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The International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV) is a peer-reviewed periodical for scientific exchange and public dissemination of the latest academic research on conflict and violence. The subjects on which the IJCV concentrates have always been the subject of interest in many different areas of academic life. Consequently, the journal encompasses contributions from a wide range of disciplines including sociology, political science, education, social psychology, criminology, ethnology, history, political philosophy, urban studies, economics, and the study of religions. The IJCV is open-access: All text of the IJCV is subject to the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives License. The IJCV is published twice a year, in spring and in fall. Each issue will focus on one specific topic while also including articles on other issues.

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Editorial

Letter from the Editors

From the outset, one of the aims of this journal has been to encourage and promote research in, from, and about the Global South. So we are especially pleased to present an issue whose contributors span the globe, addressing themes of special relevance to the less developed world.

The focus section on "Collective Memories of Colonial Violence" assembled by Chiara Volpato and Laurent Licata offers profound insights into socio-psychological aspects of the discussion concerning national apologies and compensation for historical wrongs that began decades ago but has become particularly widely and heatedly discussed of late, most notably in the form of the Australian government's apology to the Australian aborigines.

Our open section this time fortuitously links in with both these themes, with two contributions concerning the Horn of Africa—whose Italian colonial past is addressed in the focus section. Gebremariam Woldemicael discusses the relationship between fertility and military conflict in Eritrea, while Bekele Hundie explores intergroup conflicts in Ethiopia.

May 2010

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Introduction:
Collective Memories of Colonial Violence

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Introduction:
Collective Memories of Colonial Violence

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Colonialism, that Loomba calls "the most complex and traumatic relationship in human history" (2005, 8), has left its mark on international relations, social relationships within nations, and the ideologies and imaginaries of virtually all the peoples of the world. Understanding colonialism and its consequences is therefore essential to comprehending the dynamics and conflicts of the contemporary world. This special focus was born out of a desire to bring social psychological studies on colonialism to broader attention.

The collective memories that members of formerly colonized and formerly colonizing countries hold about the colonial times, and particularly about colonial violence, still permeate their current relationships. On the one hand, these memories certainly weigh on diplomatic contacts between formerly colonized countries and their former colonizers, the latter being frequently suspected of pursuing "neo-colonialist" policies. On the other hand, they also undermine intergroup relationships within societies, such as those between indigenous peoples and majority societies in former settlement colonies like Australia, New Zealand, Canada, or the United States, or those in Europe between immigrants from former colonies and their host societies. This violent past also has enduring consequences on former colonized people's identities and wellbeing. The 2001 Durban World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, which gave rise to passionate discussions, recognized the colonial past as one of the main sources of racism, xenophobia, and intolerance towards Africans, Asians and indigenous peoples. The way this violent past is collectively remembered today is therefore a crucial factor for understanding contemporary instances of intergroup conflict, prejudice, stigmatization, and racism. Conversely, collective memories of the colonial times could also be instrumental in promoting intergroup reconciliation,

mutual respect, and mutual recognition in and between contemporary societies.

In spite of this, social psychological studies have long neglected this theme. Theorization and empirical enquiries are scarce, even though many objects of inquiry of social psychological research (interracial or interethnic relations, relations between immigrants and host societies, stereotypes and prejudice) have roots in a colonial past that moulded the representations, ways of thinking, and behaviours of those who lived through it. In addition, even after the decolonization process, this influence continues to permeate the social and cultural identities of the populations formerly involved in the colonial experience, still deeply affecting inter- and intra-group dynamics. By neglecting it, social psychology runs the risk of "naturalizing" the asymmetrical relationships that derive from colonialism.

Let us consider three examples. Image theory proposes a series of out-group images: enemy, ally, colony, degenerate, barbarian, dependent, and imperialist (Alexander, Brewer, and Herrmann 1999; Alexander, Levin, and Henry 2005; Herrmann et al. 1997). The out-group image of interest for our present purpose is "colony" (Herrmann et al. 1997) or "dependent" (Alexander et al. 1999). According to this theory, this image forms in situations in which the out-

group is perceived as weaker than the in-group in terms of both power and culture. "Colony" refers to an out-group image that actually formed within the concrete relations of colonization and which, once the illusions of decolonization had dissipated, returned to centre stage with neo-colonialism (as Image Theory rightly demonstrates). However, Image Theory addresses such images in an unhistorical mode, without investigating their reasons, causes, or ideological background.

The second example concerns the Stereotype Content Model, which proposes that low levels of competence are attributed to low-status groups, whereas attributions of warmth vary as a function of the quality of their relationship with the dominant group (cooperative or competitive) (Fiske et al. 2002). Studies conducted in various countries have consistently found that ethnic minorities and immigrant groups are perceived as less competent and more or less warm depending on their relations with the majority (see Lee and Fiske 2006 for the United States; Sibley et al. 2008 for New Zealand; Volpato and Durante in press for Italy). However, these studies generally fail to explain how these judgments of competence and warmth often formed and then sedimented because of the unequal balance of power imposed by colonialism (Blanchard and Bancel 1998).

A third example relates to the body of studies on acculturation. As Bhatia and Ram point out (2001), these studies take insufficient account of the "colonisation of minds", underestimating the long-term effects of the colonial legacy and the way it goes on modelling the migrants' identity and acculturation processes. A global review of studies produced within mainstream social psychology also reveals a degree of ethnocentrism among researchers, who tend to focus on the majority's perspective at the expense of the minority.

The extraordinary work of Gustav Jahoda (1999) is a welcome exception to this pattern. Jahoda analyses the changes in the European imaginary of other peoples in relation to the evolution of colonization (from conquest to settlement and/or exploitation). He shows that after colonization a shift occurred from a representation of the other as barbarian or savage (based on the animal metaphor) to a representation of the other as child-like, primitive, and lacking intelligence, morality, and emotional control.

Recently, however, with the general changes brought about by globalization and the appearance of new cultural paradigms in the discipline (Kitayama and Cohen 2007), interest in themes connected to colonialism has increased significantly in social psychology. Three fields of empirical study and theoretical elaboration on colonialism have emerged: research on collective memories or social representations of the past and their links with social identities; research on the role of group-based emotions in the way groups deal with their past; and research on colonial mentality, the legacy of colonialism among formerly colonized people, and its influence on their self-representations, self-esteem, and mental health.

1. Social Representations and Collective Memories of the Colonial Past

Studies on collective memory have burgeoned in social psychology in the past fifteen years, following the increasing interest in collective memory studies in other disciplines such as history (Nora 1984), philosophy (Ricoeur 2000), and sociology (Olick 1999). Social psychologists particularly investigate the links between collective memories and social identities. Collective memories serve several identity-related functions. First of all, group members relate to shared representations of their past in order to define their social identity. As nicely put by Liu and Hilton (2005, 537): "History provides us with narratives that tell us who we are, where we came from and where we should be going. It defines a trajectory which helps construct the essence of a group's identity, how it relates to other groups, and ascertains what its options are for facing present challenges." In short, collective memories give content to social identities that enables group members to recognize that they all belong to the same group, that this group has a continuous history (Sani 2008), and that it will continue to exist in the future. Second, in line with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986), these memories can be used as dimensions of inter-group comparison, so that representations of the group's past may enhance group identity if the comparison favours the in-group – i.e. "our past is better than yours". Conversely, being reminded of negative aspects of the group's past may threaten social identity and elicit defensive

reactions, such as legitimizing these events, minimizing or negating them, or blaming out-groups (Baumeister and Hastings 1997). Finally, collective memories can be used to legitimize present-day actions of the in-group. Representing the in-group as a victim of past events has often been used to justify current or planned actions towards out-groups (Devine-Wright 2003).

Social psychological studies on collective memories of colonization are still scarce, but there are interesting exceptions. Licata and Klein (2005) compare the representations of different periods of Congolese colonial history of former Belgian colonials and colonized Congolese, which are still an important part of both groups' social identities; Pereira de Sa and Castro (2005) study Portuguese and Brazilian social representations of the "discovery" of Brazil; and Volpato and colleagues (Volpato 2000; Volpato and Cantone 2005; Durante, Volpato, and Fiske 2010) analyse representations of the colonized during the Italian Fascist era.

2. Dealing with the Past: The Role of Collective Emotions

Several studies in the past decade have sought to analyse the influence of people's emotions about their group's past negative actions towards an out-group on their attitudes towards its present members and towards politics of reparation (see Iyer and Leach 2008 for a review). This current explicitly addresses the colonial relationships of domination and submission. The first set of studies were conducted by Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (1998), who showed that some Dutch participants experienced collective guilt when reminded of acts against Indonesians committed by their ancestors. These studies also showed that participants who identified weakly with their country experienced more collective guilt and expressed more support for reparative actions than those who identified strongly.

The seminal study by Doosje and colleagues (1998) initiated a lively current of research that demonstrated that experiencing collective guilt had positive effects, such as supporting reparation policies or public apologies. However, collective guilt is not an automatic consequence of remembering (or being reminded of) the in-group's past misdeeds. On the contrary, it is a rather rare phenomenon, because it involves incorporating negative elements into the group's social

identity. So group members often try to "forget", minimize, or negate events that could trigger this negative emotion (see Wohl, Branscombe, and Klar 2006 for a review).

Following Doosje et al. (1998), some researchers have tried to identify the antecedents of collective guilt (Branscombe and Doosje 2004). Others investigated the consequences of collective guilt, confirming the link between this emotion and support for reparation (Iyer, Leach, and Crosby 2003; Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen 2006; McGarty et al. 2005; Pedersen et al. 2004; Swim and Miller 1999). Other authors indicate the role played by other group-based emotions, such as anger or shame. For instance, Brown and colleagues (2008) conducted three studies in Chile investigating the emotions that Chileans of European origin experience towards the Mapuche, an indigenous group that has suffered great discrimination and mistreatment.

3. The Colonial Heritage among Formerly Colonized Peoples: The Colonial Mentality

A third group of studies focus on the "colonial mentality" that still characterizes individuals and groups who were subjected to colonial domination. As a psychological construct, the colonial mentality is "a form of internalized oppression . . . characterized by a perception of ethnic or cultural inferiority" (David and Okazaki 2006, 241). This mentality, born during periods of direct domination, was reinforced through decades of "internal colonialism" (ongoing oppression in the home country or in a host country after emigration) (Okazaki, David, and Abelmann 2008).

The theoretical antecedent of this series of studies can be found in Frantz Fanon's writings (1967, 1968), which have recently attracted renewed attention in the psychological field (Cheng 2001; Davids 1997; Hassan 2003; Hook 2005; Kebede 2001; Moll 2002; Swartz 1995; Tatum 2002), as well as in subsequent trends in postcolonial studies (Loomba 2005; Williams and Chrisman 1993; Young 2001). Fanon addresses the psychological consequences of colonialism, especially the dynamics of internalization of self-depreciating identities among the colonized. Today, research on colonial mentality represents a promising path for studying the consequences of the asymmetrical relationships imposed by colonial, later neocolonial, policies on the psychological

wellbeing of individuals. As Okazaki, David, and Abelmann emphasize, "there is enormous social, psychological, and infrastructural work in producing the colonized person" (2008, 96).

In the Philippines, in India, in Latin America, in the indigenous communities of North America, in the Pacific islands, and in Australia and New Zealand, research is currently examining how individual psychologies are influenced by the colonial past. Attitudes, beliefs, or behaviours reflecting self-shame or the desire to resemble the dominant group instead of perpetuating one's own cultural heritage have been observed, for example, in Puerto Rico (Varas-Diaz and Serrano-Garcia 2003), in Mexico (Codina and Montalvo 1994), among native Americans (Brave Heart and DeBruyn 1998; Duran 2006; Duran and Duran 1995), and in South Africa (Richards et al. 2005).

Parallel research is being conducted about immigrants originating from former colonies. Studies on the mental health effects of the colonial mentality of Filipino immigrants in the United States (David and Okazaki 2006) show that colonial mentality is negatively correlated with ethnic identification and individual and collective self-esteem, and positively correlated with cultural shame, assimilation, and depression. Other studies, using the semantic priming or Implicit Association Test paradigms, show that cognitions linked with colonial mentality can operate automatically, independently of conscious control (Okazaki et al. 2008).

4. The Present Issue

This special focus presents eight studies linked with the three fields outlined above. Three papers address the field of social representations and collective memories (Leone and Mastrovito; Cabecinhas and Feijó; Licata and Klein); three others deal with the influence of group-based emotions on attitudes and behaviours linked with the colonial past (Mari, Andrighetto, Gabbiadini, Durante, and Volpato; Allpress, Barlow, Brown, and Louis; Figueiredo, Doosje, Valentim, and Zebel); Lawson-Te Aho and Liu address an issue connected with "colonial mentality"; finally, Sibley investigates the ideologies that prevail in New Zealand regarding the legacy of colonization and legitimize material and symbolic inequality.

This set of papers thus provides a global overview of the different kinds of current social psychology research concerning colonialism. The studies use diverse methodologies, with qualitative (Leone and Mastrovito; Cabecinhas and Feijó; Lawson-Te Aho and Liu) as well as quantitative methods (Licata and Klein; Mari et al.; Figueiredo et al.; Allpress et al.; Sibley).

Different geographical and historical settings are addressed. Cabecinhas and Feijó deal with the Portuguese colonization of Mozambique. Licata and Klein examine collective memories of the Belgian colonization of the Congo. Two studies focus on Italian colonialism in the Horn of Africa: Leone and Mastrovito investigate the transmission of historical memories through an analysis of school manuals, while Mari and colleagues study the emotions of guilt, anger, and shame these events provoke among Italians. Figueiredo and colleagues compare the Dutch colonization of Indonesia and Portuguese colonization in Africa. One of the studies presented by Allpress and colleagues analyzes British emotions regarding the colonial past of Kenya, while the other focuses on the emotions Australians of European origin experience about the treatment of the Aborigines. The colonization of Oceania is also addressed in two complementary articles about New Zealand: Lawson-Te Aho and Liu examine how referring to Maori culture could help foster effective strategies for tackling the high suicide rates among Maori youth, while Sibley investigates the ideologies that contribute to maintaining structural inequalities between non-indigenous New Zealanders and Maori.

Although most articles focus on the point of view of former colonizers, three papers also present data collected among formerly colonized peoples. Thus, this special focus seeks to counter a general tendency—often observed in the international social psychological literature—to give more space to the points of view of dominant social groups. But authors from formerly colonized countries are still underrepresented in this set of articles. It is a challenge for future research on the social psychology of (post-)colonialism to better include the perspective and invaluable knowledge of the colonized.

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Learning About Our Shameful Past: A Socio-Psychological Analysis of Present-Day Historical Narratives of Italian Colonial Wars

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A computer-assisted content analysis (Bolasco 2000) of seven textbooks currently used for history teaching in Italian high schools was carried out to examine to what extent past atrocities perpetrated during Italy's African colonial wars are acknowledged and taught. More specifically, we investigated the relative importance these texts devote to teaching established historical facts or to achieve socio-psychological aims, such as advancing reconciliation processes and protecting the in-group's social identity. Social psychologists working in the field of intergroup reconciliation usually consider these two aims as partially competing. The models reviewed by Nadler et al. (2008a) all consider the need to protect personal social identity as a source of biases, which the search for historical truth has to accommodate. In contrast, a recent work by Pratto and Glasford (2008) stresses that social identity can play a *positive* role as a powerful motivation for reconciliation. They suggest that acknowledging historical faults may assist the difficult process of finding a balance between the need for self-esteem and self-integrity and the need to belong. Our results seem to confirm certain aspects of the first group of models, and other aspects of Pratto and Glasford's review. The crucial point seems to be the use of abstract or concrete terms to describe in-group wrongdoings. Strikingly, more than seventy years after the Italian colonial wars only three textbooks out of seven fully describe atrocities perpetrated by the in-group using clear, concrete terminology; this is consistent with the idea of a tension between reconciliation and justice. On the other hand, the more concrete descriptions, although less frequent, seem better able to protect the in-group's self-integrity by showing their young readers a clearer acceptance of moral responsibility for the historical faults of their group.

> But now the air is so full of these ghosts
> That no one knows how to escape their hosts.
> (epigraph to Freud's *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*,
> from Goethe's *Faust*).

1. Italian Colonialism: A "Potential" Collective Memory?

The general aim of our analysis of present-day historical narratives of Italian wrongdoings during colonial wars is to better understand the strategies used in everyday life when ordinary people, long after the end of a war, carry on coping with the violence that was enacted by their in-group. More specifically, we want to explore the idea that a lexico-textual analysis of historical narratives addressed to newly-born members of the groups of former perpetrators may reveal advances in these coping strategies. Our assumption is that war violence may be coped with only through a very long social and psychological elaboration—leading, in the long term, to a socio-emotional reconciliation between former enemies (Nadler et al. 2008b)—and that narratives recollecting these difficult aspects of the in-group past change as well, according to the evolution of this same elaboration.

In this paper we explore, by analysing seven textbooks currently used for the teaching of history in Italian high schools, to what extent *historical narratives* may be revealing of the evolution of these coping strategies and reconciliation processes. In our opinion, in fact, although historical narratives are based on scientific methodologies and meant to teach established facts, what may be presumed to change

according to socio-psychological processes of intergroup reconciliation are the *teaching aims* related to the expected effects on the young people receiving these narratives about their in-group past.

More particularly, when teaching a controversial aspect of the in-group past, such as the interpretation of sufferings that war violence brought both to the in-group and to the former enemies' group, the expected effect of teaching—that of fostering a sense of citizenship—partially competes with another, basic expected effect, that of giving young people a critical tool for orientation to allow them to correctly judge what really happened in past episodes of violence and consequently better interpret present-day social situations and conflicts.

This competition of expected effects represents a fundamental tension. Any historical narrative, in fact, pursues a never-ending struggle to reconstruct the past using, as far as possible, scientific methodologies. By verifying facts, this kind of narrative therefore tries to salvage as much as possible the perspective of those who were defeated and silenced. But, at the same time, facts are selected in order to reconstruct the past for young citizens of today's communities, and so over-represent the aspects of history closest to the readers' present-day sense of belonging.

Moreover, in our time historical narratives are intended for teaching to classes that are increasingly made up of young people originating—due to global mobility—from all over the world. Facing this historical novum, historians are divided between two main stances. A first option foresees that this situation will influence historical narratives in such a way as to reinforce the identity concerns of communities "hosting" these multicultural classes. A second option claims, on the contrary, that history teaching urgently needs to acquire a broader world perspective, instead of perspectives referring only to the past of restricted communities (e.g. national, European, etc.). In short, the dilemma facing historical narratives recounting past in-group wars seems, in the present day more than ever, to be based on the two opposing aims of teaching "our" history vs. teaching a history that might seem—insofar as it is possible—acceptable to everybody (Brusa 2009).

This general problem of all history teaching becomes a crucial one when narratives address controversial or difficult aspects of the past of the in-group hosting multicultural classes. When considering Western and European history in a broader world perspective, the colonial past and, more specifically, atrocities carried out during colonial wars, are easily one of the biggest sources of divided memories (Ferro 2003a, 2003b). In particular, one of the principal aspects that make colonial experience a highly controversial issue for history teaching seems to be that, while European colonial invaders coped in various ways with the history of violence that they enacted, colonized peoples were deprived of their history and either pushed towards a forced and somehow idealized traditionalism, or denied a well-balanced relationship with modernity (Fanon 1961; Memmi 1957; Chenntouf 2008).

Among the various strategies used by colonial perpetrators to cope with their past wrongdoings, the Italian situation may be considered a very specific case. Colonial experience is located at the very core of the historical narratives of those European nations that drew a relevant part of their power and economic wealth from their colonies. In contrast with these countries, Italy engaged later and less successfully in colonial expansion. Furthermore, shortly afterwards, and in parallel with the Second World War, a civil war sharply divided the nation, ending only in 1946, with the foundation of the Italian Republic. So, while younger generations of the major colonial nations tend in our time to cope with their in-group's past wrongdoings through such collective emotions as shame or guilt (Branscombe and Doosje 2004), young Italian adults, due to the largely unsuccessful course of their in-group's past colonial adventures, tend on the contrary simply to avoid remembering a facet of their collective past that has remained peripheral to the core of the economic and social life of their nation. Besides this amnesia, another frequent coping strategy for the few young Italians who think about this period is to impute all responsibility for these past wrong-doings only to the part of community that consented to the dictatorial regime, since the last phase of colonial wars was enacted under Fascism. So in this sense colonial wars may be seen as included not in "our" past but in "their" past, paradoxically implying that a sense of responsibility for in-group

wrongdoings might be misunderstood as a sense of sharing a Fascist perspective on the Italian past.

Italian colonialism in Africa actually began much earlier, in 1870, when the Rubattino Steamship Company bought the harbour of Assab in Eritrea as a facility for its ships. Soon afterwards the Italian government took over Rubattino and extended its control to the surrounding region, finally establishing the first Italian colony in Eritrea in 1890. Meanwhile Italy suffered an initial defeat against the troops of neighbouring Ethiopia, when a detachment of about five hundred men was annihilated in Dogali (1887). In 1895–96 the Italians tried to invade Ethiopia and were again defeated in the famous battle of Adua, destined to remain a wounding memory for a very long time. While Italian penetration into Somaliland, where a protectorate was established in 1889, continued successfully, a new attempt to conquest Ethiopia was ordered only in 1935, under the Fascist regime. A second phase of Italian colonialism in Africa was aimed at the conquest of the land facing Sicily to the south— Libya—in connection with the Balkan wars shortly before the First World War. The country was quickly invaded and taken over (1911–12), but Italy's control was very weak; above all during the First World War, and in the 1920s and 1930s it had a strong rebellion to deal with, which was repressed using harsh measures including deportation to concentration camps.

These events had all already taken place when in 1935 Mussolini launched a new campaign to occupy Ethiopia, which succeeded within a year. Italian troops used poison gas against the enemy, despite its prohibition by the Geneva Convention. Ethiopian resistance continued after the official end of the war, and the Italian repression was very severe, particularly in the response to a failed assassination attempt on the Governor, Graziani, in 1937, when some six thousand civilians— according to Western sources—were executed, among them the roughly three hundred monks of Debra Libanos.

For a long time, these war crimes have been ignored in Italy. Colonial wars are not remembered at all, or are considered as a short episode intrinsically linked only to the Fascist regime. Italian history textbooks have begun exploring this issue only recently, as we will see more in depth in the

second part of this article. The repression in Libya during the 1920s is also largely ignored by Italian public discourse. The myth of the good Italian soldier (often expressed in the slogan "Italiani, brava gente"; Del Boca 2005) is very popular and enduring. Memories of Italian colonialism seem thus to be something different from the already complex concept of divided memories. They seem rather to offer, in fact, a unique and excellent example of what Maurice Halbwachs (1925, 1950) called a "potential" memory (*virtuelle*: Halbwachs 1950, 84). Speculating on relationships between individual and collective memories, Halbwachs proposed this concept to describe how some memories could remain very difficult to recollect for individuals for a long period, and then become salient and active again, sometimes many after years, only when they came to be shared again as common sense by the social groups the remembering persons belong to. In fact, memories shared by the vast majority (*tout le monde*: Halbwachs 1950, 92) are recalled more easily because each personal remembering act is helped by the memories of others. Paradoxically, then, Halbwachs proposes the idea that the more a memory is highly personal and is not shared with others as a collective one, the less easy it is to recall by a personal remembering act.

In a certain sense this is one of the most intriguing concepts proposed by Halbwachs's seminal—and in some ways controversial—theory on collective memories. Indeed, contemporary scholars (see for instance Assmann 1995) have argued that we can say communities "have a memory" only in a metaphorical sense. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that any lasting community "creates" a memory, by means of an active selection of content that is made more or less accessible in the everyday social environment of its members. This social selection is not, however, passively absorbed by the members of the community to which these memories refer. On the contrary, we may distinguish a collective memory from other kinds of memories by the fact of its being characterized by the inextricable intertwining of social and individual processes (Leone 2006; Bellelli, Curci, and Leone 2007).

From a social point of view, a memory is a collective one when it is prepared, cued, and triggered by a selection of pre-arranged aspects of collective identity that are made

accessible to individuals belonging to a group. This access is made possible not only by special social activities, as for instance commemorations, but also by making some memories embodied in concrete mediations, framing the individual remembering. For instance, a London citizen may often absentmindedly pass through an underground station named Waterloo, but no Paris citizen travelling around his town will ever encounter an underground station by the name of Waterloo. A large number of cultural artefacts characterizing minimal aspects of everyday life will therefore make some memories more easily recalled. Hints from the physical and social environment—as in the instance of underground stations—are able to build up associative tracks leading to specific content, so making easier for them to "pop up" apparently by chance in the stream of individual awareness.

If we look to these same processes from an individual point of view, we can see how a memory may be considered as collective not only by the actual remembering or forgetting of a socially pre-arranged series of events, but also by *monitoring activities* associated with memories themselves, as for instance the degree of confidence, evaluation of the personal and social impact and consequentiality of these memories, and so on (Leone 2006). These monitoring activities, showing the crucial capacity not only to remember but also to "turn around one's own memories" (Bartlett 1932), are in fact an implicit yet fundamental expression of a personal adherence to a social and cultural frame of meaning, showing the importance subjectively attributed to an affective belonging to the community with this same frame (Bellelli, Curci, and Leone 2007).

A memory may be considered as a potential collective one, when there is a difficulty, in a social environment, to be in contact with artefacts that could frame the individual remembering acts (Middeltown and Edwards 1990), leading to remember a specific set of memories. Therefore, a potential collective memory is a clear example of how the difficulty of being in contact with a social selection of well-chosen artefacts may for a certain time actively suppress personal access to a constellation of memories linked with a controversial or shaming issue of the collective past, and/or limit its subjective resonance as experienced in monitoring

activities associated with this particular set of memories. Both simple suppression of memories *per se*, and limited monitoring (for instance when, even if a memory is not suppressed and comes to be recalled, the remembering person remains unsure as to its complete truthfulness, or evaluates it as a peripheral and meaningless one) contribute to the same self-serving bias, aimed at silencing past contents capable of disadvantaging present-day social belonging. Nevertheless, in the very concept of potential collective memories this bias is tempered by the fact that a growing psycho-social elaboration of difficult aspects of the in-group past, as in the case of shameful or traumatic memories, is always expected, for two main reasons.

Firstly, an innovative shift is regularly effected each time a *new generation* reaches adulthood (Arendt 1958). At each generational renewal, in fact, memories received from institutional and familial narratives alter accordingly, being elaborated by a different personal and social frame of meaning. Secondly, a potential collective memory may become socially accessible once again, and acquire new meanings related to its monitoring, whenever *inter-group relations change* (Mazzara and Leone 2001). Both for the regular shifts through generational changes and for the changed perspectives of rebalanced group relationships, the social silence surrounding a potential collective memory is thus predicted to act as a social force (Lewin 1948) similar to those labelled in chemistry as "meta-stable" (i.e. apparently unchanging but easily reactivated).

In this theoretical framework, recent qualitative studies analysing focus groups of three different generations of Italian participants show how, while memory of the Fascist past and of the Second World War was actively disputed and salient throughout the generations and suggested an on-going process of active socio-psychological elaboration of these difficult and controversial past contents, memory of the Italian colonial past was either silent or monitored as an unimportant part of the collective past (Leone and Curigliano 2009). Even in the very few mentions received in spontaneous focus group discussions on Italian history, colonial episodes were similarly defined by three generations as essentially uninformative of the overall imagination of the national community (Anderson 1983).

Taking into account these highly problematic specificities of Italian elaboration of in-group colonial violence, the question addressed in this paper is whether contemporary historical narratives intended to teach young Italians about their shameful in-group past may signal that the time has now finally come to turn the potential collective memory of Italian atrocities into an actual one. In other words, we aim to understand better if historical narratives, addressed to present-day Italian students, now offer them a more balanced version that clearly admits and acknowledges past in-group atrocities against African populations during colonial wars, or if they try, on the contrary, to veil these shameful aspects. In fact, thanks also to generational changes that have introduced new individuals, while the people who lived through these wars have gradually disappeared, we expected that the collective elaboration of past violence perpetrated by Italians during their occupation of colonies in Africa would have reached a critical turning point in the present day, despite an amnesia of these matters in everyday Italian social discourse (Pivato 2007), evident in the above-mentioned exploratory studies of the historical identities of Italian participants of different generations (Leone and Curigliano 2009).

Speculating on the relationships between controversial collective memories and reconciliation processes, Paul Ricoeur (2000) proposes that the socio-psychological elaboration allowing this collective coping with in-group war violence is in a way similar to the individual *elaboration of mourning*, as described in classic Freudian works (Freud 1917). Although it risks overstretching the metaphor describing social life as highly akin to the life of the individual, this idea proposed by Ricoeur implies some suggestions that seem heuristically convincing. First of all, both the personal processes of the elaboration of mourning and the socio-psychological processes of intergroup reconciliation after a war are long, difficult and easily reversible. Moreover and perhaps more importantly, they both perform mourning processes over a *loss*.

The accomplishment of a personal mourning requires coming to terms with the loss of an "object of love" that played a central role in the personal life of the mourner. Such an object is sometimes a person, who died or in another way

abandoned the mourner; at other times it may be a particularly meaningful and cherished *abstract idea*, such as a project or a hope, or also a personal quality or a gift once possessed and now lost, like beauty or health (Freud 1917). Similarly, the accomplishment of a collective mourning over war memories requires coming to terms with the loss of an abstract idea, i.e. the loss of an *ideal social identity*, undamaged by the violence either enacted or suffered by one's own in-group. Nevertheless, important dissimilarities distinguish personal processes from intergroup ones, limiting to a certain extent the heuristic potential of Ricoeur's theoretical proposal (2000). The most important of these dissimilarities concerns *time*. Personal processes of the elaboration of mourning sometimes take years, but are achieved (or fail) in one lifespan. On the contrary, for an intergroup reconciliation to be achieved, *more than one generation is needed*.

After a very brief review of recent developments in reconciliation studies, we will compare these advances in socio-psychological research on reconciliation with the insights suggested by Paul Ricoeur's parallel between the personal and the collective *elaboration of mourning* (2000). Finally, we will examine how these theoretical models vary when *generational changes*—in the groups of both victims and perpetrators of war violence—modify the object of these collective elaborations from first-hand narratives of events occurring during one's own lifetime to second-hand narratives of events in the lifetime of one's ancestors.

2. Elaborating the Loss of an Ideal Social Identity: From Conflict Reduction and Settlement to Socio-Emotional Reconciliation

For a long time, social psychologists focused their attention on the two main issues of *reduction* and *settlement* of conflict (Kelman 2008). They framed conflict, in fact, within the classic "rational" model of intergroup interactions (Nadler and Shanbel 2008). According to this model, conflict arises from a competition, when in-group and out-group struggle to acquire important but scarce resources (Sherif et al. 1961). In this classic model, all strategies engaging rationality—e.g. strengthening the insight that stopping violence may be a superordinate goal, since violence causes suffering and losses for both groups—are expected to de-escalate conflict. Studying how to enhance

these rational choices is therefore seen as the primary aim of socio-psychological studies.

Nevertheless, a rational strategy, although absolutely necessary to reduce violence and resolve the conflict, is not enough to pass from the end of the conflict to the renewal of intergroup relations between the former enemies. After a peace treaty, in fact, much time has to pass before *socio-emotional barriers*—resulting from violence enacted and suffered by both groups—can finally be overcome (Burton 1969). This third step, following the two previous steps of conflict reduction and settlement slowly and with difficulty, is the issue addressed by studies on *socio-emotional reconciliation* (Nadler and Shnabel 2008).

Social psychologists have developed this third field of study only in recent years. One reason for this recent flourishing may be the evolution of socio-psychological models, now attributing increasing importance to emotional processes in general, and to *emotion regulation* in particular. This facet of research on the emotions stresses the importance of strategies that people can use in everyday life, not only to cope with their emotions, but also to extract from them signals that contribute in a meaningful way to their understanding of the situations that provoked these same emotions (Frijda 1986).

This theoretical advance in the socio-psychological understanding of emotions enables a better comprehension of how they might operate in a person confronting a stressful situation, and leads to a rejection of the dichotomy between reason and emotion. It was a shift in understanding not only of coping processes in general, but also of socio-emotional reconciliation in particular —since this kind of reconciliation may be conceived as a special example of the resilience shown by ordinary people when confronted with extraordinary events, such as the extreme degree of violence and danger experienced in wartime.

Another major development linked to the flourishing of studies on socio-emotional reconciliation concerns the *role assigned to ordinary people*. Conflict reduction and settlement lie firmly in the hands of leaders, and ordinary people are "only" asked to accept and internalize the new

intergroup balance that was negotiated for them (Kelman 2008).

Socio-emotional reconciliation, on the other hand, is a renewal of relations that not only permits but indeed requires a bottom-up elaboration. The measure of its success, in fact, is when ordinary people no longer incorporate hostility against former enemies in the core of their own social identity. This *marginalization of the enemy's image* from the characteristics that predicate in-group belonging (Kelman 2008) is obviously unreachable merely through a passive acceptance of leaders' decisions. It implies, instead, that the vast majority of ordinary people of both groups have performed a long elaboration—to the point that they can see their relations with the other group in a new way—in which memories of past violence have not disappeared, but have taken a different and somehow less important ("marginal") place.

To our thinking the speculative assumptions of Paul Ricoeur (2000) quoted above could be extremely interesting to utilize for a better understanding of the multiple facets of this concept of the marginalization of enemy's image proposed by scholars of socio-emotional reconciliation. This theoretical proposal of Ricoeur's—tracing an insightful parallel between mourning over personal loss (Freud 1917) and mourning over the collective loss of an idealized social identity—suggests that the marginalization of the enemy's image from the core of one's own social identity is achieved only when such a difficult loss of idealized features of the in-group identity is no longer avoided or postponed. The enemy's image acts, in fact, as a privileged target, onto which it is possible to project all responsibility for the suffering caused by war violence; therefore, this image allows no attention to be paid to all the in-group's faults and wrongdoings, which could also account for these same sufferings and damages. Nevertheless, the more these shameful aspects of the in-group past are coped with, the less the enemy's image is needed as a protective shield overshadowing such a difficult awareness. As suggested by Ricoeur's parallel between Freud's remarks on the individual elaboration of mourning and the field of research on intergroup reconciliation (2000), in fact, this "work" of elaboration is less difficult—both in personal and social processes—when

the object of the mourning processes comes to be considered less ambivalently.

In a similar vein, Ricoeur's suggestions can also be compared with the recent Needs-Based Model of Socio-emotional Reconciliation (Nadler and Shnabel 2008). In a way, this model supplements Kelman's model, because it proposes the idea that *the socio-psychological needs of victims and perpetrators differ*: victims need to acquire a new control of their social environment, and perpetrators need to avoid social exclusion. According to the model, a valuable reconciliation can be achieved only when both victims' and perpetrators' needs are *simultaneously* taken into account. Ricoeur's idea of reconciliation as a collective mourning over the loss of an idealized social identity (2000) may help to better understand how both of these needs might be fulfilled. Referring to the historical development of Freud's concept of mourning, Ricoeur stresses how Freud gradually seized on the idea that memory, as well as mourning, may be conceived as a kind of "work" (*Erinnerungarbeiten*: Freud 1914, as quoted in Ricoeur 1999, 6). Referring to the "work" of mourning, however, Ricoeur also emphasizes why it differs from the "work" of memory. He writes: "Mourning is a reconciliation. With what? With the loss of some object of love; objects of love may be people, of course, but also, as Freud says, abstractions like fatherland, freedom, ideals of all kinds" (Ricoeur 1999, 7). Therefore, he defines his theoretical proposal on the collective elaboration of war memories as an attempt "to bring together these two expressions: 'the work of memory' and 'the work of mourning', because it is quite possible that the work of memory *is* a kind of mourning, and also that mourning is a painful exercise in memory" (ibid.).

If we look at the fulfilment of the needs of victims and perpetrators of war violence, as defined by Nadler and Shnabel (2008), from the point of view of this "work" of memory in conjunction with the "work" of mourning, we might better conceive reconciliation based on victims' needs as requiring a working-through that—due to their powerless experience of suffering violence—is aimed at accepting the loss of an abstract idea of their social identity idealized in terms of power. Conversely, we may also conceive reconciliation based on perpetrators' needs as requiring a

working-through that—due to their in-group responsibilities in enacting violence—is directed at accepting the loss of an abstract idea of their social identity idealized in terms of moral dignity. Here again, however, the question arises: How much *time* is needed for such an elaboration to be worked through?

Certain recent historical situations (for instance, the unprecedented and somehow culturally unique experience of truth and reconciliation commissions in South Africa) present an elaboration that has directly involved victims and perpetrators of violence, called to face each other before their village communities and authorities *immediately after the conflict settlement*. In this case, forgiveness—if freely given by victims to perpetrators—was able to empower victims and avoid moral exclusion for perpetrators, i.e. to simultaneously fulfil both the model's basic needs in socio-emotional reconciliation (Nadler and Shnabel 2008). Conceptually, this view echoes research and theory on apologies as the way to mend severed social bonds (Tavuchis 1991) and the research by McCullogouh and his colleagues on forgiveness in close relations (McCullough 2000; McCullough, Pargament, and Thorensen 2000).

But many other elaborations of wartime experiences—including those related to memories of colonial wars, which we are considering in the focus section of this issue of the *IJCV*—show that socio-emotional barriers may last for a very long time, becoming *a kind of "debt" passing from one generation to another.*

We might speculate that this passage is quite immediate when responsibility for wartime violence may be clearly attributed. Sometimes, as also for instance under the apartheid regime, all the kinds of violence used for aggression against a weaker group make their oppressive aims so evident that, once the victims have at last gained enough power to free themselves, patronising or exonerating excuses can no longer be used. Sometimes, on the contrary, attributions for wartime sufferings and violence are less clear. This is the case, for instance, with wars that may be justified as being fought for "good" reasons: for instance as self-defence, or in response to particularly dangerous enemies, or as an extreme solution to stop more evil (Bobbio 1979). In all these

more complex situations, when the in-group violence may be plausibly attributed partly to the enemy's guilt, then the end of the war does not simultaneously end the symbolic war to gain a more honourable position for one's own group in the interpretation of the violence's ultimate causes. In this case, the working-through of war memories, eventually leading to socio-emotional reconciliation, passes from the generation that experienced wartime to their descendants not only as a healing of war sufferings, but also as a dispute over war responsibilities. Therefore, the issue at stake changes.

3. Working Through Memories of Wartime: From Witnesses' Narratives to "Mature" Reconciliation Processes

When the children of direct witnesses of war violence become old enough to be told about their parents' difficult past, the problem of *how past violence is narrated to newly born individuals* comes up alongside the older problem of working through a personal experience of wartime. Of course, different kinds of narratives may be offered to newly born individuals. According to the classic distinction traced by Halbwachs' work on "social frames of memory" (1925), historical narratives, in their attempt to find a comprehensive schema for *facts* influencing the evolution of a war and explaining its consequences, must be cleanly differentiated from narratives on *"lived history"*, which describe what it was like to live during wartime, coping with fear, food shortages, and the incessant threat of death to oneself and others. The latter type of narrative is usually offered to the nearest and dearest (as a principal example, Halbwachs refers to the social sharing of memories during family conversations). In the famous sociologist's view, these narratives aim to consolidate a positive idea of the family, as an indirect yet forceful empowerment of new-born members of this social group. According to Halbwachs (1925), in fact, older family members, by telling their memories to younger ones, who have not experienced the way that life changes in wartime, implicitly convey to them a message that we could phrase as: "That's our resilience, and you have received it as a family gift, because that's the way we are." A similar, though less emotionally charged, role may be seen in all the wartime memories that are narrated to young generations not through family, but through other "imagined communities" (Anderson 1991) such as, for instance, national communities.

Then a second moment arrives, when direct witnesses reach the end of their lives, and narratives of "lived history", i.e. of what it was like to live through the wartime (Halbwachs 1925, 1950), can no longer be passed directly to newly born individuals. At this moment, when the grandchildren of war witnesses are old enough to have children themselves, all narratives of war are thus destined to quickly become second-hand narratives, without the living characteristics and biases linked to the memories of events that happened during one's own lifetime. The essential feature of the direct narratives of witnesses of wartime is, in fact, that they are transient. So, as the death of living witnesses approaches, the need for a linkage of these war memories to more enduring intermediations arises too.

This working-through of wartime memories thus inextricably intertwines socio-psychological processes of elaboration of the meaning of violent episodes of war with biological processes that gradually introduce new individuals into the life of the group. In this sense, Hannah Arendt's idea that any turning point in the historical life of a society can be considered a consequence primarily of a generational change, introducing *new individuals* into the social scene while older ones gradually disappear (Arendt 1958), applies perfectly, in our opinion, to reconciliation processes.

From this point of view, we maintain that processes of reconciliation involving people who lived through wartime and their children and grandchildren must be distinguished from the processes performed by their descendants during the period of the gradual disappearance of witnesses. To better clarify this distinction, we propose to call the latter type *"mature" reconciliation processes* (Leone and Curigliano 2009). In this paper, we try to examine whether, in the crucial period when the witnesses of Italian colonial wars are gradually disappearing, the teaching of historical facts to young Italians attending the last years of high-school may finally make them aware of the war violence enacted by their in-group. We assume, in fact, that present-day generational change may at last be enabling a shift from the protective strategy of face-to-face family narratives—intended to enhance the positive aspects of "our" way, in resilience and wartime survival—to another protective strategy, enacted by more institutional narratives and directed not

at identity enhancement but at the teaching of history. This time, protective intentions towards newly born individuals may be realized not through the very fragile and short-sighted tactic of total or selective amnesia of in-group moral indignities (Pivato 2009), but through the more solid and durable solution of an opportunity to learn the truth about in-group responsibility and shame.

To achieve such a difficult elaboration, however, historical narratives must be aimed at making these young students face *the historical truth of the in-group's past violence,* undermining in a profound way their own idealized social identity. However, different models elaborated by social psychologists working in the field of intergroup reconciliation (for a review, see Nadler et al. 2008a) usually consider the need to protect social identity to be a source of biases, which the search for historical truth has to accommodate.

In contrast, a recent work by Pratto and Glasford (2008) evaluates this idea as an oversimplified solution to the highly complex problem of the trade-off between the needs of reconciliation and the demands of justice. Reviewing the socio-psychological literature on social identity, in fact, they arrive at a distinction between the different facets of social identity—which may be considered at various times by scholars as a response to either the need for belonging, the need for self-esteem, or the need for self-integrity. If social identity is seen in this more complex perspective, acknowledging historical faults may be expected to ameliorate the need for self-esteem and the need for self-integrity, although threatening the need to belong (Pratto and Glasford 2008). This kind of theoretical explanation could be particularly apt to describe current attitudes of young Italians to colonial wars if we consider, as already mentioned, that they are mainly attributed to a wrong decision of the Fascist regime. This attribution to the decision of the "other" might thus lessen the threatening aspects that the search for historical truth may have for the need to belong, since young Italians usually consider themselves as citizens of the new Republic that was born out of the partisan struggle and the defeat of the Fascist regime.

Our empirical research analyses seven textbooks currently used in Italy to teach history to pupils approaching adult-hood (at this point in their school career, they are usually expected to be 18 years old), exploring whether narratives of atrocities enacted by the in-group during colonial wars still seek protect social identity, or contrarily to openly acknowledge past wrongdoings, thus in line with the more complex conjectures of the model proposed by Pratto and Glasford (2008).

4. Research Methodology and Data

The purpose of the present research is to explore differences in the presentation of historical narratives regarding specific subject matter from Italy's past involving a loss of in-group moral dignity. The chosen period is the colonial one, and more specifically the concrete event of the war in Ethiopia as a shameful memory. We chose the war in Ethiopia because it may be considered the primary event of Italian colonialism, a bona fide invasion of the African country in 1935 lasting one year, in which the Italian army, among other atrocities, used internationally outlawed chemical weapons—roughly 2,500 mustard gas bombs, which caused about 200,000 Ethiopian civilian casualties. In order to understand the context of the research, some background is needed.

The presence of Fascism and Italian colonialism in Italian school history textbooks is quite recent. In 1960 a ministerial decree stated that the secondary school teaching program must cover historical events up to 1957, and in 1996 a new ministerial decree again strongly recommended the teaching of twentieth-century history. These institutional exhortations reflect a general reluctance in Italian history teaching to face such controversial memories. Moreover, the timing of these legal recommendations matches our description of "mature" reconciliation processes (Leone and Curigliano 2009), i.e. collective elaborations involving the third and fourth generations after war violence.

The corpus analysed is taken from seven Italian history textbooks currently used in high schools with students who are usually 18 years old. We selected specific texts relevant to the issue of Italian colonialism.[1] A preliminary qualitative analysis showed that these texts spoke more or less openly of Italian atrocities during this colonial war. This was evident from examining which kind of lemma (that is a set of words

with different inflections but with the same root) was more represented in each textbook when narrating the colonial war. Not all textbooks used unambiguous lemmas. The lemma *aggression* appeared in five textbooks out of seven, the lemma *expansion* (in terms of expansionistic designs) in four textbooks out of seven, and most importantly the word *gas* appeared in only three textbooks out of seven. We chose to consider *gas* as the crucial term in differentiating between these texts, because it was the one referring explicitly to the use of chemical weapons by the Italian army and to incidents that caused mainly civilian casualties.

On the basis of these initial findings we decided to divide the corpus into *two different subtexts*, differentiating textbooks that used the word gas (Benigno and Salvemini; De Bernardi and Guarracino; Prosperi and Viola) from those that did not (Camera and Fabietti; Detti et al.; Giardina et al.; Lepre). In order to explore their differences, the two groups of textbooks were compared using a quanti-qualitative content analysis. At the end of this analysis, we had one subtext more oriented towards *factuality* and a second more oriented towards *interpretative abstraction.*
The quanti-qualitative analysis was performed with TalTac2.5 (a program for automatic lexico-textual content analysis), with the aim of determining the characteristics of the content and structure of the texts (Bolasco 2000). The first step was normalization and lemmatization, in order to standardize the text and to associate specific grammatical categories to each lemma. The quantitative level of analysis was focused on *analysis of lemmas' specificities*: a statistical coefficient which indicates when a specific lemma is utilized more intensively in one specific sub-corpus relative to others. This analysis identifies the sets of words that may be indicated as "characteristic" (i.e. typical) of a specific text. Once a lemma was statistically selected as characteristic of a sub-text, a qualitative co-occurrence analysis was conducted. This meant returning to the local context in which each

specific lemma (characteristic of a single sub-text) was used, verifying, by a qualitative reading of the context, the actual meaning to be attributed to each use of the lemma, and thus cumulatively defining its semantic space of discourse.

5. Research Findings
5.1 Analysis of Corpus Vocabulary
The corpus is composed of seven texts classified by textbook author and is divided into two groups (textbooks oriented towards *factuality* vs. textbooks oriented towards *interpretative abstraction*). The corpus thus obtained accounts for 76,727 occurrences (word types) with 11,194 different words (word tokens), therefore exhibiting a medium to high lexical richness index, equal to 14.59 percent (see Table 1). In textual analysis, a "word token" is an occurrence in a textual unit and a "word type" is a textual unit defined as a string of letters taken from the alphabet of a language, isolated by means of separators (blank spaces or punctuation marks), which may be the same as or different from another string. Word tokens represent the entire corpus, while word types represent the entire vocabulary of the corpus.

Table 1: Lexical measures

Lexical indicator		Value
Number of occurrences (corpus dimension)	N	76727
Number of graphical forms (corpus width)	V	11194
Lexical extension	(V/N)*100	14589
Hapax percent	(V1/V)*100	14589
General mean frequency	N/V	6854
G coefficient	V/sqrN	40412
Angular coefficient	a	1206

A more analytical look at the same lexical indicators shows that their distribution among the textbooks is well-balanced (see Table 2).

1 We were directed to the textbooks by the Italian historian Luigi Cajani, whom we thank for his advice, who judged them to offer good examples of current history teaching. The corpus submitted to analysis was extracted by choosing from the texts the paragraphs dealing with colonialism and the war in Ethiopia. History textbooks are: Benigno, Salvemini (2002); De Bernardi, Guarracino (2006); Prosperi, Viola (2000); Camera, Fabietti (1999); Detti, Gallerano N., Gozzini G., Greco G., Piccinni (1997), Giardina, Sabbatucci, Vidotto (2000); Lepre (2004).

Table 2: Distribution of occurrences by textbook

Textbook	N occurrences	N forms	N hapax
Benigno, Salvemini	8446	3058	2113
De Bernardi, Guarracino	8651	2941	1997
Prosperi, Viola	9780	3338	2227
Camera, Fabietti	5132	2168	1554
Detti et al.	12285	3746	2451
Giardina et al.	10289	3469	2364
Lepre	9235	3129	2087

5.2 Analysis of Specificities

The group-by-group analysis of specificities performed enabled us to retrieve information about the characteristic lexicon used for speaking about colonialism. In the first group of textbooks oriented towards *factuality*, words revealing the more shameful aspects of Italian colonialism tend to emerge.

Table 3: Lemmas used more in the textbooks oriented towards factuality

Lemma	Total occurrences	Sub-occurrences	p-value
gas	13	11	0.000
nitrogen mustard	6	6	0.000
aggression	15	7	0.001
expansion	12	7	0.000
colonial	14	6	0.003
occupation	11	6	0.001
attack	8	5	0.001
superiority	7	5	0.000
invasion	9	4	0.014
First World War	9	4	0.014
deployment	6	4	0.002
territories	6	4	0.002
bombs	6	4	0.002

Notes: The first column lists lemmas used more in this set of textbooks (sub-text) than in the other set of textbooks (sub-text).
The second column lists occurrences of each lemma in the entire set of seven textbooks (text).
The third column lists occurrences of each lemma only in this specific set of textbooks (sub-text).
The fourth column lists probabilities assigned (by chi-square tests) to the difference between actual sub-occurrences and expected sub-occurrences (Bolasco 2000).

Lemmas more frequently used in this specific sub-text, such as *aggression*, *expansion*, *occupation, invasion*, and *attack*, denote, albeit with differing degrees of connotation, a clear stance on the Italian role during the war. Moreover, the crucial words *gas* and *nitrogen mustard* refer explicitly to the atrocities perpetrated against Ethiopian civilians by Italians. This aspect is even more clear when reading the local contexts in which these lemmas are used, as shown by the following examples:

> In October 1935, without any declaration of war, the Italian army *attacked* the African country, and had to apply itself to the full in a campaign that turned out to be much more difficult than predicted. Ethiopia did not possess heavy artillery or an air force, while Italy used its own for massive bombardments, that from January 1936 utilized toxic *gas* to lethal effect. *Nitrogen mustard* billowed over the army and over the civilian populations, over the pastures, over the livestock, into the waters. The large-scale use of toxic *gases*, personally authorized by Mussolini and ordered by marshals Badoglio and Graziani, commanders of the two *invasion* corps, was recently proven conclusively, despite having always been denied by the Italian authorities.
> (translated from Prosperi, Viola, 109, specific sub-text lemmas in italics)

> Not even the Catholic Church opposed the *aggression*, despite the initial chagrin at the *attack* on a country that for a millennium had defended Christianity—even if it was Coptic Christianity—against Islam. … The 'need' for conquest of Italy meant more than the survival of Ethiopia. The Jesuit review *Civiltà Cattolica* was more explicit: 'The reason of vital need for *expansion* is valid and enough basis to establish the legitimacy of a *colonial* conquest'.
> (translated from Prosperi, Viola, 108–109, specific sub-text lemmas in italics)

> The reputation of the Italian army was harmed by grievous atrocities against the civilian population. It is often forgotten what the Italians did in Ethiopia. Italy suffered limited losses, deaths of around 4,000: half those of the African campaign of the Crispi era, and less than the number slain in the single battle of Adua. The Ethiopians on the other hand counted at least two hundred thousand dead. In a few months the *occupying* army reached Addis Ababa and the Ethiopian emperor, Negus Haile Selassie, took refuge in England, where he remained until the Second World War, when he was able to return to his own country.
> (translated from Prosperi, Viola, 109–110, specific sub-text lemmas in italics)

Furthermore, reading the local contexts of lemmas characteristic of this specific sub-text reveals how this group of history textbooks explicitly narrates Italian responsibility

for atrocities perpetrated during colonial wars using documents, testimony, and evidence that clearly convey these in-group wrongdoings in concrete language:

> On the night of the 2nd of October 1935 the Italian troops stationed in Eritrea penetrated into Ethiopian territory, beginning a war that would lead within a few months to the conquest of the capital Addis Ababa (5th of May 1936), to the expulsion of the legitimate sovereign Haile Selassie, and to the elevation of the Kingdom of Italy to the rank of Empire, proclaimed in Rome on the 9th of May 1936 to an applauding crowd. The Italian forces suffered few losses, but to suppress the resistance of the Ethiopians the Italian army resorted to indiscriminate bombardment and the use of asphyxiating *gas* which caused thousands of casualties, also among the civilians.
> (translated from Benigno Salvemini, 168, specific sub-text lemmas in italics)

> I have the duty to inform you that on the 14th of January 1936, for the first time, *gas bombs* have been employed by the Italian air force. These *bombs* killed twenty peasants. I have personally treated fifteen cases of persons affected by the *gas* bombardment, among them two children. Burns have been caused by *nitrogen mustard*.
> (translated from Benigno Salvemini, 169, quoting *verbatim* the report of Doctor Schuppler to Ethiopia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, recorded in the official journal of the League of Nations; specific sub-text lemmas in italics)

> The war was started on the pretext of incidents that occurred on the border of the Italian possessions in Somalia and Eritrea. The Italian Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, at the head of an imposing deployment of munitions and men, brought it to an end within a few months (May 1936), distinguishing himself for the ferocity with which he conducted the military operations: he utilized chemical weapons banned by international agreements drawn up at the end of the *First World War* and involved the civilian population in the conflict.
> (translated from De Bernardi, Guarracino, 330, specific sub-text lemmas in italics)

The lemmas used more in the second group of textbooks are quite different (see Table 4). Events are described more frequently using terms that are military (lemmas such as *war, annexation, expedition*, *endeavour*) or abstract (lemmas such as *imperialism, ideological*).

Table 4: Lemmas used more in the textbooks oriented towards interpretative abstraction

Lemma	Total occurrences	Sub-occurrences	p-value
war	115	39	0.000
foreign policy	31	13	0.000
sanctions	28	15	0.000
troops	13	7	0.000
Rome-Berlin Axis	9	7	0.000
endeavour	12	6	0.002
empire	12	6	0.002
goods	8	6	0.000
expedition	5	5	0.000
Negus Haile Selassie	5	5	0.000
Ethiopian	7	5	0.001
ideological	8	5	0.001
annexation	8	5	0.001
imperialism	8	4	0.013

Notes: The first column lists lemmas used more in this set of textbooks (sub-text) than in the other set of textbooks (sub-text).
The second column lists occurrences of each lemma in the entire set of seven textbooks (text).
The third column lists occurrences of each lemma only in this specific set of textbooks (sub-text).
The fourth column lists probabilities assigned (by chi-square tests) to the difference between actual sub-occurrences and expected sub-occurrences (Bolasco 2000).

The local contexts of the lemmas characteristic of this specific sub-text reveal how this second group of history textbooks is oriented towards interpretative abstraction. It tends to underline narratives that, relating more to the territorial dimension and to Italian foreign policy during Fascism, describe the colonial war in a more ideological perspective.

Colonialism seems to be somehow justified by the general imperialistic policy also adopted by other European states. The Ethiopians are presented as a weak population unable to offer resistance to the Italian army. The effects of the conflict on African civilians are largely ignored, along with Italian responsibility for war crimes: political and economic consequences for Italian internal affairs, on the contrary, are more frequently specified.

> On the 2nd of October 1935, Mussolini decided to launch the invasion. Most Italians received the decision with approval, partly because the *war* against Ethiopia was represented as one

of a proletarian populace against rich nations. According to the Fascist propaganda, indeed, the true enemy of Italy was Great Britain, which supported Ethiopia in order to block the Italian people from winning their 'place in the sun'. This *ideological* justification made the Ethiopian *endeavour* popular… Ethiopia was governed by *Haile Selassie*, an emperor *(negus)* who had absolute power. It was a very poor country: agriculture, which constituted the prevalent economic activity by far, was very backward in its methods and commerce was obstructed by the scarcity of roads. Although it received help from Great Britain, the Ethiopian army remained weak and badly armed. The *war* was easy and short.
(translated from Lepre, 283, specific sub-text lemmas in italics)

The ruthless war, useless and costly (the last colonial war and the first war *endeavour* unleashed by a European power after 1918) was very significant from the point of view of international relations…The sanctions imposed on Italy were no more than a formality lacking any effectiveness (for example raw materials such as oil, essential for war operations, were excluded from the embargoed goods).
(translated from Detti et al., 197, specific sub-text lemmas in italics)

The Ethiopians posed scant resistance. The League of Nations proclaimed economic *sanctions* against Italy that, however, proved ineffective and had the sole result of increasing consensus in favour of the regime, which transformed into enthusiasm on the 5th of May 1936, at the announcement that the Italian troops had entered the capital Addis Ababa and that Ethiopia had become Italian.
(translated from Lepre, 283, specific sub-text lemmas in italics)

The Italian *expedition*, begun on the 3rd of October 1935, was entrusted from November to the leadership of Pietro Badoglio and concluded in May 1936 with the conquest of all Ethiopia. The ex-kingdom of the negus was thus united with Somalia and Eritrea to form the *empire* of Italian East Africa, the crown of which naturally belonged to Vittorio Emanuele III, promoted for the occasion to the rank of emperor …
The member states of the League of Nations committed themselves not to give credit to Italy, not to supply the country with certain *goods*, to boycott exports, and so on. The *sanctions* however were not serious, and had little effect except to shore up support for the Mussolini regime even in some anti-fascist circles.
(translated from Camera Fabietti, 448–49, specific sub-text lemmas in italics)

6. Concluding Remarks

Within the general theoretical framework we have briefly sketched in the opening pages of this article, our analysis shows how long it may take for the perpetrators' group to elaborate the *loss of moral dignity* blemishing their social

identity after violence enacted against an out-group. In this research line, the elaboration of in-group responsibility after a colonial war seemed particularly important, since in this case victims have often not gained enough power to propose their own interpretation of the history of violence they have suffered.

In this case especially, we show that several generations are needed before the perpetrators' descendants eventually hear the historical truth about their in-group violence, in narratives that abandon the self-serving biases of attempts to defend the image of the in-group in the eyes of new generations in order to make them experience positive feelings towards the "imagined community" (Anderson 1991) in which they happen to be born.

The results of our explorative research shows that the seven contemporary Italian history textbooks under analysis use two main strategies when presenting established historical facts about Italian colonial wars, such as the use of outlawed chemical weapons: one more oriented to protecting the in-group's social identity, the other recognizing more clearly in-group wrongdoings. The first strategy, characteristic of four of the textbooks, employs interpretative abstractions that somehow veil the in-group's moral indignities; the other, characteristic of only three textbooks, presents contrasting clear and straightforward factual descriptions of the in-group's moral indignities.

The narratives used by the group of four textbooks oriented towards interpretative abstractions seem to confirm the hypothesis put forward by many social psychologists working in the field of intergroup reconciliation (for an updated critical review see Nadler et al. 2008b). Although slightly different from one another, these models all consider the need to protect social identity to a source of biases, to which the search for historical truth characterizing the long and difficult period of socio-emotional reconciliation after a war has to accommodate.

The narratives used by the group of three textbooks oriented towards factual descriptions of in-group wrongdoings seem to confirm an alternative hypothesis advanced in the recent work by Pratto and Glasford (2008, see above).

By clearly acknowledging historical fault during colonial wars, these textbooks may in fact positively serve the need for self-esteem and self-integrity of young Italian students learning about this controversial chapter of their in-group past, although in a way threatening their need to belong (Pratto and Glasford 2008).

While a deeper discussion is certainly required, these first results echo the phenomenon of Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB). Linguistic Intergroup Bias (LIB) is the tendency to describe negative in-group and positive out-group behaviours more concretely than positive in-group and negative out-group behaviours (Maass et al. 1989). In fact, results of experiments investigating the role of in-group-protective motives, by varying the threat to the in-group identity of participants, suggest that the magnitude of LIB depends on in-group-protective motivation and that language favouring the in-group may be functional to the maintenance of self-esteem (Maas, Ceccarelli, and Rudin 1996).

Interestingly, the three textbooks narrating in-group wrongdoings during African colonial wars to present-day Italian students with very concrete and detailed words seem to show another facet of this bias. Rather than coming from protective motives directly functional to the maintenance of self-esteem, the use of this communicative strategy in historical narratives teaching negative aspects of the in-group past to young students might instead be directed to gaining a more clear awareness among the in-group of its past moral indignities. We could speculate that when used in historical texts (that are expected to be based on verified facts), this kind of communicative choice may be useful not to accomplish a directly protective function, but to show a moral commitment that appears even greater in the context of the continued lack of power of the victims of yesterday, who even today seem unable simply to impose a forceful acknowledgement of past harm. This situation in which victims remain powerless over time might explain the current amnesia of these past wrongdoings. But, at the same time, it might also make the use of concrete words more meaningful when teaching young Italians about such a difficult page of their own history.

Of course, many questions remain open. What are the effects of these different kinds of narrative on young readers? What kinds of emotions are elicited, when either narrating frankly or omitting to convey facts? How might such moral blame be interiorized by younger generations, obviously free from any personal responsibility? What is the role played by historical identity—bound to the past of one's own "imagined community"—in the overall balance of social identity?

While only a first step, our exploratory analysis suggests that, in spite of the lapse of collective memory that characterizes present-day Italian social discourse about these shameful historical episodes (Pivato 2009; Leone and Curigliano 2009), evidence of a clear account of the historical truth of in-group wrongdoing is found in a minority of the history textbooks examined. This could be seen as an advance of "mature" reconciliation processes regarding the violence enacted by Italians during colonial wars.

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Collective Memories of Portuguese Colonial Action in Africa: Representations of the Colonial Past among Mozambicans and Portuguese Youths

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Collective Memories of Portuguese Colonial Action in Africa: Representations of the Colonial Past among Mozambicans and Portuguese Youths

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Social representations of the colonization and decolonization processes among young people from a former European colonial power (Portugal) and from an African ex-colony (Mozambique) were investigated through surveys using open- and closed-ended questions about national history, focusing on the identity functions of collective memories. Hegemonic and contested representations were found of the most prominent events related to Portuguese colonization of Mozambique, arousing a range of collective emotions. A central place is occupied by memories of the Colonial War, which ended with the Carnation Revolution in Portugal and the subsequent independence of the Portuguese African colonies. Overall, the depiction of colonialism was more negative for Mozambican than for Portuguese participants. The violent effects of colonial action were very salient in Mozambican memories, which stressed the most oppressive aspects of the colonial period, associated with slave trade and brutal repression. On the Portuguese side, the idealization of the voyages of discovery persisted, obscuring the most violent effects of colonial expansion. However, collective memories of colonization of former colonizer and former colonized do not simply stand opposed. Both Mozambican and Portuguese participants reported ambivalent feelings towards the colonization process.

The last colonial empire collapsed thirty-five years ago. The Portuguese was the most enduring European empire and the last one to fall. The empire only finished in 1975, a time usually considered as "postcolonial." After the end of World War II, self-determination movements spread all over Asia and Africa. Attempting to stop the tide, the dictatorial regime of António de Oliveira Salazar—the New State (1926–74)—renewed its efforts to ensure the continuity of Portugal's African empire.[1] The idea of empire was firmly implanted in national consciousness and served as a main source of national pride. Meanwhile, in Portuguese Africa, resistance against colonial rule intensified from the late 1950s on, culminating in an armed liberation struggle (1961–74), which started in Angola and spread to Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, leading to the collapse of colonial rule and, in a related process, to the end of dictatorship in Portugal (Lloyd-Jones and Pinto 2003).

The Revolution of April 25, 1974, which became known as the Carnation Revolution, brought about deep changes in both internal and external Portuguese politics. Measures considered to be priorities were symbolically conveyed by the "3Ds" slogan "Decolonization, Democracy, Development." The end of the Colonial War became an imperative, and more and more frequently crowds cried out on the streets "no more soldiers to the colonies" (Vieira 2000, 171). Negotiations started at once for recognition of the autonomy of the various territories, and the independence of all African former colonies was recognized between by 1975.

1 Salazar ruled until 1968, the New State continued for another six years ruled by his successor, Marcelo Caetano.

About two decades after the decolonization process, the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa, CPLP) was established, a highly heterogeneous and dispersed geo-linguist community of eight "Lusophone" countries. According to Luís António Santos (2003), this community institutionally formalized a post-imperial relationship between Portugal and its former colonies. One of the difficulties faced by Portugal in attempting to establish this community was the need to avoid the charge that the CPLP was designed to support a "neo-colonialist" agenda in Africa.

In fact, nowadays in Portugal, Lusophone rhetoric frequently assumes the form of "imperial nostalgia" (Martins 2006, 80), giving rise to conflicts and misunderstanding, both in international affairs and in interpersonal relations. Despite the Lusophone rhetoric, people of African origin are still discriminated against and Portuguese people hold racial stereotypes that reveal the persistence of old dichotomies and paternalistic prejudices (Cabecinhas 2007; Vala, Brito, and Lopes 1999). These stereotypes are deeply rooted in social memory, with profound impacts on the everyday life of African immigrants in Portugal.

According to the Constitutive Declaration of the CPLP (July 17, 1996),[2] the relationship among its members is one of "cooperation" and "solidarity," aiming to preserve "a historical link and a shared patrimony resulting from centuries of common experiences." But what images do the young people of today have of this "shared past" and "heritage"? Does this "shared past" have the same meaning for the former Portuguese colonizers and for their former colonial subjects? How are the past conflicts between colonies and colonizer remembered today by people who did not directly experience colonial rule? Are these conflicts silenced or reaffirmed?

These questions were the starting point for a program of research on collective memories of colonization in Portuguese-speaking countries. This paper reports and discusses the results of an exploratory study conducted in Portugal and Mozambique. All participants in this research were university students born after the end of Portuguese colonial empire, who were invited to freely remember their national history. Before reporting the method and main results of the empirical research, we will take a brief look at the historical and theoretical background.

1.1. Colonial and "Postcolonial" Times

According to Ravlo, Gleditsch, and Dorussen (2003, 525), "Colonialism—defined as the conquest and control of land and goods—is not a European invention but an old and pervasive feature of human history." In different phases of human history, huge empires have subjugated a vast number of peoples and all kinds of outgroups. However, in historical accounts of colonialism there is a consensus that European countries were the most active colonial actors of the past few centuries, engaged in the conquest, control, and exploitation of most of the globe.

Ravlo, Gleditsch, and Dorussen (2003, 526–28) divide European colonization into three phases: the colonial period; the imperialist period; and the postcolonial period.

The early colonial period, up to the mid-eighteenth century, was based mainly on private commercial interests in overseas possessions. At this time, colonialism meant, above all, the establishment of trading posts in support of trade monopolies. Some colonies in the Americas gained independence at the end of this period: namely, the United States, Mexico, and Brazil. Subsequently, the European countries looked at their possessions in Africa as a way to ensure access to raw materials and markets. After Brazil gained independence, the Portuguese looked at Africa with the dream of forming a New Brazil (Alexandre 1999).

In contrast with early colonialism, imperialist colonization (1870–1945) was an active policy aiming to ensure a global role for European nations. Propelled by the impetus of the industrialization process, almost all European states engaged in competition for new territories and divided among themselves almost the entire land surface of the globe (Ravlo, Gleditsch, and Dorussen 2003, 526).

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2 http://www.cplp.org.

The "postcolonial period" started after World War II, when liberation movements gained ground. By the 1960s, almost all the African colonies had gained independence and the Portuguese was the only European empire that had not collapsed, probably due to the "overwhelming effect of the New State's ideological apparatus on the formation of mentalities" (Alexandre 1999, 143), both within Portugal and in its colonies. One of the priorities of the resistance movements was to rewrite history to overcome the Eurocentric perspective and decolonize people's minds.

Under the New State regime, the political ideology and national historiography, steeped in strongly nationalistic and Eurocentric assumptions, praised Portugal's civilizing role—spreading the Christian faith and morality, civilizing "savage" peoples, and bringing government and infrastructure to the overseas territories (Catroga 1996; Torgal 1996). The regime's propaganda aimed to legitimize the colonial rule, stressing the country's natural colonial vocation and the indigenous people's incapacity to develop on their own. A supposed absence of racism in the Portuguese overseas provinces and the existence there of multiracial societies perfectly integrated into the national whole—the pluri-continental and multiracial Portugal—were principles put forward by the state's propaganda (Cabecinhas and Cunha 2003; Corkill and Almeida 2009). New State propaganda promoted this supposedly "pluri-continental and multira-cial Portugal," which was a core slogan of the dictatorship, by holding up the "voyages of discovery" *(Descobrimentos)* as the "golden age" of Portuguese history and the empire as a core symbol of national identity. Imperialistic narratives were reworked to emphasize Portugal as a major power with a colonial empire spread across the globe, popularizing the saying "from the Minho to Timor." In schoolbooks, Portugal's colonial possessions were superimposed on maps of Europe from the Mediterranean to Russia to underline that Portugal was not "a small country". Colonial exhibitions were held to demonstrate the pivotal role played by Portugal in the world arena, to promote the advantages of empire for both the colonizers and the colonized, and to contribute to the reinforcement of a national mythology according to which the Portuguese possessed unique civilizing qualities that made them "good colonizers" (Corkill and Almeida 2009, 397).

According to the Luso-tropicalism theory (Freyre 1933), the Portuguese were more empathic and open to racial mixing than other European colonizers. Portuguese colonization was considered kinder and less conflict-ridden than Spanish or English colonization. Comparing with other Europeans, Freyre stated that the Portuguese "would be the 'non-conflictual' type—not with absolute ideas, nor inflexible prejudices" (translated from 1933, 191). This theory was selectively appropriated by Salazar's dictatorial regime for legitimizing Portuguese colonialism (Vala, Lopes, and Lima 2008). However, in Mozambique, as in Portugal's other African colonies, the Native Statute that ruled the rights of native people until 1961 was written in a way that allowed situations very close to slavery in the big tea and cotton plantations (Barradas 1991).

After the Carnation Revolution, the decolonization process provoked a huge migration movement from the former African colonies to Portugal, both of Portuguese colonials and of African colonized people. This traumatic return to the "former motherland" (Khan 2009) became a very sensitive issue, since the African colonized people, formally Portuguese, were now treated as foreign invaders, and the Portuguese colonials *(retornados)* also experienced strong hostility from the metropolitan Portuguese, who saw them as a threat to scarce jobs and a moral danger, as they brought new values and lifestyles. For about twenty-five years there was a "period of mourning," where speaking about the Colonial War and the decolonization process was taboo. Only recently have people started to speak more easily about these issues, and the revival of interest in the "old times in Africa" has translated into bestseller publications (novels, photo books of a lost Africa) and even soap operas (e.g. *Jewel of Africa*).

Consolidation of the democratic regime in Portugal and membership in the European Union have brought about huge socio-economic changes. However, the period of voyages of discovery is still presented as the "golden age" in state discourses and schoolbooks, where Portuguese kings and navigators appear as heroes. They are presented as active agents, as protagonists, whereas native people are portrayed as passive (Soares and Jesuíno 2004).

In Mozambique, on the other hand, new interpretations of history have been produced since independence, in order to

overcome the Eurocentric colonial paradigm. The new Mozambican historiography tends to highlight the social conflicts between the colonizers and the colonized, as well as political and economic aspects of colonial action, including the strategies adopted by the New State to ensure economic profitability in Mozambique and favor the colonizers' interests. These new approaches denounce the exploitation of the colonies as a result of asymmetrical social and power relations. The poor social and living conditions of the Mozambican population and various forms of resistance to the colonial presence have become the center of this new discursive strategy. The new approaches assume a nationalist, anti-colonial, and militant character (Feijó 2009). From the 1990s, new visions of history were developed with a new epistemological perspective, analyzing the influence of political and populist ideals in the Mozambican historiography (Magode 1996; Serra 1997).

The content of Mozambique's history schoolbooks emphasizes the role played by many Mozambicans in the long resistance to a foreign invader. Adília Ribeiro's study of official history textbooks provides an analysis of the ideological foundations underlying the respective versions of the country's history (1997). Pre-colonial African kings and emperors, the nationalist Liberation Front of Mozambique, and Mozambican heroes of the struggle against colonial rule are exalted not only in history books, but also in political speeches, in the mass media, in many monuments, and in urban toponymy.

About three decades after Mozambican independence, the political landscape has undergone significant changes. As the apartheid regimes in neighboring countries were dismantled, Mozambique experienced a democratic opening and transition to a multiparty system. However, liberalization of the economy and increased foreign investment did not prevent the persistence or worsening of phenomena such as corruption, regional disparities, and exclusion, subverting the political and social project conceived at the time of independence. The country is currently pursuing

the democratization of education, which has been translated, for example, into a proliferation of public and private universities.

1.2. Conflicting Versions of Colonial History

Before reporting young people's collective memories of colonization in Portugal and Mozambique it seems appropriate to look at the way national history is portrayed in government websites of the two countries. This quick snapshot gives an insight into how colonial history has been taught in formal education in these two countries, since its content is in accordance with the one portrayed in the history schoolbooks (Ribeiro 1997; Soares and Jesuíno 2004).[3]

On the Mozambican government website, the history section is divided into four parts: the pre-colonial period, colonial penetration, the struggle for independence, and postcolonial economy.[4] In this account, little information is given about the history before the Portuguese arrived. There is only one paragraph dedicated to the "pre-colonial period," with short references to the ways of life of the "primitive people of Mozambique" and to the main African migration movements in the region.

In contrast, there is great emphasis on the economic exploitation of natural resources and slave trafficking during colonial penetration. The account explains that by the end of the fifteenth century there was "Portuguese market penetration" on the coast. Only later was there "a process of military conquest," initially aiming to control gold mining, and later the commercialization of ivory and slaves, "engaging in the slave trade even after its official abolition." At the Berlin Conference of 1884, "Portugal was forced to effectively occupy the territory of Mozambique. Given its military and financial incapacity, Portugal granted the sovereignty of vast territories to leasing companies" in the north of the country, dedicated mainly to the plantation economy, while the south remained under direct rule of the colonial state, developing a service economy, which "explains the current asymmetry between the north and south of the country."

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3 Not all school history books reproduce the official version, but this provides an overview of the predominant approach.

4 http://www.portaldogoverno.gov.mz/Mozambique/resHistorico.

The account also explains that there was always resistance against Portuguese occupation and that the so-called pacification of Mozambique was not achieved until the twentieth century. Special emphasis is given to the liberation struggle and the declaration of independence: "Oppression for centuries under the Portuguese colonial regime would force the people of Mozambique to take up arms and fight for independence." FRELIMO (the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) was founded in 1962 and began the armed struggle for national liberation on September 25, 1964, in the north of the country. Eduardo Mondlane, the first President of FRELIMO, was murdered in 1969. Samora Machel succeeded him and proclaimed the country's independence on June 25, 1975.

After independence, the country faced "an armed conflict led by RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance). This conflict claimed many lives and destroyed much economic infrastructure." The conflict ended in 1992 with the signing of the General Peace Agreement, and in 1994 the country held its first multiparty elections, won by FRELIMO (which has remained the ruling party to this day).

In the post-colonial period, the account explains, the independent Mozambique inherited a colonial economic structure characterized by an asymmetry between north and south—and especially between Maputo (and Beira) and the rest of the country—characterized by the absence of economic integration and extreme oppression of labor in the north. The unfavorable regional and international situations, natural disasters, and an internal military conflict lasting sixteen years blocked FRELIMO's planned strategy for developing the country. This account of history ends by explaining that many Mozambicans still live below the poverty line despite the remarkable economic growth that the country has recorded. The fight against absolute poverty is a major priority. In fact, Mozambique was until recently one of the poorest countries in Africa, and even if the end of the civil war has allowed strong economic growth, the country still faces a huge rate of extreme poverty and occupies a very low position in the Human Development Index.[5]

On the official Portuguese government website, the period of Portuguese expansion is highlighted, since despite the difficulties resulting from the small size of the country, it created an empire that "lasted from 1415 to 1975."[6] The Portuguese routes in the Atlantic and Indian oceans are mentioned, with an emphasis on several "voyages of discovery."[7] Portuguese contributions to European scientific development and economic and political relationships with "African people" are stressed. The territorial occupation of the African land is described as unavoidable, due to pressure from more powerful European countries: "Despite having vast territories in Africa, Portugal had no means to settle and to defend its military presence in a context in which the great powers (which Portugal was not) were engaged in a policy of effective occupation of this continent." Portugal had "no vision of territorial occupation (which was imposed by the circumstances in Africa), but the establishment of trading posts. However, it was *forced, in order to not lose the only thing that gave it world status,* to engage in the colonization of the territories of Angola and Mozambique through military occupation" (emphasis added). However, "the dream of a new Brazil" in Africa (from coast to coast, linking Angola and Mozambique) "was prevented by British imperial ambitions."

During the New State dictatorship, Portugal strove to preserve its colonial heritage against the decolonizing trend of the times, fighting a long war on three fronts. The end of the longest dictatorship in the history of Western Europe arrived on April 25, 1974. After the decolonization process, "Portugal refocused its foreign policy and joined the European Union in 1986. However, as an important component of its national strategy, Portugal did not abandon the historical connection to the Portuguese speaking countries."

5 According to the 2009 Human Development Report, Mozambique occupies 172d position in the ranking (HDI=0.402), while Portugal appears at 34th position (HDI=0.909). http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2009.

6 http://www.portugal.gov.pt.

7 The expression "discovery" is obviously ethnocentric: "as explorers, the Portuguese (the Europeans) were also discovered" (translated from Catroga 1996, 618). Moreover, most of the so-called discoveries—like the ocean route to India found by Vasco da Gama—are discoveries only from the Western perspective, (Meneses 2008).

Thus, both Mozambican and Portuguese official websites emphasize the colonization period and mention the Colonial War (even if this particular expression is not used). The Portuguese account emphasizes "voyages of discovery" while the Mozambican one foregrounds the active struggle against foreign occupation and the heavy "heritage" of the colonial past that explains the problems the country faces today.

1.3. Identity Functions of Collective Memory

The (re)making of national history is always a comparative process, since the history of every nation includes relationships with others. Each nation's interpretation of the past determines its positioning in the present and its strategies for the future that define relationships among and within nations in a dynamic process that may balance between stability and change, the definition of new borders or their abolishment.

As Halbwachs points out, memory is not an individual phenomenon but a social one (1950 [1997]). People can only remember things that are mediated by communication in their respective social groups and that they can accommodate in their existing social frames of reference.

There is a constant interplay between social identity and the social representations of history. As Liu and Hilton point out: "History provides us with narratives that tell us who we are, where we came from and where we should be going. It defines a trajectory which helps construct the essence of a group's identity, how it relates to other groups, and ascertains what its options are for facing present challenges" (2005, 537).

According to Liu and László (2007), the memories that have proven to be important to the group are encoded into stories and preserved as public narratives, making it possible for new members to learn group history. People (re)create their group's historical past according to the group's actual needs and using social representation processes (Moscovici 1988). Social representations of history are organized through narrative templates (László 2003; Liu and László 2007). Their schematic nature is produced by repeated use of standard narrative forms (re)produced by instances such as schoolbooks, commemorations, monuments, and mass media.

Cross-cultural studies about social representations of world history show that people tend to remember mostly wars and political conflicts (Liu et al. 2005, 2009). As Liu and László point out there seem to be two reasons for the importance of conflict in social representations: conflict seems to be a basic template for human story-telling and it generates extreme emotions (2007). The social sharing of emotions promotes a sense of community and may play a crucial role in the processes of formation and transformation of social representations of history (Rimé 2005).

According to Liu and László, fights and wars are remembered more easily because they provide elements for a good narrative: they have protagonists (heroes) and antagonists (villains), a beginning (causal fact), action (exciting plot), and an ending, with relevance for the group's definition (2007). Moreover, conflicts and war play a central role in nation building, frequently being considered the foundational events in a nation's history. As pointed out by Charles Tilly: "War made the state, and the state made war" (1975). These processes are reflected in the content of social representations about history which (re)produce state-based narratives of history (Paez and Liu in press).

Licata, Klein, and Gély consider that collective memory fulfils four important identity functions (2007): contributing to the definition of group identity and to achieving positive distinctiveness (by processes of selective remembering and oblivion); providing justifications for a group's actions (past, present, and future); and enabling collective mobilization by challenging the legitimacy and stability of the existing social order. In line with this perspective, we formulate the following hypotheses:

a) Hypothesis 1 – Events related to the formation of a person's nation-state and the establishment of its borders will be the most remembered and the most positively evaluated by both Portuguese and Mozambican participants.
b) Hypothesis 2 – Each group will enhance their active role during the colonization period: Portuguese participants will focus on voyages of discovery while Mozambicans will focus on the successful fight for independence.

c) Hypothesis 3 – The violent side of colonization will be more present in Mozambicans' responses; they will remember more negative events concerning the colonization period (slavery, massacres, economic exploitation) than Portuguese participants.

d) Hypothesis 4 – The Colonial War will be more remembered and more positively evaluated by Mozambican participants than by Portuguese participants.

2. Method

Empirical research was conducted in Mozambique and Portugal. In each country, a questionnaire about world history and national history was administered to young people and their representations of colonial issues were analyzed. National groups are always very heterogeneous, comprising a wide diversity of individuals with different backgrounds, experiences, and social positioning. In this paper, we analyze solely representations of university students. The objective is not to generalize the results to the whole population, but rather to analyze the perceptions of these particular young people.

2.1. Procedure

Data were gathered using the same procedure in both countries for the purposes of comparative analysis. In Portugal, data were collected at the University of Minho in Braga, while in Mozambique data were collected at four universities in the capital city, Maputo: Universidade Pedagógica, Universidade Politécnica, Instituto Superior de Ciências e Tecnologias de Moçambique, and Escola Superior de Economia e Gestão.

The survey was conducted in university classrooms. Students were invited to participate in an international study on history. The cover page explained to participants that what mattered was their personal opinions about history, rather than their knowledge. After all participants completed the task, there was a debriefing explaining the aim of the study. Data from the survey was complemented by a series of face-to-face interviews in both countries.

2.2. Participants

A total of 298 university students participated in this study: 180 Mozambicans (99 women and 81 men; average age 26 years) and 118 Portuguese (70 women and 48 men; average age 21 years). None of the Portuguese participants reported having visited Mozambique (or other African countries); two Mozambican participants had visited Portugal.

All Portuguese participants reported Portuguese as their mother language. A broad diversity of mother languages appears when it comes to Mozambican participants: Portuguese (31.11 percent), Chagana (23.33 percent), Ronga (10.56 percent), Gitonga (8.33 percent), Chope (4.44 percent), Macua (4.44 percent), Xitsua (3.88 percent), Chuabo (2.78 percent), Ndau (2.78 percent), Nyunawe (1.67 percent), Sena (1.67 percent), and others (6.05 percent). This great diversity of languages mirrors the linguistic scene in Mozambique, a country with one official language—Portuguese—and many national and regional languages.

Concerning the other languages spoken, Portuguese participants reported speaking one or two other European languages, mainly English and French. Mozambican participants reported speaking on average three or four further languages, including native languages and European ones. So there is a strong asymmetry in the samples: while the Portuguese had no contact with African culture and languages, the Mozambicans were strongly influenced by European culture: they all spoke Portuguese (about one third as their mother tongue) and two thirds spoke other European languages (mainly English and French).

It is also important to mention that there is a huge predominance of the populations of the south in the Mozambican sample, particularly the Maronga people, known in Maputo as the intellectual elite.[8] This group had more contact with the Portuguese during the colonial period and therefore was more familiarized with Portuguese culture. There was also a predominance of Machangane (speakers of Changane, mainly originating from Gaza and the northern part

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8 The Maronga group (who speak Ronga) lives especially in the area between Maputo City, Matola, and Marracuene. It is important to note that the postwar migration movements transformed Maputo into an intercultural city where people from all the Mozambican provinces live.

of Maputo province), which was the ethnic group of great FRELIMO leaders such as Mondlane, Machel, and Chissano.

2.3 Survey Questions

The survey had the same structure in both countries, with only minor language and content adjustments, according to the pre-test conducted in each of these countries. The first part of the survey comprised open questions on world history, using an adaptation of the procedure pioneered by Liu et al. (2005), while the second part focused on national history following the same open procedure. The content of the first part of the survey was exactly the same for both countries because it covered "world history," whilst the content of the second part asked about the specific "history of Mozambique" or "history of Portugal."

The survey also included questions about social identity (national, supranational, ethnic, religious, etc.) and socio-demographic questions (participants' sex, age, nationality, mother language and other languages spoken, countries visited, etc.). The questions relating to social identity and socio-demographic characterization had to be adjusted to each country.

Participants were asked to list the "five events" they considered to have been most important for their own country's national history. Once this list had been completed, participants were asked to assess the impact (positive or

negative) of each one on national history and, finally, asked to assess their emotions when thinking about these events. No pre-established list was presented to the participants, so the evocation of the events was completely free. Emotions provoked by events were also expressed freely. However, the impact of events was assessed using a seven-point scale, from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive).

Participants' identification levels with the ingroup and with several outgroups considered to be relevant to the study were measured. Identification levels were measured using a seven-point scale, from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strong identification).

In this paper we discuss only the results pertaining to events related to colonial issues in national history, exploring the role of national (Mozambican or Portuguese) and supranational (African or European) identification on the impact attributed by participants to events relating to colonialism.

3. Results and Discussion
3.1 Collective Memories of the Colonial Past

Table 1 displays the Top 10 events spontaneously listed by Mozambican and Portuguese participants when thinking about their national history. Before interpreting the collective memories of colonization, we will briefly overview the pattern of events found in each sample.

Table 1: The ten most mentioned events in Mozambican and Portuguese national history

Mozambique (N=180)	%	Impact	Portugal (N=118)	%	Impact
National independence	81.67	6.80 (0.92)	Carnation Revolution	80.51	6.58 (0.88)
General Peace Agreement	43.89	6.74 (1.08)	Voyages of discovery	79.66	6.41 (1.13)
War of Liberation	36.11	6.35 (1.57)	Foundation of Republic	41.52	6.02 (1.01)
Civil war	32.22	1.89 (1.84)	Joining the European Union	36.44	6.00 (0.9)
Colonization	28.33	2.75 (2.18)	New State dictatorship	29.66	2.15 (1.26)
Multi-party system	22.78	6.18 (1.41)	Foundation of Portugal	20.34	6.75 (0.43)
Samora Machel's death	20.00	1.79 (1.62)	Colonialism	16.10	2.18 (1.11)
First general elections	17.78	6.45 (1.38)	Decolonization	16.10	3.53 (2.03)
Lusaka Agreements	15.00	5.50 (2.40)	Restoration of independence	11.02	6.75 (0.43)
Cahora Bassa transfer	14.44	6.16 (1.54)	Colonial War	10.17	1.27 (0.45)

% = Percentage of participants that spontaneously evoked the event.
Impact = Impact mean (and standard deviation); impact scale: 1=very negative; 7=very positive

Events related to national independence get a predominant place in both countries, along with events related to present-day political affairs. The country's independence elicits strong positive emotions in both groups (pride, joy, happiness). The present-day situation elicits milder or mixed emotions in both cases. Overall, the Mozambican participants report more negative emotions concerning their national history than the Portuguese.

The sort of historical memories reported when evoking national history differed considerably between Mozambique and Portugal. The major difference related to the recentness of events brought up and their emotional tone. Taking the young age of the participants into consideration, it is natural that events that they have recently witnessed are much more present in their memory and

therefore more easily brought up than more distant events they have learned about from their family, school, and the media. Although both groups privileged recent events over those further away in time, displaying a recency effect (Liu et al. 2009), in the Mozambican case the focus on the very recent past was stronger. The violent and painful events of recent Mozambican history—of which these young Mozambicans had direct or very close experience during childhood—have to be taken into account when interpreting these data. On the other hand, the fact that the young Portuguese bring up the "glorious" distant past of the "voyages of discovery," contributed to weakening the recency effect.

Two events were listed by the vast majority of Portuguese participants: the 25th of April 1974 and the voyages of dis-

covery, occupying respectively the first and second position in the ranking of Portuguese responses. Both events are perceived by respondents as very positive and are associated with very positive emotions: admiration, pride, and happiness. Both events are linked with colonization, since these are the moments that signal the beginning and end of the Portuguese empire. However, participants' responses reveal that the Carnation Revolution is associated with positive emotions because it is seen as the end of the dictatorship, not because it represented an important juncture in the decolonization process.

Portuguese participants also refer to the foundation of the Portuguese state in the twelfth century (20.3 percent) and the restoration of independence in 1640, after eighty years of Spanish domination (11.0 percent). Both events were considered to be very positive by the Portuguese participants and were associated with positive emotions: pride and joy. However, these events were cited less frequently than more recent events like the foundation of the republic in 1910 (41.5 percent) and accession to the European Union in 1986 (36.4 percent), which were also seen as very positive events, although less so than the first two. The Salazar dictatorship was evoked by 29.7 percent of the participants, viewed very negatively ($M = 2.15$; $SD = 1.26$), evoking disgust and frustration.

A huge majority of the Mozambican participants (81.67 percent) mentioned national independence, on June 25, 1975. This event is regarded as the most positive event in the history of the country ($M = 6.8$; $SD = 0.92$). The second most mentioned event was the General Peace Agreement that ended the sixteen-year civil war (43.89 percent), and was viewed as very positive ($M = 6.74$; $SD = 1.08$).

The War of Liberation was the third most mentioned event by Mozambican participants (36.11 percent; $M = 6.35$), closely followed by the civil war (32.22 percent; $M = 1.89$). These two wars have similar degrees of remembering, but very different emotional meanings.

The civil war of 1976–92 was negatively evaluated and associated with extremely negative emotions: frustration, disgust, hate.[9] This is a recent event with a tremendously traumatic impact that these students had lived through during their childhood. On the other hand, the War of Liberation (1964–74) was positively evaluated and associated with mixed emotions, mainly pride, frustration, and joy, but also disgust and anguish.[10]

"Colonization" (labeled as such) was mentioned by 28.33 percent of the Mozambican participants and received an overall negative evaluation ($M = 2.75$; $SD = 2.18$). However, it was also the most polarized, in the sense that the evaluation ranged from very negative to very positive, with several participants rating it as neutral. On the other hand, the arrival of the Portuguese in Mozambique was seen as very positive by the few Mozambicans who made explicit reference to the beginning of the colonial process: the "arrival of the Portuguese" (3.33 percent; $M=6.33$; $SD=0.94$) and the "arrival of Vasco da Gama" (2.22 percent; $M=6.75$; $SD=0.43$).

The Cahora Bassa transfer agreement, signed in November 2005, ended long negotiations between Mozambique and Portugal about control of the Cahora Bassa dam, which is the largest dam in southern Africa and was the biggest infrastructure investment made during the colonial period. This event received huge and strongly nationalist media coverage in Mozambique, and was on the front page of all the Maputo newspapers. In Mozambique one still sees many people wearing T-shirts bearing the slogan "Cahora Bassa é nossa!" [Cahora Bassa is ours]. It figured in the survey as a very positive event (14.44 percent; $M=6.16$; $SD=1.54$).

The clearest divergences between the Mozambican and Portuguese patterns of responses are observed in the evocation and emotional tone associated with the Portuguese voyages of discovery, colonialism, and decolonization.

As already indicated, the "voyages of discovery" were the second most often mentioned event in Portuguese national

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9 Some participants mentioned this event under other names: the sixteen-year war or the war of destabilization.

10 Some participants mentioned other labels for this event: War of Resistance or liberation struggle.

history and were consensually considered to be very positive (79.7 percent; M = 6.41; SD = 1.13). Considering that the voyages of discovery are a very remote event, Portuguese participants focus on them because they are permanently updated in schoolbooks and the media, where they are presented as the most "glorious" moments in national history.

Contrary to voyages of discovery, whose impact is consensually perceived as positive, colonialism is negatively evaluated (16.1 percent; M = 2.18; SD = 1.11), with the Colonial War being perceived as the most negative event in national history (10.2 percent; M = 1.27; SD = 0.45); both provoke strongly negative emotions: mainly frustration, shame and disgust. "Decolonization" (16.1 percent) turns out to be the most polarized event, as opinions on its impact cover the full range of the scale, resulting in a mean value close to midscale (M = 3.53; SD = 2.03).[11] The emotions associated with this event vary from the most positive to the most negative.

As mentioned before, young Portuguese and Mozambicans both tend to evaluate "colonization" negatively (respectively, M=2.18 and M=2.75). However, several violent events related to colonization are more salient in the Mozambicans' answers.

Mozambican participants mention several events related to the struggle against Portuguese colonial rule. During the last decades before independence, various forms of Mozambican protest were violently repressed by the state. One of the most dramatic episodes happened in Mueda on June 16, 1960, where many protesters demanding the end of forced labor and the opening of free markets for products and food at affordable prices were brutally massacred with bayonets on the orders of the provincial governor (Hedges 1999, 241–43). The Massacre of Mueda was evoked by 8.33 percent of Mozambican participants and was rated as very negative (M = 1.21; SD = 0.77), being associated with strong negative emotions, mainly disgust and frustration. This massacre, which caused an unknown number of deaths (about fourteen according to Portuguese accounts and

about six hundred according to Mozambican accounts), led FRELIMO president Eduardo Mondlane to conclude that nonviolent protest would not bring about change, so the only hope for achieving independence was through armed struggle (Mondale 1969).

The slave trade was mentioned by 11.11 percent of the Mozambican participants, being considered the most negative event of Mozambican history (M = 1; SD = 0). On the other hand, when thinking about national history, Portuguese mentioned the "Portuguese voyages of discovery" and no one mentioned the "slave traffic" (although two respondents referred to the "Abolishment of slavery"). Thus, issues related to slavery are much more salient for Mozambican than for Portuguese participants, who forgot this extremely violent side of the colonial occupation.

3.2. Social Identification and Memories of the Colonial Past

Table 2 displays the levels of national and supranational identification. Both groups declared strong national identification (M = 6.32 for Mozambicans and M = 6.29 for Portuguese) and less strong supranational identification (M = 5.52 and M = 5.94 respectively). In both cases, there was a significant correlation between national and supranational identification: for Mozambican participants the stronger the identification with Mozambique, the stronger the identification with Africa (r = 0.35, p < 0.001); for Portuguese participants the stronger the identification with Portugal the stronger the identification with Europe (r = 0.60, p < 0.001).

Interestingly, Mozambican participants reported a higher degree of identification with Portugal (M = 3.46), than Portuguese participants with Mozambique (M = 2.34), t = 4.658, p < 0.001. So, it seems that the "bonds" created by colonialism are stronger among the former colonized than among the former colonizer.

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[11] We aggregated four participants who mentioned "independence of African colonies."

Table 2: National and supranational identification

Identification with ...	in Mozambique (N = 180)	in Portugal (N = 118)
Africa	5.52 (2.04)	2.51 (1.33)
Europe	2.75 (2.05)	5.94 (1.08)
Mozambique	6.32 (1.40)	2.34 (1.22)
Portugal	3.46 (2.23)	6.29 (1.07)

Scale: 1 = not at all; 7 = very strongly

To explore the role of social identification in remembrance of colonial events, we calculated the overall mean impact attributed to the events related to colonialism freely evoked by the participants in each sample, and correlated it with levels of national and supranational (both ingroup and outgroup) identification. The variables with significant correlations in each sample were submitted to multiple regression linear analyses (MLRA), method *stepwise*, with the mean impact attributed to colonial events as the dependent variable.

For the Mozambican sample, the level of identification with Mozambique is the only predictor of the impact attributed to colonial issues: the stronger the national identification, the more positive the impact attributed to events related to colonialism ($\beta = 0.198$, $p < 0.021$). This is apparently a very intriguing result, since we would expect the opposite pattern to occur. However, this result is mainly due to the positive impact attributed to the War of Liberation, which was the most evoked event related to the colonial period. When the War of Liberation is excluded, the mean impact attributed to colonial issues drops significantly: from 5.37 (SD = 1.74) to 2.74 (SD = 2.28). A new MLRA performed for the Mozambican sample excluding the War of Liberation did not produce significant results, probably due to the reduction in the number of persons included in the analysis.

For the Portuguese sample, the mean impact attributed to events related to colonialism was positive (M = 5.43;

SD = 1.65). When the Colonial War (which is the Portuguese label for the War of Liberation) is excluded, the mean impact attributed to colonial issues increases slightly (M = 5.83; SD = 1.35). A MLRA performed for the Portuguese sample including all events related to colonialism did not produce significant results. However, a new MLRA excluding the Colonial War from the computation revealed significant results. The level of identification with Portugal is the major predictor of the impact attributed to events related to colonial period: the stronger the national identification, the more positive the impact attributed to colonial events ($\beta = 0.273$, $p = 0.013$). The level of identification with Mozambique is the second, marginally significant, predictor: the weaker the identification with Mozambique, the more positive the impact attributed to colonial events ($\beta = -0.181$, $p = 0.096$).

These results indicate a complex relationship involving patterns of ingroup and outgroup identification and the meanings attributed to colonial issues. Even if the explained variance of these models is quite low (adjusted $R^2 = 0.027$ for the Mozambican sample and = 0.080 for the Portuguese sample), they open fruitful perspectives for further research. For Portuguese participants, the stronger the national identification, the greater the glorification of the colonial past, mainly due to the evocation of "voyages of discovery." For Mozambican participants, the stronger the national identification, the greater the exaltation of the War of Liberation, but national identification did not affect the evaluation of other colonial-era events. Results also indicate that it is important to study not only the role of ingroup identification, but also the role of outgroup identification, as stronger outgroup identification can encourage less bi-polar visions of the colonial period.

4. Concluding Remarks

The aim of this research was to analyze collective memories of the colonial past among young people in Portugal (as the former European colonial power) and Mozambique (as a former Portuguese colony). Freely recalling their national history, the participants of both countries brought up a common set of historical events related to colonial issues. However, the frequency of recall of these "common" events, their evaluation and emotional tone were differed consider-

ably according to the country's position as former colonizer or former colony.

The voyages of discovery are considered to be one of the most important events in Portugal's history, bringing up a consensus of positive feelings among young Portuguese, which suggests that idealization of this period persists. It is still represented as the "golden age." There is an idealization of voyages of discovery, from which the violent effects of colonization are set apart.

As pointed out by Lourenço (1990, 22), there is a "strange permanence within the core of the change" as the empire remains in the Portuguese imaginary. In line with this view, Alexandre (1999) states that the myth of Luso-tropicalism (Freyre 1933) did not end with the falling of the empire, still flowing in the background even among the younger generations. According to Alexandre, this persistence is due to the long-term consequences of the New State's ideological propaganda on the formation of mentalities, and the similarity between Luso-tropicalism and "some of the ideas based on Portuguese nationalism (colonizer competency, the ability to harmoniously relate to other races and peoples, the educational mission of the country)" (translated from Alexandre 1999, 143–44).

As emphasized by Sobral, the persistence of this euphemistic picture of Portuguese colonization hinders acknowledgement and representation of "the most brutal effects of colonial expansion" (2004, 425). By contrast, these brutal effects are very visible in Mozambican memories.

However, some events of recent Mozambican history evoke more negative evaluations than colonization. The suffering of their ancestors under Portuguese rule was learned vicariously through the social sharing of emotions with their relatives and by formal education and national media. The civil war, on the other hand, was a painful first-hand experience.

The Portuguese participants considered the 1961–74 war, which they labeled as the *Colonial War or Overseas War*, the most negative event in the Portuguese history. This event was evoked by about 10 percent of the Portuguese participants. The same event was evoked by about 36 percent of the

Mozambican participants, who labeled it the *War of Liberation*, *War of Resistance*, or *Armed Struggle*. In contrast to the Portuguese, Mozambican participants considered the impact of this war very positive since it led to independence. Feelings towards the War of Liberation were mixed, but predominantly positive.

The kind of events spontaneously evoked by Mozambican and Portuguese participants about colonization are in accordance with our hypotheses, illustrating the identity functions of collective memory (Licata et al. 2007).

The events related to the formation of each nation-state were remembered more than other events and/or evaluated more positively by both Portuguese and Mozambican participants (hypothesis 1), showing the importance of collective memory in the definition of group identity. Each group emphasized its active role during the colonization period: Portuguese participants focused on voyages of discovery while Mozambicans focused on the successful fight for independence (hypothesis 2), showing that collective memory contributes to the achievement of positive distinctiveness. Findings also show that the stronger the national identification and the lower the outgroup identification, the stronger the tendency for exaltation of past ingroup actions, leading to oblivion of the violent negative consequences of past ingroup actions.

Mozambicans remembered more negative events concerning the colonization period (slave trade, massacres, exploitation) than Portuguese participants (hypothesis 3). The Colonial War was more remembered and more positively evaluated by Mozambican participants than by Portuguese participants (hypothesis 4). This pattern of remembrance provides justification for the group's actions: Mozambican engagement in armed struggle for independence. Even though this war caused a lot of casualties and suffering, it is positively evaluated by Mozambicans as it is considered as a necessary and just war to liberate the country from colonial oppression.

When spontaneously evoking "colonization" (labeled as such), both Mozambican and Portuguese participants evaluated it as negative and reported negative feelings about

it. However, the impact rating and emotional resonance of colonization cannot be explained on a simple national basis: both Mozambican and Portuguese samples reported ambivalence toward colonization.

In order to better understand these ambiguous representations of colonization, further research should be conducted in order to deepen issues like the influence of ethnic group, gender, and age, and their complex interactions. Researching the collective memories of different regional groups is particularly important in Mozambique, since it is still a country with huge regional disparities in terms of access to education, infrastructure, and development (and different ethnic groups played different roles in the colonization process and the resistance). In addition, Mozambicans' representations of colonial issues should be compared with those prevailing in other former Portuguese colonies in Africa. Finally, it would be also pertinent to compare the pattern of results obtained in Portugal with the results in other European countries, whether former colonial powers or not.

Collective memories may play an important role in the shaping of present-day relations between former colonizer and former colonized peoples, and may have profound impacts on their visions about future relations between Europe and Africa (Cabecinhas and Nhaga 2008; Licata and Klein 2005).

Findings in Mozambique and Portugal clearly show that historical memories comprise both consensual and conflictual elements, between and within groups; there is also some degree of internal ambivalence as, in some cases, a given event elicits emotions of opposite valence in the same participant.

Globally, a negative depiction of colonization prevailed, and it was associated with negative emotions. Colonization brings to mind a set of negative elements to many students who never lived through the colonial period. This was particularly evident among Mozambicans, who stressed the most oppressive aspects of the colonial period, associated with the slave trade and violent repression. Participants in this research did not live the colonial period, but they learned about the Portuguese presence in Mozambique, the colonial socio-economic system, Mozambican resistance to

the foreign presence, and the previously conflictual relationship between the Portuguese and the Mozambicans, from school and their families.

As mentioned above, there are some inconsistencies and ambivalences in the opinions of students concerning the colonial period, especially in the Mozambican sample. In face-to-face interviews, many students mentioned contradictions between the discourse learned in the classroom and the testimonies of family members, parents and grandparents (as expressed by one participant, "My parents remember all good"). When evoking conversations held in their family, some students made references to the positive side of the colonial past (construction commercial infrastructure, communication, health, and education) that they usually contrasted with the problems experienced now. The high unemployment rate, low wages, financial instability and price inflation, as well as periodic shortages of essential goods, especially during the sixteen-year civil war, facilitated oblivion of the difficulties experienced in the past in these oral accounts. This appreciation of some aspects of the colonial past can be understood as a criticism of the present day situation. These are opinions expressed by the young African elite, aware that much of the existing infrastructure in Maputo has been inherited from the colonial period. As stated by one student, in a clearly measured tone: "Independence … was an evil that came for the good. Because there were negative things, for example, a situation where we did not develop. We remained behind in development. Because I think that the Portuguese came to bring civilization to Mozambique. Therefore, we suffered. There were many deaths."

European colonialism was much more than conquest and control of land and commodities. Due to its endurance and systematic exploitation, colonialism translated into soft power that lasts until the present-day. Formally we are living in postcolonial times, but colonialism persists in people's minds, shaping personal trajectories and intergroup relations. As Frantz Fanon points out, "Colonization is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native's brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of oppressed people, and distorts, disfigures and destroys it" (Fanon 1963, 70).

The myth of Luso-tropicalism seems to continue to structure the representations of the colonial process in Portugal, leading to oblivion of their more brutal aspects. Nor is it completely absent in Mozambican answers, illustrating the pervasiveness of the oppressive effects of the colonial process.

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Holocaust or Benevolent Paternalism? Intergenerational Comparisons on Collective Memories and Emotions about Belgium's Colonial Past

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Holocaust or Benevolent Paternalism? Intergenerational Comparisons on Collective Memories and Emotions about Belgium's Colonial Past

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After publication of Adam Hochschild's *King Leopold's Ghost* in 1998, asserting that King Leopold II had been responsible for a "holocaust" in the Congo and the heated public debate this provoked, we set out to study Belgian people's reactions to these accusations. In two studies we compared collective memories of and emotions associated with Belgium's colonial action in the Congo in different generations. Results show higher levels of collective guilt and support for reparative actions among young adults than among older generations. This difference can be explained either by referring to the different ideological backgrounds in which different generations were socialized, as evidenced by stark differences in collective memories of colonialism, or by referring to the influence of national identification. Indeed, people could adapt their representations of colonialism in order to avoid experiencing a social identity threat. However, evidence for the identity-protecting functions of collective memories and collective emotions was only found in the older generations: young people held negative representations of colonialism independently of their level of national identification. We refer to the normative dimension of collective guilt to interpret these results.

1. A Severed Bronze Hand

An imposing statuary group stands by the sea in Ostend, Belgium, erected in 1931 to honor the city's "genial protector", King Leopold II. The statuary group is dominated by an equestrian statue of the king, with two sets of figures looking up to him in gratitude: on one side local fishermen, peasants and city dwellers, on the other, Congolese people accompanied by a European explorer (probably Stanley). In 2004, a local anarchist group *(De Stoete Ostendenoare)*, cut the hand off one of the Congolese figures.

One of the members explained in an anonymous newspaper interview that their action had been a protest against the official version—as stated on a nearby plaque—that the Congolese were grateful to the Belgian king for freeing them from Arab slavery (De Coninck 2005). The anarchists offered to return the stolen hand in exchange for a rectification: "This is pure revisionism. What King Leopold II did was to administer the Congo as his private property and exploit the Congolese in his rubber plantations. Everyone knows it was common practice to cut off the hands of Con-

golese who were judged to be lazy. This is why we severed the hand. It makes the image more realistic" (translated from De Coninck 2005). Today, the hand is still missing.

This incident reveals much about the Belgians' relationship with the memory of the colonization of the Congo. To start with, it opposes two radically different versions of Belgium's colonial history. The first, symbolized by the monument, is a narrative of civilization and development accomplished by the Belgians, under the guidance of Leopold II. In less than eighty years they turned this *terra incognita*—this "heart of darkness" (Conrad 1902) fallen prey to hostile nature, continuous tribal wars, and cruel slave traders—into a prosperous land equipped with a modern infrastructure, means of communication, hospitals, and schools. We found expressions of that representation when we interviewed former Belgian colonials for a previous study (Licata and Klein 2005). They compared the relationship between colonizers and colonized to that between parents and children. According to this paternalistic view (Jackman 1994), colonization was primarily aimed at fulfilling the needs of

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the colonized, as a father would care for his children. They reminded us that the Congolese called the white colonials "Noko" (uncle). The second representation, the one symbolized by the anarchists' action, presents colonialism as a large-scale enterprise of systematic human rights violations—forced labor, bloody repression of uprisings, atrocities—for the benefit of first an unscrupulous king, later a nation of shameless exploiters.

These representations embody two different kinds of collective memory. The anarchists attack a vector of the official memory put forward by the authorities: cast in bronze, commemorated in collective rituals, taught in schoolbooks. They stand instead for a vivid, dissident memory, closer to the people, orally transmitted, and resisting official influence (van Ypersele 2006). They oppose "revisionism" and sought to render the representation "more realistic" by severing the hand.

During the past decade, the opposition between these two versions of the colonial past has come to the surface in different ways in Belgium. The conflict was triggered—or revived—in 1998 by the publication of American journalist Adam Hochschild's book *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa*, which was translated into French and Dutch the same year. A bestseller, the book resuscitated a long-forgotten controversy about the real nature of Leopoldian colonialism (Marechal 2005). Hochschild explains how Leopold II started by financing Henry Morton Stanley's expeditions to central Africa, then managed to convince the European powers to let him rule the Congolese territory (about eighty times the size of Belgium) at the 1885 Berlin Conference. The Congo Free State virtually became his private property, while the Belgian government was then uninvolved. Hochschild depicts a particularly brutal system of appropriation of territory, military suppression of rebels, exploitation of wealth and, especially, of the Congolese workforce. Citing extremely high numbers of casualties (ten million), the author calls the events of this period of Belgian colonialism a genocide (in French the book's subtitle became "un Holocauste oublié," or a forgotten Holocaust). He describes atrocities including killings, keeping women and children as hostages to force men to collect rubber in the forest, physical punishments, and in

particular, the severing of hands. Hochschild explains how soldiers of the colonial army fighting insurrections were ordered to bring back a hand of each person they killed to justify their use of ammunition. But soldiers would also cut off the hands of the living in order to use the ammunition for hunting. Photographs of severed hands and mutilated people are included in the book. These abuses were denounced by an international humanitarian campaign at the beginning of the twentieth century (Morel 1906), eventually leading Leopold II to donate the colony to the Belgian government in 1908. Congo then became a proper Belgian colony until 1960, when it gained its independence.

The book triggered contrasting reactions. First among historians, who questioned the validity of Hochschild's figures. Historians are still currently debating the exact extent of the harm done to the Congolese people during the different phases of Belgian colonialism (versus its benefits), the intentionality behind these sufferings, and the degree to which colonialism is responsible for the country's present situation (Ndaywel è Nziem 2005; Vellut 2005). But the book also aroused reactions among the public. Some—in particular the former colonials—expressed indignation, contesting and delegitimizing this version of history and stressing the positive side of colonialism in the journals and websites of colonial associations. Some even pressed for the banning of cultural events (for example Marc Twain's play *King Leopold's Soliloquy* in 2005). Other Belgians welcomed the book as a revelation, soon followed by a different kind of indignation: "Why hasn't this been made public before?" In both cases, the emotion—as a response to infamy or unveiled truth—was vividly felt. For both groups, the conflict between the two historical narratives was intertwined with concerns about the meaning of their identity.

As social psychologists, we have always been interested in the ways in which societal dynamics permeate individual psyches, as well as the ways in which psychological processes influence societal dynamics. Collective memory is one of those concepts that lie precisely at the interplay between the individual and society. As a consequence, we have followed the controversy over Belgium's colonial past with great attention, and started studying memories of the colonial past at the beginning of the 2000s (see Licata,

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Klein, and Gurrieri in press for a general overview). In this article, we present the findings of two of these studies, focusing particularly on the changes in collective memories between the generation of Belgians born and raised during the colonial period and today's generation of young adults, and highlighting the role of collective emotions and identity concerns in that evolution.

2. Collective Memories through the Generations

Several definitions of collective memory are available.[1] They vary according to the standpoints of the different disciplines (Coman et al. 2009; Olick 1999; Wertsch and Roediger 2008). We adopt a definition that clearly situates collective memory at the interplay between processes of social representation (Moscovici 1961 [1976]) and social identity (Tajfel and Turner 1986): "a set of shared representations of the past based on group members' common identity" (Licata and Klein 2005). This definition echoes Maurice Halbwachs's conception: "While collective memory endures and draws strength from its base in a coherent body of people, it is individuals as group members who remember" (Halbwachs 1980). Halbwachs also points out that collective memories form and are expressed in specific social frameworks (Halbwachs and Coser 1992), and that this framework's characteristics affect the content of memories as well as the ways in which events are remembered.

This last aspect of Halbwachs's theory has important implications for the way we appraise intergenerational differences in collective memories of colonial times. First, the social and ideological framework has changed dramatically during the last fifty years. Congo became independent in 1960. Belgian people born during or before that period grew up in a largely pro-colonial environment. Congo was pictured as "the best of the colonies," as Belgian colonialism was viewed as mainly benevolent and the Belgian Congo's material infrastructure was one of the most developed among European colonies. By contrast, contemporary Belgians have witnessed numerous controversies about the evils of colonialism, both Belgian and foreign. First anti-, then post-

colonial discourses have spread through Western societies (Loomba 2005; Young 2001; Fanon 1967; Memmi 1965) and shattered the former positive representation. As sociological studies demonstrate, people tend to remember the events that were salient during their adolescence and early adulthood (Schuman, Belli, and Bischoping 1997; Schuman and Rodgers 2004). Psychologists also study this "reminiscence bump" (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000). People tend to remember events in a way that is consistent with the social and ideological framework of their youth, so older Belgians should express more positive representations of the colonial past than young adults.

However, Halbwachs (1980) also points out that collective memory always serves contemporary functions: it "retains from the past only what still lives or is capable of living in the consciousness of the groups keeping the memory alive" (80). This functional aspect of collective memory is also emphasized by Frederick Bartlett (1932), another pioneer of collective memory studies: "With the individual as with the group, the past is continually being re-made, reconstructed in the interests of the present" (309). Collective memories are not fixed once and for all in people's minds; they change in order to better fulfill their present functions. So generational differences might not (or not only) be due to differences in the social framework of the time they were encoded into memory, but also to the fact that memories can serve different functions in different generations. In particular, the identity functions of collective memories are often stressed (see Licata, Klein, and Gély 2007 for a review). People sometimes forget, distort, justify, or negate historical events in order to obtain or maintain a positive image of their group (Baumeister and Hastings 1997).

In this paper, we investigate how Belgians' memories of this past and the associated emotions and behavioral intentions are influenced both by the ways in which two (or three) generations of Belgians learned about their colonial history and by the effects of current identity concerns. For the sake of clarity of presentation, we structure the article as a succes-

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1 Some authors prefer to use the term "social memory" (Laurens and Roussiau 2002), paralleling the distinction between the Durkheim-ian concept of collective representations and the concept of social representation proposed by Serge Moscovici (1961 [1976]).

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sion of issues that we address with reference to both studies, rather than presenting each separately.

3. Different Emotions and Support for Reparative Action

In our Three-Generation Study (as opposed to the Two-Generation Study, see below), we asked French-speaking Belgian undergraduate psychology students to fill in a questionnaire about Belgian colonial activities in the Congo (n = 178; mean age = 20).[2] Then they were asked to administer the same questionnaire to one of their parents (n = 171; mean age = 49), and to one of their grandparents (n = 152; mean age = 74).[3] The questionnaire included measures of collective guilt and of support for reparative action for the Congolese. Collective guilt has been widely studied in social psychological research on intergroup conflicts and reconciliation processes (Branscombe and Doosje 2004). This emotion can be experienced "by association" for actions committed by other in-group members, often in the past. According to Branscombe (2004), it is a self-focused and aversive emotion that people usually seek to avoid, but which can lead to positive actions towards victims in order to repair the harm done to them. We measured it through a set of four nine-point items such as: "As a Belgian, I feel guilty about what happened in the Congo" or "As a Belgian, I feel regret when I think about what the Belgian administration and Belgian colonials did to the Congolese during the colonial period" (α = .79). Intergenerational comparisons (between-subjects comparisons) on this measure show that students (M = 4.34) reported significantly more collective guilt than grandparents (M = 3.70), with parents standing in-between. F (2, 500) = 4.32; p = .01). This finding is in line with earlier observations suggesting that people directly involved in collective traumatic events tend to feel less guilt than later generations (Dresler-Hawke and Liu 2006; Marques, Paez, and Serra 1997; Paez et al. 2006).

We also asked them to express their degree of support for symbolic and material reparation: "I believe that the Belgian government should publicly apologize for its actions under colonialism" and "I believe that the Belgian government should offer financial compensation to the Congolese for its actions under colonialism" (α = .76). Again, students (M = 5.78) were significantly more in favor of reparation than their grandparents (M = 3.66), with parents similarly occupying an intermediate but distinct position (M = 5.02. F (2, 500) = 36.14; p < .001); symbolic reparation was supported more strongly than financial compensation in all groups.

As argued previously, these differences in collective guilt and support for reparation could be due to differences in socialization between the generations. In that case, we should observe differences in the way people learned about colonialism as a function of their generation. And representations of the colonial past should also be different. Finally, differences in representations should explain differences in collective guilt and support for reparation.

4. Different Ways of Learning about Colonialism

Another of our studies—carried out with Cristina Stanciu (2003)—investigated the way in which members of two generations were taught about colonialism. A questionnaire was administered to French-speaking Belgian undergraduate psychology students (n = 64; mean age = 24) and to a sample of members of a senior citizens' association (n = 54; mean age = 69). We will refer to it as the Two-Generation Study.[4] The first question asked whether or not they had been taught about colonialism at school. About half of the participants in both groups answered that they had (51.9 percent of the retired people; 45.3 percent of the students. $X^2 (1) = .5; n. s.$). So there was no significant difference in exposure to this theme at school. Then we asked participants who had answered the first question positively how detailed this teaching was, on an eleven-point scale ranging from 1 (very superficial) to 11 (very detailed). The retired people

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2 Both studies were carried out with French-speaking participants. These data therefore infer nothing about how Dutch-speaking participants would have answered the same questions.

3 Participants self-completed their questionnaire, which is a potential source of bias (Richardson et al. 2006). However, the questionnaire was specially designed for self-completion, to avoid known biases. Questionnaires were carefully scrutinized and incomplete or inconsistent responses were discarded.

4 Gender had no significant effect on any of the variables of interest, and is therefore excluded from the discussion.

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reported having received slightly more detailed information about colonialism ($M = 3.75$) than students ($M = 3.21$), but the difference was not significant ($t (55) = 1.17$; *n. s.*). They were also asked to what extent this teaching conveyed a negative or positive image of colonialism. Retired people reported having been taught a significantly more positive image ($M = 6.56$) than the students ($M = 5.07$. $t (56) = 2.82$; $p < .01$). These results suggest that exposure to information about colonialism did not change dramatically between these two generations, and that the information was not quantitatively different, but they do show that the valence changed from positive to more negative representations of colonialism.

Results from the Three-Generation Study allow the effects of the information to be evaluated more closely. One of the questions asked participants to rate how informed they felt about the colonization of the Congo, on a nine-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). This time grandparents ($M = 5.38$) felt more informed than students ($M = 3.60$), with parents standing in-between ($M = 4.85$. $F (2, 496) = 30.06$; $p < .001$).[5] This suggests that sources of information other than schooling might account for the difference. More revealingly, we examined the correlations between this variable (feeling informed) and emotions (collective guilt and pride). It turns out that, among grandparents, feeling informed correlates positively with pride ($r (152) = .46$; $p < .001$) and negatively with collective guilt ($r (152) = -.19$; $p < .05$), whereas among the students it correlates positively with collective guilt ($r (178) = .18$; $p < .05$). Feeling informed also correlates positively with pride among the parents ($r (167) = .22$; $p < .01$). This result suggests that information on colonialism is interpreted in radically different ways in different generations.

5. Different Representations of Colonialism

In the Two-Generations Study, participants were asked to rate their agreement with a series of traits applied to King Leopold II. A principal components factor analysis revealed a two-factor structure accounting for 57.3 percent of the

variance. After a Varimax rotation, one factor included positive traits: humanism, generosity, patriotism, visionary king, philanthropy, love of the Congo, and altruism, while a second included negative traits: greed, megalomania, and cruelty. Comparing factor scores on these two dimensions shows how strikingly differently this emblematic figure of colonialism is perceived in the two generation groups: students view him as greedy, megalomaniac, and cruel ($M = .28$), and reject his positive traits ($M = -.18$), whereas the retired emphasize his positive traits ($M = .21$) and reject his negative ones ($M = -.34$). A Mixed Anova with the two factors as a within-subject factor and age group as a between-subjects factor revealed a significant interaction ($F (1, 116) = 17.29$; $p < .001$), but no main effects.

In the Three-Generation Study, towards the end of the questionnaire, participants were invited to let us know what they had in mind when answering the previous questions. They were asked to rate the extent to which they had thought about a series of items describing different aspects of colonialism on nine-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). This set of items gives us access to participants' representations of colonialism. A principal components analysis was again carried out. It led to a two-factor structure accounting for 62 percent of the variance. The first factor, labeled "exploitation," included the following items: forced labor, exploitation of the Congolese, racial segregation, mutilations, massacres, and exploitation of natural resources for profit. The second factor, "development," comprised building the educational system, hospitals, roads, and economic infrastructure, and the work of churches and missionaries. The factor scores were saved, and mean scores on each of them were compared between the three generation samples. A Mixed Anova with these two factors as a within-subject factor and generation group (students, parents, grandparents) as a between-subjects factor yielded a main effect of generation group ($F (1, 478) = 7.86$; $p < .001$) as well as a significant interaction ($F (2, 478) = 45.72$; $p < .001$). Students thought largely in terms of exploitation ($M = .20$), and rejected the development dimension of colonial-

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5 Degrees of freedom vary as a function of the number of participants who failed to answer some of the questions.

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ism (M = -.52). In contrast, grandparents mainly mentioned the positive development aspects (M = .36), and rejected the exploitation aspects (M = -.28). Parents stood in-between the other two generation groups on the exploitation (M = .04) and development (M = .24) factors.

We examined correlations between the representation variables and collective guilt. Collective guilt correlates positively with the exploitation factor (among the three generation groups, r (*178, 164, 144*)= .35 .42, and .46 for students, parents, and grandparents, respectively; all ps < .001), but does not correlate negatively with the other two factors. This suggests that negative representations tend to trigger this negative emotion, whereas positive representations do not efficiently shelter individuals from it.

Through another set of items we measured how participants perceived the role of the Belgians during the decolonization process. Three items depicted the decolonization process as the abandonment of the Congolese by the Belgians: "The Belgians abandoned the Congolese during decolonization," "During decolonization the Belgians behaved in a cowardly way," and "The Belgians did not adequately prepare the Congolese for independence" (α = .64). Previous interviews with former colonials (Licata and Klein 2005) had revealed that this representation was prevalent among them. We found no significant mean differences between the three generation groups when comparing them on a variable averaging these three items. But when we entered both the exploitation and abandonment factors as predictors in a multiple linear regression (one for each generation group) we found that representing colonialism in terms of exploitation remains a significant predictor of collective guilt in all three groups (β = .32 (students), .39 (parents) and .39 (grandparents); ps all < .001, all βs standardized). However, believing that the Belgians abandoned the Congolese significantly induces collective guilt among the grandparents (β = .27; p < .01), and marginally significantly among the parents (β = .14; p = .06), but not among the students.[6]

Two conceptions of morality seem to be involved in these generations. In the Three-Generation Study we asked participants how moral or immoral they judged colonialism to have been through two items: "The colonial system implemented by the Belgian administration in the Congo was morally reprehensible" and "The colonial system implemented by the Belgian administration in the Congo was broadly acceptable, from a moral point of view" (reversed. α = .82). As expected, students judged it very immoral (M = 6.30), grandparents judged it far less immoral (M = 4.61), and parents again expressed an intermediate position (M = 5.59) that differed from the other two groups (F (2, 496) = 27.39; p < .001). What is more, we found that collective guilt was triggered by different factors in the two groups: students felt guilty because their group had committed illegitimate actions against an out-group (exploitation). Grandparents felt guilty when they believed colonialism had been illegitimate, but also because Belgium had abandoned the Congolese, i.e., for its withdrawal from the colony. Moral judgement can thus be envisioned as based on responsibility for past misdeeds (students) or on transgression of a paternalistic duty (grandparents).

In order to check whether the difference in collective guilt between the three generations could be explained by the difference we found in representations about colonialism, we performed a mediation analysis. We first regressed collective guilt on generation (1 = students; 2 = parents, and 3 = grandparents) and found, as expected, that generation negatively predicted collective guilt: the older the generation, the less guilt is expressed, although the effect is quite small (β = -.13; p < .01). Next we verified that generation negatively predicted scores on the exploitation factor (β = -.19; p < .001), and that the exploitation factor positively predicted collective guilt (β = .43; p < .001). Then we regressed collective guilt on the two other variables (generation and exploitation). This way, exploitation still significantly predicted collective guilt (β = .42; p < .001), whereas the direct effect of generation on collective guilt was no longer

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6 Students: F (2, 167) = 10.67; p < .001, adjusted R^2 = .10. Parents: F (2, 158) = 19.76; p < .001, adjusted R^2 = .19. Grandparents: F (2, 140) = 29.79; p < .001, adjusted R^2 = .29.

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significant (β = -.04; p = .29). The result was confirmed by a test of mediation (Sobel's z = 3.96; p < .001). This suggests that the difference in collective guilt we observed between the three generations can be explained, at least partially, through the difference in the representations of colonialism as a function of generation.

These results tend to confirm an explanation in terms of the different socialization patterns experienced by the three groups. However, this does not rule out a second explanation in terms of the present identity functions of collective memories.

6. Different Identity Functions

The pioneering study on collective guilt by Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (1998) shows that those who identified strongly with their country (high identifiers) expressed less collective guilt than low identifiers when confronted with an ambiguous description of the Netherlands' colonial past. They argue that, in line with social identity theory (Tajfel et al. 1986), high identifiers protect their social identity from these negative aspects and therefore do not experience collective guilt, whereas low identifiers are less motivated to protect national identity and therefore felt this unpleasant emotion.

This could explain the intergenerational difference in collective guilt that we observed, provided that levels of national identification do indeed vary across generations. We compared levels of national identification in the Three-Generation Study. As expected, grandparents identify significantly more strongly with Belgium (M = 6.68) than parents (M = 5.20) or grandchildren (M = 5.02. F (2, 497) = 40.55; p < .001). Levels of identification differed in the same way in the Two-Generation Study, with retired people expressing higher levels of identification (M = 7.4) than students (M = 5.8. t (116) = 4.70; p < .001). However, Belgian identification did not show a linear relationship with collective guilt in any of the three groups.[7]

We then checked whether national identification was related to representations of the colonial past. In the Two-Generation Study we compared correlations between national identification and the two factors of representations of King Leopold II. We found a positive correlation between national identification and the positive representation (r (54) = .31; p < .05), and a negative correlation between national identification and the negative representation of the king (r (54) = .30; p < .05) among the retired participants, but no significant correlation among the students.

In the Three-Generation Study we also found a positive correlation between national identification and the civilization factor (r (155) = .19; p < .05) and a negative correlation with the exploitation factor (r (155) = -.17; p < .05) among the grandparents, but no significant correlation was obtained among the students and the parents. The negative representations of colonialism expressed by the students seem to be independent of national identification. As a conclusion, it appears that the social identity protection function of collective memories can only be applied to the oldest generation. Students' representations seem to be generally negative, independently of their level of national identification.

7. Dealing with Collective Guilt: Avoidance or Reparation

As stated above, collective guilt is an aversive emotion. In order to avoid it, people may refer to what Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan label "exonerating cognitions" (2004), i.e., ideas that tend to lessen the moral implications of past group actions. In their studies of the Israeli-Palestinian relations, they found that blaming the victims or minimizing the events (the forced evacuation of Palestinians in 1948) proved efficient.

In the Three-Generation Study we included a set of thirteen exonerating cognitions items suggested by previous interviews with former colonials (Licata and Klein 2005). A principal component analysis revealed a three-factor structure accounting for 60.89 percent of the variance. The first factor

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7 Further investigation showed that the relationship between Belgian identification and collective guilt was quadratic, with an inverted U-shaped curve, suggesting that only middle identifiers expressed collective guilt, and that the relationship did not significantly vary as a function of generation group (see Klein, Licata, and Pierucci 2010).

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includes items relating to the benevolence and morality of the Belgians' behavior during colonization, such as: "Overall, the Belgians behaved very humanely in the Congo" and "During the colonial period, Belgians often behaved in an immoral way with the Congolese." We refer to this factor as virtuous colonialism. The second factor is composed of four items evoking the difference between today's values and those that were typical of the colonial times, for example: "One cannot judge colonial actions by today's values" and "The colonials and the Belgian administration only followed the spirit of their times." This moral relativist stance could allow the illegitimacy of colonial actions to be relativized by modifying moral standards and suggesting that one cannot judge the colonials' behavior by today's standards. Finally, the third factor covered two items about the representativeness of the colonials: "During the colonial period, the behavior of the colonials and the Belgian administration were broadly representative of the will of the Belgian people at that time" and "The colonials were not really representative of the Belgians in general" (negative loading). Unrepresentativeness is a sub-typing strategy: by stressing that only a sub-category of the in-group was involved in colonialism, participants preserve a positive image of the group and thus avoid experiencing negative emotions.

Multiple regression analyses were carried out with these four exonerating cognitions variables as predictors and collective guilt as the dependent variable. The results show that different kinds of exonerating cognitions are at work in the three groups. Virtuous colonialism proved to be an efficient negative predictor of collective guilt among the grandparents (β = -.57; p < .001) and the parents (β = -.30; p < .001), but not among the students (β = -.09; p = .24). Moral relativism also negatively predicted collective guilt among the parents (β = -.30; p < .001) and the grandparents (although only with marginal significance, β = -.14; p = .06), but not among the students (β = -.11; p = .15). Finally, representativeness significantly affected collective guilt among the students (β =.22; p < .01), but not among the parents (β

= .03; p = .64) or the grandparents (β = -.07; p = .35). The more students viewed colonial actions as representative of the whole Belgian population, the more collective guilt they experienced.

To sum up: The three generation groups employ distinct strategies to avoid collective guilt. Grandparents and parents tend to avoid collective guilt by legitimizing colonial actions, either by stressing their inherent morality or by delegitimizing negative judgments by stressing the different moral standards applying to colonials at the time. By contrast, students feel less collective guilt when they believe that the colonials were not representative of the Belgian population, thus protecting their national identity. It is worth noting, though, that this model tends to predict only a small proportion of variance among the students.[8]

Another way to deal with collective guilt is to face the immorality of the in-group's past actions, experience the negative emotion, and engage in behavior aimed at repairing the harm. Accordingly, collective guilt correlated positively with support for reparation – both symbolic and material – in the three groups (students: r (178) = .32; p < .001; parents: r (167) = .51; p < .001; grandparents: r (156) = .52; p < .001).

8. Political Positioning

Political positioning on a left to right continuum – on a nine-point scale ranging from 1 (very left-wing) to 9 (very right-wing) – also varied as a function of generation, with the students holding more left-wing positions (M = 3.93) than parents (M = 4.48) and grandparents (M = 4.79. F (2. 465) = 10.09, p < .001). Political positioning correlated positively with national identification in the three groups (r (169) = .28, p < .001; r (155) = .16, p <.05; r (141) = .19, p < .05 for students, parents, and grandparents respectively). In addition, it correlated negatively with collective guilt among the parents (r (155) = -.35, p < .001) and grandparents (r (141) = -.29, p < .001), but not the students (r (170) = -.11, p = .14), and it correlated negatively with support for repara-

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8 Students: F (3, 164) = 4.48; p < .01, adjusted R^2 = .06. Parents: F (3, 157) = 11.53; p < .001, adjusted R^2 = .17. Grandparents: F (3, 140) = 22.61; p < .001, adjusted R^2 = .33.

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tion among all three groups, especially among the parents (r (170) = -.26, p = .001; r (155) = -.51, p < .001; r (141) = -.28, p < .001 for students, parents, and grandparents respectively). However, multiple regression analyses carried out in the three groups show that collective guilt still significantly predicts support for reparation after controlling for the effect of political orientation (βs = .30, .33, and .48 for students, parents, and grandparents respectively; all ps < .001), suggesting that expressing collective guilt is not just another way to take a political position.

9. Discussion

The studies we report here tend to confirm the hypothesis that differences in levels of collective guilt and support for reparative actions towards the former colonized can be traced back to important differences in socialization between the generations. Grandparents grew up in a largely pro-colonial ideological environment. At school they learned that colonialism was a positive enterprise that benefited both the colonizers and the colonized. The more informed they feel about colonialism, the more they are proud of Belgium's colonial action. This is not surprising as we also found that their representations of colonialism were predominantly positive: they emphasize the importance of the civilizing mission and of the material, infrastructure, health, and educational development of the colony, but downplay the negative aspects of colonialism (exploitation, racism, atrocities). They also hold a very positive view of King Leopold II. By contrast, the young generation grew up in a much more critical ideological environment. They only remember the worst aspects of colonialism, perceive the colonial king as a cruel megalomaniac, and report guilt to the extent that they feel informed about colonialism. The middle generation consistently occupies an intermediate position between these two generation groups, suggesting that the trend is progressive. These results are highly compatible with the idea that collective memory depends on the social frameworks in which the historical events or periods were memorized (Schuman et al. 1997). These memories form during adolescence and early adulthood, and remain relatively stable over time.

However, this observation does not refute our second hypothesis, which refers to the current identity functions

of collective memories. We consistently found that our measure of national identification significantly affected representations of colonialism (and of King Leopold II) among the oldest generation. By contrast, students' answers on these variables were largely unaffected by their level of national identification. To sum up, grandparents generally held more positive representations of colonialism but this was modulated by their level of national identification: the more they identified, the more they held positive representations of colonialism. By contrast, students held negative representations independently of their level of national identification. As a conclusion, our functional hypothesis, derived from social identity theory, that collective memories and collective emotions serve identity-protecting functions, can only be verified for the older generation (and, to a lesser extent, for the parents). How could that be explained?

So far, our analyses have been predicated upon the assumption that guilt is an individual emotion. It can be viewed as collective because it derives from shared representations and from a common group membership. But we can take this idea a step further and wonder whether guilt has become *normative*. Some have described a general tendency for Western societies to engage in repentance (Paez 2010; Barkan 2000). This thesis was put forward recently by French philosopher Pascal Bruckner in his bestselling anti-collective-guilt pamphlet, *The Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on Western Masochism* (2010). He suggests that after the mass killings of colonialism and two world wars European nations have developed a "culture of guilt" that involves admitting all past misdeeds in order to maintain a positive self-image as more "moral" than other countries. One of the functions of this "culture of guilt" is to demonstrate inner morality and to differentiate oneself from "immoral" others. Bruckner's thesis is probably overblown, with its sweeping condemnation of European nations' policies of public apology and reparation for their former victims, whereas evidence is available showing that they can have positive effects on members of both former victim groups (Blatz, Schumann, and Ross 2009) and former perpetrator groups (Lastrego and Licata 2010; see Paez 2010 for a review). But Bruckner usefully draws our attention to the normative nature of collective guilt and its identity function. Those who express guilt about their past misdeeds are viewed positively. Thus,

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expressing guilt might be a way to affirm a social identity as "tolerant." Similarly, findings of research using the minimal group paradigm suggest that one social differentiation strategy ironically involves being "fairer than the others" (Jetten, Spears, and Manstead 1996). This could help us explain why students express high levels of collective guilt. In the present situation, collective memories of colonialism do not serve the function of protecting national identity by presenting a glorious past; these memories tend to be expressed as a means to display conformity to the current social norms, which indirectly casts a positive light on one's own identity. Research on "social identity performance" (Klein, Spears, and Reicher 2007) suggests that people sometimes engage in purposeful acts of identity expression that cannot be explained only in terms of specific internal representations but are also strategic moves aimed at influencing audiences in particular ways, either to "verify" (consolidate) social identity or to mobilize audiences into engaging in specific behaviors (Klein and Licata 2003).

This normative dimension of collective memories can thus help us account for the way the colonial past is represented among generation groups. Integrating a past event into the identity narrative of a group plays a role in defining the values and norms that this group intends to adopt in the present and in the future (Liu and Hilton 2005). In this case, the colonial past is perceived as incompatible with the group's current identity. On the contrary, it now appears necessary to establish distance from these events, to construe a critical

representation of them. Among Belgian students, the whole representation of the colonial past seems to be affected by the violation of human rights associated with the Leopoldian period (1885–1908). Conversely, grandparents project their benevolent representation of Belgian colonialism (1908–1960) onto the whole colonial history of the Congo, including the Leopoldian period. This explains why we observed that students feel guilty for the immoral actions committed during the colonial period, whereas grandparents also feel guilty for having abandoned the Congolese. For students, colonialism actually serves as an antithesis in the group's identity narrative. In the same way as a historical example that is seen as edifying can be presented in an exclusively positive manner in order to symbolize the best of the group's values, a historical antithesis can be presented in an even more negative way to better highlight the qualities that group members wish to appropriate.

The example of the severed bronze hand with which we began this article would seem to obey this logic. However, the Ostend anarchists demand not the destruction of the monument to the glory of Leopold II (which would fit the notion of oblivion), but that a critical comment be added to it to point out the incompatibility of Leopold's colonial acts with today's values. That would change the monument's identity-related assertion from "We are a nation that colonized another for its own good" to "We are a nation that unfairly colonized another, but we have learned the critical lessons of that experience."[9]

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[9] Although we cannot, of course, condone the method used to convey the message.

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The Shadow of the Italian Colonial Experience: The Impact of Collective Emotions on Intentions to Help the Victims' Descendants

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Recalling the Italian colonial experience elicits the collective emotions of guilt, shame, and ingroup-focused anger. We expected that these emotions would predict different reparation intentions in favor of the colonized populations' descendants. Students and non-students were recruited (N = 152) and asked to rate their emotions of collective guilt, shame, and anger for the violence that their ingroup had perpetrated against colonized people. Results showed that shame affected intentions to provide economic compensation to current inhabitants of the ex-colonies. This relationship was mediated by concerns of damage for the ingroup's image. Anger toward the ingroup predicted intentions to help immigrants from the ex-colonies now living in Italy. Interestingly, empathy toward the outgroup mediated the latter relation. Finally, collective guilt was not reliably associated with any reparation strategy. These findings have implications for theory and for the historical collective memory of Italian colonialism.

1. Italian Colonialism

The colonization of Africa by European nations reached its peak in the second half of the nineteenth century, the period of the partitioning of Africa. Italy played a largely marginal role. Its colonial experience began quite late and was very brief. Italy was the last European country to establish a colonial empire, and it was comparatively limited in time (sixty years from the end of the nineteenth century until World War II), and space (in the African territories that are now Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea). The expansionist designs of the Italian government looked to East Africa where colonialization seemed easier than elsewhere because explorers and missionaries created an opening and competition with other countries was less fierce here (see Labanca 2007). According to Labanca (2007), Italian colonialism was a "demographic imperialism" whose main goal was to find an outlet for an excess workforce. Before the Fascist era, Italian colonialism revolved around the "white man's burden" ideology, which rested on the idea of a cultural—rather than biological—European superiority that was thus conceived as relative and modifiable. However, especially after the Ethiopian invasion, the Fascist régime adopted a blatant racist policy (with the first racial legislation passed in 1937), ending inter-racial tolerance and establishing racial separation. In that context, Italians perceived native people as competitors for the resources of the African territory.

Unsurprisingly, the Italian colonizers resorted to violence. The means used by the régime to occupy Libya and the Horn of Africa, to "pacify" the occupied regions, and to establish a hierarchy between the colonizers and the colonized people were violence and oppression. Racist ideologies and a sense of superiority that deeply penetrated Italian consciousness sustained such behavior (Labanca 2004). On many occasions Italians acted brutally and murderously. For instance, during the assaults on Abyssinia, Libya, and Ethiopia (Del Boca 1976–1984, 1986–1988) soldiers and civilians were slaughtered, poison gas was used (Del Boca 1996), martial law was declared (Del Boca 2005), and people were rounded up in concentration camps (Del Boca 1992; Rochat 1991). Despite the lack of documentation (Labanca 2004), historians estimate one hundred thousand victims of the conquest and re-conquest of Libya between 1911 and 1932 and four hundred thousand deaths in Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1887 and 1941 (Labanca 2007). According to Rochat (1991), around fifty thousand people died between 1927 and

1931 during the repression of the resistance in Cyrenaica and one hundred thousand civilians were deported from the Gebel plateau to prison camps where many of them perished.

Historical documents in the Italian state archives, only recently released after decades of censorship, confirm the occurrence of "massacres and outrages, oppression and plunder, deportations and all kind of violence" (Del Boca 1992, 113). The terms "slaughter" and "genocide" are now often used when describing Italian colonialism (Dawi 1991; Labanca 2004; Salerno 2005).

Despite recent developments in the historical reconstruction of Italian colonialism, several gaps still remain, due to the fragmentary nature of the information and the lack of witnesses' accounts. It is worth noting that there has been a general delay in historical inquiry into colonial matters, and that investigation has been subject to censorship, control, and a political tendency not to come to terms with the past (Labanca 2004; Volpato 2009). This political stance was driven mainly by the will, still present today, to spread a positive image of Italian colonialism. Specifically, the reconstruction of Italian collective identity following defeat in World War II and the stain of the alliance with the Nazis was based on the self-absolving myth of *Italiani brava gente* ("Italians good people"), which hampered the process of acknowledging the horrific acts that had been committed by highlighting an image of Italians as humane colonizers (Andrighetto et al. forthcoming; Del Boca 2005; Volpato 2009; Volpato and Cantone 2005; Volpato, Durante, and Cantone 2007). Only recently has the obstinate and persistent propensity to repress colonial issues that characterized the postwar sociopolitical landscape been called into question. In 1997 the Italian government, following the example of other colonizing nations, apologized to the Ethiopian president and, more recently, returned the Obelisk of Axum stolen from Ethiopia in 1935. Moreover, in 2009, the Italian prime minister apologized to Libya and granted financial aid.

However, with these few exceptions, the Italian colonial experience has been long neglected by both the scientific community and political and civil society. Socio-psychological research has not so far investigated Italian colonial-

ism either: the present work intends to fill this gap. The integration of psychosocial findings with the results of historical research has been strongly advocated (e.g. Gergen and Gergen 1984; Graumann and Gergen 1996; McGuire 1994), and historical-social research has indeed encouraged interesting new insights into social psychology (Brown et al. 2008; Doosje et al. 1998).

The present study set out to explore Italians' perceptions of their ingroup's colonial experience and of the violence perpetrated in the colonies. We were particularly interested in the emotional reactions aroused by these events. Specifically, we hypothesized that collective emotions of guilt, shame, and ingroup-focused anger could have important but distinct effects on behavioral intentions to help the victims' descendants. To our knowledge, no previous studies have examined the simultaneous impact of these three emotions in relation to historical ingroup wrongdoings.

2. Collective Emotions and Behavioral Implications

Intergroup emotion theory (Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Mackie, Silver, and Smith 2004; Smith 1993) proposes that individuals experience emotions about their ingroup and its behaviors that are clearly distinguished from those they feel about the self and personal behaviors (Smith 1993). Indeed, individuals may experience collective emotions relating to an event simply through acknowledging their group membership, even if they are not personally involved in the collective event or if the event belongs to their ingroup history (Smith 1993; see also Doosje et al. 1998; Steele 1990). Ever since the early explorative studies brought this topic to light, the attention of social psychologists has been drawn by the great impact of these emotions on intra- and inter-group relationships. Indeed, these emotions seem to engender specific affective states that motivate individuals to take pro-social action toward the ingroup or outgroups involved in the event (for reviews, see Iyer and Leach 2008; Thomas, McGarty, and Mavor 2009). Like self-conscious emotions, the social actions that individuals are willing to undertake depend strongly on the nature of the experienced emotion (Frijda 1986; Tiedens and Leach 2004).

Over the past decades, researchers have explored how people face and emotionally react to events in which the

ingroup is perceived to have mistreated or exploited other groups (for reviews see Branscombe and Doosje 2004; Iyer and Leach 2008). Particular studies investigated how people conceptualized events related to the Holocaust (Michman 2002; Wohl and Branscombe 2004, 2005; Zebel, Doosje, and Spears 2009), ongoing conflicts (Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel 2007; Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan 2006) or recent ones (Brown and Čehajić 2008), the exploitation of indigenous populations (Augoustinos and LeCouteur 2004; Brown et al. 2008; Sibley et al. 2008), and the colonial past (Doosje et al. 1998; Klein and Licata 2003; Licata and Klein 2005).

Collective guilt and collective shame are the most widely investigated emotional responses to such events. They share many features: Firstly, both arise from the perception that the ingroup is responsible for an action that overstepped moral limits. Secondly, both collective guilt and collective shame are negative emotional states that motivate individuals to alleviate them. Nevertheless, studies focusing on self-conscious emotions (Baumeister, Stillwell and Heatherton 1994; Lewis 1971; Tangney and Fischer 1995) reveal that shame and guilt lead to different motivational states and often lead to different goals and intentions. Recent literature confirms this distinction in the intergroup domain, showing how collective shame and collective guilt are often linked to different social actions (Brown and Čehajić 2008; Brown et al. 2008; Iyer et al. 2007), although sometimes they show high levels of correlation (Brown et al. 2008), or are even considered synonymous (Iyer, Leach, and Crosby 2003; Leach, Iyer, and Pederson 2006). Recent studies (Leach et al. 2006; Leach, Iyer and Pederson 2007) also reveal a third powerful predictor of social actions in response to ingroup wrongdoings: ingroup-focused anger.

2.1. Collective Guilt
Collective guilt arises from the evaluation that one's group has behaved inconsistently with the norms and values it endorses (Branscombe and Doosje 2004; Doosje et al. 1998). Individuals may experience guilt in relation to historical ingroup transgressions (Doosje et al. 1998; Wohl and Branscombe 2004, 2005; Zebel et al. 2009) or present-day ones (Brown et al. 2008; Roccas et al. 2006), as well as in relation to an ingroup's illegitimate socioeconomic advantages over an outgroup (Leach et al. 2006; Leach et al. 2007).

The literature confirms that collective guilt is a "pro-social emotion," since it tends to focus on negative consequences and on the victims of ingroup wrongdoings. Thus, it has been shown that the feeling of guilt motivates individuals to act to compensate the sufferings inflicted on members of the victimized outgroup. In their pioneering socio-psychological work exploring guilt in relation to colonialism, Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (1998) found that the sense of guilt Dutch people felt in relation to the violence committed in Indonesian colonies induced them to support general national aid campaigns in favor of the victimized populations. Subsequently, evidence confirmed that collective guilt is related to various pro-social attitudes and behaviors, such as support for official government apologies for historical mistreatment (McGarty et al. 2005), desire for positive contact with the victims, willingness to enact strategies to reduce social exclusion (Brown et al. 2008), and decreasing prejudice (Iyer et al. 2003).

The evidence outlined above coherently supports the idea that collective guilt encourages individuals to act pro-socially. This inclination could plausibly be driven by an increase in awareness that the members of an outgroup suffered dramatically because of the ingroup's actions. This hypothesis is supported by Brown and Čehajić (2008), who report that empathy is an important mediator in explaining the effects of collective guilt on reparation strategies. In particular, they find that the relationship between guilt and compensatory strategies is explained by the level of empathy respondents feel toward the outgroup.

Thus, collective guilt leads to positive outcomes and helps to restore harmonious intergroup relations. Nevertheless, its passive and self-reflective nature (Frjida 1986; Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz 1994) makes it a "low action potential" emotion. For this reason, its effects on reparation strategies tend to disappear when there are other more intense and "action-oriented" emotions simultaneously influencing the individual (Leach et al. 2006; for reviews see Thomas et al. 2009).

2.2. Collective Shame
Like guilt and, as we will see below, ingroup-focused anger, collective shame stems from a belief that the ingroup is

responsible for illegitimate and harmful actions (Iyer et al. 2007; Brown and Čehajić 2008; Brown et al 2008). But shame focuses mainly on the negative consequences of these actions for the ingroup's image (Branscombe, Slugoski, and Kappen 2004; Lewis 1971; Lickel, Schmader, and Barquissau 2004; Tangney et al. 1996). Collective shame involves the concern that reprehensible actions may harm the ingroup's public image in such a way that the ingroup may be perceived as incompetent, weak, or even disgusting (Branscombe et al. 2004; Lickel et al. 2004). In other words, this intensely anxious feeling is related to the worry that others might consider the group ridiculous or inferior, and reject or exclude it. Consequently, collective shame is associated with immediate emotional responses aiming to defend the ingroup's image, rather than with more constructive and reflective pro-social reactions (Tangney et al. 1996).

On an individual level, several studies find a significant positive relation between shame and self-defensive responses (Lickel et al. 2005; Roseman et al. 1994; Tangney et al. 1996). A small number of studies also confirm this relationship in the intergroup domain, showing that collective shame strongly motivates individuals to minimize, cover up, and keep a distance from the consequences of their ingroup's wrongdoing, or to avoid any direct contact with victims (Gausel et al. 2009; Iyer et al. 2007; Lickel et al. 2005). However, other studies find a moderate link between shame and pro-social responses, both on an individual level (Roseman et al. 1994; Schmader and Lickel 2006; Tangney et al. 1996) and at the group level (Brown and Čehajić 2008; Brown et al. 2008; Gausel et al. 2009; Iyer et al. 2003). This is hardly surprising, since altruistic and supportive behavior toward the victims of the ingroup's misdeeds might offer an effective way to restore the ingroup's image *in the eyes of others*. However, the effects of collective shame on these strategies are weaker and more temporary than those of guilt (Brown et al. 2008). The mediators ruling these relationships also seem to be different. For example, Brown and Čehajić (2008) find that the effects of shame on reparation strategies are to be explained as an attempt at managing the ingroup's reputation by considering the ingroup as the real victim of the situation.

2.3. Ingroup-Focused Anger
Anger is usually understood as an intensely negative feeling which predisposes people "to attack" (Lazarus 1991) an individual (Frjida 1986) or a group (Montada and Schneider 1989) responsible for a provocation. Leach and colleagues (2006; but see also Leach et al. 2007; Iyer et al. 2007) conceptualize a different form of anger that can be felt toward the ingroup. Like collective guilt and collective shame, ingroup-focused anger arises when people perceive that their group is perpetrating unfair or violent behavior toward an outgroup. Ingroup-focused anger also implies that the ingroup is acknowledged as fully responsible for harmful or illegitimate actions. Individuals are therefore motivated to repair the situation by providing compensation to the victims.

Whereas guilt is the outcome of a deep and conscious thought process, anger is elicited as soon as the stimulus becomes salient, and creates a high level of arousal: it provokes an intense negative state characterized by a pervasive sense of agitation and anxiety (Roseman et al. 1994). This drives individuals to urgently and actively face the situation in order to alleviate this state, both on an individual (Frjida 1986) and collective level (Montada and Schneider 1989). Given its high action potential, if self-focused anger were to arise together with collective guilt, anger—and not guilt—should increase intentions to provide compensation (Leach et al. 2006; Iyer et al. 2007). Self-focused anger seems to be more effective than guilt as a predictor when it comes to specific political reparation strategies, such as donating money or organizing events (Leach et al. 2006). However, the few studies investigating the effects of collective guilt and ingroup-focused anger refer only to present-day injustices and harmful actions (Leach et al. 2006; Iyer et al. 2007).

3. Collective Emotions and Historical Wrongdoing
The main aim of the present research was to test the distinct effects of collective guilt, collective shame, and ingroup-focused anger aroused by the evocation of Italian colonialism on intentions to pursue different reparation strategies. We first examined whether a generally negative evaluation of colonialism and acknowledgment of the violence and harm caused by Italian colonizers could effectively trigger the three collective emotions. We hy-

pothesized that a positive appraisal of colonialism and a reluctance to acknowledge the ingroup's violence would negatively predict feelings of guilt, shame, and ingroup-focused anger. Subsequently we investigated the relationship between the aforementioned collective emotions and reparation strategies.

Thus far, the study by Iyer and colleagues (2007) is the only research to explore the effects of these three emotions simultaneously, in relation to political strategies opposing the Iraq War of 2003. The authors found that ingroup-focused anger predicted all the opposition strategies considered, both ingroup-directed (support for confrontation of ingroup members responsible for past war conditions in Iraq and support for withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq) and outgroup-directed (support for compensation for the victims). When the level of threat to the ingroup's image was experimentally increased, collective shame predicted support for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Furthermore, when the three emotions were taken into account together, guilt did not significantly predict any opposition strategy. However, it is relevant to note that these findings concerned an ongoing conflict where the ingroup's violence and misdeeds were still particularly salient in people's perception. To our knowledge, no studies have examined the simultaneous effects of these three emotions in response to an ingroup's historical misdeeds.

Here, we propose that the effects of collective guilt might turn out to be significant when historical misdeeds are salient, even when controlled for collective shame and ingroup-focused anger. Compared to shame and anger, guilt is characterized by a conscious and articulate appraisal of wrongdoing (Branscombe and Doosje 2004) that might require a longer time to be consolidated into individuals' minds. Therefore, in the present study, we expected collective guilt to be related to a pro-social behavioral intention,

namely, helping immigrants from Italian ex-colonies. In line with Brown and Čehajić's work (2008), we also hypothesized that this relationship could be mediated by feelings of empathy toward the outgroup.

Conversely, we expected collective shame to be related only to economic compensation of the ex-colonies. This is one of the primary means whereby colonial countries have acknowledged their historical misdeeds, so this strategy should be perceived as effective for restoring a positive public image of Italy. We also hypothesized that the perception of damage to the ingroup's image could mediate the relationship between collective shame and economic compensation.[1] We predicted that less "disclosed" strategies, on the other hand, such as helping the victims' descendants now living in Italy, would not necessarily be related to the shame experience. Finally, we expected that given its high action potential, ingroup-focused anger could directly predict both reparation strategies: economic compensation for the victims' descendants living in the ex-colonies and aid to immigrants from the Italian ex-colonies.

In order to test the aforementioned relationships and, at the same time, to empirically ascertain the non-significance of alternative paths, we tested a structural model with four levels of variables (see Figure 1). At the first level, the predictors were the appraisals arising from the simple evocation of the historical event of Italian colonialism: (a) acknowledgment of violence and damage caused by the Italian ingroup; (b) general evaluation of colonialism. Both these cognitive variables were hypothesized to trigger the three considered emotions (level 2). Collective emotions, in turn, were hypothesized to affect the outcome variables through their effects on two mediators: (a) ingroup's damaged reputation; (b) empathy felt toward the outgroup (level 3). At the fourth level were the outcome variables, namely, the two reparation strategies: (a) economic compensation for the

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[1] The direction of causation between emotions and perceptions is still in debate. Some authors argue that emotional states affect perceptions and cognitions in ways that influence decision-making (Baumeister, Arndt, and Tice 2006), whereas the appraisal theory approach proposes that emotions are elicited by appraisals and evaluations (Smith and Lazarus 1990). Perhaps the empirical relationship is recursive. Here, we specifically hypothesized that perception (acknowledging the violence) leads to emotion (collective shame), which in turn leads to another perception (of damage to the ingroup's image), which finally leads to intentions of reparation.

ex-colonies; (b) aid to immigrants from the ex-colonies now living in Italy.

The role of national ingroup identification was also taken into consideration. So far, this variable has been analyzed only in connection with collective guilt (for a review see Branscombe et al. 2004). These studies, however, reveal conflicting results: national ingroup identification was sometimes positively correlated with guilt (Doosje et al. 2004), sometimes negatively (Doosje et al. 1998), and sometimes not at all (Branscombe et al. 2004). In spite of these inconsistencies, we felt that ingroup identification still remained a variable whose effects should be considered when dealing with historical events involving the ingroup, particularly if such events are characterized by violence (Moshman argues that genocide is the product of "normal identity processes," [2007, 115]). Therefore, when testing the effects hypothesized in our structural model, we took into account the possible contribution of ingroup identification.

3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
One hundred and fifty-two Italian citizens (68 males and 84 females; mean age = 29.52, SD = 11.44; range: 16–62) participated voluntarily. The sample included 68 undergraduate students from the University of Milan-Bicocca (mean age = 22.25, SD = 4.71), and 84 non-students recruited through newsgroups and notices published on internet bulletin boards (mean age = 35.56, SD = 11.88).
Procedure. The internet survey entitled "Memories of historical national events" used an online questionnaire programmed in PHP and a mySql database to manage the data collection. The participants' level of identification was assessed one week before the beginning of the survey. In the main session, the respondents were asked to read a brief paragraph containing a neutral description of Italian colonialism before answering the questionnaire:

> We are conducting research on memories of important historical events concerning our country. The conquest of the Horn of Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, and Eritrea) and Libya that led to the establishment of an Italian colonial empire is an episode of our history that deeply influenced generations of people during the first half of the twentieth century. The aim of the present survey is to investigate collective representations concerning the role played by Italians during the colonial period. Please remember

that there are no right or wrong answers; we are interested in the memories, images, and beliefs that you connect with this aspect of Italian history, and the attitude that you have toward it.

A map of Africa highlighting the former Italian colonies was displayed on the left of the introductory page quoted above.

3.1.2. Measures
Ingroup identification. Identification was measured using an eight-item shortened form of a scale developed by Capozza, Brown, Aharpour, and Falvo (2006), with items such as: "I positively evaluate being an Italian"; "I feel similar to the other Italians." The higher the score on the seven-point scale ranging from *not at all* to *very much*, the stronger the identification ($\alpha = .82$).

Cognitive appraisals
Acknowledgment of the ingroup's violence and damage was assessed with two items: "During the colonial period, Italians committed collective violence against colonized populations"; "The colonial experience has led to a worsening of living conditions for the colonized populations." Answers were given on a seven-point scale (1 = *totally disagree*; 7 = *totally agree*) that showed satisfactory internal reliability ($\alpha = .62$).
The evaluation of colonialism was measured with five items of semantic differential (*undesirable/desirable*; *bad/good*; *inhumane/humane*; *unpleasant/pleasant*; *worthless/valuable*). On the seven-point scale, 1 was assigned to the negative pole and 7 to the positive, with 4 indicating the neutral point; thus higher scores indicated more positive evaluations ($\alpha = .92$).

Emotions
Collective guilt was assessed using four items. Three of them were adapted from previous studies (Brown and Čehajić 2008; Brown et al. 2008): "Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behavior of Italians toward Africans during the colonial period"; "When I think about what Italians have done to Africans, I feel guilty"; "I feel guilty about the human rights violations committed by Italians during the colonial period." The fourth item was developed by the authors: "Thinking about how we, as Italians, have discriminated Africans through racial laws makes me feel guilty."

A seven-point scale was used (1 = *totally disagree*; 7 = *totally agree*; α = .93).

Collective shame was assessed using four items adapted from Brown et al. (2008) and Gausel et al. (2009): "As an Italian, I feel disgraced when I think about what we have done to the Africans"; "As an Italian, I feel humiliated when I think about what has happened to Africans"; "I feel ashamed when I think about how we Italians have behaved towards Africans"; "When I think about how Italians are seen by other countries because of the way they treated Africans, I feel ashamed." Answers were given on a seven-point scale (1 = *totally disagree*; 7 = *totally agree*) with very good reliability (α = .90).

Ingroup-focused anger. Participants were asked to rate how "furious," "angry," or "incensed" they felt when thinking about Italian colonialism (see Iyer et al. 2007), on a 7-point scale (1 = *not at all*; 7 = *very much*). Reliability was very satisfactory (α = .91).

Mediators of emotions

Empathy. A four-item scale developed by Vezzali, Capozza, Mari, and Hichy (2007) was used, with items such as: "If you were to be in contact with people coming from Italian ex-colonies, to what extent do you feel that you would share their emotions?"; "If you were to be in contact with people coming from Italian ex-colonies, to what extent would you feel in tune with them?" Answers were given on a seven-point scale (1 = *not at all*; 7 = *very much*), which showed very good internal reliability (α = .92).

Ingroup's damaged reputation was assessed by adapting two items from Gausel et al. (2009): "I am concerned when I think that the Italians' behavior toward Africans has created a bad image of Italy in the rest of the world"; "The racial laws issued in African colonies leave a permanent mark on the image of Italy in the world." Participants answered on a seven-point scale (1 = *totally disagree*; 7 = *totally agree*). Reliability was satisfactory (α = .67).

Reparation intentions

Economic compensation of the ex-colonies. Two items were used: "Imagine you have the chance to allocate 100 million euros for building health facilities [Item 1] [or educational facilities, Item 2] in developing countries. How much would you give to the Italian ex-colonies and how much to the other developing countries?" Participants were asked to divide the entire amount, and the amount of money allocated to the ex-colonies was treated as a variable (α = .94).

Aid to immigrants from the ex-colonies. The first of the two items related to work: "Imagine that you are the owner of a company and have to hire new employees. All the applicants have equivalent skills and competence for the job. To what extent would you be willing to employ an immigrant coming from an ex-colony?" The second item related to education: "Imagine that you have to allocate funds to undergraduate student associations. To what extent would you be willing to allocate funds to an undergraduate student association of immigrants coming from ex-colonies?" A seven-point scale was used (1 = *not at all*; 7 = *very much*; α = .77).

3.2. Results

3.2.1. Preliminary Analyses

A series of Confirmatory Factor Analyses (CFA) with LIS-REL (Jöreskog and Sörbom 2006) were run first to test the adequacy of the measurement models relative to the four levels of variables (cognitive appraisals, collective emotions, mediators of emotions, reparation strategies; see Figure 1). In all cases, no error terms were allowed to correlate and associations were specified between the hypothesized factors. To evaluate the models' goodness of fit, we use the prevailing indexes described in the literature (see e.g., Hu and Bentler 1999).[2]

We first considered the two cognitive appraisal scales (level 1). We tested a two-factor model where each item was allowed to load only on its designated factor: two items on the

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2 For each model we evaluated the general goodness of fit with a range of indexes. Firstly, we considered the chi-square. A satisfactory fits has been obtained when the chi-square is non-significant. However, since it is particularly sensitive to sample size (Bagozzi and Baumgartner 1994; Bentler 1990), we also assessed the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR). Satisfactory model fits are obtained when CFI is greater than or equal to .95, and when SRMR is less than or equal to .08 (Hu and Bentler 1999; for discussion, see also Marsh, Balla, and Hau 1996). Additionally, we assessed the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC; Akaike 1987). AIC indicates a better fit when it is smaller. For two models using same data set, the model with the smaller AIC is to be preferred.

factor of acknowledgment of violence and damage committed by the ingroup, and five items on the general evaluation of colonialism. We then ran an alternative model with one undifferentiated appraisal factor. The fit indexes revealed that the two-factor model fitted the data better than the alternative one (see Table 1).[3] Moreover, the standardized factor loadings from the hypothesized model confirmed that each factor was well defined by its items. The correlation between the two latent factors of appraisal was strong (φ = .84), but did not include the perfect correlation (SE = .03, p = .05).[4]

Table 1: Confirmatory factor analyses: Fit indexes and model comparisons

	χ^2	df	$p \cong$	CFI	SRMR	AIC
			Fit indexes			
Cognitive appraisals						
Two-factor model	26.12	13	.02	.99	.029	55.81
One-factor model	30.15	14	.01	.97	.035	58.26
Collective emotions						
Three-factor model	112.82	41	.00	.97	.056	164.76
Two-factor model	268.16	43	.00	.91	.096	309.71
One-factor model	429.77	44	.00	.85	.12	471.56
Mediators of emotions						
Two-factor model	18.36	8	.02	.98	.028	45.91
One-factor model	55.46	9	.00	.91	.11	77.26
Reparation strategies						
Two-factor model	3.51	2	.17	.99	.049	19.46
One-factor model	214.44	3	.01	.01	.26	129.68

Note: In the two-factor model items of collective guilt and shame were allowed to load on a single factor, while the items of anger loaded on a separate factor. CFI = Comparative Fit Index; SMRS = Standardized Root Mean Square Residual; AIC = Akaike Information Criterion.

We then assessed the latent structure underlying collective emotions (level 2, see Figure 1). Our aim here was to use a stringent test to demonstrate that collective guilt and shame are distinct constructs, and not synonymous as conceived in some previous research (e.g., Iyer et al. 2003; Leach et al. 2006). We tested a three-factor model where each item was allowed to load only on its respective factor (i.e., guilt, shame, and anger). An alternative two-factor model was also run, in which the observed variables of guilt and shame were loaded on the same factor, whereas anger was still considered as a separate construct. As illustrated in Table 1, the three-factor model performed much better than the two-factor one. The three latent constructs correlated positively with each other: the highest correlation was obtained between guilt and shame (φ = .81), although still significantly lower than the perfect correlation (SE = .04, p = .05; i.e., discriminant validity). It is worth noting that the three-factor model also performed better than the one-factor model (see Table 1).

3 In this specific case, it is worth noticing that in both tested models fit indexes reached the relevant level for CFI and SRMS, but in comparison between the two models the two-factor solution was more satisfactory. Factor loadings revealed that the two-factor model was empirically more adequate than the one-factor solution. Additionally, the two-factor model had a smaller AIC value, suggesting superior fit (Akaike 1987).

4 The existence of a perfect correlation is verified by assessing the confidence interval, obtained by considering two standard errors above and two standard errors below the estimated correlation (p = .05).

Moving on to consider the latent structure of mediators of emotions (level 3, see Figure 1), we assessed both a two-factor model and an alternative one-factor model: as expected, the former was better than the latter (Table 1). The correlation of latent factors (i.e., ingroup's damaged reputation and empathy) was significant but low (φ = .22).

Finally, similar results were obtained when CFAs were performed on the variables at level 4, namely, reparation strategies. The two-factor model achieved better fit indexes than the one-factor model (see Table 1). The correlation of latent constructs (i.e., economic compensation for the country and aid to immigrants) was significant but quite low: φ = .30.

3.2.2. Descriptive Statistics

The items of each scale were averaged to form reliable composite scores. Means and standard deviations for student and non-student participants, and their mean differences, are presented in Table 2. Note first, that the two subsamples showed the same level of ingroup identification. Moreover, the participants in both subsamples recognized colonialism as a period characterized by violence against the population, and evaluated it very negatively.

Table 2: Means and standard deviations of the constructs for the subsamples of students and non-students

Measures	Student subsample (N = 68)		Non-student subsample (N = 84)	
	M	SD	M	SD
Ingroup identification	3.84 [a]	0.96	3.59 [a]	1.15
Acknowledgment of ingroup's violence and damage	4.77 [a]	0.99	4.76 [a]	1.29
Evaluation of colonialism	2.84 [a]	1.08	2.65 [a]	1.27
Collective guilt	3.86 [a]	1.48	3.23 [b]	1.64
Collective shame	4.08 [a]	1.31	3.44 [b]	1.55
Ingroup-focused anger	3.26 [a]	1.43	2.55 [b]	1.44
Damage to ingroup's reputation	4.48 [a]	1.27	4.28 [a]	1.50
Empathy	4.37 [a]	1.12	3.88 [b]	1.32
Economic compensation for ex-colonies	43.89 [a]	11.77	39.40 [a]	20.57
Aid to immigrants from ex-colonies	4.48 [a]	1.38	4.30 [a]	1.23

Note: Scale of economic compensation ranged from 1 to 100, all other scales ranged from 1 to 7. Different subscripts on the same row indicate that the means are significantly different (t-test), $p < .05$.

Concerning collective emotions (see Table 2), after the evocation of the historical event of colonialism, participants expressed guilt, shame, and ingroup-focused anger with moderate intensity (generally, the level expressed in other studies was lower, e.g., Iyer et al. 2007). Students displayed such emotions with a—slightly—significantly stronger intensity than non-students. A similar result was found for empathy, which was slightly higher for students. Finally, the perceptions of the ingroup's damaged reputation and intentions to provide economic compensation to the ex-colonies or aid to immigrants coming from those nations were not different between the two subsamples.

Table 3: Means, standard deviations, and correlations between constructs of the total sample

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Ingroup identification	-									
2. Acknowledgment of ingroup's violence and damage	-.22**	–								
3. Evaluation of colonialism	.34***	-.65***	–							
4. Collective guilt	.05	.26**	-.22**	–						
5. Collective shame	.06	.36***	-.30***	.79***	–					
6. Ingroup-focused anger	-.25**	.34***	-.42***	.50***	.55***	–				
7. Damage to ingroup's reputation	.05	.32***	-.26**	.45***	.65***	.32***	–			
8. Empathy	-.16*	.10	-.12	.30***	.28***	.38***	.19*	–		
9. Economic compensation for ex-colonies	.24**	-.05	.04	.16°	.18*	.06	.30***	-.02	–	
10. Aid to immigrants from ex-colonies'	-.17*	.17*	-.28**	.16°	.18*	.40***	.14	.41***	.23**	–
M	3.70	4.77	2.73	3.51	3.73	2.87	4.37	4.10	41.41	4.38
SD	1.07	1.16	1.19	1.60	1.48	1.48	1.40	1.26	17.30	1.30

Note: Scale of economic compensation ranged from 1 to 100, all other scales ranged from 1 to 7.
°$p < .055$. *$p < .05$. **$p \leq .01$. ***$p \leq .001$.

The hypothesized structural model (see Figure 1) was tested using the whole sample data. Means, standard deviations, and correlations between all the variables are presented in Table 3. In the correlation matrix, it is worth noticing that identification did not correlate with collective guilt (compare Branscombe et al. 2004) or collective shame, but correlated negatively with ingroup-focused anger. Moreover, identification correlated with both reparation strategies—but positively with economic compensation and negatively with aid to immigrants.

Figure 1: Path analysis results for the structural model

Level 1	Level 2	Level 3	Level 4
Cognitive appraisals	Collective emotions	Mediators of collective emotions	Reparation strategies

Note: For the sake of simplicity, only significant regression coefficients are reported. The dashed arrow indicates the significant residual direct effect. The R^2 in parentheses at the outcome variable "aid to immigrants from ex-colonies" indicates the variance explained by the model when significant direct path is added.

3.2.3. Structural Model

Path analysis with LISREL (Jöreskog and Sörbom 1999) was used to test the proposed structural model (see Figure 1). The two cognitive predictors (level 1) were specified as exogenous variables predicting all of the three emotions (level 2); in turn, collective emotions were all specified as determinants of the ingroup's reputation as damaged and empathy toward the outgroup (level 3). Finally, these mediators were specified to influence the outcome variables of reparation (level 4).[5] Mediational effects were assessed following the approach of Taylor, MacKinnon, and Tein (2008).

Since we argued that ingroup identification could have some effects on the hypothesized paths, we performed such analysis by considering the partial correlations matrix as an input, controlling for its effects. Removing the statistical effects of identification is a simple but effective method to control the mutual dependencies without further compli-

cating the model by their direct inclusion (Marrelec et al. 2007; Preacher 2006).[6]

The model tested fitted the data extremely well: $\chi^2(14) = 25.18$, $p = .033$; CFI= .98; SRMR = .05. The findings revealed that, as predicted, acknowledgment of the violence and damage caused by the ingroup led to both collective guilt and collective shame ($\gamma = .20$, $p < .05$, and $\gamma = .27$, $p < .01$, respectively), whereas the general evaluation of colonialism negatively influenced ingroup-focused anger ($\gamma = -.28$, $p < .01$): the more negatively the participants evaluated colonialism, the angrier they felt toward Italians (see Figure 1).

Regarding the effects of emotions on their mediators (level 3), guilt influenced neither the ingroup's damaged reputation nor empathy; the latter result was contrary to our prediction. Nevertheless, consistent with previous studies (Branscombe et al. 2004; Lickel et al. 2004) and our

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5 In testing the model, we set free correlations between endogenous variables at level 2 (collective emotions), level 3 (the two mediators of emotions), and level 4 (reparation strategies).

6 Using this method ensures that any significant relationship between two variables is a true relationship not depending on spurious correlation with the level of identification.

own predictions, the experience of shame led participants to perceive that the main consequence of their ingroup's misdeeds was damage to its reputation ($\beta = .79$, $p < .001$).[7] Unexpectedly, ingroup-focused anger was positively related to empathy toward the outgroup ($\beta = .26$, $p < .01$).

Our hypotheses concerning reparation strategies were partially supported. The perception of a damaged national reputation did indeed determine only the intention to compensate the present population of the ex-colonies in economic terms ($\beta = .31$, $p < .001$), whereas empathy affected only the intention to aid immigrants coming from those same countries ($\beta = .38$, $p < .001$).

Because the findings showed a pattern of double mediation between certain variables, we checked for the significance of the indirect effects. The influence of acknowledgment of violence on support for economic compensation for the ex-colonies (indirect effect: .05, $p < .05$) was mediated by collective shame and ingroup's damaged reputation (indirect effect of acknowledgment of violence on ingroup's damage reputation: .18, $p < .01$; indirect effect of collective shame on support for economic compensation for ex-colonies: .24, $p < .001$). The negative effect of evaluation of colonialism on support for aid to immigrants from the ex-colonies (indirect effect: -.04, $p < .05$) was mediated by ingroup-focused anger and empathy toward the outgroup (indirect effect of evaluation of colonialism on empathy: -.10, $p < .05$; indirect effect of anger on support for aid to immigrants from the ex-colonies: .10, $p < .05$).

The portion of explained variance accounted for by the model was quite moderate for collective emotions (guilt 9 percent, shame 16 percent, anger 14 percent), good for mediators of emotions (damaged reputation 43 percent, empathy 25 percent), and modest for reparation intentions (toward ex-colonies 9 percent, toward immigrants 16 percent).

Afterwards, we tested the presence of residual direct effects: (a) of the antecedents on mediators of emotions and outcome variables (level 3 and 4); (b) of emotions on outcome variables. Such hypotheses were investigated by testing a series of nested models with LISREL. The models including each direct path were compared to the baseline double-mediation model (see Figure 1). Chi-square difference tests were computed to check for significance of these direct paths. A non-significant chi-square difference indicates a full mediation is obtained, while a significant direct path indicates a partial mediation (Kline 1998). The findings revealed no significant residual direct effects, with the single exception of the positive direct effect of ingroup-focused-anger on support for the reparation strategy of helping immigrants from the ex-colonies: $\beta = .26$, $p < .001$ ($\chi_d^2[1] = 11.17$, $p < .001$). By adding this path, the portion of variance in intentions to aid immigrants accounted for increased to .22. Therefore, the effect of anger was only partially mediated by empathy and this result confirmed the "high action potential" nature of this emotion.

To briefly recap our findings concerning the double mediation: (a) collective emotions totally mediated the effects of cognitive appraisals on the hypothesized variables, except for collective guilt, whose effects were absorbed by the intercorrelation with collective shame; (b) the ingroup's damaged reputation totally mediated the effect of shame on the economic compensation of ex-colonies; (c) empathy partially mediated the effect of ingroup-focused anger on the reparation intention of aiding immigrants from ex-colonies.[8]

4. Discussion
By testing a double mediation structural model, the present study provides preliminary empirical evidence concerning the perception and conceptualization of the Italian colonial experience. As described above, the collective memory of this period has been biased by censorship and a general

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7 An alternative model with the relationship between collective shame and ingroup's damaged reputation reversed was also tested. The model did not fit the data at all: $\chi^2(19) = 90.97$, $p = .00$; CFI= .88; SRMR = .16.

8 It is worth noting that we obtained the same significant paths when we considered the correlation matrix non-partialized for the effect of identification (i.e., the zero-order correlation) as an input. However, some effects of multicollinearity became evident.

delay in historical investigation. The present work set out to investigate how modern Italians see colonialism. Despite a tendency to spread an image of Italians as "humane colonizers" (Del Boca 2005; Labanca 2004; Volpato 2009), our results reveal a negative appraisal of these events and acknowledgement of the violence and damage perpetrated on the colonized populations, at least at an explicit level of evaluation. This was consistent for both students and non-students, regardless of age.

Those negative evaluations led to feelings of collective guilt, collective shame, and ingroup-focused anger. Interestingly, a concise and neutral evocation of colonialism proved to be effective in arousing collective emotions. Indeed, although still below the scale mid-points ($ps < .05$; t-test), their means were generally higher than those found in previous studies (e.g., Iyer et al. 2007). In line with intergroup emotion theory (Mackie et al. 2000; Mackie et al. 2004; Smith 1993), participants experienced such emotions even if they were not directly involved in these events in their ingroup's history. These collective emotions seem to have an important effect on the current relationship between Italians and victims' descendants. As expected, this impact differed according to the collective emotion considered.

We hypothesized that collective guilt might positively predict a reparation intention aimed at helping immigrants coming from the ex-colonies. Unexpectedly, the findings show that this emotion had no influence when the effects of "higher action potential" emotions, such as shame and ingroup-focused anger, were taken into account. Although this finding is consistent with the work of Iyer and colleagues (2007), it contradicts our hypothesis. We would suggest that this result might depend on the "action-oriented" reparation strategies considered here. In fact, some studies show the effects of guilt limited to abstract reparation strategies (Allpress et al. forthcoming; Iyer et al. 2007; Leach et al. 2006). Nevertheless, as previously mentioned, compared to other emotions, guilt demands a more conscious treatment to significantly affect positive behaviors. Thus, despite the mean scores of guilt found in our sample, we suggest that collective guilt probably did not function as expected because there has never been a public debate on Italian colonialism. Indeed, Italian colonialism is still protected by the

self-absolving myth of "Italians good people" (Andrighetto et al. forthcoming; Volpato et al. 2007), which does not help Italians to internalize a constructive feeling of guilt. To assess whether our finding is due to the lack of a public debate or just to the "passive" nature of collective guilt, further research is needed. For instance, it would be appropriate to consider a historical event that draws more public attention than colonialism. Moreover, since this is a correlational study, future research manipulating the presentation of Italian colonialism is needed.

Given the "ingroup-centered" nature of shame (Brown and Čehajić 2008; Gausel et al. 2009; Iyer et al. 2003), we hypothesized that this emotion was related to behavioral intentions focusing on protecting and restoring the Italian public image in the eyes of other nations. The results support the hypothesis: collective shame positively predicted this reparation strategy through a total mediation of the perception that the ingroup's image was damaged. Thus, in our opinion, collective shame predicted a reparation strategy which could elevate Italy on the same level as those countries that have already acknowledged their colonial misdeeds.

However, we believe that the most relevant result concerns the third collective emotion considered, namely, ingroup-focused anger. Contrary to our hypothesis, this emotion predicted one reparation strategy only: the intention to aid immigrants from the ex-colonies. Surprisingly, this relationship was partially mediated by empathy felt for the outgroup. Such findings show that experiencing anger toward the ingroup promotes empathetic feelings toward the outgroup, even for historical events and for outgroup members that are not direct victims of the ingroup's past violence. Therefore, it seems that the anger arising from the oppression and unfairness exerted by the ingroup in the past produces empathy toward those who are oppressed today. Although further investigations are needed, we may speculate on the pattern found here: the perception of the ingroup's misdeeds might trigger "empathic anger" (Batson et al. 2007; Dovidio et al. 2004); this could lead individuals to distance themselves from the ingroup and feel empathically closer to the victims, especially to those they may come into contact with (i.e., immigrants).

Although these results seem promising, it should be noted that the present work captured just one aspect of ingroup-focused anger, since we only considered reparation strategies focused on the outgroup. This emotion could also be a reliable predictor of "ingroup-directed" behavioral intentions, such as the intentions to reveal the ingroup members responsible for the misdeeds (Leach et al. 2007). Future works should address this issue by considering ingroup-directed compensatory strategies and identifying possible mediators of their relation with anger.

Finally, after removing the statistical effects of national identification, it seems that the paths found in the present study work independently of group identity. So far, the literature on collective emotions and identification does not present conclusive results (e.g., Branscombe et al. 2004). However, the opposing correlations we found between identification and the two types of reparation strategy suggest intriguing indications to better understand the impact of identification on collective emotions and their outcomes. Therefore, future research should address this theoretical issue by directly including identification in the structural model.

To conclude, this study provides further evidence of the great potential inherent in collective emotions for improving intergroup relations spoiled by violence and injustice. Moreover, our results suggest the importance of considering guilt, shame and ingroup-focused anger simultaneously, since their interplay deeply affects the impact on outcome variables. It should be noted, however, that the variance of outcome variables explained by our model is quite modest. Future research is needed to detect additional predictors that may help to account for the unexplained variance.

In the light of the above findings, we argue that to develop constructive feelings of guilt and shame the Italian government and educational institutions should make greater efforts to face this subject, pointing out the physical, ethical, and moral violations perpetrated by Italians during the colonial period. As a nation, a deeper reflection on Italian wrongdoings toward the colonized populations is needed. To quote Del Boca (*Corriere della Sera*, November 22, 1997): "We should have the courage to overthrow this false question of honor. . . . We have to accept the risk of causing a shock to those who have always fostered the stereotype of our colonial adventure as 'different' from others, admitting our shame and giving back the truth to ex-colonies that are still waiting for moral compensation."

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Atoning for Colonial Injustices: Group-Based Shame and Guilt Motivate Support for Reparation

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An investigation of the role of group-based shame and guilt in motivating citizens of ex-colonial countries to support restitution to former colonized groups which were the target of violence and oppression. Study 1 (N = 125) was conducted in Australia during the lead-up to the first official government apology to Aboriginal Australians. Among white Australians, guilt and shame were associated with attitudinal support for intergroup apology and victim compensation. However, only shame was associated with actual political behaviour (signing a petition in support of the apology). Study 2 (N = 181), conducted in Britain, focussed on Britain's violent mistreatment of the Kenyan population during decolonization. It tested a hypothesis that there are two forms of shame—essence shame and image shame—and demonstrated that image shame was associated with support for apology, whereas essence shame was associated with support for more substantial material and financial compensation. The findings are discussed in light of promoting restitution and reconciliation within nations with histories of colonial violence.

1. Colonization and a New International Morality

The process of colonization was generally associated with systems of violence and discrimination against indigenous peoples around the world. In many instances the colonizing country robbed the colonized groups of land, resources, culture, and dignity. In the worst instances indigenous peoples were forcibly displaced or massacred. Regrettably, such legacies of colonization can be found throughout the world. European nations such as Portugal, France, Germany, Italy, Holland, and Belgium were quick to institute ruling systems around the globe that, by today's standards, were often racist, violent, and exploitative (Ferro 1997; Mosse 1985; Pakenham 1992). British colonial rule in particular led to profound disadvantage and suffering among indigenous groups, particularly in African, Pacific, and Asian regions (Porter 1984; James 1997; Ferguson 2004). We focus in detail on two examples, Kenya and Australia.

Recently there has been a growing international recognition of the lasting effects of colonial violence and discrimination on the colonized, and an increasing willingness to address these issues (Barkan 2000; Nobles 2008; Thompson 2002). In many countries, offers of apology and reparations from former colonizing groups have been forthcoming in recognition of unjust past policies and as a means to restore a more moral intergroup relationship (Nobles 2008). Such acts have the potential to promote reconciliation between groups (Barkan 2000). For example, Queen Elizabeth II and a number of New Zealand prime ministers have apologized to Indigenous Maori for violations of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi; U.S. president Bill Clinton issued an apology to Hawaiians for violations of their sovereignty in 1893; and the Canadian government has apologized to the Indigenous Canadian population for extensive historical mistreatment (e.g., see Nobles 2008).

Barkan (2000) suggests the rapid and widespread increase in restorative actions by powerful groups around the world points to a new moral awareness within the international community. Although there are a number of political, historical, economic, and social conditions that have led former colonizing groups to attempt to make amends with the colonized, the present paper focuses specifically on the psychological processes that motivate members of colonizing groups to support restitution for past wrongs and desire reconciliation with members of "victim" groups. Particularly, we focus on a relatively new concept within social psychology, group-based emotions, as motivators of collective moral action (Eliot R. Smith 1993).

1.1. Shame and Guilt
Our specific focus is on the self-conscious emotions of group-based shame and guilt (Lewis 1971; Tangney and Fischer 1995). At the individual level, one of the most influential distinctions between the two emotions was provided by Lewis (1971). Lewis described both shame and guilt as negative self-focused emotions that arise from the violation of a moral or social code; she posited, however, that they differ in the degree to which the self is implicated in the behaviour. She proposed that guilt primarily results from a focus on how a person's behaviour has negatively affected someone else, whereas shame results from a focus on how the behaviour reflects a globally flawed self. The distinction can be summarized thus: guilt arises because one has behaved badly, whereas shame arises because one is a bad person.

Given the theoretical differences between shame and guilt, one would expect the emotions to be associated with different motivational and behavioural outcomes. Because guilt derives from a focus on an act of negative behaviour that is specific and controllable, it is believed to be associated with attempts at restitution (Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton 1994). On the other hand, because shame is associated with a perception of the self as flawed, it is typically more aversive and debilitating than guilt and is thought to be associated with withdrawal and hiding (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, and Barlow 1996; Wicker, Payne, and Morgan 1983). These predictions have received some empirical support at both the individual (e.g., Niedenthal, Tangney, and Gavanski 1994; Tangney, 1991) and group levels (e.g., Iyer, Schmad-

er, and Lickel 2007; Johns, Schmader, and Lickel 2005), although, as the present paper will demonstrate, there is growing evidence that shame at the group level can also be associated with pro-social outcomes.

Research at an interpersonal level identifies guilt as fulfilling an important social function by both preventing future transgressions and motivating efforts to make amends after their occurrence (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton 1994; Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, and Gramzow 1996). Shame has been linked with feelings of worthlessness, powerlessness, and anger, and research at the interpersonal level suggests that it is associated with victim-directed antagonism and a desire to withdraw from and avoid the situation in question (Rodogno 2008; Roseman, Wiest, and Swartz 1994; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, and Gramzow 1992). We can thus see that both shame and guilt have influential effects on interpersonal interaction.

1.2. Group-based Emotions
Group-based emotions are emotions that are experienced when group membership, and therefore social identity is salient (Eliot R. Smith 1993). These emotions, which may be either positive (e.g., pride) or negative (e.g., shame), can act as important motivators of intergroup behaviour. Our focus is on group-based guilt and shame, which differ in two important ways from individual-level guilt and shame. Firstly, they can arise in response to moral violations by members of a group to which one belongs, even if those experiencing the emotions were not directly implicated, or may not even have been alive at the time (Eliot R. Smith 1993). Secondly, the experience of these emotions can motivate behaviour toward members of the "victim" outgroup, even if these members were not personally victims of the original maltreatment.

Several studies have investigated the effects of guilt at the group level. Two studies that specifically investigated group-based guilt in relation to colonial injustices were conducted by Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (1998) and McGarty et al. (2005). In the first, Doosje and colleagues (1998) found that feelings of "collective" guilt among Dutch students predicted their willingness to advocate both personal and governmental compensation to Indonesians

for past colonial injustices perpetrated by their group. Similarly, McGarty and colleagues (2005) demonstrated that although group-based guilt tended to be low among non-Indigenous Australians, it was strongly associated with support for an official apology to Aboriginal Australians for discriminatory practices occurring in both the nineteenth (Study 2) and twentieth centuries (Study 1). A number of other studies demonstrate the positive associations between guilt and support for reparation in various intergroup conflicts. Examples include non-Indigenous Chileans' treatment of Indigenous Chileans (Brown et al. 2008), intergroup relations in post-conflict Bosnia-Herzegovina (Brown and Cehajic 2008), illegitimate (majority) ingroup advantage in the United States and Europe (Iyer, Leach, and Crosby 2003; Mallett and Swim 2007; Swim and Miller 1999; Harth, Kessler, and Leach 2008; Harvey and Oswald 2000; Leach, Iyer, and Pederson 2006; Miron, Branscombe, and Schmitt 2006), and national involvement in war (Allpress and Brown forthcoming; Iyer et al. 2007).

Despite the evidence demonstrating positive associations between guilt and support for reparation, recent research suggests that the pro-social effects of guilt may be limited only to abstract support for restitution. For instance, with regard to Aboriginal Australians' disadvantage within Australian society, Leach and colleagues (2006) showed that non-Indigenous Australians' guilt predicted attitudinal support for compensation, but did not predict intentions to act on these attitudes after accounting for respondents' prejudice and anger. Similarly, Iyer and colleagues (2007) found that feelings of guilt amongst American and British students over the invasion of Iraq did not predict support for any reparative actions after accounting for feelings of shame and anger. In the present paper we build upon the above studies by proposing that the predictive power of shame may render collective guilt less important a predictor of actual collective action. In Study 1 we evaluate this proposal in relation to a marker of actual political activism: signing a political petition advocating apology toward Aboriginal Australians.

There is less research into shame at the group level, and no research that we know of has investigated group-based shame specifically in relation to historical cases of colonial

violence. Furthermore, the findings of the extant studies are somewhat inconsistent. In line with research on interpersonal shame, a small number of studies have found an association between shame and distancing motivations (Iyer et al. 2007; Johns et al. 2005; Lickel et al. 2006; Schmader and Lickel 2006). For example, Lickel and colleagues (2005) found that feelings of shame elicited by the wrongdoings of others were associated with a desire to distance oneself from both the situation and those responsible for the wrongdoing. Similarly, Johns, Schmader, and Lickel (2005) demonstrated that U.S. citizens' feelings of shame in response to prejudice exhibited against people of Middle Eastern descent in the aftermath of 9/11 was associated with a desire to distance oneself from the ingroup perpetrators of the discrimination and, in some instances, a desire to distance oneself from the ingroup in general.

Not all research investigating group-based shame has been consistent with the above studies, however. Other work has found an association between shame and various *pro-social* attitudes. For example, Brown and colleagues (2008) conducted three studies in Chile investigating non-Indigenous Chileans' feelings of shame about the treatment of the country's largest indigenous group, the Mapuche. They found that shame had cross-sectional associations with attitudinal support for reparations to the Mapuche (a composite measure consisting of support for: apology, compensation, outgroup economic benefits, and a tolerant society) and that this association was mediated by a desire to improve the reputation of non-Indigenous Chileans. In a similar manner, Brown and Cehajic (2008) found that Bosnian Serbs' feelings of shame about their group's actions during the 1992–95 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina predicted attitudinal support for reparations to Bosnian Muslims (consisting of apology, compensation, and a desire to assist the outgroup).

1.3. Present Research
As we can see, although a number of studies have investigated the effect of guilt and shame in group contexts, a number of questions remain unaddressed. The present paper focuses on two distinct questions. The first relates to whether shame and guilt predict an instance of actual political behaviour—petition-signing (Study 1; conducted

in the context of the mistreatment of Aboriginal Australians). The second question is whether shame is related to pro-social outcomes (Study 1), and if such an association is observed, what might account for the association between shame and anti-social outcomes in some studies and pro-social outcomes in others (Study 2; conducted in the context of Kenyan decolonization). The paper therefore provides a novel contribution to the literature in two respects.

2. Study 1: Shame and Action in Australia
2.1. Historical and Political Context
The colonial treatment of Aboriginal Australians was both violent and discriminatory. In the twentieth century, the policy of removal of Aboriginal children from their families and placement into white homes or state care—the "Stolen Generations"—became a focus of activism and advocacy. We focus on this issue not only because it caused considerable damage to Aboriginal individuals, families, and communities, but because our research was conducted in the days prior to the first official national apology to the Stolen Generations by the federal government.

Aboriginal children in Australia were taken from their families from the very first days of colonization. The Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (1997) estimates that "between one in three and one in ten Indigenous children were forcibly removed from their families and communities between 1910 and 1970", and that consequently *all* Indigenous families were affected in one or more generation in the last century. The removal of children in the twentieth century was a dramatic manifestation of the government's policy of assimilation and the institutionalized racism within Australia. The practice caused extensive trauma to Indigenous families and a loss of identity and culture (Pilger 1989).

The consequences for Aboriginal Australians of two centuries of deprivation are powerfully represented in the group's statistics. Compared to non-Indigenous Australians, Aboriginal Australians' life expectancy is approximately eighteen years lower; the rate of infant mortality is three times higher; rates of both chronic and communicable diseases are between two and ten times higher; the rate of self-harm and suicide is approximately twice as high;

incarceration rates are fifteen times higher; unemployment is three times higher; two thirds of the Aboriginal population are without post-secondary education, and Indigenous people are between six and nineteen times more likely to live in overcrowded housing (Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission 2006).

The purpose of Study 1 was to evaluate the relationship between white Australians' feelings of group-based shame and guilt and their support for actions designed to repair this historical damage. We hypothesized that both guilt and shame would positively predict attitudinal support for apology and compensation. Additionally, in light of research demonstrating the weak or non-existent relationship between guilt and action intentions (e.g., Leach et al. 2006; Iyer et al. 2007), we hypothesized that shame, but not guilt, would predict political behaviour (petition signing).

2.2. Method
2.2.1. Participants
A sample of 136 participants was recruited during lunch hours in a shopping mall food-court in central Brisbane, Australia. Of those recruited, 125 (47 male, 78 female) participants who self-identified as "European/white Australian" were included in the final analysis. The ages in the sample ranged from 15 to 72, with a mean of 32 years of age.

2.2.2. Procedure
Questionnaire data were collected on February 11, 2008, two days prior to the incoming Labor government's scheduled apology to the Stolen Generations. The event was highly publicized and there was significant public discussion around the issue at the time. This is reflected in the present sample, in which 93 percent of respondents were aware of the forthcoming apology. Thus, the intergroup apology was a highly salient and relevant topic for participants.

Participants were approached while they were sitting, often while they were eating lunch. They were told of the nature of the questionnaire, that it was being run in connection with the University of Queensland, and asked if they would like to share their views. Upon completing the questionnaire, participants were debriefed and thanked for their in-

volvement in the research. A small chocolate compensation was offered to each participant as a "thank you" for helping with the research.

2.2.3. Measures
All items were measured on nine-point scales. To accommodate the busy sample population, all scales consisted of just one or two items.

Shame was measured using two items: "Due to the long history of discrimination against Aboriginal Australians, I feel ashamed" and "I feel shame when I think about how non-Indigenous Australians have behaved towards Aboriginal Australians", $r = .76$, $p < .001$.

Guilt was measured using two items: "I feel guilty about the negative things non-Indigenous Australians have done to Aboriginal Australians in the past" and "I feel guilty about the present social inequality between Aboriginal and non-Indigenous Australians", $r = .76$, $p < .001$.[1]

Support for apology was measured using two items: "I am supportive of the government's apology to the Stolen Generations" and "I agree with the government's apology to the Stolen Generations", $r = .96$, $p < .001$.

Support for compensation was measured with a single item: "Monetary compensation to the Stolen Generation is a good idea".

Petition signing. Participants were also given the opportunity to sign what they believed to be a real petition to be sent to their local member of parliament, indicating their support for the upcoming apology. The reported score reflects whether participants actually signed the petition (1) or not (0).

2.3. Results
The means of, and correlations among the five key variables are presented in Table 1. As can be seen in the table,

the levels of shame, guilt, and support for the apology were moderate, with support for financial compensation somewhat lower. To test the effect of our two predictors, shame and guilt, three regression analyses were conducted to predict apology support, compensation support, and petition signing.

Table 1: Means of and inter-correlations among variables, Study 1

	M	SD	2	3	4	5
1. Shame	4.94	2.56	.79**	.60**	.56**	.60**
2. Guilt	4.64	2.65		.61**	.54**	.56**
3. Apology support	6.35	2.75			.57**	.65**
4. Compensation support	3.85	2.71				.48**
5. Petition signing	.47	.50				

** Correlation is significant at the .001 level

2.3.1. Distinguishing Guilt and Shame
A high correlation was observed between shame and guilt (see Table 1), and therefore a confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to determine whether the separation of these two variables was warranted. A model in which guilt and shame items were specified as loading on separate factors was tested first. The factors were allowed to correlate and no observed items were allowed to cross-load. All items loaded significantly onto their predicted factors (all loadings > .81), and the model fitted the data well, $\chi^2 (1) = .39$, $p = .53$, NFI = .999, RMSEA < .001. Consistent with the theoretical distinction between the two constructs, a model in which both shame and guilt items were specified as loading onto a single factor provided a significantly worse fit to the data, $\Delta\chi^2 (1) = 8.38$, $p < .05$.

2.3.2. Regression Analyses
Support for apology. The model containing shame and guilt explained 40 percent of the variance in support for apology, $R^2 = .40$, $F(2,122) = 42.65$, $p < .001$. Both shame ($\beta = .33$, $p < .005$) and guilt ($\beta = .35$, $p < .005$) were significant positive predictors of support for the apology.

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[1] Given that the second guilt item refers specifically to present inequality, analyses were also conducted with this item omitted. This analysis did not differ meaningfully from the analysis presented below, indicating that the focus of this item did not specifically influence the reported results.

Support for compensation. As with support for apology, the model explained a significant proportion of the variance in support for compensation, $R^2 = .33$, $F(2,120) = 30.86$, $p < .001$. Again, both shame ($\beta = .36$, $p < .005$) and guilt ($\beta = .25$, $p < .05$) significantly predicted support for compensation.

Petition signing. A logistic regression analysis was conducted to predict, from feelings of shame and guilt, the likelihood of signing a petition to be sent to parliament pledging support for the upcoming apology. The model accounted for 31 percent of the variance in petition signing, Nagelkerke $R^2 = .31$, $\chi^2 (2) = 32.08$, $p < .001$. Inspection of the coefficients revealed that shame was significantly linked to petition signing, Exp(B) = 1.44, Wald = 7.37, $p < .01$. This finding means that the odds of signing the petition were 1.44 times higher for each one-point increase in reported shame. Guilt was not significantly linked to an increased likelihood of petition signing, Exp(B) = 1.16, Wald = 1.56, $p < .22$.

2.4. Discussion

The present study indicates that both shame and guilt were associated with pro-social attitudes toward apology and compensation. When taken into account simultaneously, only shame predicted behavioural *action* (petition signing) in support for the forthcoming apology. The findings in relation to guilt are consistent with past research demonstrating that although group-based guilt is associated with abstract attitudinal support for restitution (e.g., Doosje et al. 1998; McGarty et al. 2005), its positive effects may not translate into behavioural intentions (Iyer et al., 2007; Leach et al., 2006). The present study extends this work by evaluating actual behavioural support for group-based apology. It is important to reiterate that both attitudinal support for apology and behavioural support for apology action reflected the degree to which participants supported their ingroup's apology. The key difference between the two measures was that the petition measure reflected a concrete behavioural action in support of the apology, whereas the attitudinal measure reflected abstract support for the apology.

One methodological concern arises from the high inter-correlation between guilt and shame: namely, that response bias present in the items may have blurred the distinction between the two variables. The support provided by

confirmatory factor analyses for the theoretical distinction between the variables, as well as the differential predictive power of shame and guilt for the behavioural measure, petition signing, suggest that such bias is unlikely to account for the present findings, however. Methodological constraints notwithstanding, the finding that shame is predictive of positive attitudes toward apology, compensation, and political behaviour is inconsistent with some previous theorizing and research on shame (Johns et al. 2005; Lickel et al. 2005; Rodogno 2008; Schmader and Lickel 2006; Tangney et al. 1992). Study 2 investigates a possible explanation for the inconsistency between the present findings and previous literature: that there are two different forms of shame with different effects: "essence shame" and "image shame".

3. "Essence Shame" and "Image Shame"

Study 1 provided further evidence that shame can have pro-social correlates. Although our data are inconsistent with some previous work (Johns et al. 2005; Lickel et al. 2005; Rodogno 2008; Schmader and Lickel 2006; Tangney et al. 1992), two recent studies support our findings. The first showed that shame predicted not only British participants' desire to apologize and provide compensation to those harmed during the recent war in Iraq, but also a desire for future contact with Iraqis (Allpress and Brown 2010). The second, conducted in Norway and focussing on the historical mistreatment of the Norwegian Gypsies (called Tatere), reaffirmed the pro-social associations of shame by providing evidence that shame predicts pro-sociality (empathy, restitution, desire for contact) when controlling for feelings of rejection (which predict self-defensive responses) and inferiority (Gausel et al. forthcoming). There is mounting evidence, therefore, that shame may be associated with pro-social outcomes. However, it remains unclear why shame is associated with avoidance in some instances and support for restitution in others.

We propose that there are two primary types or forms of shame, and that the differences between these two forms can explain the inconsistencies within the shame literature. Although group-based shame has widely been regarded as arising from a global negative evaluation of the ingroup, it is unclear whether this negative evaluation refers to an *internalized* perception that the ingroup has a negative es-

sence, or from the perception that *others* see the ingroup in a negative manner, that its image is tainted in some way.

The "image" component of shame, which has been widely emphasized as a crucial aspect (e.g., Scheff 2000; Richard. H. Smith, Webster, Parrott, and Eyre 2002), is captured by Branscombe, Slugoski and Kappen's remark that "collective shame involves being publicly exposed as incompetent, not being in control, weak and potentially even disgusting *in the eyes of others*" (2004, 29, emphasis in original). A subtly different emphasis can be found in the suggestion by Lickel, Schmader and Barquissau (2004) that shame is associated with a perception that the ingroup has a negative "essence": "collective shame stems from perceiving that the actions of the ingroup confirm or reveal a flawed aspect of one's social identity" and "implicate something about the very nature of who they are" (2004, 42–43). We treat these two different descriptions as reflecting two different forms of shame, with different associated outcomes, rather than simply an argument over the definition of shame. One form—which we term *image shame*—arises from the perception that the ingroup is perceived negatively in the eyes of others, while the other—which we term *essence shame*—arises from an internalized perception that the ingroup has some inherently negative quality.[2]

We believe "essence shame" arises when deeds done in the name of the ingroup are perceived by the ingroup member to have violated an important moral standard and when the individual recognizes the effects of the ingroup's deeds on the "victims". Furthermore, we propose that essence shame arises when individuals believe, or fear, that their group's actions reflect some underlying negative aspect or characteristic of the ingroup. We predict that, because essence shame is associated with an *internalized* belief that the ingroup's behaviour reflects something negative about the group's essence, individuals will cope with their feelings of shame in three different ways. The first is to sub-categorize

those members of the ingroup who are perceived to have perpetrated the misdeeds, thus distancing the ingroup from those who committed the wrongdoing; the second is to dis-identify with the ingroup, thus distancing oneself from the ingroup (both strategies have been proposed by Lickel et al. 2004 and Lickel et al. 2005); the third, and most important for the present study, is to attempt to restore the ingroup's moral standing by behaving in a pro-social manner.

We view "image shame" as being based on a perception that the ingroup's standing, image, and reputation within the wider community are threatened. Because image shame is associated with an external criticism of the ingroup, we predict that there will be four ways individuals may cope. As with essence shame, participants may sub-categorize the perpetrators or disidentify with the ingroup (Lickel et al. 2004; Lickel et al. 2005). Differently from essence shame, however, group members may avoid the issue or withdraw from the situation—a strategy often seen as a typical shame reaction. Finally, and somewhat counter-intuitively, group members may also support limited acts of restitution *if* they believe this support is likely to improve the ingroup's reputation and image in the eyes of third parties. Indeed, as noted earlier, Brown and colleagues (2008) found such a relationship, where a positive association between (undifferentiated) shame and support for restitution was mediated by reputation concerns. We address some of these predictions empirically in Study 2.

4. Study 2: Essence and Image Shame about Kenya
4.1. Historical and Political Context
Britain maintained colonial rule over Kenya from the 1880s through to 1963, as part of a larger African empire. Space constraints preclude a full description of the long history of Kenyan resistance, but several general histories may be of interest to readers (Ferguson 2004; James 1997; Pakenham 1992). Below we describe the lead-up to Kenyan independence, a bloody struggle known as the Mau Mau revolution.

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2 This distinction is related but not identical to the analysis of shame by Gausel et al. (2009). In their account, there is a single emotion of shame which derives from an appraisal of the flawed moral character of the ingroup (similar to our concept of "essence shame"). This emotion is thought (and found) to have positive associations with various prosocial outcomes. In addition, there may be feelings of rejection or inferiority that stem from an appraisal that one's group is rebuffed or disparaged by others. These emotions are thought (and found) to be linked to negative social outcomes. At this stage, we have an open mind as to the relative merits of these different formulations, especially because their empirical basis is still nascent. For the present purposes, we prefer our simpler "essence" vs. "image" formulation until further research has decisively clarified the matter.

The Mau Mau revolution grew largely out of social and economic pressure on the Kenyan Kikuyu population during the 1940s and early 1950s (Anderson 2005; Berman 1976; Throup 1985). Mau Mau, Kenyans who took an oath against British colonial rule, typically members of the Kikuyu ethnic group, began destroying settler properties in the early 1950s, killing a small number of white settlers and assassinating a larger number of loyalists—Indigenous Kenyans, often Kikuyu, who "collaborated" with and profited from colonial rule. In 1952 the colonial government responded by declaring a state of emergency and increasing military control over the country. The majority of the Kikuyu population was relocated to detention camps and guarded villages (Anderson 2005; Elkins 2005) while British forces attempted to detain or kill those Kenyans who had taken the Mau Mau oath.

The atmosphere in these camps, which has been likened to both the Soviet gulags and Nazi concentration camps, was one of ritualized dehumanization, forced labour, physical and psychological violence, torture, and death (Elkins 2005). Elkins (2005) provides examples of the mistreatment of detainees, including regular beatings, forced sodomy among male prisoners, gang rape of female prisoners, beating of children, and sleep deprivation. Figures indicate that, in total, the Mau Mau killed thirty-two white settlers, over two thousand African civilians, and approximately two hundred British soldiers. The death toll for the Kikuyu was significantly higher, with between twelve thousand and one hundred thousand Kikuyu killed by British forces (Anderson 2005; Corfield 1960; Elkins 2005).

That is the background to Study 2. We hypothesized that after making ingroup wrongdoing salient to British participants, essence shame would be positively associated with support for both apology and (financial and material) compensation. We predicted that image shame would be positively associated with support for apology. However, because image shame arises primarily out of a concern for how the ingroup is viewed by third parties and not a desire to restore an equal intergroup relationship, this positive association was not predicted for support for compensation, which is also a potentially more costly political action. Rather, we reason that because compensation requires a tangible and often prolonged commitment to addressing

the ingroup's wrongdoing, individuals high in image shame will avoid this strategy, producing a negative association between image shame and concrete support for reparation.

4.2. Method
4.2.1. Participants
Participants were 183 first-year undergraduate psychology students from a British university. The 161 participants who self-identified as "British" (25 males, 136 females) were included in the final analysis. Their ages ranged from 18 to 55, with a mean of 20 years of age.

4.2.2. Procedure
Data were collected in early 2009. Students were informed that participation was entirely voluntary. The questionnaire contained a short article, written for the purposes of Study 2, on the response of the British government to the Mau Mau revolution between 1952 and 1960. The article was ostensibly sourced from the *Guardian*, a reputable British newspaper. It gave an account of the number of British and Kikuyu killed during the uprising and information about the often horrible conditions in the British-run detention camps. The article contained brief details of the beatings, starvation, and torture that occurred within the camps, and ended with a statement that there have been recent discussions about Britain's need to apologize and offer reparations to those Kenyans affected during this period. The dependent measures then followed.

4.2.3. Measures
All items were measured on nine-point scales and were positively scored.

Essence shame was measured using two items: "Our treatment of Kenyan people makes me feel somewhat ashamed about what it means to be British" and "I feel ashamed to be British for the way we have treated the Kenyan people", $r = .80$, $p < .001$.

Image shame was measured using two items: "I feel humiliated when I think of how Britain is seen negatively by the rest of the world for how it has treated the Kenyan people" and "I feel bad because the behaviour of British people towards the Kenyan people has created a bad image of us in the eyes of the world" $r = .73$, $p < .001$.

Guilt was measured using two items adapted from Brown et al. (2008): "Even if I have done nothing bad, I feel guilty for the behaviour of British people toward the Kenyans" and "I feel guilty for the manner in which Kenyans have been treated in the past by British", $r = .67$, $p < .001$.

Support for apology was measured with one item: "The British government should issue an apology for the atrocities committed against the Kenyan people".

Support for material and financial compensation was measured with two items: "I support the idea of the British government compensating Kenyans financially for past injustices" and "I agree with the idea of the British government making material reparations to Kenyans", $r = .83$, $p < .001$.

4.3. Results

4.3.1. Distinguishing Image Shame, Essence Shame, and Guilt

As in Study 1, high inter-correlations were observed among the key independent variables (see Table 2). Confirmatory factor analyses were accordingly performed to assess the factor structure of the items measuring essence shame, image shame, and guilt. In the first model, the factors were allowed to correlate but no observed items were allowed to cross-load. As expected, the factors were inter-related ($.66 < rs < .77$), and all items loaded significantly onto their predicted factors (all loadings $> .80$). The model provided an acceptable fit to the data, χ^2 (6) = 10.08, $p = .12$, CFI = .993, RMSEA = .065. In addition, the hypothesized three-factor model proved superior to two alternative models. A model that specified the essence and image shame items as loading onto one "shame" factor, in addition to a guilt factor, provided a significant decrease in fit, $\Delta\chi^2$ (2) = 46.57, $p < .001$. A third model, in which all items loaded onto one omnibus "negative emotion" factor, also proved inferior, $\Delta\chi^2$ (3) = 78.12, $p < .001$. Thus, the data support the contention that image shame, essence shame, and guilt are separate factors, consistent with our expectations.

Table 2: Means of and inter-correlations among variables, Study 2

	M	SD	2	3	4	5
1. Essence shame	5.85	2.10	.66**	.62**	.41**	.39**
2. Image shame	5.35	1.97		.56**	.45**	.25**
3. Guilt	5.95	2.06			.46**	.45**
4. Apology support	7.27	1.87				.53**
5. Compensation Support	5.98	1.89				

** Correlation is significant at the .01 level

4.3.2. Regression Analyses

The means of, and correlations among the five key variables are presented in Table 2. To test the effect of essence shame, image shame, and guilt on support for restitution, two regression analyses were conducted in which apology support and compensation support were regressed onto the three predictors.

Support for apology. The model containing essence shame, image shame, and guilt explained 25 percent of the variance in support for apology, $F(3,157) = 19.05$, $p < .001$. Both guilt ($\beta = .28$, $p < .005$) and image shame ($\beta = .24$, $p < .05$) were significant positive predictors of support for an apology being offered to Kenyan people. Essence shame was not a significant predictor of support ($\beta = .07$, $p > .45$).

Support for material and financial compensation. The model containing the three predictors also explained a significant proportion of the variance in support for material and financial compensation, $R^2 = .21$, $F(3,157) = 15.49$, $p < .001$. Both essence shame ($\beta = .24$, $p < .03$) and guilt ($\beta = .36$, $p < .001$) were significant positive predictors of support for monetary and material compensation being offered to Kenyans. Image shame was not significantly associated with support for compensation, although the trend was in the predicted direction ($\beta = -.11$, $p < .26$).

4.4. Discussion

The present study provides preliminary evidence for the different predictive effects of essence and image shame. Essence shame was associated with support for monetary and material compensation, whereas image shame was associated with support for apology.

Although we predicted that essence shame would be positively associated with both apology and compensation support, we found that it was in fact only positively associated with support for compensation. While we believe that support for compensation more strongly represents a desire to restore intergroup equality, the observed lack of association with support for apology warrants further investigation. The lack of association may stem from methodological issues in the measurement of the two types of shame. Only two items were used for each shame scale. Thus, although the construction of the independent variables was supported by confirmatory factor analysis, it may be that more reliable measurement, in future research with more comprehensive sets of items, would yield more power to detect the hypothesized relationship. Alternatively, the finding may signal instability across contexts in the cultural significance of apologies and their perceived appropriateness to restore the group's positive distinctiveness, such that the utility of apology may be perceived differently in the Kenyan situation, relative to, for example, the case in Australia. It may be that respondents in Study 2 perceived verbal apology and concrete compensation as competing rather than complementary strategies, and that those participants with higher essence shame perceived words as relatively empty and endorsed action instead. The positive inter-correlation between support for apology and support for compensation is more consistent with the former argument, however.

We also predicted that image shame would be positively associated with support for apology but negatively associated with compensation support, reflecting a desire not to address the inequalities between British and Kenyans, but merely to enhance the international reputation of the ingroup. We observed partial support for this hypothesis, with image shame being positively associated with support for apology—a distinctly public act. Image shame was not significantly associated with compensation support, and the trend was for higher shame to be accompanied by lower values for concrete action. Again, on a methodological level, the negative relationship between image shame and compensation support may reach significance using additional measures with greater face validity, more reliable scales, or a larger sample. Even at face value, however, the present data

suggest that image shame may spur support for "quick fix" gestures, such as apologies, without generalizing to concrete, longer-term solutions.

5. General Discussion

The present research illustrates the importance of understanding the effects of group members' emotional reactions of shame and guilt over colonial injustices. The findings contribute to a growing literature that demonstrates that people can experience emotions for wrongs committed by a group to which they belong—even before they were born and against people no longer alive—and that these emotions can have important effects on contemporary intergroup relations. Indeed, feelings of guilt and shame explained between 21 and 40 percent of the variance in our measures of support for intergroup restitution, across contexts and in relation to different forms of restitution—considerable explanatory power, given the complex historical, political, and economic conditions influencing intergroup relations.

Both Study 1 (general population) and Study 2 (student population) provide evidence that group-based guilt is associated with positive attitudes toward apologizing to and compensating a victim outgroup. Study 1, however, demonstrated that guilt may not be associated with actual behaviour directed at bringing about outcomes such as an apology. This implies that although guilt may be an important factor in determining whether an individual holds positive attitudes toward reconciliatory acts, guilt feelings may have little effect upon behaviour (Iyer et al. 2007). Other emotions, such as shame, may be particularly important in motivating individuals to act upon their attitudes.

In Study 1, group-based shame was shown to be associated not only with attitudinal support for apology and compensation, but also the politically active behaviour of petition signing in support of the upcoming apology. There is growing evidence, therefore, that shame can be associated with pro-social outcomes (see also Allpress and Brown forthcoming; Gausel et al. 2009).
Study 2 demonstrated that different forms of shame may motivate different responses to intergroup wrong-doing. Image shame was positively associated with apology sup-

port. Essence shame, on the other hand, was associated with support for financial and material compensation—a less public act than apology, and therefore potentially a stronger indicator of a desire to restore an equal intergroup relationship. Although Study 2 provides preliminary evidence that essence and image shame are different constructs and that they may be associated with different outcomes, future research is needed to address the methodological limitations concerning the image and essence shame scales, and broaden the scope of the dependent measures. A greater range of anti-social measures such as avoidance, victim-blaming, and a desire to cover up ingroup misdeeds, as well as additional pro-social measures, such as desire for contact and behavioural measures of pro-sociality, would allow a stronger test of the differential effects of image and essence shame.

6. Implications for Post-Colonial Reconciliation and Nation-Building

Previous papers on group-based guilt and shame have often concluded that guilt is a productive emotion in the promotion of post-conflict restitution and reconciliation, whereas shame is likely to hinder such processes (e.g., Branscombe et al. 2004; Lickel et al. 2004). The evidence from the present studies allows us to add an important qualification to these conclusions. Our research implies that guilt is indeed useful in promoting support for policies of restitution, but its effects do not always generalize to the level of actual behaviour (this finding is consistent with Iyer et al. 2007). If individuals are to act in support of the establishment of intergroup equality it is likely they need to be experiencing some form of shame.

On an applied level, it appears that groups attempting to address histories of colonial violence would face less internal resistance if group members were experiencing a degree of essence shame and guilt. It is unclear as to how malleable these emotions are. However, research suggests that guilt arises primarily when group members perceive the ingroup to be responsible for harming another group (e.g., Branscombe and Doosje 2004), and our theorizing on essence shame leads us to believe that essence shame arises when a person perceives the actions of the ingroup as being inconsistent with the idea that the ingroup is moral and just. It may therefore be helpful to provide information about how

the actions of the ingroup have affected the victim group and simultaneously to highlight the importance of morality for the ingroup.

One implication of our theorizing on image shame is that for those experiencing this emotion, apologies may serve more a desire to improve their image in the eyes of others than a desire to right a past wrong or bring about a more equitable intergroup relationship. An apology motivated by image concerns may not necessarily lead to a meaningful improvement in intergroup relations. If our theoretical model is supported, future research may find that image shame promotes avoidance and concealment of ingroup wrongdoing, as well as lower support for reparation unless third parties expect and demand such gestures. If the victim group becomes aware of a self-serving dynamic, shallow apologies may actually further damage the intergroup relationship. This speculation of course does not necessarily imply that apologies are always motivated by a desire to enhance the ingroup's image. Indeed, the fact that guilt is reliably associated with support for apologies highlights that a number of other motivations are likely to underlie apologies, and is in keeping with the finding that apologies can be a crucial step toward more favourable intergroup relations (Nobles 2008).

To sum up, we believe the present research not only provides theoretical clarification regarding the differential effects of shame and guilt at the group level, but also contributes to a growing awareness of the complex emotional experiences of group life. Investigation into specific emotions allows more precise predictions of intergroup behaviour that are ot possible using more generalized measures of ingroup bias or prejudice. Although intergroup relations are characterized and influenced by complex political, historical, and econoic factors, recognition of the varied and powerful emotional influences on group members'intergroup behaviour allows a more nuanced teatment of intergroup-behaviour allows a more nuanced treatment of intergroup violence and conflict.

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Dealing with Past Colonial Conflicts: How Perceived Characteristics of the Victimized Outgroup Can Influence the Experience of Group-Based Guilt

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An examination of potential outgroup-focused predictors of group-based guilt relating to past colonial conflicts involving Portugal and the Netherlands, specifically, the role of the perceptions of the ingroup towards the victimized outgroup, as well as on outgroup identification and meta-perceptions (i.e. the ingroup's beliefs regarding the outgroup's perceptions of it). Using Structural Equation Modeling in a Portuguese sample (N = 178) and a Dutch sample (N = 157), we found that the experience of group-based guilt due to colonial conflicts can be positively predicted by outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification (Dutch sample only). Meta-perceptions were a negative predictor of group-based guilt (Dutch sample only). Furthermore, our results show that group-based guilt is positively associated with compensatory behavioral intentions and perceived importance of remembering past colonial conflicts. Results point to the important role of outgroup-focused variables in shaping group-based guilt experiences relating to past conflicts between groups. The findings suggest possible avenues of further research and ways to improve intergroup relations following conflict.

Countries with a colonial past—like those involved in other events, such as wars and genocide, where morality comes into play—have been confronted with a need to readdress the way the colonial period is portrayed. This is also the case for Portugal and the Netherlands, which possessed colonies and were involved in conflicts there.

For example, white Australians officially acknowledged the misdeeds of their ancestors when Prime Minister Kevin Rudd publicly apologized in February 2008:

> We apologize especially for the removal of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families, their communities and their country. For the pain, suffering and hurt of these Stolen Generations, their descendants and for their families left behind, we say sorry. To the mothers and the fathers, the brothers and the sisters, for the breaking up of families and communities, we say sorry. And for the indignity and degradation thus inflicted on a proud people and a proud culture, we say sorry. (Johnston 2008)

This need to readdress past misdeeds of the colonial period can influence the experience of group-based guilt. Guilt is a self-conscious emotion, whereby individuals acknowledge they have behaved in a wrongful way towards others and try to correct their misdeeds (Branscombe and Doosje 2004; Iyer, Leach, and Crosby 2003). However, as guilt is not a very pleasant emotion, it is more common that people and nations find excuses for their behavior. In the present paper, we are interested in factors that can help override this inclination to refrain from seriously considering the past actions of the group.

We investigate the Portuguese Colonial War (Study 1) and the Dutch conflict with Indonesia (Study 2) as events with the potential to induce group-based guilt, focusing specifically on outgroup identification, and examining the ingroup's perceptions and meta-perceptions (i.e. the ingroup's beliefs regarding the outgroup's perceptions of it)

of the outgroup and their relation with group-based guilt. We are also interested in the relationship between group-based guilt and the perceived importance of remembering the negative aspects of the colonial past.

According to Intergroup Emotions Theory (Smith 1993), people do not experience emotions only as individuals; they can feel them as group members too, though not through direct transposition. Thus, it is possible for people to feel guilt as a group member without having committed transgressions themselves, via the association of the individual with the ingroup (Doosje et al. 1998). According to Branscombe, Doosje, and McGarty (2003), there are two necessary conditions for individuals to feel group-based guilt: recognizing their belonging to the group (even if this identification is not strong) and holding the ingroup accountable for a violation.

This guilt by association, which we label group-based guilt, has been widely researched (for an overview see Branscombe and Doosje 2004), linking it with several ingroup-focused constructs, such as ingroup identification (Doosje et al. 1998; Iyer, Leach, and Crosby 2003; Rensmann 2004; Zebel 2005), and exonerating cognitions (Lickel, Schmader, and Barquissau 2004; Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan 2006). This paper add new dimensions to the research on group-based guilt by highlighting *outgroup*-focused variables as potential predictors of group-based guilt.

At the interpersonal level, it has been argued that the experience of guilt may be affected by others. For example, Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1994) state that guilt involves a sense of communal bonds with significant others and that the experience of guilt will be stronger when the others are relevant for the self. Baumeister and colleagues (1994) argue that this happens because showing guilt is a manner in which individuals regulate behavior with the purpose of strengthening and preserving social relationships. We apply this line of reasoning to the intergroup level. The main argument we make in this article is that at the group level, perceptions of a communal bond and relatedness between the perpetrator ingroup and the victim outgroup will lead to higher levels of group-based guilt in relation to colonial conflicts.

We hypothesize that if the ingroup does not value the outgroup, low levels of group-based guilt will be experienced. However, if the ingroup values its relations with the outgroup, the sense of a shared relationship is heightened and, therefore, feelings of group-based guilt should arise if there is a transgression of moral standards, as it is the case in the Portuguese and Dutch contexts for the period we are discussing. Thus, if there is a sense of relatedness and a bond linking the ingroup and the outgroup, the door is open for the experience of group-based guilt.

In a limited number of studies, other authors have shown ways in which outgroups can influence the experience of group-based guilt (Iyer, Leach, and Pedersen 2004; Zebel, Doosje, and Spears 2004, 2009a, 2009b). Zebel, Doosje, and Spears (2009b) show that when the source of information about the misdeeds of the ingroup is a victimized outgroup, highly identified individuals feel higher levels of group-based guilt. Taking the perspective of the outgroup has also proved to induce higher levels of group-based guilt among members of the ingroup (Zebel, Doosje, and Spears 2009a).

These findings suggest that outgroup-focused variables can influence the way group-based guilt is experienced. In our studies, we propose new outgroup-focused variables that might affect the way individuals feel guilt about past mistreatment of another group. Specifically, we investigate the role of outgroup identification and the ingroup's perceptions and meta-perceptions of the outgroup as potential predictors of group-based guilt.

In terms of outgroup identification and perceptions of the ingroup, we argue that the more people identify with the outgroup and have a positive view of it, the more they are likely to experience high levels of group-based guilt over past misdeeds of their ingroup towards the outgroup. These two concepts differ in their group/self focus, in the sense that outgroup perceptions are related to group-based beliefs about the outgroup while outgroup identification is a self-focused measure of individual identification with the outgroup. As such, we expect these variables to have slightly different patterns of correlation with the other variables studied, though we expect them both to correlate positively with group-based guilt.

We conceptualize outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification as *bonding variable*s, because we believe outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification are two partially independent dimensions of a single higher-order concept, a communal bond with the outgroup. Based on this assumption, we expect these variables to reflect a sense of relatedness and a concern with the victimized group and we propose that they are both linked positively with group-based guilt.

We also argue that these bonding variables go beyond concepts such as taking the outgroup perspective (Zebel, Doosje, and Spears 2009a) or empathy towards the outgroup (Stephan and Finley 1999), because we believe that, though an individual can take the perspective of an outgroup or feel empathy in relation to the suffering of an outgroup, it is not necessarily true that this same individual will identify with the outgroup or have a positive view of it, and therefore, the variables included in the present study (i.e. outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification) may have different outcomes from the other variables mentioned above, regarding group-based guilt and its consequences. Our conceptualization of outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification as two partially independent dimensions of a higher order concept (i.e. bonding variables) will also allow for different patterns of relations between variables, since we expect that some people will not necessarily identify with the outgroup even though have positive perceptions of it.

We expect meta-perceptions to play a role in the experience of group-based guilt. Meta-perceptions refer to the ingroup's beliefs about the way it is perceived by the outgroup (Vorauer, Main, and O'Connell 1998). Meta-perceptions are thus activated through evaluative concerns that appear during intergroup interaction and can change according to the outgroup involved (Bizman and Yinon 2003; Vorauer et al. 2000).
We hypothesize that meta-perceptions are negatively correlated with group-based guilt. This negative association might occur because individuals who think the outgroup has a negative perception of the ingroup relate this to their own moral concerns about the misdeeds of the ingroup. When people believe the outgroup holds a negative view of the ingroup, this could mean that the outgroup holds the ingroup responsible for negative acts during the colonial

conflicts. These concerns with the moral standing of the ingroup in relation to the victimized outgroup are expected to lead to strong feelings of group-based guilt. Therefore, we predict a negative association between meta-perceptions and group-based guilt.

We also investigate the social implications of group-based guilt. Group-based guilt is a powerful emotion with social consequences, such as a desire to repair harm, seek forgiveness, and change future behavior. At the intergroup level, it has been found that group-based guilt is associated with the desire to compensate the victimized outgroup and apologize to it (Barkan 2000; Doosje et al. 1998; Lickel, Schmader, and Barquissau 2004; Mallett and Swim 2004).

Additionally, we explore the link between group-based guilt and perceived importance of remembering the past misdeeds of the ingroup. Are people in favor of remembering the negative aspects of the conflicts of Portuguese and Dutch colonialism as a means of reestablishing balance in relations between the ingroup and the outgroup?

We suggest that individuals who feel higher levels of group-based guilt about the ingroup's misdeeds will have a stronger desire to discuss and receive more negative information about these events, so these individuals are more willing to remember the negative aspects of the colonial period. In this way, they demonstrate that they are prepared to acknowledge the negative actions of the past and to deal with their feelings of group-based guilt. They are in favor of opening the way for an open public discussion and, possibly, the re-construction and improvement of relations between the ingroup and the outgroup.

The main hypotheses of focus in our studies are:
H1: Outgroup perceptions are related positively with group-based guilt.
H2: Outgroup identification is related positively with group-based guilt.
H3: Meta-perceptions are negatively related with group-based guilt.
H4: Group-based guilt predicts compensatory behavioral intentions and perceived importance of remembering negative information about past events.

We also explored the potential relationships of the three predictors (outgroup perceptions, outgroup identification, meta-perceptions) with compensatory behavioral intentions.

We opted to use two cases of colonization and two samples—Portugal and the Netherlands—because we believe the proposed theoretical model can work in different samples with a past of colonial conflicts. Nevertheless, we expected differences between the samples regarding the strength of the relationships between variables. Specifically, we hypothesized that the associations between the variables would, in general, be stronger in the Dutch sample, because, in general, the Netherlands has more positive group relations with the former colony.

It is worth noting that the Portuguese Colonial War happened approximately thirty-five years ago and the Dutch conflict in Indonesia approximately sixty years ago. That difference might also lead to stronger relationships among variables in the Dutch sample, since it is easier to acknowledge misdeeds that took place longer ago (Barkan 2000).

1. Study 1: Portugal

In Study 1 we analyze the levels of group-based guilt felt by Portuguese people about the Portuguese colonial past. From 1961 to 1974 there were wars of independence in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, which had negative consequences for both the former colonies and Portuguese society. This colonial conflict occurred when Portugal was under the New State dictatorship and resulted from the government's unwillingness to grant independence at a time when most European colonizers were recognizing the right of self-determination and the United Nations were condemning colonization worldwide.

Figueiredo, Valentim, and Doosje (forthcoming) report that Portuguese individuals who identify with the outgroup make less use of exonerating cognitions for the misbehavior of the ingroup and are more willing to compensate the outgroup. In this study, we take that result further and analyze how outgroup identification, outgroup perceptions, and meta-perceptions relate to group-based guilt. Links between group-based guilt, compensatory behavioral intentions and

perceived importance of remembering negative aspects of this period are also analyzed.

1.1. Method

Participants

One hundred seventy-eight Portuguese university students participated in this study, without reward or for course credits. Eight respondents were excluded from analysis (six not Portuguese, two due to missing data). Of the remaining 170 participants, 91.8 percent were women (age $M = 20$ years, $SD = 4.19$; range 18–50).

Design

The study used a correlational design: predictors and dependent variables regarding the Portuguese colonial period were assessed using a questionnaire.

Procedure

The questionnaire was administered at the end of a class and participants took about half an hour to complete it. It began by explaining that the study aimed to examine the perceptions people have about the Portuguese colonial period and about the Portuguese Colonial War. Demographic variables such as age, gender, and nationality of the participants and their parents were covered in the questionnaire.

Predictor variables

Outgroup perceptions. We measured Portuguese perceptions of Africans from the former colonies using a bipolar scale with nine items, partially derived from Valentim (2003) and ranging from 1 (*negative attribute*) to 7 (*positive attribute*). Examples of items include: "In general, I think the Portuguese think the Africans are unkind/kind"; "negative/positive"; "narrow-minded/open-minded"; "unfriendly/friendly". The nine items comprised a very reliable scale ($\alpha = .85$).

Outgroup identification. Participants were asked to indicate their level of identification with the outgroup by means of one item ("I identify with Africans from the former colonies"), measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).

Meta-perceptions. To measure Portuguese meta-perceptions concerning Africans from the former colonies, the same nine items used for outgroup perceptions were applied, restructured to read: "In general, I think the Africans think the Portuguese are unkind/kind," etc. (α = .86), measured using the same seven-point scale.

Emotion

Group-based guilt. Feelings of group-based guilt were assessed using the four items of the scale introduced by Doosje et al. (1998), adapted to capture feelings of guilt about the Portuguese Colonial War in Africa (α = .88) on a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Examples of items used are: "I feel guilty about the negative actions of the Portuguese toward people from the former African colonies during the Colonial War" and "I can easily feel guilty about the negative consequences of Portuguese actions during the Colonial War."

Consequences

Compensation. To capture compensatory behavioral intentions, four items derived from Doosje and colleagues (1998) were used (α =.83), with a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). Examples include: "I think the Portuguese owe something to the people from the former colonies because of the things the Portuguese did" and "I think I should make more effort to improve the position of people from the former colonies because of the things the Portuguese did."

Perceived importance of remembering. Participants were then asked about the importance of remembering the positive and negative aspects of the colonial period in the media and the school curriculum, using four items with a seven-point scale. The negative items were subtracted from the positive items so as to create a composite measure for perceived importance of remembering *negative* aspects of the colonial conflict (α = .79), with possible values ranging from -7 to +7. Examples include: "How important do you think it is for the media to give attention to the positive aspects of the Portuguese colonial period?" (reverse coded) and "How important do you think it is for the school curriculum to give attention to the negative aspects of the Portuguese colonial period?"

1.2. Results
1.2.1. Correlations

The means and standard deviations of the constructs are presented in Table 1, their correlations in Table 2. Table 1 shows that the Portuguese in general, present outgroup perceptions, outgroup identification, and meta-perceptions significantly below the mid-point of the scale, suggesting that they hold less than positive views of Africans from the former colonies. For group-based guilt the Portuguese also present an average score significantly below the mid-point of the scale; this is unsurprising because most research about group-based guilt shows it below the mid-point of the scale (Doosje et al. 2004).

Table 1: Means, standard deviations, and independent sample t-tests for the Portuguese and Dutch samples

	Portuguese sample		Dutch sample			
	M	SD	M	SD	F (1, 310)	p
Outgroup perceptions	3.72*	.97	4.58*	.74	74.10	.00
Outgroup identification	3.49*	1.19	2.50*	1.24	51.31	.00
Meta-perceptions	3.86*	.87	4.22*	.73	14.99	.00
Group-based guilt	3.44*	1.41	3.64*	1.09	1.94	.17
Compensatory behavioral intentions	4.30*	1.03	2.81*	1.03	162.72	.00
Importance of remembering negative aspects	.41*	1.33	.90*	1.44	9.64	.00

* Means significantly different from the mid-point of the scale ($p < .05$).

As expected, outgroup perceptions correlate significantly with outgroup identification, meta-perceptions, group-based guilt, and compensatory behavioral intentions (see Table 2). Outgroup identification also correlates significantly and positively with compensatory behavioral intentions, but, unexpectedly it does not correlate significantly with group-based guilt or with meta-perceptions. Perceptions of the outgroup, outgroup identification, and meta-perceptions are not significantly correlated with perceived importance of remembering the negative aspects of the past.

Table 2: Correlations (r) and p values (between brackets) among the variables in the Portuguese (Port.) and the Dutch samples

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Outgroup perceptions	Portuguese \ Dutch	.12 (.16)	.64 (.00)*	.07 (.44)	.00 (.96)	.03 (.70)
2. Outgroup identification	.16 (.04)*	–	.17 (.05)*	.23 (.01)*	.24 (.01)*	.05 (.58)
3. Meta-perceptions	.53 (.00)*	.03 (.70)	–	-.16 (.06)	-.22 (.01)*	-.18 (.04)*
4. Group-based guilt	.19 (.01)*	.05 (.52)	.05 (.56)	–	.54 (.00)*	.17 (.05)*
5. Compensation	.18 (.02)*	.18 (.02)*	.04 (.57)	.38 (.00)*	–	.11 (.20)
6. Importance of remembering negative aspects	.14 (.08)	.03 (.68)	.10 (.19)	.18 (.02)*	.19 (.02)*	–

*p < .05

Group-based guilt correlates significantly with compensatory behavioral intentions and is significantly and positively associated with perceived importance of attention to negative events, as we predicted in our hypothesis. Finally, compensatory behavioral intentions correlate positively with perceived importance of attention to negative events.

1.2.2. Structural Equation Model
To examine the hypothesized relationships between the variables for the Portuguese sample, we tested a structural equation model using EQS (see Figure 1). The model included hypothesized paths from outgroup identification, Portuguese perceptions of Africans, and Portuguese meta-perceptions of Africans, to the outcome variables,

which include feelings of group-based guilt and compensatory behavioral intentions. Paths from group-based guilt to compensatory behavioral intentions and to perceived importance of attention to negative events were also included. Given the potential relationships between the predictor variables in the model, we allowed for associations between these three predictor variables.

Figure 1: Structural equation model testing outgroup-focused antecedents and consequences of group-based guilt for the Portuguese sample

Note: Standardized parameter estimates; *p < .05.

The resulting model fits the data well. The χ² value is small and statistically insignificant: χ² (4, N = 170) = 5.74, p > .10. The other fit indices also indicate good fit: Non-normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .93, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .98, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .98, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = .99, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .04, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .05. Parameter estimates are shown in Figure 1.

The correlation between outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification is statistically significant as is the correlation between outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions. The correlation between outgroup identification and Portuguese meta-perceptions of Africans is not statistically significant in the present sample.

We found support for Hypothesis 1: Outgroup perceptions were reliably associated with group-based guilt. When people perceive the outgroup in favorable terms, they are more likely to experience guilt. There was no direct significant path from outgroup perceptions to compensatory behavioral intentions.

Unexpectedly, outgroup identification was not related to group-based guilt (Hypothesis 2), but it was significantly associated with compensatory behavioral intentions. The more people identify with the outgroup, the more they are willing to compensate the outgroup. Thus, in this study, there was a significant path from outgroup identification to outgroup compensation, but it was not via group-based guilt.

Our data do not lend support for Hypothesis 3: Portuguese meta-perceptions of to Africans were not significantly related with either group-based guilt or compensatory behavioral intentions.

Finally, confirming Hypothesis 4, group-based guilt was reliably associated with compensatory behavioral intentions. More importantly, group-based guilt was significantly related with a more recent consequence of guilt, namely the perceived importance of remembering the negative aspects of the colonial past in the media and in school.

To further test our hypotheses, we used a model to investigate whether perceived importance of remembering past misdeeds could be conceptualized as a mediator of the relationship between the three predictor variables and group-based guilt. Even though the correlations between the variables do not show direct support for this hypothesized model (see Table 2), we do think it is possible to conceptualize the importance of remembering negative aspects of the Colonial War as a mediator of the relationship between group-based guilt and the three predictors since variable can be expected to be not to be rather a cause rather than a consequence of group-based guilt, in the sense that remembering the negative aspects of the Colonial War might open the way for individuals to experience group-based guilt. Since this a novel variable in the literature, we are interested in discovering how it is related with the experience of group-based guilt and therefore wanted to see how it relates to the other variables under study when included in a different model. In fact, this alternative model fits the data poorly, with a reliable chi-square value: χ^2 (7, N = 170) = 15.61, $p <$ .05. The other fit indices also indicated weaker fit in comparison to the main hypothesized model: Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .81, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .71, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .92, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = .97, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .07, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .09. In a word: the results support the first theoretical model, but not the alternative model.

1.3. Discussion

As expected, outgroup perceptions were significantly related with group-based guilt, but, contradicting our

hypothesis, outgroup identification and meta-perceptions did not associate significantly with group-based guilt in the Portuguese sample. The lack of significant associations between outgroup identification and group-based guilt and between meta-perceptions and group-based guilt might be because members of the national group consider themselves victims of the Colonial War, as much as the outgroup does. This might be due to the fact that the war is still close in time to the present generations (just thirty-five years ago) and that there are still war veterans and Portuguese civilians who lived in the colonies and who view themselves as victims of the war and who may influence the perceptions of the younger generation. Still, it is important to stress that the present study assesses Portuguese perceptions and meta-perceptions of Africans and, as such, it could be that individuals are showing general perceptions of Africans and not only of Africans from the former Portuguese colonies. We believe this is unlikely, because every other measure used in the study referred specifically to Africans from the former Portuguese colonies, but attention should be paid to this potential limitation when generalizations are drawn.

It is important to stress that—even though there was no direct significant path from outgroup identification to group-based guilt—outgroup identification *did* significantly correlate with compensatory behavioral intentions. Thus, feeling a bond with the outgroup is related to intentions to compensate.

In line with Hypothesis 4, group-based guilt predicts support for compensatory behavioral intentions, confirming previous research in this domain. Furthermore, and importantly, we were able to find support for our more novel consequence of group-based guilt: when people feel more group-based guilt they are more likely to consider it necessary to remember negative information about the colonial past in the media and at schools. We also tested an alternative model in which perceived importance of remembering negative information was specified as a predictor of group-based guilt. This alternative proved to have a weaker fit with the data than the main model, providing further evidence for the robustness of our theoretical model.

2. Study 2: The Netherlands

Study 2 examines whether the model established in Study 1 can be confirmed using another sample, this time the Dutch colonial conflict with Indonesia. The war the Netherlands fought between 1945 and 1949 for control of Indonesia had negative consequences for the people of Indonesia and the Netherlands. Since this conflict occurred longer ago (sixty years)—and there is therefore more distance from the negative events—and intergroup relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia are better than between Portugal and its former African colonies, we expected Study 2 to show stronger correlations between the variables than Study 1, though not higher levels of group-based guilt.

The hypotheses are the same as for Study 1:

H1: Outgroup perceptions are related positively with group-based guilt.

H2: Outgroup identification is related positively with group-based guilt.

H3: Meta-perceptions are negatively related with group-based guilt.

H4: Group-based guilt predicts compensatory behavioral intentions and perceived importance of remembering negative information about past events.

As in Study 1, we examined the possible relationships between the three predictor variables (outgroup identification, outgroup perceptions, meta-perceptions) and compensatory behavioral intentions.

2.1. Method

Participants
One hundred fifty-seven Dutch university students participated in this study, either for course credits or for a €7 payment. Seventeen responses were excluded from analysis (fifteen not Dutch, two due to missing data). Of the remaining 140 participants, 77.9 percent were women (age $M = 21$ years, $SD = 4.60$; range 17–47).

Design
As in Study 1, we used a correlational design: predictors and dependent variables regarding the Dutch colonial past were assessed using a questionnaire.

Procedure
The questionnaire was administered along with four other unrelated questionnaires, with participants taking about

an hour to complete all of them. At the beginning of the questionnaire it was explained that the study aimed to examine the perceptions people have about the Dutch colonial period in Indonesia. Demographic variables such as age, gender, and nationality of the participants and their parents were also covered in the questionnaire.

Predictor variables
All measures used in Study 2 were the same as used in Study 1.
Outgroup perceptions. The nine bipolar items capturing Dutch perceptions of Indonesians comprised a very reliable scale (α = .82).
Outgroup identification. Identification with the outgroup was measured on a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).
Meta-perceptions. The nine-item scale measuring Dutch meta-perceptions of Indonesians was also reliable (α = .81). Emotion
Group-based guilt. The scale measuring feelings of group-based guilt comprised four items (Doosje et al. 1998), and had a Cronbach alpha of .71.

Consequences
Compensation. We used the same four items to capture compensatory behavioral intentions (α =.76).
Perceived importance of remembering. We used the same four-item scale to measure perceived importance of remembering negative aspects of the colonial period (α = .79), to construct a composite measure for perceived importance of remembering the negative aspects of the colonial past. The negative items were subtracted from the positive items so as to create a composite measure for perceived importance of remembering *negative* aspects of the colonial conflict, with possible values ranging from -7 to +7.

2.2. Results
2.2.1. Correlations

The means (and standard deviations) are presented in Table 1, the correlations in Table 2. Table 1 shows that all average scores for the variables are significantly away from the midpoint of the scale, with outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions the only ones significantly above the mid-point, the rest significantly below it.

In Study 2, unexpectedly, outgroup perceptions are significantly related only with meta-perceptions and with none of the other variables (see Table 2). Outgroup identification correlates significantly with meta-perceptions, group-based guilt, and compensatory behavioral intentions.

Unexpectedly, meta-perceptions are not significantly correlated with group-based guilt, though they are significantly and negatively correlated with compensatory behavioral intentions. Though we did not expect this significant relationship, meta-perceptions are also negatively and significantly associated with perceived importance of remembering the negative aspects of the colonial past.

Group-based guilt is associated significantly with both compensatory behavioral intentions and perceived importance of attention to negative events and these latter two variables are not significantly related with each other, even though we could have expected an association between them (as was the case in Study 1).

2.2.2. Structural Equation Model

We used EQS to analyze whether the model established in Study 1 could be replicated in another sample with a history of colonial conflict. The model included the same hypothesized paths from outgroup identification, Dutch perceptions of Indonesians, and Dutch meta-perceptions of Indonesians to feelings of group-based guilt and compensatory behavioral intentions. Paths from group-based guilt to compensatory behavioral intentions and to perceived importance of attention to negative events in the colonial past were also included.

To test the hypothesized relations between the predictor variables in the model, we allowed for associations between the three predictor variables in the model. The resulting model fits the data well. The χ^2 value is small and statistically insignificant: $\chi^2 (4, N = 140) = 4.39$, $p > .10$. The other fit indices also indicate good fit: Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .99, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 1.00, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 1.00, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = .99, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .03, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .03. Parameter estimates are shown in Figure 2.

The predictor variables present two statistically significant correlations; the only correlation that does not reach statistical significance is the one between outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification.

In line with Hypothesis 1, outgroup perceptions were reliably and positively associated with group-based guilt. There was no reliable path between outgroup perceptions and compensatory behavioral intentions.

Figure 2: Structural equation model testing outgroup-focused antecedents and consequences of group-based guilt for the Dutch sample

Note: Standardized parameter estimates; *p < .05.

More importantly, and in line with Hypothesis 2, outgroup identification was significantly associated with group-based guilt. In addition, there was a direct positive path from outgroup identification to compensatory behavioral intentions, as was observed in Study 1.

In contrast to Study 1, Dutch meta-perceptions of Indonesians were significantly and negatively associated with both group-based guilt and compensatory behavioral intentions. Thus, Dutch participants who thought that Indonesian participants had a negative view of the Dutch experienced higher levels of group-based guilt. This supports Hypothesis 3.

Confirming Hypothesis 4, group-based guilt was significantly related with compensatory behavioral intentions. In addition, we replicated the positive path from group-based

guilt to perceived importance of remembering the negative aspects of the colonial past.

Following the same rationale as in Study 1, the same alternative model was also tested with the present sample. Again, this resulted in a weaker fit with the data: χ^2 (7, N = 140) = 27.99, p < .01. The other fit indices also indicated poorer fit than the main hypothesized model: Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = .70, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .86, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .87, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = .94, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .10, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .15.

Given that the present sample showed an unexpected significant correlation between meta-perceptions and perceived importance of remembering the negative aspects of the

past, we conducted another analysis, where this path was included in another structural equation model. This model proved to have a good fit with the data: χ^2 (3, N = 140) = 1.13, p > .10. In general, the other fit indices also indicate good fit: Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI) = 1.01, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = 1.00, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = 1.01, Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) = 1.00, standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) = .02, and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) = .00. Even though this model proves to have a good fit with the data, the path between meta-perceptions and perceived importance of remembering negative information is not statistically significant and, therefore, our main hypothesized theoretical model proves to have a better fit with the data.

2.2.3. Differences Between the Portuguese and Dutch Samples

To check for differences between the Portuguese and the Dutch samples regarding the average scores on the variables under analysis, we conducted a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA), which showed that there are significant differences between the Portuguese and the Dutch samples: Wilks' Lambda = .02; F (6, 303) = 2253.70, p < .001). As can be seen in Table 1, outgroup perceptions in the Dutch sample are significantly more positive than in the Portuguese sample (F (1, 310) = 74.10, p < .01). In addition, in the Dutch sample, outgroup perceptions are positive and significantly above the mid-point of the scale (t = 9.29, p = .00). In contrast, in the Portuguese sample perceptions of Africans from the former colonies are negative and significantly below the mid-point of the scale (t = -3.72, p = .00). Meta-perceptions of outgroup also show the same pattern: in the Dutch sample these are positive and significantly above the mid-point of the scale (t = 3.51, p = .00); in the Portuguese sample these are negative and significantly below the mid-point of the scale (t = -2.13, p = .04). Furthermore, the meta-perceptions in the Dutch sample are more positive than in the Portuguese sample (F (1, 310) = 14.99, p < .01). However, in contrast to the patterns of outgroup perception and meta-perception, participants identify more strongly with the outgroup in the Portuguese sample than in the Dutch sample (F (1, 310) = 51.31, p < .01).

With respect to group-based guilt, the Dutch sample does not differ from the Portuguese sample, (F (1, 310) = 1.94, p

> .15). Both means are significantly below the mid-point of the scale (t = -5.17, p = .00 for the Portuguese sample and t = -3.86, p = .00 for the Dutch sample).

The Dutch sample shows a higher mean in perceived importance of remembering negative aspects of the past (F (1, 310) = 9.64, p < .01). As both means are above the mid-point of the scale, we can argue that both the Dutch and the Portuguese participants are willing to remember the negative aspects of the colonial period (t = -3.97, p = .00 for the Portuguese sample and t = -7.35, p = .00 for the Dutch sample), but the Dutch are more willing to do so.

In contrast to this pattern, the Portuguese have significantly stronger compensatory behavioral intentions than the Dutch (F (1, 310) = 162.72, p < .01). In addition, the Portuguese participants tend to support such intentions (the mean is above the mid-point of the scale [t = 3.84, p = .00]), whereas the Dutch participants are generally unsupportive (their mean is below the mid-point of the scale [t = -13.78, p = .00]).

2.3. Discussion

In Study 2 we were again able to obtain evidence for a link between outgroup perceptions and group-based guilt. As expected, outgroup identification was significantly related to group-based guilt. In addition, we replicated the significant positive path between outgroup identification and compensatory behavioral intentions found in Study 1. These results support our concept of *bonding variables*, a cluster of variables which are related to a feeling of sharing a bond with the outgroup and which influence the experience of group-based guilt.

Confirming hypothesis 3, meta-perceptions were significantly and negatively correlated with group-based guilt and compensatory behavioral intentions. Thus, having more positive meta-perceptions leads individuals to show both lower levels of group-based guilt (leading indirectly to lower levels of support for victim compensation) and a decreased desire to compensate the victims of the ingroup's past colonial misdeeds (a direct path from meta-perceptions to outgroup compensation). Confirming our hypotheses regarding the social functions of group-based guilt, we found significant positive relationships between group-based guilt

and both compensatory behavioral intentions and perceived importance of remembering the negative aspects of the colonial past. Once again, the main hypothesized model had a better fit to the data than the alternative model, giving us further evidence for our conceptualization of perceived importance of remembering the negative aspects of the colonial period as a consequence of group-based guilt and not as an antecedent of it.

We were not able to achieve the desirable ratio between the number of participants and the number of model parameters, which, according to Kline (1998) should be 10:1 (in our case it was 8:1). Still, we believe this model to be reliable, because it has very good fit indices and was replicated using two different samples with a past of colonial conflicts.

3. General Discussion

Taken together, the results of the two studies show support for our hypotheses concerning the role of different outgroup-focused variables in predicting feelings of group-based guilt about colonial conflicts. .

In both studies we were able to show a positive relationship between outgroup perceptions and group-based guilt. Individuals experience more group-based guilt when they believe their group has a more positive rather than negative view of the outgroup. We also found evidence that outgroup identification has a positive relationship with group-based guilt (Study 2 only), meaning that the more people identify with the outgroup, the more group-based guilt they will experience. It thus seems that feeling a bond with the outgroup leads people to tend to report higher levels of group-based guilt and, thus, be more willing to acknowledge the misdeeds of their national group's colonial past.

These results are in line with the argument of Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1994) that when the relationship damaged is with a relevant person or group individuals will feel more guilt than when the other is not relevant to the person who committed the wrongful actions.

Drawing from the differences found between the two samples in relation to the overall averages of outgroup

perceptions (higher in the Dutch sample) and outgroup identification (higher in the Portuguese sample) and taking in consideration the correlation patterns between outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification in both samples (i.e. this correlation only reached statistical significance in the Portuguese sample), it is possible to argue that these two variables are two partially independent dimensions of a higher-order concept, i.e. bonding variables. They do not necessarily need to be strongly related with each other, since we argue that it is possible that some individuals (as is the case for the Dutch) can have positive perceptions of the outgroup without necessarily identifying with them, or vice-versa.

Taking this into consideration, it is still clear that this cluster of results supports our conceptualization of outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification as *bonding* variables, since the existence of a bond connecting the ingroup with the outgroup leads individuals to identify and feel close to members of other groups. In the case of colonization, where there was contact and a feeling of relatedness between the ingroup (the colonizers) and the outgroup (the colonized), an acknowledgment that negative acts were committed against the outgroup during colonial conflicts can lead members of the ingroup to experience higher levels of group-based guilt. Without this sense of relatedness, feelings of group-based guilt would be lower. It is probably this same sense of connectedness that instigates the desire to construct better relations between the groups. Thus, valuing the outgroup and having a positive view of it can have positive consequences for the reconstruction of relations between the groups.

Further research could fruitfully analyze ways to improve the perspective of perpetrator groups toward victimized outgroups, as a means to deal with the past and construct better relations in the future. This relationship-enhancing function of guilt can, therefore, play a fundamental role in opening the way for future positive relations amongst groups involved in colonial conflicts (Barkan 2000).

The lack in both samples of a significant direct path from outgroup perceptions to compensatory behavioral intentions leads us to suggest that having positive outgroup

perceptions does not associate directly with a desire to compensate the victims, but rather that this relationship is mediated by feelings of group-based guilt. We argue that having positive outgroup perceptions does not, *per se*, lead groups to make amends for past misdeeds; this is actually achieved through an acknowledgment of feeling group-based guilt.

In both samples, outgroup identification—unlike outgroup perceptions—is directly related with compensatory behavioral intentions. It thus seems that outgroup identification, as one partially independent dimension of the broader concept of bonding variables is, *per se*, related with the desire to compensate the victims of past misdeeds and can, therefore, serve a relationship-enhancing function by signaling that there is an imbalance in the intergroup relationship, which can be addressed by compensation of the victimized outgroup (Wohl and Branscombe 2004), via a direct link between outgroup identification and compensatory behavioral intentions.

Though the measure used in the present study has been used in previous studies with reliable patterns of results (for an example see Valentim 2003), we must treat this pattern of results with caution because the measure used for outgroup identification has only one item, thus limiting our results and the interpretations drawn from them.

We also found that having positive meta-perceptions predicts lower levels of group-based guilt (statistically significant only in Study 2). We hypothesized positive meta-perceptions to be a predictor of lower levels of group-based guilt, because if the ingroup believes the outgroup has a positive view of the ingroup, then the ingroup believes the misdeeds during the colonial conflict are less salient in the present and that there is already a positive relation between the groups.

Therefore, individuals who believe the outgroup has more positive perceptions of the ingroup will feel less group-based guilt, because they believe the outgroup does not hold them as strongly responsible for the past misdeeds as when there are still negative meta-perceptions. Further research should look into the underlying dynamics by which positive

meta-perceptions are related to lower levels of group-based guilt.

Our results also show that both outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions score higher in the Dutch sample (although the Portuguese identified somewhat more strongly with the colonial group than the Dutch did), and both relate significantly with group-based guilt in the Dutch sample.

We would argue that meta-perceptions are a stronger predictor in the Dutch sample than the Portuguese because the Dutch seem to have a more positive view of their relations with the Indonesians (higher outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions) than the Portuguese of their relations with Africans. Perhaps meta-perceptions only significantly influence feelings of group-based guilt when the perpetrator group has quite positive views of the victimized group. This is also consistent with the argument of Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton that guilt is most common in relationships that are positive in nature to begin with (1994).

Following the same reasoning, we think that the stronger, negative influence of meta-perceptions on group-based guilt in the Dutch sample can help to explain why, on average, the Portuguese and Dutch sample do not differ in feelings of group-based guilt about the colonial period. At first, this seemed an odd finding, because the Dutch are significantly more positive about their relations with the Indonesians than the Portuguese about their relations with Africans. However, meta-perceptions inhibit group-based guilt, while outgroup perceptions increase group-based guilt among the Dutch. As a result, the net effect of outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions seems zero, which can perhaps explain why group-based guilt among the Dutch is not higher than among the Portuguese.

Regarding the differences in the average values of outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions between the two samples, it is important to keep in mind that in the Portuguese sample these measures were targeted towards Africans in general and not towards Africans from the former Portuguese colonies. This may have weakened the relationship between these variables and group-based guilt, since individuals might have responded thinking of a general African

category, for which their perceptions and meta-perceptions might be more negative than when thinking about Africans from the former Portuguese colonies. Still, the authors believe that, given the nature of the study, participants were already framed to think in terms of Africans from the former colonies. The fact that this measure does not directly state it does not mean individuals were not thinking specifically of Africans from the former colonies.

In view of previous research, it is not surprising that we found a significant path from group-based guilt to outgroup compensation. Less expectedly, we observed a significant path in both samples between group-based guilt and perceived importance of remembering the negative aspects of colonial history in the media and in the school curriculum.

In both studies the alternative model had a weaker fit to the data than our main hypothesized model, supporting our conceptualization of perceived importance of remembering negative aspects of the colonial past as a consequence of group-based guilt and not as an antecedent of the experience of group-based guilt. This suggests that feeling group-based guilt leads to a willingness of the ingroup (perpetrator group) to face its deficits. We believe this is an important step in improving relations between groups involved in an immoral historical episode, such as the colonial conflicts analyzed here.

Regarding the differences between the Portuguese and Dutch samples, we found that compensatory behavioral intentions are higher in the Portuguese sample. We suggest this is because the Portuguese perceive they have not compensated the victims of their past misdeeds as much as the Dutch have and, therefore, feel a stronger need to compensate the outgroup. We also found less willingness to remember the negative aspects of the colonial past on the side of the Portuguese.

Perhaps the time difference between the events makes it easier for the Dutch to look back and be more critical of their historical misdeeds, since the events are longer ago and, thus, do not involve the self so much in the actions taken by the ingroup (e.g., Barkan 2000). In contrast, for the Portuguese sample, the events are more recent and the con-

sequences of the war are still relevant for today's Portuguese society. When an event such as the Colonial War is still too recent, people might refrain from accepting negative aspects of their group's history and therefore deny or fail to acknowledge the need to remember them (Barkan 2000). Further studies should analyze the relationship between time distance of negative intergroup events and the experience of group-based guilt.

Interestingly, even though the Portuguese are less willing to remember the negative aspects of the colonial past, they are more inclined than the Dutch to compensate the outgroup. This might be due to the influence of the timing of events, as explained above. But there is another possible explanation: compensating the victims might be an instrumental way of dealing with the ingroup's past negative actions. From this perspective, compensating an outgroup for the misdeeds of the past is an easier way of acknowledging the past and coming to terms with it than actually discussing the negative aspects of the past relationships between the groups.

It is important to acknowledge that our samples are mostly composed of female participants and that there is some evidence that women are more prone to feelings of guilt than men (Stapley and Havilan 1989). Still, we believe these gender differences do not affect our results or the associations between the variables under study, because we are interested in the associations between the variables under study and not the intensity of the emotion *per se*.

The present research investigated the role of three outgroup-focused variables in the prediction of group-based guilt. We show that outgroup perceptions and outgroup identification can be conceptualized as bonding variables which are related to the experience of group-based guilt. Further research should analyze the possibility of creating ways for individuals to bond with the outgroup and thus create awareness of the negative events of the past as a way to improve intergroup relations. Future avenues of research should also focus on the underlying processes by which outgroup perceptions and meta-perceptions might influence feelings of group-based guilt and the social consequences of this emotion by which intergroup relations can be improved.

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The Dark Duo of Post-Colonial Ideology: A Model of Symbolic Exclusion and Historical Negation

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The Dark Duo of Post-Colonial Ideology:
A Model of Symbolic Exclusion and Historical Negation

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Post-colonial nations experience a specific set of socio-structural conditions that foster a unique duo of ideologies. These are the ideology of Historical Recognition versus Negation (or HRN) and the ideology of Symbolic Projection versus Exclusion (or SPE). These ideologies operate in tandem to legitimize material and symbolic inequality in response to specific and contested aspects of post-colonial social structure and history. HRN is promoted by the dominant group to legitimize inequality in outcomes experienced by Indigenous peoples in post-colonial societies where historical injustice is objective fact (objective historical injustice). SPE is promoted by the dominant group to claim ownership of the national category in post-colonial societies where there is an inability to logically deny that Indigenous peoples "belong" to the nation (undeniable belongingness). I present the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale (PCIS-2D), which assesses these two distinct "dark" ideologies. Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analyses validated the factor structure of the PCIS-2D in undergraduate (N = 373; Study 1) and community (N = 447; Study 2) samples of New Zealand (NZ) citizens. The PCIS-2D evidenced good construct validity, as SPE and HRN predicted unique variance in voting preferences and social policy attitudes controlling for demographics, Big Five personality, and System Justification ideology (Study 2). These results indicate that HRN and SPE are distinct ideologies that explain unique variance in support for a range of social and political issues. At the systemic level, HRN and SPE form a joint ideological system that legitimates inequality in two critical social domains: one relating to resource allocations, the other relating to representation and ownership of the national category.

Integration, as stated, implies some continuation of Maori culture. Much of it, though, has already departed and only the fittest elements (worthiest of preservation) have survived the onset of civilisation. Language, arts and crafts, and the institutions of the marae are the chief relics. Only the Maori's [sic] themselves can decide whether these features of their ancient life are, in fact, to be kept alive; and, in the final analysis, it is entirely a matter of individual choice.
Excerpt from the Hunn Report, commissioned by the New Zealand Government in 1961 (p. 15).

Let me be quite clear. Many things happened to the Maori people that should not have happened. There were injustices, and the Treaty process is an attempt to acknowledge that, and to make a gesture at recompense. But it is only that. It can be no more than that. None of us was around at the time of the New Zealand wars. None of us had anything to do with the confiscations. There is a limit to how much any generation can apologise for the sins of its great grandparents.
(Excerpt from speech on Nationhood delivered by National Party leader Don Brash, 27 January 2004).

Ideology matters; it has power. Let me be quite clear what I mean by this; power in the sense that ideologies are persuasive on a broad societal level. Ideology can be used to sway opinion and alter the way in which people think

about or view social issues within a particular frame of reference. A successful ideology achieves this power by providing a standard rhetoric or discourse that permeates or is consensually endorsed by a wide section of society. Ideologies therefore exert social control to the extent that they shape public opinion in a direction intended by elites; be it opinions about a group or social issue, or political or voting preferences. The psychological study of ideology has been something of a dead area for the last few decades, and has only been recently reinvigorated by researchers such as Jost (2006), Sidanius, and Pratto (1999), and Jackman (1994). Jost's review (2006) was particularly influential in this regard, and provided a direct response to claims that ideology was irrelevant for understanding the voting behavior of ordinary citizens.

In this paper, I propose a model of ideology specific to post-colonial nations where "former colonizers" live side by side with "former colonized" peoples. I argue that the history of injustice experienced by Indigenous peoples in many post-colonial nations, paired with a tension in recognizing Indigenous culture as a fundamental or inherent aspect of the nation, has resulted in two distinct ideologies that are central to many aspects of post-colonial intergroup relations. The epigraphs with which I began this manuscript provide good examples of these two distinct ideologies in the New Zealand (NZ) context. The first quote, by Hunn in 1961, relates to the role and fitness of Indigenous culture, symbols, and practices. The second quote, by Brash in 2004, is a recent example of political discourse negating the contemporary relevance of historical injustices experienced by Māori, the Indigenous peoples of New Zealand.

I present a new measure, the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale – 2 Dimensions (or PCIS-2D) that indexes these dual "dark" ideologies, which I label *Symbolic Projection versus Exclusion* (SPE) and *Historical Recognition versus Negation* (HRN). I define SPE as a measure assessing the prescriptive belief that Indigenous culture is irrelevant in representations of modern national identity [exclusion], versus the belief that markers and symbols of Indigenous culture provide a meaningful addition to representations of national identity and the national category [projection]. I define HRN as a measure of the prescriptive belief that historical

injustices experienced by Indigenous peoples in the colonial era are irrelevant in contemporary society [negation], versus the belief that such injustices are of continued relevance and that current generations of settler/colonial members of the population have an obligation to address such injustices [recognition].

I argue that SPE and HRN are distinct and independently coherent ideologies that arise from different social-structural factors of post-colonial society. As I argue below, these two distinct ideologies will often co-occur because in post-colonial societies, the Indigenous peoples have experienced *objective historical injustice* (which should produce HRN as a response) and have a claim of *undeniable nationality* (which should produce SPE as a response). I argue that these two ideologies operate additively to target dual central aspects of intergroup relations, and articulate a pair of discourses that draw upon culturally sanctioned repertoires to "make ok" or dismiss calls for reparation and representation. SPE and HRN therefore constitute distinct *ideologies*, as defined by Rokeach (1968, 123–24), who argued that "an *ideology* is an organization of beliefs and attitudes—religious, political, or philosophical in nature—that is more or less institutionalized or shared with others, deriving from external authority". I evaluate the proposed *Dark Duo Model of Post-Colonial Ideology* by first assessing the psychometric properties of the PCIS-2D in the NZ context. I then extend this analysis to demonstrate that SPE and HRN predict substantial unique variance in political voting preferences and social policy attitudes in NZ after controlling for plausible alternative explanatory variables (demographics, personality, and System Justification ideology).

1. A Dark Duo Model of Post-Colonial Ideology

Ideologies are not plucked from thin air; their content is dependent upon specific social conditions. Ideologies will therefore differ across cultures and groups to the extent that social conditions differ. Put simply, socio-structural conditions provide a more fertile environment for some ideologies than others; and once an ideology takes root, it reciprocally influences socio-structural conditions by shaping the way in which people view existing arrangements, and the political and social policies that they will or will not support.

Perhaps the most widely-researched example of the socio-structural geneses of ideology is Glick and Fiske's Ambivalent Sexism Theory (1996), which states that socio-structural relations between men and women have produced, and in turn legitimize and maintain, two related forms of sexism: Benevolent Sexism and Hostile Sexism. The duality of sexist ideology is theorized to result from mutual interdependencies between men and women, such as the need for heterosexual intimacy, paired with continued gender inequality (Glick and Fiske 1996). This promotes a pair of ideologies that prescribe that women should be both protected and controlled by men, while at the same time stating that women should be vilified if they fail to conform to traditional gender roles. Ethnic group relations, in contrast, are not characterized by dyadic needs in the same way, and thus ideologies relating to race relations often differ dramatically from those relating to gender relations as they do not emphasize to the same extent this ideological component positioning subordinate or disadvantaged group members as wonderful but weak (e.g., a woman as her male partner's "better half"). Ethnic group ideologies (of which racism is a good example), in contrast, tend, in most contexts, to be focused more directly on hostile or antipathetic beliefs (Jackman 1994).

Post-colonial nations, I argue, experience a specific set of socio-structural conditions between Indigenous and more recent settler/immigrant populations that differ in important regards from ethnic group relations in other nations. This results from a unique history in which historical injustices are in many cases undeniable, paired with the inability of the dominant (former settler) group to logically deny that Indigenous peoples "belong" to the nation. In contrast, ideologies expressing sentiments along the lines of "they should go back to their own countries as they are not wanted here" seem to be a common aspect of contemporary prejudice toward many recent non-Indigenous immigrant groups (e.g., Asian peoples in the United States, Turkish people in Germany).

The dual socio-structural conditions of *objective historical injustice* and *undeniable nationality* result in a tension that I argue permeates many mainstream contemporary post-colonial societies. The presence of *objective historical injustice* and *undeniable nationality* engender as a response distinct ideologies prescribing opposition versus support for (a) the relevance of historical injustices experienced by Indigenous peoples for contemporary post-colonial society and (b) the symbolic projection of Indigenous symbols in representations of the national category. I discuss each of these ideologies in turn in the following two sections.

1.1. Historical Injustice and the Ideology of Historical Negation

History—or at least consensually shared representations of history—tend to favor majority or dominant groups. NZ, where the current research was conducted, like many other post-colonial nations, can trace a history of considerable injustices experienced by Indigenous peoples. Like minority ethnic groups in many nations, the Indigenous peoples of NZ (Māori) also remain disadvantaged relative to the dominant majority group (NZ Europeans) in contemporary society. Māori, for example, earn on average two New Zealand dollars less per hour than NZ Europeans, and their life expectancy is 8.2 years lower (The Social Report 2006). One might reasonably argue, as many have (Belich 1996), that present day inequalities between Māori and NZ Europeans are at least partially the product of historical injustices experienced by Māori during the colonial period; injustices such as the alienation of communally owned land from Māori, and bans on the use of Māori language in schools. Despite this, claims for reparation on the basis of historical injustice often incite considerable controversy and opposition in mainstream (NZ European) society (Sibley et al. 2008).

Liu and colleagues argue that the positioning of history constitutes a powerful ideology for mobilizing opinions about resource allocations for historically disadvantaged groups in contemporary post-colonial society (Liu and Hilton 2005; Liu and Sibley 2009). In this regard, the negation of historical injustices can be seen to reflect a political ideology of considerable power. More generally, Liu and Hilton argue that history provides a *charter*, or central and binding ideology, for the ingroup and nation that provides "an account of its origin and historical mission. . . . Such charters are *constitutional*: they serve the function of a foundational myth for a society, defining rights and obligations for a group and legitimizing its social and political arrangements" (2005, 538). The manner in which historical charters

are constructed and interpreted can have enduring implications for what is considered fair in society, whether specific historical events constitute *injustices*, and how resources are to be allocated in contemporary society.

In an initial examination of this position, Sibley et al. (2008) demonstrated that HRN was a critical mediator of policy preferences on issues impacting Māori, and indeed explained around 60 percent of the variance in resource-specific policy preferences among NZ Europeans. Sibley and Liu (in press) argue that HRN is partially produced by the motivation to protect the glorious history of the ingroup (and the related perception of the group's ancestors as decent hard-working people who earned what they achieved). Discourses positioning the ingroup as being accountable or as having a responsibility for the actions of previous generations of their group, or as even being directly linked and therefore "alike" to the perpetrators of previous historical injustices and crimes constitute a dramatic threat to positive representations of the dominant ingroup. So long as Indigenous peoples have a collective voice and can continue to call the majority group to account for historical injustices, I argue that an ideology of Historical Negation, as indexed by the measure of HRN originally developed by Sibley et al. (2008) will likely occur as a result in order to negate such calls.

1.2. Undeniable Nationality and the Ideology of Symbolic Exclusion
Along with the ability to define the relevance of specific aspects of history, the ability to define the national category is also of central importance for the legitimation of the status quo in post-colonial society. Representations of history and representations of the nation form two critical building blocks for defining who "we" are and where "we" have come from.

The importance of definitions of the national category for understanding prejudice and discrimination is underlined by Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) in their Ingroup Projection Model. The Ingroup Projection Model begins with the premise that superordinate categories, by definition, include all constituent groups. In the case of the national category, this would include all citizens, regardless of their specific ethnic group identification. The model states that tolerance versus discrimination is in turn predicted by the

extent to which a group is seen to "fit" or be representative of the national or inclusive category. Thus, while all groups of citizens are seen to constitute the national category, not all groups will be seen as equally representing the values and character of the national prototype. Indeed, as predictions derived from System Justification Theory (Jost and Banaji 1994) also emphasize, consensual representations of the prototypical features of the inclusive category—that is, the characteristics that are seen as most typical for defining members of the category—should be unduly determined by the majority or dominant group within society (see also Sidanius and Petrocik 2001). This model is well supported by experimental data. Numerous studies indicate that groups that are seen as less representative of superordinate categories tend to be judged more harshly than groups that are seen as fitting the national prototype (e.g., Waldzus et al. 2003; Wenzel et al. 2003).

Representations of the majority or dominant group as the prototypical exemplar of the national category may help to promote and maintain hierarchically organized social structures, especially when they are consensually shared by both majority and minority group members. Under such conditions, appeals to national identity and values become synonymous with appeals to the identity and values of the dominant majority. As Devos and Banaji stress (2005), such appeals may therefore function to reduce the opportunity of ethnic minority groups to contribute to concepts of national identity and nationhood (or in some cases marginalize or directly exclude such contributions). Sidanius and Petrocik discuss a similar phenomenon which they refer to as *exclusionary patriotism* (2001). This seems to represent a central process in intergroup relations that likely occurs across a diverse range of stratification criteria (including ethnicity, gender, and age).

I argue that an ideology of exclusion (versus projection) is also fundamental to governing intergroup relations in post-colonial nations. This ideology of SPE is extremely similar to prescriptive beliefs relating to the exclusion versus projection of various groups in the national prototype for say, recent immigrant groups, but must be managed differently in post-colonial nations because Indigenous groups have what I refer to as *undeniable nationality*. That is, their status as

members of the national or superordinate category cannot be questioned in definitional terms. Given that Indigenous peoples within a given nation have a collective voice calling for cultural representation and recognition as part of the nation, I argue that an ideology akin to that I describe here in terms of SPE should occur as a result because it provides a mechanism for negating the collective voice of the Indigenous peoples.

However, as I articulate in Study 2, SPE may vary in mean level; and this is perhaps the most troubling aspect of this ideology. In short, a low level of SPE (that is, support for symbolic projection of Indigenous culture) may, when paired with high HRN (the positioning of historical injustice as irrelevant) form a particularly effective and insidious method of social control in post-colonial society. This is because support for the projection of symbolic and possibly tokenistic aspects of Indigenous culture may diffuse dissonance, or allow majority group members to legitimate, both to themselves and others, expressions of opposition toward calls for reparation for historical injustice relating more directly to material or resource-based issues.

1.3. Overview and Summary

I present two studies assessing the reliability and validity of the PCIS-2D. Study 1 provides an initial test of the factor structure of the PCIS-2D, and uses Exploratory Factor Analysis to examine the proposed scales assessing respective ideologies of HRN and SPE. Study 2 provides a confirmatory test of the proposed two-dimensional structure of the PCIS-2D using Confirmatory Factor Analysis of a large community sample. Study 2 also examines the predictive validity of the HRN and SPE scales of the PCIS-2D by testing whether these two distinct ideologies predict unique variance in, and thus provide unique explanatory power for explaining, specific social policy issues and political party attitudes.

2. Study 1: Development of the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale
2.1. Method
2.1.1. Participants and Procedure

Participants were 372 undergraduates who completed the questionnaire in their own time at the end of tutorials (117 men, 253 women, 2 unreported; M_{age} = 19.46 SD_{age} = 4.68).

All participants were NZ citizens (279 Pākehā/European, 31 Māori, 19 Pacific Nations, 20 Chinese, 11 Indian, 2 Middle Eastern, and 10 other/unreported).

2.1.2. Measures

I administered the PCIS-2D (Post-Colonial Ideology Scale – 2 Dimensions), which contained balanced eight-item scales assessing SPE and HRN. Items were rated from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). See Table 1 for the full item list. The scale assessing HRN were originally developed by Sibley et al. (2008). As discussed by Sibley et al. (2008), the item HRN05, as listed in Table 1, was taken from the measure of collective guilt developed by Doosje et al. (1998).

2.2. Results

I examined the factor structure of the PCIS-2D using Maximum Likelihood Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). Comparison of actual and parallel eigenvalues generated using the procedure provided by O'Connor (2000) supported a two-factor model that explained 56 percent of the variance. Only the first two eigenvalues (6.86, 2.07, 1.15, .73, .68, .66) were greater than those the 95th percentile of chance eigenvalues generated from random data with the same number of participants and items (1.44, 1.34, 1.28, 1.22, 1.16, 1.12). This indicates that, as hypothesized, only the first two factors explained more variance than could be attributed to chance.

Item loadings for a two-factor solution, estimated using an oblique rotation, are presented in Table 1. I opted to employ an oblique rotation as I saw no reason to restrict the model by assuming that the two hypothesized factors would be orthogonal (that is, uncorrelated). As shown, items assessing SPE loaded cleanly on the first factor, and items assessing HRN loaded cleanly on the second. The SPE and HRN subscales both evidenced high internal reliability (αs = .86 and .90), and were moderately to strongly positively correlated ($r(370)$ = .55, $p < .01$).

2.3. Discussion

Study 1 provided promising support for the factor structure and internal reliability of the two distinct but correlated dimensions of ideology assessed by the PCIS-2D.

Table 1: Item content and pattern matrix coefficients from an Exploratory Factor Analysis for the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale (PCIS-2D)

Symbolic Projection vs. Exclusion (SPE)		Factor 1	Factor 2
SPE01	I think that Māori culture helps to define New Zealand in positive ways. (r)	**.72**	.08
SPE02	I reckon Māori culture should stay where it belongs—with Māori. It doesn't concern other New Zealanders.	**.73**	-.02
SPE03	Māori culture is something that all New Zealanders can share in, even if they are not themselves Māori by descent. (r)	**.68**	.01
SPE04	I reckon New Zealand would be a much better place if it stopped trying to promote Māori culture and just got on with other things.	**.85**	.02
SPE05	I think Māori culture is just as important as European culture for defining what true "New Zealandness" is. (r)	**.71**	-.05
SPE06	When we're honest about it, Māori culture has very little to do with what it actually means to be a true New Zealander.	**.64**	.01
SPE07	New Zealand would be a much more boring place to live if it was all just based on White/European culture. (r)	**.53**	.03
SPE08	New Zealand would be a better place to live if we forgot about trying to promote Māori culture to everyone.	**.86**	-.03
Historical Recognition vs. Negation (HRN)			
HRN01	Grievances for past injustices should be recognized and due compensation offered to the descendants of those who suffered from such injustices. (r)	-.05	**.84**
HRN02	We should not have to pay for the mistakes of our ancestors.	.01	**.60**
HRN03	New Zealand law needs to recognize that certain ethnic minorities have been treated unfairly in the past. People belonging to those groups should be entitled to certain benefits and compensation. (r)	-.04	**.86**
HRN04	We should all move on as one nation and forget about past differences and conflicts between ethnic groups.	-.05	**.49**
HRN05	I believe that I should take part in the efforts to help repair the damage to others caused by earlier generations of people from my ethnic group. (r)	.15	**.74**
HRN06	It is true that many things happened to Māori people in the past that should not have happened, but it is unfair to hold current generations of NZ Europeans/Pakeha accountable for things that happened so long ago.	-.02	**.51**
HRN07	We as a nation have a responsibility that see that due settlement is offered to Māori in compensation for past injustices. (r)	.21	**.45**
HRN08	People who weren't around in previous centuries should not feel accountable for the actions of their ancestors.	.08	**.58**

Note. Pattern matrix coefficients > .25 are printed in bold. Exploratory Factor Analysis was conducted using Maximum Likelihood Estimation with oblique rotation. N = 374 undergraduates born in New Zealand. (r) indicates reverse scored items. For shortened (three-item) versions of these measures, I suggest using items SPE01, SPE02 and SPE08 to assess Symbolic Exclusion, and items HRN02, HRN04 and HRN08 to assess Historical Negation. This version of the PCIS refers to the New Zealand context. Items could easily be reworded by simply replacing references to the relevant nation and Indigenous group.

3. Study 2: Validation of the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale

I extended my analysis of the factor structure of the PCIS-2D in Study 2 using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) of data from a large community sample of NZ citizens. CFA is a powerful technique that allows formal tests assessing how well a model (in this case a model of two distinct but correlated factors representing SPE and HRN) fits the observed data. CFA also allows tests of whether the hypothesized model fits the data significantly better than plausible alternatives (in this case a single-factor model in which I modeled SPE and HRN as representing a single ideology).

3.1. Ideology Should Predict Voting Preferences and Social Policy Attitudes

I also evaluated the construct validity (both discriminant and convergent) of the PCIS-2D. Discriminant validity refers to whether the proposed measure or measures differ from other measures that might plausibly assess the same construct. Convergent validity refers to whether the proposed measure or measures are similar to, or predict other measures for which we can make strong theoretical predictions that they should be related. In order to evaluate these properties of the PCIS-2D, I tested whether the SPE and HRN subscales predicted unique variance in support for the two primary political parties in New Zealand: the Labor Party (the primary center-left party) and the National Party (the primary center-right party).

Central to Rokeach's aforementioned definition of ideology (1968) is that it is promoted by political elites to forge consensus of opinion among ingroup members. If SPE and HRN constitute distinct and meaningful political ideologies in the NZ context, then I reasoned that both scales should predict unique variance in support for the two primary NZ political parties. I also predicted that SPE and HRN would explain unique variance in support for another widely debated contemporary policy issue in NZ society: that of government funding of a full-time free-to-air Māori television channel (which is now up and running).
I also examined the incremental validity of SPE and HRN by controlling for a range of alternative explanatory variables in the analysis: demographics, Big Five personality, and System Justification. Tests of incremental validity assess whether a proposed measure explains novel variance in an outcome variable that was previously unexplained by an existing model (or prior set of measures). Tests of incremental validity are therefore very similar to tests of discriminant validity, and can be seen as a more specific aspect of this form of validity. What, then, would constitute an alternative model containing other constructs that could more parsimoniously explain voting preferences and social policy attitudes?

Personality has been shown to reliably predict political orientation (Carney et al. 2008). Likewise, the power of System Justification in explaining political conservatism and various intergroup attitudes has been extensively documented (Jost et al. 2003; Kay and Jost 2003). System Justification indexes an ideology akin to just world beliefs, prescribing that society is generally fair and that people get what they deserve. Combined with demographic indicators, Big Five personality and System Justification ideology therefore seemed to provide reasonable alternative explanations for social and political preferences. I therefore deemed it important to control for these constructs when evaluating the hypothesized unique effects of SPE and HRN on voting preferences and policy attitudes.

3.2. Ethnic Group Differences in SPE and HRN

I assert that a low level of SPE ideology emphasizing how much "we like them" or perhaps how much "we enjoy their culture" may combine with the negation of claims for reparation based on historical injustice (HRN) ("let bygones be bygones") as a way of justifying the status quo. Ideologies promoting support for symbolic aspects of Indigenous culture may therefore operate to legitimize the existing system in a manner similar to how Benevolent Sexism is theorized to operate by both disarming women's resistance to gender inequality and also allowing men to maintain a positive self-image as protectors and providers for their "better halves" (Glick and Fiske 1996). This should result in a pattern of relatively low SPE but high HRN across society as a whole. This might be summarized as reflecting something like the following reasoning: "Indigenous culture is an important part of our nation, but the past is still the past, and although bad things happened to the Indigenous people, we, the majority, are not accountable."

If this reasoning is correct, then Māori and non-Māori New Zealanders should exhibit very similar levels of SPE (and generally be supportive of the symbolic projection of Māori culture). However, Māori and non-Māori New Zealanders should differ dramatically in the positioning of history, with non-Māori New Zealanders displaying higher levels of HRN than Māori. To test these predictions, I examined mean differences in SPE and HRN across three different groups of NZ citizens: Māori, NZ-born non-Māori, and foreign-born citizens. I also controlled for other demographic variables (gender, age, income, marital and religious status) in these analyses in order to rule out the possibility that any mean differences might result from these alternative factors. I hypothesized that there would be an interaction in which Māori and NZ-born non-Māori citizens would be similar in SPE, but that NZ-born non-Māori citizens would exhibit significantly higher HRN. I also predicted that foreign-born NZ citizens would exhibit high HRN, but did not have clear predictions about whether or not this group would display high or low levels of SPE.

3.3. Method
3.3.1. Participants and Procedure
Participants were 447 NZ citizens who were approached in public places (e.g., parks, bus stops, other outdoor seated areas). Participants (176 men, 271 women; M_{age} = 31.16 SD_{age} = 14.06) were invited to complete the questionnaire on the spot or take it with them and post it back at a later date. Thirty-two percent of participants were married, and 44 percent identified with a religion and/or congregation. Median reported household income was within the $NZ 71,000 – $NZ 80,000 bracket.

Participants were offered a $5 grocery voucher as an incentive to participate. The measures analyzed here were included within a larger unrelated battery. Analyses of other aspects of these data, which also included non-NZ citizens, are reported in Sibley and Duckitt (2010).

I categorized participants into three groups: Māori (n = 58), other (non-Māori) NZ-born citizens (n = 240) and foreign-born NZ citizens (n = 149). NZ-born citizens identified their ethnicity as follows: 190 New Zealand Europeans/Pakeha, 36 Pacific Island New Zealanders, 6 Chinese New Zealanders, 6 Indian New Zealanders, and 2 unreported. Foreign-born citizens identified their country of origin as follows: 29 United Kingdom, 17 other European nations, 16 South Africa, 12 China, 12 India, 12 Middle East, 10 Australia, 9 other Asian nations, 8 Pacific Islands, 7 Canada/United States, 7 Philippines, 6 Korea, and 4 Sri Lanka.

3.3.2. Measures
The PCIS-2D was administered as in Study 1 (see Table 1 for items). System Justification was assessed using the eight-item scale developed by Kay and Jost (2003). The System Justification scale contains items such as "Everyone has a fair shot at wealth and happiness in New Zealand" and "In general, I find New Zealand society to be fair." All items were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) and averaged to give scale scores.

The Big Five dimensions of personality were assessed using items from the Big Five Aspects Scale (BFAS; DeYoung, Quilty, and Peterson 2007). The BFAS measures two distinct aspects of each Big Five dimension. Items were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (very inaccurate) to 7 (very accurate). I averaged the items assessing each pair of Big Five aspects to create broad-bandwidth (twelve-item) indicators of each Big Five dimension (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience). Descriptive statistics, Cronbach's alphas for all scales, and correlations between scale scores, are reported in Table 2.

3.4. Results
3.4.1. Confirmatory Factor Analysis
I conducted a CFA testing the hypothesized dual-factor structure of the PCIS-2D. As shown in Figure 1, the eight items assessing each subscale were modeled as loading on

Table 2: Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations between all variables in Study 2

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14	15.	16.
1. Gender (.50 male, -.50 female)																
2. Age	.13*															
3. Household income	.09	.04														
4. Marital status (.50 yes, -.50 no)	.02	.49*	.17*													
5. Religious (.50 yes, -.50 no)	-.04	.08	.08	.12*												
6. SPE	.19*	-.07	-.01	-.07	-.11*											
7. HRN	.05	-.13*	.09	-.04	-.04	.46*										
8. Extraversion	-.09	-.09	.06	-.00	.10*	-.15*	-.03									
9. Agreeableness	-.22	.12*	.04	.13*	.14*	-.31*	-.03	.22*								
10. Conscientiousness	-.02	.17*	.12*	.18*	.10*	-.03	.02	.17*	.19*							
11. Neuroticism	-.12*	-.22*	-.09	-.19*	-.04	.08	.06	-.14*	-.10*	-.15*						
12. Openness to Experiences	-.10*	-.01	.02	-.02	-.09	-.26*	-.10*	.38*	.26*	.09	-.02					
13. System Justification	.12*	.20*	.14*	.22*	.13*	-.11*	-.01	.01	.01	.13*	-.22*	-.03				
14. Support for National Party	.08	-.07	.10*	.05	.14*	.23*	.31*	.09	.00	.16*	-.07	-.05	.20*			
15. Support for Labor Party	-.07	-.06	-.06	-.08	-.06	-.24*	-.27*	.04	.02	-.03	.05	.11*	.09	-.45*		
16. Support for Govt. Funding Māori TV	-.13*	-.04	.00	-.05	-.01	-.54*	-.51*	.09	.06	-.09*	-.05	.18*	-.02	-.22*	.25*	
M						2.79	4.39	4.81	5.16	4.69	3.74	4.96	4.38	4.37	4.48	4.11
SD						1.27	1.33	.79	.75	.80	.86	.77	.82	1.73	1.77	1.79
α						.90	.88	.78	.77	.75	.81	.70	.72			
skewness						.61	-.11	-.04	-.46	-.13	.14	-.14	-.18	-.31	-.27	-.18
kurtosis						.03	-.03	-.12	1.14	.09	.16	.08	.20	-.76	-.83	-.83

n = 447, * *p* < .05.

two distinct but correlated latent variables representing SPE and HRN. All items were strongly related to their hypothesized latent factor, as shown by the standardized coefficients reported in Figure 1.

Figure 1: CFA of the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale (PCIS-2D) with standardized parameter estimates (items are listed in Table 1)

* *p* < .05.

When evaluating model fit, Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest that reasonable measurement models should generally have a standardized Root Mean Square Residual (sRMR) of near or below .08, values of around or above .95 for the Non-Normed Fit Index (NNFI), Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and Incremental Fit Index (IFI), and a Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) of near or below .06. Fit indices for the hypothesized model were: $\chi^2(103) = 719.72$, $p < .01$;

sRMR = .065, NNFI = .94, CFI = .95, IFI = .95, RMSEA = .12. The hypothesized model performed reasonably well according to most of these indices, indicating reasonable model fit. The exception was the RMSEA, which indicated that model fit was fairly poor according to this specific index. Critically, however, the sRMR was within acceptable bounds (less than .08), and the hypothesized dual-factor model depicted in Figure 1 also provided a substantially better fit than an alter-

native model in which items assessing SPE and HRN loaded on a single latent variable ($\chi^2_{d.ff}(1) = 1633$, $p < .01$).

3.4.2. Ideology Predicts Voting Preferences and Social Policy Attitudes

I conducted a series of hierarchical multiple regression analyses examining the extent to which a model containing HRN and SPE improved the variance explained in three outcomes, beyond that already explained by an initial set of other predictor variables. These other predictors, I argue, represent a plausible alternative model that explains individual differences in voting preferences and social policy attitudes in terms of demographics (gender, age, income, religious affiliation, and marital status), Big Five personality (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism, and Openness to Experience), and the relatively universal ideology of System Justification. I first tested a model containing this set of initial predictors, and then a revised model also containing SPE and HRN, and their interaction. Results for the final regression models (containing all variables) predicting (a) support for the Labor Party, (b) support for The National Party, and (c) support for government funding of a dedicated free-to-air Māori television channel are presented in Table 3.

Table 3: Multiple regression analyses examining the unique effects of Symbolic Projection vs. Exclusion (SPE) and Historical Recognition vs. Negation (HRN) on support for the Labor Party, the National Party, and government funding of Māori television in NZ

	Support for the Labor Party		Support for the National Party		Support for government funding of Māori TV	
	β	t	β	t	β	t
Gender (.50 male, -.50 female)	-.03	-.68	.04	.83	-.04	-1.09
Age	-.06	-1.02	-.12	-2.27*	-.07	-1.56
Household income	-.03	-.66	.02	.46	.05	1.38
Marital status (.50 yes, -.50 no)	-.07	-1.21	.05	.96	-.03	-.66
Religious (.50 yes, -.50 no)	-.08	-1.71	.12	2.69*	-.04	-1.10
Extraversion	.01	.22	.08	1.59	.01	.26
Agreeableness	-.02	-.41	.02	.38	-.07	-1.61
Conscientiousness	-.01	-.23	.11	2.36*	-.08	-2.08*
Neuroticism	.06	1.25	-.04	-.83	-.05	-1.24
Openness to Experiences	.05	.93	-.00	-.08	.05	1.14
System Justification	.13	2.74*	.18	3.84*	-.04	-.98
SPE	**-.13**	**-2.18***	**.18**	**3.19***	**-.40**	**-8.21***
HRN	**-.22**	**-4.16***	**.21**	**4.14***	**-.33**	**-7.52***
SPE x HRN	-.01	-.27	-.02	-.46	-.01	-.12

Note: The Labor Party is the primary center-left political party in NZ. The National Party is the primary center-right political party in NZ. Support for government funding of Māori TV refers funding of a free-to-air Māori television channel. SPE x HRN refers to the interaction term created by multiplying centered SPE and HRN scores. β = standardized beta coefficient, * $p < .05$.

The initial model containing demographics, Big Five personality and System Justification predicted 5 percent of the variance in individual differences in support for the Labor Party ($R^2 = .05$, $F_{(11,435)} = 1.88$, $p = .04$). This same model predicted 10 percent of the variance in support for the National Party ($R^2 = .10$, $F_{(11,435)} = 4.34$, $p < .01$) and 6 percent of the variance in support for government funding of Māori television ($R^2 = .06$, $F_{(11,435)} = 2.70$, $p < .01$). Thus, in all three cases, the initial model explained a significant, but reasonably small percentage of variance (5–10 percent) in individual attitudes toward these three political and policy-related outcomes.

A revised model also including SPE and HRN (and their interaction) predicted a significant and substantial proportion of additional variance in all three outcomes beyond that explained by demographics, personality and System Justification. The revised model containing SPE and HRN predicted an additional 8 percent of variance in support for the Labor Party, yielding a combined model explaining a total of 13 percent of the variance ($\Delta R^2 = .08$, $\Delta F_{(2,433)} = 20.37$, $p < .01$; final model $R^2 = .13$, $F_{(13,433)} = 4.87$, $p < .01$). Likewise, the revised model predicted an additional 10 percent of variance in support for the National Party, yielding a combined model explaining a total of 20 percent of the variance ($\Delta R^2 = .10$, $\Delta F_{(2,433)} = 26.74$, $p < .01$; final model $R^2 = .20$, $F_{(13,433)} = 8.22$, $p < .01$). The revised model containing SPE and HRN also predicted a whopping 34 percent additional variance in support for government funding of a free-to-air Māori television channel, yielding a combined model explaining a total of 41 percent of the variance in attitudes toward this policy issue ($\Delta R^2 = .34$, $\Delta F_{(2,433)} = 124.04$, $p < .01$; final model $R^2 = .41$, $F_{(12,433)} = 22.67$, $p < .01$).

These results clearly indicate that, when predicting all three outcomes, a model including SPE and HRN exhibited substantially greater predictive power than one based solely on demographics, personality, and System Justification ideology.

Standardized betas and t-values for the final model assessing the unique effects of all predictor variables on support for the Labor Party, the National Party and government funding of a free-to-air Māori television channel are presented in Table 3. Higher SPE and HRN scores predicted increased support for the center-right National Party, and decreased

levels of support for the center-left Labor Party and government funding of a free-to-air Māori television channel. Critically in all three cases, SPE and HRN exerted unique main effects. This indicates that, despite being moderately-to-strongly positively correlated, both ideologies provided unique explanatory power when predicting these three outcomes. The inclusion of HRN and SPE dramatically increased the explanatory power of a model explaining political and voting preferences in terms of individual differences. Moreover, the effects of these dual ideologies appear to be additive rather than interactive, as evidenced by the non-significant SPE x HRN interaction terms in all three models.

3.4.3. Ethnic Group Differences in SPE and HRN

To explore ethnic group differences in mean levels of SPE and HRN, I tested a three (citizen group: foreign-born NZ citizens, NZ-born non-Māori citizens, Māori) by two (ideology: SPE versus HRN) interaction using a mixed-design ANOVA with repeated measures on the second factor. This interaction was significant ($F_{(2,444)} = 3.59$, $p = .03$, $partial$ $\eta^2 = .02$), and persisted after controlling for demographic differences in gender, age, household income, and religious and marital status ($F_{(2,439)} = 3.83$, $p = .02$, $partial$ $\eta^2 = .02$).

Figure 2: Adjusted mean levels of SPE and HRN in a community sample of foreign-born, New Zealand-born non-Māori, and Māori New Zealand citizens

Note Adjusted means represent intercepts after controlling for centered gender, marital status, and religion, and mean age and income. Error bars represent the standard errors of these intercepts).

Adjusted mean levels of SPE and HRN across the three citizen groups (foreign-born NZ citizens, NZ-born non-Māori citizens, Māori) are presented in Figure 2. These adjusted means represent intercepts controlling for centered gender, marital status, and religion, and mean age and income. As shown, the interaction occurred because NZ-born non-Māori citizens seemed similar to Māori in that both groups were reasonably low in SPE, but more similar to foreign-born NZ citizens in that both groups were reasonably high in HRN. Additional analyses supported this interpretation, as the main effects for both SPE ($F(2,439) = 24.34$, $p < .01$, partial $\eta^2 = .04$) and HRN ($F(2,439) = 7.57$, $p < .01$, partial $\eta^2 = .03$) across citizen groups were both significant (demographics were entered as covariates in all analyses). Importantly, Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons indicated that, as hypothesized, NZ-born non-Māori citizens and Māori expressed similar (non-significantly different) levels of SPE ($p = .13$), and both groups expressed significantly lower levels of SPE compared to foreign-born NZ citizens ($ps < .02$). As expected, a different pattern emerged when examining mean levels of HRN. NZ-born non-Māori citizens were extremely similar to foreign-born NZ citizens in this regard, and both displayed extremely similar levels of HRN ($p = .99$), and were both significantly higher in HRN than Māori ($ps < .01$).

4. Discussion

Study 2 validated the PCIS-2D and tested novel predictions derived from the proposed dark duo model of post-colonial ideology using a large community sample. The study tested and found reasonable support for the proposed dual-factor structure of the PCIS-2D assessing SPE and HRN. In particular, this dual factor model provided a substantially better fit than an alternative single-factor model. This provided additional evidence that, although positively correlated, the exclusion of Indigenous culture from representations of the national category and the negation of historical injustices experienced by Indigenous peoples represent distinct ideologies.

By definition, political ideology should shape political preferences, voting behavior, and social policy attitudes (see Jost 2006, for recent discussion). This, I argue, is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for defining political ideology. As

such, tests of the ability of ideology to predict political party preferences provide an excellent test of construct validity when developing new measures of political ideology. Study 2 indicated that SPE and HRN both predicted substantial unique (non-overlapping) variance in individual differences in three important political questions in NZ: support versus opposition for the two major NZ political parties (the Labor Party and the National Party), and support versus opposition on a topical social issue that generated much debate at the time these data were collected in 2008 and early 2009: government funding of a free-to-air Māori television channel. The findings provide good evidence for the convergent and discriminant validity of PCIS-2D and indicate that the scale provides important information that increases the accuracy of models predicting voting behavior in NZ. Indeed, this is something of an understatement, as HRN and SPE together increased the predictive power of the baseline models by 8-10 percent when predicting political party support, and by 34 percent when predicting support for a Māori television channel.

Finally, analysis of mean differences across ethnic groups indicated that non-Māori NZ-born citizens and Māori were similar in their level of support for the symbolic representation of Māori culture in national identity (as evidenced by comparably low SPE scores). Non-Māori NZ-born citizens were readily distinguishable from Māori however, in that they maintained that historical injustices should be forgotten or no longer viewed as relevant (as evidenced by significantly higher HRN scores).

5. General Discussion

As far as I am aware, this is the first psychological study to have attempted to identify and develop psychometric measures of the contemporary ideologies that result from the specific and unique socio-structural circumstances present in many modern-day post-colonial nations. There is a plethora of literature documenting the ideologies that arose in colonial periods, in contrast. Colonial ideology centered on the notion of Indigenous peoples as "noble savages" who were childlike and in need of protection and civilization afforded by Europeans (see Jackman 1994, for an excellent review). As Glick and Fiske comment (2001), this colonial ideology of civilizing paternalism and protection "for their

own benefit", was aptly characterized by the so-called prophet of British imperialism, Rudyard Kipling in the first verse of the poem, "The White Man's Burden" (1899, 290):

> Take up the White Man's burden—
> Send forth the best ye breed—
> Go, bind your sons to exile
> To serve your captives' need;
> To wait, in heavy harness,
> On fluttered folk and wild—
> Your new-caught sullen peoples,
> Half devil and half child.

Much as modern forms of racism have supplanted classical or old-fashioned racism (McConahay 1986), I argue that modern post-colonial ideology has supplanted ideologies of colonial imperialism such as that expressed in Kipling's poem.

I proposed and tested a *Dark Duo Model of Post-Colonial Ideology.* The dark duo contains two related, but clearly distinct, ideologies: one reflecting *Historical Recognition versus Negation* (HRN), the other reflecting *Symbolic Projection versus Exclusion* (SPE). HRN indexes the prescriptive belief that historical injustices experienced by Indigenous peoples in the colonial era are irrelevant in contemporary society. SPE indexes the prescriptive belief that Indigenous culture is irrelevant in representations of modern national identity. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis indicated the Post-Colonial Ideology Scale – 2 Dimensions (PCIS-2D) provided a valid and internally reliable measure of these two ideologies in the New Zealand context.

The SPE and HRN scales evidenced a strong and unique ability to predict political party support in a community sample of NZ voters (Study 2). These effects persisted after controlling for a host of other predictors of political party support, including demographic factors such as age and income, broad-bandwidth indicators of Big Five personality, and the general ideology of System Justification. That these effects persisted after controlling for System Justification is particularly promising, given that this latter ideology has been shown to have strong and pervasive effects on intergroup and political attitudes across numerous domains (see Kay et al. 2007, for a review). SPE and HRN index something unique in this regard, although

the belief that the political system is fair and operates as it should (system justification) is also a good general predictor of political preferences. It seems that the positioning of historical injustice as irrelevant, and of Indigenous symbols as being something that is irrelevant for modern conceptions of the national category, provide an axis of meaning that aids in the creation and mobilization of political opinion.

5.1. Implications, Caveats, and Directions for Future Research

The identification of SPE and HRN as distinct ideologies that predict voting and policy preferences raises intriguing questions about the role and function of realistic/resource-based versus symbolic representations of Indigenous culture in national identity. For instance, the Ingroup Projection Model and the Common Ingroup Identity Model both state that creating a superordinate representation that includes both subgroups should serve to increase tolerance and decrease discrimination (see Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy 2009, for a review). The Common Ingroup Identity Model also emphasizes that interventions aiming to create a superordinate categorization can have the reverse effect because they may threaten positive distinctiveness of the constituent groups. In their review, Dovidio, Gaertner, and Saguy (2009) emphasize the importance of mutual intergroup differentiation, which proposes that to be effective, the superordinate representation should recognize and equally emphasize both subgroup identities (see also Hornsey and Hogg 2000).

The Common Ingroup Identity Model has important implications for social policy aiming to promote a more inclusive national identity. Although social policies that emphasize symbolic integration and equality of identity contribution might strengthen a mutual ingroup national identity, it seems less likely that they will affect support for material allocations or representations relating to the guardianship of resources. As my colleagues and I propose (Sibley, Liu, and Khan in press), it would be interesting to compare manipulations that emphasize mutual intergroup identity in terms of representations of belongingness (which seems to be already in place or at least easily accessible in NZ) with manipulations that emphasize shared responsibility for looking after and protecting material resources, such as NZ national

assets, forests, fisheries, and the natural environment. These latter interventions might help to further change public opinion about material allocations aiming to promote social equality and address historical injustices experienced by Māori.

There are numerous avenues for future research extending the model of post-colonial ideology that I propose here. One obvious next step is to ensure that the model holds in post-colonial nations other than NZ. As I argue above, I expect that the model should predict political party preferences in all post-colonial nations where "former colonizers" live side by side with "former colonized" peoples, *and* where the following conditions are also met: (a) there is a history of *objective historical injustice* experienced by Indigenous peoples, and those peoples have a voice to call modern day society to account, and (b) Indigenous peoples have *undeniable nationality* and a collective voice calling for cultural representation and recognition.

Future research could, for instance, test whether the mean levels of SPE and HRN expressed by non-Indigenous citizens vary systematically according to objective indicators of material inequality experienced by different Indigenous groups. For instance, in the NZ context the Treaty of Waitangi (signed between the British Crown and Māori in 1840) provides a legal basis for claims for reparation under common law. NZ seems fairly unique in this context. I suspect that HRN may become more salient in this context, because there is a strong legal basis for claims for reparation. In nations with less legal basis for claims for reparation, endorsing HRN may be less pertinent in legitimating continued levels of inequality. Thus, HRN may, for example, be lower among Australian Europeans than among NZ Europeans, as Australia does not have a similar treaty between the British Crown and Indigenous Australian peoples.

Another obvious direction for future research is to extend the PCIS-2D to incorporate other dimensions of ideology not limited to the unique socio-structural conditions present in post-colonial nations. SPE and HRN form two central ideologies in post-colonial society, but this is not to say that other ideologies do not also play an important part. Obvious candidates for a unified and comprehensive model

of the dimensions of ethnic-group ideology include System Justification Ideology (Kay and Jost 2003) and Color-Blind Ideology (Knowles et al. 2009). These two ideologies have been identified in general research on ethnic group relations, and should also be relevant for understanding intergroup relations between Indigenous and more recent settler/immigrant populations in post-colonial society.

5.2. Concluding Comments and Reflections

I began this manuscript with a quote from the Hunn Report commissioned by the New Zealand government in 1961. The Hunn Report talked about integration of Māori culture in terms of "the chief relics" being those "worthiest of preservation." This epigraph reflects an ideology relating to beliefs about the projection and maintenance of symbolic aspects of Māori culture, and the manner in which those aspects are positioned, which I have tried to articulate and develop a reliable measure of here. I refer to this scale as a measure of *Symbolic Projection versus Exclusion* (or SPE). My analysis paints a dark view of integration; and suggests that Māori culture and practices may be strategically positioned as distinct from national identity, or as not belonging in representations of the superordinate or national category. What is key to this analysis is that SPE reflects a prescriptive belief that positions Māori cultural elements and symbols as being maladaptive, or a thing of the past that is of little relevance for contemporary national identity, as opposed to an important and integral part of New Zealand.

The ideology of symbolic exclusion does not operate in isolation. I argue that it forms one part of a *dual ideological system*, which when paired with an ideology of *Historical Recognition versus Negation* (HRN), functions in tandem to legitimize systemic inequality in the allocation of resources and the cultural representation of Indigenous versus more recent settler/immigrant populations. Together, these two ideologies form a "dark duo"; they articulate a pair of discourses that draw upon culturally sanctioned repertoires to "make ok" or dismiss calls for reparation *and* representation. This interpretation is grounded in Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius and Pratto 1999) and Integrated Threat Theory (Stephan and Stephan 2000). Integrated Threat Theory emphasizes a distinction between symbolic and realistic or material threats, which parallels the more specific

distinction between SPE and HRN which I present here. Social Dominance Theory locates these dual ideologies as two central or proximal legitimizing myths operating in post-colonial nations to justify different aspects of inequality in intergroup relations between immigrant/settler and Indigenous populations.

I wish to finish on a personal note. When reading political speeches and elite discourse used to develop items for the PCIS-2D, I was struck by the lack of alternative formulations available. This is evident in the way the pro-trait items included in the PCIS-2D in many cases closely mirror actual political discourse, whereas I wrote the reverse-worded items in response to such discourse because alternative counter-formulations were few and far between in the available media and political discourse. There is a very real need to provide alternative ideological positions. This is difficult;

however, it is by no means impossible. Indeed, there are some powerful and evocative exceptions to the dominant ideological position; one of these, in a speech made by New Zealand Prime Minister Norman Kirk shortly before his untimely death in 1974, I will end with here:

> We are not one people; we are one nation. The idea of one people grew out of the days when fashionable folk talked about integration. So far as the majority and minority are concerned, integration is precisely what cats do to mice. They integrate them. The majority swallows up the minority; makes it sacrifice its culture and traditions and often its belongings to conform to the traditions and the culture of the majority. . . . We are one nation in which all have equal rights, but we are two peoples and in no circumstances should we by any law or Act demand that any part of the New Zealand community should have to give up its inheritance, its culture, or its identity to play its part in this nation.
>
> (Norman Kirk, 5 July 1974)

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Indigenous Suicide and Colonization: The Legacy of Violence and the Necessity of Self-Determination

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Contemporary indigenous first nations psychologists have developed an alternative frame for viewing suicide that not only shifts the focus from individual-level to group-level explanations, but challenges discourses that position group-level influences as "risk factors" that can be easily subsumed within standard repertoires for suicide prevention. First nations psychologists show the violent legacy of colonization has left a dark shadow on the contemporary lives of young people, so that around the world, suicide rates for indigenous peoples are much higher than for non-indigenous peoples in the same country. These arguments, which rely on historical accounts, cannot be neatly demonstrated using empirical data, but form an important part of a self-determination movement among indigenous peoples, directly challenging unequal power relations in society as a means to seek redress for particular issues of inequity like rates of youth suicide. We present a theoretical case study and analysis of contemporary suicide among Maori youth in New Zealand. In a traditional Maori conceptualization, individual well-being is sourced and tied to the well-being of the collective cultural identity. Therefore, individual pain is inseparable from collective pain and the role of the collective becomes that of carrying individuals who are suffering. The state of *kahupo* or spiritual blindness (Kruger, Pitman, et al. 2004) is characterized by a loss of hope, meaning, and purpose and an enduring sense of despair. It bears the symptoms of chronic dissociation or separation of the physical from the spiritual and vice versa. We describe community empowerment practices and social policy environments that offer pathways forward from colonization towards *tino rangatiratanga*, or indigenous self-determination, noting significant obstacles along the way.

Around the world, suicide rates for first nations (indigenous/aboriginal) peoples that have been colonized and positioned as a minority in their homeland are more than double that for other groups in the same country. Mainstream researchers have framed the issue in terms of discrete risk factors, such as unstable family situation or drug use, but have also included loss of culture and acculturative stress among the instrumental factors driving indigenous suicide (Collings and Beautrais 2002). Indigenous researchers have advocated a more holistic approach where the "primary intervention" to reduce indigenous suicide is not to target individual-level risk factors, but the restoration of culture at the group level. This approach is grounded in political awareness, expressed by Lorde as: *"the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house"* (1979). An individual-level epidemiological approach addresses the symptoms of colonization, but does not address the root cause of the high rate of indigenous suicide, which according to indigenous researchers is the traumatic loss of culture over generations.

1. Indigenous Suicide Rates and Mainstream Interventions

Suicide completion rates for indigenous populations are 1.5 to 4 times higher than those of other ethnic groups in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand based on epidemiological data. Coupe's literature review (2005) found increased suicide rates among first nations compared to other ethnic groups in the same country: 1.7 times higher for American Indians and Native Alaskans, triple for Canadian Inuit and Metis in age-specific comparisons and double in gender-specific comparisons, three to four times higher for Australian Aborigines, and 1.5 times higher for New Zealand Maori. Beautrais and Fergusson (2006) comment on the problem of reliably identifying ethnic identity

to produce accurate epidemiological studies of suicide rates, which is likely to result in *under-reporting* of indigenous suicide rates (i.e., many suicides are not ethnically identified but might be of an indigenous person).

Evidence of effective interventions for suicide prevention with indigenous populations are numerically rare and limited in scope (Cutcliffe 2005; Proctor 2005). Most interventions target specific discrete indigenous populations at the tribal level (May, Serna, Hurt, and DeBruyn 2005; EcoHawk 2006), and so are difficult to generalize. Some interventions have been found wanting, as they have been designed for non-indigenous populations, are acultural, disregard historical trends, and treat suicide as individualized psychopathology (Lalonde 2000, cited in Cutcliffe 2005). Although there is value in certain other orthodox psychological treatments for known risk factors for suicide amongst indigenous populations such as drug and alcohol abuse (Echohawk 2006; Perez 2006), such treatments fail to reach sufficiently large numbers of indigenous youth. The risk factors approach where certain indicators trigger intervention may be inadequate for indigenous populations, where the consistent evidence of high rates of risk across cultures suggests a root cause that cannot be addressed using individual-level interventions. This has led to research supporting a collective response to suicide prevention that links reductions in suicide rates in discrete indigenous populations with progress towards self determination and self governance (Chandler and Lalonde 2000).

2. The Legacy of Colonization

Colonization, like race and ethnic identity, is taken for granted by those in privileged positions, and tends not to be seen as having explanatory power that accounts for suicidal behavior in colonized populations. There is an emerging acceptance of the role of acculturative stress and colonization by non-indigenous suicide researchers (Collings and Beautrais 2002). However, the epidemiological approach they adopt is limited by the fact that the impacts of colonization cannot easily be measured at the individual level. Hence, in mainstream research, obvious and immediate risk factors like mental illness, depressed mood, and drug and alcohol abuse offer proximal and scientifically observable proof that the "mad, sad or bad" status of the colonized indigenous

person is instrumental in their suicidal tendencies (Collings and Beautrais 2002). Following these lines, Coupe's doctoral dissertation on Maori youth suicide prevention (2005) identified a correlation between Maori suicide and loss of cultural identity, but her study of three samples of out-patients attending New Zealand hospitals found that the pre-eminent risk factors for medically significant suicide attempts were health-related. At the individual level, these results might be replicated among other indigenous populations, but they neither tell the whole story nor show how a path forward might be constructed.

Indigenous and non-indigenous peoples can journey along a pathway towards a common goal of equality, liberation, and justice. However, according to Lorde's thesis (1979), which is supported by other indigenous scholars like Churchill (1996) and Ramsden (2000), at other points unequal power relations drive a wedge through this relationship. The dominant power holders tend to forget the part that their culture played in the oppression of the indigenous other throughout history. Indigenous people, on the other hand, seek justice and restoration of power and authority to exercise control over their fate and become acutely aware of their lack of power to do so. A violent colonial past leaves a legacy in the cultural lives of the people that were once targets of this violence, even as a process of denial lives on in the cultural life of the dominant group (Sibley, Liu, Duckitt, and Khan 2008). This paper articulates a logic of intervention in indigenous suicide prevention that relies on the restoration of culture at the group level as a response to the situation of Maori, the first peoples of New Zealand.

3. Cultural Identity as a Collective Resource in Suicide Prevention

The foundation of this logic is *whakapapa*, or knowledge and practice of kinship relationships. *Whakapapa* is the beating heart of Maori identity; it is what makes Maori unique (Kruger et al. 2004; Te Rito 2007). *Whakapapa* is the knowledge and practice of kin relationships that creates core features of the traditional social organization of Maori culture: *whanau* (family), *hapu* (sub-tribe), and *iwi* (tribe). A person is not treated as an individual in Maori culture, but as part of a web of social relationships involving a mutuality of responsibilities to the collective and connections to one another that transcend time and space. *Whakapapa*

(kinship) is a strength and deterrent to mental illness because it renders individual pain a collective concern rather than treating it as a personal issue as typical in psychology (Duran and Duran 1995). *Whakapapa* is considered to be the pre-eminent and culturally prescribed form of Maori identity.

Hence, cultural identity as expressed through such concepts as *whakapapa* may be instrumental in the promotion of good mental health and positive psychological outcomes for Maori (Durie 2001; Durie, Fitzgerald, Kingi, McKinley, and Stevenson 2002). Conversely, any act that removes or tampers with intact cultural identities may be considered to be detrimental. The potential for cultural development to mediate suicide risk and the role of cultural identity as a protective factor has been theorized by Lawson-Te Aho (1997) and Durie (2001). It is also an active area of current research. Coupe (2005), for instance, has explored correlations between loss of culture and depression and their implications for suicide attempts amongst Maori. The implication for Maori youth suicide prevention is that the *hapu* and *iwi* (sub-tribe and tribe) have a culturally enshrined obligation to act in situations of suicide risk.[1]

Moreover, the survival and healing of the tribal or sub-tribal kin group is contingent upon the survival and healing of each individual connected by blood (acknowledged through *whakapapa*) to the collective identity of the tribe or sub-tribe. This is the culturally appropriate way of framing suicide prevention for Maori. Individual and collective well-being are interconnected as part of one process (Kruger et al. 2004). Kruger et al. (2004) illustrate this point in the conceptualization of *whanau* (family) violence prevention: "Whanau (family) is about birthright. There are rights and responsibilities and obligations that come with whanau (family). If someone committed a misdemeanor you might go to the next member of the whanau (family) and then that person gets hoha (angry) with the person who committed the misdemeanor. This is the manifestation of social responsibility. Geography means nothing. Whakapapa

(kinship) makes you responsible. When there is violence in the whanau (family), the whanau (family) is involved in spite of what has been said about the violence and in spite of whether they talk about it or not" (2004, 9).

4. A Maori Development Agenda
A movement for indigenous control and authority over all aspects of indigenous life has characterized the indigenous political agenda and established the case for claims about indigenous rights. In their contribution to Allwood and Berry's overview of indigenous psychology (2006), for example, Nikora, Levy, Masters, and Waitoki state that "Indigenous psychology in A[otearoa]/NZ has always been a part of how Maori approach wellness, health, and being, stemming from a world-view that values balance, continuity, unity, and purpose", and conclude that "For psychology, the Maori development agenda is to create psychologies to meet the needs of Maori people in a way that maintains a unique cultural heritage, and makes for a better collective Maori future. It is a journey towards Maori self-determination."

The clear evidence of the traumatizing impacts of colonization in the claims before the Waitangi Tribunal (investigating breaches of the law during the colonial process) sets an agenda for change that is driven by both reactive and pro-active imperatives. Reactive in the sense that suicide is seen as a by-product of a colonizing and oppressive set of experiences that needs to be countered. Pro-active in the sense that development with Maori at the helm of a culture-appropriate process may actually negate the need for suicide prevention. The thesis is that when Maori youth are engaged in their own development and reclaiming their own cultural identity, it gives them purpose, meaning, and thereby a will to live.

For Maori, development is based on the revitalization of kinship traditions and the distinctive strengths and resiliencies that flow from a strong working knowledge of one's tribal identity (Kahu and Wakefield 2008). Durie as-

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1 Among most traditional Maori groupings, the sub-tribe or *hapu*, consisting of several families organized together in a village structure, was probably the more influential organizational structure. The tribe, however, is the only Maori collective grouping that is recognized by the state.

serts that the bases of Maori development are identity and relationship (2001). Therefore, we hypothesize that when kinship-based cultural identity is intact and relationships are positive and functional, suicide can be prevented. Individual trauma becomes a shared burden and the collective carries the load of the burdened ones, supporting, encouraging, and embracing them in the collective relationship that is bounded by kinship. Empirical evidence for this as yet is lacking, and, moreover, is difficult to obtain given the lack of boundaries between today's tribal groupings and mainstream society. There is probably no single tribal group in New Zealand where a majority of its members by lineage could be found to still reside in lands that traditionally belonged to the tribe (and are now generally in non-Maori hands). The process of colonization was thorough.

5. Challenges Facing the Development Agenda at the Group and Individual Levels

The restoration of indigenous people's rights is understood as an issue of the colonizing power relinquishing control over resources, language, and the cultural development of indigenous peoples. However, there are many complexities that confound the basic power relations underpinning colonization.

Fanon (1952) and Memmi (1991) examine the role of the colonized as oppressor. Internal group struggles within some Maori tribes for power and control over decision-making and resource allocation (particularly over assets that have been returned to tribal authorities as a part of the settlement of colonial-era grievances) could be construed as an indigenous population taking on the oppressive stance of the colonizer. Practices that place stringent criteria around membership of the tribal collective deny a number of indigenous people a place as part of that tribal collective. The ability to be heard as a Maori woman inside a male-dominated tribal authority structure may also be hard to attain, creating a situation of double oppression for Maori women.

Similarly, when members of an indigenous group allow the struggle for control and money within their collective to take precedence over kinship-based relationships, then kinship is compromised and reciprocal obligations abandoned. The heartbeat of Maori identity is kinship relations,

so a challenge to kin-based belongingness can lead to a real sense of abandonment. The loss of knowledge of identity as Maori, or challenges to a person's right of belonging does not mean that the fact of kinship can be extinguished. The fact of kinship remains as a spiritual reality, continuous and permanent. However the lived expression of it changes, sometimes in a very negative direction. In Maori terms, suicide is associated with a state of mind characterized as *kahupo* (Kruger et al. 2004), meaning loss of hope, meaning, and purpose, and an enduring sense of despair. It bears the symptoms of chronic dissociation or separation of the physical from the spiritual and vice-versa—the psychological separation of the individual from the collective.

Equivalent states of spiritual pain and suffering exist in other indigenous cultures that have been colonized. The spirit is the core of indigenous well-being. Indigenous cultures all have a word for the spirit, indicating that it is a central and critical construct in indigenous well-being. Spiritual pain and suffering is considered to be linked to the existence of mental illness. The wounded spirit carries various orthodox psychological interpretations such as sub-clinical depression, post-traumatic stress and post-colonial stress (Duran and Duran 1995; Lawson-Te Aho 1997). The psychological process that best describes the impacts of colonization and historical trauma is cumulative psychic wounding (Duran and Duran 1995; Edwards 2002). This recognizes that historical trauma is multigenerational (Cashin 2001). Braveheart describes collective complex trauma as historical trauma inflicted over time on a group of people who share a specific ethnic, national, or religious group identity or affiliation (1999). It is the legacy of numerous traumatic events a community experiences over generations and encompasses the psychological and social responses to those events. Empirical research with non-indigenous populations has also demonstrated that the shadow of the past can live on in the present, through collective memories (Pennebaker, Paez, and Rimé 1997) or social representations of history (Liu and Hilton 2005) that condition individual psychological processes.

Soul wounding is a term developed by indigenous researchers to acknowledge that the effects of colonization are understood primarily as spiritual injury (Clearing-Sky

2007). Soul wounding has been described as an outcome of the ongoing trauma of colonization (Braveheart 2003). It is characterized by a loss of hope and leads to depression (Byers 2006), post-traumatic stress or a specific type of multigenerational trauma (Cashin 2001), and suicide (Lawson-Te Aho 1997), among other outcomes. These are all indications of a people in profound pain. Suicide amongst Maori indicates a wounding of the spirit. A strong and intact set of cultural identities based on time-honored cultural practices with intact kinship serves to insulate and protect Maori youth from the legacy of colonization and historical trauma. However, it does not fully erase the historical trauma birthed in colonization. Similarly, other self-destructive behaviors can be linked to the wounded indigenous spirit, like self-mutilation or excessive drug use (Napolean 1995). Conversely, a healthy spirit for Maori includes an identity that is linked to the collective identity of Maori.

The rebuilding of collective traditional cultural structures includes a transfer of resources (from the government) and the return of decision-making authority and power to the hands of tribes. This is a process known as *tino rangatiratanga* or tribal sovereignty (tribal self determination). Tribal sovereignty creates the conditions needed for the collective to care for the welfare and well-being of the Maori individual based on kinship obligations. Regaining tino rangatiratanga is integral to the healing of the wounded indigenous spirit, as is the understanding that this requires a full release from the oppressive state of being in bondage to others who seek to harm and whose actions have created harm. Whether the state of bondage is outwardly or inwardly driven, tino rangatiratanga demands nothing less than authority and power being given back to, or taken back by, indigenous peoples. Ironically, suicide is often misconstrued as the ultimate act of self-determination rather than the ultimate act of oppression and victimhood forged within a deeply wounded spirit. It seems that once the spirit is deeply and profoundly wounded and thereby rendered vulnerable to death, suicide becomes a possible way in which the wounded spirit can be translated out of a place of misery and despair into a place of escape from the conditions which bind it. EchoHawk proposes that this process occurs for Native American youth (1991).

It is impossible to turn back the pages of time to recreate a pure, uncontaminated set of pre-colonial kinship-based traditions and social structures. However, unless Maori are able to exercise control over the design of interventions for suicide prevention, the solution will continue to be improperly framed in Western psychological traditions as an individualized, deficit-focused problem inside the individual. This renders the continuity of the trauma of colonization invisible, except in the form of statistics showing massively higher rates of indigenous suicide. Maori cannot look to Western psychological traditions (a colonizing/assimilationist tradition) for this kind of healing. Instead, a reclamation of the authority and resources to develop culture appropriate responses to suicide is needed. This means the reinstatement of *tino rangatiratanga* (tribal sovereignty) based on *whakapapa* (kinship) relations and functioning inside the framework of best cultural practices (Kruger et al. 2004). This is particularly important given that the colonizers' tools cannot be expected to dismantle the colonizers' house (Lorde 1979).

6. Kia Piki Te Ora O Te Taitamariki: The Maori Youth Suicide Prevention Strategy

Kia Piki Te Ora o Te Taitamariki, the Maori component of the New Zealand youth suicide prevention strategy, was drafted in 1997 following extensive research with key leaders in Maori development and research on indigenous suicide prevention in a global perspective (Lawson-Te Aho 1997). The positioning of suicide prevention as an issue of development rather than the limited clinical treatment of pathology marked a radical departure from the way suicide amongst Maori youth had previously been understood and treated. Policymakers treated suicide as a universal youth phenomenon with universal risk factors, and although it was acknowledged that the "problem" may be more significant for Maori, there was no concept of soul wounding and intergenerational trauma stemming from colonization. It was claimed that there was insufficient evidence to verify the links to colonization and it therefore lacked explanatory power (Lawson-Te Aho 2009). The fact that Maori suicide was subsumed into the broader picture of New Zealand suicide prevention confirmed that government policymakers and suicide prevention researchers did not view Maori suicide as separate or different from suicide in the general population.

In the policy arena, culture was largely invisible in terms of offering explanations for apparent differences in the onset, causation, maintenance, and therefore prevention of mental illness, including suicide. The early work of Durie (1977) and Tipene-Leach (1984) promoted the idea that cultural differences were clearly evident in the therapeutic process and that to ignore these differences was potentially dangerous for the Maori patient. Furthermore, Durie proposed that Maori needed to be understood and counseled differently based on culturally determined communication styles and cultural meanings that drove different health behaviors (1987). Therefore, the early advocacy of a separate strategy for Maori youth suicide prevention was based on the creation of a policy argument that actively recognized cultural differences in psychology.

Creating space inside orthodox policy processes was very challenging when these failed to see Maori as different in any way. Universality and "one size fits all" were the order of the day. Cultural specificity was gaining popularity in public health programming yet no one had made the conceptual leap to the development of public policy based on the need for a different and specialized cultural treatment of Maori mental health issues.

For proponents of parallel development, the concomitant development of Maori political action provided additional impetus for the development of a specialized Maori suicide prevention strategy using the argument that the best intervention was one that was driven *by Maori for Maori* and that took into account the pressing desire of *iwi* (tribes) and Maori communities to lead their own development (Lawson-Te Aho 1997). The common concern driving the development of specialized Maori initiatives including suicide prevention was that no one understood the psychology of Maori better than Maori and that the tribes had a key role to play. The tribes held the political authority to press for tribal development to enable them to meet their cultural obligations to their members.

Some of the tribes understood that if Maori were killing themselves in increasing numbers, they had to act because the survival of individuals was pivotal to the survival of the collective. However, these tribes were also battle-weary,

consumed by the long struggle for redress for loss of land and for political and cultural autonomy, and by the devastating outcomes of oppression including premature loss of life and multi- and inter-generational suffering (Wakefield and Kahu 2008).

A further development of the late 1980s (when the rationale for having a separate Maori youth suicide prevention strategy was being crafted), and in the lead-up to the 150th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi (the basis for New Zealand nationhood under British sovereignty), was the issue of Maori rights to self-determination. This shaped the arguments for a separate Maori suicide prevention strategy as an issue of rights rather than needs. The debate about rights versus needs opened a serious challenge to the government and policy-makers of the time because it meant that the failure of the government to provide for the health needs of Maori was potentially a breach of treaty rights and the government could perhaps be held accountable in an international court for human rights breaches.

In 1999, Kia Piki Te Ora o Te Taitamariki was implemented as a regional coordination service led by Maori for Maori. Led by Maori suicide prevention coordinators and positioned in *iwi* (tribal) health and social services and Maori development organizations around New Zealand, the program began. There were six Kia Piki pilot sites. The roles of the Kia Piki coordinators were to coordinate the responses to Maori youth who were seen as being "at risk" in each community by working with government-funded services to ensure that they knew about the program and the prioritization of Maori youth suicide prevention in the local community. However, when set in the context of an already underfunded social services sector, building relationships across the sector and amongst health and social providers proved to be a daunting challenge.

A robust Kia Piki model was developed. As a strategy it included emphases on *whanau* (family), *hapu*, and *iwi* development, positioning Maori youth in the context of those larger cultural structures. It also emphasized Maori youth being instrumental in *whanau*, *hapu*, *iwi*, and Maori youth development as an exercise in tino rangatiratanga/

self-determination. There was also an emphasis on the development of general population or "mainstream" service responses to Maori youth so that rather than being sites of secondary victimization processes, Maori youth were able to access the support and help that they needed in a culturally responsive way. Part of the strategy involved a process described as decolonization training, in which Maori youth were to be taught about the real impacts of colonization and the seeds of enlightenment needed to advance an agenda of self-determination would be sown. The early emphasis on decolonization training was not declared but it was assumed that it would arise out of the focus on Maori youth development and the reclamation of *tino rangatiratanga*. Underpinning the strategy was the building of a knowledge base around suicide prevention efforts that recognized the role of a strong cultural identity as pivotal to suicide prevention amongst Maori youth.

7. Kia Piki Te Ora o Te Taitamariki: The Maori Component of the New Zealand Youth Suicide Prevention Strategy Eleven Years On

Kia Piki was based on recognition of the vital need for Maori to control their own responses to suicide amongst Maori youth through the vehicles of *iwi*, *hapu*, and Maori community development. Moreover, this was not seen as a response to a mental health need that the government and other external stakeholders would benevolently respond to but a right that Maori youth were fully entitled to as part of *whanau*, *hapu*, and *iwi*.

Suicide prevention amongst Maori youth was understood primarily as a process of rebuilding, reclaiming, healing, and restoring the collective of *whanau*, *hapu*, and *iwi* and involving indigenous youth in their own development as means of reversing the impacts of the soul wounding that took place during colonization with resounding impacts through generations.

But Kia Piki did not live up to its promise as a model. A lack of funding starved the program of the ability to initiate substantial innovations on its own, and coordinators were unable to mobilize established government service providers to depart from their routines and consider how they could assist *iwi*, *hapu*, and *whanau* development as a strategy for suicide prevention. *Iwi* also suffered from an overload of de-

mands for their limited resources and were unable to meet the challenges on their own.

In the end, the strategy failed to be anything more than a Maori-led coordination service in terms of its immediate impacts on the prevention of Maori youth suicide. However, it did change the youth suicide prevention discourse from one in which Maori were like any other youth to one that validated the explanatory power of colonization, the strengths and resiliencies associated with a strong cultural identity, and the imperative that suicide among Maori youth be considered as an issue of counter-development and of individual and collective authority and self determination. It also created the rationale for Maori youth suicide to be understood in context of the global struggle of indigenous peoples for more than survival, the struggle for healing, justice, and restoration on all levels.

8. Where To From Here?

According to the latest statistics, Maori youth are still committing suicide 1.9 times more often than their non-indigenous counterparts. However, Maori are firmly resolved to heal and restore themselves without waiting for the government to save them. One strand of response is the development of theories of urban development, and the resituating of Maori identities in contemporary urban settings (Borrell 2005). This includes acknowledging that many Maori today are irretrievably non-traditional in their lifestyles and their social connectedness, and that this should not be treated as a deficit in and of itself (McIntosh 2005). Where the central issue is the tailoring of services rather than the cultural constitution of the services themselves, the effective delivery, outreach, and application of mainstream suicide prevention interventions to particular Maori environments remains an important consideration.

However, the larger strands emanate from positive tribal development initiatives that are restoring, healing, and building vision and hope for Maori individuals in the context of these traditional cultural networks and structures. From the authors' perspective, the answer to Maori youth suicide is somehow linked to the positive forward movement of the collective, and its interactions with service providers embedded in the national mainstream. Tribes

are beginning to wield more political and economic power, driven by the engine of treaty settlements returning assets and funds expropriated during the colonial era. The Maori Party has emerged as an autonomous political vehicle for wielding Maori political influence in parliament. These factors are changing the political landscape in New Zealand, making indigenous visions like that expressed in Kia Piki more realizable, and less likely to be swallowed up by standard bureaucratic processes. They allow breathing room for a social constructionist approach to research methodologies and epistemologies (see Denzin and Lincoln 2004).

A new generation of researchers and policy-makers will have to face issues summarized by Allwood and Berry's review of indigenous psychologies around the world, since: "The local culture is unanimously identified as both a source of inspiration for developing an IP [indigenous psychology], and as a concrete goal in achieving an IP" (2006, 254), making indigenous suicide prevention efforts simultaneously descriptive *and* prescriptive. Indigenous psychologists in New Zealand (like indigenous psycholo-

gists in other parts of the world, see Bhawuk 2008) do not view the drive towards cultural restoration as something that can or should be verified by empirical means—it is rather a cultural imperative from which empirical benefits are likely to be derived. It will be a challenge for indigenous psychologists to simultaneously push forward their vision of cultural restoration *and* be open to empirical influences providing advice and feedback as to when and where to focus their efforts.

To indigenous psychologists, the agenda for tribal development was set in history. The imperative that tribes must struggle to work for the well-being of families and individuals is sourced in the enduring legacy of colonization. However, it is also more positively sourced in kinship, in the obligations stemming from kinship and history. Those in tribal leadership must be accountable for the roles that they are entrusted with, to work for the betterment of their people. Maori are moving forward in positive development mode. Like all good things this will take time but it will be worth waiting for in the end.

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Conflicts between Afar Pastoralists and their Neighbors: Triggers and Motivations

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Conflicts between Afar Pastoralists and their Neighbors: Triggers and Motivations

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Particularly pervasive violent conflicts in the Horn of Africa have detrimental effects on people's livelihoods there. While the intensity, causes, and repercussions of violent conflicts vary spatially and temporally, pastoral areas are currently the hotspots. This paper examines the causes and consequences of violent conflicts in Ethiopia between Afar pastoralists and two of their neighbors, the Issa and the Karrayyu. The findings are based on primary data (individual interviews, group discussions, and field observations) and secondary data (documents and publications) collected in 2005 and 2006. The results indicate that contemporary challenges such as recurrent droughts, resource appropriation, livestock raiding, proliferation of small arms, and illicit trade contribute to the perpetuation of violent conflicts. While traditional institutions manage inter-clan conflicts, their effectiveness is quite limited with regard to inter-ethnic conflicts, where the contemporary challenges in pastoral areas are too diverse and complex to be managed solely by traditional institutions. The perpetuation of violent conflicts has affected the livelihoods of pastoralists, thereby causing humanitarian crisis and limiting access to resources and opportunities.

1. Introduction

More than a century ago Vilfredo Pareto wrote that "the efforts of men are utilized in two different ways: they are directed to the production or transformation of economic goods, or else to the appropriation of goods produced by others" (Pareto 1906 [1971], 341). The production or transformation of economic goods requires involvement in exchange through peaceful institutions; interacting entities focus on building harmonious relationships through negotiation, mutual respect, and cooperation. On the other hand, the appropriation of resources or goods owned by others may entail the application of other types of institutions involving coercion arising from antagonism—here termed "institutions of violence". Several theoretical analyses show the possibility that institutions of violence can coexist with (if not totally replace) peaceful institutions

(Garfinkel 1990; Skaperdas 1992; Hirshleifer 1988). Skaperdas's analysis indicates a narrow range for full cooperation, and implies that in the context of insecure property rights actors are most likely to prefer coercive means. Likewise, Hirshleifer develops a model to explain the situation of continuing conflict that implies that competing groups always find it advantageous to allot at least some of their resources to conflict technology. Hence, "total peace" is less likely when coercion is one possible means to control resources.

Existing evidence corroborates these theoretical studies. Despite normative arguments in favor of peace, conflicts occur everywhere in the world. Even today, more than eight hundred thousand people lose their lives every year because of armed conflicts (Ogata and Sen 2003). In some parts of the world, for example in some African countries, armed

conflicts are becoming normal events and consequently the institutions of violence are influential in governing behavior and actions (Nhema 2004; Agyeman-Duah 1996).

Pastoral areas in the Horn of Africa are conflict hotspots. Put bluntly, these are places where states fail to properly fulfil their functions (Markakis 2004; Salih et al. 2001). One may wonder why conflicts endure despite empirical evidence and normative judgment telling us that they are destructive. Generally, conflicts occur and are sustained when actors realize that applying institutions of violence is rational in a given context (Korf 2006), but conflict-insti-gating factors and the mechanisms of conflict vary spatially and temporally.

This paper discusses the causes and consequences of conflicts in selected areas of Afar region, Ethiopia. The conflicts addressed involve armed attacks and counterattacks between different pastoral groups, while the institutions of violence are the informal rules and norms that shape the behavior of individual pastoralists before, during, and after the events of conflict.

Section 2 introduces the study area and the data used. Section 3 outlines theoretical discussions on conflicts and related factors. Section 4 discusses the institutions of violence of Afar pastoralists. Section 5 explains the causes of conflicts between the Afar and their neighbors, while section 6 draws conclusions and makes a number of policy recommendations.

2. The Study Areas and the Data

Afar is one of the nine regional states of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. Geographically, the region is situated between 8°40′ to 14°27′ N and 39°51′ to 41°23′ E. It shares international borders with Eritrea (to the north) and Djibouti (to the northeast). Domestically, Afar borders on the Somali region (to the east), the Oromia region (to the south), the Amhara region (to the west and southwest), and the Tigray region (to the northwest) (Figure 1). The region is arid and hot, with annual rainfall usually between 225 mm and 560 mm and the daily maximum temperature between 18 and 45 degrees Celsius. Transhumant pastoralism is the main economic activity of Afar region. Afar pastoralists keep various types of livestock including camels, cattle, sheep, and goats.

The study was conducted in two districts in the southern part of the region, namely, Amibara and Awash-Fentale. The data was collected in two phases. The first fieldwork was conducted over about six months in 2005, involving extensive focused group discussions, participant observations, key informant interviews, and a household survey involving 120 randomly selected pastoral households. Discussions were also held with local administrative officials and experts working for NGOs and government offices. The second fieldwork phase was conducted over one month in 2006 to fill gaps in the data collected during the first phase. To this end several focused group discussions and key informant interviews were conducted. Altogether, a total of twelve group discussions were conducted in the two districts. The analysis in this paper is based largely on the qualitative data generated through group discussions, key informant interviews, official documents of aid organizations (e.g. United Nations Emergency Unit for Ethiopia), and previous studies conducted in the area (e.g. Getachew 2001; Gebre 2001). Quantitative data (generated through the household survey) was used to a lesser extent.

Figure 1: Location of the study area in Afar region and Ethiopia

3. The Institutions of Violence

Many scholars of the new institutionalism regard institutions as humanly designed constraints (either through spontaneous informal process or through formal procedure) governing behavior in social and economic interactions (North 1990; Knight 1992; Ostrom 2005; Schmid 2004). Indeed, institutions facilitate the occurrence of one action, say A, over another, say B, by increasing the cost of implementing action B relative to A. While many categorizations are possible, institutions can be peaceful institutions and institutions of violence. Peaceful institutions shape the behavior of actors to reach an outcome through cooperation and harmony, whereas the institutions of violence do so through coercion and antagonism. The two types of institutions inherently have the potential to displace each other. On the one hand, peaceful institutions create an environment disabling to the institutions of violence embedded in conflicts, thereby facilitating peaceful interaction among actors.[1] On the other, institutions of violence can debilitate the capacity of existing peaceful institutions to the extent that the latter fail to govern behavior and action (Korf 2004; Korf and Fünfgeld 2006). In other words, existing regularized patterns of behavior can be altered substantially and peaceful institutions become inoperative when the institutions of violence are pre-eminent in governing behavior and actions.

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[1] For example, the existence of strict property rights and effective institutions to enforce the rule of law can mitigate conflicts by increasing the cost of intrusion into territory and other unlawful actions.

Many scholars explain the occurrence of conflicts using the greed-grievance conception of conflict analysis (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; de Soysa 2002; Korf 2005, 2006; Korf and Fünfgeld 2006). The grievance hypothesis, which follows the neo-Malthusian line of thinking, relates the sustenance of institutions of violence to increasing *challenges* of securing access to adequate resources for survival (Korf and Fünfgeld 2006; Percival and Homer-Dixon 1998). In this paradigm, fierce competition over natural resources produces inequality among resource users that, in turn, induces continuous struggle (grievance) of suppressed groups seeking to increase their share. The greed hypothesis, on the other hand, explains the sustenance of institutions of violence by focusing on *opportunities* that combatant groups can exploit by controlling spaces or resources (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; de Soysa 2002). According to Collier and Hoeffler, for example, scarcity of resources may contribute to the incidence of conflicts but the paramount factor is the existence of opportunities (e.g. resources to loot) that combatants can exploit in situations of protracted conflicts. Other scholars go beyond a separate analysis of grievance (challenges) or greed (opportunities) to show how both can sustain the institutions of violence along with other factors (such as ideology and pride sentiments) (Cramer 2002; Korf 2005, 2006).

Several empirical studies show that increasing resource scarcity is the main cause of conflicts in different parts of the world (Homer-Dixon 2001; Tir and Diehl 1998; Hauge and Ellingsen 1998). Homer-Dixon argues that environmental scarcities represent great challenges to human life, contributing to insurrections, ethnic clashes, urban unrest, and other forms of civil violence, especially in developing countries. Similarly, Bardhan argues that, while passions evoked by ethnocentric attitudes (i.e. pride) should not be overlooked, a great number of conflicts around the world occur as a result of increasing competition over scarce resources (2005). Other scholars argue the role of opportunities arising from resource abundance in sustaining conflicts (Olsson 2006; De Boeck 2001). De Boeck discusses how the diamond trade across the Angolan/Congolese border sustains institutions of violence among actors who struggle to maximize their share from trade opportunities. These studies show that both challenges and opportunities can

result in conflicts, but the two factors operate in different ways. When challenges appear, actors mainly target expected losses and conflicts arise when they try to minimize the loss unilaterally at the expense of each other. On the contrary, when opportunities are identified, actors mainly target expected benefits and conflicts arise when they try to maximize benefits from the opportunities by blocking one another.

These resource-centered orthodoxies have recently been challenged. Hagmann criticizes resource-centered arguments for relying on preconceived causalities, for amalgamating eco-centric and anthropocentric philosophies, and for neglecting the motivations and subjective perceptions of local actors (2005). Recent studies conducted within the context of East African pastoral areas also relativize—if not utterly dismiss—the link between resource scarcity (or abundance) and violent conflicts by focusing on newly introduced opportunities (e.g. access to illicit trade and the demand for better state benefits) and the historical process of modern state-building to explain conflicts (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008; Yasin 2008; Markakis 2003). Hagmann and Mulugeta argue that current pastoral conflicts are complex in their causes and, unlike in the past, are highly connected with modern state politics and the capitalist mode of production. Hence, contemporary conflicts among East African pastoralists are driven not only by scarcity of pastoral resources (which was prominent in the past) but also by competition over new sources of revenue (e.g. government budget) and control of market centers and strategic places. Others associate pastoral conflicts with crippled conflict management institutions caused by widespread corruption in the work of NGOs operating in these areas (Eaton 2008) and politically motivated actions (Mulugeta and Hagmann 2008). Taken together, these studies suggest that the causes of conflicts among East African pastoralists go beyond the pastoralists' domain, and resource-centered solutions are therefore unlikely to bring sustained peace in these areas.

4. The "Institutions of Violence" in Afar
The institutions of violence in Afar constitute local social capital, which can be deployed when coercion is needed. Clan is the highest level where meaningful operation of the institutions of violence is observed since clan members

share common ancestors, territorial ownership, and political leadership. The descriptive analysis in Table 1 shows how much Afar pastoralists rely on their clan in connection with security.

Table 1: If you are attacked by outsiders, who will come to assist you?

	Number of respondents	Percent
Relatives, friends, and neighbors	5	4.5
Every clan member	106	94.6
No assistance	1	0.9

Source: Survey data

However, the level of cooperation (i.e. the level of operation of the institutions of violence) sometimes rises to inter-clan level when conflicts erupt between any Afar clan and the neighboring ethnic groups, as the following quote indicates:

> We [Afars] fight together against outsiders [Karrayyu, Issa]. Our immediate neighbors belong to another tribe of Afar [the Weima tribe] but help us if they see us fighting with Oromo [Karrayyu] or Issa. We also do the same favor for them whenever they are attacked by others.
> (Group interview in Doho kebele, Awash Fentale district, February 2005)

The institutions of violence are manifested in the form of cooperative norms before and during fighting with an enemy. In this regard, Afars have developed a special institution known as *dero* to mobilize fighters for collective action: when an intrusion occurs or clan members are attacked by outsiders those aware of the incident utter a special sound ("eee…"), ensuring that many people can hear it. Others echo and repeat the signal until enough clan members are gathered for collective action. All able-bodied adult male members of the clan are expected to participate when the signal is heard. On the other hand, when an intrusion is planned the clan sends scouts to the target area to evaluate the enemy's resources and "military" strength. This helps them to decide whether to carry through the intrusion and to determine the number of fighters to be mobilized for collective action.

Solidarity is not only expressed during collective fighting and information sharing. It may take also the form of sharing punishments when a conflict is peacefully resolved through the mediation of a third party: if a subset of the clan is found guilty, clan members will share the penalties (which usually take the form of livestock). Even in a private case when a clan member commits a crime against a non-member for personal reasons, the corresponding sanction passes collectively to the culprit's whole clan. Likewise, any incoming compensation will be shared among clan members. Indeed, the principle of collective (as opposed to individual) guilt and responsibility for infractions against outsiders forms the basis for solidarity within Afar clans and hence contributes to the effectiveness of the institutions of violence.

5. Explaining Conflict in Afar

The pattern of conflict in the study areas is complex, with several factors contributing to the perpetuation of conflicts. In order to elucidate the driving forces of conflicts in the study areas, two cases are examined separately. This section also discusses peaceful institutions (informal and formal) that exist to manage conflicts in the area.

5.1. Conflicts with Issa-Somali

Two major factors are making resources scarcer in Afar and putting many places which were previously accessible to Afars out of their reach. First, a wide-scale westward expansion of Issa-Somalis (hereinafter Issa) in the past seven to eight decades has displaced a number of Afar clans (particularly those who belong to the Weima tribe) from their traditional rangelands in West Hararghe (Getachew 2001; Gebre 2001).[2]

> Issas are in our territory. They get military training in Djibouti to displace us from our fathers' land. They were around Dire Dawa in the past but control most of our resources now.[3]
> (Interview with Seko Mohammed Seid, Afar elder at Ambash, Amibara district, November 2006)

Similar ideas were reflected in many of the group discussions. A closer look at the qualitative data reveals that Afars

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[2] A tribe in this paper refers to a cluster of clans. Most of the Afar clans inhabiting the southern part of Afar region are members of the Weima or Debne tribe.

[3] Dire Dawa is 250–300 km east of Aleideghi plain (the current key point of conflict).

have lost control of places such as Mulu, Erer, Afdem, and part of the Alaydeghi plain.

Second, state development programs have increased the pressure on the Afars. A total of 375,219 hectares of prime Afar rangeland has been confiscated by the Ethiopian state for various purposes (Table 2). The Yangudirassa National Park, Alaydeghi Wildlife Reserve, West Awash Wildlife Reserve, Gewane Wildlife Reserve, Mille Serdo Wildlife Reserve, West Awash Controlled Hunting Area, and several large-scale farms in the Middle Awash Valley constrict the Afars' access to rangeland resources.

Table 2: Land confiscated from Afar pastoralists

Purpose	Area (ha)
National parks	54,870
Wildlife reserves	148,180
Controlled hunting areas	150,680
Commercial farms	16,318
Other	2,160
Total	372,208

Source: Computed from Yemane (2003, 5), Getachew (2001, 91), and own data

Squeezed from different directions, the Afars became aggressively resistant against the Issas, which led to recurrent bloodshed between the two ethnic groups. More importantly, the rapid and coercive westward expansion of the Issa into territories historically controlled by Afars has reduced the possibility of peaceful resource sharing among the two groups. Alaydeghi, Blen, Buri and Andido are the major places of conflict with Issa pastoralists because of their better endowment of pastoral resources. The conflict is exacerbated by the prolonged and recurrent droughts the area has experienced, particularly, since the mid-1990s. For instance, a series of clashes occurred between the two groups in 2002 following the failure of the *sugum* rain that normally occurs in March and April (UN-EUE 2002a, 2002b; Markakis 2004). The conflict during that time was quite serious and reached to the extent of blocking transportation between Ethiopia and Djibouti for some time.
While the shrinking pastoral resource base is an important factor in explaining the Afar-Issa conflict, it is not the only one. Smuggling has also contributed much to the perpetu-

ation of the conflict. Apart from its grazing resources, the eastern part of Afar is a smuggling route for caravans taking large quantities of manufactured goods (clothing, footwear, electronics, pharmaceuticals) and food from the eastern borderlands of Ethiopia to Addis Ababa. For a long time the Afar have benefited from their strategic location on this trade route by acting as middlemen between the coastal and hinterland traders as well as by direct involvement in the smuggling business (Getachew 2001). However, the Afars' gains from smuggling have attracted Issas who are also active in this field. Issas control two key smuggling centers (Gedamaitu and Adaitu) in the Afars' contested territory whereas Afars frequently inflict attacks on Issa to regain these strategic places. For instance, a series of clashes between the two groups over control of the trading centers were recorded in 2001 and 2002 (UN-EUE 2001; 2002a). For Issas, controlling the trading centers ensures free movement to transport smuggled goods between Ethiopia's two main import-export lines, the railway and the highway. For Afars, maintaining control over such strategic places not only ensures their income from the "underground economy" but also relaxes their access to grazing resources especially during drought years. Therefore, for both groups, fighting is in this case mainly a matter of expanding their own "free zone" to maximize benefits from cross-border trade opportunities.

Another source of conflict between the two groups is the recurring livestock raiding. Issas not only fight for the rich pastoral resources and of smuggling centers in Afar territory, but also for the livestock that they can raid from Afars to sell immediately in domestic markets or export through illegal routes. Nor are Afars immune from the raiding "business." Notable examples of livestock raids and counter-raids occurred in 2002: In June 2002, Issas raided more than 3,500 head of livestock from Afar and killed seven Afar herders. Organizing in response, the Afars went to Mulu market to save their animals from being sold, but were unsuccessful as the animals were taken to Djibouti by a different route. Four months later, young Afar men took retaliation against the Issa and sold a number of raided animals (the number not reported) at Bati market in Amhara region. This implies that livestock raiding between the two groups is a reciprocal "business" that sustains conflicts between them.

Meanwhile the conflict between Afar and Issa has become highly politicized, particularly since the 1970s. The military-led regime that overthrew a civilian government in 1969 showed a strong demand for territorial expansion to form "the Great Somalia," which was the main cause of war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977/78. This pan-Somali passion of the former Somali regime and its military support led the Issas—as ethnic Somalis—to claim several places in Afar including the flood-fed rangelands in the Middle Awash Valley (Getachew 2001; Markakis 2004; Galaty and Bonte 1991). Although the pan-Somali passion is not formally promoted nowadays, the legacy of the past regime still influences the attitudes of Afars towards the Issas. Indeed, there is a strong belief among ordinary Afars that any attack they launch on Issa is legitimate as long as Issas are in their traditional territory. Moreover, the conflict between the two is compounded by current political situations and complexities in the Horn. The ethnic-based federalism adopted in Ethiopia in 1991 which increased ethnic groups' awareness of traditional territories, the unstable geopolitical conditions of the Horn countries which facilitated illegal trafficking of firearms, and the high dependence of Ethiopia on the port of Djibouti where the Issas have political dominance over Afars are all contributing to the perpetuation of conflicts between the two ethnic groups.

5.2. Conflicts with Karrayyu-Oromo

The Karrayyu are longtime neighbors of the Afar. Their relationship began two centuries ago when Karrayyus occupied the Upper and Middle Awash Valley (Getachew 2001; Gebre 2001). Traditionally, Afars control areas north of Mount Fentale whereas Karrayyus control the lands to the south. The two groups had strong economic and social relationships in the past, which were also manifested in solidarity and shared values. As Getachew notes: "They shared pastures and even lived in shared settlements" (2001, 48). While such positive relationships still exist to some extent, their conflictive interactions are more pronounced nowadays.

Two main reasons can be given for gradual deterioration of peaceful interaction between Afars and Karrayyus. The first is the gradual decline of the pastoral resource base for various reasons. Confiscation of land by the state is among the serious challenges that Afars in Awash-Fentale have been facing since the 1960s. Near Mount Fentale, the Awara Melka state farm now occupies a significant tract of the rangeland previously accessible to Afars, while several state farms (such as Melka-Sedi, Melka-Werer, and Yalo) and settlement farms occupy large tracts of the dry season grazing retreat in Amibara. Most of the remaining rangelands have also been proclaimed as game reserves, national parks, and controlled hunting areas (Table 2). In addition to state land confiscation schemes, the westward expansion of the Issa displaced several Afar clans from their homelands in West Hararghe (Gebre 2001; Getachew 2001). The declining resource base within their territory pushed Afars southwards and increased their competition with Karrayyus. However, resource scarcity is not unique to Afars. Karrayyus are also victims of the extensive land confiscation programs of the Ethiopian state. The Nura Era Orchard, the Metehara Sugar Estate, and part of the Awash National Park have already displaced Karrayyus from their rangelands (Gebre 2001; Tolera 2000). Moreover, Karrayyus face continuous pressure in the east from Arsi Oromos (Getachew 2001; Tolera 2000). The severity of resource scarcity has been worsened by a series of droughts since mid-1990s, and the deterioration of rangeland quality over time due to expansions of unwanted plants (such as *Acacia nubica* and *Acacia senegal*) (Abule et al. 2005, 26).

The deterioration in the pastoral resource base has negatively influenced peaceful relations between the two groups. On the one hand, Karrayyus become less willing to permit Afar herders onto rangelands in their domain and less tolerant to any intrusion (Gebre 2001). On the other hand, such resource scarcity also leads Karrayyus to cross into Afar territory, resulting in frequent confrontations between the two groups. The Karrayyus' conflict is more serious with the Weima tribe of Afar because the latter settled near contested areas following their eviction from West Hararghe by Issa. Frequent clashes occur between the Weima Afar and Karrayyu, particularly near the Awash National Park (in places such as Beleadi, Aroretti, and Dinkuku Pond) and around Mount Gumbi. Conflicts occasionally also erupt between Karrayyus and the Debne tribe of Afar (longtime neighbors of the Karrayyu) over the wet-season rangeland

known as the Gababa plain (between the two peaks of Mount Fentale). Clashes are more intense during droughts. For instance, a series of attacks and counter-attacks between Afar and Karrayyu occurred in June 2002 following the failure of the short rainy season (UN-EUE 2002a). The conflict became exacerbated later in October as the drought continued (UN-EUE 2002b).

Another cause of the Afar-Karrayyu conflict is the intensification of livestock raiding *(gadle)* between the two groups. Indeed, raiding is the traditional phenomenon between the two groups, and is tacitly approved by traditional leaders (Getachew 2001). In its traditional sense, raiding is a means of restocking after drought seasons, establishing initial stock for young men in order to assert manhood in the pastoral environment, and increasing prestige. Nowadays, however, livestock are mainly raided for commercial purposes and sold in open markets or exported through illegal routes. Since contemporary raids are usually wide in scale of operation, the level of conflict sometimes reaches an extent where government security forces have to intervene. For instance, in 2004, Karrayyus raided some five hundred head of livestock from Afar in Awash-Fentale, killing five Afar herders and injuring one. On a revenge attack, the Afars killed one Karrayyu and raided an unknown number of animals. The spiraling escalation of conflict was stopped by the intervention of the government.

5.3. Comparative Discussion

At least two important factors can be extracted from the above discussions. First, state land confiscation programs since the 1960s have increased resource scarcity in the study areas and aggravated conflict. Since large state-owned establishments—nature reserves and large-scale farms—have occupied most of the dry-season rangelands *(kalo)*, pastoralists have been forced to keep their livestock in wet-season rangelands *(alta)* almost year-round. This has increased the scope for confrontation with neighboring ethnic groups (such as Issa and Karrayyu) since most of the wet-season rangelands (e.g. the Alaydeghi plain and the Fentale) are

found in contested zones. This policy-induced scarcity is exacerbated by the recurrence of drought in the study areas. Given that pastoral resources are subtractable in nature, scarcity implies the existence of highly negative appropriation externalities.[4] In such situations, each pastoral group seeks to minimize and if possible avoid the negative externalities created by others. This is outlined by an Afar elder:

> We fight with others during droughts because water and grasses are not adequate to feed our animals. When we migrate elsewhere beyond our territory we usually negotiate with the owners [except with Issa] to feed our animals; most likely, the owners refuse to allow more animals onto their rangeland during droughts. However, refusal by the owners does not block us from entering the desired rangeland because we have to save our animals from possible death.
> (Interview with Hummed Musa, Afar elder in Amibara, February 2005)

This means that resource scarcity (induced by policy and nature) has transformed a cooperative game of using pastoral resources into a zero-sum game in which the gains of the gainers are equal to the losses of the losers and hence has facilitated the application of the institutions of violence.

The second conflict-instigating factor is livestock raiding. Livestock are resources that can be accumulated through production (by applying peaceful institutions) or through raiding (by applying the institutions of violence) by Afars and their neighbors. As a "forced contract," livestock raiding has traditionally occurred between pastoral groups of East Africa since time immemorial (Galaty and Bonte 1991; Otim 2002). While raiding, as a cultural phenomenon, contributes to conflicts in the study areas, culture provides a partial explanation for the existence of raiding. Nowadays, raiding occurs not only for cultural reasons but also to earn income by selling the animals in open markets. This is due to the integration of the pastoral economy into the commercial economy, which is associated with increasing access to external and domestic livestock markets. The change in the incentive for livestock raiding from "culture" to "commerce" arising from the opportunity to sell the raided animals could influence the frequency and extent of conflicts. First,

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4 The negative externalities are manifested in the costs incurred to fulfill the biological needs of livestock (i.e. resource appropriation costs).

commercial raiding is extensive in nature, which means that it is less tolerable and hence the victims are more likely to take retaliatory action. Second, by its nature, commercial raiding involves larger numbers of actors. Livestock traders, traffickers of illegal arms, and others are usually behind the raids, fueling up the conflicts. Since these actors share few common norms and values, traditional institutions are less effective in managing conflicts associated with commercial raiding. Third, commercial raiding increases the likelihood that raided animals will quickly be beyond the reach of the raided groups, which reduces the effectiveness of negotiations to return the animals. As local opinions indicate, there are several cases in which negotiations were unable to bring any change simply because the animals had crossed the border to Djibouti or Somalia or been marketed elsewhere within Ethiopia. The usual response of a victim group is retaliation using its institutions of violence.

An implicit factor behind the conflicts is access to conflict technologies, which is mainly associated with the instability in the Horn of Africa since the 1970s.[5] In the "old" days, conflict technologies constituted traditional fighting tools. Local accounts indicate that Afars (and their neighbors) used to fight with spears, bows, swords, and, in rare cases, non-automatic rifles. Nowadays, if these old conflict technologies exist at all, it is only for their symbolic value. Instead, modern firearms are used to attack and defend. It is not surprising to encounter armed youths around homesteads, in bush areas, and in some towns in Afar. This is not without reason. Better access to conflict technologies increases win probabilities and hence increase the likelihood of controlling strategic places or benefiting from looted resources (livestock). Indeed, it is an imperative for every Afar to acquire modern weapons to sustain their livelihood, given that the neighboring groups own and use the same technologies. This implies that, as power resources, modern conflict technologies are essential instruments that sustain the institutions of violence among Afars and their neighbors.

5.4. Institutional Aspects

The likelihood of violent conflicts will be zero—at least theoretically—if peaceful institutions exist to counterbalance the institutions of violence. This subsection discusses the capacity and effectiveness of the existing institutions to counteract the institutions of violence. Since such institutions can be formal or informal, the two categories are discussed separately.

5.4.1. Informal Conflict Management Institutions

Conflicts between Afar clans are managed by the *madaa* based on Afar customary law. Members of the traditional jury are elders selected from different clans, excluding the clans involved in dispute. The process is called *billi arri,* which literally means peace-making. In the mediation process, the mediators focus on cooling off the parties by extending the length of the procedure until they settle their affairs by themselves. According to the elders in Ambash, traditional deliberations may take up to two weeks. Sanctions are not designed to punish the wrongdoer. Instead, to use Rugege's expressions, the traditional mediators impose sanctions based more on the "give-little-and-take-little" principle than the "winner-takes-all" principle (1995). The *madaa* has the authority and legitimacy to effectively enforce sanctions imposed by the traditional jury. Central to its effectiveness is the tradition of forgiveness among Afar clans, respect for elders, and the transfer of resources as compensation. As a result, there are few cases in which conflicts between Afar clans escalate until they need the mediation of outsiders.

The *madaa* was able to effectively manage conflicts between Afars and some of their neighbors in the past (Getachew 2001). For example, Afar and Karrayyu used to share institutions that enable them to exchange fugitives, pay compensation, and reduce tensions; i.e. if an Afar murdered a Karrayyu (or vice versa), a traditional jury composed of both ethnic groups would handle the

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5 Countries in the Horn of Africa have been shaken by war and civil unrest particularly since the 1970s. The Ethio-Somalia war of the 1970s, the civil war in Somalia since the 1980s, the instability in Djibouti in 1990s, the intensified civil war in Ethiopia in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the Ethio-Eritrea war in the late 1990s are apt examples. These instabilities and wars facilitated the availability of light weapons in "underground" markets of all countries in the Horn.

case.[6] However, though they still exist to some extent, these shared institutions are no longer influential. For Afar and Issa, the traditional framework for managing conflicts (as well enforcing agreements) is either latent or non-existent. In general, the *madaa* is now less effective at managing inter-ethnic conflicts.

The household survey also indicates that inter-clan conflicts are within the capacity of traditional institutions while inter-ethnic conflicts often exceed it. Thirty-eight out of forty-eight interviewed pastoralists who reported inter-ethnic conflicts indicated that the conflicts were either resolved with the involvement of formal mediators or were not resolved at all. This contrasts with inter-clan conflicts, which required little external facilitation within the period considered.

5.4.2. Formal Conflict Management Institutions
The existence of well-functioning formal institutions (in addition to informal ones) may have two related benefits for societies (Knight 1992). First, the existence of formal institutions facilitates the introduction of third-party enforcers (mainly the state) and can help to stabilize informal institutions. Second, the introduction of formal institutions makes the institutional setup more complete and robust for handling diverse challenges and opportunities. In this respect, state-backed property rights and conflict management institutions can augment informal institutions in managing conflicts in pastoral areas (Swallow and Bromley 1995).

As a third-party rule enforcer, the state is expected to facilitate peaceful interaction between right-holders and duty-bearers. However, this is not the case in the study areas: the right-holders and the duty-bearers are often unknown, particularly in border areas. Meanwhile, high territorial demand is observed particularly for locations that have either better pastoral resources (such as the Alaydeghi plain and the vicinity of Mount Fentale) or strategic importance for exploiting trade opportunities (such as Gedamaitu and

Adaitu). Afars move into contested areas without the consent of their neighbors because they believe that these areas are within their territorial domain. Their neighbors also do not hesitate to take countervailing actions that usually lead to bloody confrontations. The actions of the local administrations are limited to precautionary tactics such as establishing offices in contested areas to safeguard future claims of their people.[7] At higher levels, conflicts are understated and are usually considered as temporary conflicts over pasture and water rather than a struggle between groups for permanent territorial control.

In several policy documents the Ethiopian government has acknowledged the complexity of pastoral challenges and called for certain critical interventions to improve the livelihoods of pastoral communities. However, conflict and its management have received marginal attention, if mentioned at all, in many of the contemporary policy documents. For instance, while eight articles (out of 104) in the food security strategy of 1996 discuss pastoral areas, none of them mentions the importance of conflict management in these areas (FDRE 1996). Even the most recent policy document, the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program, envisages no systematic way of managing conflicts in pastoral areas (FDRE 2002).

Despite this fact, government and development agencies intervene in conflict mediations on an *ad hoc* basis. Actually, most of the inter-ethnic conflicts within three years preceding this study were mediated in the presence of the government and the NGOs operating in the area (such as CARE Ethiopia). The mediation forums were held in urban centers in the presence of traditional leaders and government officials, where the latter took leadership on the stage. The meetings lasted two to three days depending upon the complexity of the cases and the damages involved. The government and the NGOs provided logistics to bring the conflicting parties together.

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6 Based on the rule that the culprit and his clan pay 101 head of cattle as compensation or blood money to the victim's family and clan.

7 In order to stop the expansion of the Issa, new district offices have been built close to the eastern border of Afar region. Since October 2006, the Amibara district administration has transferred all district-

level government offices to an open rangeland known as Andido, which is a critical penetration point of the Issa because of its proximity to water points at Blen.

Unfortunately, these mediation efforts were unable to mitigate the recurrent conflicts between Afars and their neighbors. Rather, formal mediations are usually wound up with pseudo-commitments by participants to share resources in a peaceful manner. For instance, at the formal mediation forums in the towns of Awash 7 Kilo and Dire Dawa in December 1998, Afar and Issa elders agreed to forgive each other for earlier conflicts and vowed to work together for peace and stability of the area (Unruh 2005). However, the conflicts between the two groups showed no sign of abating after these promising agreements, with instances of conflict between the two groups occurring in June 2002 (UN-EUE 2002a), October 2002 (UN-EUE 2002b), and April 2007 ("MoWR Alaydege Conflict Delay," *Addis Fortune*, April 20, 2007) offering typical justifications for the violations of prior agreements. Similarly, more than five instances of conflict between Afar and Karrayyu occurred in 2004 despite the efforts of the government and NGOs to mediate between the two groups. The recurrent failures of formal mediations to bring harmony among conflicting groups have reduced confidence among Afars. As a result, Afars have termed formal mediations *dir wegry*, which literally means false mediations.

A number of limitations are embedded in formal mediations. The first is that local mediators may lack knowledge and experience on how to apply the informal and the formal approaches in an integrated manner. This may create disparities between the local elders and government officials in their ways of handling the mediation. In the traditional system, mediators rarely act as a dictating party but use "soft" techniques to resolve conflicts. By contrast, formal mediators usually downplay the "soft" techniques of traditional mediators and are tempted to provide fast solutions.

Second, formal mediation forums are organized with budget support from the government and the NGOs operating in the area and conducted in high-profile hotels in local towns (such as Awash 7 Kilo) with traditional elders compensated for their participation entirely in monetary terms (in the form of per diems and transport allowances). The facilitators (affiliated with government offices and NGOs) also take their share of benefits by claiming for per diems and allowances. Since the budget rules for conflict mediation do not follow the standard procedures of public finance, it is highly likely that the compensation paid to the mediating actors is inflated and the budget is corrupted. This implies, as also observed elsewhere in East Africa (Eaton 2008), that conflicts between Afar pastoralists and their neighbors could serve as a "business opportunity" for mediating actors thereby reducing the incentive of these actors to work for total avoidance of violence.

The third problem of formal mediation emanates from the domination of local officials in the mediation process. Some local opinion holds that government officials monopolize the mediation forum and elders are given little chance to express their views or else their interests are overlooked. Moreover, since participation of the elders in the mediation forums provide them with the opportunity to access state and NGO budgets and participants are often selected by local politicians, elders tend to "stay on the safe side" in the mediation process. The involvement of local elders in this way can have detrimental effects on traditional institutions and sustainability of peaceful interactions among the neighboring groups. That is to say, the elders, who could provide an alternative forum for justice, may be associated with the formal authority by the local people and lose their legitimacy, as also observed elsewhere in East Africa (Hoehne 2006; Mulugeta and Hagmann 2008). For instance, Mulugeta and Hagmann note that traditional Karrayyu elders have earned the nickname *luke*, meaning informer, because of their loyalty to politicians.

6. Conclusion and Policy Suggestions

The institutions of violence are frequently on the front line when it comes to influencing behavior and action among the interacting groups in Afar. In line with contemporary arguments (Homer-Dixon 1998; 2001; Tir and Diehl 1998; Hauge and Ellingsen 1998), the findings show that resource scarcity is an important challenge leading to recurrent clashes among neighboring groups. Extensive land confiscations by the state and recurrent droughts are the major factors contributing to resource scarcity. However, resource scarcity is not the only factor that led to conflicts in the study areas. Livelihood opportunities have also played some

role. In this regard, market opportunities for livestock (both domestic and abroad), opportunities for smuggling, and access to modern conflict technologies are important.

Conflict management should be recognized as part and parcel of pastoral development policies, because development efforts cannot produce the anticipated impacts on the livelihood of pastoralists in the presence of recurrent conflicts in pastoral areas. While managing conflicts in pastoral areas should be a crucial policy agenda, it is worthwhile, however, to recognize that conflicts in the study areas are complex and diverse in origin. Therefore, a detailed understanding of the natural, social, economic, political, and historical contexts of pastoral areas is crucial to providing long-lasting solutions.

The current situation indicates that traditional institutions alone are not effective in managing conflicts and hence external intervention is indispensable. This is attributable to the gradual weakening of the ability of traditional institutions to manage resource use patterns and to the fact that some of the contemporary causes of conflicts are beyond the capacity of traditional authorities. It is worthwhile to note, however, that external intervention does not mean introducing entirely new forms of governance and crafting "modern" rules to extinguish the traditional ones. Rather, it is essential to provide a locally motivated institutional

framework whereby traditional and formal conflict management institutions cross-fertilize each other. In this regard, the government should strengthen out-of-court conflict management procedures by building the capacities of local and traditional authorities, for example through regular training events where innovative new procedures and successful experiences from other areas are introduced. In the meantime, it is important to strengthen legal institutions at district level so that the conflicting parties can present their cases for judgment when mediations fail. In the long run this latter point implies strengthening state security institutions step by step to realize fully functioning rule of law in pastoral areas.

Finally, managing inter-ethnic conflicts requires strong cooperation between neighboring regions (Afar, Somali, and Oromia), including designing institutions to sanction cross-regional livestock raiding and facilitating inter-ethnic resource-sharing. However, mitigating conflicts in these areas entails also cooperation beyond the neighboring regions. In this regard, creating strong alliances among neighboring countries (e.g. Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somaliland) to control illicit cross-border trade and small arms trafficking, to license and facilitate cross-border livestock trade, and to exchange cross-border livestock raiders and criminals is an essential, albeit challenging, element of conflict management.

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Declining Fertility in Eritrea Since the Mid-1990s: A Demographic Response to Military Conflict

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Declining Fertility in Eritrea Since the Mid-1990s: A Demographic Response to Military Conflict

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Between the mid-1990s and the early part of the new century, the total fertility rate in Eritrea declined by twenty one percent. Even more striking than the magnitude of this decline within a short period is that it occurred in the absence of any improvements in contraceptive use and without any evident reduction in desired family size. In this study, fertility decline and its underlying factors are examined using data from two waves of the Eritrea Demographic and Health Surveys. The central question is whether the recent decline is an outcome of the 1998–2000 border conflict, is related to changes in women's reproductive intentions, or is due to socio-economic transformations. The findings demonstrate that the fertility decline, especially for first births, is the result less of increased demand for family size limitation and more of the border conflict. Although the conflict seems to have played a role in accelerating the decline in higher-order births, the change seems to be a long-term transition that started before the conflict. These findings imply that military conflicts are unlikely to instigate sustainable fertility decline, but may prompt short-term fertility changes among certain groups or modify an ongoing decline.

Until the late 1980s, the a woman in sub-Saharan Africa had six children in her lifetime, which was higher than the average in any other region in the world. During the 1990s, fertility started to decline in most sub-Saharan African countries, marking the beginning of a trend to smaller family size preferences in the region (USAID 2003). Reduction in under-five mortality rates, a rise in use of modern contraceptives, and an increase in age at first marriage are suggested as the major factors associated with fertility decline (Makinwa-Adebusoye 2001). In the Horn of Africa, Eritrean fertility rates declined considerably during a period of border conflict with Ethiopia (1998–2000). According to the Eritrea Demography and Health Survey (EDHS), total fertility rate (TFR) declined from 6.1 in 1995 to 4.8 in 2002, implying a reduction in period fertility of 21 percent over a period of about six years (NSEO and ORC Macro 2003).

The fertility decline in Eritrea has generated much interest in academic and other concerned circles, arising from a belief that Eritrea has witnessed a remarkable reduction in fertility rates despite largely lacking the improvements in family planning and standards of living frequently associated with demographic transition. Increases in contraceptive use and induced abortion, relatively late age at marriage, as well as long periods of post-partum sexual abstinence and postpartum amenorrhea can substantially reduce fertility from its natural maximum (Bongaarts and Potter 1983). However, with the exception of age at first marriage and the proportion of women never married, the proximate variables have not changed sufficiently since 1995 to account for the observed declines in fertility. For instance, the rate of use of any contraceptive practice remained constant at 8 percent between 1995 and 2002. In the case of postpartum variables, the median duration of postpartum abstinence remained

roughly the same (2.7 months in 1995 and 3.0 months in 2002) (NSEO and ORC Macro 2003). And median duration of insusceptibility changed in a manner that would lead to an increase in fertility, falling from 16.6 months in 1995 to 14.6 months in 2002. Changes in the duration of sexual abstinence and postpartum insusceptibility are, therefore, not likely to be important factors for the recent fertility decline. The median age at first marriage among women aged 20–49 increased slightly from 16.8 in 1995 to 17.7 years in 2002. In Eritrea, statistics on abortion are scarce and unreliable because abortion is illegal unless it is intended to save the mother's life. It is, therefore, difficult to know how prevalent induced abortion is in Eritrea and what contribution it may have made to the recent decline.

Even though there were some improvements in education, health services, and economic status between 1993 and 1997, it cannot be said that progress continued after 1998. Instead, Eritrea experienced severe economic difficulties, high inflation, population displacement and migration, and military mobilization caused by the 1998–2000 border conflict. Although the country has had relative peace since 2000, it has suffered from considerable crisis-induced hardships because of military tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which remain unresolved.

Conventional demographic transition theory predicts that a decline in actual fertility should lag behind decline in desire for more children or in ideal family size. Several classical cases of fertility transition show that as a country develops, the cost of rearing children rises and benefits from having them fall, thus leading couples to want smaller families (Bulatao and Casterline 2001). To implement these preferences, couples use contraception, which in turn leads to lower actual fertility. However, empirical evidence on fertility decline has not always been consistent. It is argued that fertility decline may occur without any evident reduction in desired family size as fertility and fertility desires can be influenced by other non-conventional factors such as war or economic and political crises (Agadjanian and Ndola 2002).

The rapid decline in fertility in Eritrea demands investigation: is the decline an outcome of the border conflict or due to changes in women's reproductive intentions, caused by other factors? The key questions are: How does fertility respond to such war and socio-economic crisis? Can we say that the border conflict initiated or accelerated the decline, producing a negative correlation between socio-economic factors and family limitation as opposed to the positive correlation associated with classical demographic theory? Or does the recent decline in fertility stem from changes in women's demand for large families, with conflict and economic decline neutral in effect? Answers to these questions may have important implications for theories of fertility change and for population programs in the country. More importantly, the fertility response to the border conflict may have practical consequences for future population growth in Eritrea.

Despite such important theoretical and policy implications, there are only two studies of the nature and cause of changes in Eritrean fertility (Blanc 2004; Woldemicael 2008). Using Bongaarts model, Blanc concluded that the recent fertility decline is mainly an outcome of the border conflict mediated by a reduction in the proportion of women exposed to the risk of pregnancy (as a consequence of delayed age at marriage and spousal separation). However, it is not clear whether such effects are evident when other more specific factors such as region of residence, child survival status, historical period, and other socio-economic factors are examined using multivariate models. Using both trend and multivariate analyses, Woldemicael (2008) shows that the fertility decline is partly due to the impact of the border conflict and partly due to the socio-economic transformation pre-dating the conflict. However, although both studies provide some understanding of the impact of the border conflict on the recent fertility decline, several important questions remain unaddressed, including the role of reproductive preferences, spousal separation, and adolescent childbearing in the fertility decline.

The present study extends my previous work in three important ways: First, an important unresolved issue concerns whether changes in reproductive behavior favoring smaller families (i.e., the proportion of women who want no more children) occurred in Eritrea during the inter-survey period

(1995–2002), and if so, what do these changes in reproductive preferences suggest about the recent fertility decline? Classical demographic transition theory understands fertility decline as a direct consequence of a decreased desire for live births. This decreased desire or demand for children is viewed as a response to improved child survival and a result of structural changes in society that reduce the benefits and increase the costs of rearing children (Davis 1963; Hirschman 1994). Other factors, such as military conflict or economic decline, can also lead to low demand for children and crisis-led transition in fertility intentions (Hill 2004). Second, a trend analysis examines whether adolescent childbearing and age at first marriage changed during the conflict period and assesses their relative contribution to the decline. Here, we consider fertility as a potentially important demographic mechanism through which individuals adjust to changes in their environment. Conventional demographic wisdom suggests that in societies like Eritrea, where childbearing and marriage are closely related, the postponement of the onset of childbearing would typically be achieved by delaying marriage (Caldwell 2004). Caldwell argues that entry into marriage is an important path of adjustment; I examine its dynamics in Eritrea. The third important question of interest in this study is whether spousal separation changed during the conflict period and whether this factor contributed to the recent decline.

1. The Background in Eritrea

Eritrea is one of the least developed countries in the world with per capita income of about $130 and a Human Development Index ranking of 156 out of 177 countries (Advisory Panel on Country Information 2007). Maternal and child mortality are still high: about 600 maternal deaths per 100,000 live births and more than 50 infant deaths per 1000 live births. More than 60 percent of households have no access to safe drinking water (NSEO and ORC Macro 2003). About 39 percent of males and 52 percent of females have never attended school. The male-female gap in education is still large and most evident at higher levels of education. The country is still characterized by high fertility levels, although they have started to decline.

The country has been in a state of war with Ethiopia for the past five decades or more. The thirty-year struggle for

independence (1961–91) and subsequently the 1998–2000 border conflict both had significant socio-economic and demographic impacts on the country. Statistical indicators on socio-economic trends are very limited and those that are available are largely unreliable, as there is very little transparency from the side of the government. The few statistics that are available indicate a negative trend in economic performance and per-capital GDP declining since the outbreak of the border conflict (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2008; Healy 2007). Before the border conflict, the Eritrean economy grew by an average of 7 percent annually between 1994 and 1997. Following the outbreak of war in 1998, GDP growth declined to 4 percent in 1998 and 3 percent in 1999; the economy contracted by 9 percent in 2000 (Alamin 2003). The border conflict devastated the subsistence agricultural sector, on which 80 percent of the population rely, with food production reduced by 62 percent. The delayed demobilization of agriculturalists from military service kept agricultural production well below normal, holding down growth in 2002–2006 (Advisory Panel on Country Information 2007).

The war of liberation and the recent border conflict both had serious repercussions on the country's demographic situation as well. Military mobilization, loss of life, and wartime migration have created several unusual features in the population structure, distorted the population pyramid, and skewed sex ratios. For instance, the average ratio of males to females in rural Eritrea during the struggle for liberation has been estimated at 47 to 53 (Community Development Services 1991). This imbalance in the ratio of men to women, caused mainly by male losses in the liberation struggle, has led to labor shortages, particularly in the agricultural sector (Green and Baden 1994). The population pyramid in Figure 1 is also a clear testimony of the impact of the 1998–2000 border conflict on the age structure of the population. The pyramid is characterized by a broad base and a striking deficit of adults, especially men. The male deficit is mainly between ages 20–54 and to a lesser extent at ages 15–19 and above 55 years. The observed male deficit can be attributed to endless military service, forced conscription, and a mass exodus of youth to neighboring countries and much further afield. Conscription is compulsory for all male and unmarried

female Eritreans aged 18–45 years. Figure 1 also shows that the proportion of the population aged 0–4 is smaller than the proportion aged 5–9, suggesting that there were fewer births during the period of conflict. This age group would have been broader if there had been more married couples living together.

Figure 1: Population pyramid of Eritrea, 2002

Source: National Statistics Office & ORC Macro Inc. 2003. 2002 Demographic and Health Survey Report

The impact of the conflict is also reflected in high proportions of female-headed households and increased spousal separation, factors that are important for fertility change. The EDHS reports show that the proportion of households headed by females increased from 31 percent in 1995 to 47 percent in 2002. Military mobilization for the border conflict also decreased the proportion of married couples living together. A comparison of the proportions of married women residing with their husbands at the time of the 1995 and 2002 EDHS surveys shows a significant decline in all age groups (see Table 1) and particularly at younger ages. For instance, the proportion of married women aged 15–19 who were living with their husband in 2002 is about 50 percent lower than it was in 1995. Moreover, only four in ten

married women aged 20–24 were living with their husband in 2002, while the corresponding figure in 1995 was more than seven in ten. Separation reduces married women's exposure to the risk of pregnancy. A review of fertility response to war and population displacement of women in Sarajevo before and during the Bosnian war in 1992–94 shows that in the short-term fertility fell mainly as a result of temporary separation of couples (Hill 2004).

Table 1: Percent ever married and percent of married women residing with husband by age, 1995 and 2002

Current age	Ever married		Residing with husband	
	1995	2002	1995	2002
15-19	37.6	31.0	60.4	30.5
20-24	78.1	72.7	74.4	42.1
25-29	92.1	88.5	79.1	48.9
30-34	95.8	95.4	84.0	60.6
35-39	98.2	97.8	88.4	72.4
40-44	97.3	99.0	89.0	78.9
45-49	98.1	99.2	90.6	88.0
Total	80.0	76.7	80.9	58.5

The figures are calculated from the 1995 and 2002 EDHS data files

War can also lead to conscious adjustments in fertility behavior because couples are more likely to opt to avoid births during troubled times (CEPED 1998). We expect that in countries like Eritrea, military tensions and the uncertainty of peace will depress the desire for fertility and as a result fertility may decline. Such fertility responses to war are indeed described in some studies, where fertility falls because the stress and uncertainties in people's lives are not conducive to childbearing (Lindstrom and Berhanu 1999; McGinn 2000). Thus, although the data used in this study do not allow any examination of the duration of war-induced change in fertility behavior, the war is likely to have had some impact on fertility behavior. In addition, cultural values or traditions of a society may affect fertility behavior, where traditional societies favor large families and non-traditional societies prefer small families.

2. Data and Variables

The data for this study come from two Eritrea Demographic and Health Surveys conducted in 1995 and 2002. Both surveys are nationally representative of households. Each survey collected information on the characteristics of selected households and from all women of reproductive age (age 15–49). Information on fertility, fertility intentions, contraception, maternal and child health, and other related issues was collected from 5,054 women of reproductive age in 1995 and 8,754 women of the same age in 2002.

Criteria including timing of the fertility decline and regional/provincial response differentials were used to examine the hypothesis that the decline is an outcome of the border conflict. The rationale for using each criterion is given below.

Timing of the fertility decline: Even though there is no established timeframe for examining a fertility response to military conflict or economic decline, the expectation is that it would occur over a relatively short period depending upon the nature, extent, and severity of the crisis (Ashton et al. 1984). Palloni, Hill, and Pinto (1996) show that the impact of economic shock on fertility becomes apparent within one or two years after the onset of the crisis and conclude that the strength of impact depends on the magnitude and duration of crisis. Thus, the characteristic of a crisis-led decline is that fertility change closely follows rather than precedes crisis. Annual TFRs were estimated and plotted over a period of one decade preceding the survey to precisely establish the timing of fertility change in relation to the onset of conflict in the country. Plotting the annual fertility estimates shows visually whether a fertility decline occurred after the onset of conflict in 1998. Age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) were also estimated to examine how the trend varies by age.

The timing of the fertility decline was also be assessed using multivariate statistical analysis, specifically a Cox regression model. The simpler strategy of measuring crisis in terms of a historical period was adopted. This meant, however, that it was not possible to identify the specific crisis factors responsible for the change (changes in GDP, inflation rates, etc.). Thus, historical period is the key proximate indicator of

conflict in this study and is measured by a categorical variable, defined as before 1990, 1990–92, 1993–95, 1996–98, and 1999–2001: this grouping reflects the past political and economic situation of the country. The period before 1990 and 1990–92 were the time of the liberation struggle and preparation for the independence referendum, 1993–98 was the post-independence period where some progress was made in education, health services, and other infrastructure, while the last period was a time of military mobilization, mass displacement, and economic decline caused by the border conflict which started in mid-1998. The analysis recognizes 1999 as the starting year of social disruption and economic decline due to the conflict. Thus, in the multivariate analysis, the relative probabilities attached to the different categories of historical period indicate how much fertility changed during the crisis period in comparison with the peace period, especially with the reference category (1996–98).

Regional response differentials: If crisis is responsible for initiating the fertility decline, then this decline should be most pronounced among populations with the most severe experience of conflict. Although all regions of the country were affected by the border conflict, two regions—Southern and Gash Barka—were worst hit. Thousands of residents of these regions were displaced. Thus, one would expect a stronger fertility response in these regions. Interaction terms between historical period and region of residence were introduced in a multivariate model to test the hypothesis that fertility responses differ between regions.

Spousal separation was also included as a proxy indicator of the war effect. As described above, the border conflict resulted in general military mobilization, especially of males aged 18–45. It is likely that such separation will have reduced married women's exposure to the risk of pregnancy. However, note that because this variable was measured on the interview date it may not capture the full effect of war-related separation on fertility, due to the cross-sectional nature of the data, and because information on the exact timing of spousal separation is not available; we are thus unable to use duration of spousal separation.

In addition to the independent variables outlined above, we included other demographic and socio-economic variables

as control variables. These include age at birth of previous child, age at first marriage, birth order, previous birth interval, and survival status of previous child. Background socio-economic variables include education and childhood residence (rural/urban).

Unfortunately, we were unable to take into account numerous other factors that influence fertility directly or indirectly. Probably one of the most important is HIV/AIDS. Some researchers argue that severe HIV epidemics are likely to exert to downward pressure on fertility (Gregson 1994). Using the Demographic Health Survey of Tanzania, Baschieri (2000) found a greater impact of HIV/AIDS in the higher-prevalence zones (fertility was three to five percent lower than it would be in the absence of HIV/AIDS) than in the lower-prevalence zones (where the impact was less than two percent). An HIV/AIDS epidemic can affect fertility in several ways (Mturi and Hinde 2001): First, men and women with HIV/AIDS may reduce fecundity for a variety of reasons (including reduced coital frequency). Second, age-selective AIDS mortality may reduce the population capable of giving birth, since most deaths from AIDS occur in the childbearing ages. Finally, an HIV/AIDS epidemic can give rise to greater use of contraceptives (especially condoms) which may lead to reduced fertility. Since no detailed information on HIV/AIDS is available in Eritrea, we could not consider this variable in our analyses.

3. Results
3.1. Fertility Trends in Eritrea
To give some idea of the fertility trends in Eritrea, total fertility rate (TFR) and age-specific fertility rates (ASFR) are presented in Figures 2 through 4. Eritrea is at the earliest stage of fertility transition and has an intermediate level of fertility (a TFR of about 5). The TFR was around seven children per woman during the mid-1990s (see Figure 2). Since then it has begun to decrease, with relatively faster decline particularly after 1998. TFR declined from about 6.1 children per woman in 1997/98 to 4.8 in 2001/02. So in about six years, TFR declined by about 1.3 children per woman (or 21 percent). This finding is consistent with the results of the National Statistics and Evaluation Office (NSEO and ORC Macro 2003)

Figure 2: Total fertility rate, 1990–2001

To show the trend in fertility more clearly, fertility rates for five-year age groups were plotted for both surveys (see Figures 3 and 4). The age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) in Figure 3 show a broad peaked age pattern of fertility that falls slowly with advanced age. This is a characteristic of a population where there is little parity-specific fertility control. With the exception of the oldest age group (45–49), a decline in fertility over the period occurred in all age groups, although most of the fertility decline occurred among ages 20–30.

Figure 3: Age-specific fertility rate per woman, 1995 and 2002

Figure 4 shows that the decline by age in rural areas follows the national trend, where the decline is most marked at ages 30–34 and older. In urban areas, the decline is noticeable at ages 25–34 and 40–44. Regardless of age, fertility is lower in urban areas in both surveys, and the fertility gap between the two surveys is wider in rural areas, suggesting that the decline was stronger in rural areas. Couples' changing attitudes toward desire to reproduce as children become more and more expensive (economic value is declining, more and more children going to school, increasing shortages in housing and other social facilities) are likely to affect fertility, particularly in the urban areas (Teller et al. 2007).

Figure 4: Urban and rural age-specific fertility rate per woman, 1995 and 2002

3.2. Age at Start of Childbearing and Adolescent Fertility

Age at first marriage marks the beginning of the period of potential childbearing and is one of the most important determinants of fertility in societies like Eritrea, where premarital sex and birth out of wedlock are uncommon and stigmatized. Table 2 shows median age at first marriage in Eritrea obtained from the 1995 and 2002 surveys.

The data indicate an increase of about one year in median age at first marriage between 1995 and 2002. The data also show an increase in median age at first marriage in each age group, with smaller differences in younger age cohorts. This trend in age at first marriage suggests that war might have hastened fertility reduction by delaying marriage.

Table 2: Median age at first marriage, 1995 and 2002

Age	Median age at first marriage	
	1995	2002
20-24	16.7	17.1
25-29	17.3	18.0
30-34	17.3	17.8
35-39	16.8	18.8
40-44	16.5	18.8
45-49	16.3	17.8
All ages	16.8	17.7

Table 3 presents data on the proportion of teenage women who became pregnant before age 20 in relation to selected variables. Overall, the data show that teenage childbearing in Eritrea declined from 23 percent in 1995 to 14 percent in 2002. Delayed childbearing among adolescent women is likely to lead to fertility decline. It is evident from this table that the proportion of teenage mothers rises steadily with age. As expected, there are differences by educational status in both survey years. The proportion of teenage childbearing among women with no education or just primary education is consistently higher than that of their better-educated counterparts. This finding is consistent with evidence found elsewhere (Gupta and Leite 1999). In addition, urban teenagers are less likely to have ever given birth. Although teenage childbearing declined in rural areas and among less educated women, no such decline was observed among more educated women and urban teenagers. This finding deserves further investigation.

Table 3: Adolescent fertility: Percentage of adolescent women in category who have begun childbearing, 1995 and 2002

	1995		2002	
Age	Percent	Number	Percent	Number
15	3.0	303	2.1	426
16	13.4	217	2.8	424
17	21.6	190	8.0	326
18	40.4	275	24.0	545
19	50.7	144	36.4	280
Place of residence				
Rural	33.8	681	19.3	917
Urban	7.4	448	7.7	1084
Education				
No education	42.1	430	25.4	425
Primary	18.9	350	13.5	996
Secondary or higher	4.6	349	6.6	580
Total	23.3	1129	14.0	2001

3.3. Fertility Intentions

Earlier studies (e.g., Kulkarni and Choe 1998) indicate that unwanted fertility is very low or non-existent at the beginning of the transition process when fertility desires are mostly unrestricted and at the end when couples have nearly complete control over their fertility. In-between these two extremes, many couples would prefer a specific family size but do not control their fertility effectively and hence have unwanted births (Easterlin 1983; Bongaarts 1997). Adetunji (2001) shows that the probability of having unwanted fertility is low in countries with TFR above 6 and below 3 and high among those with a TFR in the range in-between. The low level of unwanted fertility at the start of transition when TFR is maximum and at the last phase

of transition when TFR is minimum on one hand, and the high level of unwanted fertility in the middle phase of the transition to lower fertility, on the other hand, demonstrate how the link between unwanted fertility and TFR exists during fertility transition. Thus, as fertility begins to decline, we should expect to see an increase in the level of unwanted fertility, reflecting of a downward trend in fertility preference. However, until unwanted fertility reaches high levels, prospects for a lasting reduction in total fertility rate are small (Adetunji 2001). The key question here is: Do the findings from Eritrea show the expected trend? That is, does the level of unwanted fertility depend on where Eritrea is in the course of fertility transition?

To answer these questions, first a comparison was made of wanted and unwanted fertility, which are the two components of total fertility. As can be seen from Table 4, the TF shows a decline from 6.2 in 1995 to 4.9 in 2002. Similarly, the wanted total fertility declined substantially, from 5.8 to 4.5 while the unwanted component remained constant at 0.4 children per woman. All other things being equal, as countries move from high to low fertility levels, unwanted fertility levels tend to increase first unless efforts are made to reduce them and then decrease as fertility reaches the lower level (Adetunji 2001). However, contrary to expectations and previous research, unwanted fertility remained constant between the surveys. From these results, we can infer that if unwanted fertility had been prevented, the total fertility rate in 2002 would have declined by only 8 percent (i.e., 4.5 births per woman rather than 4.9). Thus,

had women in Eritrea used contraception to avoid their unwanted births, the reduction in overall fertility would not have been significant or would not account for the observed decline.

Table 4 also presents the levels of wanted and unwanted fertility by urban/rural residence, education, and household economic status. Total fertility and total wanted fertility declined in both urban and rural areas, but the decline was much greater in rural areas. Wanted fertility in rural areas is more than double the figure for urban areas in both surveys, while there is no urban-rural difference in unwanted fertility. In terms of education, there are large and consistent differences in wanted fertility between the three groups, with uneducated women wanting more children than women with primary or secondary education. The pattern for unwanted fertility is similar to that of wanted fertility. While in the later survey unwanted fertility decreases consistently as education increases, in the earlier survey it is higher among women with primary education than those with no education. It may be that in the earlier period many women with primary education would like fewer children but are not yet controlling their fertility effectively, thus leading to relatively high levels of unwanted fertility for this group. There is difference in unwanted fertility between women with low and medium household income, while those with high household economic status have the lowest unwanted fertility. It may be that women with higher economic status are more likely to wish to lower their fertility and hence use contraception.

Table 4: Total marital fertility, wanted and unwanted marital fertility, and percentage unwanted, by residence and education, 1995 and 2002

Socioeconomic factors	1995				2002			
	TMF	TWMF	TUMF	% unwanted*	TMF	TWMF	TUMF	% unwanted*
Residence								
Urban	4.2	3.9	0.3	7.1	3.5	3.1	0.4	11.4
Rural	7.0	6.7	0.3	4.3	5.8	5.4	0.4	6.9
Education								
No education	6.8	6.5	0.3	4.4	5.9	5.4	0.5	8.5
Primary	6.1	5.6	0.5	8.2	4.1	3.7	0.4	9.8
Secondary+	2.8	2.8	0.0	0.0	3.0	2.8	0.2	6.7
Household economic status								
Low	6.5	6.1	0.4	6.2	6.0	5.5	0.5	8.3
Medium	6.0	5.6	0.4	6.7	5.0	4.5	0.5	10.0
High	3.4	3.4	0.0	0.0	3.0	2.8	0.2	6.7
Total	6.3	5.8	0.4	6.5	4.9	4.5	0.4	8.2

* Calculated as TUMF/TMF*100.

To obtain further information on whether the desire to have no more children is related to the course of the overall fertility decline in Eritrea, women's desire for more children was examined. Table 5 shows data on currently married women's desire for children broken down by the number of living children. The overall proportion of women who want no more children is very low, and has remained constant at about 18 percent since 1995. Previous studies (e.g., Westoff and Bankole 2002) indicate that in sub-Saharan African countries that have experienced sustained fertility decline the proportion of women who want no more children is within the range of 30 to 50 percent. By comparison the proportion of Eritrean women wanting no more children is much lower. According to Westoff and Bankole, this would imply that Eritrea had not experienced a decline or was at the beginning of fertility transition, whereas in fact the country has experienced a remarkable decline in fertility. So, Westoff and Bankole's thesis is not always consistent. Other factors, for instance, military conflict, economic downturn, and other abnormal situations can lead to low aspirations and crisis-led fertility transitions (Avogo and Agadjanian 2007; Hill 2004; Lindstrom and Berhanu 1999). Table 5 also shows that the desire for another child is strongly related to the number of living children a woman has. As the number of living children increases, the proportion of women who desire to have another child declines while the proportion of women who want no more children increases.

Table 5: Percentage of currently married women who want additional children or no more children, by number of living children, 1995 and 2002

Number of living children	1995				2002			
	% want another child	% want no more children	% undecided	% infecund	% want another child	% want no more children	% undecided	% infecund
0	92.9	1.5	4.3	1.2	94.2	0.8	4.0	1.0
1	93.1	3.5	2.0	1.3	93.7	2.2	3.3	0.8
2	88.8	6.2	3.3	1.7	88.0	5.8	4.4	1.8
3	87.6	7.6	2.6	2.2	83.3	9.9	5.2	1.6
4	77.9	15.1	1.9	5.1	68.0	22.2	7.2	2.6
5	66.3	23.8	3.4	6.5	58.6	26.8	9.9	4.6
6	53.2	32.7	8.5	5.6	45.8	41.0	9.6	3.6
7+	33.5	50.3	7.2	9.0	28.2	55.9	9.8	6.1
Total	73.7	18.1	4.1	4.1	73.8	17.6	6.2	2.5

3.4. War-Related Variation in Eritrean Fertility

So far we have used TFR and ASFR to assess the trends in fertility. But such measures do not capture the impact of changes in other factors contributing to family size limitation. Multivariate analyses including socio-demographic factors were used to control for compositional differences that may have contributed to the fertility decline. Analysis and interpretation of the association between the explanatory variables and fertility was facilitated by estimation of separate models for first and higher-order births. We expected some variables, such as age at first marriage, to be more important for first births while others, such as age at birth of previous child, birth order, and previous birth interval, are only applicable for higher parities. Table 6 presents the multivariate results of first birth analysis. Two models are estimated. Model 1 includes calendar year only and Model 2 adds other socio-demographic factors.

The relative probabilities associated with calendar years indicate how much fertility has changed relative to the reference period level (1996–98). Overall, Model 1 shows significantly lower fertility in the early 1990s and before, higher fertility between 1993 and 1998, and significantly lower fertility after 1998. Although it is difficult to establish a direct causal link between military conflict and fertility, the findings offer some evidence that the changes in fertility coincide with three major historical events in Eritrea: the thirty-year war of independence ending in 1992, the subsequent political stability and peace in 1993–98, and the border conflict with Ethiopia starting in 1998. The lower fertility of first births during the early 1990s may be seen as a response to economic decline and political instability caused by the war of independence. The specific demographic effects of conscription of young adults, separation of married couples due to forced migration and mass displacement, and intentional or unintentional postponement of marriages and childbearing during this period can only be guessed at, but it is clear that these factors can reduce fertility. The increase in fertility during 1993–98 could be a reflection of a boom in marriages and births postponed during the war for liberation. This is consistent with studies of pre-industrial Europe (Hobcraft 1996), which indicate a sharp decline in fertility during war years with a rebound in post-war years. The subsequent fertility decline reflects the effect of the recent border conflict. Although the border conflict started in mid-1998, its effect can be observed in 1999 and after. Even after controlling for the socio-demographic factors, the effects of historical period remain almost the same and statistically significant. Thus, historical period exerts a strong and independent influence over fertility and this clearly suggests that a substantial part of the effect of historical period is channeled through other mechanisms.

The results of Model 2 also show that most of the socio-demographic factors are significantly associated with first birth fertility. As expected, age at marriage has a strong effect on first birth fertility, with women who married later (20 or older) being 75 percent less likely to have their first birth than women who married at 16 years or younger. First birth fertility is also lower among married women who are not living with their husbands. The probability of having a first birth is lower among women with secondary or higher education and those who reside in urban areas. The impact of region of residence seems to be contrary to our expectations. The two regions (Gash Barka and Southern) which are considered to be worst affected by the conflict do not show lower fertility compared with other regions. In fact, the Southern region has the highest fertility.

Table 7 displays the multivariate results for higher-order births. Unlike for first births (Table 6), the probability of a higher-order birth increases linearly up to 1995 and then falls significantly. Thus although the decline is accelerated after the border conflict (1999–2001), it already started sometime between 1996 and 1998. As with the results for first births, the effects of historical period on fertility of higher-order births are unchanged when the socio-demographic factors are held constant. Women whose husbands live away are 15 percent less likely to have a child than women whose husbands live with them. Lindstrom and Berhanu (1999) found spousal separation to be the main mechanism by which civil war affected fertility in Ethiopia. Fertility for

higher-order births is more likely to be lower among older women (35 or older) than among younger women. A decline in fertility is also observed at higher birth orders (four and above). The survival status of the previous child has a significant effect on fertility, where fertility is higher if the preceding child dies than it survives until the conception of the next birth. The probability of having a higher-order birth decreases significantly with increasing birth interval. The effects of urban/rural childhood residence and education are in the expected direction and statistically significant, where fertility is lower among women with some education and among those who grew up in urban areas. Fertility of higher-order births is significantly lower in Northern Red Sea and Gash Barka regions than in other regions. The lower fertility in Gash Barka region may be a response to the effect of the conflict, although this was not observed in our first birth analysis. One explanation for the lower fertility in the Northern Red Sea region could be that the population of this region is mostly pastoralist or semi-nomadic. Some studies indicate that African pastoral populations have lower fertility rates than sedentary farming populations or than national average (Swift 1977). Swift's study in Somalia shows that pastoral Somali had a lower birth rate (37/1,000 population) than settled Somali (56/1,000 population). Another study in Senegal also reveals lower fertility for nomadic pastoral populations compared to sedentary farming populations (Lacombe, Lamy, and Vaugelade 1975). The same reason can also be expected to apply in the Northern Red Sea region of Eritrea, though further investigation may be needed.

Table 6: Relative risks of first birth associated with selected variables, 2002

	Model 1	Model 2
Historical period		
Before 1990	0.75***	0.54***
1990–1992	0.85***	0.71***
1993–1995	0.94	0.81***
1996–1998	1	1
1999–2001	0.72***	0.90**
Age at first marriage		
<16	–	1
16–19	–	0.61***
≥20	–	0.25***
Spousal separation		
Husband lives with her	–	1
Husband lives away	–	0.94*
Education		
No education	–	1
Primary	–	1.08**
Secondary or higher	–	0.91
Childhood residence		
Rural	–	1
Urban	–	0.90**
Region of residence		
Southern Red Sea	–	1
Maekel	–	1.05
Northern Red Sea	–	1.04
Anseba	–	1.15***
Gash Barka	–	1.05
Southern	–	1.30***

* p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%

Table 7: Relative risks of higher order births associated with selected socio-demographic variables, 2002

	Model 1	Model 2
Historical period		
Before 1990	1.17***	0.98
1990–1992	1.32***	1.17***
1993–1995	1.30***	1.23***
1996–1998	1	1
1999–2001	0.74***	0.76***
Age at birth of previous child		
<20	–	1
20-24	–	1.09***
25-29	–	1.15***
30-34	–	1.11***
35-39	–	0.91**
40+	–	0.64***
Birth order		
2-3	–	1
4-5	–	0.92***
6-7	–	0.83***
8+	–	0.69***
Survival status of previous child		
Alive		1
Dead		1.27***
Previous birth interval (months)		
Less than 18		1
18-23		0.92***
24-35		0.90***
36-47		0.79***
48+		0.73***
Spousal separation		
Husband lives with her	–	1
Husband lives away	–	0.85***
Education		
No education	–	1
Primary	–	0.89***
Secondary or higher	–	0.65***
Childhood residence		
Rural	–	1
Urban	–	0.92**
Region of residence		
Southern Red Sea	–	1
Maekel	–	0.98
Northern Red Sea	–	0.92***
Anseba	–	1.02
Gash Barka	–	0.93**
Southern	–	1.04

* p<10%, ** p<5%, *** p<1%

To examine more closely whether more affected regions exhibit greater fertility response than less affected regions, we ran an interaction term between calendar year and region of residence (Table 8). The results show that fertility declined in all regions during the conflict period and there was little difference in the decline between the more affected (Gash Barka and Southern) and less affected regions. This is probably because the most affected groups, especially the displaced groups in the two regions, were excluded from the survey, as most of them were living in separate camps for internally displaced persons. It is also possible that the war was not associated with the fertility change in these regions. Research indicates that even if some military conflicts are reported to have resulted in short-term fertility changes, most are not associated with such changes. For instance, a study by Agadjanian and Ndola (2002) on Angolan fertility indicates that contrary to their expectations the capital Luanda, which had least direct experience of conflict during the civil war, had the strongest fertility response, while other regions more affected by the war had weak fertility response.

Table 8: Interaction effects of historical period and region of residence on fertility of higher-order births

	Region of residence					
Period	Southern Red Sea	Central	Northern Red Sea	Anseba	Gask Barka	Southern
Before 1990	1.07	1.18	1.08	0.98	1.03	0.75
1990–1992	1.24	1.30	1.43	1.20	1.03	1.01
1993–1995	1.17	1.26	1.45	1.27	1.23	1.07
1996–1998	1	1	1	1	1	1
1999–2001	0.66	0.79	0.91	0.79	0.73	0.70

Note: relative risks relative to the period 1996–98.

4. Discussion and Conclusion

Our major finding is that the substantial decline in fertility in Eritrea in the period since the mid-1990s was less the result of increased demand for family-size limitation and more the result of the border conflict. In other words, the conflict is the primary explanation for the observed fertility decline, particularly the decline among first births, mainly through delayed age at first marriage and spousal separa-

tion. This argument is supported by the finding that when these two variables and other socio-demographic factors were included in the model, the effect of historical period on fertility decreased in both magnitude and statistical significance, especially after 1999. In addition, the findings from the cross-tabulation analysis show a decline in adolescent childbearing from 23 percent in 1995 to 14 percent in 2002. However, the effect of historical period still remains strong and significant after controlling for other factors, suggesting that a substantial part of the period effect is explained by other factors that are not included in our analysis (changes in per capita income, health, nutrition, etc.). During war crises, motivation to reproduce declines due to deteriorating economic conditions or declining family income (Lesthaeghe 1989). Because of diminishing job opportunities during periods of war or economic crisis, potential parents delay the next birth or terminate childbearing (Boserup 1985). Palloni, Hill, and Pinto (1996) also contend that since health and nutritional status of pregnant mothers deteriorate during crisis periods, an immediate reduction in the number of births can be expected to fall still further. Psychological stress associated with decline in nutritional status or standard of living is also likely to reduce fecundity and frequency of intercourse.

Another way of expressing these results is to say that the decline in fertility did not come about primarily through an increase in contraception or satisfaction of unmet need for family planning. Contraception remained constant in Eritrea throughout the period 1995 to 2002. Moreover, reported fertility preferences, which are considered an important factor for fertility change, have changed little. The average desired family size remained the same (NSEO and ORC Macro 2003) and the proportion of women who reported that they want no more children is very low, only 17 percent, compared with 30–50 percent among women in other sub-Saharan African countries that have achieved sustained fertility decline (Westoff and Bankole 2002). In concrete terms, the decline in fertility was not preceded by changes in fertility intentions. Despite Eritrea's declining fertility, its unwanted fertility, and the proportion of women wanting no more children remained almost constant. This means that the level of unwanted fertility does not seem to predict the position Eritrea has in the course

of actual fertility transition. These findings challenge the hypothesis that fertility preference precedes actual fertility decline. Since the number of births can decrease due to war-induced effects without women desiring to have smaller families, it may not always be true that changes in fertility preferences will precede the decline in actual fertility. The uncertainty of peace may depress the desire for children.

Our findings from the analysis of higher order births show that the decline did not follow the onset of the conflict in 1998. Rather, the decline started in the period between 1996 and 1998, well before the outbreak of border conflict. Thus, the post-1998 decline may partly be an extension of a long-term decline that began before 1998 and might have continued even without the eruption of the border conflict. The finding that the decline occurred among older women (35 years or older) and at higher parities (four or higher), further corroborates the argument that the decline partly indicates the onset of a long-term fertility transition. Viewed from the sub-Saharan African perspective, Eritrea's fertility decline in terms of higher-order births and among older women that occurred before the conflict partly reflects the general trend of sub-Saharan Africa. The decline in sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by a concentration of declines at high parities and among older women who have achieved or exceeded their desired family size (van de Walle and Foster 1990). Similar relationships between fertility decline and higher-order births and older women were also observed in Latin American countries in the early 1960s (Rodriguez and Hobcraft 1980). One important exception in the Eritrean case is that the decline occurred without any evident reduction in desired family size; this may imply that the decline is mainly unintentional and war-induced. In particular, the rapid decline during the peak years of the border war (1999–2001), suggests that the conflict accelerated the fertility decline of higher-order births. In addition, the fall in first births is noticeable only after 1998, which indicates that the decline is mainly an outcome of the border conflict. The conflict thus cannot have been neutral in effect on the recent fertility decline in Eritrea.

It can be concluded that Eritrea, with its devastating experience of thirty years of war for liberation (1961–91) and the

1998–2000 border conflict, presents an extreme case of war-led changes in both socio-economic and demographic aspects. Even though Eritrea's war, the longest in sub-Saharan Africa, is distinctively disastrous, it still offers lessons for other African countries that are experiencing similar disruption or remain vulnerable to military conflict. The Eritrean case allowed us to investigate how demographic trends, notably fertility, can be altered or modified by military conflict. The inconsistencies of previous studies on the effect of war and associated economic crisis on fertility prompted the decision to disaggregate by first and higher-order births and to incorporate all the potential socio-demographic factors that are considered to affect fertility, even though the data did not allow us to conduct a more specific analysis of time-varying covariates and proximate determinants of fertility.

Even though this study addresses several important aspects and determinants of the recent changes in fertility in Eritrea, some questions could not be addressed due to the cross-sectional nature of the data. For instance, data limitation prevented further analysis of the effects of socio-economic status, both at individual level and macro-level in different areas of the country. Changes in such economic indicators may affect fertility differently in different periods. But even with these limitations our analysis proved sufficient to supply informative inferences. First, as expected, we found a lower probability of first birth during wartime, both during the peak years of the war of independence (before 1992) and during the border conflict (1999–2001) and a rebound in the periods of peace and political stability (1993–1998). Second, the decline in higher-order births started before the conflict, but accelerated during and after the conflict.

Finally, the cross-sectional analysis of fertility and its determinants does not enable any sound predictions of future trends in fertility to be made. In general, with the data used in this study, any attempt to extrapolate the differences discovered between the periods before and after the conflict would be highly speculative, especially because the political situation remains volatile and the 1998–2000 border conflict is still unresolved and further complicates the country's demographic situation. Studies suggest that war-

related short-term swings in fertility are easily detectable, but long-term effects of war- or crisis-induced distress are more complex to establish (Lindstrom and Berhanu 1999). Nevertheless, although we have no reason to think that the border conflict has caused lasting change in Eritrea's fertil-

ity, it is plausible to conclude that it has a clear short-term impact across different socio-economic segments of the population, particularly in terms of first-birth fertility, and that these variations are likely to mark the course of future demographic transition.

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