members' initial positions, in the direction already favored by that mean. So, for example, group discussion among a collection of people who already favor capital punishment is likely to produce a group decision that strongly favors capital punishment" (Hogg and Vaughan 2005, 342). With group identity overriding individual identity, the group, if highly cohesive, will tend toward a state of mind known as groupthink. Hogg and Vaughan (2005, 340) list the antecedents of groupthink as being:

- Excessive group cohesiveness
- Insulation of group from external information and influence

- Lack of impartial leadership and of norms encouraging proper procedures
- High stress from external threat and task complexity

They also list the symptoms of these antecedents as;

- Feelings of invulnerability and unanimity
- Unquestioning belief that the group must be right
- Tendency to ignore or discredit information contrary to the group's position
- Direct pressure exerted on dissidents to bring them into line
- Stereotyping of outgroup members

The antecedents and their symptoms (which have all been discussed in this paper) show how a commonly held group identity can radicalize the individual group members toward a state of mind that they may not reach independent of a group setting. In terms of suicide bombing, terrorist cells "canalize disparate religious or political sentiments of individuals into an emotionally bonded group of fictive kin who willfully commit to die spectacularly for one another" (Atran 2003, 1534). Suicide bombing, in this light, is a form of Durkheim's (1953) concept of altruistic suicide whereby, due to the deep integration of the individual in the group, the suicide is carried out for the group rather than for the individual himself.

Social psychologists argue that conformity is a big factor in explaining behavior in a group setting. Conformity to group norms is a less direct manner of social influence than Milgram's famous experiments (1974). Conformity to an authoritative figure does not explain the behaviour but "the subjective validity of social norms; that is, a feeling of confidence and certainty that the beliefs and actions described by the norm are correct, appropriate, valid and socially desirable" (Hogg and Vaughan 2005, 245). Leaders of terrorist organizations ensure norm conformity until moments before the suicide bombing. Fellow terrorist group members closely guard the bomber. This facilitates suicide bombing by guarding against the bomber reneging. In Palestine, if the would-be-bomber does show signs of weakness, a senior trainer will be called for to reinforce his determination (Hassan 2001). Eyewitness reports of suicide bombings in Israel consistently include the description of three or four men dropping the bomber off at his destination. Other organizations use multiple bombers at the

same time to build more pressure to conform. Al Qaeda, the Tamil Tigers, and the Chechen and Iraqi insurgents regularly use more than one bomber. Iraqi and Palestinian suicide bombers are constantly subjected to videos of past suicide bombings in the days before their operation (Hassan 2001, Ghosh 2005). Would-be bombers write and record their last wills and testaments, the effect of which may create a point of no return. The charismatic leader of the Tamil Tigers, Pirabhakaran, has a final meal with would-be bombers the night before their operation. On one occasion, Anita Pratap, an Indian journalist was present. She described the would-be bombers as "utterly emotionless … they could have been lobotomized for all I knew … the only time they showed some emotion was when they talked about Pirabhakaran" (Pratap 2001, 102–104).

Some Palestinian areas frequently produce bombers in intermittent phases. This may be because the bombers are trained and socialized into the group together, and are set down a path dependent process whereby the first bombing produces a pressure on the next in line to become a bomber. There are many examples of this. Three university students from Hebron all carried out separate attacks in Israel over the course of three days in May 2003. A fourth Hebron resident followed four weeks later. Twelve suicide bombers came from Nablus between December 2, 2001, and March 30, 2002. No Nablus residents carried out a suicide bombing in the following five weeks. Ten suicide bombers broke this phase between May 7 and August 6. Again, no bombers emerged from Nablus for another two months before four more carried out their operations between October 27, 2002, and January 5, 2003. What is striking is that when no bombers emerged from Nablus, plenty came from Jenin. For example, between 25 May, 2001, and 12 August, 2001, there were seven Jenin suicide bombers. No Jenin bombers materialized for almost two months. Between October 7, 2001, and December 9, 2001, three Jenin residents blew themselves up. No Jenin bombers emerged until March 5, 2002, and there was a further five before June 5. Again, there was a two-month spell with no Jenin suicide bombers but four bombers followed in the space of two months between August 4 and October 21. Of the eighteen months covered here, there is only eight weeks of overlap between the two towns producing suicide bombers. This pattern of intermittent phases also occurs in

Bethlehem, Hebron, Tulkarem and Kalkilya. The same may also be true of bombers within the Iraqi and Afghanistan insurgencies but data is too sparse at this moment in time.

Table 1: Bombers from Nablus and Jenin, May 25, 2001 – January 5, 2003

Dates	Town	No. of bombers
May 25 – July 22, 2001	Jenin	5
August 2 – 8, 2001	Nablus	2
August 9 – 12, 2001	Jenin	2
October 7 – December 9, 2001	Jenin	3
December 2, 2001 – March 30, 2002	Nablus	12
March 5 – June 5, 2002	Jenin	6
May 7 – August 8, 2002	Nablus	10
August 4 – October 21, 2002	Jenin	4
October 27, 2002 – January 5, 2003	Nablus	4

This pattern of intermittent phases may be reinforced by domestic competition factors between Palestinian factions. Palestinian terrorist organizations are not as hierarchically structured as, for example, the IRA, or ETA. Because of the restrictions on movement and communication, and the targeted assassination of their leaders, these organizations rely on a high degree of autonomy of local leaders and activists (Pedahzur and Perliger 2006). A Hamas suicide bombing by their Nablus cell, for example, would create a pressure on the rival Nablus cells of Fatah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the PFLP to carry out a similar operation for fear of losing local support. This finding coupled with Pedahzur and Perliger's social network analysis of Palestinian terrorist organizations (2006) supports Bloom's thesis (2005) of domestic political competition factors driving suicide bombings except at a local rather than national level.

3. Conclusion

This paper has proposed a theoretical prism to view suicide bombing by incorporating the interactions between the suicide bomber, the terrorist organization and the surrounding society from which suicide bombing emerges. By synthesizing empirically rich unidimensional approaches, this multi-dimensional model provides us with a broader understanding of suicide bombing. Leaders of terrorist organizations use material and nonmaterial resources to venerate suicide bombing. Resources include the use of

charismatic leaders, epistemic authority figures, agency-laden institutions, framing justifications, euphemistic language, and monetary rewards. Under conditions of threat, societies accept the proclamations of authoritarian charismatic leaders as authentic and resort to authoritarian mindsets. Threat salience coupled with, and caused by, surrounding political conditions facilitate support for suicide bombing. The individual, in search of a positive identity, joins the terrorist organization with the support of a surrounding community. Experiencing catalysts and recruitment through pre-existing familial and friendship ties drive the process of becoming a suicide bomber forward. Within the group, the new recruit radicalizes further. Relevant norm internalization, group polarization, group conformity, group identity overriding individual identity, the use of multiple bombers and other techniques are used by group leaders to facilitate the individual becoming a suicide bomber.

This model is stronger than others in the current field of research for many reasons. By focusing on organizational and individual motivations as two distinct processes, the models proposed by Moghadam (2006) and Hafez (2006) ignore why and how leaders of terrorist organizations socially construct a "culture of martyrdom" and under what conditions audiences become susceptible to such narratives. The radicalization process of the would-be-bomber within the group setting is also largely ignored. Insights from social and political psychology provide an effective interpretive lens to understand these symbiotic processes. By his own admission, Pedahzur's model (2004) is too systematic. Various interactions have shown dissimilar causal weights in each case of a terrorist organization resorting to suicide bombing. Elites within Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad resorted to suicide bombing after carefully crafting a "culture of martyrdom." The Tamil Tigers spent three years radicalizing and training cadres to become suicide bombers. This followed the apparent accidental suicide bombing of Captain Miller in 1987, which LTTE supporters celebrated as the highest form of martyrdom. In this case, grass roots support for suicide bombing preceded the social construction of a "culture of martyrdom" and the training of members. When these conditions converged from 1990 onwards, the LTTE became the most prolific users of suicide bombing until the Iraqi insurgency began. Fatah's

declining support in the Palestinian regions led them to undertake suicide bombing campaigns to boost support. Lower-level members of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) resorted to suicide bombing following the imprisonment of their leader in Turkey. Self-starter suicide bombers such as the London bombers make their own decisions but are heavily motivated by pre-existing calls to arms by al Qaeda leaders, "virtual" supporters, and ultimately group radicalization.

Focusing on organizations that have not resorted to suicide bombing also confirms this model. Kalyvas and Sánchez-Cuenca (2005, 211) provide details of Colombian terrorist organization FARC's attempt to recruit suicide bombers. Despite offering a $2 million reward to the families of potential bombers, FARC was unsuccessful. The model outlined in this paper provides two reasons for this failure. Firstly, FARC does not possess charismatic leaders or epistemic authority figures, nor does it control social institutions. This makes it impossible to successfully create a "culture of martyrdom" to garner support for suicide bombing from the wider community. Secondly, offering substantial amounts of money does not overcome the unwillingness of potential recruits to become suicide bombers. Without a "culture of martyrdom" and support for suicide bombing amongst their constituency of supporters, FARC found it impossible to radicalize recruits to the point of becoming a suicide bomber. ETA never resorted to suicide bombing, also for these reasons. A further reason may explain the IRA's unwillingness to use suicide bombing despite possessing a historical narrative of martyrdom to rely upon. Kalyvas and Sánchez Cuenca (2005) provide examples of how the IRA marginalized themselves within their community after indiscriminate acts of violence. Suicide bombing causes more deaths than any other terrorist method. Possessing this knowledge through social learning, the IRA knew it could not afford the costs of losing more support. The examples, provided by Kalyvas and Sánchez Cuenca, also suggest that ETA's and the IRA's supporters were considerably more moderate than the members of the organizations themselves. The IRA perhaps were also mindful not to disaffect their American support base. Utilizing a tactic originally developed to kill American forces in Lebanon might have isolated the IRA from their lucrative fundraising contacts in America.

Further research will be required to refine the model. Is there a relationship between acts of suicide bombing and counter-terrorism techniques such as targeted assassinations and incursions? Is there an association between societal support for suicide bombing and counter-terrorism techniques? In what way do some counter-terrorism techniques influence the target society? Interviews with failed suicide bombers may further our knowledge of the group radicalization process while more detailed case studies of individual terrorist organizations and campaigns would allow for a comparative approach to this model.

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Suicide Bombers in Israel:
Their Motivations, Characteristics, and Prior Activity in Terrorist Organizations

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Suicide Bombers in Israel:
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This paper examines the characteristics of suicide bombers as reflected in the Israeli press during the Second Intifada in Israel. The analysis aims to determine whether there were significant differences in the characteristics of suicide bombers with religious motives versus those with nationalist motives. The findings reveal that gender, education level, and organizational affiliation correlated significantly with motives for carrying out suicide attacks. Most of the suicide bombers with religious motives were men with elementary education. In addition, the results show that most of the suicide bombers who were affiliated with the Hamas organization acted out of religious motives. No significant differences were found between suicide bombers with religious and those with nationalist motives with regard to age, marital status, and prior activity in terrorist organizations.

1. Literature Review

1.1. Suicide Bombers

Suicide bombers pose one of the most extreme criminological problems that the international community has encountered in the contemporary era. Suicide bombings and other terrorist acts that cause high numbers of casualties are a form of psychological warfare (Crenshaw 2000). Essentially, one of the main goals of terrorist organizations is to frighten people through acts of random brutality and violence, in an attempt to gain extensive publicity about their goals (Ganor 2000). Suicide bombings upset the social framework that members of a society depend on and trust. No one is sure of the behavior that can be expected of others, and levels of trust are reduced as individuals turn inward and concentrate on their own survival (Crenshaw 2000). Therefore, suicide bombers have an immense impact on the public due to the overwhelming sense of helplessness that ensues following the attack (Sprinzak 2000).

Over the last two decades, Islamic fundamentalist groups have sponsored human bombings in Israel as well as in other countries such as Afghanistan, Argentina, Chechnya, Croatia, Kashmir, Kenya, Lebanon, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Tanzania. The targets have ranged from ordinary people to world leaders, including an attempt to assassinate the Pope in Manila in 1995 (Nasra 2001). Most suicide attacks are executed by activating explosives, which are carried on the terrorist's body in the form of a portable explosive device, or are planted in a vehicle driven by the terrorist (Ganor 2000). Thus, the suicide bomber essentially becomes a human bomb, and selects the time, place, and circumstances for activating the explosive device in an attempt to cause maximum damage to the target (Schweitzer 2001). For terrorist organizations, human bomb attacks are one of the surest ways of hitting a target. The human bomb is a simple and low-cost operation, and the main objective is to guarantee that the enemy will be traumatized. With an explosive belt or bag, the bomber has control over the target, location, and timing (Nasra 2001). In addition, there is no risk that interrogated terrorists will surrender important information, because their deaths are certain (Sprinzak 2000). Suicide is a forbidden act according to the Islamic religion – but during a holy war it is an acceptable act, which is defined as self-sacrifice in the service of Allah – *istashahad* rather than suicide (Nasra 2001). According to the Muslim religion, the *shahid* is a person who dies a martyr's death – a warrior who sacrifices his own life for the glory of Allah. Most of the suicide bombings in

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different parts of the world were carried out by members of religious organizations such as Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad (Shay and Schweitzer 2002).

1.2. Suicide Bombers in Israel

The first time a Palestinian organization initiated a suicide bombing against an Israeli target was in April 1993 in the West Bank, which is Israeli occupied territory (Schweitzer 2001). Between 1993 and the second Intifada in 2000, thirty-seven suicide bombers exploded in Israel. Most of them were identified as members of the Hamas organization, and a small proportion were identified as members of Islamic Jihad (Nasra 2001).

The term *Intifada* has been used by the Palestinians in reference to their violent rebellion against continued Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which were captured by Israel in the Six Day War of 1967. Since the establishment of the state of Israel, there have been two Intifadas. The first one lasted for about five years, from 1987 to 1993, while the second one, which began in September 2000, is still ongoing. This study refers specifically to the second Intifada.

Since the outbreak of the second Intifada in September 2000, 164 human bombs have exploded in Israel. Most of the terrorists were men, but a minority were women. In addition, 450 terrorists were arrested on their way to commit a suicide bombing (Israeli Intelligence and Terrorism Center 2006). Most of the suicide attacks in Israel have taken place in shopping malls, on buses, at street corners, and in places where people congregate.

There are two main hypotheses regarding the motives of suicide bombers in Palestinian society. The first is the religious approach, which argues that belief in Islam is the main motive for terrorism in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Religious suicide bombers believe that Allah selects the martyrs, and that the only aim of the suicide attack is to win Allah's satisfaction. In addition, religious suicide bombers perceive a lofty and glorious place for themselves in the spiritual and mystical realm beyond life on earth (Nasra 2001). Ganor (2000) emphasizes that in most cases the suicide bomber has a strong religious affiliation, and that the religious sentiments are skillfully manipulated

in order to persuade him to take part in the terrorist operation. Thus, it is not surprising that many bombers are recruited in mosques and in religious schools (Nasra, 2001). Islamic terrorist organizations prepare suicide bombers and strengthen their commitment by focusing attention on paradise, on being in the presence of Allah, and on meeting the Prophet Muhammad (Telhami 2002). Moreover, most of the suicide bombers were educated in religious schools and practiced Islam in their everyday lives (Ganor 2000; Merari 1990; Schweitzer 2001).

The second motive is political/national, and highlights the political situation as the main reason for suicide attacks (Stern 2003). According to this approach, the main cause for suicide bombing is collective rage, hopelessness, and despair within Palestinian society on the national-political level. In this climate, suicide bombings occur because they help individuals escape desperation without having to rely on the Israeli and Palestinian governments to release them from their plight (Telhami 2002). Previous studies have noted that during the second Intifada, an increasing proportion of secular Palestinians have endorsed suicide attacks as an effective way of making the occupation unbearable for Israel (Nasra 2001; Telhami 2002). Despite the above-mentioned distinctions between the two types of motives, suicide bombers can also be motivated by a combination of religious and nationalist incentives, especially within the realm of Palestinian society (Pedahzur et al. 2003). The differences between the two motives can be understood only in terms of the subjective meaning of the act for the person who commits the suicide bombing, and in terms of the suicide bomber's psychological state.

Previous studies have shown that most suicide bombers are religious, young, male, unmarried, and unemployed, with some high school education (Ganor 2000). A study that examined the sociodemographic characteristics of suicide versus non-suicide terrorists revealed significant differences between the two types of terrorists: the mean age of suicide bombers was 24.5 years, they were older than non-suicide terrorists, more suicide bombers than non-suicide terrorists were educated in religious schools, and the percentage of suicide terrorists affiliated with religious fundamentalist organizations was higher than that of non-suicide terrorists (Pedahzur et al. 2003). It

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should be noted the sociodemographic characteristics of the suicide bombers (young, unmarried, and unemployed) are congruent with those of suicide bombers in other terrorist organizations such as the "Black Tigers" (LTTE) in Sri Lanka (Gunaratna 2000) and female suicide bombers acting on behalf of the PKK in Turkey (Ergil 2000). Most of the female suicide bombers in Palestinian society are also in their twenties and single. However, in contrast to male suicide bombers, they have a higher level of education than the average population. In fact, some female suicide bombers are graduates of universities or other institutions of higher education (Berko 2004; Yaffeh 2003).

2. The Present Study

The period of the second Intifada significantly differs from other historical periods in Israeli history, because it has been characterized by intensive and numerous suicide attacks that have made civilian life into a battlefront. Against this background, the present study examines whether there were significant differences in the characteristics of suicide bombers with religious motives versus those with nationalist motives. The emphasis on distinctions between suicide bombers in terms of the motives for their activity provides new insights into these dimensions, and comparisons highlight changes that have occurred in the characteristics of suicide bombers since the outbreak of the second Intifada.

3. Method

Analyzing the differences between nationalist and religious suicide bombers prompts the question whether and how it is possible to distinguish between these two types of motives. Although the main motive of a suicide bomber is usually clear, there are some cases in which nationalist and religious motives are combined, especially within Palestinian society (Pedahzur et al. 2003). Therefore, scholars have suggested that differences between the two motives can only be examined in terms of the subjective meaning of the act for the suicide bomber and his psychological state. This distinction is based on previous studies which examined various aspects related to the motives for terrorism (Kimhi and Even 2004; Pedahzur et al. 2003). The present study relies on this approach; the analysis relates only to cases in which it was clear that the main motive of the terrorist was nationalist or religious. This distinction resulted from the set of perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes

expressed by the terrorists in interviews following their arrest. The motives of those terrorists who detonated themselves were determined based on their declarations prior to the event. The following examples reflect nationalist motives: "I wanted to sacrifice myself for Palestine, for my land," "… like my brethren, I also wanted to contribute my share to the national struggle," and "I wanted to do something good for the Palestinian homeland." Examples of statements reflecting religious motives are: "I wanted to sacrifice myself for Allah," "I wanted to be a *shahid* [a martyr], and go to heaven," and "I wanted to die a martyr's death."

An additional methodological limitation resulted from the data collected from media coverage on suicide bombing. Newspaper reports are by nature selected and chosen extracts from the discourse on suicide bombing. Furthermore, media news reports on terrorist acts are also influenced by the Israeli security sources (Dor 2001; Korn 2004). However, despite this limitation, it should be noted that media coverage on suicide attacks is one of the main sources for studying suicide bombing and has been used in prior studies (Kimhi and Even 2004; Pedahzur et al. 2003). This limitation was dealt with in two ways. First, the effect of other sources on the media was minimized by relying on the suicide bomber's psychological state or interviews following their arrest. Secondly, this study used a triangulated approach, which combined three different sources for information. The theoretical assumption behind this approach is that each source reveals different information on the phenomenon under investigation (Babbie 2001). The database for this study was established in two stages. First, data were derived from a stratified random sample of 294 articles on suicide bombers published in three major daily newspapers in Israel *(Yediʻot Aharonot, Maʻariv, and Haʻaretz)* between 2002 and 2005. Most of the reports concerning suicide bombers appeared on the first pages of the newspapers surveyed. Their length varied from several lines to two or three pages (in cases in which the terrorist succeeded). Once all of the articles were identified, a database was established with 176 cases in which the motive of the terrorist was clear. These cases were subsequently coded into the proper motive category. In an additional forty-three cases, the main motive was unclear or consisted of different motives combined together.

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The relatively small number of cases in the sample is also a consequence of the tendency of the media to omit descriptions of the suicide bombers. This is not necessarily a representative sample, and the study is therefore categorized as an exploratory and preliminary study. However, it does provide an opportunity to examine the differences between the two motives of suicide bombers' and will provides new insights into the growing phenomenon of suicide attacks in Palestinian society.

3.1. Coding Procedures

The analysis was based on criteria formulated by Pedahzur et al. (2003). The dependent variable was type of motive (nationalist versus religious). Six independent variables were selected: age, sex, education (elementary, high school, academic), marital status, organizational affiliation (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Fatah organizations), and prior involvement in terrorist acts (first event, not first event). The research method included inter-triangulation, which was carried out by two different coders who had been trained by the author. Each coder worked independently, read the articles, and coded them according to the appropriate categories. The coders also participated in practice sessions with the author before they began their actual work. The coding process established a quantitative database that included the characteristics as mentioned above. The practice sessions established initially acceptable intrarater reliability (a minimum of 85 percent agreement) and interrater reliability (Cohen's kappa $\geq$ .80). The final reliability values for the different categories are: age (K = .95), education (K = .94), marital status (K = .91), organizational affiliation (K = .94), and prior involvement in terrorist acts (K = .96).

3.2. Data Analysis

The analysis in this study was conducted on two levels. The first level was a comparative analysis, which aimed to determine whether there were significant differences in the characteristics of suicide bombers with religious versus nationalist motives. Data analysis was conducted using a chi-square test for each of the characteristics, and a T-test for the age variable. Separate analyses were conducted for males and females, and for each type of motive. This decision was based on existing literature, which indicates that the profiles of female suicide bombers might be different than those of males (Berko 2004; Yaffeh 2003).

The second level of analysis was based on a logistic regression model. The analysis included the effects of the independent variables (age, sex, type of education, marital status, organizational affiliation and prior involvement in terrorist acts) on the type of motive for the suicide attack (religious versus national). The logistic regression analysis was conducted for male and female bombers together, because there were not enough observations to conduct separate analyses by sex. Therefore, the terrorist's sex was examined as part of the other independent variables of the study.

4. Results

Table 1 presents the characteristics of suicide bombers as they were described in the press, by sex and type of motive (nationalist versus religious).

The results presented in Table 1 indicate that the mean age of the male suicide bombers was 20, whereas the female suicide bombers were older (mean age 22.6 years). T-tests results reveal that the age differences between male suicide bombers with religious motives and those with nationalist motives were not significant. A similar trend was found among the female suicide bombers. Results show that most of the male suicide bombers with nationalist motives had a high school education (69.5 percent), and some of them even had academic education (5.9 percent). By contrast, most of the male suicide bombers with religious motives had elementary school education (74.6 percent), and the rest had high school education (25.4 percent). These differences in education level by type of motive (nationalist versus religious) are reflected in the Chi-square tests ($x^2 = 35.01$, $df = 2$, p < .0001). Among female suicide bombers, however, no significant differences in education level were found by type of motive. Nonetheless, a higher percentage of female suicide bombers who were motivated by nationalism had academic education, compared to those with the religious motives (12 percent versus 8.3 percent). The vast majority of male and female suicide bombers were unmarried (about 85 percent), and no significant differences in marital status were found between the different types of motive.

Significant differences were, however, found in previous activity in terrorist organizations by type of motive

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Table 1: Suicide bombers' characteristics by motive and gender

Motive	Female			Male	
	Religious (n = 12)	Natural (n = 28)		Religious (n = 69)	National (n = 67)
Age	M = 22.8 (SD = .55)	M = 22.6 (SD = .37)		M = 19.8 (SD = 2.59)	M = 20.2 (SD = 2.35)
Education					
Elementary	49.1	25.0		74.6	24.6
High school	42.6	62.5		25.4	69.5
Academic	8.3	12.5		0.0	5.9
Marital status					
Married	11.2	17.5		15.9	16.3
Unmarried	88.8	82.5		84.1	83.7
Prior involvement in terrorist acts					
First event	100.0	92.9		63.3	81.4
Not first event	0.0	7.1		36.7	18.6
Organizational affiliation					
Hamas	0.0	0.0		32.8	6.8
Islamic Jihad	56.2	64.7		59.7	85.2
Fatah	43.8	35.3		7.5	8.0

($x^2 = 15.1$, $df = 1$, p<.0001). A higher percentage of males with religious motives had been active in terrorist organizations, compared to those who were motivated by nationalism (36.7 percent versus 18.6 percent, respectively). Previous activity in terrorist organizations among female suicide bombers is rare, and no significant differences were found by type of motive. Findings indicate that more male suicide bombers with religious motives belong to the Islamic Jihad organization than to the Hamas organization (59.7 percent versus 32.8 percent, respectively). In addition, most of the suicide bombers with nationalist motives belong to the Islamic Jihad organization (85.2 percent), whereas the rest belong to the Hamas and Fatah organizations (6.8 percent and 8 percent, respectively).

Chi-square tests revealed significant differences in affiliation with terrorist organizations by type of motive among male suicide bombers ($x^2 = 18$, $df = 2$, p<.0001), whereas no significant differences in affiliation with terrorist organizations by type of motive were found among female suicide bombers. Most of the female suicide bombers belonged to Islamic Jihad (about 60 percent), while the rest belonged to Fatah. None of them belonged to Hamas. Table 2 presents the results of logistic regression analysis, by type of motive (nationalist versus religious).

Table 2: Estimated effects of the suicide bomber's characteristics on the type of motive

Variable	Odds Ratio	SE	Estimate
Age	1.02	0.01	.01
Sex	22.50	1.41	3.11*
Education A	8.96	2.19	2.19*
Education B	1.61	1.41	.47
Marital status A	2.02	1.28	.79
Prior involvement in terrorist acts	21.05	1.02	3.06
Organizational affiliation A	15.30	1.19	2.73*
Organizational affiliation B	3.46	1.13	1.24

Notes: Education A: 1 = elementary, 0 = non-elementary
Education B: 1 = academic, 0 = non-academic
Organizational affiliation A: 1= Hamas, 0 = non-Hamas
Organizational affiliation B: 1= Fatah, 0 = non-Fatah
*p < .05

The results in Table 2 indicate that the suicide bomber's gender was significantly related to the type of motive for carrying out the attack. The probability that male suicide bombers will have religious motives is 22.5 times higher than the probability for female suicide bombers. However, age and marital status were not significantly related to the type of motive for carrying out a suicide bombing. Regarding the bomber's level of education, a significant relation-

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ship was found with type of motive. The probability that suicide bombers with elementary education will have religious motives was 8.9 times higher than the probability for those with high school or academic education. Prior activity in terrorist organizations was not found to have a significant effect on type of motive for carrying out suicide bombings, whereas the nature of the terrorist organization was found to have a significant effect. The probability that suicide bombers belonging to Hamas will motivated by the religious motives was 15.3 times higher than for those belonging to Islamic Jihad or to the Fatah organization.

5. Discussion

This paper presents the findings of an exploratory study on the characteristics of suicide bombers in Israel during the second Intifada. The unique contribution of this study lies in its analysis of the differences between the characteristics of suicide bombers with religious motives versus those with nationalist motives. As mentioned, the period of the second Intifada significantly differs from other historical periods in Israeli history, because it has been characterized by intensive and numerous suicide attacks. Thus, it provides a unique opportunity for comparison with earlier periods, which shed light on the changes that have occurred in the characteristics of suicide bombers since the outbreak of the second Intifada.

The first theme relates to the differences in the characteristics of suicide bombers who acted out of religious motives versus those who acted out of nationalist motives. The results of multivariate analysis revealed that the main differences were in gender, education, and affiliation with terrorist organizations. However, with regard to age and marital status, no significant differences were found between suicide bombers with religious versus nationalist motives. The findings indicated that the probability of religious motivation is higher among male than female suicide bombers. In addition, suicide bombers with nationalist motives had a higher level of education than those with religious motives. Likewise, the results showed that suicide bombers affiliated with Hamas were more likely to act out of religious motives than are those affiliated with the Islamic Jihad or the Fatah organizations. It can be assumed that this difference derives from the distinctions between the terrorist organizations in Palestinian society.

Notably, Hamas is a more extreme religious organization than Islamic Jihad and Fatah. Initially, the Hamas forbade women from participating in suicide bombings for religious reasons (Yaffeh 2003). However, this policy changed in 2002, after Sheikh Hassan Youssef made a declaration encouraging women to participate in suicide bombings. In January 2004, a female suicide bombing was collectively claimed by Hamas and the Al Aqsa brigades.

It should be noted, however, that although the main motive is usually clear, there are some cases in which the two motives are combined. Additionally, it can be assumed that the suicide bomber's declared motive is affected by the organization he or she belongs to, as well as by the messages that the organization seeks to convey to the public through the suicide attack. However, despite the complexity of the issue, research on the motives of suicide bombers contributes an essential dimension to understanding suicide attacks, and various aspects related to the motives for terrorism have been examined in previous research (Kimhi and Even 2004; Pedahzur et al. 2003). Broadening empirical knowledge on motives for terrorism makes it possible to enhance understanding of the growing phenomenon of suicide bombings.

Discussion of the characteristics of suicide bombers raises the question whether there might by one profile that typifies suicide bombers. A review of the research literature indicates that terrorism is a broad phenomenon that goes beyond characteristics such as socioeconomic status, level of education, employment, gender, and marital status. The findings of the present study also show that the range of characteristics such as age, level of education, and marital status is broad, and varies from one terrorist event to another. Hence, it cannot be argued that there is one profile or one social or psychological prototype that characterizes the suicide bomber. The prevailing opinion in research literature is that suicide terror is multicausal phenomenon that cannot be explained by one factor or a single profile of the suicide bomber. Therefore, there are various approaches and explanations for suicide terror which include personal and group motives, environmental conditions, and their interactions (Kimhhi and Even 2004; Laster et al. 2004; Merarri 2004; Pedahzur et al. 2003; Stern 2003).

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Comparing the results with the findings of research conducted prior to the Intifada reveals several changes that have occurred in the characteristics of suicide bombers in Palestinian society. Therefore, the Intifada period might have influenced the motivation of terrorists from different backgrounds to participate in suicide bombings. In addition, the period of the Intifada might have led to a change in the policy of terrorist organizations with regard to recruitment of suicide bombers. The first essential change during the Intifada was the participation of Palestinian women in suicide bombings. Research findings indicate that the percentage of female suicide bombers who acted out of nationalist motives was more than twice as high as those who acted out of religious motives. In addition, some of them had academic education and/or were married with children. The findings have also shown that female Palestinian terrorists have a higher level of education than their counterparts in other terrorist organizations (Ergil 2000; Gunaratna 2000).

Additionally, prior to the outbreak of the second Intifada, most of the suicide terrorists in Israel studied in religious schools (Ganor 2000; Pedahzur et al. 2003). The current study indicates that during the Intifida, the majority of suicide bombers who were motivated by nationalist motives had high school or academic education. It can thus be assumed that secular suicide bombers possessed a stronger national and social consciousness. This result is consistent with other studies, which indicate that following the outbreak of the second Intifada, the phenomenon of secular suicide bombers with nationalist motives began to increase (Telhami 2002).

The current findings reveal that the suicide bombers in the Intifada period were younger than those investigated by earlier studies. Specifically, the age range of suicide bombers was broader (14–25 years), and the mean age was 20 years compared 24.5 years in earlier studies (Pedahzur et al. 2003). Therefore, during the second Intifada there has been a decline in the age of suicide bombers and an increase in the involvement of minors (aged under 17) in suicide bombings in Israel. In contrast, no significant change was found in the marital status of the suicide bombers between the pre-Intifada period and during the Intifada: most of the suicide bombers are unmarried (Ganor 2000;

Gunaratna 2000). It can be assumed that the combination of being young and unmarried lowers the sense of personal and family commitment, and may contribute to willingness to carry out a suicide bombing. This assumption is based on research literature which indicates that most suicide bombers have weak family ties (Pedahzur et al. 2003). The current study shows that most of the suicide bombers were without prior experience in a terrorist organization. On this issue, existing research findings are inconsistent. Some studies have found that most suicide bombers were not previously involved in terrorist organizations (Ganor 2000; Nasra 2001), whereas other studies have revealed that previous activity in terrorist organizations was prevalent among suicide bombers (Pedahzur et al. 2003). It is possible that during the second Intifada the phenomenon of recruiting younger candidates without prior experience in a terrorist organization became increasingly prevalent. The findings of the present study reflect the specific nature of the Intifada period compared with other periods in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It can be assumed that changes in the characteristics of suicide terrorists during the second Intifada are not related only to the changes in the policies of the terrorist organizations. Rather, they also reflect changes in the attitude of Palestinian society toward suicide bombings.

Previous studies have shown that social support had a salient effect on the willingness of individuals in Palestinian society to commit suicide attacks during the second Intifada. Clearly, neither suicide bombers nor terrorist organizations operate in a vacuum, and they are influenced by the social environment and the support in the Palestinian society. Kimhi and Even, (2004) argue that although it is not always possible to differentiate between the spontaneous support of the Palestinian people and the social support directed by the terrorist organization, it seems that they are influenced by the environment, which encourages suicide attacks. Social support such as public assemblies, posters of the suicide bombers in the streets, and financial support for the families of suicide bombers have contributed toward establishing the collective perception of suicide attacks as a legitimate act of national liberation in Palestinian society. The findings of this study also highlight the need for more comprehensive research in this field. For example, it would be worthwhile to examine the impact of additional

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variables such as family relations, employment, and socio-economic status. A more comprehensive analysis encompassing these factors would add to existing knowledge on the subject. Moreover, future studies might examine the explanations proposed here regarding changes in the processes of recruiting suicide bombers.

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Living with Contradiction:
Examining the Worldview of the Jewish Settlers in Hebron

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In the West Bank city of Hebron the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still overshadows all activities. Despite the tension, friction, and violence that have become integral to the city's everyday life, the Jewish Community of Hebron is expanding in numbers and geographical extent. Since the Six Day War, the community has attracted some of the most militant groups among the settlers in the West Bank, responsible for severe violence against Palestinians, including harassment, car bombs, and attempts to blow up the Dome of the Rock mosque itself. Why do the members of the Jewish Community of Hebron wish to live and raise their children in such a violent setting? Using a series of interviews with members of the Jewish Community of Hebron and related settler communities in the period 2000–05, the article examines the ways the Jewish Community legitimizes its disputed presence. It reveals a deep religious belief, blended with intense distrust of and hatred toward the Palestinian population.

1. Introduction

In the midst of the West Bank city of Hebron, surrounded by more than 140,000 Palestinians, a group of some 450 Jewish settlers have established their homes in the heart of the Old City. Divided into four separate enclaves, the settler community is regularly accused of transforming the Hebron from being a vibrant Palestinian city into the present state where the streets are deserted of any Palestinian activity and the armed Jewish settlers thus can have the streets to themselves.

Since the Six Day War, the state of Israel has officially stated its right to these areas, asserting that settlements are an outcome of a Jewish right to establish homes there. This claim requires the Israeli authorities to safeguard Israeli citizens residing in these territories until their final status is determined.[1] Consequently there is a heavy presence of IDF soldiers present 24/7 in Hebron's so-called H2 area.

The division of Hebron into two zones, one Palestinian and one Israeli security zone (H1 and H2 respectively), is a result of the Hebron Protocol for Redeployment signed on January 15, 1997, by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Likud government, at the time led by Benyamin Netanyahu. The protocol was in turn a diplomatic outcome of the incident on February 25, 1994, when Baruch Goldstein, an American-born settler and member of the illegal ultra-right Kach party, opened fire on Muslim worshipers in the Tomb of Abraham in the heart of Hebron, killing twenty-nine before being bludgeoned to death by the survivors.[2] By dividing Hebron into two zones, the Hebron Protocol for Redeployment placed the Tomb of Abraham, as well as Hebron's Old City and thus the Jewish settlements, under Israeli security control in the H2 area. It also divided the Tomb of Abraham into two parts: one Muslim and one Jewish.[3] Moreover, the protocol committed the state of Israel to three further redeployments over the next

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1 See e.g. www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/
go.asp?MFAH0dgj0 (accessed August 19, 2007).

2 See e.g. www.hebron.co.il and Shlaim (2001, 524).

3 www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/go.asp?MFAH00qlo
(accessed August 19, 2007).

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eighteen months (Shlaim 2001, 580). The protocol has not been ratified by its signing parties, nor, perhaps most importantly, has any member of the Jewish Community of Hebron either signed or recognized it. Instead, the settlers repeatedly reiterate that they are not withdrawing from one single inch of the city – rather the contrary, as Noam Arnon states (1999, 32):

> The mission of Abraham, father of the Jewish nation, the first to settle in Hebron, has not been completed. Our work must continue despite all adversity. The Hebron Community is fulfilling this mission on behalf of the entire Jewish People.

Today, the Jewish Community of Hebron is engaged in a daily and at times lethal struggle to maintain – and increase – its presence. The question, then, arises: Why does a group of Jews wish to establish their homes in the midst of Palestinian population, in a highly contested territory, and live a life that the international community claims is in contradiction to international law?

This article will examine how the Jewish Community of Hebron itself legitimizes its disputed presence. The article will show how any withdrawal from the occupied territories is considered a violation of divine law, and how violence towards their opponents is considered a means for coping with the opposition. Thus, in an attempt to expose the religious aspects integral to the worldview of this group of settlers – an aspect rarely emphasized as a primary explanatory approach – the article leaves aside the larger, and already widely elaborated, political context of which settlements are part. The worldview of the Jewish Community of Hebron is highly complex, so the following discussion necessarily has to focus on the primary traits.

1.2 Material

The article is built on a wide set of material. The basis of the article is formed by thirty-two in-depth interviews carried out in the period 2000–05. Eighteen of these are with people who were or still are members of the Jewish community of Hebron. The last fourteen are with other radical settlers who are not living in Hebron, but are part of the same network as the community in Hebron. Most of the interviewees were interviewed twice.

Among the interviewees, the gender division is equally balanced, with a slight excess of men due to the relatively sharp division in gender roles in these religious communities; women are responsible for the home, whereas men are both more active outside of the confines of the home and family, and also dominate the leadership positions. The interviews were conducted by the author in the interviewees' native language – English, Hebrew, or German. All interviews were conducted in the interviewees' homes or settlements, and took the form of open conversations without a rigid format.

The primary written sources used are the elaborate websites of the Jewish Community of Hebron in Hebrew and English, which were followed closely in the period 1998–2005, a number of publications by the community, and other relevant settler organs.

The Jewish Community of Hebron and its supporters publish a number of leaflets as well as the bimonthly magazine *Hebron Today* where much information regarding the community's activities can be found. Information online can be accessed on the community's two websites, in Hebrew and English respectively.[4] Although commentaries on political issues on a regional and national level are published on the website, the many theological references on these websites are more prominent and it is these that comprise the basis for the analysis in this article.

To respect informants' wish to remain anonymous, they have been given fictitious names. Fictitious names appear in quotes.

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4 See www.hebron.com for the English version and www.hebron.co.il for the Hebrew version (both accessed August 19, 2007). Though there have been major discrepancies between these two versions over the years, they are now coordinated and the information on both sites is similar.

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2. The Theology

In an interview on July 26, 2000, spokesperson David Wilder stated:

> Everything that happens now is written in the Tanakh [the Hebrew Bible]…. God decides everything. Hebron is where it all started and where it all continues. It is not a coincidence that the Jewish Community of Hebron exists today or that people do as they do there. History proves us right.

The statement spells out two central dimensions in the worldview of the Jewish community of Hebron: Firstly, the *literal* understanding of the sacred texts. Secondly, the understanding of themselves as *active and decisive parts* in the cosmic puzzle called "contemporary history."

2.1. The Theopolitical Heritage

The theopolitical religious Zionism taught at the Merkaz haRav Yeshiva (Talmudic academy) in Jerusalem is fundamental in any understanding of the mindset of the national/religious settler movement, and accordingly also for the members of the Jewish community of Hebron. This *religious* Zionism considered *secular* Zionism as deriving from religious roots, and thus the actions of secular political Zionists as leading towards a religious destination (Aran 1987, 8). Consequently, although the secular Zionists instigated immigration to the territories of the Land of Israel with the secular hope of establishing a home for the Jews, these religious Zionists associated this hope with redemption, claiming it was essentially religious. Thus, religion was Zionist and Zionism was religious.

Following the Six Day War, Israeli civil society was struck by what Israeli political scientist Ehud Sprinzak called "imperial conviction"; a sense of having returned to the cradle of Jewish civilization blended with a sense of "wanting more" (Sprinzak, 1991). The land was conquered,

now it needed to be settled. The students of the Yeshivat Merkaz HaRav set about their task with sincerity. As an example of *messirut ha-nefesh,* a "complete devotion to the holy cause," student Rabbi Moshe Levinger saw the Jewish territorial expansion as implying an obligation to ensure that the Land of Israel would again be settled by Jews. And, already in 1968 Rabbi Levinger headed for Hebron to establish a Jewish enclave in the city.[5]

Drawing heavily on the theological education given at the Yeshivat Merkaz HaRav and led by Rabbi Levinger, the students later established the influential Gush Emunim (Block of the Faithful) movement in 1974.[6] Gush Emunim was a redemptive movement, giving new life to the Zionist spirit of Jewish state-building, with the aim of settling and cultivating the Land of Israel, thus claiming that its members were the true heirs of Zionism, following up the work of the early pioneers who settled inside what in 1948 turned into the state of Israel (Aran 1987).

The worldview of Gush Emunim, and thus also the theological basis of the Jewish Community of Hebron, was created by the head of the Merkaz haRav, namely Rabbi Avraham Kook, and later developed further by Rabbi Tsvi.[7] The worldview can be summed up in three primary postulates: Firstly, the Land of Israel in its entirety is holy. Secondly, the People of Israel are holy, having a latent sacred "spark." And thirdly, we now live in the Age in Redemption, signaled by the gradual return of the Jewish People to the Land of Israel throughout the twentieth century, and the consolidation of its territorial possessions in milestones such as the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948 or the Six Day War of 1967.

This last point is crucial. In the times of redemption, the Land and the People must be united in order for the Jewish People to fulfill their religious Commandments and live as proper Jews. There is, in other words, an intrinsic,

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5 The establishment of the Jewish Community of Hebron and of Gush Emunim have already been widely elaborated upon, for example by Sprinzak (1991), Aran (1987), and Lustick (1988).

6 Gush Emunim was not formally established until 1974, triggered by the outcome of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. With the territorial concessions Israel faced after the war, the Gush Emunim founders "felt it their duty to set up a barrier capable of stopping unnecessary territorial concessions" (Sprinzak 1991, 29).

7 The significance of these two rabbis cannot be overestimated. As "Zhira" said in an interview in October 2002: "Rabbi Kook set the state of what we see today. His son, a righteous man, followed up and showed us where to go. And we have walked from there."

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sacred link between the Jewish People and the Land of Is-rael that cannot be compared to that of other nations and their states. But, perhaps more importantly, it implied that Jews must create settlements in the Occupied Territories in order to further the redemption process. In practice, this meant that the young generation of religious Zionist activ-ists equated the extent of redemption with the borders of the State of Israel – in other words, the state of Israel represents a sacred unit, being a primary element in the process of redemption (see e.g. Sprinzak 1991; Aran 1987; Ravitzky 1990, 1996; Lustick 1988; Røislien 2002, 2006).

Added to this, and in consequence also radicalizing the worldview further, were Rabbi Avraham Kook's teachings on war. He wrote that "even through the destruction of war, the light of *Mashiach* appears. The power of *Mashiach* is released when a great war grips the world. In fact, the greater the magnitude and force of the war, the greater the revelation of *Mashiach* which follows" (Samson and Fish-erman 1997, 38–39). To Rabbi Kook, the Messiah is not the idealized Jewish King, but a *process* that will evolve over time, triggered by a massive war. Rabbi Tsvi reinterpreted his father's views on war by contextualizing them. Encour-agement to settle in the West Bank left the Jewish settlers with a problem; they came into open conflict with the Ar-abs living there. But instead of condemning violence, they condoned it, believing that the very fabric of the Land of Israel had been spun as a web of conflict that would usher the coming of the Messiah. Thus, conflict is considered as a positive element.

Just as the old pioneers had managed to create a state, a new effort was now required to settle in the West Bank, in the Biblical Judea and Samaria. The Israeli state borders were strangling the Jewish right to these lands, they said. The spiritual leader of Gush Emunim in its early days, Rabbi Tsvi Yehuda ha-Cohen Kook, even went as far as referring to the pre-1967 borders as "Auschwitz borders" (Hoch 1994, 27). This reflects the essential radicalizations

of the theology of land that Gush Emunim represented, emphasizing the borders of the state as the key to redemp-tion. This has contributed to drawing Israeli politics into the religious sphere, also adding religious value to human participation in politics (see Friedman 1992, 18; Aran 1987; Sprinzak 1991, among others).

2.2 Biblical Tenets

Two fundamental elements of the Hebrew Bible storyline are emphasized in the worldview of the Jewish Commu-nity of Hebron.[8] Firstly, the clear understanding that the Land of Israel was given to the Jewish People for eternity. Secondly, Hebron features in central events of the Hebrew Bible; according to the Jewish community Hebron is men-tioned eighty-seven times in the Torah while Jerusalem is only mentioned once. The Community has only existed in the city for some thirty-five years, and its religious outlook is clearly influenced by historical and political events oc-curring in the twentieth century.[9] Nonetheless, one finds in its teaching numerous Biblical references with a clear understanding of the history outlined in the Tanakh as being the literal history of the Jewish People.
A cardinal motif in the Tanakh is how God makes a ter-ritorial covenant with a representative of the chosen tribe. There is no doubt that land, with its associated rights and privileges, was and is a factor of great historical, ideologi-cal, and theological significance for the life and faith of the People of Israel. Professor of theology James Parker even goes as far as saying that Judaism per se is "tied to the his-tory of a single people and the geographical actuality of a single land" (Blum 1987, 105).

The divine connection between God and the People of Israel, later narrated as the Jewish People, finds its roots already in Genesis 12 and 13. In this text, God makes what is in sacred territorial terms the most significant – the covenant with Abraham – which makes Abraham leave his father's house and settle in Hebron (Gen. 13:18). The covenant between God and Abraham and the subsequent

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8 Several of the central elements found in the worldview of the Jewish Community of Hebron are similar to those of previous Gush Emunim leaders. The Chief Rabbi of the Jews in Hebron, Rabbi Moshe Levinger, was among the founders of Gush Emunim, and thus highly influential in

the development of the national/religious Zionist settler movement and its ideology.

9 Setting a clear date is difficult, as its found-ing date is disputed. The first attempt to set up a settlement was made in 1968, the second in 1979,

although the presence of the community in the city was not formally recognized by the Israeli government until 1980.

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settlement in Hebron, has for the settlers today evolved into a conductive element where settlement in Hebron equals the reaffirmation of the covenant between God and the descendants of Abraham.[10]

God's promise of the Land to Abraham is reaffirmed with Moses (Exod. 6:5–8). The covenant with Moses differs from the covenant with Abraham in the fundamental aspect of whether the Land is given to the people *with* or *without* conditions: The covenant with Moses, eschatological in character, is dependent on the People of Israel fulfilling the commandments for the promises of the covenant to be accomplished (Davies 1991, 8). The Jewish Community of Hebron interprets the legends of Moses as saying that Moses was first shown the Tomb of Abraham in Hebron:

> Prior to Moses' death, G-d showed him the entire land of Israel. Scholars emphasize the fact that Moses was shown the Cave of the Machpelah [Tomb of Abraham]: "And G-d showed him the entire land and the Negev *(southern region)*" (34:1,3). This verse teaches us that He showed him the Machpelah Cave where the patriarchs are buried.[11]

The covenants with Abraham and Moses are interpreted as giving the People of Israel *inalienable rights of possession to the land.* The promise has been restated and reconstructed through the generations in such a way that it has become a driving force in the life of the people. Possessing the land is an eternal task, and living there is a divine promise (Davies 1991). For the religious Zionists, the promise implies that attaining total religious integrity also includes the desire to return to the Land of Israel. Consequently, it has been a defining element in the idea that Jewish civilization outside of the Land of Israel is *exiled.* But, for the Jews of Hebron, exile ended in 1967.

The revival of contemporary religious Zionism, messianic in its aspirations, must be seen in relation to this: the time had come to re-establish the Divine Kingdom. Rabbi Eliezer Waldman, who was among the group that first came to settle in Hebron in 1968, refers to the endeavor as a *return,* saying: "The prophets warned of two exiles and two returns. Just read Jeremiah – he predicted the exile. But there was not warning of a third exile. Now we have returned and we have come to stay."[12]

Among the members of the Jewish Community of Hebron, then, Hebron is given particular significance in the "cosmic drama":[13] The city is considered second in line in terms of sanctity, only exceeded by Jerusalem, reflecting the hierarchical interpretation of geography within Judaism (Kunin 1998). The Jewish settlers in Hebron express a literal understanding of the Hebrew scriptures, as "Dorit" clearly shows in her explanation of why she has chosen to settle in Hebron: "I can quote it to you – it is all here in the Torah. Read Genesis 23 and you will understand."[14]

The most emphasized narrative amongst the Jews of Hebron concerns Abraham, who in Judaism is considered to be the Jewish Patriarch – and among the Jewish Community of Hebron, considered to be the first Jew in Hebron. But other Biblical figures and their ties with Hebron are also given considerable attention, including as Sarah, Jacob, Leah, and Rebecca. The overall effect is to identify Hebron as a sacred, *Jewish* city.

Jewish mythology is seen as the vehicle of God's presence in the world (Lancaster 1998, 13–14). Jewish religious history is defined in relation to Israel, and aspiring to settle in the Land of Israel when conditions permit. Returning to Israel is understood within the context of a purpose of history, as a forerunner to the coming of the Messiah.

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10 E.g. with Isaac (Gen. 26:3) and with Jacob at Beth-El (Gen. 28:3–4, 28:12–15, 35:11–12.

11 From the Jewish Community of Hebron's website; original emphasis.

12 Rabbi Eliezer Waldman refers to two mythical exiles in the Bible to verify this claim: In about 921 BCE the nation of Israel split into two kingdoms, with Judah in the south and Israel in the north. The northern kingdom fell to Assyria in 722 BCE.

The southern kingdom fell to Babylon in 586 BCE and a large part of the population living in the Land of Israel was brought to Babylonia. In 538 BCE, King Cyrus of Persia permitted the Jews to return to their land, where they also were allowed to rebuild the Temple in Jerusalem (Ezra 1:1–4, 6:3–5), earlier destroyed by the Babylonians. In 70 CE, the Temple was once again destroyed, this time by the Romans. Interview with Rabbi Eliezer Waldman August 1, 2000.

13 See the Jewish Community of Hebron's websites for elaboration.

14 Interview with "Dorit" August 3, 2000. In Genesis 23:2 Kiryat Arba is also called Hebron, and thus living in Kiryat Arba is living at the site of Biblical Hebron.

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The precise delineation of the exact borders to the Promised Land is disputed. The maximum extent of the promised territory is given in Genesis 15:18, corresponding to the Land of Canaan: "On that day, God made a covenant with Abram, saying, 'Unto thy seed have I given this land, from the river of Egypt unto the great river, the river Euphrates'" (Gen. 15:18).[15]

The settler movement today has a maximalist interpretation and a gradualist approach to action. A former leader of the settler movement's Yesha Council (the representative body for the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza), Yehudit Tayar, said that although the ultimate aim is to settle the entire Land of Israel in its widest definition, one has to take one step at the time.[16] Therefore, today's generation struggles for the most imminent settlement issues and leaves settling the remaining parts of the Land of Israel to generations to come. Consequently, the Jewish Community of Hebron has taken on the task of settling in the core area of the Land of Israel, close to the roots of the Jewish People, in order to secure a safe stronghold in the Land. It is thus the settling in the land that secures possession, and this is therefore significant in its own right (Schweid 1985, 20).

To the Jewish community, Hebron plays a crucial role in Jews' maintenance of the intrinsic and unbreakable link with the Land of Israel, as the very roots of the Jewish People are located in Hebron, which is a determining factor in designating the sanctity of Hebron.[17]

2.3 The Sanctity of Hebron

The sanctity of Hebron is inseparably linked to the Tomb of Abraham, which is where Abraham and Sarah, Jacob and Leah, and Isaac and Rebecca are all mythically believed to be buried, and a place with crucial religious significance.[18] It is thus through the Tomb of Abraham

that Hebron attains its significance as the place containing the roots of the Jewish People. We can identify three primary factors that together constitute the religious sanctity of the city:

Firstly, Abraham resided in Hebron where he purchased a cave in which he was buried, "The Tomb of Abraham." Genesis, primarily Genesis 23, combines the story of Sarah's death and burial in Hebron with a fuller description of Abraham's purchase of the cave from the Hittites. Although it is Sarah's death that triggers the purchase of the cave, her death has little place in the narrative. Rather, it is the *purchase* that is the central issue, as it underscores how Hebron was the first place a Jew – Abraham – acquired land in the Promised Land.

Secondly, King David was anointed king in Hebron.

Thirdly, the Tomb of Abraham covers the entrance to the Garden of Eden. This authoritative narrative is found in the primary holy scripture of the Jewish mystics, the Zohar.[19] Hence, the narratives of the Tanakh and the Zohar together outline the sanctity of Hebron, also pointing at the kabbalistic elements that the Jewish Community of Hebron embraces. Redemption will be fulfilled when the masculine and feminine aspects of God are united in the Tomb of Abraham.[20] The Jewish Community of Hebron explains:

> Ma'arat HaMachpela is the threshold to the Garden of Eden, the place where our prayers ascend On High, and the place where our souls ascend to the celestial realm. According to the Midrash, it was Adam who discovered the secret of the place. Moreover, it was he who dug out the cave and buried Eve in it. Later on, Adam himself was buried there. We can thus understand why Abraham wanted precisely this place.[21]

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15 Other delineations are also given in the Torah though they all centre on the designated area given in Genesis 15:18. See e.g. Deut. 11:24–25. The citations are taken from The King James Study Bible: King James Version (Nashville, 1988: Thomas Nelson Publishers).

16 Interview with Yehudit Tayar, January 20, 2000.

17 See www.hebron.org (accessed August 19, 2007). This was underscored by all interviewees. E.g. interview with "Dorit," August 25, 2000: "In the beginning God created the world. And since God created the world, then he also knew who to give the land to. He gave the Land of Israel to the Jewish People. So this is why we are here, and why we stay."

18 See www.hebron.co.il, www.hebron.com.

19 The Zohar is a mystical, i.e. kabbalist, commentary on the Torah (the Pentateuch) and much of Nevi'im (the Hagiographia).

20 See the Jewish Community of Hebron's websites for more details.

21 www.hebron.com

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What we see here is that there were not only the three couples Abraham and Sarah, Isaac and Rebecca, and Jacob and Leah who are buried in Hebron. Adam and Eve were too. In other words, there are *four* couples buried in Hebron, nourishing the mystic emphasis on numbers and the explanation of the name Kiryat Arba as meaning the "City of Four," i.e. four hallowed couples.

In addition to these elements – the purchase of Hebron and the Cave of Machpelah by Abraham, the burial place for the patriarchs and the matriarchs, the entrance to the Garden of Eden, the place at which David was anointed – the Jewish religious tradition in which the Jewish Community of Hebron stands also tells of Hebron as being the location of other sites of sacred value. For example, according to tradition the Tomb of Ruth and Jesse is located in the Tel Rumeida settlement enclave, and the Terebinths of Mamre, the *Alonei Mamre* (mentioned in Genesis 18:1 as the place where God appeared to Abraham before he went to Hebron to purchase the cave) are situated on the outskirts of Hebron.

Furthermore, Jewish tradition says that King David's Pool referred to in the Book of Samuel (2 Samuel 4:12) is located in the center of Hebron (and today known locally as the Sultan's Pool). This also goes for the first judge, Otniel Ben Knaz (Judges 3:9–11), and the Tomb of Abner, who was the general of King David and Saul, both located in Hebron. The Book of Joshua also states that Joshua assigned Hebron to Caleb from the tribe of Judah (Joshua 14:13–14).

Even though not all of these places necessarily are decisive individually, they add up to form an understanding of Hebron as being a sacred, Jewish city.

2.4 Reunifying God
Hebron is viewed as representing the source of the Jewish realm, and can thus be expected to have a fundamental role in the culmination of the Messianic era when all Jews are again gathered in the Land of Israel. This understanding, however, has repeatedly caused rabbis and Jewish theologians trouble. Ideally, God dwells with His chosen

people in the Land of Israel, i.e. the triangle is "complete" when the Jews are living in their Promised Land. However, if the Jewish People live in exile – does it affect the relationship between God and the Land, and God and the Jewish People? In other words, does God have a location?

Traditional rabbinic Judaism emphasizes the unity and oneness of God. However, the religious outlook of the Jewish Community of Hebron is influenced by the Jewish mysticism of *Kabbalah,* which relates the question of a location of God to the two religious epithets *Maqom* (literally "place") and *Shekhinah* (literally "dwelling").[22] *Maqom* is understood as signifying omnipresence rather than pointing at a particular place, but also designates God's nearness; it refers to the God who reveals Himself in whatever place He wishes (Urbach 1979, 72). *Maqom,* therefore, signifies an inherent tension in God's omnipresence, implying that God also resides in every place.

Bridging the gap between omnipresence and place, between heaven and earth, is the concept of *Shekhinah.* Shekhinah is a Talmudic epithet expressing the presence of God in a place though *not limited* to this place (Urbach 1979, 66). In rabbinical literature *Shekhinah* is literally translated as "God's divine presence." However, in Kabbalah, the concept of *Shekhinah* is defined differently. A mystic-messianic interpretation of the *Shekhinah* views it in duality, with a feminine and masculine aspect, where the feminine aspect shares in the exile of the Jewish People.

Redemption implies reuniting God's feminine and masculine aspects. The Kabbalist interpretation of redemption gives Hebron high symbolic value. This must be seen in light of the Hebrew name of the Tomb of Abraham, the *Ma'arat HaMachpelah.* "Ma'arah" means "cave" in Hebrew, and "Machpelah" means "double". The most common religious interpretation of the cave's name reflects the perception of it as being the burial place of the patriarchs and matriarchs of the Jewish People, i.e. husband and wife; a "doublet."[23] In addition to the significance the Cave acquires by being such a burial place, it is implied that there is both a feminine and a masculine aspect represented in the Cave.

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22 The Hebrew root *sh-kh-n,* constructing the verb *shakhan,* literally means "to dwell."

23 See www.hebron.com.

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My interviewees emphasized that the redemptive phase of reuniting the aspects of God will be centered in the Cave. The Light of God is particularly strong in the Tomb of Abraham, and the Cave is a place in which God's masculine aspect dwells. The feminine aspect, the *Shekhinah,* was exiled with the Jewish People. The return from exile signifies the beginning of the Age of Redemption. Overall, these two aspects will be united with the return of the Jewish People to the Land of Israel. But at a more specific level, these two aspects will be reunited in the Cave. In other words, the unity of God, the Jewish People and the Land of Israel will be embraced and founded in the Tomb of Abraham, the *Ma'arat HaMachpelah.*

3. Contextual Elements

In an interview in Hebron's Avraham Avinu settlement on July 26, 2000, spokesman David Wilder summed up the official argument for why the Jewish Community of Hebron sees the city as laden with such decisive religious and symbolic value:

> Hebron is the roots of the Jewish People. Hebron is where the Jewish People began, where all of monotheism began, where Abraham lived, the Patriarchs, the Matriarchs, King David – this is the foundation of the Jewish People, and if we don't have the right to live here, what right do we have to live in Tel Aviv or anywhere else? This place is important to us spiritually … you are talking in terms of a spiritual place … one of the most important sights of the world. And this is of course the heart of Hebron. Jews have lived here for thousands of years, up until the Arabs massacred us in 1929. And now, after Judea and Samaria was liberated in 1967, we have come back to stay again.

This statement sums up the importance of Biblical elements in the way the Jewish Community of Hebron legitimizes its presence (as described above), but it also adds another dimension, namely the contextual aspects. By

bringing in sentiments towards the Arab population – the local Palestinians – the spokesman also states *who* the Jews of Hebron point out as their prime enemy and *why* they have come to the city to stay.

3.1. The 1929 *Tarpat* Trauma

Today one can read "Lo od Tarpat" ("Never Again Tarpat") on huge banners and graffiti in the H-2 area. "Tarpat" is the Hebrew name for the year 1929 (5689 in the Jewish calendar),[24] which stands for an unforgettable trauma, due to the anti-Jewish riots that occurred during the summer that year. Tensions between Muslims and Jews had increased in British Mandate Palestine and days of unrest occurred repeatedly. A major element in the dispute was access to the Western Wall in Jerusalem. On August 22, 1929, violent clashes between Jews and Arabs occurred in Jerusalem.[25]

Rumors reached Hebron the same afternoon, claiming that a bloodbath was taking place in Jerusalem, where Jews were allegedly slaughtering Arabs. Arab reactions resulted in the eruption of riots and protests against the Jews in Hebron. When the riots finally ended on the evening of August 23, fifty-nine people had been killed, and another eight died of their wounds the next day. Subsequently, the British authorities evacuated the surviving Jewish inhabitants to Jerusalem. Thirty-five of these families returned to Hebron in 1931, but the attempt to resettle was destroyed by unrest in 1936, when the British authorities, fearing new anti-Jewish uprisings, evacuated the Jewish inhabitants on April 23, 1936. From 1936 until the Jordanian conquest of the city in 1948, only one Jew lived in Hebron, and from 1948 until 1967 no Jews were present in the city at all.

The Jewish Community of Hebron today does not have any family ties with the Jewish community of 1929 – on the contrary, the relatives of Jewish families of 1929 strongly oppose the presence of the Jewish Community of Hebron (Abusway 1997). Nonetheless, the settlers today strongly

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24 This also reflects the numerological influence from Kabbalah. Other similar interpreted abbreviations are e.g. the abbreviation for Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, *Yesh'a,* which literally means "salvation" in Hebrew. Written in Hebrew, the Six Day War spells the word *ko'ach,* which means

"strength." Also, Kahane Chai, a splinter group from Kach, has the abbreviation *ko'ach.*

25 The exact course of events has been given relatively little attention within academic research, and there are few impartial sources. The incident

is widely covered on the website of the Jewish Community of Hebron. However, outside the Community the incident is mentioned more in passing, such as in Michael Feige's works (1996 and 2001).

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identify themselves with the pre-1929 Jewish community in Hebron and consequently view the Arabs with distrust: "The murderers still walk the streets," one interviewee replied to the question of why she did not buy her groceries at the local Palestinian shop but preferred to take the bus up to nearby Kiryat Arba or go all the way to Jerusalem.

The Tarpat incident thus represents a significant milestone in the collective memory of the Jewish Community of Hebron. As the Israeli anthropologist Michael Feige explains in his article "The Settlement of Hebron: The Place and the Other" (2001), the contemporary settler community initiated the narrative of *return* to the city after the massacre of Jews in the city in 1929; they have in other words returned to restore the ancient community, thus creating a discourse of legitimacy for their occupation of Palestinian homes (Feige 2001). Feige even goes so far as claiming that the collective memory of the contemporary Jewish Community of Hebron has undergone a process of *Tarpatization;* they relate so strongly to what occurred in 1929 that it both impinges on the personal relationship each member of the community has towards the Palestinian residents of the city and counts among the founding pillars of their common identity (Feige 1996). In other words, the Jewish community today projects the incident of 1929 is unto the Palestinians, creating the image of the Palestinians both being responsible for the 1929 massacre and inclined to carry it out again.

Visually, the Tarpat is commemorated by a museum in the Beit Hadassah settlement cluster. The exhibition is a collection of brutal pictures of the physical harm the members of the old Jewish community of Hebron were subjected to. But perhaps more important is the significance of Tarpat for the Community's notion of Hebron's Palestinian population today. As David Wilder said when commenting on a clash between Jewish settlers and Palestinians in May 2001: "It is all like the massacre of the Jews in Hebron in 1929. Nothing has changed. They are animals" (Quirke and MacAskill 2001).

Wilder's assumption is common within the community. "If you follow the 1929 story, it follows an ever-recurring pattern," Elyakim Haetzni said when describing the relationship with the Palestinians. Accordingly, historical

injustice by the Arabs tends to result in "anti-Arabism" that occurs as an additional motif for both the community's presence and not least its actions. The exhibition at the museum can be described as "visual proof" of a historically authentic cultural heritage; it consolidates the mythical and cultural past (Hylland Eriksen 1996). Culturally normative meaning is therefore exchanged with historical descriptions of the event.

As places are culturally constructed, one cannot dismiss ties to history. Culture is identity. Thus, historicity and identity are primary components in the construction of the legitimacy of place. Emphasizing the historical significance of the place for the culture in question "verifies" the culture's right to the place. The social anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen explains in his book *Kampen om Fortiden* (The battle for the past) (1996, 75–80) how constructing and sustaining the impression of an authoritative, heroic past that is tied to a particular place is an important underlying process in cultural identity. To establish a historic "prescriptive right" to a particular place is therefore an important constituent in the construction of a cultural identity. Thus, establishing a connection to the Tarpat becomes a significant element in the process of legitimating a rightful notion of belonging.

3.2 Pioneers for the Divine

Needless to say, the settlement endeavor has turned into a highly controversial political issue, resulting in continuing clashes and eruptions of violence between the settlers and local Palestinians in the West Bank. However, despite meeting resistance, the religious Zionists are not ending their settlement endeavor. In accordance with the theological significance of Hebron, the very act of settling in Hebron is considered both "a right and an obligation," as all interviewees said, using the Hebrew terms *zkhot* and *chova* to explain this perspective, irrespective of their native tongue. In other words, they have a *divinely defined responsibility to take care of the Land.*

At his home in Kiryat Arba, Baruch Nachshon, who together with his wife Sarah was among the very first to come to Hebron, told me how he had practically felt God choosing him to go to Hebron: "Don't think that I only live here because I want to. I also live here because that is

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what the Scriptures say that I should do."[26] Other members of the community also explained their reasons for staying in Hebron in similar terms. In an attempt to show the sincerity of her choice "Zhira" said:

> Israel, and above all Hebron, is a very uncomfortable place to be in if you don't take on the Commandments. I have friends visiting from the U.S. who wonder what I am doing here. They just look around and see how bad it all looks from the outside. Hebron is a very earthy place. Of course spiritually, but look around you – there is dust and mud everywhere. But everyone pays a rent for his flat. My rent is dirt and hostility.[27]

In other words, Hebron is not viewed in terms of its physical expression, but in *terms of the layers of significance and sanctity.* A complete Jewish life can only be lived in Hebron, and the land will wither away without the Jews.[28] Theologically, the Land needs the Jewish People, but the claim is also reinforced through historical arguments. Elyakim Haetzni emphasized that the desert in Judea and Samaria gradually began to flourish with the Jews, saying:

> I remember the day I heard a bird here for the first time. It was a total desert here until we came and built it – look around you – we built all this. It was nothing until we came. Absolutely nothing. Just dry sand. The Arabs will say that "you took all this from us," but that isn't true. We made it flourish. And if we leave, all this can be destroyed in a day.[29]

To be a Jew you have to act like a Jew and realize, and accept, the responsibilities that come with it. Thus, the settlers reassert their Jewish identity through the connection and proximity to the actual land.

As seen above, the promise of land as a defining element in the constitution of the nation is fundamental to the Jewish Community of Hebron, and distinguishes the Jews from other nations. This promise is interpreted as a redemptive *responsibility* given to the People of Israel. Hebron was the first city in which the nationalist religious Zionists tried to establish a Jewish settlement, and it has also proven to be one of the most difficult settlements to maintain due to the everlasting friction between the two populations. Consequently, a "pioneering spirit" pervades the settlement in Hebron. "We are the head of the spear" Nomi Horowitz, a resident of Beit Hadassah, said in an interview with *Time* (McGeary 1996).

However, despite both the sanctity of Hebron and the emotional attachment to the city, Hebron is hierarchically second in line after Jerusalem, so why not settle there? It was only a handful families that actually established the Community, so most of the members moved to Hebron *after* it was established and cannot be considered pioneers in the strict definition of the term. So why do they come to *stay*?

"Zhira" explained that the very fact that Hebron was a contested place was part of the reason why she came. It is a question of moving barriers. She pointed out that the most contested places were the most sacred ones, and vice versa, and this very fact explicitly shows that it is a place worth fighting for.[30] According to the Israeli sociologist Miriam Billig, the risks the Jews of Hebron are exposed to – including the threat that their homes may be taken away from them – contributes to forging a stronger emotional attachment (Billig 2006). In "Is My Home My Castle? Place Attachment, Risk Perception, and Religious Faith" (2006) she examines the sense of belonging and attachment to their homes among the (now evacuated) settlers in Gaza, and shows how the threats they were exposed to also contributed to increasing their attachment. Billig's findings also help to explain the elevated status members of the Jewish Community of Hebron have in radical settler

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26 Interview with Baruch Nachshon, August 3, 2000.

27 Interview with "Zhira," August 7, 2000.

28 E.g., in an interview on August 1, 2000, Rabbi Waldman said: "In Leviticus, at the end, we are told that there will be a blessing and a curse. The curse is that God will make the Land desolate. The

sages tell that the Land without Jews will dry up. A complete Jewish life can only be lived here, because the Land can only prosper with the Jews. Others can only bring destruction to the Land."

29 Interview with Elyakim Haetzni, August 3, 2000.

30 She mentioned the controversies over Rachel's

Tomb in Bethlehem and Joseph's Tomb in Nablus and the frequent clashes that erupt outside them (interview with "Zhira," August 7, 2000). Joseph's Tomb in Nablus was among the first Jewish settlements to be destroyed when the second intifada began in the autumn of 2000.

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circles. "Shlomo," an orthodox settler in Kiryat Arba, said enviously: "They make enormous sacrifices for Judea and Samaria, for salvation – for us all."[31]

This role that the Jewish Community of Hebron has in the redemptive process can also be seen in relation to the first settlement endeavor in 1968, which had a decisive impact on the perception of their significance. That *they* took the step and actually pushed forward a Jewish settlement, *their actions* proved to be fundamental in terms of reaching the goal that Jews again should reside in the Biblical Land of Israel. In other words, their settlement endeavor reaffirmed how man can affect the divine process.

The endeavor also gave the primordial link between the land and the people a new spark. It can be compared with natural laws: "You see – it is natural to be here. One can't fight nature," "Yitz" responded when asked why it was of such vital importance that Jews live in Hebron.[32] Spokesman Noam Arnon also upheld this position: "It is natural to be here. *'Am Israel* belongs to *Erets Yisra'el.* It's just the way it is. How else should it be?"[33] The "natural" in this context must be viewed as God's order: The divine imperative that the Jewish People should reside in the Land of Israel is also looked upon as a natural order. Although this link is defined in theological terms, it is also reaffirmed through what the Jewish settlers consider a *feeling* of attachment to Hebron. David Wilder explained:

> Look, one has to differentiate spiritually, religiously, between what we call *Halakhic Kdushah* [sanctity defined within Jewish law] and sanctity that isn't *halakhic* but more emotional. In terms of Jewish law, really the only place that has laws of holiness is the Temple Mount in Jerusalem… . But in terms of emotional attachment, the Jewish People has Hebron as what we've dreamt of – you know, it is considered to be very special. Unique and special. That's why we're here.[34]

The alleged natural link between the Land and the People does in its consequence favor action; or rather, the sense of

belonging and ownership obliges the Jewish People to take care of their property. With ownership comes responsibility. Living in Judea and Samaria reasserts and manifests both their individual identity and unity with other Jews within this specific land and the particular spatial setting of the Land of Israel. Active settling is the divine imperative that the people have to follow in order to fulfill their obligations, as the land and the people belong to each other.

Accordingly, if Hebron is perceived as naturally sacred and intrinsically Jewish through a divine imperative, it follows that the city is considered Jewish property, regardless of any secular protocols or agreements claiming otherwise. Nevertheless, Palestinian residents of Hebron by far outnumber the small Jewish community, whose members in consequence have to pass through Palestinian areas in order to move from one settlement cluster to another. And, it is here that another latent dimension of the ideology is exposed; the nationalism.

Tamara Neumann analyses in her doctoral thesis (2000) the social production of space in Kiryat Arba settlement adjacent to Hebron, and finds that the spatial practices of the members of the settlement reaffirm their religious claim on the place. She writes that "Hebron, as their god-given 'inheritance', is granted plausibility by virtue of particular socio-political conditions that allow the domain of religious belief to be realized in practical terms" (Neuman 2000, 8).

This position is also applicable to the way the Jewish Community of Hebron makes use of its surroundings.[35] Travel between the four settlement enclaves is done in minivans and cars that are covered with pro-Israeli and anti-Arab bumper stickers; the isolation and the hostile signals prevent any interaction between Jews and Palestinians.

Here the settlers express their feelings of ownership towards the area, and at the same time reflect an apparent indifference to the non-Jewish users of the territory. This is most explicit during the many curfews that are imposed

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31 Interview with "Shlomo," October 19, 2002.

32 Interview with "Yitz," August 7, 2000.

33 Interview with Noam Arnon, August 8, 2000.

34 Interview with David Wilder, July 26, 2000.

35 Visually, it is noteworthy that the many large water tanks in the H-2 area that exclusively supply the settlements are painted with a large Israeli flag.

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on the Palestinian residents of the city, and that have become almost routine during the Jewish Shabbat and on all major Jewish feasts. During the curfew one can observe heavily armed families strolling undisturbed through the streets to the Tomb of Abraham and back. They have the whole space to themselves, while Palestinians peek out from behind closed doors and windows.

One such explicit display of domination occurs on Israeli Independence Day, which is widely celebrated within the state of Israel.[36] However, Hebron is not Israeli sovereign territory and the celebration is therefore loaded with a different symbolic value to that within Israel proper. On the Israeli Independence Day, Palestinians are confined to their homes under curfew, while the Jewish Community of Hebron is permitted to roam the streets alone, along with the hordes of visitors the city attracts on such days. On Independence Day 2001, a large Israeli flag was ceremonially raised on top of the Tomb of Abraham. This clearly reflects the nationalist components of their worldview. The demand that they wanted the Israeli flag flown over the Tomb had already been raised when the settlers first came to Hebron after the Six Day War (Sprinzak 1991, 89). The Israeli flag is laden with religious symbolism. It is represents the journey of Moses, when the sea opened and split in two for the Jewish People to cross. Consequently, to these religious Zionists the flag is a nationalist symbol of the sanctity of the Jewish State, with Hebron as an integral part.

3.3 Light of the Nations
The religious Zionist movement blends the covenants and the promise of the Land with Isaiah 49:6: "I will also make you a light of nations." In other words, the promise contains a redemptive responsibility: it is the responsibility of the People of Israel, now the Jewish People, to lead the world to salvation As "Netah" put it: "We have a divine task – *one day* they will *all* thank us."[37]

By virtue of being part of a divinely chosen nation, the members of the Jewish Community of Hebron consider

themselves as doing the world a favor. Theologically, this is reflected in Isaiah 49:6: "I will also make you a light of nations, that My salvation may reach the ends of the earth." This is an imperative postulate. *Personal redemption* is bound *with collective redemption.* Seen against the background of the idea that Jewish history is a reflection of God's Will on earth, the Jewish settlement in Hebron is a religious act to reach universal redemption. By putting the Land of Israel into Jewish hands, redemption will thus be fulfilled for all.

All the interviewees reaffirmed this throughout the interviews. However, it was not asserted as an element in itself, or as a step on the way to final redemption. It was mentioned as a matter of course, as a self-evident fundamental principle. Jews are the Light of Nations, *Or la-Goyim,* the people that will lead the world through the messianic process to ultimate redemption. Settling in the Land of Israel is therefore an obligation placed upon the Jewish People not for exclusive reasons that will only bring redemption to the Jewish People. Rather, the act of settling is a righteous deed of a particular people done as a universal favor.

The reaction of "Gabi" – a mother of six in her late 30s who is a highly committed community worker in Hebron – is typical: "What do you expect us to do? *Pretend* that we are *not Or la-Goyim* – that we don't have an obligation to redeem the nations?! This place [Hebron] has moral and judicial obligations and we do what we have to do, because *we know* that we will bring all of humanity to redemption."[38]

3.4 A Local Theology to Fight Defilement of a Sacred Place
The members of the Jewish Community of Hebron also reveal a fundamental distrust in others. The claim by "Meyrav" that "history has showed us that we cannot trust anyone but ourselves," is reaffirmed by many.[39] This distrust relates above all to the people in their immediate surroundings: the Palestinians.
Violence and the use of forms of protest have become facets of the expression of the presence of the community

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36 This is also treated extensively by Tamara Neumann (2000).

37 Interview with "Netah," August 8, 2000.

38 Interview with "Gabi," October 2002.

39 Interview with "Meyrav," October 2005.

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in Hebron, both toward Arabs and toward others who oppose their presence in the city.[40] Rabbi Levinger, the community's influential rabbi, has been convicted of manslaughter and repeatedly charged with acts of violence against Palestinians. With the escalation of the situation in Hebron, violence has become increasingly common.[41]

Viewing the sanctity of the Land of Israel as an inherent character of the land, the Jews of Hebron consider themselves obliged to transcend secular law to protect their promised land. Rabbi Waldman therefore claims that seemingly extreme actions are simply the external expression of the land's "inner holiness."[42] In other words; secular concepts of strategy, defense, and nationalism are the external implementations of the inherent holiness.

"Shlomo" claimed that "Jews don't *normally* initiate violence."[43] Nonetheless, it is beyond doubt that members of the Jewish Community of Hebron are responsible for aggressive and intimidating behavior, as well as more severe acts of violence towards the Palestinian residents of the city. As Aran notes (1987, 293):

> … the actual implementation of this cosmic vision has time and again demonstrated its potential for motivating and rationalizing a kind of religious violence. Activist-believers committed acts of sabotage and murder against the very Arabs who, according to [Gush Emunim's] idiosyncratic interpretation, will voluntarily lend a hand in the redemption of the Jews. Several times the Torah-centred settlers addressed the local Hebron Arabs in a seemingly conciliatory tone.

The very act of violence may forge moral understanding of their actions. Viewing their actions as morally justi-

fied may thus also further accentuate the development of various forms of "resistance" to what they perceive as insufferable oppression (Nordstrom and Robben 1995, 8). As noted above, every so often, and particularly at the time of religious feasts or other large gatherings, Palestinian homes and shops located on the routes between Jewish settlements and the Tomb of Abraham are practically raided as members of the Jewish Community and visitors from other settlements fill the streets.

In accordance with the *Tarpatization* phenomenon described above, my interviewees gave a psychological explanation of the "Arab mind"; Arabs are mendacious, vicious, self-centered, and impossible to trust.[44] These characteristics were also mentioned by those members of the Community who claimed to have Arab friends. Responding to the question on who the instigators of violence in the city were, one interviewee responded:

> Everything is a struggle in this place. How do you know if the Arab you meet is the terrorist or the one who will help you? You must always be very careful, and always carry a gun. And even though you shouldn't necessarily assume that every Arab is a terrorist, some of them are. And if you know that he will attack you – they all will – then you have to protect yourself and Hebron.[45]

In other words, a fundamental distrust in Arabs is mixed with the feeling of protecting the sacred landscape. "Myerav" explained this in relation to the Tomb of Abraham: "The Arabs turned the Cave of Machpelah into, for them, a mosque. It is not a mosque! For us it is a *Jewish* place for *Jewish* worship. The Christians pray wherever they pray, Muslims pray to the east, they pray to Mecca, which is the

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40 There is an apparent difference between Kach and Gush Emunim in terms of explicitly condoning violence. Accordingly, the relationship – or non-relationship – to Arabs represents a decisive dividing line between the two groups: Gush Emunim did not explicitly advocate the use of violence towards Arabs, nor was the transfer of Arabs a necessary aim or wish. The Gush Emunim worldview opens the possibility of coexistence with Arabs in the West Bank if they agree to accept and obey Jewish authority. While Rabbi Meir Kahane was explicitly anti-Arab, Gush Emunim claimed

that coexistence with Arabs was possible, and reiterated that the primary wish was not to uproot the Arabs from the West Bank (Sprinzak 1991, 88).

41 For example, on June 16, 2001, *The Jerusalem Post* reported that Jewish settlers in Hebron had clashed with both Jewish Israelis who were demonstrating against the Tel Rumeida settlement and with the IDF soldiers trying to prevent the clash (see e.g. Dudkevitch 18/06/01, Dudai 2001b, AIC 1994).

42 Interview with Rabbi Waldman, August 1, 2000.

43 Interview with "Shlomo," October 19, 2002.

44 This was clearly displayed in numerous interviews. See also the community's websites.

45 Interview with "Gabi," October 2005.

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important place for them, but we, we have to pray here!"[46] The question is, how do they relate to those who, in their opinion, defile the very sanctity of Hebron?

Violent actions appear to have been reinterpreted and given normative meaning. They conceive themselves as obliged to act as they do; it is considered necessary to engage in any action that will prevent Arabs from settling in the city.

On the basis of the Rabbis Kook's view of war – that friction releases the messianic process – there are also voices within the Jewish Community of Hebron that favor the recurring clashes between Jews and Palestinians. Consequently, the presence of Arabs and the resulting eruptions of violence are part of the process of redemption – or in other words, the presence of Arabs actually brings forth redemption. Commenting on contemporary politics, Baruch Nachshon said "Arafat wants to destroy us. So there will be a great war with the Arabs. And then the Arabs have to leave. Therefore, the Arabs under Arafat's leadership are bringing the last days."[47] Though these views are not often publicly stated, the Kookist-based theology helps to integrate clashes with Palestinians into a local theology. The need to unify the Land with the Jewish People and to seek further friction to advance redemption blend well with intense anti-Palestinian sentiments. Put bluntly, actions directed against the Palestinians represent a response within the legitimacy of a localized theological framework. As "Yossi" said: "We don't want Arabs here. They are not righteous and they want to kill us. And they want to throw us out, to stop us. So they are in the way for us."[48]

4. Conclusion

The religious worldview of the Jewish Community of Hebron is based on a messianic framework with three fundamental assumptions: the intrinsic sanctity of the Land of Israel, the sanctity of the Jewish People, and the belief that the current time is the Age of Redemption. There is also a deep faith in the postulate that in the Age of Redemption man plays an active part in the divine scheme. Accordingly, the People of Israel and the Land of Israel must be united, leading to an obligation to settle the land. As a

Light of Nations, where personal redemption is bound up with collective redemption, the Jewish People are acting as part of the divine scheme leading to the ultimate re-establishment of the messianic kingdom on earth.

In this messianic process, theocratic "legislation" supersedes all other jurisdictions. In a localized theology and as members of the Jewish People, the residents of Jewish Community of Hebron are obliged to aspire to be reunited with God and their Land, and thus to push forward the Age of Redemption. Therefore, all opportunities and obstacles are given their own metaphysical value. Accordingly, any obstacle preventing fulfillment of this divine scheme has to be removed in order to discharge the sacred duty that God has imposed on them.

The violence conducted by the Jewish Community of Hebron is thus a counter-cultural religious war. It is a consequence of a perception of living in sacred time on sacred ground, merged with a theological interpretation of the existence and activities of Palestinians opposing the very existence of the Jewish community, resulting in a deeply-felt hatred against Arabs integrated into a redemptive framework.

The Palestinian resistance to these religious Zionist settlers is interpreted as fitting into the divine scheme where violence and war are part of the apocalyptic vision ultimately leading to the re-establishment of God's kingdom. The ability of the community's worldview to integrate the violent context it operates in as a necessities for redemption makes the community resistant to criticism and to security risk. It responds instead by condoning arms and the use of force.

Being a Light of Nations, the Jewish Community of Hebron is leading a religious battle that is aimed at ushering the messianic process, but which in consequence is changing the political order.

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46 Interview with "Meyrav," March 2004. 47 Interview with "Baruch," July 2002. 48 Interview with "Yossi," July 7, 2000.

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Explaining the Long-Term Trend in Violent Crime: A Heuristic Scheme and Some Methodological Considerations

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There has been a discontinuous but fairly persistent long-term decline in homicide rates in core European countries since about 1500. Since the 1950s, however, we observe an upward trend in violent crime not only in Europe but in almost all of the economically advanced nations that combine democratic political structures with free-market economies. The paper presents an explanatory scheme designed to account for both, the long decline and its apparent reversal. The theoretical model draws heavily upon ideas taken from the sociological work of Emile Durkheim and Norbert Elias – with some modifications and extensions. It seeks to integrate sociological and historical perspectives and to give due weight to both, structural and developmental forces. A key hypothesis is that the pacifying effects of the erosion of traditional collectivism can only be maintained to the extent by which "cooperative individualism" dominates over against the forces of "disintegrative individualism." Some suggestions are made concerning the selection of appropriate indicators and the handling of methodological problems related to causal attribution.

1. Introduction: Defining What Is to Be Explained

In previous articles (Thome 1995, 2001) I have outlined a heuristic scheme for explaining the long-term trend in lethal violence in Europe since, roughly, the beginning of the sixteenth century. This paper now offers a more concise and systematized version of this theoretical account and adds some reflections on methodological problems that arise when it is applied in empirical research.

My point of departure is a set of empirical observations that document (1) the long-term decline in lethal interpersonal violence in Europe since about 1500 and (2) the upward trend in violent crime that has occurred more recently – in the second half of the twentieth century – not only in Europe but in almost all of the economically advanced nations that combine democratic political structures with free-market economies (Gartner 1990). The "S-" or "U-shaped-curve" (depending on how far back one goes in history) of this development was depicted by Ted R. Gurr some twenty-five years ago when he investigated British court records on homicide indictments and other related sources (Gurr 1981; Gurr et al. 1977). More recently,

in a series of papers Manuel Eisner (2003a; 2003b) has extended Gurr's work considerably by compiling homicide data from nearly four hundred historical case studies that cover different European regions and nations in the premodern era, and adding data from national vital or police recorded homicide statistics for the modern era. Thus, we now have a much better database that reduces the influence of the idiosyncrasies – the measurement errors – of each study in shaping the overall trend pattern.

The pattern that emerges from these data basically confirms the picture drawn by Gurr. Eisner calculates a factor of more than thirty by which homicide rates decreased between the end of the medieval period and the middle of the twentieth century when the mean rate stood at less than one death per year per 100,000 inhabitants (Eisner 2003a, 106). There are some discontinuities and short-term departures from the (trans-)secular trend line, but the decline as such is remarkably persistent through time. In addition, between the late nineteenth century and the 1950s the national homicide rates in western Europe more or less converged and cross-national differences have

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remained rather small since then. Even in non-European countries like New Zealand the homicide rates between 1880 and 1990 clearly display the U-shaped trend pattern (Dunstall 2004). Of course, we do not know if the upward trend or level shift since around 1960 (roughly doubling the rates by 1990) will persist or whether it will yet be another short-lived departure from the long-term trend. In many countries there is a leveling off in homicide rates or even a slight decline during the 1990s, but other types of recorded violence, like serious assault and, in particular, robbery, have generally continued to rise strongly.[1]

For the sake of argument, I will assume that we are not facing a short- or medium-term discontinuity but rather, since the middle of the twentieth century, a reversal of the long-term trend in criminal violence. The task for sociology then is to construct a coherent theory that accounts for both the long decline and its reversal, i.e., the U-shaped-pattern. If such a theory is available or can be constructed we may switch perspectives and predict that the increase in violent crime – at least a level shift, if not a continuing upward movement – will persist beyond the present. Studying the discontinuities, the local and temporary departures from the trend, or the manifold "contextual trajectories" (Eisner) would certainly also be very instructive. But if we want to find the picture behind the puzzle we must first have an idea what it might look like. And in order to apprehend the meaning of the picture one first needs to know something about the principles and techniques that were used in constructing it.

If the pattern is so consistent across the nations that have followed the Western type path of development,[2] then we apparently have to relate these crime trends to fundamen-

tal structural changes that have shaped these societies – again in fairly similar ways. This has led some sociologists to use sweeping concepts like rationalization, individualization, or social disintegration in their efforts to explain the increase in violent crime during the last forty or fifty years. But rationalization and individualization have been rising for several centuries during which interpersonal violence decreased, as indicated above. So these concepts are not sufficient, or at least they must be greatly refined and supplemented with additional hypotheses. What follows is an attempt at doing just that.

Being interested in theoretical generalizations, I have set up my explanatory scheme in terms of an explanandum and certain propositions and descriptive statements that are supposed to provide a basis for constructing the explanans. (The explanans itself is, as yet, far from being complete.) The phenomenon to be explained is the long-term trend in interpersonal violence, the U-shaped pattern documented in the work of Gurr, Eisner, and others. The core ideas for developing an explanation I have found in the work of Norbert Elias and Emile Durkheim.

2. Concepts and Propositions: Building Blocks for Constructing a Theoretical Model
2.1. Elias's Theory of Civilization
According to Elias, the major pacifying forces that have been unfolding in the long extended civilizing process (or processes) are the following (this is only a brief reminder): (1) The creation of the state monopoly on violence, its subsequent legitimation in the processes of democratization, and its constriction by the rule of law. Anticipating my later references to Durkheim, I should like to add a fourth component or stage in the process of state and

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Harris et al. (2002) calculated that at the end of the 1990s the U.S. homicide rate would have been three times higher had no progress been made in medical services and equipment since the 1960s.

2 The major exceptions among the Western countries with respect to the U-shaped-curve are Finland, and the United States. On Finland (and its unique national history) see Ylikangas (1998). With respect to the United States, one first has to note that this nation came into existence as a modern state, a fully-fledged democracy. Second, there has never been a state monopoly of violence

in the sense that this monopoly became established within European states. Third, the United States has experienced the biggest waves of immigration and most enduring ethnic conflicts among the Western states, and ethnic conflicts tend to come in cycles. The cyclical pattern that is to be observed in American homicide rates (Gurr 1989) may be amplified by the comparatively low level of social security benefits granted by the state and the high level of economic inequality and social marginalization; both leave ordinary people highly exposed to the tide of economic ups and downs.

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nation-building: increasing social inclusion, the balancing of freedom and equality within the institutional framework of the welfare state (in short, "social democracy"). (2) The extension of the market economy implying the elongation of action chains and increasing functional interdependencies between individual and collective actors. More people are impelled to plan and strive for distant goals and places. (3) The promulgation of a culture of non-violence, an increasing condemnation of and even revulsion at the infliction of serious bodily harm including corporal punishment. (4) Finally, the transformation of personality structures in the direction of a greater capacity for affect control. Apart from the state and the market, other agencies of formal and informal social control and generalized discipline have contributed to this – like school and factories and, not least, the processes of (religious) "confessionalization." Other scholars (like Weber, Oestreich, and Foucault) who have analyzed various disciplinary forces shaping modern cultures readily come to mind, but I will not consider specific contributions made along these lines.

Elias has shown all of these processes to be closely interrelated in a way that I will not draw out here. They are more or less cumulative and sufficiently continuous as to fit into a trend pattern that can be imagined to be inversely related to the secular decline of homicide rates. I do see some problems in Elias's heavily Freudian conception of affect control (Thome 1995), but will not take up this point in the present discussion. Later on (in section 2.3), a revised concept of self-control will be proposed.

There are several routes through which the evolving structures of a centralized and democratic state have promoted the gradual reduction of criminal violence.[3] The decisive point has been and still seems to be that the monopoly on violence becomes embedded within an institutional framework that integrates effectiveness and legitimacy, making one dependent upon the other. Given that this has happened in Europe (step by step, unevenly, and with retrograde movements), what are we to make of this hypothesis

when we turn to the increase of violent crime since the 1950s or 1960s? To maintain consistency in our reasoning three routes are open. The first one would be to argue that the legitimized and effective state monopoly on violence has been eroding for quite a while. If the development of the state's monopoly on violence and its subsequent "domestication" within liberal democratic systems has been and still is a major factor in bringing about *decreasing* rates of interpersonal violence, one should expect an *increase* of such violence if this monopoly is weakening or crumbling without being supplanted by functionally equivalent forces. The other alternative would be to demonstrate that the monopoly on violence has not been weakened significantly, but that other factors have come forward to push up crime rates. Finally, a third alternative – favored here – would be to consider both, an erosion of the monopoly of violence and some additional factors, as the driving forces behind the trend reversal.

Several scholars have argued in favor of the erosion hypothesis. They have presented a number of indicators that support the hypothesis that the institutional nexus in which the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the state monopoly on violence were closely intertwined has started to erode and will continue to do so. The German sociologist Trutz von Trotha, for example, speaks of an "oligarchic-preventive order of security" (OPOS) which, in his view, has been emerging in Western democracies during recent decades (von Trotha 1995). It is characterized, among other things, by the remarkable growth of private security industries and services (DeWaard 1999), moves towards privatization of prisons, and the promulgation of community control orders. He notes that the newly emerging security system is without a "center"; that the responsibility of the agents of political and administrative power has, at least partially, been replaced by the purchasing power of clients in security markets and this transforms the structures of economic inequality into the social inequality of differentially available security. This "commodification" of security normalizes the use of violence, which then progressively

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3 I am not dealing with the state's potential for starting a war against other nations or misusing its powers in domestic affairs. This would make for another explanandum than the one chosen here.

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penetrates into the web of social relationships (von Trotha 1995, 157–59; for further arguments see, e.g., Garland 1996; Gallagher 1995). "No-go-areas" outside the reach or continuous attention of (regular) police forces have been expanding. A "culture of violent self-help" (von Trotha) is re-emerging; the taboo on violence is losing ground among an increasing number of individuals and social groups (Eckert et al. 1989). In many European states people's trust in governmental institutions has been in decline for quite a while (see, e.g., Inglehart 1997; Putnam 2000, 2001).

One should also note that discussions about a general "legitimation crisis" (Habermas 1973) and the dissolution of the functional prerogatives of the state (Luhmann 1981) have been with us for quite a while, not just since the 1990s. In a more recent book, Gary LaFree (1998) links the rising crime rates in the United States since the 1960s to a wide variety of indicators of diminished legitimacy of social, political, and economic institutions. The protest movements that called into question the legitimacy of "the system" in the 1960s were primarily politically and morally motivated (e.g., civil rights and the Vietnam war in the United States, and in Germany the younger generation's insistence on discussing responsibility for the terror of the Nazi era). A second, perhaps even more powerful, and still unfolding discussion about the delegitimation and diminishing regulative power of the state has been set in motion by various technological innovations and economic developments now summarized under such headings like "the information age" and "globalization" (see below). In these processes a positive feedback system seems to have established itself in which diminishing control capacities of the nation-state undermine its legitimacy and subsequently further diminish its regulatory powers (Castells 1997; van Creveld 1999). In particular, globalizing free market economies have undermined the state's monopoly of taxation upon which – to recall Elias – the monopoly on violence and other regulatory capacities had been founded. (We will return to this point in our discussion of Durkheim's ideas.) On a more concrete level of analysis, one would have to talk about the internationalization of organized crime and about technological developments in weaponry and worldwide electronic communication that have put certain types of criminals into a rather advantageous position over against the state. As a consequence, the state increasingly finds itself in a dilemma whereby it either has to let go or apply "big brother" strategies outside the previously legitimate boundaries (e. g., the extensive installation of CCTV surveillance systems, particularly in Great Britain, and other technologies of collecting and using previously non-accessible data on suspects and non-suspects).

Before taking up the second major element in Elias's theory of civilization processes, i.e., affect- or self-control (section 2.3), I will continue on the macro-level by bringing in some of the major concepts found in Durkheim's work.

2.2. Durkheim: Structural Evolution and Social Pathologies

Some forty years before Elias wrote his now celebrated book on the processes of civilization, Durkheim suggested that "with the progress of civilization homicide decreases" (Durkheim 1992, 113). He saw the reason for this in the demystification of the collectivity and its devaluation relative to the "worshipping" of the individual. "Collectivism" he construed as an integrative pattern in which the group – the family, the clan, the caste, a religious or ethnic community, the nation – was valued more, much more, than the individual and his or her well-being. The collectivity takes on the quality of a sacred being demanding harsh reactions against those who step out of line, thereby creating a culture of violence. High levels of passion and low respect for the individual render the individual more likely to become the object of physical attacks by others. The major organizing principles that foster violence are "honor" and "hierarchy." The importance of honor (and its counterpart, defamation) has been widely recognized in the literature (e.g., Spierenburg 1998), and I have nothing to add to it in the present paper. With respect to hierarchy (cf. Roth 2001, 47), I should like to emphasize the following aspect. If the group counts more than the individual, there are typically particular individuals that are closer to the gods than the masses; there are leaders and followers, masters and servants, insiders and outsiders. In other words, there is rigid stratification, and the members of various strata differ in the amount of honor, respect, and general worth granted to them. These differences seem to have a criminogenic effect on their own. Eisner, in analyzing data provided by Ruggiero on violent offenders in early Renaissance Venice, notes that "upper-class people seemingly victimized people of lower standing more often than vice

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versa, which…contrasts strikingly with modern patterns. Nobles, it appears, did not scruple to assault, rape, or kill people of lower standing" (Eisner 2003a, 116). It would be interesting to consider whether there has been a return of hierarchy in (post-)modern "winner-take-all" societies (Frank and Cook 1995), and with it the return of certain routines of adoration and defamation on which the mass media thrive.[4]

Traditional collectivism had to break down in the course of increasing social differentiation. The individual now is no longer tied into a closely knit mesh of norms, symbols, and rituals that define his or her own identity in terms of belonging to the collectivity. The fusion of personal and collective identities dissolves. Violations of social norms that occur somewhere in the group are no longer of immediate personal concern. The individual's social standing and reputation are no longer defined by a code of honor that, for example, makes blood revenge obligatory. The expression of identities becomes less body-centered (this trend may also have been reversed recently); violence that injures, mutilates, or kills another person becomes repugnant, abominable. There is a "collective conscience" even in individualized societies, but the highest-ranking value in it is the individual "in general" as Durkheim emphasizes; not just the individual "self" but also the individual "other." And such a system implies a lower level of passion and stronger control of emotions. The reason why passions are lower or more constrained in individualist cultures seems to be that the person who violates the norms (and is to be punished for that) is, so to speak, an incarnation of the very object which is now being worshipped, i.e., the individual in general (Durkheim 1978). This seems to be reminiscent of Elias, but note the shift in perspective: large-scale pacification is effected not by disciplinary forces holding down individual impulses but by freeing the individual from the closely knit bonds that kept him tied to the collectivity. Restructured agents of social control and moral guidance, particularly the (nuclear) family, the school, and professional organizations, however, remain important for providing the moral underpinnings of social life in modern societies. Durkheim believes, however, that it is not so much the rise of individualism but rather the erosion of collectivism that directly causes the reduction in the number of homicides (Durkheim 1992, 115).

There is some empirical evidence from cross-national studies indicating that there is a positive correlation between the degree of collectivism and the level of interpersonal violence in a society (Karstedt 2001). One problem with testing this proposition is that the erosion of collectivism and the formation of the state generally have co-evolved, more or less (at least in Europe), throughout history so that the pacifying effect of one of these processes can hardly be disentangled from the effect of the other. A strategy for circumventing this problem is the study of cross-sectional units that differ with respect to collectivism but stand equally under the jurisdiction of the same state. Following this strategy I have utilized data on more than five hundred urban and rural counties in Prussia at the end of the nineteenth century and treated birthrates as an empirical indicator of the degree of collectivism vs. individualism prevalent in a county. In a multivariate analysis it was shown that birthrate was by far the most powerful predictor of violent crime (serious assault and battery) controlling for various indicators of economic development, demographic and ethnic composition, degree of urbanization, and dominant religious confession. Another noteworthy result that emerged from these analyses is the following: Though violent crime (severe bodily harm) was generally rising between 1880 and 1900 the rates in highly urbanized areas remained generally below the rates in rural counties by a margin of about 20 percent (though not equally in all regions) (Thome 2002; parts of the analysis are also presented in Thome 2001). This is important to note, because it demonstrates the necessity to distinguish between (anomic) developmental and structural effects. Rapid change may, for some time, bring about higher crime rates even though the emerging social structure may be less criminogenic than the old one.

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4 Baumeister et al. (1996) review some of the psychological literature confirming the violent implications arising from claims of superiority. For the connection between sharpened economic competition and the "renaturalization" of inequality resulting in differential claims of moral worth, i.e. superiority, see Bauman (1990), Young (1958); see also footnote 7 below.

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If we are prepared to accept Durkheim's hypothesis on the effects of collectivism, an even more formidable problem seems to arise. If the erosion of collectivism is said to explain the long decline of violence, how do we account for the rise of illegal violence in the second half of the twentieth century – a period that has brought us even more individualism? Does this observation not falsify our (Durkheim's) hypothesis? I will try to answer this objection by specifying the concept of individualism along the lines Durkheim proposed. The answer will be that only a specific type of individualism protects against violence or, rather, preserves the pacifying consequences of the eclipse of collectivism. Figure 1 presents the two analytical dimensions on which Durkheim's typology of "normal" and "pathological" states of society rests (Hynes 1975; Besnard 1993):

Figure 1: Durkheim's analytical scheme

indicates density

The horizontal axis represents the dimension of cultural and structural evolution from collectivism to individualism, from mechanical to organic solidarity, or from a seg-

mentally differentiated and hierarchically stratified society to a functionally differentiated society, as we would put it today. Durkheim's major concern here is with integration, viz. coordination. The slanting vertical axis represents a more actor-oriented analytic dimension, i.e. "regulation,"[5] which is foremost the domain of the state or the political subsystem including secondary groups and public discourse. If regulation optimally fits in with the possibilities and restrictions given by the structural elements inherent to "modern" societies (with – primarily – functional instead of segmentary differentiation), then Durkheim's ideal type of "cooperative" or "moral" individualism should be realized.

Particularly in *Suicide* (1951), Durkheim was concerned with two major "pathologies" that he thought would threaten the future course of societal development: one would be "anomie" (a lack or breakdown of regulation), the other "excessive" or "egoistic" individualism. The analytical scheme provides for a third pathology: over-regulation, which in Durkheim's terminology figures as "fatalism" (perhaps a misleading term, since it connotes subjective reactions rather than the normative arrangements and material conditions that might cause them). Here, severe restrictions imposed on the autonomy of the individual run counter to the opportunities provided by the degree of social differentiation and economic productivity reached within the given society. Durkheim downplayed the role of this particular pathology, but I think that there are good reasons to include it in our heuristic scheme. So let me briefly characterize each of the four social types, first the allegedly "normal" type.

2.2.1. Moral or Cooperative Individualism

I have already characterized this type in terms of its cultural orientation. It refers to a broad consensus according to which the individual is more valued than the group. But it is not the particularized – egoistic – individual that is addressed here, but rather a universalistic conception, the individual "in general." As a philosophical perspective, Durkheim's moral individualism comes close to contem-

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5 The axis is slanting to indicate some measure of correlation both between anomie and egoistic individualism and, on the other side, between fatalism and collectivism.

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porary communitarianism (however with a completely different conception of the state). As a social praxis, moral individualism is based on mutual sympathy and respect for others – any other person; it seeks to increase social inclusion and it postulates the right of self-actualization for all.

On the socio-structural and political plane this type seeks to secure justice and to balance personal freedom and equality, mainly by combining social welfare provisions and parliamentary democracy. Durkheim insists on the functional primacy of the state over the economy, which he saw as immanently amoral. On the other hand, he clearly considered it necessary to counterbalance the power of the state by strong secondary social groups – thereby anticipating what political scientists and sociologists have later conceptualized as various forms of "corporatism" (e.g., Siaroff 1999; Kenworthy 2002, Hall, and Gingerich 2004). Measures of decommodification and corporatism have also been used in criminological research, e.g., by Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) and Pampel and Gartner (1995).

When evaluating the trend concerning the development of cooperative individualism, one may also look at indicators discussed in the literature on "social capital," like membership in voluntary associations or generalized social trust (Putnam 2000, 2001; Pharr and Putnam 2000). Participation rates in national elections (after partialling out event-specific effects) might also be a useful indicator of shifting weights between cooperative versus egoistic individualism. Cooperative individualism implies a principled readiness to invest in collective goods (like having a democratic government) even without calculable individual payoffs (resulting from one's own investment) or losses (resulting from making no personal investments). The "collective good" dilemma involved in voting, e.g., is overcome by individuals who feel a moral obligation (responsibility) to vote, whereas from a purely instrumentalist perspective voting is simply irrational. Shifting membership rates among different types of associations might be evaluated

in terms of implied contributions they make for collective goods versus individual payoffs.

2.2.2. Egoistic (Excessive) Individualism

On the cultural plane, this is the reversion of the defining characteristics of moral individualism: particularism instead of universalism; hedonistic self-fulfillment instead of social solidarity; ruthless pursuit of one's own interests while using others as a mere "means" in strategic interactions. In the tradition of the Frankfurt School of social thought, it is the triumph of "instrumentalism" or, in Habermas's terms, the dominance of strategic interaction over communicative action seeking mutual understanding and recognition (Habermas 1981).[6] With regard to social structure and politics it implies the functional primacy of the economy and the expansion of market competition into other realms of social life, the diminution (if not dismantling) of welfare state provisions, the recommodification of social relationships, and the strengthening of forces that advance social marginalization and exclusion. Tocqueville already warned that materialism and egoism triggered by too much competition would threaten the moral base for political democracy. Durkheim himself, in his book on suicide, did not interpret egoistic individualism as a force that would promote violence; he saw it only as an aggravating condition with respect to suicide. I have argued elsewhere that his reasoning is not convincing on this point (Thome 2004).[7]

As for Durkheim, the role of the state is crucial for safeguarding moral individualism against egoistic individualism. He conceives the state as being "the organ of moral discipline" (Durkheim 1992, 72, 69), but he also sees it as the champion of individualism. Without the state the individual could not have been set free from his primordial bonds, without the state there would be no power to protect the individual against the "tyrannical" claims of his group. Durkheim expressly rejects the Hegelian, the socialist, and the utilitarian (liberal) conceptions of the

6 Gary LaFree (referring to work done by Steffensmeier) notes that in the United States "the rate of instrumental, felony-related killings (e.g., contract murders) increases substantially during the postwar period (from about 7 percent of all murders in 1960 to about 20 percent in 1990)" (LaFree 1998, 40–41). British data, however, do not reveal such a trend.

7 On the causal connections between a culture of competition, social and economic inequality, and violence see also Hagan et al. (1998), Jacobs and Carmichael (2002), Messner (2004), and Pescosolido and Rubin (2000). Studying data from European surveys conducted in 1969 and repeated in 1990, David Halpern (2001) found evidence for

increasing importance attached to "self-interest." He also found a rather strong positive relationship between aggregated self-interest and national victimization rates, particularly when combined with relatively high levels of social inequality.

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state. What he had in mind was a democratic state whose power had to be limited by strong secondary groups and free social associations that would mediate between the individual and the state. The state, however, should have adequate regulatory power to implement the measures necessary for securing sufficient degrees of justice, equity, and equality – which Durkheim considered to be the structural precondition without which moral individualism could not prevail.

The processes of globalization that were set in motion by the dismantling of the Bretton Woods agreement in the early 1970s followed by the liberalization of financial capital markets in the 1980s and further accelerated by the collapse of the Soviet Union have gradually undermined the role and legitimacy of the nation-state, in particular its regulative power regarding the economy. Nation-states, even within the European Union, have come to compete with each other in providing the most favorable conditions for attracting economic investments. The average tax rate on corporate profits in twenty-one OECD countries fell from about 50 percent in the mid-1980s to 32 percent in 2003 (Ganghof 2005). At the same time the low-income sector has been expanding broadly. In this process the secular trend towards more equality has been reversed: inequality in income and assets has been rising in almost all OECD countries since the mid- or late 1970s (Smeeding 2002). Despite continuous economic growth (in terms of real GDP), large segments of the populations have actually suffered from falling real incomes, which has increased the number of people forced into or threatened by social marginalization and exclusion. Apart from measures that capture inequality, poverty, and the generosity of public welfare provisions (for the latter see Scruggs 2005; Scruggs and Allan 2006), further indicators that one may want to consider in this context are, for example, the number of insolvencies of firms and private households (severity of competition), the volume of consumer credit in relation to income (indicative of the prevalence of economic aspirations), the volume of advertising and sponsoring activities (competition and expanding commercialization), the share of individually paid fees for using public services

and facilities relative to public funding (downgrading the role of the citizen – and the public good – relative to that of the consumer and the private good), and the number of people who never have children and the number of children who live with one parent only (reduced weight of institutions outside the economy).

2.2.3. Anomie or Lack of Regulation

Durkheim propounded (but did not systematically elaborate) different versions of the concept of "anomie" that, due to space limitations, cannot be discussed here in any detail (see Thome 2003). In my understanding Durkheim considers three major subtypes of anomie in *The Division of Labor in Society* (Durkheim 1933). One is a lack of coordination or a functional imbalance between different societal subsystems (like the economy and education); another is the discrepancy between diverse role requirements on one side and the actors' need for self-actualization. The third has become the most prominent one in the literature: anomie as a lack of cognitive and normative orientation making conformity to moral and legal rules less likely. These tendencies are most prominent in times of rapid social and economic change so that we may speak of a *developmental* or process-induced variant of anomie. But in *Suicide* (1951) Durkheim also envisioned the possibility of "chronic" anomie induced by the internal dynamics of an economy that is bound to defy moral and political constrictions, i.e., a *structural* type of anomie. Witnessing the first round of economic globalization in modern times he observes: "Ultimately, this liberation of desires has been made worse by the very development of industry and the almost infinite extension of the market. (…) Now that he [the producer, H.T.] may assume to have almost the entire world as his customer, how could passions accept their former confinement in the face of such limitless prospects?" (Durkheim 1951, 255 et seq.).

On this point, the pathologies of egoistic individualism and structurally rather than developmentally induced anomie collapse into one category that we might label as *disintegrative* individualism.[8] Under the structural conditions of chronic anomie "excessive individualism"

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8 Though Durkheim, in his book on Suicide, concedes that "anomic" and "egoistic" suicide might empirically merge, he insists on keeping

both types analytically distinct. In the literature there have been lively debates on the feasibility and

validity of this distinction, see, e.g., Hynes (1975) or Johnson (1965).

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loses its character as a temporary or minor deviation from the "normal" type of moral or cooperative individualism; instead it becomes an evolutionary type of its own (not explicated by Durkheim himself). There is considerable conceptual overlap between "disintegrative individualism" (conceived in this way) and Merton's structural anomie or Messner and Rosenfeld's institutional anomie theory (Messner and Rosenfeld 2000). This, however, needs to be worked out in detail in another paper.[9]

One major idea underlying Durkheim's *developmental* variant of anomie, however, remains important in my heuristic scheme designed to account for the rise of violent crime between 1950 and the late 1970s: rapid social change – in whatever direction – is likely to produce anomie, i.e. high levels of "normlessness." Though Durkheim, again, did not clearly specify the mechanisms through which this happens, two routes are suggested: (1) Previous regulations (norms) become obsolete, counter-productive, or inconsistent, whereas the emergence of more adequate new regulations lags behind the dynamic development of productive forces and structural change.[10] (2) Personal aspirations tend to rise beyond the capacity to fulfill them and threaten the individual's sense of personal integrity and having an identity anchored within a social community.

During the 1950s and 1960s the economically prosperous countries (not only in Europe) underwent great social change with unusually high GDP growth rates. For most people in the early 1950s everyday activities concerning social life and human sustenance were still organized primarily on a local level. For example, in Germany at that time 40 percent of the labor force were employed in the traditional sector: farming and small-scale manufacturing, service, and retail trades (Lutz 1984). Even the majority

of those who worked in the industrial sector were closely and primarily integrated into local milieus. Most people possessed no car, had no telephone, and had no television available in their own household. Only a minority of people had access to more than eight years of school education. All this changed rapidly within ten or fifteen years. If the developmental variant of the anomie concept has any validity it should be a major factor in accounting for the take-off phase in rising rates of violent crime since the 1950s. But unlike developments toward the end of the nineteenth century (as indicated above), the changes initiated in the 1950s ultimately paved the way for a more, not less, criminogenic social and cultural structure. It must be admitted, however, that there is an ad hoc element in the explanatory scheme I am proposing, since there is convincing evidence that cooperative individualism was actually strengthened during the early phase of these developmental changes, not least by expanding welfare state provisions and by transforming family structures to become less hierarchic (i.e. less "collectivistic"). Unfortunately we do not have the means to clearly calculate and quantify the respective effects of these contradictory factors.

As already indicated, chronic anomie or disintegrative individualism refers to a cultural and social system whose internal structural dynamics imply a persistently high tempo of social change in the direction of undermining the characteristic features of cooperative individualism. Technological and organizational changes within the realm of mass communication via television, internet, mobile phones, and video have become a decisive force in this process. Here again, we can draw upon Durkheim's ideas about anomie by generalizing his notion of "aspirations" becoming unlimited or unfettered. The modern technologies of communication have greatly enhanced the possibili-

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9 Much of what has been said by Polanyi (1944), Hirsch (1976), and Frank and Cook (1995) is also pertinent in this context.

10 The significance of such processes becomes obvious when we consider one of the major functions social norms perform: giving certitude and stability to expectations that govern the daily interchanges among people (Luhmann 1969). The crucial point here is that expectations based on norms (unlike "cognitive" expectations) can be maintained even when they have not been met; the fault, in this case,

is not attributed to the expectation but to those who have not conformed to it. This mechanism, however, breaks down when falsifications are mounting: incertitude replaces certitude. Transmitting norms from one generation to another is the major route towards internalization. Unrestricted (and time-consuming) "discourse" among equals may be considered to be an important method for resolving moral conflict or dilemmas on the basis of universally held moral principles (Habermas 1981). Rapid social change is detrimental to both of them. For example, normative traditions provide no

solutions for the moral dilemmas posed by recent advances in genetics, biotechnology, and medicine. The options these open up expand faster than the capacity to define or apply the criteria for choosing among them and creating a social consensus that would support them. Consequently, moral questions are being transformed into economic and political questions, thus strengthening the impetus towards instrumentalist thinking.

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ties to open up diverse avenues of *"Entgrenzung"*: a general-ized tendency or momentum towards lifting, tearing down, or dissolving boundaries wherever they are encountered, the transgression of symbolic demarcation lines, and the conflation or blurring of semantic meanings, the philoso-phy of "everything goes." Two instances or subdimensions of *Entgrenzung* seem to be particularly important.

The first is the blending or fusion of the private and the public sphere (Sennett 1977). Just think of certain shows on television, the gossip in the newspapers and magazines, and, not least, the increasing availability of personal data to commerce and state agencies. The distinctness of the private and the public sphere, however, is constitutive for our personal integrity and dignity, and it is a prerequisite for the integration of society. Functionally differentiated societies secure their integration chiefly by roles, not by persons. When personal affairs overshadow performance of a role the functioning of the system is impaired – con-sider the detrimental effects that were inflicted on the U.S. administration by the mass media's revelations about President Clinton's sex life. The routinized exhibitionism that figures so prominently in TV programs and tabloid newspapers tends to reduce people's sensitivity and make them less attentive to other people's vulnerability. With re-spect to crime, it also has a more direct effect by reducing the preventive effect of nescience ("Präventivwirkung des Nicht-Wissens"), a phrase coined by the German sociolo-gist Heinrich Popitz (1968) who observed that compliance with social norms is greatly facilitated by widespread igno-rance (or at least the pretense of it) about deviant behavior by others.

A second subdimension of *Entgrenzung* is given by the blurring or blotting out of distinctions constituting the symbolic order of meaning, e.g., the distinction between the "profane" and the "sacred," between truth and false-hood, real and imagined worlds, or, on another plane, the "destructuring" of the distinction between the lifeworld of children and the lifeworld of adults. Driving forces behind these processes are the marketing and advertis-

ing business. Another arena where the symbolic order of meaning becomes increasingly tenuous is the field of genetics, biotechnology, and medicine (already referred to in footnote 10) where research seems to have opened up nearly unlimited possibilities of shaping – and perhaps copying – the human body (or parts of it) and manipulat-ing the chemistry of the human brain. This threatens to undermine the foundations on which any system of mo-rality has to rest: the distinction between what is given by nature or divine providence and what is left to the respon-sibility of human beings making their own decisions and being accountable for them.[11]

It is no easy task to find meaningful quantitative indicators of the varied phenomena of *Entgrenzung* over time. Re-search on the changing content and consumption patterns of mass media and the use of modern information tech-nologies (internet, etc.) might provide valuable data. The increasing intrusion of advertisements and product place-ment into TV programs and internet platforms, the growth of "infotainment," and the expanding business of "event management" (i.e., the art of inventing techniques and practices which generalize the principle that "the medium becomes the message") might be indicative of the blending of previously distinct symbolic universes. The sky-rocket-ing salaries of business managers and investment bankers that have severed any ties with discernible achievements and performances, the volatility of stock market indices, and the rising discrepancies between share value and real assets of a firm may all be indicative of the progressive blending of the "real" and the "imagined." With respect to encroachments on privacy, the installation of video cam-eras in public places and buildings, and the sales volumes of various devices for collecting personal data (of consum-ers and clients, for example) are all trackable over time.

2.2.4. Over-regulation: Regressive Collectivism
Durkheim's concept of "fatalism" (in his book on *Suicide*) refers to suppressive conditions and norms that make life unbearable to a person, thereby pushing them to-wards committing suicide. In a way, I would like to turn

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11 Consider, for example, Charles Taylor's observa-tion that making strong valuations, as in moral commitments, presupposes that something is be-yond our reach, beyond our capacities (Taylor 1989).

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Durkheim's concept upside down. Rather than concentrating on a purely subjective response to a dreadful situation brought about by suppressive means of regulation, we can think of "over-regulation" as a desired state of affairs that is seen as a remedy to another dreadful condition caused by the lack of regulation or expanding disintegrative individualism. This orientation, though arising within modern societies, refers back to traditional social forms incorporating collectivistic orientations. To set it apart from "traditional" collectivism we may speak of "regressive" collectivism. This orientation manifests itself in all forms of xenophobia, intolerance towards those who think differently, contempt for democratic principles and procedures, and attempts at defining certain people or groups as being inferior by nature thereby emphasizing hierarchy and leadership over against equity and participation. Large collections of survey data provide useful information on these issues.

2.2.5 The "Normalcy" of Crime

Durkheim considered crime to be a "normal," even necessary, social fact in all societies. The "normal" level of crime was to be inferred from some type- and phase-specific average: "A social fact is normal, in relation to a given social type at a given phase of its development, when it is present in the average society of that species at the corresponding phase of its evolution" (Durkheim 1938, 64). Even though we may find somewhat lacking his "rules for the classification of social types" (Durkheim 1938, chapter 4) and his suggestions as to how to calculate averages and deviations that would qualify as being "pathological" (ibid., 55), I still find Durkheim's conception helpful for at least two reasons. First, it draws our attention to the possibility that a crime rate might be too low. Durkheim believed that a certain level of crime was needed to keep open or clear the way for social creativity and innovation (modern type totalitarian regimes have amply demonstrated what this might possibly mean). Second, it opens up a historical perspective: what is normal depends on the given type of society, the evolutionary path it has followed, the basic principles and mechanisms that organize social life, economic productions and transactions, and the symbolic patterns of meaning. Different levels of crime may thus reflect "modes" rather than "degrees" of social integration. Collectivistic societies have a range of normal crime that differs from that which applies to individualized societies;

and when the balance shifts from cooperative to egoistic or disintegrative individualism the normal rate changes again. Even though we may not be able to define levels of normality for a single case we may still be able to predict changes when we move across time or between societies. The increasing convergence of crime rates among advanced nations, the uniformity of the trend pattern noted above, suggests that all these societies have been shaped by the same fundamental evolutionary processes (beyond all the context-specific trajectories and regional particularities that need to be recognized as well). In a historical perspective, lower crime rates do not necessarily indicate better or more integrated societies but may point to differing modes of integration and "structuration."

2.3. Macro-Micro Linkages: The Role of Self-control

Though crime rates are characteristics of groups or regions, they are nothing but standardized aggregates of classified individual behavior. So it would be useful to specify the intervening variables that transform structures (as considered above) into individual actions. When looking at various approaches in the theory of crime one encounters at least a dozen of them, middle-range theories each specifying bundles of variables thought to be conducive to crime in general or to criminal violence in particular – for example, differential social learning theory, social disorganization theory, theories of subculture, strain theories, control theories, opportunity theory. Decades of research have passed by, thousands of articles and books have been written, but no single unified theory has emerged (though some authors have claimed that they had accomplished just this). Many of these different approaches do not really compete with each other but simply focus on different subsets of variables that prove relevant on different occasions. A multitude of possible linkages connecting macro-structures and criminal behavior could thus be constructed. Before getting lost in such an exercise it might be more feasible to be selective and adhere to the principle of parsimony. Most approaches to analyzing violent crime look at it as resulting from some kind of deficiency. For example, the actor has insufficient command over or access to legitimate means for obtaining commonly sought or accepted goods to which he aspires. (Highly competitive cultures and high degrees of inequality tend to open up this gap for a large number of persons). Or the actor is situated within

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a social environment that exerts little control upon him, or he belongs to a subculture insufficiently integrated into society. Or the actor himself has insufficient control over impulses impelling him to commit deviant acts including physical aggression. He may not get the recognition and respect that he would need to acquire or maintain a sufficient degree of self-assurance or self-respect because he is discriminated against or because he does not have the instrumental or expressive capacities for being well received by others. Again, high competitiveness and exclusivistic solidarities nourished by regressive collectivism may render such experiences more likely.

In their *General Theory of Crime,* Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) declared, in a way reminiscent of Elias, lack of self-control to be the key variable making all sorts of criminal acts more likely to occur. Their argument, however, is somewhat simplistic: crime doesn't pay, they say, therefore criminal behavior is irrational. As Gary Becker (1968) and others (e.g., Freeman 1995, Morselli and Tremblay 2004) have shown, however, many criminal acts do have a sizable payoff or, at least, can be expected to have one. Therefore, they do not generally result from a lack of self-control as construed by Gottfredson and Hirschi. But numerous studies and meta-analyses (cf. Pratt and Cullen 2000) have demonstrated that lack of self-control is indeed a relevant proximate cause of criminal behavior.

The concept of self-control should however be expanded in the direction of a more sociological concept of "agency." Drawing upon a similar idea put forward by Manuel Eisner (1997) I propose a three-dimensional concept. The *first* dimension would, indeed, take up the idea of affect control: the capacity to control one's impulses and emotions without suppressing them, allowing the person to express his or her feelings while taking into account the normative requirements encountered in a given situation. This might be called *expressive competence.* The *second* component would be of a strategic nature: the capacity to use one's personal abilities and the opportunities offered by the situation to obtain one's goals, including the capacity to evaluate immediately available rewards in their consequences for long-term objectives: this we might call strategic or *instrumental competence.* The *third* component refers to moral consciousness, the capacity and the willingness

to balance one's personal interest against those of others while taking into account given social norms and, on a higher level of competence, universal principles as well (principles that might contravene group-based norms). This involves the capacity for "role taking" (as sociologists like to call it) or " sympathetic empathy" (as psychologists put it). We might refer to this as normative or *moral competence* that comprises a motivational and a cognitive component which, however, might be less congruously related to each other than Kohlberg has postulated (Nunner-Winkler 2004).

This multi-dimensional concept goes beyond Elias's or Gottfredson and Hirschi's dichotomy by shifting our attention to the individual's capacity to integrate several functional requirements: identities must be expressed, long-range personal interests must be pursued, non-exclusivistic solidarities must be preserved, and none of these at the cost of neglecting the other. To the extent that this capacity is lacking vis-à-vis the restrictions and opportunities offered in a given situation, the probability rises that the individual will resort to criminal activities, including the use of illegal violence. Durkheim's pathological types (excessive individualism, anomie, and oppressive over-regulation) refer to structural conditions that, in a given population, impede the development of sufficient measures of (integrative) self-control among a relevant number of persons. I have indicated some of these linkages in previous sections. For example, rapid social change and the decay of symbolic structures of meaning (i.e., "anomie") undermine communicative processes needed to build up moral competence. Likewise, the erosion of cooperative individualism by increased competition and re-commodification of social relationships may de-emphasize normative considerations in favor of instrumental rationality. And if the future becomes increasingly uncertain, e.g., in terms of employment or return on investments, delayed gratification becomes less plausible. Consequently, strong internalized control structures are less likely to develop.

2.4. Summary: The Core Hypotheses Incorporated in the Heuristic Scheme
The major components of the explanatory scheme presented here can be summed up in the following way:
(1) The (trans-)secular decline in interpersonal violence (homicide rates) that took place between ca. 1500 and

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1950 is mainly due to (a) the processes of nation-building that established a monopoly on violence held by the state that became gradually domesticated by law, legitimized by democratic participation, and supported by evolving social welfare systems; (b) structural and cultural changes (from segmental to functional differentiation) that moved modernizing societies away from "collectivistic" to predominantly "individualistic" orientations and institutional arrangements.

(2a) The institutional nexus in which the effectiveness and legitimacy of the state's monopoly on violence mutually supported each other has been eroding in post-industrial societies in the second half of the twentieth century.

(2b) The opportunity structure and the motivation for illegal uses of violence have been enhanced in these processes.

(3a) The pacifying effect of the erosion of traditional collectivism can only be maintained to the extent by which cooperative individualism dominates over against the forces of egoistic viz. disintegrative individualism.

(3b) Since the mid-1970s free-market post-industrial societies have been evolving in the direction of strengthening the elements of egoistic individualism and anomie (i.e., disintegrative individualism) which in turn also stimulate, at least temporarily, the growth of regressive collectivism.

(4) The take-off phase in rising levels of violent crime was set in motion by rapid and particularly incisive social changes taking place in the 1950s and 1960s (developmental anomie).

(5a) The lower the capacity for integrative self-control the higher the propensity to engage in deviant behavior including violent crime.

(5b) In postindustrial societies there is a widening gap between the quality of self-control demanded from the individual person and the average level of self-control actually obtained.

3. Some Methodological Problems

All these hypotheses, to be sure, bear the marks of speculative thinking. Now I will consider some of the methodological problems that come up when we try to apply and test the propositions just presented.

The hypotheses that make up the explanatory scheme outlined above introduce several key concepts that need to be measured somehow. That is, one needs to establish observ-

able indicators that are either correlationally or analytically related to such concepts as legitimacy, anomie, or instrumentalism. In previous sections I have offered some suggestions regarding such indicators, but all of them are open to debate. For example: How do we measure whether or to what extent there has been an erosion of the state's monopoly of violence? Are clearance rates a valid indicator for its effectiveness? (Probably not in the short run, but possibly in the long run). These problems are not unique to the approach I am recommending here; they are common to any approach trying to relate macro-social structures to rates of crime or other types of problem behavior in a cross-sectional or cross-temporal perspective (e.g., Eisner 2002; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997, or the overview in Messner 2003). The relationship between (observable) indicators and a nonobservable theoretical construct is (and must be) hypothetical; the burden of proof thus lies with those who want to criticize a specific choice.

In order to illustrate the kind of discussion that might come up on such an occasion let me briefly return to my decision to use birth rates as an indicator of the degree of collectivism vs. individualism present in the culture of a given nation or region in the late nineteenth century (Thome 2001, 2002). Of course, high birth rates do not "mean" high degrees of collectivism, but they may still serve as "correlative" indicators. There are two possibilities here: first, lower birthrates might be a consequence of less collectivism; second, the demographic transition that was taking place in late nineteenth century brought about higher survival rates of children, thus inducing (potential) parents to opt for having fewer children (thereby producing lower birthrates) – which, in turn, raised the value of the individual child, i.e., fostered "individualism" in the sense construed by Durkheim. One objection might be that birthrates correlate with other variables, like demographic, ethnic, religious, or social class composition that compete with "collectivism" in explaining violent crime. This objection can be answered by directly controlling for those competing variables in multivariate statistical analyses (as was done in my aforementioned study). I have made these claims with respect to the end of the nineteenth century when the issue was the erosion of collectivism (as conceived by Durkheim) and the average birth rate was much higher than today. As for the present, one might

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still ponder on the idea of using birth rates as an indicator – this time for assessing the relative weight of cooperative vs. disintegrative individualism.

Provided that sufficiently valid indicators have been provided, how do we establish causal relationships between the structural (economic, social, and cultural) indicators and rates of violent crime? Most of the indicators one might think of have trends that change over time: the gross national product, unemployment or divorce rates, insolvencies, and advertising budgets have been rising, trust in government institutions and membership in certain voluntary associations have been declining. If they were not trending – parallel with or contrary to…crime rates, they could not be valid indicators of potent explanatory variables in the first place. Trending series, however, correlate with each other even without any causal linkage. Causality can be tested only if *stochastic* trends correspond to each other, i. e., if the series are "cointegrated." Cointegration tests can be run only with long time series; fifty measurement points are often not sufficient, a rule of thumb calls for at least one hundred measurements.[12] Note that in my explanatory scheme I search for *level* relationships not just for correlated *change* scores. But the rate of (rapid) change in a structural variable may – as noted before – have an effect that diverges from the long run level effect.

Pooled cross-sectional time series analyses are likely to be the most efficient design for studying long-term relationships between structural indicators and crime rates. They offer better leverage for dealing with measurement problems. In causal analyses, measurement errors may be conceived of as a special type of omitted variables. Omitted variables distort the estimation of impact parameters (like regression coefficients) only to the degree that they co-vary not just with the dependent but also with the independent variables specified in the model. Some of the measurement errors (and other uncontrolled sources of variance in the dependent variable) may systematically confound over-time variance but less so the variances across units – or vice-versa.[13] Besides, fixed-effect models may help to neu-

tralize cross-unit differences in legal provisions, policing, and registration practices.

To develop hypotheses regarding causal linkages between structural indicators and crime rates over time it might be helpful to start with cross-sectional data and *individual* level relationships, particularly if no sufficient time series data are available for the structural variables. For example, if there is a negative relationship between individuals' trust in political or governmental institutions and the probability of committing acts of violent crime (Sampson and Bartusch 1998), it seems reasonable to assume that declining levels of trust (inferred, e.g., from a series of public opinion polls) would contribute to rising levels of violent crime. The problem with this strategy is that the evidence on social and political trust presented in the literature is rather mixed. And this applies to other potentially relevant variables as well. One only needs to look at the literature concerning the consequences of divorce or growing up in a one-parent family.

On the other hand, one has to realize that weak or even insignificant relationships on the individual level do not rule out sizable effects on the aggregate level. For example, if only two out of every one hundred thousand persons newly exposed during the course of a year to violent scenes produced by TV programs, internet platforms, or video games are thereby pushed over their personal probability threshold for committing murder, this might significantly increase the homicide rate in the country. But no experimental setting with, say, two thousand individual subjects will demonstrate any significant effect for a probability difference of $p = 0.000002$.

Many of the structural changes are likely to have contradictory effects upon crime rates. For example: increased female participation in the labor force may lead to decreased guardianship, increased exposure to crime, and less social control of children, all of which would help crime rates to rise. On the other hand, if more women are working, the improved economic conditions may reduce

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12 For an introduction to the statistical model of "cointegration" see, e.g., Hamilton (1994) or Thome (2005); for applications in criminological analyses see Field (1999), Hale (1998).

13 With respect to error-ridden measurements of suicide rates, a study by Pescosolido and Mendelsohn (1986) is instructive here, demonstrating that such errors do not necessarily distort the

impact parameters estimated for various explanatory variables.

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criminal motivations. Fajnzylber et al. (2002, 1328) state the ambiguous effects connected with rising levels of mass education as follows:

> An individual's education level…may impact on the decision to commit a crime through several channels. Higher levels of educational attainment may be associated with higher expected legal earning…Also, education, through its civic component, may increase the individual's moral stance…On the other hand, education may reduce the costs of committing crimes…or may raise the loot from crime…Hence the net effect of education on the individual's decision to commit a crime is, a priori, ambiguous. We can conjecture, however, that if legal economic activities are more skill- or education-intensive than illegal activities, then it is more likely that education induces individuals not to commit crimes.

At any case, the aggregate relationship will reveal the net effect that a unit increase in the level of education (or other "ambiguous" structural variables) will have on the crime rate. For a methodological individualist this may not mean a great deal. But the aggregate effect may still guide his search for moderator variables that would specify which of possibly diverse effects apply to what category of individuals.

This brings up the (in)famous "ecological fallacy" theorem, which is one of the most misrepresented methodological theorems in the social sciences. Often it has been interpreted as implying that regression estimates are always biased if they are based on aggregated data although they are interpreted with reference to individual-level relationships. Indeed, a positive "correlation" between the proportion of black people and the crime rate does not prove that black people commit more crimes than whites. It might well be the case that white people commit more and black people commit less crimes when the proportion of black people in a population increases. If this were the case, the bivariate relationship (with "crime" as the criterion and "race" as the predictor variable) would imply a grossly mis-specified model that excludes additive and multiplicative context ef-

fects. As Lutz Erbring (1989) put it: there is no aggregation bias, but, under specific circumstances, bias aggregation. If the model is correctly specified (with correct functional form and all of the relevant explanatory factors included) the slope coefficients (as causal effect measures) are unbiased no matter what the aggregation level is. (The correlation coefficients, of course, will be larger, but the size of correlation coefficients is irrelevant here).

The sad fact, however, is that often our models are not correctly specified, due to lack of data or false reasoning. But in this case, individual level relationships may occasionally be more deceptive than aggregate level relationships. For example, zero correlation between long-term *individual* unemployment and readiness to commit crimes does not preclude rising unemployment levels causing higher crime rates. Being unemployed may directly stimulate individual motivation to commit criminal acts (as specified, e.g., by a theory of relative deprivation); it may also, as a contextual variable, indicate intensified competition and hence higher levels of criminogenic instrumentalism among the successfully employed. In a bivariate individual-level relationship the direct effect and the contextual effect may cancel each other out; in the aggregate relationship they would accumulate. Another example where an aggregate relationship can be meaningfully interpreted in the absence of an individual-level relationship is provided by David Halpern. In a cross-national analysis he found a significant relationship between "self-interested values" and "social trust" that disappeared when the correlation analysis was performed with individual-level data. Halpern comments: "This is indicative of an ecological effect and does seem to make sense. An individual can be selfish but still independently recognize if those around them are to be trustworthy.[14] But it would be much odder if a society was generally composed of self-interested individuals yet also characterized as high in social trust" (Halpern 2001, 244). So if the number of selfish people increases, both the selfish and the unselfish person become more inclined to be distrustful.

Finally, if a relationship between macro-structural indicators and crime rates has been established, this link is not

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14 More precisely, a selfish person is just as capable as an unselfish person in this respect, H.T.

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invalidated by missing specifications concerning intervening variables that mediate between macro and micro level. As for structural equation modeling, Diekmann (1980) and Tuma and Hannan (1984) have shown that the total effect of exogenous variables can be reliably registered without intervening relationships (as long as the system under study is non-explosive).

4. Concluding Remarks

It is obvious that the hypotheses explicated within the heuristic scheme presented here cannot *in toto* be tested directly in an empirical project. Most of the concepts and propositions need further clarification and specification. But it is hoped that the approach taken here will be helpful in integrating several perspectives in the study of violent crime hitherto left unconnected and often thought to be hopelessly unrelated to each other. In particular, it is hoped that convincing arguments have been offered in favor of conducting macro-level analyses in a historical perspective. A recently completed comparative study of social change and the development of violent crime in Sweden, England/Wales, and Germany from 1950 to 2000 may be relevant here (Thome and Birkel 2007). In this work we further elaborate the explanatory model outlined in the present article and apply it to the interpretation of a large set of empirical data taken from various statistical sources and survey evidence. The results of that study may thus help to evaluate the merits or flaws of the theoretical and methodological assumptions that have been advanced in this paper.

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