International Journal of Conflict and Violence

Vol. 7 (1) 2013

International Journal of Conflict and Violence – IJCV

The International Journal of Conflict and Violence (IJCV) is a peer-reviewed periodical for scientific exchange and public dissemination of the latest academic research on conflict and violence. It was included in the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) in March 2011. The subjects on which the IJCV concentrates have always been the subject of interest in many different areas of academic life. Consequently, the journal encompasses contributions from a wide range of disciplines including sociology, political science, education, social psychology, criminology, ethnology, history, political philosophy, urban studies, economics, and the study of religions. The IJCV is open-access: All text of the IJCV is subject to the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives License. The IJCV is published twice a year, in spring and in fall. Each issue will focus on one specific topic while also including articles on other issues.

Editorial

Letter from the Editors

Dear Reader,

This issue of the journal features a double focus for the first time. Opening with insights into processes of transitional justice (guest editors Susanne Buckley-Zistel and Thorsten Bonacker), it moves on to a variety of explorations in the field of prejudice using qualitative method approaches (guest edited by Felix Knappertsbusch, Björn Milbradt, and Udo Kelle). Our sincere thanks to both guest editing teams for the interesting and worthwhile focus sections they have assembled.

The two papers in the open section once again reflect the diversity of the field of conflict and violence: terrorist internet forums are the topic of the first article, while the second examines the classical sociological topic of youth violence.

The next issue, to appear in autumn 2013, will focus on intimate partner violence. Until then we invite you to visit our new early view section every once in a while to check on pre-releases.

June 2013

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Introduction: Transitions from Violence – Analyzing the Effects of Transitional Justice

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Introduction: Transitions from Violence – Analyzing the Effects of Transitional Justice

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Transitional justice refers to processes of dealing with the aftermath of violent conflicts and human rights abuses in order to provide for a peaceful future. It makes use of a number of instruments and mechanisms – including tribunals, truth commissions, memory work, and reparations – which aim at uncovering the truth about past crimes, putting past wrongs right, holding perpetrators accountable, vindicating the dignity of victim-survivors, and contributing to reconciliation. The objective of this focus section is to critically assess the potential of transitional justice, its achievements thus far, any conflicting goals, and the inherent or external obstacles that limit its influence and reach. Through empirical case studies from across the globe it paints a multi-faceted picture of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach.

Transitional justice refers to processes of dealing with the aftermath of violent conflicts and human rights abuses in order to provide for a peaceful future. It makes use of a number of different instruments and mechanisms, including national and international tribunals, truth commissions, memory work, reparations, and institutional reforms, which aim at uncovering the truth about past crimes, putting past wrongs right, holding perpetrators accountable, vindicating the dignity of victim-survivors, and contributing to reconciliation. In terms of its temporal focus, transitional justice is, at one and the same time, oriented towards the past, present, and future. As a past-oriented practice, transitional justice addresses wrongs committed during a conflict. As a present-oriented practice, it establishes a new ethical and institutional framework and, through this, seeks to prevent the future occurrence of gross injustices and violence. Over the past two decades, the concept of transitional justice has acquired a central place in international and domestic politics, as well as in political, sociological, and legal academic research.

Given that a number of transitional justice instruments have been in place since the mid-1980s, with a significant increase since the 1990s, it is now possible to expand academic analysis from the modalities of their operation to their effect on societies, politics, and beyond. With five to seven years or more having passed since the ending of some of the mechanisms, this focus section is concerned with the question if and how transitional justice mechanisms live up to the high expectations placed upon them by various agents including human rights groups, victims' associations, new governments, international organizations, and (international) donors. The call for papers invited contributions assessing the social, political, and legal effects of the following objectives of transitional justice: establishing the truth about the past, holding perpetrators accountable, vindicating the dignity of victims, improving community relations in divided societies, contributing to national reconciliation and nation-building, preventing future violence, and establishing the rule of law and supporting democratization.

Transitional justice processes have provoked a number of conceptual debates regarding their various (anticipated) effects. Most prominent is the debate about peace vs. justice which revolves around whether truth commissions and

tribunals contribute to establishing justice for the society, leading to stabilization and peace, or whether they have a destabilizing effect dividing the society even more deeply between victims and perpetrators (for that debate see Sriram and Pillay 2010). Another intense discussion centers around the question of the need for a global jurisdiction. Some proponents argue that institutions such as the International Criminal Court could be seen as an essential milestone in legalizing international relations as well as an expression of a civilizing process, while others doubt that this kind of limitation to state sovereignty can prevent the outbreak of future violence (for an overview see Bonacker, forthcoming). All these debates are full of implicit assumptions about the impact and consequences of transitional justice instruments, which merit closer attention.[1]

The objective of this focus section is therefore to critically assess the potential of transitional justice, its achievements thus far, any conflicting goals, and the inherent or external obstacles that limit its influence and reach. Through empirical case studies from across the globe we paint a multi-faceted picture of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach. Since research on transitional justice is spread across a broad range of disciplines including sociology, politics, law, history, anthropology, etc., we have assembled contributions that combine different approaches.

1. Assessing Effects

Initially, academic scholarship dedicated attention mainly to the various mechanisms and their workings and was, at least in the early phase, accompanied by great trust in their effects on transitional processes. It was firmly believed that truth commissions uncover the truth, that tribunals render justice, that reparations lead to social and economic repair, and that memorials contribute to a shared understanding of the past. These "articles of faith," as Michael Ingantieff (1996) aptly labeled them, went unchallenged, and remain so for some to this very day. This might be explained by the strong practical orientation of the field, where the desire prevails that something positive has to come out of these processes.

Meanwhile, the initial enthusiasm has ebbed and scholarship turned more sober. Over the past decade, numerous publications have challenged many aspects of the transitional justice concept and its application: Is it appropriate for the contexts in which it operates? Are its normative assumptions legitimate? Does it function in the ways initially intended? Are its outcomes non-ambiguous? How does it support transitional moments? How does it affect the communities and structures concerned?

However, the body of literature assessing the effects of transitional justice is still rather small. This might be a consequence of the enduring policy orientation of the field even though, as Neil J. Kritz recently pointed out, research can – and should – inform policy choices for drafting transitional justice programs. This, he argues, may include finding "ways of disaggregating the different contextual factors and different transitional justice components at play in any particular case" (Kritz 2009, 15) in order to better understand their effects. The lack of literature assessing the impact of transitional justice is somewhat surprising, since there is a small but growing group of authors who argue that transitional justice policy choices need to be evidence-based and that it is crucial that academia produce more insights about the impact and effects of transitional justice mechanisms (see for instance Pham and Vinck 2007; Clark 2011). One example is the question as to how different kinds of reparations affect the transitional process of a post-conflict or post-dictatorship society. Even though a number of analytical or normative approaches to reparations, as well as descriptive case studies, have recently been published by transitional justice scholars and practitioners (de Greiff 2006; Ferstman, Goetz, and Stephens 2009) there are very few empirical case studies dealing with the consequences of reparation mechanisms, including the different impacts of individual or collective reparations (or material or symbolic reparations) on victims' views, their mental health, or their openness to reconciliation processes (Rauchfuss and Schmolze 2008; Backer 2010; Pham, Vinck, and Stover 2009). And yet, for drafting a reparations program, systematic knowledge about those effects would be of great importance.

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1   For a discussion of different concepts of transitional justice see Buckley-Zistel et. al. 2013.

This focus section seeks answers to the very broad questions: *does transitional justice work?* Does it achieve its goals? Needless to say, this is a difficult task. Assessing effects on social change, modifications in attitudes and values, and the transformation of political or social structures are aspects social sciences – both quantitative and qualitative – have been grappling with for some time. In the context of transitional justice, too, separating "utopian dreams or practical possibilities" is certainly a challenge (Hamber, Sevenko, and Naidu 2010). This is further complicated by the fact that the results of transitional justice can be interpreted in different ways by different audiences, so that there is no direct path of cause and effect that can be followed. For "justice … will never be a singular outcome but is an ongoing relational process involving an exchange between people's 'ideals' and the structural 'realities' that limit action" (Dancy 2010, 55–356). Nevertheless, some efforts have been undertaken recently to develop methodologies and indicators to assess impact using empirical data (Van der Merwe, Baxter, and Chapman 2009; Duggan 2010) and by applying multivariate regression to measure the impact of transitional justice on the quality of democracy, human rights, and transitional justice (Olsen et al. 2010, 146).

In the following pages, our intention is however not to focus on causal relations of output and impact in a narrow sense. Instead, we are concerned with transitional justice's effects on a much wider and much more diverse level, including its impact, consequences, and influence, as well as with methodologies for its evaluation. The contributions thus discuss its effect on the politics of national elites (and *vice versa)*, on democratization, and on the construction of memories and grand narratives. In line with this, we are also interested in cases where the potential impact on a constituency is undermined, for instance where transitional justice institutions are based on concepts of little relevance for the people concerned. Moving beyond the mere assessment of simple correlations of cause and effect, our authors draw on rich empirical data and recent insights for their analysis of the effects of transitional justice.

2. Overview of the Issue

Based on extensive ethnographic field research, the first article by Friederike Mieth (2013) examines the impact of one of the key mechanisms of transitional justice: the tribunal. "Bringing Justice and Enforcing Peace? An Ethnographic Perspective on the Impact of the Special Court for Sierra Leone" explores the underlying assumptions that the court brings justice to those affected by the war and contributes to peace in Sierra Leone.

Mieth's findings are sobering. Regarding justice, she describes how most of her interviewees stated that the court did not bring justice to them. The first reason for this is that their understanding of justice differs from the retributive justice rendered by judicial mechanisms of punishment of offenders. A notion of justice defined in restorative terms seemed to be much more meaningful to her informants. Second, in the interviews Sierra Leoneans stated that the courts bore little relevance for their daily lives, again undermining its ability to lead to justice in their eyes. In the midst of poverty, the challenges of everyday existence, and the frequent experience of other injustices (such as corruption, but also in encounters with justice institutions), dealing with the war is not the first priority of many people interviewed. Interestingly, rather than trusting in a court to right past wrongs, Mieth describes how people place faith in metaphysical ideas of justice such as bad karma or judgment in the afterworld.

Regarding the second aspect, namely, whether the Special Court brings peace to Sierra Leone, Mieth notes certain positive effects, although not in the ways intended. Interviewees stated that it was not necessary to bring peace to the country – given that the country is at peace – but were glad that those who might ignite new feuds and throw the country into turmoil were behind bars as a result of the Special Court. Here, they felt it had a positive effect.

Mieth concludes that few Sierra Leoneans perceive the Special Court as a means to bring justice to the country. In order to have an impact on the people concerned, she contends, they must be involved in the very conception of transitional justice mechanisms, and not only in their execution. In the case of Sierra Leone, this might entail moving away from a punitive understanding of justice to a restorative one, as well as addressing social injustices more broadly than by a special court dealing only with those related to the war.

Eva Ottendörfer's contribution (2013) assesses the effects of transitional justice on prevailing political structures and nation-building. "Contesting International Norms of Transitional Justice: The Case of Timor Leste" applies a complementary approach to weigh up the success of the United Nations strategy of implementing transitional justice by following a so-called complementary approach. After the experience of countries where only tribunals where set up (such as Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia), the judicial process of dealing with the past in Timor Leste was complemented by a truth commission. Ottendörfer's critical analysis reveals that this approach, too, failed to have its desired impact since political leaders successfully sidelined the efforts, while forwarding their own understanding of the future of the country. To conceptionally frame her analysis, Ottendörfer couches it on recent contributions to the emergence and salience of norms and, like Mieth, draws on extensive field research to substantiate her argument.

Ottendörfer's objective is to assess the impact of externally induced transitional justice on the domestic, political level by exploring the responses of domestic actors to the mechanisms and their outputs. She argues that the UN has pursued a rather functionalist approach to transitional justice, assuming that it would have an effect on the rule of law and nation-building. Yet this was undermined by political leaders, both in government and opposition, who were successful in promoting their own version of nation-building based on the notion of a morally infeasible resistance and who undermined legal prosecution through acts of clemency and forgiveness. Moreover, the report of the truth commission was not discussed in parliament and its recommendations were ignored. Importantly, the author concludes, transitional justice is not simply a moment of imposing international, external norms onto a post-conflict society, but also a moment where domestic political leaders can promote their own interests and norms. When it comes to assessing the effects of transitional justice mechanisms, this implies that they have to be considered against the framework of the political and social circumstances in the post-violence country.

Both Mieth and Ottendörfer provide good illustrations of the limitations of the effects of transitional justice. From

Mieth's perspective, it is hampered by culturally different views and expectations about what is necessary and appropriate to deal with a violent past. In Sierra Leone, it seems that transitional justice is simply not the answer to the most pertinent questions. While this might also be the case in Timor Leste, Ottendörfer's insights into the political elites and their power to restrict the impact of courts and truth commissions are equally revealing, showing how transitional justice processes do not operate in a political vacuum but in the highly complex environment of renegotiation of the country's future.

While the first two contributions focus on the social and political effect of transitional justice – or the absence thereof – Chrisje Brants and Katrien Klep (2013) take a slightly different approach by opening up the black box of tribunals and truth commission. In "Transitional Justice: History-Telling, Collective Memory and the Victim-Witness" they discuss the effects of witness accounts, testimonies, and statements given to international courts and truth commissions on the construction of collective memories about past human rights abuses. While these transitional justice mechanisms are generally considered to contribute to uncovering facts and punishing perpetrators, the authors contend that their processes also have a strong impact on the ways the past is narrated. Although many competing truths emerge from the hearings and consultations of tribunals and truth commissions, the authors argue, they tend to produce one coherent version of the past whose fixation in verdicts and reports renders it authoritative and thus hegemonic.

Brants and Klep focus particularly on the role of victim-witnesses in this process, since their recollections enunciated to courts and commissions function as a crucial source for history and collective memory. Victims can shape narratives because they have become the central figures of transitional justice processes, with their accounts of past injustices being key sources for piecing together an overall account of the crimes. While the authors consider this to be a positive development from a moral perspective, they caution that there may also be drawbacks. For Brants and Klep, victims can serve as key sources of information only if they are imbued with the specific subject position of

survivor, which is inevitably associated with suffering and pain.

Turning to the general victim orientation of transitional justice since the 1990s (Bonacker and Safferling 2013), Brants and Klep show how the victim-centered paradigm, under which victims become the main narrators of past events, grants their suffering an influential role in the way the past is narrated. Concerning the construction of collective memory, as one outcome of these processes, they argue that the disproportionate representation of victims' accounts might lead to a distortion of the factual truth of human rights abuses. While they contend that this holds true for both mechanisms – international tribunals and truth commissions – they point out that an important dif-

ference remains: in a tribunal the truth is established in the fixed form of a verdict, which allows no room for dissent, while a truth commission establishes a version of the truth that is always open to contestation and renegotiation, if not in the course of the commission's work itself then in other more general arenas in the post-violence society.

The articles in this focus section reveal that initial efforts to assess the effect of transitional justice are under way, but also that much remains to be done. We understand it as a small contribution to ongoing scholarship on these questions. In addition to providing more comparative studies there is a need to develop and refine methodologies, both qualitative and quantitative, for studying the effects of transitional justice in more detail.

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Bringing Justice and Enforcing Peace? An Ethnographic Perspective on the Impact of the Special Court for Sierra Leone

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Vol. 7 (1) 2013

Bringing Justice and Enforcing Peace? An Ethnographic Perspective on the Impact of the Special Court for Sierra Leone

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The Special Court for Sierra Leone was set up in 2002 to try those who bear the greatest responsibility for actrocities perpetrated during a decade-long civil war in the country. This would, according to Court officials and observers, bring justice to the victims of the war and contribute to peace. Based on eight months of ethnographic fieldwork in Sierra Leone between 2010 and 2012, this article challenges those assumptions by exploring the viewpoint of ordinary Sierra Leoneans. The impact of the Special Court on the lives of ordinary people is rather small, first and foremost because they have a different understanding of what justice constitutes and who is able to provide it. This resulted in low expectations of the Court from the beginning. Moreover, the relevance of transitional justice fades in the context of daily challenges and remaining injustices. While the Special Court is viewed more positively as contributing to the peace, transitional justice institutions should engage more critically with the local context they operate in.

This article explores the impact of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (hereafter "Special Court" or "Court") on the lives of ordinary Sierra Leoneans. Two common assumptions are scrutinized: that by holding perpetrators accountable the Special Court brings justice to the victims of the war, and that the Court contributes to lasting peace. Using data gathered during eight months of ethnographic fieldwork conducted from October 2010 to April 2012, I describe Sierra Leoneans' perceptions of the Special Court and their ideas about justice, accountability, and peace.

The article fills a gap in the existing literature about the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Firstly, the majority of the literature available on the Special Court is of a legal nature and thus concentrates on the legal impact of the institution. In this context, some of the Court's "firsts" are discussed: The Court was the first hybrid war crimes tribunal that sought to combine international and national law. It

was also the first time the recruitment of child soldiers and gender based crimes such as sexual slavery were considered as crimes against humanity. Discussion of these legal features often characterizes analysis of the impact of the Special Court on international law (Lamin 2003; Smith 2004; Tejan-Cole 2009).

Secondly, while a number of academic publications and practical reports address the impact of the Special Court, the majority of these analyze the impact of the Court from an external, top down, or again overly legalistic angle, hence using the same (Western) parameters from which the Court originated. Many scholars scrutinize the proceedings, as well as the selections of cases, fairness of trials, witness protection and security issues, transparency of the process, and outreach activities of the Court (Arzt 2006; Perriello and Wierda 2006; Staggs 2006; Jalloh 2011; Lincoln 2011). For example, Donna E. Arzt examines the local perception of

the Special Court but does so only within pre-set categories such as legitimacy or impartiality (2006). Other studies use survey data focusing more on knowledge about the Court and the effectiveness of the Court's outreach program in informing Sierra Leoneans about its work and principles (Sawyer and Kelsall 2007; Kerr and Lincoln 2008).

The impact of the Special Court on people's lives, however, has received little attention so far. While anthropologists Rosalind Shaw and Michael Jackson do not specifically look at a possible impact of the Special Court, their work hints that such a tribunal might not have the same meaning locally as is ascribed to it internationally. Jackson's observations of 2002 – while the Court was being established – reveal that many of the Sierra Leoneans he spoke to did not seem to be looking for justice and instead wanted to move on (2004). Similarly, Shaw argues that healing and social recovery after the war took place through what she called "social forgetting," which allowed Sierra Leoneans to move on with their lives (2005, 9). In a later contribution, Shaw explores the meaning of the discourse of forgiveness after the war in northern Sierra Leone and finds that people's ideas of what constitutes justice differ from the concept of justice used by transitional justice institutions such as the Special Court (Shaw 2010). Such data raises rather fundamental questions regarding the idea of a war crimes tribunal, which I will take as a starting point.

The findings presented in this article are the result of an eight-month ethnographic study about dealing with the past in Sierra Leone. Combining many different data-gathering techniques, such as participant observation, interviews, informal conversations, observations, group discussions, literature study, and interviews with professionals, ethnographers seek deeper insights into how people view a situation in their own terms. In order to gain a better understanding of how people lived their lives, I stayed in different research locations for longer periods of time. These stays not only gave me an idea of how people talk and think about their experiences of dealing with the

past and their view of the institutions involved, but more importantly how issues of dealing with the past are situated in the context of "normal" life. This makes ethnography a particularly suitable method for examining the perception of the Special Court in Sierra Leone and its impact on people's lives.

While in Sierra Leone I conducted research mainly in three locations: First, in Madina, a small village near Makeni in northern Sierra Leone where I stayed, together with a research assistant, for a month and a half. Second, in Tombodu, a larger village near Koidu in eastern Sierra Leone. While staying with a family in Koidu I went to Tombodu on day trips several times a week over a period of five weeks. In Koidu and Tombodu, I also enlisted the help of a research assistant. Third, I conducted research in the capital Freetown, where I stayed in several homes in the western and eastern districts of the city for about six months. I mostly used local transport throughout the country and in all locations I stayed in private homes; either they were assigned to me by the village chief or I was able to find accommodation with people or families I already knew. Throughout the research I avoided association with any formal organization.[1]

In order to learn about how people view their situation and how they perceive institutions like the Special Court, I had numerous informal conversations and conducted some forty-four more formal interviews in all of the above locations. The majority of the people I spoke to were "ordinary" Sierra Leoneans, mostly farmers in the rural locations. The respondents were not selected according to specific criteria, as in the rural research locations my assistants and I often approached people with whom we had already established a relationship. Nonetheless, the interviewees cover all age ranges and men and women are equally represented. In Freetown, I drew on a similarly diverse network of people with whom I regularly interacted: (former) college students, owners of small businesses, persons with occasional employment, housewives,

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1 Still, because of my mere appearance as a young white female, it is possible that people in some of the locations I visited less frequently may have assumed that I was a representative or "scout" for a particular program or an NGO employee. Hence I had to accept that some of the information I was given would have been influenced by such considerations.

but also unemployed individuals living in the slums areas. I also took part in family and neighbourhood activities. In addition to this, I interviewed fourteen professionals with whom I discussed specific aspects. Conversations in the rural areas were often held in local languages (with research assistants acting as interpreters), as well as in Krio, an English-based creole language spoken widely in Sierra Leone. Most of the conversations in Freetown and with professionals were held in Krio or English.

This article examines the Special Court from the perspective of Sierra Leoneans. I will therefore refrain from more theoretical discussions of concepts like justice and accountability, which are frequently used by the Special Court, in order to concentrate on how Sierra Leoneans understand these issues. While I also sporadically use the categories of "victims" and "perpetrators," I want to stress that in Sierra Leone, as in many other post-conflict situations, these are rather problematic terms because they mask the complexity of the post-war situation where people cannot easily be categorized into such clear-cut groups.

1. Background to the War and the Special Court for Sierra Leone

The civil war in Sierra Leone was not primarily a religious, ethnic, or politically motivated war.[2] When a revolutionary movement entered from Liberia in 1991 and started to attack villages in the eastern parts of the country it was at first not taken seriously by many in the rest of the country. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) sought to overthrow the government, but soon lost credibility because of attacks on innocent civilians. The government sent a largely under-equipped army to fight the rebellion, and eventually army forces took to looting and killing as well. (Richards 1996; Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2004; Keen 2005).

After pressure from civil society elections were held in 1996, and later a peace agreement was signed between the government and the rebels. However, fighting soon

re-erupted. Vigilante groups that had previously formed mainly in the southern part of the country were formalized into the Civil Defense Force (CDF) under the defense ministry, as the army was no longer trusted. CDF fighters – coming from the same background as military recruits and rebels – perpetrated similar atrocities on civilians, though on a smaller scale. From 1997 to 1998 a rogue section of the army (as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, AFRC) and rebels joined forces and ousted the elected President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who fled to Guinea. After West African peacekeepers reinstated the government, rebels and AFRC regrouped and launched a major attack on Freetown on January 6, 1999. This event heightened international awareness, which eventually led to renewed peace negotiations and the signing of the Lomé Peace accord in July 1999. Finally, when rebels and other splinter groups again violated the peace accord, the UN intervened with a full mission and British forces were deployed. The UN ran a demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration program, and in 2002 President Kabbah officially declared the war over (Keen 2005). Sierra Leone has since been peaceful, with three democratic elections held since the end of the war, in 2002, 2007, and November 2012. The most recent elections were the first the country organized on its own and were largely heralded as free and fair (BBC 2012).

The lack of clear fronts and ideologies was a characteristic feature of this war, which almost make it resemble a riot that had taken on a life of its own. During the research, people often told me that the war had "no head and no tail," meaning that it lacked any sense. For civilians it was difficult to distinguish between different fighting factions, or between combatants and non-combatants. All armed groups forcibly recruited (though the RUF was the most brutal in this respect), which further blurred the distinction between perpetrators and victims (Abdullah 2004; Keen 2005).

The effects of the war on the population were so grave that almost everybody was affected. Of roughly four million

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2   For in-depth analyses of the war see Abdullah (2004), Keen (2005), Richards (1996), as well as the final report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2004).

inhabitants of Sierra Leone at the time (UNDP 2011), one to two million were reported internally displaced, and half a million fled to neighboring countries. More than 50,000 were killed. The most brutal atrocities included amputations, which were perpetrated mostly by rebel groups but also by other armed groups. About six hundred amputees survived the war, though it is estimated that more than four times as many amputations were performed during the war (Lord 2000; see also Ibrahim and Shepler 2011).

The Special Court for Sierra Leone was established jointly by the UN and the government of Sierra Leone in 2002 in response to a request by President Kabbah. The mandate of the Court was to "prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996" (Special Court for Sierra Leone 2002b). The Special Court indicted thirteen persons of whom eight are now serving prison sentences in Rwanda; the trial of Charles Taylor, former president of Liberia, is currently in the appeals phase after a verdict was announced on 26 April 2012 and sentence passed in May. Three trials were held in Freetown, covering the three main fighting factions during the war: RUF, CDF, and AFRC. The trial of Charles Taylor is being held in The Hague, Netherlands (Special Court for Sierra Leone 2011).

One particular detail about the Special Court for Sierra Leone was that the men who were eventually sentenced were relatively unknown. On the one hand this is due to the type of war that took place in Sierra Leone, where the rather loosely organized nature of the fighting factions meant that some of the individuals indicted by the Court, though high in the chain of command, were relatively unknown to the population. Some respondents told me that they trusted the Special Court to have found the right persons: "Yes, they said they are responsible for the war," an older man told me in Tombodu:

> What do you want me to say? We didn't see them [during the war]. They said they were responsible, so are they not the ones that brought the war? Is that not so? What we were praying for was that the war wouldn't come again. That is all we were praying for.

> (Tombodu, January 2011)

However, this also hints at the possibility that people felt less personally involved from the beginning. On the other hand, and possibly unfortunately for the Court, four well-known indicted commanders were never tried: Foday Sankoh, the leader of the RUF rebels, and Samuel Hinga Norman, former deputy defense minister and as such head of the CDF, both died in custody. Another well-known RUF leader, Sam Bockarie, was killed in Liberia, and Johnny Paul Koroma, the leader of the AFRC junta, was never arrested. Charles Taylor, though well known to many Sierra Leoneans, was the president of a neighboring country at the time of the war and had never entered Sierra Leone himself. His connection to the RUF was, from an ordinary Sierra Leonean perspective, rather abstract and based on hearsay.

2. Does Accountability Lead to Justice?

While its statutes do not state explicitly that justice will be sought for Sierra Leoneans, Special Court officials and observers often assume that holding perpetrators accountable will bring justice to those affected by the war. As an example, when the RUF case was closed acting prosecutor Joseph Kamara said:

> With the end of this trial, there is now a final recognition of their crimes. And there is a strong measure of justice and accountability for their victims – the families of those who were slaughtered, the women who were raped, the children forced to fight and kill, the many thousands who were mutilated and terrorized.

> (cited in Special Court for Sierra Leone 2009a)

At a UN Security Council briefing in July 2009, prosecutor Stephen Rapp asked for further support for the Special Court to fulfil its mandate "so that justice can be achieved for the victims of those crimes" (Special Court for Sierra Leone 2009b). Such language is mirrored by donors and observers. During a UN Security Council meeting in 2007, the US representative suggested that the work of the Special Court brings "a sense of justice to the innocent victims of the terrible crimes and atrocities that were perpetrated in Sierra Leone" (Ms. Wolcott Sanders, cited in UN Security Council 2007). This was also reiterated by international human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch:

Accountability for serious human rights crimes, like those com-
mitted during Sierra Leone's war, is essential for several reasons:
to bring justice to the victims, to punish the perpetrators, and to
lay the foundation for building respect for the rule of law in
post-conflict societies.

(Human Rights Watch 2004, 1)

The message to the Sierra Leonean people is illustrated
quite simply by the poster shown in Figure 1. Here, justice is
clearly depicted as something that will eventually be
achieved for all Sierra Leoneans. This rhetoric is still used
by Special Court officials, with the registrar of the Court,
Binta Mansaray, stating in a 2012 interview that the institu-
tion was primarily "in the name of those who suffered"
(cited in International Center for Transitional Justice 2012).

Figure 1: Poster for the Special Court Outreach Program

Photographed by the author at a small memorial site in Tombodu, Kono district. Below the picture it
says: "Together the Special Court and the people of Sierra Leone will move towards peace and justice."

What is lacking in these statements is an explanation of
how bringing perpetrators to justice will transform into
justice for victims or, more generally, the people of Sierra
Leone. In fact, ten years after the conflict and about three
years after the Freetown trials concluded (with the RUF
trial ending in 2009) the impact of the Special Court on the
lives of Sierra Leoneans has rarely been discussed.

In contrast to the claims by Court officials, many Sierra
Leoneans I spoke to described the work of the Court as
irrelevant for them and stated that it has not brought jus-
tice to them. Their reasons can be loosely grouped into two
categories: that their concept of justice differed from that
of the Court, and that their everyday circumstances made
the work of the Court less relevant for them.

Firstly, the kind of justice the Court was designed to deliver
is based on an idea of retributive justice that stems from
Europe and North America and differs in its approach
from what the majority of my respondents would describe
as justice. Most local and informal justice systems in Sierra
Leone are similar to ideas of restorative justice, according
to which victims should be compensated for their losses
(Alie 2008, 136). Retributive justice, which is common in
many Western societies, focuses on punishing perpetrators.
In the light of this it is no surprise that many respondents
did not perceive the work of the Court as achieving justice
for *them*, because they would have expected "justice" to
reach them in a tangible way. Rather, the work of the Court
was perceived as abstract and distant. I sometimes asked
directly how it made a person feel to know that some of the
top commanders were now in prison, and quite often the
answer was "I feel nothing." Some respondents explained
why the Special Court did not have any relevance in their
lives:

This Special Court does not do anything for me and my own
life. They could leave [the ex-combatants], they could kill them.
What does it matter to me, it doesn't do anything for me. […] It
is their own law that they pass, isn't it? [The ex-combatants] did
bad, so they make them suffer the penalty. But they have already
done the bad things, so what does that have to do with me?
They don't come and give me money.

(woman in her late thirties, Bendu 2, Tombodu, February 2011)

> The Special Court, they arrest the person because it's the law, that's what the law says. But if it's just us […] It's better they just leave them like that. Because even if they kill him, or he dies in prison, nothing will happen to me. Or, maybe […] all my family has gone, it is only me that is left over, you think that if a man, by his life alone going [to the Court], is what … it is stupidity!
>
> (man in his twenties, Koidu, February 2011)

Throughout my fieldwork I was told that justice was rendered by restoring things to how they were before. For instance, when discussing a recent reconciliation program, a woman in Tombodu told me that "they didn't give me anything to make me forget" (Tombodu, Jan. 2011). When I asked what she meant, she explained that if somebody wants people to feel better about what happened, they should "make them as they were before." For example, if they were traders before the war they should be given money to resume this occupation, she continued: "having that money in your hand, you will forget about what has happened" (woman in her forties, January 2011).

There were other voices of course. A woman in Madina said that she was content with the Court's work: "I am happy about it because I want them to taste the bitterness that we faced during the war. They were supporting this. We experienced the hard life in the bush" (woman in her late forties, Madina, December 2010). However, she was in a minority in supporting the idea of such a "detached" punishment. With their notions of justice as a restorative action, it was difficult for the majority of Sierra Leoneans I talked with to understand how the work of the Special Court was to bring them justice if it did not have any direct influence on their situation.

Secondly, when assessing the impact of the Special Court on people's everyday lives it is crucial to place the institution in its broader context and consider, for example, that with the mandate of the Special Court limited to trying those who bore the "greatest responsibility" for the war crimes, the majority of those who committed crimes during the civil war were amnestied. This is one reason people often gave for their feeling that it was difficult to relate to the Court's rhetoric: They were confronted with the challenge of living together with perpetrators on an everyday

basis. Therefore, while the Court could speak of holding perpetrators accountable, in "real life" the majority of Sierra Leoneans had to find strategies to live with perpetrators – sometimes with the very ex-combatants who had killed their own family members.

Moreover, many of the people I talked to were struggling to secure their livelihood, and consequently lacked interest in the work of the Court. In a country where access to very basic services like electricity, clean water, or health care is problematic (even in the capital), overall interest in the work of the Special Court was understandably low. The condition of structural inequality in Sierra Leone has of course already been raised many times, but from the perspective of the individual it remains critical. I found it striking to hear a man who testified as a witness before the Special Court explain that inside the Court, "it's Europe." Rather than reporting about the proceedings, he told his listeners about the lights, the computers, the white people, and the air conditioning.

Poverty is not the only reason for the lack of interest in the core work of the Court. In Freetown, I observed that the Special Court was very rarely a topic of conversation, not even when Charles Taylor's verdict was announced. Many people told me it simply had no relevance for them because they were caught up in other activities. A friend who was involved in a business told me that if I really wanted to talk about the war I should go to the rural areas, where people have the time to sit down "all day." If I planned to talk to him, he warned me, he might "have to get up in the middle of the interview to do business" (man in his late thirties, Freetown, March 2012).

What I find more pertinent in this context, however, is that people could not relate to the messages of the Court because they continued to experience injustice in everyday life, even if not war-related. People in Freetown mostly spoke about high-level corruption, which regularly makes headlines. Similarly, in a village near Tombodu people suspected that they were being denied development assistance by corrupt authorities. Trust in the police and the formal justice system is low, partly due to their being perceived as unfair. While I was in Koidu there was a small riot at a

school and an acquaintance complained that two pupils had been arrested at random. "In any other country," he said, "they would pick [the boys] up from the street, but then they would start investigating the issue and interrogate the boys. But here they just imprison them and take them to court." (man in his forties, Koidu, February 2011).

Mistrust in institutions is so strong that people often refrain altogether from turning to the police or courts. In a conversation with the founding director of a Sierra Leonean NGO that strives to improve access to legal assistance in the country, I was told:

> People do not have faith in the justice system, and when they don't, they don't even bother to go there. So if they cannot get a solution using their customary system, they will just let it go. And they will not report a crime to the police, for example, because the next thing the police will do will be to arrest them and [take] them to court. You have many of those stories. … We have one now from a man … in Makeni, he saw a corpse in an unfinished house and he reported that to the police. Yes, he reported that to the police, and he was arrested as [a suspect]. And he was in prison for twenty-three months without any trial, we only got bail for him in December.

(S. Koroma, TIMAP for Justice, March 2012)

One is inclined to ask if the Special Court could not have made a contribution to improving the national justice system in Sierra Leone, as this was actually one of the main reasons why it was designed as a hybrid institution. UN Security Council Resolution 1315 states that international cooperation could "assist in strengthening the judicial system of Sierra Leone" (UN Security Council 2000). Similarly, Human Rights Watch hoped that the Court would make a positive contribution to the restoration of the rule of law and Sierra Leoneans' attitude towards the judicial system:

> It is hoped that the Special Court will contribute to revitalizing Sierra Leoneans' belief in the rule of law – that, in the face of future crimes, they will turn to the judicial system for recourse instead of either seeking revenge or fatalistically accepting what happened as "the way it is." This is necessary to meaningfully combat the culture of impunity that has prevailed in Sierra Leone, to build respect for the rule of law, and to bring a sense of justice for the horrific crimes committed.

(Human Rights Watch 2004, 32)

While it would be beyond the scope of this article to examine the Court's impact on the legal system in Sierra Leone in detail, it is debatable whether the majority of Sierra Leoneans will feel the effects of any possible improvements. Legacy activities of the Special Court are – by design – focused only on the formal judicial system, whose reach and capacity are seriously limited (Bangura 2005; Maru 2005). As in many African countries, the legal landscape in Sierra Leone is characterized by legal dualism, where formal courts coexist and sometimes overlap with customary law administered by chiefs or other local authorities. The formal justice system is limited almost exclusively to the capital, with ten of the eleven high court judges based in Freetown. Hence for the majority of Sierra Leoneans customary law has more relevance, but it is often administered in a similarly unfair manner (Maru 2005, 20). Thus, even if the formal judicial system had benefited from the presence of the Special Court, little of this effect would have been felt by ordinary Sierra Leoneans, as the problem of injustice in the customary institutions would remain untouched.

The same can be said for the Court's outreach activities such as town hall meetings and school visits, teaching the principles of human rights, international law, and the rule of law in general. Despite the many obstacles the program faced it has been praised for its achievements (Kerr and Lincoln 2008). However, while educating citizens in matters of human rights is important, it does little to change the fact that Sierra Leone's justice system has effectively been crippled since long before the war and that injustices prevail in both official and customary justice practices (Bangura 2005; Fanthorpe 2006).

Should the conclusion of this discussion then be that Sierra Leoneans simply accept injustice, especially that of the recent war? Faced with structural injustices that seem impossible to rectify, and the fact that most "perpetrators" are free, would it not be understandable if people have simply become fatalistic, as suggested in the Human Rights Watch Report cited above? The answers to these questions lie outside the realm of transitional justice institutions.

One idea almost everybody I met during the research agreed on was that there will be some kind of judgement

for a person's actions, even if it will not happen in "this world", i.e. in one's own lifespan. People said that they "leave the judgement to God" or that a perpetrator will "meet his people." Similarly, Jackson's research assistant explained why people so often say they have already forgiven perpetrators: "[it] doesn't mean that justice will not be done … most of us here feel that God sees everything and that God will mete out punishment in his own good time" (Jackson 2004, 68). And indeed, in many of my own conversations I noted that people seemed to have already accepted what happened to them and society as a whole, some of course more readily than others:

> We don't have problems with them [ex-combatants], actually. Because those things already happened. There is no other way. If I get money, I will be able to live fine with my family, is it not so? This we think of, nothing else. … The only thing is, they will get the judgement between them and God. Anything we humans do, we get the reward. You do good, the reward will be good. You do bad, the reward is bad. We don't last here. Today, tomorrow, we are going. We are going to die, everybody is going to die! Is it not so? It's only God who has his own judgement.

> (woman in her late 30s, Tombodu, January 2011)

Shaw similarly grappled with generalizations about the "fatalistic" attitude of Sierra Leoneans made by international observers. She finds that rather than representing passiveness and fatalism, Sierra Leoneans' calls to forgive and their idea of God's justice can be understood as alternative ways of articulating justice. These more performative actions may also symbolize the closure of cycles of revenge (2010, 223).

Another related idea is the concept of *hake*, which is a Krio expression that is also used by speakers of other local languages, and often occurs in this context (Shaw 2010, 223; Jackson 2004, 68). If a person has *hake* from somebody else, it means that he or she has wronged another person and this will be reflected in something happening to him or her later, as if in exchange. A simple example would be if two men have a business idea and one of them secretly goes ahead and sets up the business by himself, and then it fails, it is the other man's *hake* following him. Some people used this concept to claim that former combatants are actually in a worse position than civilians now, not only as a result of their lack of education and use of drugs during the war,

but also because of the civilians' *hake*. One of my neighbors in Freetown explained:

> People say, now, the rebels, they're going mad, they're beggars on the streets, they're dying, you know, they're sick and whatever, they're poor: they say *na Salone pipul im hake* (the Sierra Leonean people's *hake*). It's the bad things, [like a] bad omen, the Nigerians call it bad omen, it's the bad things they've done to people. That's what's following them.

> (woman in her twenties, Freetown, March 2012)

It is interesting to note that the concept of *hake* is not direct; it follows the wrongdoer like a portent, but is not something that is done to him or her directly in response to the wrongdoing. In that respect, *hake* differs from (the wish for) revenge. As with leaving judgement to God, this idea draws attention to the process of moving on rather than focusing on the punishment of the other. "Leave them. Let them deal with the *hake*" one man said during a group discussion in Tombodu, when some of the other men voiced their anger about a popular ex-combatant (man in his fifties, Tombodu, March 2011)

Coming back to the Special Court, it is worth recapitulating that in terms of bringing justice it has had a rather negligible effect on the lives of ordinary Sierra Leoneans. On the one hand, the kind of justice the Court pursued, retributive and limited to the legal sphere, did not coincide with local ideas of justice where, if at all, restorative actions would have been expected. On the other hand, the Court operated in a context where the majority of the perpetrators had to be accepted into society, which required people to find strategies of coexistence. Coupled with ongoing injustices in the formal and customary legal systems, as well as the general hardship many people experience, the abstract notion of justice "brought" by the Special Court was often described as meaningless by ordinary people.

However, this does not mean that the institution as such was regarded as meaningless. As I will describe below, the notion of accountability did resonate with Sierra Leoneans, if not for the sake of justice, then for ending the war. Several of the people who knew about the Court attributed it with a positive influence on the peace process.

3. Peace Without Justice

The Court's outreach material states that its work is a step towards bringing peace to Sierra Leone, as explained in a pamphlet entitled "What is the Special Court?":[3]

> The Special Court started because Sierra Leoneans asked the world to help them try those people who are alleged to bear the greatest responsibility for crimes that occurred during the recent war. The international community answered that call because they believed that only by holding people accountable will Sierra Leone truly know lasting peace.
>
> (Special Court for Sierra Leone Outreach Section 2003, 4)

Similarly, in 2002 prosecutor David Crane told during a public meeting in Freetown that "the [Truth and Reconciliation Commission] and the Special Court are two key pillars to stabilize the peace in Sierra Leone" (Special Court for Sierra Leone 2002). Similar language is used when the UN and the Court's donors are addressed:

> As President of the Special Court and as a Sierra Leonean, I hold the firm belief that the establishment of the Court represents a major contribution to long-term peace and security in Sierra Leone and the subregion.
>
> (Justice King, cited in UN Security Council 2007)

As mentioned above, it is not explained exactly how the work of the Court will translate into a contribution to peace. Nevertheless, one positive observation from my fieldwork is that there is indeed widespread agreement that there is peace today. On the question of the Court's contribution to peace, answers were much more mixed, which can partly be explained with a lack of knowledge about the specific mandate of the Court.

Of those who were fairly well-informed about the Court, many regarded its role of helping to imprison the leaders of the armed groups as positive. Interestingly, the emphasis here was primarily on imprisonment and less on holding these leaders accountable for their actions. Many believed that the detention of those most responsible prevented them from prolonging the war and enabled or forced the

rank and file combatants to stop fighting, which some considered to be a crucial step in the peace process. Here, people often described the role of the Special Court as holding these big men in a *tight place* (prison). For example, a young man from Madina explained:

> The Special Court program, I don't understand it much. The only help is the one that I told you of, where we heard that the Special Court arrested the big big men, the[n] we got cold hearts in this country. And the peace that we have is the one that I understand.
>
> (man in his twenties, Madina, December 2010)

Thus, the prime reason why most people approved of the arrest of the "big men" was not that they would receive punishment for their actions but that they were now "under control," removed from society, and this made peace possible. "We want the big big ones […] to be in a tight place first," a woman in Madina told me, "because we don't know what they have planned next. If the white people can talk to them, well it is nice, for us, it's only the peace we want" (December 2010). This point was underlined when I realized that many were not interested in what happened to these "big men" after their arrest. While a young woman, interviewed in Waterloo,[4] blamed RUF leader Foday Sankoh for starting the war, she was not even aware that he had passed away in the meantime. In her view, he would be judged anyway; after being told that his death had been natural, she mumbled: "Oh Sankoh. You will meet with God." (woman in her thirties, Waterloo, November 2010)

Others clearly mentioned that the Court had a deterrent function and that it was part of the establishment of the rule of law after the war. In Koidu, a young man explained that not even a strong commander would now be immune:

> I say the Special Court is fine, because that will give cause for the war to stop. [Or] for any other plan back again. Even if it is [popular rebel commander] who did bad, that no one [would have] arrest[ed], now people will say stop, because the law will

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3 "Wetin na di Speshal Kot" (Special Court for Sierra Leone 2004). Despite its Krio title, the booklet's language is English.

4 A former refugee camp nearby Freetown where many of the war-displaced settled.

arrest him. If they would not have done that, people would not have stopped to do bad.

(man in his early thirties, Koidu, February 2011)

A woman in Waterloo told us that whilst the war had already "spoiled" their lives, the arrest of the leaders still has a deterrent effect: "Those ones, they are in prison. What they have done, they have already done it. It's just a formality. But if other people are having intentions, with this same badness, they will be afraid" (woman in her fifties, Waterloo, November 2010).

That said, the main reasons why Sierra Leoneans experience peace today are only marginally related to the work of the Court. On the one hand, there is no (political) continuation of the war ideology. After large-scale disarmament by the UN mission, which is believed to have disarmed the great majority of (armed) combatants, no hostilities have broken out between the former fighting factions. Moreover, since the armed groups were not ideologically motivated, the war as such has not been politicized on a large scale (International Crisis Group 2008). This distinguishes the context of the Special Court from other international war crimes tribunals like the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, which operate in highly politicized surroundings.

On the other hand, peace was established in everyday life. People's experience of more than ten years of peaceful coexistence contributes greatly to their feeling that peace will hold. At the signing of the 1999 peace accord President Kabbah asked Sierra Leoneans to "forgive and forget," and this has become a widely adopted discourse (Shaw 2010). While people in harder-hit areas such as Tombodu expressed their difficulties with the situation, they still argued that their decision to allow ex-combatants to live among them is one of the main reasons the peace holds. Even in the bigger cities, to which the majority of the ex-combatants (as well as young people in general) have moved, civilians and ex-combatants interact peacefully in many ways (Peters 2007). In the neighborhood where I stayed in Freetown, for example, CDF fighters who were deployed there during the war decided to stay and have been accepted by the residents.

3. Conclusions

For many Sierra Leoneans, the Special Court is not perceived as having delivered justice to those affected by the war. So far, in academic discourse, the many reports about the Court's legalistic procedures seem to ignore the fact that many Sierra Leoneans talk about justice as something that should affect them directly – for example in the form of efforts to restore their livelihoods. At the same time, Sierra Leoneans' perception of their own judicial system is characterized by mistrust which is partly the result of its unfairness. This also has to be seen in the context of structural inequality that many experience in their everyday lives; "justice" would include the removal of these inequalities. Knowing this, many Sierra Leoneans never expected the Special Court to provide "justice" for them in the first place, since what it could offer would have little relevance for them. V. S. Naipaul wrote that "You couldn't listen to sweet songs about injustice unless you expected justice and received it much of the time" (1979, 149), holding a mirror to the (Western) reader: in many societies justice is not normality and cannot simply be *done.* Theories of justice that are independent of the functioning of legal systems, such as the widespread belief in God's judgement I found in Sierra Leone, may serve as a way of making sense of injustice.

Transitional justice practitioners should therefore critically assess what they constitute as "justice." As Rama Mani argued, "peace-builders" have difficulties acknowledging the complexities of post-conflict societies where conceptions of injustice often include structural inequalities experienced in pre- and postwar contexts. By focusing on retributive justice alone institutions such as the Special Court thus leave other injustices untouched: "if ideas and institutions about as fundamental and personal a value as justice are imposed from outside without internal resonance, they may flounder, notwithstanding their assertion of universality" (Mani 2002, 49). As Lundy and McGovern (2008) argue, in order to make transitional justice institutions more meaningful to the people they are supposed to serve, the participatory process should start from the very conception of these institutions. Simply involving people in the implementation phase, as the Special Court did through its outreach work, is not enough. Moreover, the

Sierra Leonean case demonstrates that a discussion about possible alternatives to the Special Court might have proven insightful as well.

On the other hand, the perception of the Court's impact on enforcing peace can be seen in a more positive light. People approved of the Court because it was perceived as part of the (international) institutions that ended the war. The detention of leaders of the fighting factions, preventing them from inciting another round of violence, is popularly understood as the main accomplishment of the Court. In the eyes of many, though, accountability served primarily as a means to regain control, rather than punishing the perpetrators. Moreover, the peace in Sierra Leone is of course not the making of international institutions alone. The willingness of ordinary people to keep the peace on an everyday basis, for example by tolerating ex-combatants among them, has contributed crucially to the stability of peace.

Finally, transitional justice practitioners could be more realistic about how much institutions such as the Special Court can influence a specific context (McEvoy 2007). The data presented in this article demonstrates that the rather small impact of the Special Court on people's lives was mostly due to its design and set up. However, the often grandiose rhetoric used by Court officials and others mirrors the high expectations many had in the capability and reach of such an institution. In this light, Special Court officials can be criticized for their ignorance of the context they operated in, which led them to such bold promises of "justice" and "peace." As I have shown, these claims are for a large part based on assumptions, and as soon as the everyday situation of many Sierra Leoneans is taken into consideration, such promises seem out of place.

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Contesting International Norms of Transitional Justice: The Case of Timor Leste

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Vol. 7 (1) 2013

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A discussion of the interplay of different concepts of justice and reconciliation in United Nations peace operations in Timor Leste and in the Timorese political leadership. Drawing on research into norm diffusion and concepts of localization and norm contestation to understand how societies deal with their violent past under the auspices of international actors in UN peace operations, the analysis challenges the UN's functionalistic concept of transitional justice as a precondition to state- and nationbuilding in post-conflict societies. As the case of Timor Leste demonstrates, the Timorese leadership has been successful in promoting its own concept of justice and reconciliation, leading to a localized version of state- and nationbuilding that openly contests international approaches.

After the rather sobering experiments with the international ad-hoc tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s, the United Nations developed a complementary approach to transitional justice consisting of tribunals and truth commissions established within the respective country. This new approach was assumed to better meet the aim of peace operations by having an impact on peace- and statebuilding. However, as this article will demonstrate for Timor Leste, the complementary approach did not have the expected impact. Instead, political leaders have successfully sidelined internationally induced transitional justice initiatives and promoted their own concepts of nationbuilding and reconciliation, which clearly contradict international concepts. The example of Timor Leste shows how much this complementary approach still requires the acceptance of political stakeholders in order to have an impact on reform processes in post-conflict countries. At the same time it proves even more vulnerable to the structural deficits and incapacities typical of a post-conflict situation, which aggravates the risk of reducing transitional justice to an internationally initiated short-term intervention.

After a short introduction to transitional justice in peace operations, I will propose a model of analysis in which the use of different concepts of transitional justice is traced beyond their application within the respective mechanisms up to their impact on the democratic institution-building process. In order to set the stage for such an assessment of the impact of international approaches to transitional justice in Timor Leste, I will discuss the origins and evolution of narratives on nationhood in Timor Leste. Subsequently, the developments within the field of transitional justice in East Timor are reconstructed up to and including the discussion in the East Timorese parliament about a reparations program and an Institute of Public Memory. As I will demonstrate, internationally induced transitional justice initiatives have been successfully sidelined by political leaders as incompatible with the East Timorese history of resistance, traditions, and world views.

1. Transitional Justice in Peace Operations

In the 1980 and 1990s transitional justice was mainly a matter of democratic transitions and exclusively an internal affair for governments (Teitel 2003, 71). Research focused on political constellations to analyze elites' choices with regard to dealing with the past (Huntington 1991; Huyse 1995). It took the events in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda for transitional justice to become an instrument of intervention and peacebuilding. However,

research on the international ad hoc tribunals laid open their incapacity to foster reconciliation, recognize victims' suffering, or acknowledge their rights (Mertus 2000; Akhavam 1998). Jelena Subotic (2009) demonstrated how compliance with international law in Bosnia and Serbia served as window-dressing to avert international pressure. She concluded that this problem exists first and foremost for international tribunals, while a broader approach would prevent transitional justice from becoming a political instrument in the hand of national leaders (383). Since the complementary approach to transitional justice developed in response to this critique was implemented within the respective country it was expected to have a positive impact on statebuilding by demonstrating rule of law and by having a capacity-building effect on national justice systems (Stromseth 2006, 249ff.). Truth commissions were expected to help foster an inclusive national identity and contribute to peacebuilding by facilitating reconciliation (Hazan 2006, 21). In this context ownership was introduced as a new norm of conduct for transitional justice processes (Stromseth 2006; Annan 2004). It is therefore worthwhile to analyze whether this complementary approach has been able to render transitional justice more effective for the UN's peace- and statebuilding agenda.

2. Norm Diffusion in Peace Operations

Since the early 1990s, norms have become an explanatory factor for political change on the domestic and international level. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (1999) introduced a spiral model of norm diffusion in which domestic and international human rights networks force a repressive regime into tactical concessions followed by the institutionalization of rule-consistent behavior. However, peace operations give a different context to the transfer of norms since international actors can directly influence the agenda of a post-conflict political system and compel domestic actors to institutionalize new norms. This situation involves a high risk of creating a conflict between officially accepted norms and the personal convictions people act upon at the receiving end. Antje Wiener (2004) therefore introduced the concept of norm contestation focusing on the conflictive interpretations actors ascribe to a norm. In Amitav Acharya's concept of

norm localization (2009), domestic actors actively reconstruct new norms to make them fit their own *cognitive prior*. This *cognitive prior* comprises shared systems of beliefs, practices, and ideas of the nation's "founding fathers" (22–23).

These approaches place the focus on political leaders in processes of norm transfer – not only in defining the *cognitive prior* of a post-conflict society but also discursively contesting externally introduced norms. This is even more pertinent in a post-conflict context where state structures are weak and political actors enjoy even greater power to interfere in political processes and influence political developments in an ad hoc manner. Therefore, to adequately evaluate processes of norm transfer not only the functioning of political institutions but also political ad hoc practices have to be taken into account. Thus, I will analyze how domestic actors have responded to internationally induced transitional justice mechanisms and how they deal with these mechanisms' outputs, such as the final report of a truth commission or indictments of a tribunal, on a practical and a discursive level. As the article will demonstrate, it is up to political leaders to decide if an internationally induced concept of transitional justice will have an impact on democratic institution-building, by serving as a role model for the justice sector and for how to deal with situations of crisis for example.

3. Political Elites and Narratives of Nationhood in Timor Leste

In the following I draw on Antje Wiener's (2009) approach to study the "meaning-in-use" of norms to trace discursive reactions of political leaders to international transitional justice initiatives in Timor Leste. By focusing on speeches and interviews with East Timorese leaders and international actors of the UN peace operations the varying meanings which are ascribed to the same norms by different actors shall be illustrated. In addition, a closer look at political practices and processes of institutionalization will show how actors enact norms while at the same time contesting their validity. In this article, the term "political elite" refers to actors engaged in high level party politics, be it government or opposition. In the case of Timor Leste all of these leaders were part of the resistance movement and draw their legitimacy from their experiences under occu-

pation.[1] Therefore, the broader population perceives them as the "founding fathers" of the nation, providing them with great symbolic authority. The first half of this section gives an overview of the historic developments in Timor Leste that led to the referendum and the different peace operations. The second half will demonstrate how different narratives of nationhood and national identity have evolved over time.

After more than four hundred years under Portuguese rule and a short but brutal civil war, Timor Leste declared its independence on November 28, 1975. Only nine days later Indonesia invaded and forced the leading political movement FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste Independente) to withdraw into the mountains. From there FRETILIN organized the resistance struggle against the Indonesian forces. During the occupation almost two hundred thousand people died from sickness and starvation due to forced resettlement or counter-insurgency operations in which the civilian population was used as human shields (CAVR 2005, 6.1). In 1981, Ray Kala "Xanana" Gusmao became the new leader of FRETILIN.[2] He presented the East Timorese cause as a fight against human rights violations and became internationally even more well-known when he was captured in 1992 (Niner 2009, 161). In the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1998, President Suharto's regime in Indonesia collapsed and hopes for independence rose quickly in Timor Leste. A referendum about independence or autonomy within the Indonesian nation-state was agreed upon by Portugal, the UN and Suharto's successor Jusuf Habibie. When the results of the referendum turned out to be in favor of independence on September 4, 1999, pro-integration militias unleashed a campaign of retaliation, killing almost 1,500 people (UN GA A/54/660, 8).[3] In response the UN

deployed the multinational force INTERFRET to restore security, followed by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). UNTAET was tasked with rebuilding the country from scratch, since more than 70 percent of its infrastructure had been destroyed. After independence on May 20, 2002, two considerably smaller missions were installed; UNMISET (United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor) and UNOTIL (United Nations office in Timor Leste). However, after a crisis in 2006 a mission with a broader mandate was established: UNMIT (United Nations Integrated Mission to Timor Leste) was entrusted with security sector reform and rule of law development; its mandate ended in December 2012.

Although FRETILIN presented its cause as the struggle of the common people, the civil war of 1974/75 had left a divisive legacy for the political parties in East Timor.[4] When Gusmao gained leadership of FRETILIN and its armed wing FALINTIL (Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste), he stripped the movement of its socialist stance and convinced supporters of the former opposition party UDT (Uniao Democratice Timorense) and the church to join the movement (CAVR 2005, 3.15). This generated support among East Timorese living in exile, many of them UDT supporters (Schmitz 2010, 97). Accordingly, in 1984, FRETILIN declared "national unity" as its political line, which led to frictions between socialist hardliners and their leader (CAVR 2005, 3.15). However, growing international attention proved Gusmao right: the diaspora presented the Timorese cause as a people suffering from human rights violations, a discourse which had greater resonance among the transnational human rights movement (Wise 2004). At the same time political leaders stressed the close connection between the guerilla forces

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1 Xanana Gusmao became the first president after independence. Dr. Mari Alkatiri, Secretary General of FRETILIN, was a founding member of FRETILIN in 1975 and the first prime minister after independence in 2002. José Ramos-Horta was Minister of Foreign Affairs in the FRETILIN government in 1975. He received the Nobel Peace Prize for his diplomatic struggle in 1996, together with the bishop of Dili, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo.

2 When Gusmao took over the leadership of FRETILIN in 1981, he set up a threefold resistance front consisting of a diplomatic, a clandestine, and an armed wing. Before this, the resistance movement had been practically defeated by the occupying forces during the period between 1975 and 1981.

3 The result of the referendum was 78.5 percent in favor of independence. Despite the intimidation tactics of pro-Indonesian militias, turnout was 98.6 percent (Myrttinen 2009, 222).

4 FRETILIN used the term *Maubere*, originally a derogative name for the illiterate population used by the Portuguese, as a unifying label to represent the East Timorese (Traube 2007, 9). However, other parties interpreted this denotation in a highly divisive manner, pitting the racially "pure" East Timorese against the mixed-blood *mestizos* population. This divided FRETILIN from other parties whose supporters were former colonial administrators (CAVR 2005, 3.1).

and the civil population as a suffering but united nation (Niner 2000, 153ff.; Ruak 2000).

This strong notion of a suffering nation gained a different meaning in post-independence political discourse. After the common enemy had vanished, "national unity" proved to be difficult to manage and competition arose over historic ownership of the resistance and the distribution of government positions (Babo-Soares 2003, 144). Political leaders used their resistance record to demonstrate their connection with the population and their readiness for political leadership (Silva 2007, 165). This issue of deservedness contains an inherent logic of reciprocity: on the one hand, the claim for a position of political leadership relies on a person's role in the resistance (Silva 2007, 168; Hohe 2002, 78). On the other hand, various groups in society demand material compensation from their leaders based on their support for these individuals and on their own contribution to the resistance (Roll 2011, 74; ICG 2011, 4).[5]

Hence, the question who did what during the resistance period gained centrality within the political discourse and became the defining feature for national identity, displacing the "national unity" narrative. This is illustrated by the wording of the constitution of 2002, which lists "valorization of the resistance" as one of the republic's fundamental principles. The constitution also commits the state to "special protection of all those who dedicated their lives to the struggle for independence and national sovereignty" (RDTL 2002, 11.3).

4. Transitional Justice in Timor Leste

At the time of the establishment of UNTAET, the United Nations had already developed its complementary approach to transitional justice. In 1997, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) had affirmed victims' rights to truth and reparations in addition to a "duty to prosecute" (UN Commission of Human Rights 1997). Truth commissions supplemented the prosecutorial approach, albeit the "duty to prosecute" was still given priority (Trenkov-Wermuth 2010, 28; Bassiouni 2006, 9). On the question of reconciliation, the United Nations Economic and Social Council discussed the application of mechanisms of restorative justice in 1999; the final recommendation was to apply such initiatives only to minor offenders (UN Economic and Social Council 1999).

When UNTAET was established in October 1999, the UN sent a team of special rapporteurs on human rights violations to prepare recommendations on how to deal with East Timor's violent past. The special rapporteurs stressed that the East Timorese would "continue to seek justice and are unable to come to terms with their sorrow and distress" (UN General Assembly 1999, 12). In other words, they presented themselves as the legitimate spokespersons of the East Timorese suggesting that ignoring this concern would endanger the newly won peace and stability. An international tribunal for the human rights violations committed before and after the referendum in 1999 was proposed but support quickly faded in the light of the great expense of the international tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Instead, the option of two ad hoc tribunals established in Indonesia and Timor Leste was preferred by the Security Council.

4.1. International and East Timorese Approaches to "Serious Crimes"

In June 2000, UNTAET established a Special Panel within the Dili District Court to prosecute genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity (UNTAET 2000). In addition, "Serious Crimes" – defined as murder, sexual offenses, and torture, committed between January 1 and October 25, 1999 – were also to be prosecuted. These offences were added to the offences defined by jus cogens especially to deal with the violence before and after the referendum. UNTAET thereby stressed the importance of prosecutions as a basis for establishing a credible criminal justice system and as a precondition for reconciliation (Larke 2009, 655).[6]

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[5] In the post-referendum period various veterans' groups were formed based on these claims. Groups such as Sacrada Familia and CPD-RDTL (Resistance Council of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste) recruit members among former guerillas who are discontent with the demobilization program and the lack of material support from their leaders (ICG 2006, 2011; Babo-Soares 2003, 175).

[6] This stance was also mentioned in interviews with members of UNMIT's Serious Crimes Investigation Team and its Human Rights and Transitional Justice Unit.

The Special Panel was intended to consist of international and national judges along with a Serious Crimes Unit (SCU) for investigations. At that time, there were no practicing judges in East Timor, so UNTAET had to train domestic personnel on the job.[7] A Defense Lawyers Unit was only established in 2002, two years after the creation of the Special Panel. From the very beginning the Special Panel had to deal with serious budget cuts. Due to lack of funding and personnel, it was forced to focus exclusively on the violence of 1999, to the detriment of the wider context of the Indonesian occupation.[8] The achievements of the Panel remained modest: it concluded fifty-five trials with eighty-five convictions, all of them low-ranking members of East Timorese militias. Significantly, despite a Memorandum of Understanding with UNTAET, no high-ranking Indonesian military officers were tried, since Indonesia refused to hand over indicted persons.

In addition, East Timor's political leadership presented their approach to the question of accountability for human rights violations which clearly contradicted the UN's approach. Even before independence, Ray Kala Xanana Gusmao stressed the importance of reconciliation through forgiveness.[9] Hence, instead of prosecutions, the repatriation of the more than 250,000 East Timorese who had been forcibly resettled in West Timor was declared the national priority. From 2000 on, Gusmao and José Ramos-Horta initiated meetings on the border with West Timor to encourage people to return. For these so-called border reconciliation meetings they allowed indicted militia leaders to safely cross the border in spite of the indictments the SCU prosecutors had issued against some of these individuals (Kyodo News Service 2001). The return and reintegration of high-ranking militia members was justified as a necessary means to restore "national unity" as a precondition for development (Ramos-Horta 1999; Gusmao 1999). In this context, reconciliation was presented as an act of clemency and personal strength on behalf of the victims (Gusmao 2003a). According to such a "reconciliation

through forgiveness" narrative, the pursuit of justice was revenge without moral legitimacy (Gusamo 2003c). In addition, Gusmao claimed that prosecutorial justice was not necessary for a deterrent effect (Lusa 2000). Instead he argued that the people of Timor Leste would only require members of the militias to apologize in order to forgive them. Political leaders also condemned the UN's "Serious Crimes" process as selective, trying East Timorese only. It was criticized for its "excessive" verdicts and for diverting much-needed funds from Timor Leste's development agenda while poverty prevailed for the people (Gusmao 2003b; Lusa 2003). In this context, development and independence were presented as "real justice" for the people, to which the prosecutorial approach of the "Serious Crimes" process posed a severe challenge (Lusa 2003; Gusmao 2003a; Sherif 2009).

Given the lack of any credible court structure in East Timor, UNTAET started to consider mechanisms of traditional conflict settlement to deal with minor crimes committed since April 1974. In 2000, UNTAET's Human Rights Section introduced the idea of a truth commission for Timor Leste. All East Timorese political stakeholders, back then still integrated in the CNRT (Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense), supported this initiative, emphasizing the need for a "commission of resettlement and reconciliation" (CNS 2000). Xanana Gusmao also persistently referred to the model of the South African truth and reconciliation commission to stress the idea of amnesty for high-ranking perpetrators, depicting the search for truth as counterproductive for the development of the nation in various statements (Dodd 2000; Gusmao 2003c; ABC 2001).

Consultations held by UNTAET on how to facilitate reconciliation concluded that a traditional mechanism for conflict resolution should be applied to minor offences while perpetrators of "Serious Crimes" were to be referred to the prosecutor general (CAVR 2005, 9.1). This stance fitted the

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UN's approach to reconciliation and restorative justice but contradicted Gusmao's concept of reconciliation as forgiveness on all levels. On July 13, 2001, UNTAET established the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e Reconciliacao, CAVR), including a Community Reconciliation Program (CRP) based on the traditional practice of *nahe biti* (to spread the mat). For this mechanism of conflict resolution the victim and the alleged perpetrator were to meet on a mat in front of the community to settle conflicts with the mediation of local leaders and a regional commissioner of the CAVR (CAVR 2005, 9.2). Perpetrators were requested to ask for forgiveness and to compensate the victims and their communities. According to observers, the proceedings focused strongly on the rehabilitation of the perpetrators instead of providing a platform to recognize people's suffering. In the absence of high-ranking militia members, perpetrators were able to present themselves as minor offenders who had been forced to join the militias, leaving aside the wider context of the human rights violations (Larke 2009, 661; Kent 2004, 15–16).[10] Since people's willingness to reintegrate minor offenders relied on the expectation that major offenders would be tried in the "Serious Crimes" process, the CRP made the work of the latter even more important. However, due to the immense backlog in the "Serious Crimes" process, hardly any of the cases referred to the prosecutor general have yet been tried (Braithwaite 2012, 212).

The truth-seeking component of the CAVR staged public hearings in all districts and collected accounts from more than 7,800 people. It published its final report in 2005, calling for the prosecution of high-ranking Indonesian generals.[11] The report also issued more than two hundred recommendations for reform of Timor Leste's political and security institutions (CAVR 2005, 11) paying special attention to victims' rights to truth, including the state's obligation to search for involuntarily disappeared people as

well as victims' right to compensation. However, at the report's official handover to the president on October 31, 2005, then President Gusmao decidedly dismissed the report's stance on victimhood :

> In general, I must stress that the responsibilities that befell upon us, the sons and daughters of a people whose mission was to guide that people in its march towards liberation, was a tacit acceptance of our own duties. . . . In times of sacrifice we rose to be heroes. Today, in times of peace, we are regarded as victims! Our people, the heroic and forsaken people of Timor Leste, do not deserve to be treated with so blatant a disrespect! (Gusmao 2005)

Gusmao, as well as then Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, stressed the moral indefeasibility of the resistance movement and dismissed the commission's mandate to establish a comprehensive truth.[12]

This brief look at transitional justice mechanisms in East Timor highlights that their application was highly contested by domestic political leaders. To legitimize their agendas, both sides, international actors as well as East Timorese political leaders, constructed a *cognitive prior* claiming to represent the wishes and concerns of the East Timorese people. The special rapporteurs presented East Timorese voices in order to demand an ad hoc tribunal for human rights violations, and consultations on how to establish a reconciliation mechanism were used by UNTAET to legitimize its approach of prosecutorial justice and reconciliation. On the contrary, Xanana Gusmao claimed that the people would forgive former militia members if only they received an apology. At the same time he presented a reconciliation commission's main task as setting the stage for granting amnesties.

Since none of the national leaders had explicitly called for a mechanism of truth-finding (but only for reconciliation), the final report as the CAVR's main output did not meet their interests and was highly contested by East Timorese

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10 Although the CRP had a mandate to facilitate reconciliation relating to acts committed between April 25, 1974, and October 25, 1999, more than 90 percent of the cases dealt with were committed in 1999 (Interview with Ben Larke, former advisor to CAVR Dili, May 15, 2011).

11 FRETILIN and its armed wing FALINTIL were declared responsible for 10 percent of the human rights violations of which most were committed during the civil war in 1975 (CAVR 2005, 8.1).

12 Alkatiri admitted FRETILIN's excesses during the war but rejected the claimed death toll. His biggest concern was that the publication of the report would lead to social unrest and persecutions of alleged perpetrators (Lusa 2005).

political leaders. Notions on victimhood contradicted the official narrative of a "valorization of resistance." In terms of political practices, José Ramos-Horta and Xanana Gusmao proved successful in their initiatives to convince refugees and militias in West Timor to return. Their move clearly challenged the UN's initiative for prosecutorial justice through the "Serious Crimes" process.

The prosecutorial approach of the United Nations also suffered from the structural deficits of a post-conflict situation. There was a delay in setting up the Special Panel because the country's entire infrastructure had to be rebuilt. For instance, the majority of the well-educated workforce had left the country, so local staff had to be trained first. The whole endeavor was seriously constrained by severe cuts in Special Panel's budget. Therefore, while international actors were committed to present their agenda as a representation of the East Timorese peoples' interest and to create ownership on behalf of the East Timorese, the budget cuts clearly demonstrated a lack of ownership regarding the United Nations' concern about the "Serious Crimes" process.

After the preceding sub-section has discussed the establishment of mechanisms of transitional justice and the outputs they have produced in Timor Leste, the following part presents government initiatives and political practices, which reflect transitional justice mechanisms as well as cases where an institutionalization of the mechanisms' output has been averted.

4.2. The Impact of Transitional Justice Mechanisms on the Domestic Level

Although the outbreak of the crisis in 2006 cannot be explained with reference to controversies about the nation's past only, it still demonstrated the risk of violent outbreaks around these issues. In January, 159 members of the F-FDTL defense forces (FALINTIL-Forcas Defensas Timor Leste) signed a petition complaining about recruitment, promotion, and disciplinary measures. The soldiers claimed to be discriminated against based on the allegation that people from the Western part of Timor Leste had formerly collaborated with the occupation forces while people from the East had fought for independence (ICG 2006, 6). In March 2006 the group, which had grown to nearly six hundred soldiers, was dismissed from the armed forces. The protest of these so-called "petitioners" became a catalyst for all sorts of dissenting groups expressing frustration over employment opportunities, living conditions, and government benefits and turned into a major conflict between the Western-dominated police and the Eastern-dominated defense forces. The conflict brought long-standing grievances between different political figures to the surface, some of them dating back to the 1980s when Gusmao opened up the resistance movement to other political factions (ICG 2006, 4). The crisis left thirty-eight dead, hundreds of houses burnt, and more than one hundred thousand internally displaced. Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri was forced to step down and was replaced by José Ramos-Horta until elections were held in 2007. Since the crisis demonstrated the discontent of various groups in independent Timor Leste, the government enhanced its benefit scheme in order to meet grievances concerning housing and medical care.[13] This move was crafted according to the "valorization of resistance" narrative and in 2007 Gusmao as newly elected prime minister made the payment of veterans' pensions the priority of his government. Contrary to the notion that everybody had somehow contributed to the resistance movement (see Ruak 2000), the respective law, enacted in 2006, pronounced an exclusive definition of who qualifies as a "veteran" and who is therefore eligible to pensions: only persons with more than eight years of full-time service in the resistance movement's armed wing and family members of those who had fought for more than fifteen years were eligible for pensions (RDTL 2006). After vociferous protests from members of the clandestine front,[14] a one-off payment was introduced for people who had served the resistance outside its armed wing (ICG 2011, 7; RDTL 2009). The limitation of deser-

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13 The connection between the crisis and the broadening of the benefit schemes was referred to in interviews with representatives from UNMIT Department of Political Affairs as well as representatives from various NGOs working on good governance and security sector reform in East Timor.

14 The clandestine front comprised persons who secretly supported the resistance movement while officially collaborating with the occupation forces. Given the secrecy of their missions it is difficult for members to prove their service.

vedness to an exclusive group of veterans can also be observed on a symbolic level, with medals handed out in "recognition ceremonies" (World Bank 2008, 21) and the establishment of so-called heroes' cemeteries, where exclusively veterans are buried.

The crisis of 2006 constituted a serious test for rule of law development in Timor Leste. A Commission of Inquiry set up by the UN proposed the prosecution of several individuals for crimes against humanity (UN 2006). Some of these alleged perpetrators were tried but the way the government dealt with the crisis reflected the narrative of "reconciliation through forgiveness" rather than the prosecutorial approach of the UN. In May 2008, President Ramos-Horta pardoned ninety-four individuals, among them seven former militia fighters involved in the violence in 1999, and in August 2010 he reduced the sentences of twenty-six persons convicted of involvement in the crisis in 2006 (Interpress Service 2008).[15] He presented this move as part of his reconciliation policy to leave behind the violent past (Presidential decree no. 31/2010, see CIGI 2011, 3). In December 2006, a reconciliation ceremony was held in Dili to officially end the crisis. Leaders from all parties sat together on a huge mat, officially admitted their mistakes and hugged each other (Braithwaite, Charlesworth, and Soares 2012, 326). Reconciliation meetings were also organized for the defense forces and the police as well as for refugees on their return to their communities (ibid.). This approach to reconciliation has also been institutionalized through the Department of Peacebuilding and Social Cohesion, whose task is to establish "peacebuilding mechanisms and procedures in the national government" and to "strengthen conflict-resolution capacity and mechanisms at the community level" (Muggah and LeBrun 2010, 33).

Drawing from this example, the traditional practices which formed the basis for the Community Reconciliation Program were used officially to deal with a situation of crisis: political leaders institutionalized the concept to be applicable on the political level. In addition, the practice of par-

dons and reduction of sentences has rendered the impact of the "Serious Crimes" process concerning the demonstration of a functioning rule of law system practically nil.

4.3. Dealing with Victims' Rights on the National and Bilateral Level

In 2001, Indonesia agreed to set up an ad hoc tribunal in Jakarta to deal with the crimes of 1999. However, the proceedings turned into farce when of the eighteen accused only six were convicted and given very short sentences (UNSC 2005, 41ff.). In May 2005, a UN Commission of Experts reviewed the work of the Special Panel and the ad hoc tribunal in Jakarta and recommended setting up an international tribunal because the proceedings had been politically interfered with in both countries (62). The plan of the East Timorese and the Indonesian government to set up a bilateral truth commission must therefore be understood as an initiative to sideline further demands for investigations and prosecutions, as many observers have argued (JSMP 2005; Asia Pacific Solidarity Net 2007).[16]

The aim of the Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF), installed in May 2005, was to establish the truth about human rights violations before and after the referendum in 1999 and prepare recommendations to "heal the wounds of the past and to strengthen friendship" between the two nations (CTF 2008, i). Accordingly, the commission was given a mandate to grant amnesties. Although the commission was criticized as an attempt to put an end to further investigations, the commission's output was surprisingly blunt: it found the Indonesian military responsible for the human rights violations, and did not recommend amnesties, because none of the alleged perpetrators had fulfilled the criteria of full cooperation with the commission (CTF 2008: 296). While the Indonesian government had rejected the findings of the CAVR, it was now compelled to accept the findings of the CTF and therefore to officially acknowledge responsibility, albeit on an institutional instead of an individual level (Antara News 2006).

Given its bilateral nature, the CTF can be seen as an institutionalized contestation of the prosecutorial approach of

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15 Of the nine high-ranking persons convicted for their role in the 2006 crisis, seven were pardoned or got their sentence reduced which led to their immediate release in 2011 (CIGI 2011, 14).

16 Interview with Edward Rees, Peace Dividend Trust, Dili, March 10, 2011

the United Nations.[17] The commission's mandate fitted the "reconciliation through forgiveness" narrative since it was assigned to grant amnesties to the highest level of perpetrators. At the same time it paid tribute to the "valorization of resistance" narrative as the basis for Timor Leste's national identity because the mandate covered the events of 1999 only and therefore did not investigate resistance members' responsibilities for human rights violations. However, the output of the commission, its final report, presented a strong stance for victims' right to truth about the events in 1999 and therefore served the goals of the international actors' agenda better than expected.[18]

To return to the output of the CAVR, its final report was handed over to the UN Security Council on January 23, 2006. However, President Gusmao refrained from publication within Timor Leste, pointing to other priorities for the country's development and suggesting that its content was too sensitive for publication (Gusmao 2006). To this day, the report has not been discussed in the East Timorese parliament but international and local NGOs used the report's recommendations as a starting point to promote the establishment of an "Institute of Public Memory" (Instituto Público da Memória) entrusted with the supervision of the implementation of the CAVR's recommendations (RDTL 2010). The Human Rights and Transitional Justice Section of UNMIT also started to lobby for such an institute in order to create "at least some sense of justice for the victims."[19] A "National Consensus Dialogue" conducted from 2008 to 2010 brought these issues back into the political arena. Thereby, in 2009, political leaders agreed upon the development of the respective draft laws for a reparations program and an "Institute of Public Memory", on the condition that none of the initiatives would result in the prosecution of veterans.[20]

The draft law on reparations comprises mechanisms of symbolic and collective reparations with a clear emphasis on infrastructure, education, and psychosocial counseling as a contribution to development and inclusive nation-building. Its definition of who qualifies as a victim is independent of a person's political affiliation and therefore also grants victims of human rights violations committed by members of the resistance the right to reparations. This issue poses a serious problem since in the eyes of many East Timorese, supporters of the integration with Indonesia do not deserve to be compensated for any harm done to them.[21] Several attempts to stage a discussion of the two draft laws in parliament have been postponed.[22] In February 2011, a coalition of parliamentarians requested that 75 percent of the veterans should be registered for the pensions program before a law about reparations for the victims could be passed in parliament.[23] As the following statement by one FRETILIN member of parliament shows, this notion reflects the logic of deservedness:

> There are those who fought and those who didn't fight but supported the resistance and then there are those who did not support the resistance. First, we have to take care of those who fought, then we can care about those who didn't fight, and when they are doing well we can take care of the others.[24]

The draft law about the "Institute of Public Memory" reiterates these tensions. The institute would have the mandate to search for involuntarily disappeared persons, collect information about human rights violations within the period from 1974 to 1999, and engage in public education about this period. This poses a threat to the independence movement nostalgia on which the "valorization of the resistance" narrative is based. Consequently, especially the period of examination which includes the civil war in 1975 was criticized.[25] Parliamentarians also argued that the institute would divert much-needed funds from other projects

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17 In several interviews in the East Timorese Foreign Ministry, the bilateral nature of the CTF was presented as a ground-breaking development in international politics and as a more effective means than any prosecutorial mechanism (interviews in Dili, May 2011).

18 Interview with Louis Gentile, Head of the Human Rights and Transitional Justice Section of UNMIT, Dili, March 6, 2011

19 Interview with Louis Gentile, see note 19.

20 Interview with an advisor to the national parliament, Dili, April 19, 2011.

21 Parliamentarians, NGO representatives, and members of UNMIT identified the draft law's victim definition as the most sensitive issue. None of the victims of the occupation I was able to talk to accepted that former supporters of the integration with Indonesia should be granted reparations.

22 A discussion was staged for September 2010, February 2011, October 2011, and April 2012.

23 This alliance mainly comprises parliamentarians who are closely connected with veterans' associations but also includes members of all major parties.

24 Interview with David Dias Ximenes, MP, Dili, April 16, 2011.

25 Interview with David Dias Ximenes and other MPs who prefer not to be identified.

which are better suited to support the nation's development. However, in comparison to the veterans' pensions program the institute has a comparatively small budget.[26]

As these developments show, domestic political actors have been able to sideline the norms institutionalized within transitional justice mechanisms when it comes to their adoption on the domestic political level. Despite efforts to fit the reparations law into the government's nation building and development agenda, the draft laws have not been passed by the parliament. Especially the reparations law's inclusive definition of victims contradicts the "valorization of resistance" and the inherent concept of deservedness. The same problem can be observed for the "Institute of Public Memory". Its initiative to seek information about the deeds of the resistance movement creates a fundamental threat to the common resistance nostalgia.

5. Conclusion: What Is Left of Transitional Justice in Timor Leste?

As has been demonstrated in this article, the impact of transitional justice initiatives on the long-term goals of peace operations crucially depends on political leaders' willingness to adopt international concepts of transitional justice on the domestic level. Therefore, the UN's functionalistic approach of transitional justice as having an impact on the rule of law and the formation of an inclusive national identity has not proven to be effective. Instead, political leaders in Timor Leste have successfully promoted their own exclusive version of nationbuilding, which is based on a narrative about a morally indefeasible resistance. Additionally, the aim to demonstrate the functioning of rule of law through prosecutions has been adapted by domestic leaders to include acts of clemency and forgiveness in order to leave behind the violent past. The CAVR's final report was prevented from having an impact on inclusive nationbuilding since its recommendations concerning victims' rights have not been implemented. Since the parliament has refused to discuss its contents, the report has been sidelined in the political discourse and the narrative to "valorize the resistance" has been disseminated

on symbolic and material levels instead. While narratives of "national unity" could have precluded an exclusive definition of national identity, post-referendum political dynamics have led to the structuring of the political discourse and the government's willingness to provide welfare according to issues of deservedness .

Therefore, Subotic's expectation (2009), that a complementary approach to transitional justice would avert window-dressing activities of political leaders cannot be confirmed. The example of Timor Leste demonstrates that a post-conflict situation is not only an arena for international actors to transfer their norms but much more for domestic leaders to promote their interests and norms. Transitional justice, regardless whether applied inside or outside the country, still needs the willingness and ownership of domestic political actors if it is to be taken beyond an adoption in mechanisms of transitional justice and have an impact on political institution-building. This is especially the case in a post-conflict situation where state structures are weak and political leaders enjoy authority due to their personal history. While international actors were focusing on creating ownership for their transitional justice initiatives they were not aware that there already existed ownership on the part of the political leadership for a different understanding of justice and reconciliation. The fact that the complementary approach to transitional justice is based within the respective country enhances the possibilities for domestic actors to interfere in the justice process and to render an internationally designed agenda meaningless. At the same time weak post-conflict infrastructure makes even more ownership on the part of international actors necessary, which was not granted in the case of Timor Leste. For Timor Leste this means that an institutionalization of norms of transitional justice concerning victims' rights on the domestic level will require a new generation of leaders who are willing to overcome the narrow definition of national identity based on the "valorization of resistance."

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26 Interview with Vicente Guterres, Vice-President of the Parliament, May 4, 2011. The planned budget of the public memory institute was $1.5 million per year. The veterans' pensions, however, comprised 8 percent of the 2011 state budget, or $68 million.

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Transitional Justice: History-Telling, Collective Memory, and the Victim-Witness

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Vol. 7 (1) 2013

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This article examines the complex, inherently political, and often contradictory processes of truth-finding, history-telling, and formation of collective memory through transitional justice. It explores tensions between history-telling and the normative goals of truth commissions and international criminal courts, taking into account the increasing importance attributed to victims as witnesses of history. The legal space these instruments of transitional justice offer is determined by both their historical and political roots, and specific goals and procedures. Because the legal space that truth commissions offer for history-telling is more flexible and their report open to public debate, they may open up alternative public spaces and enable civil society to contest the master narrative. The legal truth laid down in the rulings of an international criminal court is by definition closed. The verdict of a court is definite and authoritative; closure, not continued debate about what it has established as the truth, is its one and only purpose. In conclusion, the article calls for a critical appraisal of transitional justice as acclaimed mediator of collective memories in post-conflict societies.

In connection with modern society and the construction of a common core of memory, it has been observed that: "[H]istory and legal institutions supersede and replace rituals and traditions; archives …, and bureaucracies provide stores of memory; museums and memorials celebrate the past. Modern societies need a wide range of different institutions that store and construct collective memories, and do so in differing ways' (Karstedt 2009, 4). This article is concerned with two such legal institutions: international criminal courts and truth commissions. Both are instruments of transitional justice, employed in (post)conflict societies to support the transition from conflict to peace, but their manifest purposes are very different. An international criminal trial aims to *bring to justice perpetrators* of atrocities by determining what they have done through due process of law; the primary concern of truth commissions is to *bring justice to victims* through publicly establishing what happened to them. But this obvious difference hides a significant similarity: such truth-finding also promotes the development of a collective memory by establishing a version of history that informs, and is informed by, the memories of those involved – a shared truth about

crime and injustice that allows sense to be made of a traumatic past and is a prerequisite for a stable future. Truth, collective memory, and history-telling have become buzzwords in the transitional justice debate, conceptual keys to reconciliation, democracy, and peace in conflict-ridden nations.

Mark Osiel (1997, 6) maintains that international criminal trials are "often a focal point for the collective memory of whole nations"; even "secular rituals of commemoration. As such, they consolidate shared memories with increasing deliberateness and sophistication." Martha Minow (1998, 60) has argued that truth commissions "undertake to write the history of what happened as a central task," and that "a truth commission may be a more effective mechanism than litigation for devising a new national narrative" (Minow 2008, 180). Truth Commissions then, flatten-out, so to speak, complex memories and understandings of the past into an inclusive nation-building narrative which they envision as a collective memory. And, discussing the current (academic) interest in "memory," Jay Winter (2006, 1) refers to "the memory boom … – a wide array of collective

mediations on war and the victims of war." However, he takes issue with the ease with which the term "collective memory" is employed, as if there were "one national 'theatre of memory' which we all inhabit" (2006, 185). While he makes this point about film as a cultural practice and source of collective memories, it is equally true of transitional justice.

According to Winter (2006, 185), it is more constructive to see film as "one of the mediators of the memories of particular groups." Transitional justice also (re)produces memories but aspires to more than that. "Justice" requires that the different theatres of memory are collected into one "truth" (Osiel's "coherent collective memory," Minow's "national narrative"). This means that transitional justice can be understood as a mediator between different collective memories. Moreover, unlike film, this mediator embodies the voice of (legal) authority. The version of past events that courts and truth commissions produce in their verdicts and reports is an authoritative claim of truth.

However, while history-telling and the formation of collective memory in the name of justice may result in a coherent narrative, they are neither neutral nor objective. They are dynamic processes grounded in social, cultural, and power relations in (international) society at any given time; they are coloured by the moment at which the past is considered, and by how a preferred narrative is promoted. History and memory change as time goes on, and are never "finished." At the same time, the "truth" established by a court or truth commission is based in no small part on the testimony of victims, but the flattened, often truncated narrative that combines their memories and stories is, almost by definition, unlikely to do justice to their suffering.

This makes the authoritative truth claim of courts and truth commissions particularly problematic, given the parameters of their establishment, the limitations of their remit, and the other goals of transitional justice: just retribution, redress for victims, reconciliation, deterrence, and the establishment of democracy and the rule of law. The complex, inherently political and often contradictory process of truth-finding, history-telling, and the formation of collective memory through transitional justice are the con-

cern of this article. In particular, we explore whether and where tensions exist between history-telling and the normative aims of truth commissions and international criminal courts and ask how their goals and procedures shape the "truth" they produce.

We pay particular attention to the increasing importance attributed to victims as witnesses of history and the impact this has on transitional justice. We maintain that, given the liberal political aspirations of transitional justice and the central position of the victim-witness, we would do well to take Jay Winter's warning seriously and adopt a cautious and critical stance towards history-telling in transitional justice, especially in the case of international criminal courts. While truth commissions are by no means without problems, we argue that, compared to criminal trials, they are by their very nature more open-ended. Although they too may fall short in the justice they provide for victims, they are also able to pave the way for the development of other collective memories and alternative histories.

First we will delve into the historical development of international criminal justice and the changing position of the victim-witness, to reveal tensions between the goals of criminal justice and the need for history telling by the courts to ensure that what has happened is not forgotten. Then we will take a closer look at the position of the victim-witnesses in truth commissions, and show how victims' testimonies are shaped into an official narrative by the mandates of the commissions. At the same time, victims and social organizations contest these official narratives and open up spaces for ongoing public debate. Finally, we examine the potential and limitations of both instruments of transitional justice when it comes to history-telling and the scope for autonomous action they afford to the victim-witness.

1. International Criminal Justice: Doing Justice, Making History
1.1. From Arbitrary Vengeance to Due Process of Law
Dealing with the aftermath of conflict through legal process was discussed from the post-Waterloo period onward, but in particular after the First World War when the Allies envisaged that the German Kaiser would face an international tribunal with a view, among other things, to vin-

dicating "the validity of international morality" (quoted in Bass 2002, 76). Although the trial never materialized, the very idea reflects the notion, if embryonic, that war is governed by an international legal order transcending customary rules. The specific goals of this undertaking were not entirely clear. Retribution and deterrence certainly figured in the background. Victims other than the allied nations themselves – as they saw it, viciously and illegally attacked by an aggressor-state bent on self-aggrandizement – were not part of the scheme. The British solicitor-general did remark that there "would remain for all time a record of German brutality" (quoted in Bass 2002, 302), but history-telling was not recognized as significant in itself until it came to dealing with the crimes committed under Nazi rule.

Much has been written about the Nuremberg trials from many different perspectives. Most legal scholars now seem to agree that their greatest achievement was the recognition of crimes against humanity.[1] But this is with hindsight. Bass (2002) comes much closer to the contemporary mind-set in regarding Nuremberg as the victory of liberalism, the acceptance of the civilized fair trial as better (and more effective) justice than arbitrary vengeance. Although Nuremberg revealed a mountain of information about crimes against humanity these were secondary considerations. The needs of individual victims figured not at all, while a form of collective victimhood was reserved for (the peoples of) the nations attacked by Germany. As in 1919, the Allies regarded themselves as victims of a brutal war of aggression, during which there had "also" been a programme to exterminate the Jews. Nuremberg was about retribution for the war in general. It was also about deterrence through "education" of the German populace. Punishing the leaders "in a dignified manner consistent with the advance of civilization" served that end,[2] but also implied producing a collectively shared version of history in the face of the disparate theatres of memory inhabited by Germans immediately after the war.

While we should not try to read too much into Nuremberg, there is no doubt that it is part of the ideological legacy of the Second World War and as such played a significant role in the development of international criminal justice. That legacy included the concepts of human rights and crimes against humanity as the concern of the international community and the legal and organizational infrastructure needed to ensure that "never again" would such a catastrophe befall the world – the United Nations, the Geneva Conventions, and, later, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Court of Human Rights. However, although the notion of a permanent international criminal court, whose jurisdiction would transcend the sovereignty of the nation state, was mooted after the Second World War, it was soon shelved in the hostile climate of the Cold War. The idea re-emerged in the 1990s, partly as a result of the momentum created by the ad-hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is a both political and idealistic venture in cosmopolitan liberalism and human rights (Brants 2011), and global criminal justice has become the "new paradigm of the rule of law" (Teitel 2005, 839).

> International criminal justice is said to establish the rule of law (therefore easing and legitimizing transition to democracy), because it also brings reconciliation, conflict resolution, rehabilitation, deterrence, retribution, and because it provides a platform for victims, exposes mass-victimization and lends a voice to the millions who would otherwise go unheard …, preventing history from being either forgotten or repeated.
>
> (Brants 2007, 185)

Its ultimate aim is therefore "the domestication of violence by law, by the establishment of a just peace where the wounds of history can, at last, be healed" (Hazan 2010, 54–55).

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1   The very title of the volume *From Nuremberg to the Hague* (Sands 2003) posits direct continuity between Nuremberg and prosecutions by the international ad hoc tribunals and the permanent International Criminal Court.

2   Henry Stimson, American secretary of war, quoted by Bass (2002, 165).

1.2. The Victim-Witness and History-Telling

International criminal justice is often lauded as the triumph of idealism and civilization over cynicism and barbarism. At the same time, international courts have come in for a deal of criticism as well. While Osiel (2008) contends that international criminal trials, through the history-telling that is part of the legal construction of a case, not only are but *should* be geared towards the development of a coherent collective memory as a means of coming to terms with a divisive and painful past, others emphasize the essentially political nature of international trials and warn that the history-telling involved in the truth-finding process is open to abuse for political ends (Alvarez 2004; Teitel 2005).

Drumbl (2005, 2007) takes issue with the Western bias of the principles of due process and maintains that sentencing according to individualized guilt fails to address the collective nature of international crimes – this being more damaging now that international criminal law is increasingly seen as *the* legitimate response to mass atrocities; other context-specific or traditional ways of responding (such as reintegration and reconciliation rituals) are accepted only as subordinate to international criminal law, which alienates victims from the process.

A third approach, closely related to Drumbl's criticism, holds that international trials cannot provide justice for victims and highlights contradictions with the other goals of international criminal justice. Demands for justice for victims played an important part in the negotiations leading up to the establishment of the ICC. Especially France, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty International pushed for the incorporation of victim participation in the Rome Statute.[3] In the words of the French Minister of Justice, "The *raisons d'être* of our fight are the victims."[4] However, although victims may also appear as interested parties before the ICC, not only to receive reparation but also to tell their story, this does not resolve the problem that due

process traps witnesses between the precise and quantifiable evidence required for establishing facts beyond reasonable doubt and the emotive memories inherent in victims' narratives, preventing them from relating their experiences in their own words (Haslam 2004, 328) or even recognizing them. The narrative of law is inevitably reductive, not only because of stringent evidential requirements but also because, in practice, it is impossible to put the combination of every person and factor that contributed to the victim's suffering on trial (Brants 2007).

These criticisms come together in a three-way tension between truth-finding through due process that is concerned with establishing the guilt of the accused fairly; politically expedient history-telling and developing a collective memory to exorcise the ghosts of the past and make a shared future possible; and the needs of victims to share, have recognized and redressed their individual experiences of suffering. That tension is nowhere more obvious than in the role of the victim-witness as it has developed in international criminal justice, although it has a precedent in the trial of Adolf Eichmann.

The secondary role of the Holocaust at Nuremberg was an important incentive for Israel to find the masterminds who had evaded justice.[5] Adolf Eichmann was kidnapped, brought to Jerusalem, and charged under Israeli law with, inter alia, crimes against the Jewish people, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. He was found guilty and hanged. The intention of the Israeli government and the prosecutor was, of course, to hold accountable a top Nazi who was personally responsible for genocide, but behind that lay related aims of putting the Holocaust on the map of remembrance, influencing (inter)national public awareness, strengthening the state of Israel politically, and giving Jewish victims a voice. Where the Allies relied predominantly on documentary evidence at Nuremberg, the Israeli prosecutor sought a "living record of a gigantic human disaster" (Hausner 1966, 303–304), live testimony

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3 On victim participation under the Rome Statute, see amongst others Groenhuijsen and De Brouwer (2008); De Beco (2009); McGonigle (2009).

4 Opening address of Paris Seminar "Access of Victims to the International Criminal Court," Paris, April 27, 1999, cited in Haslam (2004).

5 On the Eichmann trial: Hannah Arendt ([1963] 2003); Gideon Hausner (1966); David Cesarani (2005); Harry Mulisch (2005, original in Dutch, 1961); www.nizkor.org/hweb/people/e/eichmann-adolf/transcripts/Judgment.

from survivors selected to give the broadest possible historical picture. Eichmann's judges, however, were resolute in what they saw as their core business – and that was not history-telling:

> [I]t is the purpose of every criminal trial to clarify whether the charges in the prosecution's indictment against the accused who is on trial are true, and if the accused is convicted, to mete out due punishment to him … [This does] not mean that we are unaware of the great educational value, implicit in the very holding of this trial, for those who live in Israel as well as for those beyond the confines of this state. … Without a doubt, the testimony given at this trial by survivors of the Holocaust, who poured out their hearts as they stood in the witness box, will provide valuable material for research workers and historians, but as far as this Court is concerned, they are to be regarded as by-products of the trial.[6]

Despite this clear declaration of purpose, the lasting legacy of the Eichmann trial for international criminal justice has been the importance of history-telling and its demonstration that "memory [is] moral in character, and that the chief carriers of that message [are] the victims themselves" (Winter 2006, 30). Increasingly, the testimony of victim-survivors is not only a source of moral memory but also the basis for the historical narratives that international trials produce. But, while many criticize the failure of international criminal law to provide justice for victims, the advent of victim participation at the ICC notwithstanding, few have been willing to problematize the *role* of victims in relation to truth and history. As if, given the gravity of the crimes and the memory of the Holocaust, inquiring into whether a victim-based approach is wholly appropriate in the context of international criminal law, somehow implies a negation of those crimes and their victims.

Winter (2006, 49) distinguishes between three levels of witnessing: legal, as in giving evidence before an (inter-national) court against specific perpetrators; moral, implying that testimony about specific crimes against humanity frames a much wider narrative about absolute evil; and the witness as spokesperson for humanity, emphasizing that we not only have a duty to remember, but

also that we forget at our moral peril. All three levels occur in trials where crimes against humanity are the issue, and their significance lies in their influence on the historical and narrative value of investigation and verdict, and the production of collective memory. That is the theoretical, idealistic view. But historical narrative and collective memory are constructions that depend on their specific input. The way a case is constructed and presented by a prosecutor can influence historical and collective memory in several ways and, paradoxically, undermine the very significance of witnessing.

The Eichmann-trial made some contemporary commentators uneasy (Cesarani 2005). It was true that it reversed the process of "collective world amnesia," gave victims a voice, demonstrated that bearing witness can be a reparative act in itself, and that the rule of law triumphed over lawlessness.[7] But the narrative it produced ignored the role of collaborators and bystanders, and the (lack of) response by the outside world, including the Jews themselves. The Israeli government instructed the prosecutor to go easy on West Germany and avoid insulting Chancellor Adenauer, and suggested he downplay the failure of the Allies to rescue Jews from Europe and highlight the role of Arab countries in providing a safe haven for fugitive Nazis (Cesarani 2005, 256). The prosecutor relied heavily on survivors' testimony, but, heartrending though it was, it was piecemeal and inconclusive as victims struggled to remember or became confused under cross-examination. Although many victims felt vindicated in finally being able to tell their story, others were traumatized by the experience or felt that the court, however empathetic towards the witnesses, had not needed their personal memories – which was true in the sense that they were often irrelevant to the matter in hand: Eichmann's personal guilt under criminal law.

Similar concerns and complaints have been voiced with regard to the ad hoc tribunals. Unlike the ICC, victims have no particular standing under the International

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6   Judgment, *supra*, opening passage.

7   Contrary to the defence's protestations that a fair trial was impossible, the court's handling of the case is generally considered exemplary.

Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). They appear simply as witnesses, although special measures may be taken to protect them if necessary and to prevent, as far as possible, revictimization through the trauma of testifying or being confronted with their tormentors. Nevertheless, they are a tool in the prosecutor's strategy to deliver both proof beyond reasonable doubt of who was responsible and a (political) history of what happened to them.

Extending the aims of the truth-finding process beyond the question of the defendant's guilt to the much broader purpose of making sure what happened is not forgotten, with victim testimony the primary vehicle of collective memory, sets the trial agenda to re-reading the meaning of victims and justice and retelling history rather than fair truth-finding by the court. That the essence and purpose of the trial, of fairness even, becomes to accommodate the victim's, rather than the defendant's day in court is procedurally unacceptable in the context of due process (and only a trial that is scrupulously fair can demonstrate that civilized values should and can prevail over barbarity). If the counter-argument were that it should indeed be the victim's day, then the question arises as to why we should have a trial at all and worry whether it is fair. But, even if we accept that the magnitude of suffering involved in international crimes justifies this new victim paradigm, trials can only be brought to a successful conclusion by reducing the selection of both defendants and charges – and therefore victims' experiences – to manageable proportions that need not, probably do not, reflect reality.

Sandvik (2009) points out that there has been a shift from collective political struggles seeking agreements on social, civil, and political justice at the national level, to judicial and individualized formats in the international sphere, where individual agency has come to be seen as intrinsic to the legitimacy of cosmopolitan justice, namely its ability to achieve not only reconciliation at a personal and national level, healing and dignity, but also to pave the way for a truly moral, cosmopolitan world-society. This coincides with Winter's third level of witnessing, but is often so at odds with the other goals of international criminal justice, including reconciliation and justice for victims, that Haslam has called for honest acknowledgement (also by victims) of the limitations on the ability of the legal process to restore a victim's sense of self-respect, and for alternative platforms to meet such ends (2004, 319). So, how do history, memory, and the interests of victims fare under one such alternative: truth commissions?

2. Truth Commissions: Nation-Building and Collective Memory

Deeply entwined with the political transition process, truth commissions are highly political instruments negotiated between countless actors. In recent decades many countries have used them to confront the aftermath of violent conflict and atrocity.[8] In the wake of the authoritarian regimes of the 1970s and 1980s, the debate on transitional justice in Latin America was driven by intertwined demands for justice and truth, and the need to legitimize the new governments. "Truth" in this context was understood as the obligation of the successor state to investigate and establish the facts about past violations. Although questions about whether there was a duty to punish human rights violators were debated (Arthur 2009, 353), in the Latin America of the 1980s transitional justice centred on achieving two aims: some measure of justice for the victims and a more just democratic order (Arthur 2009, 355–56). Behind this lay the need to establish a nation-building narrative. According to Posel, these "previously bitterly and brutally divided polities" sought to "refashion themselves as spaces of unity and democratic stability." Here the problem of history-writing presented itself in a particular way: how to create an "imagined community" of the new democratic nation on the strength of an account of the past to which previously warring groupings – with disparate, even incommensurate, versions of events – would now consent" (Posel 2008, 120–21).

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8 Worldwide, there have been forty truth commissions, from 1974 (Uganda) to the beginning of 2010 (Kenya) (Hayner 2011, 256).

In 1995 the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was installed, with according to Hayner (2011, 26) "the most complex and sophisticated mandate for any truth commission to date." A key feature that set it apart from earlier truth commissions (besides its much larger reach in terms of mandate, personnel, and funds) were the public hearings of both victims and perpetrators and the possibility to grant individualized amnesty. For the first time, a truth commission's work took place in front of live, television, and radio audiences. "For many, these public hearings were the commission" (Cole 2007, 167–68).

2.1. Victims, Testimony, and Collective Memory

The primary function of a truth commission is to collect testimony and publish an official record of the past, a public recognition of past (state) violence, while also offering recommendations to the transitional or successor government (Laplante and Theidon 2007, 235). This approach aims to present the nation with a history that places past events in an understandable story, a master narrative of the conflict (Phelps 2004, 79). The place of the victim is central. According to Joseph Slaughter (1997, 407), "human rights violations target the voice, and therefore, the voice should be the focus of international human rights instruments." There is a general consensus in the literature that the importance of a truth commission lies in providing an official arena and producing a report that acknowledges victims' voices and endows them with official authority vis-à-vis the nation and the world.

The many critical questions that have arisen concern the limitations of that platform. Wilson (2001) and Grandin (2005) for example show how the human rights discourse shapes both form and content of the testimonies given before it and the official identity of the testifiers, while truth-finding can also become subordinated to "the overriding nation-building objective" of the new regime (Wilson 2001, 34). Questions about the historical and political context of the conflict, the parties and groups involved, and past and present socio-economic differences and power relations are left out. The discourse on individual human rights violations and the focus on the "victim" obscure stories of social and political agency and the collective dimension of the repression; Robben (2010a, 52) has

argued that TRCs should take care not to neglect "antagonistic social identities." Others maintain there is little scientific evidence for the assumption that truth-telling before a truth commission is either healing or cathartic (Hayner 2011, 5) and that there is a need for reparations after the act of truth-telling (Laplante and Theidon 2007; Shaw 2007).

Some authors take issue with the phenomenon of "testimony." "Society wants to use witnesses' accounts as evidence, and testimonies are condemned in case they do not match evidence collected by other means" (Strejilevich 2006, 703). The academic and legal apparatus requires systematization of testimonies to make them legible, to literally make them make sense, corresponding with the idea that a testimony is a fixed and repeatable story based on facts. In the legal context of evidence, this is of crucial importance. However, a survivor's testimony is expressed before multiple audiences. Testimonies do not exist in "a primordially 'authentic' form" (French 2009, 98). Inevitably there will be disjunctions between the narratives of those who testify before a truth commission and what the commission eventually relates in its report.

Phelps argues that truth commissions can help give voice to those who were muted and excluded during the period of repression, depending on *how* those voices are used in relation to what she calls the master narrative. She asks how individual stories can be contextualized without reducing them to "examples" or "evidence." Her answer is that individual voices should be allowed to compete. "We can only know the past through many competing narratives, and we can only envision the future by incorporating this polyphony into the new national story" (Phelps 2004, 127). This goes against the grain of many truth commissions which seek a coherent and unequivocal official narrative.

We now turn to the Chilean National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1991) and the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (2004), which each had a distinct legal focus and attempted to derive an objective official narrative on the dictatorial past while recognizing persons who were assassinated or disappeared, or suffered political imprisonment and torture as individual

victims. Neither of the commissions held public hearings and, in that sense, they lacked the performativity and public, emotive dimension that the South African TRC so clearly had (although the 1991 Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Commission served as an example and inspiration for the TRC). Nevertheless, we believe that in their wider social impact they are highly illustrative of a more general effect of truth commissions on collective processes of memory-formation and history telling.

2.2. The Chilean Truth Commissions: Contesting the Official Narrative

After seventeen years, the Chilean dictatorship was narrowly defeated at the ballot box in 1988.[9] Although the theme of human rights violations loomed large at the time, a political and legal reality still dominated by actors and laws of the dictatorship made thorough investigation of the crimes difficult. Truth and "national reconciliation," not criminal justice, became the stepping stones from violent past to new democracy. In April 1990, newly elected President Aylwin created the Chilean National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (also known as the Rettig Commission after its president, lawyer Raúl Rettig).[10]

The Commission's mandate was to establish the most complete picture possible of the grave human rights violations committed between September 11, 1973, and March 11, 1990. It recognized individual victims "on both sides": the detained-disappeared,[11] the executed, and those who died under torture, at the hands of state agents or people in its service (2,025 persons), and those who were kidnapped or suffered an attack on their lives carried out by "individuals acting under political pretexts" (90 cases). Moreover, the Commission recommended reparations and measures to ensure "never again." Its mandate prohibited the Commission from pronouncing on possible individual (criminal) responsibility. For an entity with no judicial powers, the Rettig Commission operated with remarkably rigorous legal criteria and legal tone. It was to be neutral and objective,

emphasizing its position of impartiality in an attempt to forge political and social consensus on the recent past.

In June 1990, members of the victims' families were invited by the commission to testify. They were also asked to present persons who had witnessed what had happened to their relatives, and written proof of the actions they themselves had undertaken before the courts and human rights organizations to find their loved ones. The Commission received around 3,400 cases (CNVR 1991, 5–6) and heard all family members who so requested. Due to time constraints it was only possible to interview those witnesses considered most relevant and not included in other sources (CNRV 1991, 9).

The Rettig Report described the development of the regime's repressive tactics chronologically, presenting the individual cases throughout the text and recognizing in total 2,298 victims. The Commission's mandate, however, severely limited the official narrative: it did not focus on perpetrators, and recognized a specifically defined group of individual victims of human rights violations by the dictatorship, those who either died or were disappeared. Phelps has argued that because there were no living victims included in the report the victims' stories were necessarily told by the Rettig Report's authors, and became subsumed into the master narrative (Phelps 2004, 93) which was geared at "national reconciliation."[12] As a result, no perpetrators were named and victim-survivors were neither recognized as victims nor given a voice. As an expression of the power relations in the early 1990s, the mandate shows the limits of what was possible at the time in a careful balancing of demands, interests, and restraints.

Although the Rettig Report was crucial in officially acknowledging the repression and suffering under the military regime, family members and human rights organizations found its "truth" unsatisfactory. In countless commemorative acts, meetings, and protests, and by con-

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9 This section is based on doctoral research by Katrien Klep in Santiago de Chile.

10 *Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación*, Supreme Decree 335. The Report was published in March 1991. Ley de Reparación 19.123 (8 February

1992) granted reparation payments to the families of victims recognized by the Report.

11 In Chile the term *detenidos desaparecidos* is used to refer to those who fell in the hands of the military dictatorship and literally disappeared without any information about their fate or whereabouts. See

also CNVR 1991, 22–23). We use "the detained-disappeared" as the closest English equivalent.

12 For a comparison of the position of the victims and their testimonies in the Argentinean and Chilean truth commissions see Robben (2010b).

tinuous efforts to bring perpetrators to justice, they presented their own demands for truth and justice. They not only had a truth *to tell* that had been obscured and denied under the dictatorship they helped bring to light, they also needed *to know* the truth, or at least that part of the truth to which they had no access: what happened to the detained-disappeared, and where were they now? They also wanted criminal justice for those responsible. Moreover, the Rettig Report, although mentioning torture as an element of repression, did not individually recognize the tens of thousands of Chileans who had suffered political imprisonment, torture, dismissal on political grounds, and exile.

In a drastically changed political landscape, President Lagos created the National Commission on Political Detention and Torture in 2003 (also known as the Valech Commission after its president Monsignor Sergio Valech), with a view to reparation of the victims.[13] Its mandate was "to determine, based on the antecedents presented, who suffered deprivation of liberty and who was tortured for political reasons by agents of the state or persons in the service of the state, during the period between September 11, 1973, and March 11, 1990" (translated from CNPPT 2004, 21).

The Valech Report, like the Rettig Report, describes the periods of repression and includes a chapter listing the different torture methods in detail; testimonies are not reproduced completely although there are anonymous quotes and excerpts. An important part of the report is dedicated to listing 1,132 precincts where people were detained throughout Chile during the dictatorship: precincts of the different branches of the armed forces, quarters of the (civil) police, boats, sport stadiums, prison camps, jails, and secret detention and torture centres of the secret service (CNPPT 2004, 261–466). Of the almost 35,000 persons who applied to the Commission, 27,255 were recognized as having been imprisoned and tortured for political reasons; their names are all mentioned in the report.

The Valech Report broadened the official narrative of the military dictatorship in that it offered more detail than the Rettig Report on the specific forms of repression of imprisonment and torture. Moreover, it delved deeper into the victims' political and social engagement, making it explicit that they were persecuted for their political and social ideas. It recognizes the victim-survivors of political imprisonment and torture individually but, like the Rettig Report, names no perpetrators; testimonies will remain secret for fifty years to come, even for the courts.

There is no doubt that both the Rettig and Valech Commissions, through their carefully constructed narratives, were of crucial importance in promoting broad acknowledgment of the predicament of the victims in Chilean society and in bringing their testimonies into the public sphere. Yet, it is exactly this shaping of witness-testimonies into an authoritative narrative of individual victims of human rights violations that has also led victim-survivors, human rights organizations, and others to press on for truth and justice. With their strict mandates, legal language, and focus on hard facts, the reports led victim-survivors to seek to establish a different kind of collective memory of the dictatorship, in which witnesses are not just victims but also political and social agents. These processes have led to many public manifestations of memory in memorials, monuments, and the creation of visitors centres in former torture and detention centres, while survivors and human rights lawyers continue their fight against impunity (perpetrators of crimes during the military regime are still being brought before the Chilean courts).[14]

3. History-Telling and the Limitations of Legal Space
Per definition, both courts and truth commissions engage in history-telling: the establishment of an authoritative narrative of past events is part and parcel of their remit. The creation of a truth commission and the historical narrative related in its report reflect the power relations in the

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country concerned, for the public debates surrounding the installation, functioning, and results of a commission are part and parcel of the truth-finding exercise with which it is concerned. That is perhaps more obvious in the case of a national truth commission, where there is a closeness and immediacy that is absent in the context of international courts. But there too, the political-historical roots involve many actors and produce mandates that shape not only proceedings and outcome, but also the "historical truth" that is globally disseminated through the verdict.

History-telling, however, is not only determined by the historical events and political processes that gave rise to the particular instrument of transitional justice concerned, but also by the goals and procedures of those instruments that make up the legal space in which history-telling takes place. Here, victim-witnesses have become a crucial source of history and collective memory. From the person who experienced a crime and can testify to the identity of its perpetrator and the manner and circumstances of its occurrence, "the victim" – an abstract entity – has become the spokesperson for humankind whose testimony is a moral necessity: "lest we forget." From the ubiquitous perspective of human rights discourse which informs the goals of transitional justice and is moreover transitional in another sense – namely a step on the cosmopolitan road to a truly human, global society – this is precisely as it should be.

However, the construction of victim-testimony in verdicts and reports is also the message that an international criminal court or truth commission broadcasts, and transitional justice selectively and deliberately endows victims of human rights violations with differentiated forms of subjectivity, envisioning a certain type of survivor (Sandvik 2009). Cosmopolitan imageries of suffering are both created and used by international courts, to establish their legitimacy and to underline their message to the world. Likewise, national truth commissions shape victim-testimony to "fit" what they (or their remit) regard as the demands of a viable national future. In both cases, victim-witnesses (and perpetrators) are constructed procedurally as a category from whom a certain legal performance is expected. But that is to ignore the contradictions and prob-

lems inherent in the legal space that procedures of transitional justice provide.

As legal instruments, both truth commissions and international criminal courts (must) regard the victim-witness as instrumental to their own processes and goals. Victims see those processes as instrumental in the alleviation of their own suffering and/or as means to recover the voice lost in victimhood. The latter may or may not overlap with the discourse of the victim as spokesperson for humankind, about which Winter (2006, 241–42) has remarked that, ethically it is the testimony that matters, not the instrumental uses to which it is put. That is a succinct description of the problem of history-telling through witness testimony in the context of what, after all, are instruments of a legal process of justice in which testimony is, by definition, instrumental. There is however a difference between the legal space that international criminal courts allot to the testimony of victim-witnesses and the legal space for testimony allotted by truth commissions, and the manner in which that space is restricted by the other goals of these different instruments of transitional justice.

3.1. International Criminal Courts: Doing Justice to Mass Atrocity

If the aims of international criminal justice are "as ambitious as they are contradictory" (Alvarez 2004, 321–22) and are discussed and criticized at length, the primary purpose of an international criminal trial (any criminal trial for that matter) – to establish the guilt of the perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt in a fair manner – is often overlooked. Yet this is precisely what delineates the legal procedural space of an international trial, within which all other goals must be achieved. This will remain inherently problematic unless we relinquish either the idea that crimes against humanity deserve to be punished under criminal law, or that such punishment is legitimate only after the establishment of guilt according to due process. Otherwise, there are limits – whatever the needs of victims.

Inevitably the narrative of crime will be reduced to a few provable sound-bites, in many ways devaluing the victim's experience by taking individual culpability out of the context of the historical reality. No trial of an individual mur-

derer can ever do justice to the experience of mass atrocity. Indeed, an individual does not "commit" such crimes in any normal sense of the word. They are collective, political, and social-psychological events involving a society as a whole. What any individual did personally is only a very small part of how such events developed and essentially unimportant in explaining or understanding them; but it is the only thing that matters in a criminal trial. Eichmann's final defence that he was expatiating "the guilt of the epoch" was in a sense true, but irrelevant.

That truth-finding by an international criminal court is, of necessity, related to personal guilt, also has repercussions for the value of that "truth" as history and its contribution to reconciliation. Even if the court manages to create "a coherent and judicially manageable narrative," international trials can only stop denial; they cannot impose shared remembering. "Justice will also serve the interests of truth. But the truth will not necessarily be believed, and it is putting too much faith in truth to believe that it can heal" (Ignatieff 1997, 15). Indeed, the very form of an adversarial trial, with its primary aim of establishing individual guilt, puts victims and perpetrators on either sides of a black and white divide that – given the shades of grey that characterize the collective nature of mass atrocities – is neither a "true" version of events nor a promising starting point for reconciliation and a tenable future.

3.2. History-Telling Beyond Truth Commissions

It has been argued that truth commissions are more suited than criminal trials to make possible a detailed analysis of the past and creating a national narrative that can be used broadly in society (Minow 2008, 180). It is true that they can publicly acknowledge and condemn the violent past. They can also examine the role of multiple sectors and actors, and stimulate debate. However, while they do not "suffer" from the overwhelming constraint of having to establish individual guilt within the strict limits of due process, whether or not they succeed in promoting peace, justice, and reconciliation depends on the commission's mandate and procedures, the way testimonies are woven into the official narrative, and the interaction between the way that the narrative is presented to, and received in, society.

The very public South African TRC as well as the much more closed Chilean National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Rettig Commission) and National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (Valech Commission) can all be said to have a "cultural afterlife" (Robins 2007) in which their narratives, ambiguities, and silences are engaged and contested. In Chile, the reports of both commissions strove for an objective, abstract, and closed narrative, framed in terms of the international human rights discourse. Family members, victim-survivors, and others engaged tirelessly in cultural, social, legal, and political contestation and negotiation of the official narrative, broadening the understanding of the military dictatorship and opening up other spaces for a much wider range of testimonies and memories in Chilean society. Here, not before the commissions, we find a public emotive and performative dimension of the Chilean processes of memorialization. This is the more remarkable given that the hearings before the Chilean commissions were closed to the public, while those of the South African TRC were broadcast on national radio and television.

As in Chile, the South African TRC did not reveal "the whole truth" nor reconcile the entire nation. "The TRC's successes as a state ritual were largely a result of the creative tension between its ambitious efforts to establish a totalising, nation-building discourse, and the contestations, ambiguities and contradictions that this process unleashed" (Robins 2007, 146). Cole (1997, 187) concludes that, "[I]n the disjunctions between participants' performances of truth they wished to perform and the commission's public iteration of the truth it wished to perform, we come closest to perceiving the complexity of the knowledge the TRC brought into being." That complexity is also evident in the space created in South African literature and art to touch upon silences and unspoken aspects of the past and to critique the TRC and its truth production (Gready 2009). Lisa Laplante (2007, 435) underlines the importance of both voice and agency when she draws attention to the act of truth-telling in the context of the Peruvian TRC: "Importantly, this desire *to tell* is accompanied by a need to be protagonists *in telling*. … it is the change in personal and political status as truth-tellers, and not just the content

of this truth, that makes memory projects important endeavours" (italics in the original).

3.3. Conclusion

The current victim-oriented paradigm of transitional justice asserts that the (hi)story of the suffering of victims is paramount to establishing a shared – moral – memory that serves the demands of a stable and democratic future and at the same time does justice to the victims themselves. Yet, precisely because this historical narrative is couched in terms of gross violations of individual human rights and also aims at nation-building, in practice it inevitably distorts the historical "reality" of collective mass atrocities and the victims' remembered experiences of it. That is true of both international criminal courts and truth commissions.

However, because the legal space that truth commissions can provide for history-telling is flexible and their reports, though authoritative, open to public debate, they also encourage competing public and private discourses in alternative public spaces where that debate can be conducted and the master narrative contested. It is perhaps this aspect that completes their role as history-tellers and allows them to promote a shared memory of the past: his-

tory-telling and the promotion of collective memory is not the prerogative of historians, but takes place in all of the public and private spheres of society.

A truth commission's report opens opportunities for victims that the verdict of a court would be expected to close. In that sense, truth commissions offer empowerment in ways in which an international criminal court never can; they also allow for the development of competing theatres of memory, leaving room for other voices that may differ and even oppose the official historical narrative. The legal truth, laid down in the rulings of an international criminal court is, by definition, *not* open-ended. The verdict of a court is definite and authoritative; in this context, closure, not continued debate about what it has established as the truth, is its one and only purpose – indeed, on this its legitimacy depends. But then, also by definition, its contribution to history-telling, collective memory, and justice for victims is limited indeed. All of this is not to say that truth commissions are better than international criminal trials, for it should not be forgotten that trials offer an end to impunity and retribution in ways that truth commissions never can. Only that they are different, and that each has its own, limited role to play in transitional justice.

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Guest Editorial: Qualitative Research on Prejudice

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Guest Editorial: Qualitative Research on Prejudice

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Central topics and challenges for current social research on prejudice and discrimination are outlined and discussed with special regard to how such research may benefit from a stronger focus on qualitative and mixed methods perspectives. Such a methodological approach is described as particularly fruitful in dealing with the *context-sensitive flexibility and fragmentation* of prejudiced behavior; the special role of *ideological patterns of justification in such expressions* of prejudice; and the *normative character and reflexivity of prejudice research* itself. The contributions to this issue are then presented against the backdrop of this theoretical and methodological framework.

The discrimination and persecution of minority groups on the basis of stereotypical patterns of perception is still a highly relevant and prevailing problem in modern societies. Recent incidents such as the mass murder committed by Anders Breivik in Norway, the violent attacks against Romani people in the Czech Republic, anti-Semitic hate speech against intellectuals in Hungary, or the serial killing of immigrants by the right wing terrorist group Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund (National Socialist Underground) in Germany point to the urgent necessity of interdisciplinary research on prejudice and stereotyping.

But the social issue of prejudiced behavior is not limited to fierce and open antipathy or violent hate crimes. Research must also face the challenge of coping with elusive and latent forms of prejudice that occur in a variety of different guises in complex sociopolitical contexts. Such contexts constitute the ideological framework in which more violent expressions of prejudice and discrimination are embedded. In conceptualizing for example subtle racism (Pettigrew and Meertens 1995), benevolent sexism (Glick and Fiske 2012; Jackman 1996), and institutional discrimination (Pager and Shepherd 2008), research has acknowledged "the inadequacy of defining prejudice solely as an antipathy" (Dovidio et al. 2005, 11). This concentration on the flexible, less easily

defined expressions of prejudice and their embedment in everyday interaction coincides with a critical reassessment of two other "foundational assumptions of the prejudice problematic, notably its individualistic orientation and its assumptions about the role played by cognitive irrationality" (Dixon and Levine 2012, 3). The problem of individualism has been criticized as an "over-psychologization" (Billig 1991, 126) of the phenomenon in question and an indicator of disregard for prejudice as a social issue with fluid boundaries towards broader topics such as social inequality, nationalism, and ethnicity. The psychological monopoly on the notion of prejudice is thus criticized for misconstruing prejudice as "a personal pathology, a failure of inner-directed empathy and intellect, rather than a social pathology, shaped by power relations and the conflicting vested interests of groups" (Wetherell 2012, 165). Even though most of today's psychological prejudice research has acknowledged the situated and contextual character of prejudiced action, an integrated theory of social and psychological aspects of prejudice is still under development and is often hindered by rigid disciplinary cultures and boundaries.

The criticism of an overly individualistic perspective on prejudice is closely connected to the question of the putative irrationality or falseness of stereotypes: The limits of the

"classical" Allportian criterion of prejudice as based on "faulty and inflexible generalization[s]" (Allport [1954] 1979, 9) have been extensively discussed by authors who attempted to develop a more differentiated view on the propositional content of prejudiced expressions (Jussim et al. 2009; Wetherell and Potter 1992, 67 ff.). Proponents of "Rhetorical Psychology" have argued that the falseness of prejudice talk is not of a propositional but rather of a rhetorical or performative and ultimately normative nature (Billig 1991, 38–39). Although it cannot be denied that ignorance, false beliefs, and bigotry are important sources of discrimination, many instances of prejudice occur in the gray areas of normative rhetoric, which is typically concerned with what ought to be, not what can be settled by mere facts. This perspective has led many researchers in the field to reflexively reconsider their normative stance and the part they play in the rhetorical "game" of talk about prejudice and its (scientific) critique (Wetherell 2012, 176; Dixon et al. 2012).

But since egalitarian and anti-prejudice norms have – at least officially – become an established and widely accepted normative standard in most democratic societies, reflexivity is today a feature not only of prejudice research but also of much of today's prejudice itself: An important feature of contemporary prejudiced action is often a contradictory, sometimes paradoxical, self-awareness by which justifications of prejudiced or discriminatory speech become an integral part of prejudiced rhetoric. Today a substantial portion of infractions of equality norms are not explicitly directed *against* equality, they rather present themselves as *readings of* egalitarian norms: Where "traditional" overt racism claims the natural inferiority of respective out-groups, modern racism seeks to legitimize its position by tropes of diversity and fairness; where "traditional" homophobia marks LGBT sexual orientations as pathological and immoral, its modern expressions present themselves as an egalitarian defense of traditional lifestyles. Thus, as Margaret Wetherell points out with regard to the analysis of racist discourse, "an important part of anti-racist practice is identifying the forms legitimation takes, and charting also the fragmented and dilemmatic nature of everyday discourse, because it is at those points of fracture and contradiction that there is scope for change and the redirection of argument" (Wetherell 2012, 176).

The theoretical focus shift from prejudice as an individual attribute to prejudice as a social, context-embedded phenomenon that increasingly employs an ideologically reflexive rhetoric is strongly connected to methodological questions about empirical research into stereotyping and prejudice. In the wake of linguistic, cultural, and practical turns in the social sciences, qualitative research methods have long since become an integral part of prejudice research and have initiated considerable development in our understanding of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. More strongly than the predominant quantitative methodology of prejudice research, qualitative research is focused on prejudice as a variety of often ambivalent, fragmented, and particularly context-related phenomena. This focus section aims to fill a specific gap in the research literature on prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination: While the methodological and methodical chapters in recent handbooks on prejudice almost exclusively deal with quantitative methods (Dovidio et al. 2010; Nelson 2009; Petersen and Six 2008), handbooks and monographs on qualitative methods show hardly any interest in the topic of prejudice. The present focus section seeks to add to this particular area of research by highlighting the specific potential and contributions of qualitative studies in prejudice research. However, the strengths of qualitative methods in reconstructing the interpretative repertoires (Wetherell and Potter 1992), rhetorical functions, and context specific flexibilities of prejudice should not be played off against standardized research methods. Recent debates about the relation between qualitative and quantitative methods have made clear that attempts to strictly separate qualitative and quantitative methodological paradigms are based on very shaky methodological foundations (Kelle 2008; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009) and serve to constrain rather than foster critical and innovative social research. Furthermore, like quantitative research, qualitative approaches also exhibit weak points of their own and can profit from a quantitative perspective just as much as vice versa. Just as efforts to theoretically advance prejudice research clearly benefit from a crossing of disciplinary divides between psychological, sociological, historical and other approaches, the answer to the accompanying methodological questions can be neither strictly qualitative nor strictly quantitative. Instead, from a perspective of method triangulation, research designs in which qualitative and quantitative methods show

"complementary strengths and non-overlapping weaknesses" (Johnson and Turner, quoted in Kelle 2008, 47) may advance prejudice research to a considerable degree.

The introductory remarks above have outlined three major topics for "qualitative research on prejudice:"
- the context-sensitive flexibility and fragmentation of prejudiced behavior;
- its normative ambivalence with regard to egalitarian norms and the special role of the ideological patterns of justification emerging from it; and
- methodological considerations concerning the strengths and weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative research methods and the normative character of prejudice research itself.

The contributions presented in this focus section deal with these aspects of prejudice research in various ways, highlighting the specific strengths of qualitative perspectives and multi-method approaches.

Peter Martin's contribution shows that when anti-racism becomes a generally accepted cultural and societal norm, racialized practices of discrimination and identity construction may take on ambivalent and reflexive forms. Martin seeks to accommodate those new forms of racial prejudice through the concept of "differentialist racism," a form of out-group construction that relies mainly on rigid cultural distinctions while presenting itself as anti-racist. In his mixed-methods design, Martin initially shows how participants in a standardized survey of London residents simultaneously endorse anti-racism and differentialism. For this purpose, he uses a newly developed scale for everyday differentialism. In the second step, qualitative interviews conducted with members of a subsample from the survey show how the interview partners reconcile contradictory racist and anti-racist orientations. Martin argues for a mixed-methods approach and discusses strengths and weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative approaches towards prejudice: By employing and combining qualitative and quantitative methods, patterns of ambivalent prejudice can be extensively described and their prevalence in a certain population can be statistically estimated. Additionally, qualitative and quantitative methods proved to be produc-

tive for cross-validating the operationalization of differentialist racism.

Jessica Walton, Naomi Priest, and Yin Paradies focus on lay conceptions of prejudice, a topic rarely addressed in current research, and seek to close this gap by drawing on cognitive interviews and focus groups. The data show that while manifest racism is predominantly conceived as offensive, strongly emotional, and violent, more subtle or even benevolent forms of racialized discrimination or stereotyping are often not recognized as problematic. Furthermore, participants' assessments of whether an utterance can be seen as racist speech focused on the assumed intentions of speakers, on the relation between speaker and addressees, and on the potential for direct offense. Racialized discourse is thus rated acceptable if it is uttered in a familiar social environment with no obvious intent of harming anybody and if it does not directly offend persons present. These results can also be differentiated with regard to the participants' class and social status: Interviewees with a working class background were more likely to regard racialized talk as non-racist if it was uttered in informal talk among friends (joking, etc.) or if it did not directly (physically) harm anyone. Benefits of the triangulation of data from focus groups and cognitive interviews are discussed with regard to their complementary character: While interviews were used to investigate individual understandings of examples of racialized talk, focus groups centered on the most consensual and common aspects of lay theorizing.

Felix Knappertsbusch discusses the limits of current conceptualizations of anti-Americanism and in the process deals with the general problem of conceptualizing prejudice and operationalizing such concepts for empirical research. Typical attempts at deriving nominal definitions by naming core criteria often cause serious difficulties for empirical researchers, who must decide whether such criteria are met in the data. Furthermore, such definitions also display theoretical deficits since they often fail to account for the great variety and variability of anti-American utterances. Finally, this approach does not pay enough attention to the importance of the social and ideological context of prejudiced speech. To address these problems, Knappertsbusch proposes a practice theoretical turn in the conceptualization of anti-Americanism: Instead of searching for a "true essence"

of anti-Americanism, empirical research should treat such prejudice as an open network of speech acts bound by family resemblances rather than by overarching criteria of identity. In this way, researchers are relieved of the insurmountable task of looking for a minimal set of criteria for, or a common denominator of, anti-Americanism. An adequate theoretical analysis and understanding of anti-American speech which considers its "situated use" and context-dependence requires its *in vivo* study through a close investigation of empirical instances. Adopting such a performative perspective, Knappertsbusch uses qualitative interviews to analyze the interplay between different conceptions of America in their situated use. In this way, different forms of "use in context" of anti-American utterances are described where seemingly paradoxical strategies of stereotyping help to preserve and stabilize nationalist identity constructions.

E. Rosemary McKeever, Richard Reed, Samuel Pehrson, Lesley Storey, and J. Christopher Cohrs investigated discursive means of legitimizing violence against (immigrant) minority groups. Within the theoretical framework of discourse analysis and rhetorical psychology, they provide an account of how violent attacks on a Belfast immigrant community are legitimized through the dehumanization of the target group and its construal as a threat to the racial-national in-group. The authors provide an exemplary analysis of a leaflet circulated in the loyalist Donegall Pass area of Belfast demanding the removal of the Chinese population. From a practice theoretical perspective, two main discursive effects can be reconstructed within the pamphlet: A "community-focused discourse" serves to naturalize the ethnic and cultural boundaries between the in-group and the Chinese minority and marks the latter as morally inferior. A "martial discourse" then constructs the scenario of an immigrant threat to the local community and legitimizes violent action against minority members as a defensive strategy. This aggressive out-group construction is then discussed in relation to the corresponding in-group construction: The discursive strategy of the leaflet is shown to draw on fears that continually resonate in the history of loyalist culture.

Vera King, Hans-Christoph Koller, and Janina Zölch address the victim perspective with regard to stereotyping and discrimination: What are the psychological and social con-

sequences of being a target of prejudice, stigmatization and discriminatory practices? Their research focuses on Turkish families in Germany, who often experience a somewhat paradoxical life situation between mobility and immobility: Having covered huge geographical distances to start a new life, they find themselves trapped in highly segregated residential quarters and in a situation with rather limited prospects for social advancement. Under these circumstances, parents often develop great hopes and high aspirations concerning their children's success in the German educational system. However, their offspring may experience serious difficulties there – even children and adolescents who never migrated themselves are frequently treated as immigrants due to their families' ethnic background. Discrimination in schools and a lack of familiarity with dominant cultural codes impacts the educational careers of young Turks and may lead to disappointment, feelings of shame and guilt, and severe tension within families. To develop a better understanding of the coping strategies employed to deal with these problems, narrative interviews were conducted with young males and their parents. Koller and colleagues found that the strategies developed by families to cope with discrimination and marginalization are handed down to subsequent generations in remarkably different ways. Two types of dealing with marginalization are presented in detail: Parents may desperately strive to escape marginalization through perfect ("hyper"-)integration and thereby deny experiences of discrimination and conceal the resulting hardships and aggressions. As a consequence, children may display unfocused and explosive forms of rebellion at school which endanger their educational accomplishments. A contrasting case study presents parents who were allowed to talk freely about experiences of powerlessness and distress related to their marginalized situation as migrants. This openness also helped them to develop role models as active citizens who proactively work for the betterment of their situation.

Oliver Decker, Katharina Rothe, Marliese Weissmann, Johannes Kiess, and Elmar Brähler center their article on social psychological mechanisms which bring about the statistical correlation between right-wing orientations and economic disintegration. With their qualitative research, they follow up on a survey on right-wing extremism in Germany in which the well-known association of right-wing attitudes

on the one hand and social and economic deprivation on the other hand was replicated. Quantitative and qualitative methods are integrated in a sequential mixed-methods design to understand and explain this statistical correlation through a psychoanalytically oriented analysis of focus group discussions. Interpreting data from those discussions, the authors conclude that the narcissistic trauma of German national identity caused by the Second World War was relieved and covered by the economic prosperity of the immediate post-war era. If, however, this "narcissistic filling" is removed, as is the case during the current recession, the economically deprived return to their traditional means of restoring feelings of national strength and unity by ostracizing and blaming migrants and other supposedly harmful groups. Thus, by drawing on a mixed-methods design, the authors were able to interpret and explain findings from a quantitative study and develop a detailed and historically situated account of how deprivation and right-wing extremist attitudes are functionally connected in everyday discourse.

Bjoern Milbradt's contribution deals with the syndrome character of prejudice from an epistemological and language theoretical perspective. He criticizes the traditional and still predominant psychological concept of stereotyping and prejudice as "inner states," offering instead a speech-act-theoretical approach. This perspective is developed along the lines of the Frankfurt School of critical theory as well as the rhetorical psychology of Michael Billig. In Milbradt's reading of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and the *Authoritarian Personality*, the notions of ticket-thinking and stereotyping are used as a theoretical framework to understand and depict a certain disintegration of the linguistic means of perception taking place in modern capitalist societies. However, language simultaneously offers the potential for emancipation through individual reference to particular objects and for coercion through their inflexible categorization. Consequently, the ability to reflect on this double potential is the precondition of free and flexible (and therefore accurate) perception. Stereotyping is defined as the loss of this reflexive ability, which results in perception becoming a mere "propaganda trial" in which any object is subjected to a preconceived judgment. This mechanism of "rigid notions" is carved out as the overarching feature leading to a syndrome-like coherence of different forms of prejudice. Using excerpts from Norwegian

mass-murderer Anders Behring Breivik's manifesto, Milbradt exemplifies such a reified and essentially imperceptive mode of speaking, in which every object is rigidly subsumed under the schemata of an overall world view. In this paper, qualitative methods of social research are discussed for their potential to reconstruct the different forms and expressions which such stereotypical language may take.

As can be seen from the summaries given above, this focus section displays the wide theoretical and methodological diversity of current qualitative research on prejudice, which is nevertheless bound together by certain leitmotifs. Results from qualitative research in this field demonstrate, on the one hand, limits of quantitative monomethod research as well as of social psychological concepts like "attitude" or "stereotype." On the other hand, the contributions do not dismiss quantitative approaches, but rather stress their benefits. Although the focus section lays strong emphasis on qualitative methods, it also reflects current trends in social research to bridge the gap between methodological paradigms and to address research problems without reinforcing established disciplinary and methodological divides. Whilst surveys are able to tell us more about tendencies in the dissemination of attitudes, a closer examination of interviews or focus groups may tell us more about ambivalences of prejudice (cf. Martin in this issue) as well as of the discursive relation of a phenomenon that remains relatively unclear if it is solely researched in a quantitative paradigm (cf. Decker et al. in this issue). In the process of such an examination, both qualitative and quantitative approaches have to cope with the "systematic ambiguity" (Winch 2008 [1958], 25) of meaningful social action. This ambiguity cannot be dissolved by applying nominal definitions to the object of our research (cf. Knappertsbusch in this issue). That is, if we take seriously the linguistic turn and its epistemological consequences, we cannot reasonably speak of *the* prejudice or *the* stereotype (Milbradt) without methodically taking into account the flexibility of their situated expression. Standardization and nominal definitions are *one* way to cope with those challenges, but they have certain shortcomings that must be critically reflected. One possibility to foster such reflection is the use of mixed methods designs: The use of methods of survey research, experiments, interviews, focus groups, or ethnographic fieldwork should not be regarded as a mere con-

sequence of the fact that researchers are rooted in mutually exclusive paradigms. Rather, these approaches can be seen as different but complementary expressions of the common *theoretical* goal of deepening our understanding of the phenomena in question. In accommodating recent efforts of social psychology to take into account ambivalences as well as situational factors and sociopolitical contexts, current research on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination intensifies its efforts to arrive at an interdisciplinary research program that deals with various forms of social practices

rather than with solely individual or mental phenomena. Thus, the handing down of experiences of stigmatization and discrimination between generations (cf. King et al. in this issue), the legitimization of racist violence (cf. McKeever et al. in this issue) and the situational development of acceptance or rejection of racist discourse (cf. Walton et al. in this issue) shed light on the necessity of developing an interdisciplinary research framework that does not level down the strengths of different approaches, but joins them together in a productive collaborative effort.

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"It Depends How You're Saying It": The Complexities of Everyday Racism

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While racism is widely recognised as a complex social phenomenon, the basis for defining and identifying everyday racism from a lay perspective is not well understood. This exploration of factors used to frame everyday racism draws on seven cognitive interviews and four focus groups conducted in November 2010 and January 2011 with Australian adults predominantly from Anglo ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The study reveals lay theorising centring on tropes of intentionality, effect of speech, relationality and acceptability. Participants were more likely to think of racism as having negative, overtly offensive and emotional connotations. Racialised speech that was not considered to be blatantly racist was more contested, with participants engaging in complex theorising to determine whether or not such speech constituted racism. The study also highlights the potential of qualitative research to inform survey development as an unobtrusive method for in-depth participant reflection. The ambiguous nature of everyday racism demonstrated in this paper indicates a need to foster more nuanced lay understandings of racism that encompass the subtle, rational and complementary expressions that can be situated within institutions and society.

Racism is a complex and enduring social problem that exists in many forms at institutional, interpersonal and individual levels. Racism can be broadly defined as a phenomenon that maintains or exacerbates avoidable and unfair inequalities in power, resources, or opportunities across racial, ethnic, cultural, or religious groups in society. While the inclusion of religion in such definitions has been debated, we include it in recognition of its frequent conflation with ethnicity and culture in popular culture (Hartman et al. 2011). Moreover, while we recognise culture is not synonymous with race or ethnicity, in some parts of the world, including Australia, culture is commonly used as a proxy for, and conflated with, race and/or ethnicity and/or religion (Moran 2011). At a personal level, racism can be expressed through beliefs (e.g., negative and inaccurate stereotypes), emotions (e.g., fear or hatred), or behaviours/

practices (e.g., unfair treatment) (Berman and Paradies 2010). Some research suggests that attitudes are stable phenomenon stored in long-term memory while other evidence indicates attitudes are constructed "on the spot" in response to particular situations. Given these mixed findings, most scholars now acknowledge that attitudes have both stable and contextually variable elements (Akrami et al. 2009; Bohner and Dickel 2011). More specifically, there is evidence that while contextual factors affect level of prejudice, stable personality traits still account for an individual's level of prejudice in relation to others in the same situation (Akrami et al. 2009).

The term "everyday racism" references the recurrent and normalised existence of racism as "infused into familiar practices" such as talk (including jokes) and behaviour

(Essed 1991, 3). Everyday racism pertains to mundane discourse and practices rather than extreme incidents. It is embedded in routine and everyday practice and can be experienced as amorphous and ambiguous (Essed 1991).

A range of qualitative research has examined people's lived experiences as targets of racism (Essed 1990, 1991) while the broader concept of diversity has been studied among people from the majority group (Bell and Hartmann 2007). Some psychological research has considered lay or folk conceptualisations of racism, largely focused on stereotypes, essentialism and ideologies (Levy, Chiu, and Hong 2006) as well as the causes and persistence of racism (Esses and Hodson 2006). A more extensive body of psychological scholarship has examined the ambiguity of defining racism from the target's perspective, such as studies exploring attributional ambiguity (Crocker et al. 1991; Major, Quinton, and Schmader 2003; Hoyt et al. 2007).

In-depth analyses of racism in context pursued within discursive psychology tend to focus on how and in what ways discourse can be characterised as racist as determined by researchers (Augoustinos and Every 2007; Van Dijk 2003; Tuffin 2008). In particular, this scholarship is concerned with "the study of racist discourse and rhetoric in terms of its psychological and political functions" (Tuffin 2008, 594), on "every-day sense making in terms of how it functions rhetorically within interaction" (Hanson-Easey, Alen, and Augoustinos 2012, 29) and on the denial of racism (Augoustinos and Every 2007). Instead of identifying racism and its functions within discourse and interaction, our paper focuses on how lay participants discuss racism, including both its abstract definition and its concrete expression in particular situations involving everyday racism. To put it simply, instead of focusing on "racism in talk," we examine "talk about racism."

To our knowledge, and according to other scholars, there has been little previous research examining the complex and nuanced attribution of everyday racism from the perspective of majority group members (Sommers and Norton 2006). In fact, there has been scant attention to lay conceptions more broadly, with scholars largely con-

sidering everyday actors as "unreflexive formulators of stereotyped views, bearers of prejudiced attitudes, or agents of discriminatory behaviour" (Figgou and Condor, 219) while the concept of "racism" remains an unexamined "backdrop for analysis" (Figgou and Condor 2006, 220). This point has been emphasised most recently by Billig (2012, 152) who notes, "there is little social scientific work to fall back upon, in order to demonstrate what people consider to be prototypical examples of prejudice and discrimination."

Our research builds in particular on issues identified by three recent studies. A study conducted with twenty-six school students in Australia found that although racism was often "taken-for-granted" with a shared common-sense understanding, much discussion was nonetheless concerned with defining racism in relation to tropes such as freedom of speech (McLeod and Yates 2003). Figgou and Condor (2006, 237) focused on "documenting the ways in which the constructs of prejudice and racism were employed as rhetorical resources" as they related to Albanian immigration in Greece. A significant finding across thirty-two semi-structured interviews was a distinction between conceptual understandings of racism and prejudice and how these concepts were drawn upon as rhetorical strategies to describe situations in practice. At a conceptual level, respondents questioned the accuracy of stereotypes that negatively portray Albanians as criminals – but then reiterated these stereotypes when considering everyday situations (Figgou and Condor 2006). Finally, a comparative sociological study looked at how Black professionals in Brazil and South Africa made sense of the persistence of racism at a societal level (Silva 2012). While these studies begin to explore lay conceptualisations, there is a need to explore in greater detail how people define and identify everyday racism in order to inform more effective anti-racism strategies.

1. Methods

The data utilised in this paper is drawn from a larger project to assess community and organisational capacity/readiness to respond to racism witnessed in interpersonal situations or identified in organisational culture (Pennay and Paradies 2011). Specifically, the research draws on four

focus groups (each with seven or eight participants) conducted in November 2010 and seven cognitive interviews conducted in January 2011 (no participant was involved in both an interview and focus group). Data collection was conducted in Melbourne, Australia, to inform the development of a structured telephone survey instrument intended to understand factors that enable or prevent action by those who witness racism. As the transcribed interview and focus group data yielded sufficient information for thematic saturation, no further recruitment was required (Morgan 2008).

Participants were working adults (25–50 years old) involved in local community sports clubs either directly or via their children. Participants included an even mix of genders, a diverse range of occupations across socioeconomic levels, and were from predominantly Anglo-Australian backgrounds. The focus groups were purposively selected such that two focus groups were undertaken with "blue-collar" participants (those in skilled or unskilled manual employment) and two with "white-collar" participants (those in professional or para-professional employment). While detailed information about the racial, ethnic and cultural background of participants was not explicitly collected by the Social Research Centre, such information was gathered from transcripts as the majority of participants identified their racial, ethnic or cultural background when responding to questions during the interviews and focus groups.

Research ethics approval for the study was granted by the Faculty of Humanities and Social Science Ethics Committee at La Trobe University (#917-10). Participants were recruited via a market research agency with quotas set to ensure equal representation of blue- and white-collar employees. Interviews and cognitive interviews were conducted on site at the Social Research Centre by experienced qualitative interviewers. A $60 reimbursement to cover out-of-pocket expenses was provided to participants.

Cognitive interviewing or testing is a widely utilised qualitative technique for informing survey development by understanding the cognitive processes that individuals engage in when attempting to respond to survey items

(Willis 2005; Beatty and Willis 2007). This method has been used effectively to determine the quality of survey items in terms of performance functionality, validity and reliability (Latcheva 2011; Reeve et al. 2011). Although sharing many similarities with other forms of qualitative interviewing, cognitive testing tends to include a suite of specific techniques such as respondent observation, concurrent think-aloud techniques, paraphrasing tasks, probes, confidence ratings and answer elaboration (Hak, van der Veel, and Ommundsen 2006; Beatty and Willis 2007).

Participants in the individual cognitive interviews were asked questions from a survey about their views on the acceptability of various forms of racism (slang, jokes, insults/verbal abuse and comments on social media websites). For example, they were asked whether it would be acceptable to tell a racist joke when a person of that background was present and could have been offended. They were also asked whether it was acceptable for someone to tell a racist joke when the person of that background was not present and no harm was intended. Here, the issues are threefold: (1) the presence of the targeted person, (2) the intent of the joke, and (3) the potential for offence. Cognitive interview techniques included (1) follow-up probes to determine what comes to mind when asked about these phenomena (e.g. when we use a term like racist slang, what sort of things are you thinking of?), (2) respondent observation (e.g. so do you find that question a bit confusing?), (3) confidence ratings to assess participants' response options (e.g. why would you agree as opposed to strongly agree?), and (4) answer elaboration (what is your main reason for strongly agreeing with all of those things?)

Focus groups enhance the validity of survey research by providing more detailed understanding of the topic under consideration (Wilkinson 1998) by: contributing to the identification of relevant theoretical concepts; assisting in the formulation of appropriate hypotheses; and aiding in effective communication with the target population (Fuller et al. 1993). For this study, a semi-structured interview schedule was used to guide the focus groups, prompting participants to discuss situations where they had witnessed or observed racism, explain the nuances of racist incidents, and explore their perceptions of what constitutes racism.

Cognitive interviewing techniques were not used in focus groups.

Interviews and focus groups were audio recorded, transcribed by a commercial provider and checked for accuracy by the first author. In the transcripts, separate lines denote a change in speaker and italicised text indicates the interviewer's speech. Compared to individual cognitive interviews, the fundamental unit of analysis for focus group research is the group itself, rather than the individual. In general, the explicit differentiation of individuals from qualitative focus group data is not appropriate for the purposes of analysis (i.e. in-depth one-on-one interviews are carried out for such a purpose). Instead, the conversational interaction between individuals is an important aspect of group research especially in terms of how they build consensus or provide opposing perspectives to support the discussion (Willis et al. 2009). We have drawn on this group dynamic in the focus groups to provide a richer understanding of lay conceptualisations of everyday racism.

Transcripts were coded using a content analysis approach in which pre-determined topics and constructs were used deductively to code the transcripts, searching the data for these categories and recording where and when they occur (Ryan and Bernard 2000). This process was conducted by all three authors separately with a focus on identifying categories where participants discussed racism as a conceptual construct, described types of racism, and considered factors that influenced the identification and acceptability of racism. The emerging categories were then discussed by all three authors before further coding and refining by the first author into a conceptual overview of themes and subthemes describing the data. This iterative analysis process also included reviewing transcripts and emergent themes to consider in more detail how participants defined racism as a conceptual construct and how this compared to the ways they described racialised discourse in an everyday context. Common patterns and any differences or unique perspectives within the data were identified and incorporated into the analysis (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Gibbs et al. 2007; Willis et al. 2007). Lastly, themes and sub-themes were linked to theoretical concepts relevant to the study (Green et al. 2007; Willis et al. 2007).

This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the ways in which: (1) racism is defined at an abstract level from lay perspectives; (2) factors are used to determine whether a racialised comment is thought to constitute racism, including intent, relationality, potential for offence and online versus off-line contexts; (3) different types of racialised discourse, such as race-based jokes and racist slang are understood in relation to their perceived social acceptability; and (4) race-based talk (racialism) is identified as racism. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the potential benefits in utilising focus groups and interviews to discuss the complexities of identifying everyday racism.

2. Defining Racism

Focus group participants were initially asked to describe what they think of when they hear the word "racism." Most participants associated racism with negative connotations, especially a negative focus on difference, discrimination and disadvantage based on race and nationality, as well as a lack of acceptance.

Participants across both focus groups and cognitive interviews explained that racism is based on individual ignorance or a lack of knowledge, which can then lead to negative attitudes and behaviours toward difference. They also defined racism as a negative focus on racial differences that also denied a common humanity. For example, one cognitive interview participant stated, "I think it's almost like saying that even though we all have a heart and lungs and a soul and everything that you're just not human, you're different to me but not in a way of a different personality" (Interview 3, female white-collar). This supports previous findings that people understand prejudice as an irrational disregard of both individual differences and the commonality humans share as a species (Figgou and Condor 2006; Bain et al. 2012). In the following excerpt, unregulated extreme emotion and irrational behaviour are cited as visible markers of racism:

What sorts of attitudes or behaviours come to mind when you think about racism, what sort of behaviours?

Aggression

In what sense?

Oh just, very vocal, not placid, just very out there, heated, angry.

Exclusion. […]

I think ignorance as well, you just judge instantly without knowing anything about anyone.

(Focus Group 2, female white-collar)

Ignorance.

Discrimination.

Just unacceptance [sic] and ignorance as well yeah.

A lack of understanding about the cultures.

I think it's a way of separating people not bringing them together.

(Focus Group 4, female blue-collar)

In this description, racism is not just about recognising difference, but also about excluding people based on that perceived difference. Furthermore, irrational thought processes such as judging other people unfairly based on racial and cultural differences to the exclusion of all other individual factors contribute to this lay understanding of racism.

In addition, participants also connected ignorance with unfamiliarity as a reason for racist attitudes and behaviours. A few participants suggested that a lack of close friends from other racial or cultural backgrounds contributed to ignorance, resulting in behaviour that excludes people based on negative and stereotyped constructions of difference.

A lot of it's based on ignorance and lack of understanding and lack of knowing. Because you see often, you might see someone who's racist and then all of a sudden an Indian person who moves in next door and they become friends with them, and all of a sudden they're no longer racist, you know, so they just get to know them.

(Focus Group 3, male white-collar)

In this example, the participant suggests that physical proximity to neighbours and exposure to people from different racial and cultural backgrounds contribute to the potential for friendship. This supports the research litera-

ture on intergroup contact and the role of friendship in promoting positive attitudes toward people from different cultural backgrounds (Pettigrew 2008).

In contrast to participants in other groups, the male blue-collar focus group participants mainly identified something as racism if it was aggressive or severe including swearing and physical violence. The group agreed that it is the intent behind the words or actions as well as the degree of severity that determine whether something is racist. The participants focused on examples of severe physical and verbal violence as being clear indicators of unacceptable and thus, racist behaviour:

Race based, racially motivated stabbings have occurred in groups as well. So, yeah, [group violence] for sure is severe.

Sledging in sport I would not put as severe because it hasn't led to violence yet.[1]

[…]

Yeah. Everything we're putting in severe seems to be physically hurting people.

Yeah.

Yep.

(Focus Group 1, male blue-collar)

Milder race-based behaviours such as some types of sledging were more contested in terms of whether they constituted racism. As a result, these participants tended to question whether drawing attention to racial differences is always negative, and thus always racist:

Racism can be positive as well, can't it? The definition of it, there's no [inherent] negative [association]. It's basically just saying someone is different for their race rather than, you know, someone who is bad for being racist. You could have positive racist things as well.

(Focus Group 1, male blue-collar)

Another participant from a different focus group indicated that there could be a continuum when thinking about racism, stating that it is "more negative than positive" (Focus

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1 Sledging is a term used in sport, typically in cricket, to refer to verbal insults or intimidations to unnerve players on the opposing team.

Group 2, female white-collar). These descriptions begin to delve into the ambiguity of racism. Such lay theorising echoes the concept of "racialisation" that is broadly defined as the process by which situations with racial elements become meaningful in different contexts (Delgado and Stefancic 2001). Such situations can have aspects that constitute racism and/or anti-racism (Kowal et al. 2013). As noted by Giroux (2006), even in academic circles, racialisation is often erroneously considered as synonymous with racism.

Aside from these ambiguities about the valence of racism, participants were confident defining racism on an abstract level. According to their lay understanding, racism is characterised by ignorance, extreme emotion, aggression, an irrational and negative focus on racial difference, and demeaning behaviour. These lay conceptualisations of racism share with academic definitions a focus on "'blatant, simple, hot, direct' beliefs (i.e. ignorance), emotion (e.g. aggression) and behaviour (demeaning others) but fail to recognise 'more subtle, complex, cool, implicit biases'" (Dixon and Levine 2012, 304). There is also a failure to highlight broader issues of unfair treatment, power differentials and institutional racism. This omission is not surprising given the "invisible" nature of institutional racism and racist social structures (Williams 1985).

When asked to think about everyday situations in which racism might occur, identifying something as racism and considering whether it was acceptable or not was a much more difficult task for those participating in interviews and focus groups. The following sections explore specific factors that participants discussed as contributing to the situated ambiguity of identifying racism.

3. Identifying Everyday Racism

Building on the previous section, participants were given different situations involving race-based (or racialised) comments. Generally, the statements to which participants responded lacked details on the relationship between those involved in the hypothetical situation (e.g. someone told a racist joke about another person). In responding to the statements, participants clearly highlighted that it was important to know the specifics of social relationships in

order to determine the acceptability of comments. In the following examples, participants focused on interpersonal considerations such as relational proximity, the position of the interlocutor, the intent and impact of comments, and the presence or absence of a "target" person, including whether the comment was made face-to-face or online.

3.1. Relationality and Positionality

Relational proximity or familiarity was an important factor for participants to consider before making a racialised joke or using racialised slang, as illustrated by the following excerpts:

> Well, a group of mates you can say anything you want to, don't you? And they know what your opinions are, so they're not surprised by what you say. Whereas with people you don't know you have to guard your opinions a bit more until you know what their opinions are.
>
> (Focus Group 1, male blue-collar)

> If you've just met the person I probably just wouldn't go there but if you know what they're like and what their boundaries are.
>
> (Interview 4, male blue-collar)

> I mean you do say that because I've known her for a long time because we do as a joke sometimes make little funny comments and then we have a laugh because I say, well I can say that because I am Chinese. It's almost like having a joke with your family. We'll talk about bad drivers and you know the old, oh crazy Asian drivers. And you can say that.
>
> (Interview 1, female white-collar)

> Well my husband and his friends call each other "wog" and they can call each other that but nobody else can. You have to be in that circle, you know.
>
> (Focus Group 4, female blue-collar)

In the first three examples, relational proximity depends on how long people have known each other, how well they know each other, and what is considered appropriate within the context of a particular relationship. In the third and fourth examples, the authority to draw on prevalent stereotypes or to refer to someone using racist slang such as "wog", which has historically been used to demean people from a Mediterranean background (in particular Italians and Greeks), is also dependent on the shared identity of those present. Furthermore, because participants in the blue-collar focus groups were more likely to consider

racialised behaviours or speech as potentially positive if done without malice or aggression, it was particularly important to assess whether the people witnessing the act were friends or at least knew each other.

3.2. Intent and Impact

The intent of a racist comment or joke and the impact of that on the targeted person were also key factors when deciding whether racism was acceptable. Given lay conceptualisations of racism as demeaning, derogatory and characterised by aggression (see section 2), it is not surprising that racist language used to insult or abuse another person was considered unacceptable by all participants. In contrast, a racist comment or joke was considered acceptable if no harm was intended:

> Racism is intent. Intent to be mean because someone is different to you that's what I think. (…)
>
> It's a power thing
>
> Bullying, bullying yeah it is, power.
>
> (Focus Group 4, female blue-collar)

> I've got team friends who have always called me "skip girl",[2] or "roo girl". I could, you know, someone could take offence to that. You don't because it's not given with bad intent.
>
> (Focus Group 4, female blue-collar)

> So you can understand sometimes it's maybe a term of endearment but it depends on how it's delivered isn't it, whether the comment is meant to be nasty or not.
>
> (Interview 1, female white-collar)

These examples suggest that intent behind the words determines whether racialised talk is perceived as friendly banter or as hurtful.

Additionally, the first example involves a discussion about racist behaviours in a workplace environment, such as using racist language to demean another person to assert perceived superiority. The participants described racism as akin to bullying because of a power differential present between the perpetrator and target in both racism and bullying. A

participant in another focus group also described racism as similar to bullying in that racism is a form of bullying, but contended that not all bullying is necessarily race-based. He described issues at a junior community sports club:

> But there's not so much racism. I haven't heard any racism but it's the same sort of bullying, you know what I mean? We had a bullying issue this year and they were [12 years old and under].
>
> (Focus Group 1, male blue-collar)

This participant suggests that it is sometimes unclear whether bullying is race-based and, therefore, whether it constitutes racism.

Despite different considerations used to identify racism, most participants felt that even in the absence of malicious intent or when race-based talk was between people of the same background, if offence was taken or hurt ensued then the talk was considered unacceptable. Based on participants' earlier description of racism as fostering social exclusion on the basis of race, some lay theorising suggested that race-based speech is only acceptable if it does not serve to harm or exclude another person.

> As soon as you start hurting that person's feelings, that's when you've crossed the line.
>
> (Focus Group 1, male blue-collar)

> If you just tell them a joke to someone who obviously isn't of that race, then it's a joke as a joke, but it's. . .
>
> *But if it's harming someone?*
>
> Then it's racist.
>
> (Focus Group 1, male blue-collar)

> Maybe, how it affects the person that's receiving the information or receiving the exclusion … so you know, if they are taking offence and it's definitely, that's a problem. I think it's the receiver that makes that call, whether it was offensive or not.
>
> (Focus Group 2, female white-collar)

> My brother's girlfriend's of a Lebanese background but it all depends on how that girl or guy takes it. Some people don't like it at all, whereas some people like myself, I've got an ethnic background and nothing fazes me so it just doesn't matter

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2   "Skip" is a slang term used to refer to Anglo Australians and is based on a popular children's television series from the 1960s, "Skippy the Bush Kangaroo". "Roo girl" is presumably also a reference to a common international perception that strongly associates Australia/Australians with kangaroos.

what anyone says or does but I know there a lot of people that take offence.

(Interview 4, male blue-collar)

These examples also reiterate the importance of knowing the audience of racialised comments.

3.3. Presence or Absence of the Target Person

When cognitive interview participants were asked whether telling race-based jokes was acceptable, the presence or absence of the targeted person was a factor for determining social acceptability. Among cognitive interview participants, jokes were generally perceived to be less acceptable when the targeted person was present and could have been offended and more acceptable if the targeted person was not present and no harm was intended. However, one participant felt that it was worse when the targeted person was not present: "because then everyone's just laughing at them and they've got no chance to respond back" (Interview 2, female white-collar).

Reflecting the importance of understanding the context of everyday racism, cognitive interview participants who were asked whether posting a racist comment or joke was acceptable online (for example on social media websites) unanimously responded that such behaviour was never acceptable.

> It's never really acceptable because you don't really know who's looking at it. You've got no way of knowing your audience.
>
> (Interview 2, female white-collar)
>
> It's one thing to say [something because] it dissipates in the room. It's another thing to post it.
>
> (Interview 1, female white-collar)
>
> *And someone telling a racist joke about a certain racial or ethnic group when someone of that background was present and could've been offended, always, sometimes, rarely or never [acceptable]?*
>
> I suppose it depends on that person but rarely acceptable.
>
> *And someone posting a racist comment or joke about people from certain racial or ethnic backgrounds using social media such as Facebook or Twitter?*
>
> Never.
>
> (Interview 4, male white-collar)

Here, the question only asked about the acceptability of posting a racist comment or joke online. However, partici-

pants still explained that knowing the social context and clues that frame a racialised comment were important factors in determining social acceptability. Furthermore, compared to face-to-face interactions, these participants highlighted that posting racist comments or jokes online means that it is difficult to control who sees it, which means that the relational context is absent and the potential to offend an unknown person is greater.

Focus group participants were also asked if they felt it was appropriate to make a race-based joke online. For example, in one focus group the interviewer asked if it was appropriate to send a race-based joke via e-mail and participants responded:

> I mean, it depends how you're saying it. Like, I said, it's emphasis; it depends how you're saying it. Like, you could type it in and type stuff in, but you haven't said it and meant it like they're interpreting it.
>
> You can't get sarcasm.
>
> That's why you got to actually be talking face-to-face to understand wavelength level.
>
> (Focus Group 1, male blue-collar)

They explained that clues present in face-to-face interactions such as body gestures and intonation were not as easily conveyed online and therefore, the meaning of discourse was unclear. It was then difficult to understand the intent of the words.

Overall, participants emphasised that race-based language needs to be understood in context. Situations where racialised talk is posted online highlighted the importance of this, once again demonstrating the situational ambiguity of identifying everyday racism. The next section explores this ambiguity within race-based jokes and general race-based comments that highlight individual racial or cultural differences.

4. Racism and Racialisation

In the process of identifying something as racist or not, participants touched on academic debates about the distinction between racialisation and racism (Berman and Paradies 2010; Giroux 2006). This was most evident when participants talked about race-based jokes and general

comments that referred to race, particularly as these forms of racialised talk were not always overtly offensive or intentionally malicious. The following examples illustrate this:

> It's not a negative way of doing it because racism is just singling out someone for their race.

> You're just trying to tell them who it is sort of thing you know. If you just say it's the white guy, it could be ten white guys that took the catch you know. But I don't know. Look, there's a fine line somewhere.
>
> (Focus Group 1, male blue-collar)

> But then again, with little kids too, they might say, look at that lady over there she's really black. And then they might say, have a look at that lady over there she's only got one leg they're just saying what they see.
>
> (Focus Group 4, female blue-collar)

Here, participants recognise that racialisation may not always constitute racism.

Colour-blindness is an ideology contending that individuals should not notice, perceive or "see" race or racial difference. A frequent corollary is the belief that any form of racialisation is racist. In a post-racial environment, "colour-blindness" is perceived to be beneficial to society. However, despite the widespread belief in the social benefits of using a "colour-blind" approach, research indicates that colour-blindness has detrimental effects on minority groups (Trawalter and Richeson 2008; Plaut, Thomas, and Goren 2009), leads to negative inter-racial interactions (Norton et al. 2006; Correll, Park, and Smith 2008) and fails to prevent racial bias (Pahlke, Bigler, and Suizzo 2012). Rossing argues that: "Race marks physical and cultural traits by which people construct categories. It functions as an affirmative signifier in cases such as group solidarity, familial ties, and empowerment" (2012, 47). He continues: "If people equate seeing or discussing race with racism, then naming even the most obvious racial disparities is understood as racism and people are left without recourse to address racial injustice" (Rossing 2012, 50). The following subsections explore the ambiguity of race-based jokes and general race-based comments by examining the interplay between racialisation and racism in lay theorising, particularly whether, and in what circumstances, race-talk is considered racist or solely a neutral description of individual racial characteristics.

4.1. Is a Race-Based Joke Always Racist?

In the context of telling racist jokes, a few participants made a distinction between general racialised discourse and racialised jokes by pointing out the mediating role of comedy. They indicated that comedy allows people to talk about sensitive or provocative issues that are otherwise difficult to discuss. For example, one participant reflected, "I'd be horrified if someone heard me say [something that could be interpreted as racist]. I wouldn't intend it to be malicious. It might be funny but I mean that's what comedy, sometimes comedy touches on something" (Interview 7, male white-collar). As opposed to a colour-blind approach, which elides race altogether, comedy has the potential to provide a space where people can discuss complex social issues such as racism.

The ambiguity around whether a race-based joke constitutes racism or not highlights a dilemma articulated in existing literature. It supports Martin's observation that "even experts cannot agree on whether disparaging humour is evidence of prejudice, is evidence of rebellion against social conventions, or is simply benign" (2007, cited in Hodson, Rush, and MacInnes 2010). For example, one participant struggled with the potential social implications of race-based jokes:

> I know that there's perhaps no offence intended necessarily but it does make me think, "Well we're all far more than just that." But it's ignorance and sometimes these jokes, they come from ignorance and they spread ignorance so my answer really should be that it's never okay, the more I think about it.
>
> (Interview 3, female white-collar)

In relation to race, Park, Gabbadon, and Chernin (2006) argued that popular racial humour confirms damaging stereotypes more than it subverts them. Furthermore, "Haggins warns that comedy's various (mis)interpretations makes it difficult to determine if a critical, comedic discourse 'explod[es] stereotypes or merely reinforc[es] them'" (Rossing 2012, 53). The following focus group discussion further highlights these nuances:

> With the Irish jokes, sorry, I don't think any of us thought of them as racist, because when we think of racism we think of something negative and aggressive with violence and vocal, whereas the Irish jokes were typically amusing and not meant to offend anyone.

But that classes them as a group of silly people, dumb people.

They have done that, but there was no malice involved, certainly.

Yeah dumb stuff.

You could say there was a race there, the Irish race […]

I think it probably came from the British don't you think, the background, the British ridiculing the Irish.

(Focus Group 2, female white-collar)

The first comment again contrasts a conceptual understanding of racism as aggressive and vocal with a perceived sense that even though jokes might be race-based, they are harmless if no offence is intended. The second comment challenges this by pointing out that the content of the joke still serves to perpetuate stereotypes of Irish people as stupid. This is contested by emphasising the harmless intent of the person telling the joke. Another person questions whether Irish people can be defined as belonging to a race. Finally, the historical context is evoked as a reason behind the stereotype and its present expression as a joke. As evident from this dialogue, there is no clear consensus over whether Irish jokes are demeaning (and hence whether they constitute racism according to lay conceptions).

4.2. Is Talking about Race Always Racist?

Overall, most participants felt that race-based comments about an individual simply described physical differences rather than constituting racism. Participant orientations ranged from colour-blind approaches that avoided talking about race to racialised approaches where racial differences were used to describe people. In the interviews, some participants felt that racialised comments were racist while others felt that race was used too often to erroneously frame a situation as racist.

In the following examples, participants described examples that they felt were not racist by using a colour-blind approach to detract from the social significance of race. The first example describes what the participant believed to be simply an expressed opinion based on driving through a suburb with a high proportion of people with a Vietnamese background. However, while a simple observation at one level, it is also racist because it assumes that

Australians are White, thus excluding non-White Australians.

I'm just saying something that I don't like. You know, I drive through Springvale every now and then and I think, "Where has Australia gone?"

(Focus Group 1, male blue-collar)

Other participants questioned whether it is always necessary to mention race in certain situations:

If a Greek guy gets beat up, is it a racial attack or it just happened to be that the guy was Greek, why do you bother mentioning it?

Yeah, exactly.

It might be he just didn't like the guy.

(Focus Group 3, male white-collar)

I think sometimes people do play the racism card too sometimes, you know that sometimes they are being excluded for something or someone doesn't like someone and they think that's the reason why because maybe of past experiences with other people, but you know it might be for other reasons.

(Focus Group 2, female white-collar)

These participants felt that it was not always relevant to mention a person's racial, ethnic or cultural background because there could be other reasons to explain those situations. These observations highlight factors such as intent, which the media tends to gloss over. However, at the same time, the possibility that it was a racist attack is left to the interpretation of the perceiver rather than taking into account social power inequalities and the lived realities of everyday racism that many people from minority groups experience (Essed 1990).

Reflecting participant constructions of racism as negative and overtly insulting, some forms of racial stereotyping that were considered to be more positive or neutral were described as "generalisations" (Focus Group 3, male white-collar), "generic comments" (Focus Group 2, female white-collar) and "gentle stereotypes" (Interview 7, male white-collar). Participants also considered whether positive or complimentary stereotypes were racist:

A lot of people will come up and go, "I wish I was your colour", you know and, to them they take that as you're being offensive. But it's not, you're actually saying you like their olive skin.

But yeah I guess some people take it different to what some people actually are trying to come across.

(Focus Group 4, female blue-collar)

Related to this, participants also touched on othering, essentialisation and exoticisation:

Yeah you know, there's I mean there's such a range of, we've only just got some Sudanese people come to our neighbourhood and their skin is just like velvet. I, I look at that lady all the time it's she's got beautiful skin but I've never, I have never ever seen that, that darkness and it just fascinates me.

(Focus Group 4, female blue-collar)

Research suggests that complimentary stereotypes (e.g. relating to athleticism, musical and rhythmic ability, and social/sexual competence) are considered a form of racism by members of minority groups and are also strongly related to more traditional negative stereotypes (Czopp and Monteigh 2006; Czopp 2008).

Additionally, participants suggested that some potentially offensive comments were not racist because they did not include malicious intent, were not based on hatred or were made by people who have friends from culturally diverse backgrounds (implying that they cannot also be racist). This supports lay theorising that racism is rooted in extreme volatile emotions, and so racialised comments that were judged as less harmful were not considered to be racist. However, research demonstrates that subtle racism is just as harmful if not more harmful than blatant racism (Dovidio 2001; Major, Quinton, and Schmader 2003; Yoo, Steger, and Lee 2010). Additionally, lay theorising that racism is about exclusion supports the idea that if someone has friends from different racial, ethnic and cultural backgrounds, then that person cannot also be racist. One focus group participant commented:

I know a few people that make generic comments that you know, they might say things like, "Oh, the bloody Asians," or things like that but at the same time they've got friends that are Asians.

(Focus Group 2, female white-collar)

Another participant immediately responded:

[I'm] exactly the same, and I do it sometimes, and I don't literally mean it because I have friends of all different backgrounds but

when you are driving and you are like, "Oh, Indian driver," or sometimes we'll say it or, "Taxi drivers are always the worst" … we are already grouping them but I don't mean it as in I hate them.

(Focus Group 2, female white-collar)

Here, the participants seemed to take a slightly defensive stance as potential perpetrators of racism. They justified potentially offensive comments by claiming they are inclusive of people from different cultures and by emphasising that their comments were not due to racial hatred. The second participant begins to consider the effect of the comment by acknowledging that they are "grouping" people based on racial or cultural background, but says that this does not imply hatred of the group.

A few participants utilised empathic and reflexive skills to observe that race-based comments used to describe people were not always simple descriptions of people but could actually be offensive regardless of perceived intent. One participant talked about her children's reference to Lebanese people and at first justifies the comment saying that she believed their intent was not hateful but then considers that it could still be offensive to Lebanese people.

Even when they're talking about Lebanese they go, "Oh, they're Lebos" … I don't necessarily think that he hates Lebanese people but I think that they're the kinds of things that that question brings up to me and I think that a Lebanese person may or may not be offended but you're taking a chance so therefore I think it's not acceptable.

(Interview 3, female white-collar)

Another participant commented that it is never acceptable to use a racist slang term or phrase to describe someone. She then decided "it's probably okay" to tell a racist joke about someone from a particular racial group if no-one of that background is present and no harm is intended. However, she changed her answer again to the survey response option of "rarely acceptable" after considering what it would be like to be the person from that targeted background and how it would make her feel. She also considered broader societal impacts:

I think, "Well when is it okay and when isn't it okay?" and that's made me think that it's really never okay because if you say rarely, that 1 percent between rarely and never, if it's 1 percent it

might mean that that goes out into the community and spreads and it's not okay.

(Interview 3, female white-collar)

These comments begin to question whether past experiences that participants thought were not racist might have actually been unacceptable and possibly racist. Some participants went further to consider times when they expressed racist attitudes by giving examples of judgments they have made about other people based on race. This is the topic of the next section.

5. Examining Racism

As participants delved deeper into discussions about whether something was racist or simply race-based talk, several reflected on examples when they had exhibited racist attitudes. One of the cognitive interview respondents who identified himself as Anglo admitted to prejudice against other cultures while still engaging in nuanced lay theorising about racism (Interview 5, male white-collar). This was also acknowledged in a focus group in response to a prompt from the interviewer about whether "everybody is a little bit racist." The participants acknowledged that it is not a good thing to be racist but admitted that they may have been racist without thinking about it:

> I wouldn't like to think that I'm racist, and maybe there is occasions where I have been unintentionally, because like you talk about human behaviour, it just becomes natural in the conversation, I like to think I judge people individually but, you know, I'm sure there's occasions when people don't realise they are being racist you know. . .
>
> *Ok yeah, what do other people think about that statement?*
>
> It's not a nice statement, but I think it's true. Like we don't like to think about it. We don't like to think that it would be the case for ourselves, but I think it's quite truthful at the end of the day. I'm sure we are all racist somewhere along the line if we are pushed. It could be a situation we are not familiar with.

(Focus Group 2, female white-collar)

Similarly, in another focus group, the participants discussed how the older generations may have racist attitudes toward Japanese people even if they might be "good decent people". Following these observations, one participant talked about how a Japanese student, who was staying in her home, was scared of a slug and poured salt on it:

> And I just remember going in my head saying, oh they were renowned for torture 'cause she was Japanese. Just in my head I just thought what a cruel thing to do. And I thought you know I don't consider myself but yet I, came up with that thought in my head.

(Focus Group 4, female blue-collar).

In the context of talking about her perception that older generations were more racist, this participant volunteered an example of how she also has racist thoughts about Japanese people.

Finally, reflective thinking about racist attitudes was also demonstrated in a focus group with male blue-collar participants. When the interviewer asked, "Is everyone a little bit racist?" participants responded by referencing a previous discussion about a participant getting upset about the school not including Christmas carols and decorations due to complaints from some of the Muslim parents:

> I am [a little bit racist] with certain things like what I was saying before.
>
> What you were saying about the Christmas carols.
>
> Yeah, that really got to me. I got really angry with them then.

(Focus Group 1, male blue-collar)

These focus group participants in particular were able to draw on group dynamics that encouraged lay theorising about racism to feel more comfortable talking openly about times when they might have been "a bit racist". Based on the premise established by the interviewer that maybe "everyone is a little bit racist," it then became more socially acceptable within that group to reflect on their own attitudes toward race and racism.

6. Conclusion

Overall, the findings of this study suggest that lay understandings of racism are conceptualised through tropes of speaker intention, effect of speech, and familiarity between speakers and listeners and/or targets. Rather than being primarily concerned with whether or not they generally appear racist (Figgou and Condor 2006; Augoustinos and Every 2007) or denying the existence of racism (Nelson 2013), these tropes demonstrate that some majority group members possess sophisticated, nuanced perspectives on

racism. Importantly, these lay understandings encompass the dialectic between intention and effect, the situational ambiguity of meaning-making and the moderating influence of familiarity on a recognised potential for offence ever-present within race-related speech.

Participants were clear about what they considered racism to be when they were asked to describe it. This included strongly negative associations that focused on speech that was demeaning, deliberately insulting and hateful. They were, however, less clear about the everyday context of racialised speech. Participants were frequently unsure whether racialised jokes, stereotypes, or statements about individual characteristics constituted racism and whether they were socially acceptable. For example, most felt it was less acceptable if a "target" person of a joke or comment was present due to a perceived risk that the targeted person would be offended. Additionally, it was considered to be more acceptable if the person was a close friend and it was never acceptable if a racialised comment was posted online because there is no control over who might see it.

Due to negative connotations associated with racism, it is common for people to distance themselves from the stigma of racism and prejudice in discussions of racism (Figgou and Condor 2006), with previous scholarship suggesting that a key function of lay theories of racism is to disavow personal membership in the category "racist" (Sommers and Norton 2006). In this study, it seems that interviews and focus groups conducted to inform survey development allowed participants to reflect on the wording of questions and to explore the situated meaning of racism rather than being asked directly to identify their attitudes and beliefs relating to racism. This contrasts with the study by Figgou and Condor (2006) where participants employed rhetorical strategies to frame hostile behaviour against Albanian refugees as stemming from perceived risk and insecurity rather than from racism or exclusion. It is, however, consonant with the study by McLeod and Yates (2003) where students were comfortable discussing the nature of racism even though it was not the topic of the study and focused instead on young people's general attitudes, sense of self and relation to school.

Questions that prompted thinking about the acceptability of racial jokes or discrimination in different situations (among friends, online, in the workplace, or at a community sports club) provided an opportunity to consider contextual factors without triggering concerns about social desirability, response presentation or the need to disavow personal racism. The effect may be similar to that achieved through projective or third-person survey techniques in which questions focus on what other people think. Such an approach places respondents at a more comfortable "psychological distance" from a sensitive topic at the same time as their personal beliefs become projected onto, or ascribed to, their responses (Supphellen, Kvitastein, and Johanson 1997). This effect may also constitute a step towards reflexive anti-racism, a term encompassing an understanding of anti-racism as a goal to strive for, while acknowledging that being non-racist is virtually unattainable for individuals in contemporary societies (Kowal et al. 2013).

Finally, some participants reflected that the interview allowed them to think more deeply about racism in everyday situations. For example, one male participant stated:

> It's the sort of topic that no one deals with directly. It's not about belief, it's something that only shows up when you're actually starting to be pushed on some of the, drill down on the actual facts of how it is.
>
> (Interview 5, male white-collar)

One participant said at the start of the interview: "We don't think about it, and questions like this make you think, so they're very good questions and they're making me think" (Interview 3, female white-collar). Reflecting at the end of the interview, she said: "Well I suppose it's made me re-focus on my own values of what I think of racism and different cultures" (Interview 3, female white-collar).

This study highlights the need for further research on the nuances of racism from everyday lay perspectives, especially by those from majority backgrounds. Additional distinctions that could be considered include the social acceptability of racialised discourse, intersections between racism and bullying, and whether and under what conditions participants consider specific comments, jokes and

descriptions to be racist. Further exploration in other national settings, with minority and majority groups as well as socio-demographic variations by gender, age and social class, is also required.

An in-depth analysis of lay theorising about everyday racism has the potential to inform anti-racism interventions and add to existing anti-racist scholarship (Paradies et al. 2009; Pedersen et al. 2011). Understanding how people think about racial, ethnic and cultural differences and how they understand racism and discrimination is a critical first step in combating racism and promoting positive attitudes to cultural diversity across society. Such knowledge of understandings and conceptualisations of racism among majority participants is particularly pertinent to reorienting social norms and to promoting transformative anti-racism approaches that recognise and redress structural power inequalities due to racial/ethnic categories. In particular, increased awareness of contemporary racism is strongly associated with reducing racism at the individual level (Gawronski et al. 2012). This study highlights the need for lay understandings of racism to encompass subtle as well as blatant expressions; positive as well as negative stereotypes; and rational as well as irrational behaviour. Echoing critiques of existing academic scholarship (Howarth and Hook 2005; Reicher 2007; Berard 2008; Anthony 2012), our findings indicate a need for lay theorising to include the broader impact of racist talk beyond the immediate situation in which it occurs (e.g. impact even when a member of the target group is not present) and to foster a deeper understanding of everyday racism as situated within institutions and social relations of power (including the benefits that accrue to dominate groups in society).

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Racism, Differentialism, and Antiracism in Everyday Ideology: A Mixed-Methods Study in Britain

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Vol. 7 (1) 2013

Racism, Differentialism, and Antiracism in Everyday Ideology: A Mixed-Methods Study in Britain

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Racism is ostracized in British public life, but continues to exist and exert influence in various forms. One such is the ideology of differentialism that enforces racialized distinctions by emphasizing culture and difference in place of biology and hierarchy. Although differentialism has been described by various authors, there has been no prior attempt to operationalize it in an attitude scale that could be used in national surveys. This mixed methods study of differentialism in a context of official antiracism presents an attitude scale of Everyday Differentialism and applies it in a postal survey in two areas of London. Scale quality was tested using psychometric methods and qualitative interviews with a sub-sample of survey respondents. The analysis suggests that quantitative and qualitative data converge toward the same classification of individuals: differentialists, antiracists, and those of ambiguous opinion. A detailed qualitative analysis reveals how respondents deal with ambiguity and contradictory attitudes within the ideological field of differentialism and anti-racism. Although the denial of racism is now part of racist ideology itself, we also find evidence of genuine ambiguity in respondents' thinking about issues of racism.

The study of racism in Britain today takes place within a social context that largely ostracizes blatant racism. Since the "race relations" legislation of the 1960s, Britain has been officially antiracist. The aim of integrating immigrants into British life was summarized at the time by Home Secretary Roy Jenkins: "equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance" (quoted in Solomos 2003, 83). Racist violence and hate speech are denounced by public opinion. And survey indicators of racial prejudice – operationalized as "social distance" – appear to show a decline in racial prejudice for the period for which time series data are available (1983 through 1996; Ford 2008).

On the other hand, there is evidence for the persistence of racism as a force in British society: classical biological racism continues an existence at the fringe of public life, while racist groups and networks use modern communication technologies to create new public spaces using internet and e-mail (Solomos and Schuster 2002). More subtle racism may also live on without being expressed openly, in a state of what Bergmann and Erb (1986) have called "communicative latency". Evidence that racism still profoundly influences the chances of individuals within British society comes from studies using "discrimination testing" of employment practices using actors (Wrench and Modood 2000), as well as research on the labour market (Cheung and Heath 2007), education (Gillborn 2008), and housing (Modood et al. 1997, 184ff).

If blatant racism is now largely a "non-public opinion" (Adorno [1959] 2003), the question arises whether survey indicators of racial prejudice are able to provide valid estimates of the prevalence of racism in contemporary Britain.

This question is not a new one. It arose in the United States in the post-civil rights era, and led to a fierce debate about the validity of the concept of a "new racism" – a form of racism that rationalizes the defence of white privilege without recourse to the discredited topoi of blatant racism (e.g. Sniderman et al. 1991, Sears et al. 1997). In Europe, a variety of authors have tried to address the problem by devising scales to measure "modern racial prejudice" (Akrami et al. 2000), or "symbolic racism" (Kleinpennig and Hagendoorn 1993). The most widely cited European study in this vein is the work of Pettigrew and Meertens" (1995, 2001), who contrasted "blatant" and "subtle" prejudice, and operationalized the latter with survey items designed to offer respondents a socially acceptable rationalization for expressing their prejudice. The authors used confirmatory factor analysis to demonstrate that subtle and blatant prejudice are indeed separate dimensions, and that the "subtle prejudice" scale does indeed measure racism. However, the validity of their analysis has been questioned, both in terms of the quality of the latent variable model (Coenders et al. 2001), and in terms of the face validity of some of the items involved. For example, one dimension of "subtle prejudice" is measured by the "exaggeration of cultural differences" subscale; however, as Brown (1995) has pointed out, recognition of differences is part of the agenda of multiculturalism, and indeed of official antiracism, and it is not clear whether we should take pronounced perception of cultural differences as an indicator of prejudice per se. Moreover, attempts to replicate Pettigrew and Meertens' results have produced mixed results regarding whether subtle and blatant prejudice are really separate attitudes, with some evidence in favour (e.g. Vala et al. 2002), and some against (Ganter 2001).

I wish to highlight two methodological difficulties common to studies attempting to develop "new racism" scales. First, in all cases validation relies exclusively on correlations between survey items, employing factor analysis and construct validation techniques whose results are open to alternative interpretations by the critics of the "new racism" concepts. Second, the theoretical idea of "subtle prejudice" relies on the assumption that respondents, at least superficially, accept an egalitarian, antiracist norm; this is the basis for their need to resort to subtle, rather

than blatant, expressions of prejudice. Yet antiracism has not been measured directly – neither by Pettigrew and Meertens nor by other proponents of "new racism" scales.

This paper presents a mixed methods study of everyday racism in times of official antiracism, and attempts to add a new methodological approach to the debate around the measurement of "new racism" by explicitly investigating the relationship between contemporary racism and antiracist norms, and by taking into account evidence from qualitative interviews as well as surveys. We address two questions:

1. Do survey data and evidence from qualitative data cross-validate one another? Are differences between respondents, as measured by survey questions, reflected in different discursive performance in a more in-depth interview situation? This is the question of validation by triangulation (Erzberger and Prein 1997).
2. How do respondents to qualitative interviews negotiate the complex field of racist and antiracist ideologies? How do they deal with the contradictions of their potentially racist "non-public" opinions and their desire to conform to antiracist norms?

1. Differentialist Racism and Antiracism

What is the ideological form of contemporary racism in Britain? Many theorists have described the emergence of a "new racism" in Europe: a racism that shuns classical racist themes of a biological hierarchy of races – thus trying to avoid the accusation of *being* racism – and instead argues that cultural differences between "us" and "them" make it impossible to integrate in a single society (Barker 1981; Räthzel 1994; Balibar [1988] 1991). The most theoretically thorough account of this ideological change was put forward by the French philosopher Pierre-André Taguieff ([1987] 2001) in his description of what he called differentialism, or differentialist racism. He argued that while the hierarchical aspect of racism emphasizes the superiority of "us" over "them", the differentialist aspect points out the importance of keeping "us" separate from "them". Differentialism does not naturalize a hierarchy of groups, but naturalizes the inevitability of group conflict and the impossibility of conviviality, and argues that within-group homogeneity and between-group separation are both natu-

ral and desirable states. Although apparently denying any assumption of hierarchy, differentialist arguments often subtly imply the superiority of a group's own culture, for example by asserting that "Western cultures" display more tolerance toward diversity than non-Western cultures.

Taguieff exposes as reductionist the classical definition of racism as a belief in biological hierarchy: it captures but one aspect of racism. In fact, biology and culture, hierarchy and difference are almost invariably mutually reinforcing elements of racial theories (Hund 2006). Differentialism and the argument from culture , rather than biology, are not in themselves new features of racism. But they have become a prevalent mode of racist expression under conditions of an official antiracism, whose definition of racism tends to reduce the phenomenon to ideas of racial hierarchies based on biological endowments.

Taguieff criticizes mainstream antiracism ([1987] 2001, esp. chap. 5) – not in order to defend racism, but to point out that popular and official antiracism rely on a simplified model of racism, and fail to criticize, or even grasp, current practices of racialization. On the level of ideology, mainstream antiracism contents itself with the knowledge that, as there is no scientific basis for racial hierarchies, racism is factually wrong. This simplistic conceptualization fails to account for differentialist racism, which often relies on arguments that are not easily falsified through scientific evidence, but are arguments about values. Differentialism is a "subtle racism" in the sense that it is not recognized as racism, and that its expression frequently involves rhetorical devices designed to present it as a "reasonable" position.

2. Why Mixed Methods?: "Attitudes" in Discursive Psychology and Survey Research

Taguieff has described differentialist racism as an intellectual ideology. It is the task of social research to find out how it is expressed as an "everyday ideology" (Billig et al. 1988), by ordinary people. Another task is to establish how prevalent differentialist views are in a population. These two tasks are rarely approached jointly, because of the continuing chasm between "qualitative" and "quantitative" research, which is often linked to substantial theoretical

differences between proponents on either side of the divide. Discursive psychologists study racism as a discourse (Wetherell and Potter 1992), while the study of survey data employs the concept of "attitude". Discursive psychologists have argued that attitude scales are unable to adequately capture the nature of racism, which they see as situated in discursive performance rather than mental representation (Potter and Wetherell 1987). Attitude researchers rarely take account of qualitative evidence at all.

This paper aims to unite the two perspectives. It takes the view that attitudes are stances that individuals take within social contexts of controversy (Billig et al. 1988; Martin 2010), such as the controversy between racism and antiracism. In agreement with Michael Billig's rhetorical psychology (1991), attitude is conceptualized as a response to a social situation: an argument, an experience, or indeed a research interview or questionnaire. To help refine this concept, I will first discuss criticism of the attitude concept brought forward by discursive psychologists, and second consider results from the psychology of survey response that suggest a conceptualization capable of taking into account both quantitative and qualitative evidence.

Potter and Wetherell (1987) have criticized the concept of attitude as a "psychologization" of socially constructed discourse. As an alternative, they have put forward the notion of "interpretive repertoires" to suggest that people use arguments flexibly in response to a given dialogic situation. These interpretive repertoires are seen as features of discourse, rather than features of an individual's cognitive make-up. Their approach has allowed Wetherell and Potter (1992) to show how their interviewees use apparently liberal, egalitarian arguments in order to discursively defend racial privilege.

However, Potter and Wetherell's focus on discourse does not address the question why different people living in the same society, and thus exposed to the same "discourses", nonetheless differ in their opinions – or why people persist in holding on to outdated opinions (such as biological racism) even while the mainstream discourse has moved on. Without some concept of attitude, how would we explain that there are antiracists as well as racists? May not dis-

cursive performance, in turn, be structured by more or less stable (albeit context-flexible and changeable) mental representations that we may study as "attitudes"?

Survey research has by and large relied on the traditional attitude concept, where an attitude was seen as a relatively stable mental disposition that influenced both speech acts and behaviour. In the context of survey methodology, this gave rise to the "file drawer model" of attitudes: a survey question was understood to prompt the respondent to search her mental file drawer for a pre-existing attitude that would allow her to determine her response. This file drawer model, however, was challenged by the increasing body of evidence for the sensitivity of attitude questions to variations in context (such as recent significant political events or priming by preceding questionnaire items) and to apparently minor alterations in wording. If attitudes are such stable evaluative responses to stimuli, why were the measures used to tap them so sensitive to method effects? The survey methodologists Tourangeau, Rips and Rasinski (2000) have considered this question and presented an alternative conceptualization, which they call the "belief sampling model" of attitudes. This conceptualizes the survey response as follows: When called upon to answer an attitude question, people recall considerations – impressions, values, and specific beliefs – related to the question. However, at any one time they are likely only to recall a selection of all related considerations. Which considerations come to their minds can depend on many features of the situation, including interviewer characteristics, questionnaire design, question wording, and extraneous circumstances such as events reported in the media in the period immediately preceding the interview.

The belief sampling model involves a new definition of the concept of attitude. Rather than a stable evaluation of an object, an attitude is seen as "a kind of memory structure that contains existing evaluations, vague impressions, general values, and relevant feelings and beliefs" (Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000, 194).

An attitude, then, may be regarded as a pool of potential considerations. It is not necessarily the case that all considerations are logically or evaluatively consistent. Nor does

the "attitude" necessarily exist before the need to respond to a survey question prompted the search for relevant considerations (Tourangeou, Rips, and Rasinski 2000, 197). When faced with a survey question, we construct an attitude response, rather than reporting a pre-existing mental representation.

In social psychology, it is an issue of some debate whether attitudes are relatively stable dispositions stored in memory or are constructed on the spot, or whether the truth lies somewhere between these two extremes (Bohner and Dickel 2011). The belief sampling model would suggest that people construct attitudes spontaneously when they are faced with an unfamiliar attitude object, or with a request to evaluate a familiar object in an unfamiliar context (such as a survey) – but that this construction is accomplished with reference to a pool of considerations, which themselves are stored in memory and which may be more or less stable.

I suggest that such a process also occurs when people respond to a research interview by a qualitative researcher: people "make up their minds" about what to say in the course of the interview, responding to interviewer identity, interviewer behaviour, and other features of social context (including, say, the newspaper front page of the day). I assume, therefore, that both survey and interview methods tap into the same human capability for constructing attitudes in response to a social situation – they only observe these attitudes in a different way. To some extent, we can hope that narrative or semi-structured interviews offer more space than surveys to explore complex and contradictory attitudes. Yet in most qualitative research, this remains an assumption that cannot, within the framework of qualitative methodology, be put to a rigorous empirical test. It would therefore be naïve to assume that data from qualitative interviews, although they may be "richer" than survey data, are also truer representations of the respondents' "attitudes", or "discourse". Like survey data, qualitative interview data are subject to being influenced by social context – an observation that is recognized in qualitative research through the emphasis on researcher reflexivity, which includes for example taking into account how the interviewer's social identity may impact on the view

respondents take of the interview, and therefore on their answers. Like surveys, then, qualitative interviews may only access a subset of the whole potential "pool of considerations" that informs an interviewee's actions and life decisions. At the same time, we should remember the limitations of most qualitative research. It is one task to describe the features of contemporary racist discourse, as Wetherell and Potter have done; it is another to try and establish how many people endorse it, how many reject it, how many adopt ambiguous positions, and so forth – and yet another to try to find structural reasons (represented, for example, by variables such as education, residence, or age) for people's positions. For the latter two tasks, surveys may prove more useful than discursive psychologists have acknowledged. A mixed method approach to the study of everyday differentialism – its discursive features as well as its prevalence as an attitude – would therefore seem promising. This does not involve the use of two separate methodological paradigms; rather, both qualitative and quantitative methods are different ways of accessing respondents' "pools of considerations", different ways of evoking contexts of controversy in response to which they take a stance. Both qualitative and quantitative methods, then, serve to cast light on the phenomenon of racism from different angles, but within a single theoretical perspective. Both yield valuable, but partial, insight. One may serve to fortify or cast doubt on the conclusions drawn from the other; but neither is superior to the other. It is to the methods that we now turn.

3. Data Collection : Postal Survey and Semi-Structured Interviews

This study combined a postal survey with semi-structured interviews of a sub-sample of survey respondents. The postal survey was conducted in two boroughs of Greater London: Barking and Dagenham, and Havering. Both are untypical for London, in that at the time of data collection (May and June 2008) both had a large majority of white British residents, according to the latest available census (Barking and Dagenham 81 percent, Havering 92 percent;

Office for National Statistics 2009). Barking and Dagenham is an area of inward migration (Keith 2008). It became nationally notorious for the strong showing of the extreme right-wing British National Party (BNP) in the 2006 local elections (at the time of the study, the BNP held 12 out of 51 seats in the council). Havering is more affluent, and the BNP was not nearly as successful there, but did hold one local council seat in 2008.

The sampling frame for the survey consisted of the Electoral Registers of each borough. I employed simple random sampling with implicit stratification by area of residence (electoral ward) to select 250 voters for each borough. A total of 237 completed questionnaires were received, 111 for Barking and Dagenham and 125 for Havering[1]. The overall achieved response rate was 47.4 percent. The current analysis examines only *White British* respondents (n=174), who self-identified as "White British", "White Other: English", or "White" with British nationality in survey questions on ethnicity and nationality.

The demographic composition of the "White British" sample is shown in Table 1. Comparison to relevant 2001 census data revealed that the overall achieved sample slightly overrepresented the middle aged (in the age category 40–59) and the well-educated, and underrepresented the young and the old, as well as the less well-educated.

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1 The counts for completed questionnaires in each borough do not add up to the total, because one respondent removed the serial number from their questionnaire, so that their residence could not be identified.

Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of "White British" Respondents (n=174)

		Total	
Sex	Male	84	(49%)
	Female	88	(51%)
Age	18 or under	3	(2%)
	19–29	19	(11%)
	30–39	18	(10%)
	40–49	42	(24%)
	50–59	42	(24%)
	60–69	20	(12%)
	70 or older	29	(17%)
Highest qualification	No qualification	49	(30%)
	NVQ 1	24	(14%)
	NVQ 2	48	(29%)
	NVQ 3	22	(13%)
	NVQ 4/5	23	(14%)

Notes: Cases with missing values are not reported; the total numbers within each demographic variable vary due to missing values. NVQ: National Vocational Qualification. NVQ level 3 is equivalent to A-levels (completed high school), NVQ level 4 is equivalent to an undergraduate university degree (bachelor's).

The survey questionnaire was presented as a study of "Neighbourhood and Community", and began with questions about the quality of life in the respondents' local area. Questions relating to racial attitudes appeared later in the questionnaire, but were not explicitly labelled as such. The questionnaire also included a request to participate in the follow-on qualitative part of the study. Thirty-one "White British" people indicated their willingness to take part. They were contacted in June and July 2008. In the end, twelve agreed to be interviewed in person. Table 2 shows the characteristics of the qualitative sample, according to survey responses. This sample is clearly not representative either of the survey sample, or the population of the two boroughs. Unfortunately, no person under 40 years of age could be persuaded to take part. This represents a major limitation, since attitudes and the way they are framed by individuals may well differ by age. Furthermore, like the samples of many qualitative interview studies, the interviewees are a self-selected group, having volunteered their participation, and by this token are likely to be untypical of

the general population. It is clear, also, that interviewees' perception of the interview purpose may have been influenced by their perception of the preceding postal survey. In fact, as will become clear below, several interviewees referred back to their survey responses in their interviews. This may be considered a weakness of the study, since quantitative and qualitative observations were not independent of one another – but also constitutes an advantage, as respondents had the opportunity to explain the thinking behind their "tick-box" answers.

Table 2: Interview Sample Characteristics (n=12)

		Barking and Dagenham	Havering	Total
Sex	Female	2	2	4
	Male	6	2	8
Age	40–49	3	1	4
	50–59	4	3	7
	60–69	1	0	1
Highest qualification (NVQ level*)	None or missing	4	1	5
	NVQ1	1	0	1
	NVQ2	2	0	2
	NVQ3	0	2	2
	NVQ4 or higher	1	1	2
Total		8	4	12

Note: NVQ: See note to Table 1

For the qualitative part of the study, I conducted semi-structured interviews. Interviewees were told that the interview's purpose was to explore the topic of the questionnaire in greater depth. At the point of interview, I was blind to the survey responses of my interviewees. The general interviewing strategy was to first ask respondents about their neighbourhoods, what they like and dislike about them, and changes they may have seen while living there. If respondents broached issues of race and ethnicity of their own account, I did ask probing follow-on questions to explore their attitudes. Only if respondents did not mention immigration and race relations at all did I initiate a conversation about these issues through direct questions.

4. Survey Measures of Differentialist Racism and Antiracist Principles

Everyday differentialism was measured using a four-item Likert scale. Item wordings are shown in Table 3. Item development was based on a review of evidence from qualitative studies on discourses on race in Britain (Martin 2010), and operationalizes differentialism through three components: a preference for cultural homogeneity, the belief that peaceful coexistence of different cultures in the same social space is impossible, and a subtle sense of moral superiority of one's own culture.[2]

Table 3: Items Comprising the Scale of Everyday Differentialism

CULTURES	All in all, people from different cultures can live side by side and get on well with one another. [reverse coded]
STRANGER	With all the immigrants living here, I'm beginning to feel like a stranger in my own country.
TOLERANT	The average immigrant is just as tolerant as the average British person. [reverse coded]
THREAT	The British way of life is under threat from too much immigration.

Each item was scored on a five-point response scale.[3] A scale score was constructed by summing responses across the four items, and calibrating the scale to have a range from 0 to 10. Item non-response was very low (1.6 percent of values were missing across the whole survey, with 86 percent of questionnaires providing complete information). Missing values were imputed using the Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm (Wirtz 2004).

Psychometric evaluation indicated that the scale was of good quality. Cronbach's alpha was α = 0.733, indicating acceptable internal consistency. There was also evidence for construct validity. The scale was correlated to indicators of social distance to seven different outgroups (see Table 6 for item wordings); Kendall's tau-b of the association between

social distance and Everyday Differentialism ranged from 0.26 to 0.47 (all coefficients were significantly different from zero; p<.001 in all cases).

Table 4: Everyday Differentialism and Antiracist Principles: Descriptive Statistics (n=174)

	Mean	Median	Mode	Std. Deviation	Min.	Max.
Everyday Differentialism	6.56	6.88	6.25	2.10	0.00	10.00
Antiracist Principles	7.69	7.50	10.00	2.22	0.00	10.00

An index of Antiracist Principles was derived from the two items displayed in Table 5, which focus on antiracism in education and the police. It may seem likely that such general antiracist principles are all but unanimously endorsed. Yet as Hewitt (2005) documents, some White Britons harbour considerable resentment against what they perceive to be an unfair focus on white racism in both the education system and the police.

Table 5: Items Comprising a Scale of Antiracist Principles

| POLICE | It is important to put a stop to racism in the police. |
| SCHOOLS | Schools should teach equality between people from all ethnic backgrounds. |

The two items of the Antiracist Principles Index were moderately correlated with one another (Pearson's r = 0.35). The index was formed by summing responses to both items and calibrating the result to have a range from 0 to 10.

The level of racist resentment in the sample was rather high. As Table 4 shows, the mean Everyday Differentialism score was 6.56, which indicates that respondents were more

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[2] Item development involved a questionnaire pre-test using a convenience sample of university students (n=53), and cognitive interviews (n=8, not all students) to explore respondents' comprehension of items. Nine "everyday differentialism" items were included in the postal questionnaire. The four items

presented here were selected on the basis of three criteria: (1) coverage of all three theoretical dimensions; (2) inclusion of items in both attitude directions (pro- and contra-differentialism), (3) maximization of Cronbach's alpha.

[3] Definitely disagree [score: 1], Disagree to some extent [2], Neither agree nor disagree [3], Agree to some extent [4], Definitely agree [5]. Note that scoring was reversed for two of the four items (see Table 3).

likely to agree with the differentialist premise of the questions than to disagree. As Table 6 shows, the majority of the sample had a tendency to resent the presence of people other than "White British" in their area. No matter which of the seven categories we consider, only a minority of respondents "would not mind at all" having an "outgroup" member as a neighbour. We also note that the category "Gypsies / Romanies / Travellers" met the strongest rejection.

Table 6: Social Distance Items ("Please tell us whether you would mind or not mind having each of these kinds of people as neighbours")

	Wouldn't mind at all %	Would mind a bit %	Would mind a lot %	Total (base)
People who don't speak English	12	32	56	100 (171)
Africans	32	37	41	100 (161)
Poles	44	33	23	100 (162)
Asians	37	38	25	100 (162)
Gypsies/ Romanies/ Travellers	7	18	75	100 (158)
Muslims	34	31	36	100 (160)
Asylum seekers	13	23	64	100 (162)

Despite the high level of differentialism and social distance measured in the sample, antiracist principles were endorsed by a large majority of survey respondents, as evidence by the high mean of the Antiracist Principles Index.

Figure 1: Scatterplot of Everyday Differentialism by Antiracist Principles

Note: The size of a "bubble" represents the number of cases at a given point within the bivariate distribution.

Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the survey scales "Everyday Differentialism" and "Antiracist Principles". Pearson's r measures the linear relationship between the two variables as negative and of moderate strength, at $r = -.31$ ($p<.001$). However, the scatterplot indicates that the association between the two variables may not be linear. The lower left quadrant of the plot is empty: no respondent rejected both Everyday Differentialism and Antiracist Principles. On the other hand, simultaneous endorsement of both Everyday Differentialism and Antiracist Principles was commonplace. There were also "consistent antiracists" (who reject differentialism, but endorse antiracism), and "consistent racists" (who reject antiracism and endorse differentialism). The plot is consistent with the interpretation that endorsement of antiracist principles is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the rejection of differentialist racism.

It is possible that this result is due to a measurement problem: psychometrically speaking, the antiracism items are "too easy", since the majority of respondents endorsed them. The nonlinear relationship may therefore be an artifact of the inability of the Antiracist Principles Index to distinguish between attitudes at the higher end of antiracist commitment. Indeed, the two antiracism items formulate statements that typify a broad social consensus on the rejection of blatant racism. Nonetheless, it is an interesting empirical result that even in the current sample, where Everyday Differentialism is endorsed by the majority of respondents, basic antiracist principles are widely accepted.

So far, the results appear to confirm the proposition formulated at the beginning: antiracist principles are generally accepted, but racist ideology continues to thrive in a differentialist, culturalist form. Do the interview data bear out this interpretation? And if so, how do interviewees negotiate the ideological tensions between antiracist and differentialist commitments?

5. Discussing Differentialist Racism: Outgroups and Ingroups

It is almost commonplace now to say that the social construction of outgroups is intimately connected to the social construction of the ingroup. We need the "Other" to reassure ourselves of our own identity (Räthzel 1994). In biological racist discourse, the supposedly inferior racial Other functions as a reassurance of the racial ingroup's supposed superiority. In differentialist racism, the assertion of "our" homogeneity only begins to make sense if a heterogeneous "Other", who is held to disrupt this homogeneity, can be defined.

The analysis of interview data was aimed at establishing the respondents' construction of their (racialized) ingroups and outgroups, however they themselves labelled and defined them. In line with the tenets of rhetorical psychology, I paid particular attention to argumentation – that is, the analysis aimed to establish the particular versions of reality that respondents promoted, and the ways in which they attempted to render them plausible and persuasive. The result was a summary of the interpretative repertoires used by each interviewee. To allow inter-individual comparisons of interpretative repertoires, a system of codes had to be con-

structed. Coding followed the "structural analysis of group arguments" (SAGA) method put forward by Reicher and Sani (1998), which is specifically designed for the summary and comparison of arguments across individual interviews.

6. The Interpretive Repertoire of Everyday Differentialism

In the short space of a journal paper it is impossible to present the whole coding frame in detail. I shall concentrate on the themes most closely related to Everyday Differentialism and Antiracism, namely arguments about outgroups, the ingroup, and rhetorical devices related to both. A full analysis can be found in Martin (2010).

6.1 Arguments against Outgroup Members

6.1.1. "They Keep to Themselves": The Idea that Ethnic Minorities Do Not Want to Integrate

Four out of twelve interviewees argued that immigrants and/or ethnic minorities were unwilling to integrate into British social life. In all cases, integration was explicitly or implicitly understood as an assimilation to the cultural codes of conduct in Britain.

Extract 1

> The Asians, I believe that their particular religion, which is the Muslim religion, is a very indoctrinating religion, very indoctrinating. And they've taken it a step further, they don't want to keep it within their community they want the whole wide world to be it. We want an Asian parliament. Hold on a minute, is this my country? What do you want an Asian parliament for? You come to this country, you live by our rules or you pack your bags and you go.

The respondent in Extract 1 portrays Asians, a category which he incorrectly equates with Muslims, as members of an "indoctrinating religion" that allegedly make an unjustified demand for expansion into a political space that the respondent views as belonging to "this country" and whose rules are not negotiable ("our rules"). It is clear for this respondent, then, that the Asians are not included in the category of those to whom "this country" belongs.

The same topos was used against different outgroups by various respondents: whereas one criticized the lack of integration by Africans and Poles, but specifically excluded "most of the Asians" from this criticism, Asians/Muslims are precisely the subject of the complaint quoted above.

Two other respondents specifically referred to the perceived unwillingness of "Nigerians" to integrate.

6.1.2. "Their Behaviour Can Be Quite Offensive": The Idea That Ethnic Minorities Are Impolite

Another argument that some respondents made against racialized outgroups was the outgroup's perceived lack of politeness. One respondent reported her perception of customers in the bank where she worked:

Extract 2

> The way they speak to me when they're coming to work as well. […] They come in and they're very arrogant, they straightaway give the – not, the majority of them once they get to know you they soften, but on their first three or four visits they're very arrogant and they think that you're going to do them wrong. They won't say please for it, they think straight away, they're on your case, they say to you: "I want this." I get: "No, you're going to do it." I worked in a branch the other day and because I wouldn't serve a gentleman, yeah? I got I was not going to serve him only because he was black. […] And that is the way they treat you. And I've had it from Polish, I've had it from all nationalities. I'm not just picking out certain ones because they're black, all nationalities, but they are the most arrogant of them all at the moment.

The respondent describes what she perceives as the impolite attitude of many of her customers, whom she portrays as making unreasonable demands, and as complaining of racial discrimination if the demands are not met. She singles out "black" customers as particularly "arrogant".

6.1.3 "Everything Seems to Be Geared for the Ethnic People": The Idea That White British People Are Disadvantaged

Most interviewees spontaneously categorized themselves and their ingroup as "white". For them, whiteness was not just a routine self-categorization in response to a survey question; it was a salient category used to make sense of social life. Seven out of twelve respondents argued that "white British people" are disadvantaged relative to minorities.

Extract 3

> Things should be fair. Everyone should be treated the same. Your skin colour shouldn't matter. But now the white people are disadvantaged. The councils and the government are so worried about political correctness that they now don't look after their own, I mean, don't look after the people who have lived here for forty years. […] A friend got a parking ticket. She got a parking ticket because she was a few inches over the line. But two other

cars, which belonged to Asians, didn't get a parking ticket, because the council is afraid of upsetting anybody. But I think everyone should be treated the same.

This respondent asserts that both in her local area (represented by the council) and in Britain as a whole (represented by the government) the white people are the victims of inequality. She introduces this argument with a statement in support of racial equality, which allows her to make a claim to be a non-racist, but simultaneously introduces the category of skin colour, which she then uses to argue that Whites are disadvantaged. In the next sentence, the category "white" is invested with further significance as those who are the natural constituency of the council and government ("their own"). When the respondent claims that councils and government "don't look after the people who have lived here for forty years", she avoids a blatantly exclusionary categorization of the "indigenous" people as solely "white". Her formulation leaves open the possibility that migrants who have settled in Britain a long time ago may be included in the category of the "not looked after". Nor does she explicitly claim that the length of residence in a local area or in Britain should imply privileges vis-à-vis recent arrivals. Nonetheless, her indignation at the disadvantaging of whites is given greater force by the implication that whites have been disenfranchised within their established place of belonging.

6.1.4 "If I Went to Another Country"

We now turn to rhetorical devices that respondents used to support their arguments. One such may be called the "If I went to another country" device, in which the demand for cultural assimilation of immigrants is portrayed as a matter of fairness to the host society, with the help of a counterfactual, hypothetical scenario that involves the respondent imagining himself or herself moving abroad. "If I went to another country," the respondents argue, "I would have to assimilate, too." Consider the following interview extract:

Extract 4

> I'm also of the view that if you come to this country and you want to work, fine I don't have a problem with that. But what I do have a problem is with people that come over here, slag the country off, earn the wages and then what they want to do, is they want to set up their own churches, they want to set up their own parliaments. I mean, and they want to ram it down your throat.

Interviewer: Like what?

> Like the Muslim. If I was working in, we'll say Bahrain, I would live by the rules out there. If there's no drink, there's no drink. If you had to say the Koran three times a day because that was the done thing in the country, I would have to do it wouldn't I? If I wanted to work there. But I'm seeing it where youth clubs are shutting up and they're turning them into mosques.

The counterfactual scenario serves to criticize the supposed lack of integration by Muslims living in Britain as a violation of a norm that holds for all. This norm, as evoked by this respondent, is complete assimilation, at least in terms of outward behaviour, to the receiving culture. In the respondent's argument, Muslims who create spaces for worship are constructed as violating this universal norm of assimilation.

6.1.5 Credentialing ("I Am Not a Racist, But …")

The single most frequent rhetorical device respondents used was a disclaimer of the form "I am not a racist, but …" This is a case of what Hewitt and Stokes (1975) have called credentialling: by naming a possible accusation against herself, a speaker gives herself credentials as someone who is aware that what they are about to say may be construed as racism. Examples for credentialing phrases are "I am not a racist, but …," or "Some of my best friends are blacks – but …" When a speaker uses such phrases, she displays her knowledge about racism in order to pre-empt typification as an ignorant racist.

Extract 5

> *[The respondent had complained that parking tickets are not given fairly in his area. In particular, he reported that on a certain street in his neighbourhood, cars are often parked illicitly without penalty.]*
>
> Interviewer: But why do you think that is? Why is the law not applied?
>
> [Short pause] I'm going to say it. I think it's a black thing. Because it's only the black drivers that park on there or drive on there.
>
> Interviewer: Okay.
>
> You know. I must sound awfully racist but I'm not. I've got black friends, I've got yellow friends, green, you know, so it's not a racial thing, it's something that I feel strong about. If I'm going to get penalised for doing something so should everyone else in fairness, you know. And that's whether it's Mr Brown,

Gordon, Blair, it doesn't matter who. You know, if you break the law and I break the law we all get treated the same. It doesn't happen.

The respondent suspects that black drivers are systematically advantaged over white drivers. He is aware that this perception may be construed as racism, but argues that his motivation is a principle of universal fairness that is unrelated to skin colour ("it's not a racial thing").

6.2 Criticizing the Ingroup

I shall now turn to arguments that are used to challenge racist accounts. The racist arguments that we have encountered above did not only appear in the discourse of those who used them; they were also *referred* to by respondents who wanted to make a counter-argument. This was sometimes prompted by an interviewer question, but not always.

6.2.1 "An Element of Double Standards": Arguments Against Racism

The next extract takes on one of the argumentative strategies we have seen used in anti-outgroup discourse above, and turns it on its head. Instead of arguing that "If I went to another country, I would have to assimilate," this respondent argues that British people who decide to live abroad actually don't assimilate. The respondent contends that this reveals double standards in British people's perception of immigration and immigrants.

Extract 6

Yeah, maybe there's, there's always a lot publicity isn't there, around, there's a lot of publicity around immigration. […] That, a friend, a comment a friend of mine said, well people shouldn't come and live here unless they can speak the language. And I said, but you, you're watching the Place in the Sun, it's English people going and building houses in Spain, and they're completely, and the kids are going to Spanish schools. And in some of these schools, it's, a lot of it's English, so they can't speak Spanish at all. So I do find at times, we are, if there are, there's an element of double standards really.

The respondent argues that "double standards" are applied in the demands some British people would like to place on immigrants: they demand, the respondent contends, higher standards of assimilation from immigrants than they would from people who emigrate out of Britain to live in a different country.

6.2.2 "It Was Just Stupid Ignorance": The Acknowledgement of Ingroup Racism

Another form of ingroup criticism was the relating of experiences of racism. The difference to the previous category is that the reported racism is not answered with a sustained counter-argument, but rather brought into the conversation as evidence of the existence of racist views that in themselves are not discussed. One respondent refers to friends who have been harassed in public spaces due to their physical appearance as non-Whites.

Extract 7

> There's one example I could give you that one of my friends who lives in Rush Green in Romford, he is Chinese/Hong Kong. He's born and brought up in Romford but, and he has told me on many occasions that he gets racial abuse I suppose, people who shout insults at him. [...] He tells me that people have shouted Paki at him for example, which is just so ignorant it's not true, because he's Chinese, not Pakistani, it's just this level of ignorance.

7. The Discursive Negotiation of Racism and Antiracism

On the basis of the codes applied to their interviews, the twelve respondents were classified into three groups,

which are presented in Table 7: "Antiracists" who do not make anti-outgroup arguments and put forward sustained, reflected critique of racism amongst their own ingroup members; "Ambiguous Differentialists", who make anti-outgroup arguments based on differentialist ideas, but also present some arguments against ingroup racism; and "Strong Differentialists", whose differentialist discourse is not tempered by antiracist arguments (although a shallow affirmation of antiracist ideals in the form of disclaimers invariably features in their rhetoric). If the Everyday Differentialism scale is a valid indicator of the underlying attitudes it purports to measure, we would expect clear group differences in Everyday Differentialism scores – where the "Antiracists" would score lowest and the "Strong Differentialists" score highest. As Table 7 shows, this expectation is confirmed. The mean of the Antiracists is firmly below the scale midpoint at around 3; the mean of the "Strong Differentialists" is clearly above the midpoint, at 8; and the "Ambiguous Differentialists" all score slightly above the scale midpoint, with an average of around 6.

Table 7: Typology of interview discourses

Group label	Everyday differentialist arguments	Sustained anti-racist arguments	Frequency	Everyday differentialism score (means)	Antiracist principles score (means)
Antiracists	Absent	Present (strong)	4	2.97	10.00
Ambiguous differentialists	Present (weak)	Present (weak)	3	6.05	9.58
Strong differentialists	Present (strong)	Absent	5	8.00	5.00

Despite some qualitative researchers' scepticism against the validity of survey data, it turns out that the survey questions did not perform badly, as far as the task of indicating the respondents' stances on differentialist arguments and antiracist thinking was concerned. Yet we may interrogate the interview data more closely. How do respondents negotiate, in their thinking, antiracist norms and differentialist convictions? Those interviewees who brought forward anti-outgroup arguments invariably used rhetorical devices such as disclaimers to distance themselves from the

label "racist". On the other hand, interviewees who made sustained anti-racist arguments, criticizing positions of other members in their ingroup, did not use such devices; since their opinions did not come close to violating anti-racist norms, they had no need for them.

Scholars of racism have long pointed out that the denial of prejudice and racism is a part of racist discourse, and that the apparent acceptance of egalitarian norms as such does not necessarily indicate immunity to attitudes that defy

these very same norms (Condor et al. 2006). This is confirmed by the current study. Yet I shall argue that there may also be genuine ambiguity of attitudes. The logical contradiction between racism and antiracism is not necessarily an empirical contradiction, insofar as both attitudes are found within the discourse of individual respondents, and in particular those of the "Ambiguous" group.

Between the polar extremes of differentialism and antiracism there is a grey zone of ambiguity of thought where racialization pervades a respondent's discourse to varying degrees, but is counterbalanced, and even explicitly opposed by what appears to be a genuine commitment to non-racism. Below, I present extracts from interviews with two respondents who engaged in this highly ambiguous discourse.

When I phoned the respondent cited in Extracts 8 and 9 to ask for an interview, she referred back to her survey answer about having Poles as neighbours. I quote from my research notes, made immediately after the telephone conversation:

Extract 8

I laugh because I said [in the survey] that I don't want Poles or Africans as neighbours because they're noisy. We have West Indians next door, and Poles one house removed. And they're quite noisy. […]

In the interview, we returned to this issue:

Extract 9

People are, I mean I can sit at this road and look out. I think they're African.

Interviewer: The people who live in the opposite house?

Yeah, and then it's Asian and Asian, British Black next to us, West Indians, who are super.

Interviewer: Who are super?

Yeah, lovely they're nice people. Actually it's a very nice road. The gentleman that's moved into the house there, said they wanted to move here because it was a nice road, people talk to you. It is a nice road, it's a very tolerant road. We've got Chinese, Somalians who were refugees who have stayed, it's a Peacock House, Trust House so, and we've got Polish next door but one. It's just that they're very noisy, they sit out, they sit in the garden at night, that's why I said.

Interviewer: You mentioned that […], you've got problems with some neighbours?

No it's not problems, they're not doing anything than sitting out, they're young, they're sitting outside because there's a lot of them, they're sitting outside and smoking and drinking and talking. But Polish people talk very, I mean I know I've got a loud voice, so and they're all conversing so sometimes the row gets a bit much but you think, well they're not doing, they're not having all night parties or anything else it's just a, and you just, they live next door to you I think was the question.

Interviewer: In the survey?

Yeah, it was that, it was being selfish rather than prejudiced.

Interviewer: So there were certain people whom you said you would mind living next to …?

No, I don't, just if you were picking people. People are people, you can put a characteristic to somebody and then you can meet somebody that's not like that.

The respondent is evidently keen to downplay the significance of her ticking the "would mind a bit" box when asked about having Polish and African neighbours. Yet her attitude to her multicultural neighbourhood is not generally negative, and it would be difficult to justify classifying her as a differentialist on the basis of these extracts or the remainder of her interview. It is interesting to reflect that the same respondent also ticked that she minded "Gypsies" "a lot", but felt no need to defend her choice. In fact, during the interview this respondent made quite clear her view that gypsies "do an awful lot of stealing". It is true in general that gypsies were the only racialized outgroup about whom respondents voiced racist opinions without using rhetorical manoeuvres to qualify and defend their own views against the accusation of racism. Anti-gypsy prejudice, it appears, is not currently subject to the taboos that ostracize overt racism against almost any other racialized outgroup in Britain.

Social scientists that analyze qualitative interview material with the intention of informing theories of racism commonly think of respondent discourse in terms of rhetorical strategy, and consequently view racism denial and rhetorical devices such as disclaimers as attempts to save face vis-à-vis an interviewer (Bonilla-Silva 2006). This may be true in many cases, but often an alternative explanation is equally plausible: namely that respondents are genuinely contradictory in their thinking. One respondent explicitly

addressed the contradiction between her own interview discourse and her self-image as an open, tolerant person; she wondered aloud whether she was a racist or not. Consider the following two extracts.

Extract 10

> […] Perhaps talking to you it sounds like I'm a racist but I'm not. I don't think I am.
>
> Interviewer: Why do you think it sounds like a racist?
>
> Well because I seem to be sort of blaming people, and blaming different people. But I mean I know, it does sound it. Perhaps I didn't think I was. Perhaps I am now, I don't know. No, I'm not really.
>
> Interviewer: But I mean can I ask, what do you think is a racist then … [unclear]. What would racism be?
>
> Well people that are always down on, if I was racist I'd always be sort of like down on one particular type of person.

At the end of the interview, she returns to this point:

Extract 11

> Actually I'm going to be thinking whether I'm racist now, I must admit, whether I'm – I hope not. I hope I'm not down on them. Got me worried, you've got me worried about that.

With her worry that she may be a racist, the respondent expresses an implicit theory of racism: namely, that racism is something that the racist may not recognize in herself. The tendency to be "down on one particular type of person", which for the respondent constitutes the distinguishing characteristic of racism, may be one that escapes the racist's own recognition.

This respondent had a high Everyday Differentialism score, and had voiced anti-Black views during her interview. Yet she was one of the few respondents who also displayed curiosity about outgroups (in her case, Nigerians who had joined her Catholic church). Compared to most other respondents, her answers on the "Neighbours" questions were distinctly on the tolerant side: she didn't mind having any of the mentioned groups as neighbours, except "gypsies", whom she indicated she "would mind a bit". We should not simply (and maybe smugly) dismiss this respondent's ambiguity as an attempt to save face vis-à-vis an interviewer. It is at least as plausible that her combination of resentment and tolerance, accusation and curi-

osity represents a contradictory but not necessarily insincere position within the dilemmatic ideological field of racism and antiracism.

8. Discussion

The aims of this study were to investigate whether survey questions devised to measure everyday differentialist racism would stand up to validation by evidence from qualitative interviews, and to explore how British people with different attitudinal stances discursively negotiate the ideological field of racism and antiracism. Qualitative analysis produced a descriptive account of the relationship between antiracist and racist elements in respondents' discourses. There is a continuum of commitment to antiracism that ranges from superficial to profound. None of my respondents openly endorsed hierarchical racism. But some respondents, the "differentialists", made only perfunctory antiracist statements that had the function to preventatively fend off the accusation of racism when they presented anti-outgroup arguments. They did not refer to the existence of racism in their own ingroup in any but a token manner.

In a second group of respondents, the "Antiracists", racializations were all but absent, and they were not only aware of racism amongst their ingroup, but offered sustained and reflected arguments against racialized thinking. A third group of respondents appeared to argue with themselves over their interpretations. While racializations pervaded their discourse, they considered and endorsed antiracist counter-arguments against their own statements, and showed awareness of the existence of racism among their ingroup.

This description could not have been obtained by survey methods alone. But it is important to note that the scales on Everyday Differentialism and Antiracism, as a whole, were well able to pick up the differences between these three groups. The range of opinions in the interview discourse is reflected relatively well in the survey evidence.

We have seen that the coexistence of racist and antiracist themes in a respondent's account need not necessarily mean that antiracism is only adhered to in a perfunctory

way. Although perfunctory antiracism does exist, and plays a prominent role within racist discourse, we also find, in some respondents' statements, a profound ambiguity. The attitudes of these respondents lead them to make rather complex evaluations of local and national issues; and although they do not always manage to shake off the spectacles of racializing perception, in many ways they also question racist stereotypes, including their own. If what they said in the interview is representative of what they say in everyday interactions, these ambiguous differentialists may sometimes perpetuate racialized discourse in their social networks; but at other times may well be a force against racism through their opposition to blatantly racist views and discriminatory behaviour.

It is possible that what appear to be contradictory or ambiguous opinions are the result of a methodological artifact due to the two modes of asking used in this study. From the methodology of survey research it is well known that data from self-completion questionnaires are subject to less social desirability bias than data from survey interviews (Tourangeau and Smith 1996). It is plausible to assume that a tendency to (consciously or unconsciously) edit opinions in the direction of conformity with the antiracist norm may have played a role in the qualitative interviews. In fact, it would be surprising if this was not the case at least to some extent, especially as the interviewer's

nationality and accent (German) highlighted to respondents that "immigrants" to their country come in different kinds and colours. Qualitative researchers sometimes assume that in-depth interviews, as they offer the interviewer the chance for probing and the detailed inquiry into the structure of respondents' thinking, will bring out the respondent's true opinions better than a survey with its necessarily brief and superficial questions. Yet we do not have solid evidence to either verify or falsify this claim. In any case, both the survey and the interview, both quantitative and qualitative analysis of attitudes, share a common weakness: both are only ever able to investigate what people are prepared to say (to a researcher); not more, not less. Yet this is but a small part of the phenomenon we call racism. People may hold implicit attitudes that they are not conscious of and are not able to verbalize (Kawakami et al. 2009). Neither surveys nor qualitative interviews are well suited to uncovering implicit attitudes; experimental methods have the capacity to provide much clearer and less ambiguous evidence (Hodson et al. 2005). I am not suggesting that speech acts are unimportant – they are not – but that, in racism as in other areas of social life, many significant motives that determine human action (such as, say, discriminatory behaviour), may not be fully conscious, and would be missed by both quantitative and qualitative research methods that focus solely on verbalizable attitudes.

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The Meaning of Anti-Americanism: A Performative Approach to Anti-American Prejudice

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Vol. 7 (1) 2013

The Meaning of Anti-Americanism: A Performative Approach to Anti-American Prejudice

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A contribution to the ongoing debate on how anti-Americanism can be adequately conceptualized and how such prejudice can be distinguished from legitimate criticism, arguing that part of these conceptual problems arise from a too narrow focus on defining anti-Americanism and the use of standardized empirical operationalizations. Such approaches exhibit severe limitations in grasping the flexibility of the phenomenon in everyday discourse and often underestimate or ignore the interpretive aspect involved in identifying utterances as anti-American prejudice. Alternatively, a performative approach is proposed, understanding anti-Americanism as a network of speech acts bound by family resemblance rather than identical features. In combination with qualitative empirical research methods such a conceptualization is especially suited to account for the flexible, situated use of anti-American utterances. At the same time it grants reflexivity to the research concept, in the sense of a close description of the scientific application of the notion of anti-Americanism. Two empirical examples from an interview study on anti-American speech in Germany illustrate the potential of such an approach, providing an insight into how anti-Americanism is incorporated into the construction and expression of racist and revisionist national identifications in everyday discourse.

How should we explain to someone what a game is? I imagine that we should describe games to him, and we might add: "This and similar things are called 'games'". And do we know any more about it ourselves? Is it only other people who we cannot tell exactly what a game is? – But this is not ignorance. We do not know the boundaries because none have been drawn.

(Wittgenstein 1967, § 69)

In the field of research on prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination, anti-Americanism is one of the rather controversial and often neglected topics. The notion of anti-Americanism is often accompanied by debates about the extent and intent of its application, what counts as anti-American, and what should be regarded as legitimate criticism of the United States. The concept is frequently dismissed as mere political rhetoric, and critics deny it has any substance, much more than with many other forms of prejudice (Hahn 2003, 20–21; Markovits 2007, 13 ff.). Those claiming such a position often regard anti-Americanism as a legitimate and necessary form of political protest (Misik 2003; ProKla 1989). Some of the opponents of criticism of anti-Americanism even affirm-

atively label themselves anti-American, while claiming that there is nothing wrong with prejudice when it comes to the United States (O'Connor 2007, 13–14; Markovits 2007, 25). While I do not mean to ignore the specific characteristics of different forms of prejudice and discrimination, or equate them directly, the general rejection of criticism of anti-Americanism seems to be rather troubling. I agree with Brendon O'Connor's slightly hyperbolical claim: "to overcome anti-American prejudice, we first need to overcome the prejudice against seeing anti-Americanism as a form of prejudice" (O'Connor 2007, 19).

However, at the same time researchers in this field agree that there is good reason to criticize the current state of research on anti-Americanism:

> Despite its currency in popular discourse, anti-Americanism is a topic that has received limited attention by academics. This lack of attention is probably due to two factors. First, anti-Americanism is a term that is difficult to conceptualize. Second, it easily lends itself to (mis)use as a pejorative.

(Johnston 2006, 2–3)

Brendon O'Connor claims that research on anti-Americanism seems to have somewhat prematurely rushed past more basic conceptual issues that still need to be dealt with:

> The existing academic literature provides endless divisions between different so-called sources of anti-Americanism but there is too little scholarship on what anti-Americanism conceptually is and thus how anti-Americanism can effectively be differentiated from criticism.

(O'Connor 2007, 7)

Some of the most informative work on anti-Americanism seeks to resolve these conceptual problems by employing the notion of prejudice (ibid., 13–14). This approach has many virtues and constitutes one of the most promising developments in current anti-Americanism research. It provides useful distinctions and theoretical concepts, while connecting the study of anti-Americanism more closely to the large and well-established body of prejudice research. Secondly, as O'Connor rightfully indicates, this anti-Americanism-as-prejudice perspective places the notion of anti-Americanism in a strong normative context with "significant cultural and political resonance in the fight against racism and discrimination" (ibid.). However, at the same time, I argue that considerable shortcomings in the way prejudice is commonly conceptualized limit the concept's potential to resolve the problems that it is supposed to. What is interesting about both Johnston's and O'Connor's diagnoses is their mention of a close association between conceptual and practical or ethical aspects of the notion of anti-Americanism. The disagreement about how anti-Americanism should be defined seems to be strongly related to the question of how a *good use* of the concept might be construed (for example, how anti-Americanism can be differentiated from criticism of the United States). In fact, it seems to me that this controversy is at least as much about the *application* of the concept of anti-Americanism, as it is about its definition.[1] This question of a *good use* of definitions will thus occupy a central place in

my exploration. I will argue that conceptions of anti-Americanism as prejudice often focus too much on strict definitions of their subject matter, dismissing the importance of also accounting for the immense variability in their application to concrete empirical phenomena, i.e. reflecting on the empirical application of such concepts. I will go on to show how these conceptual foundations, which stand very much in the tradition of the "prejudice as attitude" approach (Nelson 2002, 8–9), limit the scope for addressing the problems outlined above. In my view, they are too focused on defining an essential core of anti-Americanism: "the 'real thing', the real anti-Americanism" (Markovits 2007, 12). Applying a distinction Andrei Markovits has fruitfully applied to the criticism of anti-Americanism (ibid.), one could say that research seems to concentrate too much on what anti-Americanism "is" and too little on what it actually "does." The reciprocal relation of semantics and pragmatics in meaning-making (both lay and scientific) is reduced to a mere problem of definitional imprecision, to be resolved by the abstract listing of the right criteria. In contrast to this, I will stress the "priority of practice" both in lay discourse and scientific conceptualization (Bloor 2001).

A similar criticism has recently been put forward by Klaus Baethge and colleagues (2010), pointing out how notions of anti-Americanism are often too occupied with definitions of the content of anti-American stereotypes, while neglecting a thorough investigation of their flexible functionality in everyday discourse. Building on this line of argument, I propose a performative perspective on anti-Americanism, grasping it as an open network of speech acts. In this perspective the focus is shifted towards anti-Americanism as practical meaning-making, concerning not definable features of the prejudiced psyche or lexical-semantical core elements of anti-American speech, but anti-Americanism as embedded in the discursive practice of "everyday ideology" (Martin 2010, 62). Such highlighting of the performative aspect of anti-American speech simul-

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1   Similarly, Konrad Jarausch has suggested including the meta-debate on the scientific and political use of the term itself in research on anti-Americanism (Jarausch 2005, 46–47).

taneously serves as a reflection on the empirical use of the scientific concept of anti-Americanism: reflecting on the everyday language use of *anti-American talk* reciprocally implies reflecting on the scientific language use of *talk about anti-Americanism.* The assumption that we cannot theoretically know or properly define what anti-Americanism *is* unless we empirically work through various instances of what it *does* is essential to this approach. In fact, what anti-Americanism *is*, as determined by definitions, is only a reflection on the practice of what anti-American speech *does.* This emphasis on practical meaning in context necessitates the use of methods of empirically grounded theory construction,[2] which have as yet received very limited attention in the study of anti-Americanism.[3] I will argue that while standardized empirical methods show serious limitations with regard to a performative perspective on anti-American speech, qualitative methods within the framework of empirically grounded theory construction fit this theoretical approach particularly well.

1. Current Conceptualizations of Anti-Americanism as Prejudice

As described above, the anti-Americanism-as-prejudice perspective can be seen as one of the most promising developments in current anti-Americanism research, since it provides a more detailed and conceptually consistent understanding of the matter than many other conceptualizations which, as O'Connor points out (2007, 10 ff., 19), often use the term either in a too liberal or an overly restricted way. Understanding anti-Americanism as a form of prejudice seems to avoid both of these tendencies and is therefore adopted by many researchers (O'Connor 2007, Markovits 2007, Keohane and Katzenstein 2007, Beyer and Liebe 2010). However, despite its obvious advantages, the notion of prejudice is far from guaranteeing a more concise and insightful approach to the phenomenon.

Scientific concepts essentially have to meet the same demands as any abstract concept in everyday language use:

They have to be understandable as distinctive signifiers of certain referents, but have to do so in a wide variety of different contexts. Thus, the question is: How can we *identify* anti-Americanism as a general concept that is at the same time *flexible* enough to denote a potentially infinite number of particular actions (i.e. expressions of anti-Americanism)? Definitions of anti-American prejudice typically seek to deal with this problem analytically, by naming "core markers" (O'Connor 2007, 2) or "minimal characteristics" (Markovits 2007, 12) as criteria for the adequate application of the definition. But even if these criteria are closely defined, the difficulty of judging exactly when they are met remains. To pick out just one example, here are the central characteristics of anti-American prejudice cited by Markovits (referring to Josef Joffe):

1. Stereotypization (that is, statements of the type: "This is what they are all like.")
2. Denigration (the ascription of a collective moral or cultural inferiority to the target group)
3. Omnipotence (e.g., "They control the media, the economy, the world.")
4. Conspiracy (e.g., "This is what they want to do to us surreptitiously and stealthily – sully our racial purity, destroy our traditional, better, and morally superior ways.")
5. Obsession (a constant preoccupation with the perceived and feared evil and powerful ways of the hated group) (Markovits 2007, 12.)

The question is: when are these criteria actually fulfilled? For example, a statement like "The Americans are superficial and selfish" surely does appear stereotypical. But then again, there are many conceivable contexts in which it would probably not be viewed as an expression of prejudice. After all, we use simplifications and exaggerations in our everyday speech all the time, judging individuals by their group membership without being prejudiced.[4] Furthermore, can the statement be regarded as denigrating? The context of utterance may very well not imply a strong

2 The term "empirically grounded theory construction" is used here in a broader sense, not specifically referring to Glaser and Strauss's approach.

3 A notable exception being the abovementioned study by Baethge and colleagues (2010), who very

fruitfully apply a reconstructive empirical approach to material gathered via group discussions.

4 Keohane and Katzenstein, who apply the notion of cognitive "schemas" to their concept of anti-Americanism point out a similar problem: "Schemas do not necessarily imply bias. Indeed they can be

based on a coherent worldview based on a reasonable interpretation of available facts." (Keohane and Katzenstein 2007, 13)

evaluative notion or a sense of hierarchy. In addition, not all forms of devaluation or hierarchization are generally denigrating in a prejudiced way.[5] Does a speaker necessarily have to ascribe omnipotence and conspiracy to "the Americans" for his speech to be counted as anti-American? And what is meant by the clinical term "obsession"? In what sense are speakers of anti-American discourse obsessive, and do they have to be?[6] Moreover, if not all of these criteria are necessary, which ones in which combinations would be sufficient? Can there even be a fixed set of necessary and sufficient conditions?[7]

As we can see, notions like the one cited above focus on typical features of anti-Americanism as a definite concept, but largely disregard a systematic account of how these features are *flexibly* realized within actual utterances. This becomes especially problematic when dealing with expressions of anti-Americanism that are not cases of blunt ideological agitation, but part of everyday discourse, "speech acts of ordinary people who don't hold political office … and who haven't made a profession out of writing or speaking" (Martin 2010, 40; see also Baethge et al. 2010). To be sure, most authors are aware that their definitions have to be applied in a context-specific and situated manner. For instance, Andrei Markovits has repeatedly emphasized the importance of tone and context in describing the anti-American quality of actual speech: "The content defines, but the context lends meaning." (2007, 16) However, current research on anti-Americanism mostly approaches this problem as if it were predominantly about finding a "more precise definition of the term" (O'Connor 2007, 6), neglecting the issue of concept application. According to a practice theoretical perspective on language and meaning (Potter 2011), the norms of language use do not function like axiomatic definitions, but have to retain a certain amount of uncertainty. This "systematic ambiguity" is only suspended in the practice of everyday dis-

course (Winch 2008 [1958], 25). Applying this notion to definitive conceptions of anti-Americanism, they face the same problem as any strictly axiomatic understanding of language use. As Peter Winch formulates with regard to how ostensive definitions are unable to account for the application of the word "Everest":

> However emphatically I point at this mountain here before me and however emphatically I utter the words "this mountain", my decision still has to be applied in the future, and it is precisely what is involved in such an application that is here in question. Hence no formula will help to solve this problem; we must always come to a point at which we have to give an account of the application of the formula.
>
> (Winch 2008 [1958], 27)

Accordingly, the problems of applying the concept of anti-Americanism will not be solved by a more precise definition alone, but will require a conceptualization that reflexively integrates its own application *as part* of the subject matter. However, since this integration cannot be achieved in a strictly formalized manner, it will require the close description of empirical examples of the phenomenon in question. This has implications for how we conceptualize anti-Americanism in two different yet reciprocal regards: Firstly, it concerns the way in which we view our scientific approach towards investigating the social phenomenon in question. Secondly, and by the same token, it concerns the way in which we grasp the subject matter itself, i.e. how we conceptualize expressions of anti-Americanism. These aspects will be discussed in the two following sections.

2. Anti-Americanism as Performative Utterance
The conceptual problems discussed above can be summarized by the question: How can the anti-American meaning of an utterance be grasped and what, consequently, is the meaning of the term anti-Americanism? As an alternative

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5 For example, the everyday distinctive practices between adherents of different sub-cultural movements surely express a certain amount of group-based hierarchy and in-group favoritism, as does everyday chat with friends about colleagues, etc. Ethically problematic as some of these practices may be, to simply include them in the concept of

prejudice would empty the notion of much of its specific meaning.

6 This also ties in with the problem of "individualism" found in most prejudice research (Wetherell 2012, 161 ff.). Can the anti-American quality of (speech) acts really be grasped as a psychological condition of the speakers?

7 My criticism here is in many respects congruent with the arguments made against definitional concepts in cognitive psychology from a graded structure and prototypes perspective (Rosch 1999). I will come back to this in section 2.

to a definition-based answer I propose a performative or speech-act-theory perspective. Simply put, the central question raised by such an approach is not *what is said* in an utterance, but *what is done* by saying it.

The notion of speech acts is most prominently associated with the work of John L. Austin, whose influential *How to Do Things With Words* dealt with what Sadock describes as "the observation that certain sorts of sentences, e.g., I christen this ship the Joseph Stalin; I now pronounce you man and wife, and the like, seem designed to do something, here to christen and wed, respectively, rather than merely to say something" (Sadock 2006, 54). After initially introducing a distinction between "Constatives" and "Performatives" (ibid.), to theoretically grasp this interplay of "saying" and "doing," Austin eventually acknowledged that every speech act, even the mere stating of facts, can be seen to have a performative aspect (Austin 1975, 91–92, 133 ff.), and suggested three general levels of description instead: locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts (Austin 1975, 101 ff.). While Austin's "performative speech acts" primarily referred to a certain class of institutionalized illocutionary acts (to promise, to wed, etc.), I will use the concept "performativity" in a broader sense similar to the applications put forward by Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter (1992, 90): A performative perspective in this sense focuses on what Austin calls "perlocutionary" acts, i.e. the effect of a speech act within a certain context of action. Accordingly, I propose to grasp anti-Americanism as performative utterance, i.e. as the perlocutions evoked by certain contextual uses of certain semantic motifs, not the mere definable features of such uses or motifs.[8] This notion of performativity is closely related to Wittgenstein's view on the contextual nature of meaningful speech in "language games" that are "part of an activity, or of a form of life" (Wittgenstein 1967, 11). The meaning of a sentence cannot be grasped without understanding its functional role within a specific language game, which in turn has to be described as nested in the broader practices of a form of life: "To obey

a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess are *customs* (uses, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique." (Wittgenstein 1967, 81)[9] Let me point out that this embedment of linguistic meaning in everyday practices does not aim to describe the functions of speech acts as additional events exterior to "mere" speech, i.e. something that follows from it causally or goes along with it coincidentally. It rather describes a perspective on linguistic meaning, in which it can only be understood as a contextualized form of practice: "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (ibid., 20). Thus, when I talk about anti-American meaning as a performative effect, I do not mean to investigate whether certain speech acts have certain direct causal effects (e.g. if somebody was actually discriminated against or harmed as a consequence of this particular speech act), but rather to highlight the practical context as a necessary component of interpreting something *as anti-American*. Such interpretation then implies reconstructing *possible perlocutions* from the specific point of view of a prejudice critique.

In the field of prejudice research, a practice theoretical approach has been developed in the theory of rhetorical and discursive social psychology, most prominently pursued by Michael Billig, Margaret Wetherell, and Jonathan Potter (Martin 2010, 106 ff.). In their work on *Mapping the Language of Racism*, Wetherell and Potter develop a criticism of traditional prejudice research, which I will apply to the argument outlined above. By pointing out the limitations of an approach that is mainly concerned with "defining the content of racism in an a priori fashion" (Wetherell and Potter 1992, 69), they focus on "discourse in action rather than language as an abstract system" (71; see also Billig 1991, 44). This approach treats "as primary what may be called the 'action orientation' of discourse":

> The sense of texts or talk is not seen as derived from their abstract meaning or organization but from their situated use.

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8 Thus, when I talk about performative anti-Americanism, I am not implying anti-American speech that could be classified as "performative speech acts" in Austin's narrower sense. I am not talking about anti-Americanisms as something comparable to "promises," "christenings," "weddings," or the like.

9 Note how Wittgenstein, in contrast to Austin's understanding of performative speech, employs a much broader notion of institutions and customs.

> By the same token, the nature of the use to which any text or talk is put is not derivable from the abstract or dictionary meanings of the terms used.
>
> (Wetherell and Potter 1992, 90)

Thus, this approach suggests a distinction of "interpretative resource" and "the flexible application of that resource in practice" to reconstruct the meaning of prejudiced speech (Wetherell 2012, 171). Following this line of thinking, I apply a heuristic distinction between semantic content of utterances (in a lexical-grammatical sense) and their use in context as the basis for my empirically grounded notion of anti-Americanism. Both of these aspects, semantics and use, are to be conceptualized as essentially contingent with regard to anti-American meaning, i.e. neither of the two suffices in itself to classify a prejudiced speech act as anti-American; it is the performative effect of certain situated combinations that constitutes anti-American meaning (Wetherell and Potter 1992, 70, 90–91).[10]

This means that, contrary to traditional definitions of prejudice as "faulty and inflexible generalizations" that are "factually wrong" (Martin 2010, 67 ff., 104; also Wetherell and Potter 1992, 67 ff.), the criticism of anti-Americanism (or any prejudice, for that matter) cannot be primarily concerned with propositional truth claims. Even though anti-Americanism may often present itself as mere constative speech, criticism needs to be primarily concerned with the practical or ethical meaning of what people actually do when performing such speech acts, not the factual validity of their claims (Baethge et al. 2010, 373). This also serves as a strong argument against "correspondence approach[es]" and "representational analyses" of prejudice

(Wetherell and Potter 1992, 67 ff.; Holz 2001, 62), which still are rather common in anti-Americanism research.[11]

The claim that anti-Americanism is not primarily a matter of propositional truth, however, should not be misunderstood as an argument for the arbitrariness of its semantic content. It is important to acknowledge that semantic content and functional use are interconnected: certain semantic content is needed to achieve specific functional outcomes (Holz 2001, 59–60), although it may not exclusively provide the means to achieve these functions (Baethge et al. 2010, 377 ff.).

Focusing on the performative aspect of (anti-American) prejudice also highlights the super-individual quality of the phenomenon, since it is concerned with grasping the "ideological thrust" of utterances (Wetherell 2012, 171): "This means studying thinking, and the holding of opinions, in its wider social context" (Billig 1991, 1). Although current notions of prejudice in social psychology acknowledge the contextual factors of its expression, most concepts still retain an individualistic bias, conceiving the phenomenon first and foremost by individual factors which are then placed in social context: "Prejudice remains a personal pathology, a failure of inner-directed empathy and intellect, rather than a social pathology, shaped by power relations and the conflicting vested interests of groups" (Wetherell 2012, 165). A performative approach tries to integrate both aspects, reading utterances of prejudice as expressions of "social pathologies" (see also Honneth 2007) while at the same time accounting for the fragmented and flexible character of their subjective realization.[12]

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10 Despite the principal contingency in the connection of relevant semantic content and its anti-American or non-anti-American use, it has to be assumed that some motifs relevant to anti-American prejudice may coincide more often with anti-American use than others; some may even necessitate such applications. Wetherell and Potter mention a similar idea with regard to racism: "We acknowledge that there are some interpretative resources which will constitute social action in racist ways on nearly every occasion they are deployed. However, to focus on these is to ignore the other, sometimes more flexible, resources which characterize a good deal of 'modern racism'" (71).

11 Examples of such approaches, seeking to grasp anti-Americanism via definitions of "Americanism" or "Americanization" include: Srp (2005, 32, 40) and Birkenkämper (2006, 24–25). Keohane and Katzenstein also express a representational leaning in their concept (2007, 3). For critical remarks on such conceptualizations see also O'Connor (2007, 17–18) and O'Connor and Griffiths (2006, 1).

12 The term social pathology refers to the paradoxical normative basis of critical theory, which has to simultaneously assume the falsity of ideological thought and consider itself to be caught up in it. A critical approach to the subject of investigation thus implies avoiding both "a radical elitism, which downgrades individual autonomy" as well as "an individual analysis, which accepts uncritically the frameworks of power" (Billig 1991, 13). Since such a critique cannot assume a viewpoint outside of ideological social conditions, it is not concerned with a "correction" of "definitely false" consciousness, but with the interpretive reflection and transformation of a false social practice which it considers itself to be an active part of (cf. Menke 1996; Bonacker 2000).

To provide a theoretical framework that systematically includes the considerations of speech act theory discussed above, I propose the following concept: Anti-Americanism is the performative aspect of speech acts that are characterized by the interplay of particular America motifs and particular situated uses.

Of course, this notion only provides a "heuristic framework" (Kelle 2005, 14) which, to be theoretically informative, has to be combined with empirical research. A conceptualization of anti-American prejudice will thus consist of an empirical "mapping" (Wetherell and Potter 1992) of relevant America motifs and their different situated uses, combined with examples of actual anti-American performances. Here are some examples of such motifs and uses.[13]

Table 1: Examples of America motifs relevant to anti-American speech and possible anti-American applications

Relevant America motifs	Typical uses in anti-American speech
· The United States acts as an overbearing "world police," interfering with other nations' affairs	· Externalization of uncomfortable aspects of (national) in-group identity, e.g. self-contradictory elements
· American culture is superficial, or Americans have no real culture	· Deflection of anticipated moral sanctioning for certain opinions or arguments (e.g. nationalism) via comparison to the United States
· Americans are hypocritical, for example in their moral and religious behavior	· A camouflaged expression of anti-Semitism or racism
· Americans are overly individualistic and unable to develop profound social bonds	· ...
· Americans are uneducated and naive	
· ...	

Again, I want to stress that the reproduction of the America motifs cited above does not necessarily make an utterance anti-American, nor do the communicative functions given on the right hand side of the table by themselves suffice as criteria for anti-American prejudice. To be counted as anti-American speech, an utterance needs to be shown to achieve one or more of the given functions

through the reproduction of one or more typical America motifs. As can be seen from the example functions listed, conceptualizing anti-Americanism in this perspective coincides with a close description of the more general ideological phenomena it is nested in. A functional connection to antisemitism and racism seems to be an important part of this ideological context of anti-American speech, while all three share strong ties to nationalist identity construction. I will point out some functional affinities and specific differences between these phenomena in more detail in the empirical examples below.

Thus far I have concentrated on the potential of a performative approach to account for the *flexibility* of anti-American utterances. However, the question remains open, how such a diversification of the concept can at the same time satisfy the need to comprehensively *identify* anti-Americanism, i.e. distinguish different manifestations of anti-Americanism *as manifestations of a common phenomenon*. I will draw on Wittgensteins notion of "family resemblances" to suggest an answer (Wittgenstein 1967, 32).

In his famous example of the word "game" and its meaningful use, Wittgenstein comes to the interesting conclusion that, even though there is obviously a practical understanding of the term in everyday language, it is impossible to define a single essential feature, "something that is common to all" of its applications (31). He describes several different understandings of the word, concluding that "the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail" (32). Following this general description of the distinctive yet flexible use of a concept, I propose to grasp the notion of anti-Americanism as a family of speech acts, bound not by identity but similarity of features. The concept is illustrated in Figure 1, where the two lower boxes represent the inventory of relevant semantics and applications (as described in Table 1), and the ellipse above (dashed line) comprises the family of particular anti-American speech acts.

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13 The table represents an excerpt from the author's ongoing dissertation on contemporary anti-American speech in Germany. The examples are preliminary results of empirical work in progress and are thus to be treated with a degree of caution.

Figure 1: Anti-Americanism as Family Resemblance

The essential difference from analytical definitions of anti-Americanism is that the members of the family do not share a universally common feature (or set of features), at least none that could justify their classification as anti-American:[14] "aa 1" and "aa 3" show common functions of different motifs while "aa 3" and "aa 4" achieve different functions via the same motifs. By way of resemblance, this connects "aa 1" to "aa 4" via "aa 3," while "aa 2" is connected to the rest of the group via "aa 5." Thus, no single feature binds all five cases together. They can be denominated as anti-American only with reference to the family of anti-American discourse, i.e. their resemblances to other anti-American speech acts whose features are not included in every family member. What makes an utterance anti-American is not located entirely in the utterance itself, but in its association to a group of utterances that make up the discourse of anti-American speech. Reciprocally, the general features of the family of anti-American discourse, i.e.

the concept of anti-Americanism, cannot be explained without reference to the particular features of its members. Thus, the anti-American quality of an utterance is not a feature that can be directly observed or defined. Instead, we need to account for what anti-Americanism is by showing similarities within its flexible realizations. This requires an interpretative act of regarding something *as anti-American*, as I will point out in more detail in the following section. As John O'Connor has suggested with regard to conceptualizing anti-American ideology, the different expressions of anti-Americanism are seen here too as bound by a "flexible coherence" (O'Connor 2007, 16). But instead of assuming an "ideological 'core'" binding these ideas, as O'Connor does (ibid.), I stress the conceptual idea of a coreless network of commonalities. To adopt another Wittgensteinian metaphor: such a notion of anti-Americanism allows us to "extend our concept … as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength

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14 For instance, even though all expressions of anti-Americanism may include a direct or indirect reference to Americans or the United States, this common criterion cannot distinguish anti-Americanism from non-anti-American language uses.

of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres" (Wittgenstein 1967, 32).[15] Of course, the empirical analysis of such a network of similarities will at different stages result in stating the most common anti-American uses and America motifs, in an attempt to provide a general description of the characteristics of anti-Americanism. But we must not misconstrue these general characteristics as *something that exists* in the same way as the particular realizations do (ibid.). Such treatment of the social practice of anti-American speech runs the risk of creating "fictional things" (Billig 2011, 14 ff.) instead of informative accounts of what people do, thereby overlooking the flexibility and functionality of such actions.

3. Methodological Implications of a Performative Approach to Anti-Americanism

I have argued for shifting the focus of anti-Americanism research towards the empirical application of its concepts by investigating the situated use of America stereotypes. I will now point out how methods of qualitative empirical research can help to foster such an approach. This is discussed within the frame of empirically grounded theory construction, where the topic of theory application has been extensively discussed (Kelle 1998; Alvesson and Sköldberg 2008, 16–17).

It is a commonly acknowledged insight in general epistemology and the methodology of empirical science, that any empirical observation constitutes a "'theory-laden' undertaking" (Hanson 1972, 19; see also Kelle 2005, 3; Alvesson and Sköldberg 2008, 17), i.e. any observation of something presupposes prior knowledge enabling us to see it *as something*. Applying a concept of anti-Americanism constitutes such an operation of "seeing as" (Hanson 1972), which

means that it contains a necessary element of interpretation. The anti-American meaning is not merely something which is "in the data," but also in the act of scientific observation. I have shown above that this interpretative act of "seeing as," i.e. applying the concept, cannot be grasped in an axiomatic fashion (see section 1). Nonetheless, methods of standardized operationalization, which are predominant in anti-Americanism research, can be regarded as an attempt to do exactly that: concept application in a formalized manner. In contrast to this, I will argue that the interpretative aspect of concept application needs to be mirrored by the methodology of empirical research, which can be achieved through the hermeneutics of qualitative empirical study.

It has been repeatedly noted that standardized measures of anti-Americanism, especially common survey instruments, "risk imposing a conceptual unity on extremely diverse sets of political processes that mean different things in different contexts" (Keohane and Katzenstein 2007, 19; see also O'Connor 2007, 6). Such measurements are most commonly operationalized via the scaling of agreement to certain statements using instruments ranging from simply asking about approval or disapproval of US politics or the United States in general (Chiozza 2007) to more distinctively assessing respondents' agreement or disagreement with items expressing typical semantic content of anti-American speech (Knappertsbusch and Kelle 2010; Beyer and Liebe 2010; Schwan 1999). In any case, this kind of empirical application may identify the reproduction of relevant America stereotypes, but tells us hardly anything about *how these motifs are used* by the respondents. As I argue above, to assess the anti-American meaning of an utterance it is most important to observe not only certain stereotypes, but also their situated use. A standardized

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15 As noted in section 1, my proposed understanding of the concept is very much in line with prototype theory as pursued by Eleanor Rosch. Without being able to go into further detail here, this applies especially with regard to her understanding of concepts as bound by family resemblance rather than necessary and sufficient conditions, her rejection of solipsism or individualism, the context-dependency of concept-meaning, and the participatory rather than identifying character of concepts (Rosch 2012, 68 ff.).

operationalization does not provide the necessary context to *read an utterance as* anti-American in its use. To be sure, this by no means renders standardized surveys inappropriate to the study of (anti-American) prejudice: they remain an indispensable tool for assessing the prevalence of certain patterns of interpretation within larger populations (Martin 2010, 122 ff.) and describing models of probabilistic causality (Kelle 2008, 181 ff.). But, strictly speaking, they can never grasp anti-American speech in action: the standardized operationalization provides a black box of probability, however plausible the instrument construction may be, rather than an account of the actual use of the phrases they survey. To give such an account, we need to approach expressions of anti-Americanism as readable texts that provide more vivid information about what actors do by uttering them. Methods of interpretative empirical research can provide the means for such reconstructions of the anti-American meaning of utterances. Material gathered through qualitative research (Lincoln and Guba 2005, 10 ff.), such as transcripts of non-standardized interviews, provide an opportunity to observe the reproduction of certain America images *and* interpret them as (non-)anti-American utterances in their situated use.[16] Such a combination of empirical and theoretical practice can be described as a form of empirically grounded theory construction (Kelle 1998). While research following the quantitative empirical paradigm favors a "hypothetico-deductive model of theory generation" (Kelle 2005, 16), in which theory development and empirical hypothesis-testing are consecutive, the methodology of empirically grounded theory construction contests such a strict division of theoretical and empirical research practice. Instead, it favors a model of theory generation in which empirical observation and theoretical understanding and/or explanation are reciprocal: theory generation becomes the scientific practice of "seeing as," in which theoretical and empirical aspects are inextricably intertwined (Kalthoff 2008, 8–9). Such a methodological framework corresponds

nicely with the conceptual notion of family resemblance outlined above, in which the theoretical abstractions remain reciprocally bound to their empirical realizations and vice versa.

4. Two Empirical Examples of Anti-American Speech

Applying the heuristic distinction between *America motifs* and their situated anti-American use, I will show how certain America images can be used in an ideological context that justifies reading them as anti-American speech. To illustrate my proposition that the criticism of anti-American prejudice is not primarily a matter of propositional truth, I have chosen examples in which anti-American speech revolves around images that might generally be seen as expressions of a prejudice-critique, not prejudice: the image of the *United States as a racist society* and the condemnation of *crimes against Native Americans.* I will show how these motifs are employed in the context of (1) a xenophobic racial nationalism and (2) an obscuration and relativization of the Holocaust as a means to rehabilitate a consistently positive German national identity.

The examples are taken from a sample of qualitative interviews conducted during the fall of 2011.[17] Cases were selected from a sample previously collected for a standardized survey on different forms of prejudice and ideological attitudes in Germany in the summer of 2011. The interview participants were selected on the basis of their high scoring responses on a six-item anti-Americanism scale. Participants were re-contacted and interviewed by telephone, conducting semi-structured interviews with the help of a flexible interview guide. Loosely drawing on the techniques of cognitive interviewing (Willis 2005; Martin 2010, 189 ff.), the guide included the items of the anti-Americanism scale to which participants had already responded in the standardized survey. In the course of the interview they were presented with their previous responses and asked to elaborate on these.

16 To be sure, such non-standardized data are of course also "artificial" interactions, co-constructed by researchers and respondents, and cannot be conceived as providing a "direct insight" into the everyday practice of participants. What distinguishes them from standardized research methods is that

they leave as much space as possible for the spontaneous actions and associations of the respondents and thus provide material that allows for ex post hermeneutical and reflexive analyses (Davies 2008, 4 ff.; for a critical view on qualitative interviewing as a research tool see Potter and Hepburn 2005).

4.1. Anti-Americanism and Holocaust Relativization

The example demonstrates how the motif of crimes against Native Americans – their deportation and partial annihilation by American colonists and settlers – whose veracity cannot in itself be denied, can nonetheless be applied in prejudiced speech. At first glance one might generally want to agree with the participant's statement: "Five hundred Native American nations, whole tribes, were eliminated. […] I think the Americans should do a lot more educational work to reflect on that"[18] However, in the wider context of speech, this statement can be shown to achieve an entirely different purpose than stating and evaluating facts of American history.

The interview starts out with the participant being asked to explain his affirmative response to the survey item: "I can certainly understand that some people don't like the Americans."[19] He asserts that his answer is based on his rejection of US foreign policy, i.e. the way in which the United States acts as a "world police" forcing other countries to align with an "American worldview." Asked by the interviewer to more closely describe his associations with said "world police," the participant explains:

> Well, I don't want to come across as a right-wing extremist or something like that by any means, but … If I, regarding history, come back to the Second World War (incomprehensible) … Of course, what happened in Germany was very, very awful, and it should never happen again in any nation on earth in this way, that is totally clear. But the Americans have now designed practically the whole European educational system, so that practically a World War.… Er, and this is the crucial point, I think, at which one should become a little vigilant: One single nation cannot cause a World War on its own. After all, I think, they were all involved, England, France, Italy, Russia […]. And to now have the Americans dictate our school system right from the beginning, telling us what we are allowed and not allowed to know…

Interestingly, the participant does not pick one of the events usually cited as current examples for American dominance, like the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but

spontaneously refers to Europe and particularly Germany as victims of American power. This turn of the conversation reveals that the issue of German national identity and its relation to the Nazi past is closely connected to his depiction of the United States. His theory about how Americans more or less comprehensively control German history education conveys a strong sense of being patronized by a foreign power: in his view Germany is unrightfully accused of having caused the Second World War and Germans are led to believe so by American indoctrination. I argue that this construction is to be seen as an ideological expression of a paradox in the participant's construction of national identity. This paradox of German post-war identity, which has been described with regard to current antisemitism (Holz 2007), consists in distancing the in-group from the perpetrators of National Socialism and the Holocaust while simultaneously including and normalizing them as part of it. In such a perspective, the mass murder of European Jews appears primarily as an obstacle to a positive, continuous national identity. To express such a positive nationalism, the Holocaust and the Nazi-past have to be obscured or diminished while simultaneously avoiding "coming across as a right-wing extremist." Like in antisemitic constructions, the paradox is dissolved here through a reversal of perpetrator and victim roles (Holz 2007, 39 ff.). As the participant elaborates his argument about German history and its (foreign) evaluation, the motif of crimes against Native Americans comes into play:

> Of course, mistakes and acts that do not exactly conform to the Geneva Convention were committed by both sides, the Allies and their adversaries. But this means America that does not have the right to continue to this day condemning Germany alone for something the Americans already did before the world wars, that is, annihilating whole populations. I think, for instance, of the Native Americans. Five hundred Native American nations, whole tribes, were eliminated. […] I think the Americans should do a lot more educational work to reflect on that, to somehow finally bring – let me say – that balance of justice into present day Europe.

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18 The interview excerpts in section 4 are taken from the respective transcripts. In the transcripts "(.)" and "(…)" signify short and longer pauses (up to 3 seconds), while "[…]" signifies parts of the

transcript have been omitted for the sake of brevity; "…" indicates an unfinished sentence.

19 Item translated by the author. Original German item wording: "Ich kann es gut verstehen, wenn manchen Leuten die US-Amerikaner unangenehm sind" (adopted from Decker et al. 2010).

After having "normalized" German responsibility for World War II, claiming that Allied and Axis forces were equally involved in war crimes, the participant moves on to a more specific topic, stating that Americans should not condemn other deeds committed by Germans either, since they themselves committed "the same deeds" before, namely "annihilating whole populations." Here, the participant is implicitly but clearly invoking the Holocaust and equating it to crimes against Native Americans. This reference to American history thus enables him to relativize the Holocaust without ever having to explicitly mention it. The motif of crimes against Native Americans provides an anti-American resolution to the "paradox of normalization" of German post-war nationalism (Holz 2007). This function is framed by a partial perpetrator-victim reversal, in which conflicting aspects of the in-group are externalized as false accusations from an out-group. Through the use of the motifs of an oppressive American "world police" and its control over European media and education, what should be acknowledged as an intrinsic paradox within German post-war identity becomes a conflict between a consistent, positive national in-group and a hostile external force. The perpetrators of the Holocaust and their successors are transformed into the victims of oppressive indoctrination. These aspects of anti-American speech also provide an illustrative example of the functional affinity between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism, (Markovits 2007, 188 ff.; Holz 2005, 103; 2001, 499 ff.). However, in this variety of anti-Americanism the perpetrator role is attributed not to "the Jews," as in expressions of secondary antisemitism, but to "the Americans." Given the historical connection of anti-American and anti-Semitic stereotypes in which "America" has often been used as code for "the Jews" (Markovits 2007, 157 ff.), the boundaries between these attributions are rather fuzzy. Yet there is a distinction to be made: The attribution to "Americans" represents a clear "advantage" for the speaker insofar as he avoids anti-Semitic speech but still can deal with said paradox of national identity in a similar way. While the example does not classify as anti-Semitism, it would be an oversimplification to view these speech acts as strictly distinct from anti-Semitism simply because no Jews are mentioned. Jews are not merely unmentioned, but systematically omitted as victims of the Holocaust. That this omission is achieved by America stereotypes bespeaks both a specific connection and a distinction between anti-Americanism and anti-Semitism.

4.2. Anti-Americanism and Racial Nationalism

My second example of anti-American speech refers to the motif of the United States as a racist society. As with the previous example, this claim surely cannot be generally rejected on a propositional level, since drastic instances of racism abound in American history and remain a prominent social issue. However, despite it not being "factually wrong" (see section 2), it can nonetheless be utilized in a prejudiced way: Talking about racism in the United States can serve as a preemptive deflection of the charge of racism against a speaker's in-group. In the following example the whole topic of racism is externalized as an "American" problem, which gives the speaker the opportunity to indulge in rather open expressions of xenophobia (especially towards Turkish immigrants) and racial nationalism, while at the same time presenting himself as non-racist. Thus anti-American speech can again be viewed as an expression of a paradox within nationalist identity construction: to support racism while complying to a norm of anti-racism (Billig 2012, 140 ff.).

After the participant was initially asked to explain his agreement with the item "I tend to find Americans dislikable,"[20] he talks about his dislike for the way Americans retain a sense of superiority despite their failure to adjust to global trends in recent years. He then goes on to relate how his hopes for change in this respect were connected to the presidency of Barack Obama, but are currently fading:

> […] because the white man is still in charge in the United States, that is becoming more and more clear now. They are actually wrecking a whole country, just to […] defeat a black president and – okay, to consequently regain dominant power […].

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[20] Item translated by the author. Original German wording: "Mir sind die US-Amerikaner eher unsympathisch" (adopted from Decker et al. 2010).

The participant claims that a racist power elite is deliberately harming the US economy in order to bring down President Obama. When asked to explain his views on how Obama might have a problem because of his skin color, he responds:

> Might have? He does have a problem because of his skin color. I mean, these […] Tea Partiers […] they openly proclaim that to completely defame and embarrass him in public. And to embarrass the whole administration, this is bullying or maybe even worse, the stuff they are doing over there. […] Well, as a German it really makes you wonder how somebody can argue that publicly and with total self-confidence. Only to bring down the government […], only to keep the black man from gaining power.

What is noticeable about this sequence is the rather emphatic distinction between the German in-group and an American out-group, marked by the phrase "as a German it really makes you wonder." As I will argue in the following, this juxtaposition of Germans and Americans assumes a functional role in the externalization of racism. The externalizing function of the motif becomes evident as the participant is asked whether something similar (racial discrimination of a government official) would be possible in Germany. He objects: "How do you mean? Because of racism? […] I don't think so, I don't think so." Instead of acknowledging at least the possibility of such racist discrimination in Germany, the participant reiterates the already invoked clear distinction between the German in-group and American out-group. The reasons for this omission become more evident when he is asked whether he could imagine somebody with Turkish roots being elected German chancellor:

> Oh dear (…) Oh dear, oh, I cannot imagine that [laughing slightly] ever happening. I don't think so. Well, well I think the Germans, […] so to speak, are Germans in private. (…) What is accepted (.) accepted or, how they say, tolerated, (.) are the Turks (.) Turks, Italians, Greeks. I would say they are tolerated. But nobody really loves them. […] The Turks do have an aspiration to power. […] Well, they lost the battle for Vienna back then, but maybe they are infiltrating the country today. I think that's what the Germans are afraid of. Islam, the Turks (.), and you notice that (.) sometimes, when everything is being infiltrated. […].

And in a latter sequence he adds:

> Well, for all I care Özdemir could become, let's say, become Development Minister or something like that, but he will never be Foreign Minister.[21] I cannot imagine that happening. And there is no chance he will ever become Chancellor.

It becomes obvious in these sequences that the participant, while emphatically rejecting racism against Obama in the United States, actually shares a racist orientation himself. He expresses a strong differentialist nationalism in emphasizing the superficiality of tolerance for minority groups and how they are actually rejected by the German population.[22] These xenophobic attitudes, which are presented as publicly disapproved and thus uttered only "in private," are constructed as a constitutive element of in-group identity, since Germans are only "Germans in private." Even the slightest mark of an immigrant background in a German citizen, as represented by the example of Cem Özdemir, serves as an inhibiting criterion for in-group membership, which clearly points to the racist distinction at the heart of this construction. However, what is most important here regarding anti-Americanism is the paradoxical combination of moral outrage over racism against an American president *and* the racist exclusion of minority members from political office in Germany. This construction can be understood as an expression *and* dissolution of a more general ideological paradox of racial nationalism in post-war Germany: It is common sense to construct an ethnically homogenous core community while the racist and discriminatory consequences of such constructions are systematically denied (Martin 2010, 71 ff.; Sutterlüty 2011).[23] The image of the United States as a racist society, in combination with stereotypes depicting America as "cultureless" that cannot be presented in greater detail here, allows the participant to resolve this paradox by externalizing the issue of racism. Because he sees America as an exception within a world of racially

21 Cem Özdemir is a German politician of Turkish extraction. He has been a member of the Bundestag and the European Parliament, and is currently co-leader of the Green Party.

22 Differentialism is a term coined by French political scientist Pierre-André Taguieff to describe a current form of racism relying on cultural distinctions rather than biological ones (Martin 2010, 44).

23 I want to stress that such denial does not necessarily have to be conceived as a conscious strategy, nor as an individually motivated suppression. I suggest conceptualizing this paradox or "double sanctioning" (Billig 2012, 144) first and foremost as a genuinely social phenomenon of "everyday ideology" (Martin 2010, 62). It provides the basis for paradoxical constructions that may not be recognized as such by the actors, as most probably holds true for the example presented here.

founded nations, i.e. a nation which consists solely of immigrants but somehow still constitutes a distinct national identity, it can serve as the external locus of "illegitimate" racial discrimination. Because the United States is the one nation where inequality and discrimination cannot be justified by traditional ethnic homogeneity, it is the place where these phenomena appear as illegitimate "racism." Thus, this application of America motifs can be regarded as anti-American prejudice in that it serves to dissolve the paradox of a nationalist identity construction that simultaneously endorses anti-racist and racist practices.

In summary, these examples give an impression of how prejudiced speech can be enacted through the use of America stereotypes. What the participants presented as criticism of American society and politics can be read as expressions of racist and revisionist constructions of national identity. Applying the heuristic distinction of America motifs and anti-American uses, we have seen how only the combination of both these aspects of speech creates a performative effect that can be labeled anti-American. Realizations of the semantic motifs and functional aspects could be imagined in different, non-anti-American contexts: It is of course possible to criticize racism in the United States without being anti-American, just as other semantic motifs, not referring to the United States, can provide the means to express a racial or revisionist nationalism. It is the combination of reinforcing racial nationalism *through* the expression of certain America stereotypes that makes it an anti-American performance.

What may seem surprising about these examples is that anti-Americanism is not uttered primarily as hostility or discriminatory intention towards Americans. While certainly applying negative images of the United States, this kind of anti-Americanism rather seems to be an accessory to other forms of prejudice and ideological patterns, such as racism, antisemitism, and nationalism. However, since it would be problematic to limit our notion of prejudice exclusively to forms of direct enmity or discriminatory intentions (Martin 2010, 50 ff.; Wetherell and Potter 1992, 69 ff.), this should not be regarded as a counterargument to classifying the given examples as anti-American speech, but

rather as a deeper insight into the flexibility of everyday anti-Americanism and an informative example of how different forms of prejudice interconnect and support each other (Baethge et al. 2010, 382).

5. Conclusion

Discussions on what anti-Americanism *is* are often connected to the question of how anti-American prejudice can be distinguished from legitimate criticism, i.e. how the concept of anti-Americanism should be *applied*. I argue that this problem of a *general* concept of anti-Americanism that is able to grasp the *flexible and situated* character of prejudiced speech is often misrepresented as solely a problem of imprecise definitions. As an alternative approach, a speech act or practice theoretical framework was proposed, in which the performative aspects of both anti-American discourse and scientific discourse on anti-Americanism are systematically integrated into the conceptualization of anti-Americanism. Building on a distinction of *semantic America motifs* and their *situated use*, this approach attempts to conceptualize anti-Americanism as a family of performative speech acts, bound by similarity rather than universally common features. Qualitative research methods were shown to be essential to the empirical application of this approach, since they provide the interpretive means to *read utterances as anti-American* in a broader context of speech. This focus on the performative aspect of anti-Americanism was presented within a framework of empirically grounded theory construction, emphasizing the reciprocal relation between theoretical and empirical research. Two examples illustrated how such an approach can be applied. In both cases anti-American speech did not primarily express dislike or discriminatory intentions towards Americans, but rather functioned as part of a broader ideological constellation incorporating elements of differentialist racism and secondary anti-Semitism. It was shown how anti-American speech serves in both cases to express and simultaneously dissolve paradoxes of national identification. In the first example it provided the means for latently invoking and relativizing the Holocaust, thereby allowing for a simultaneous distancing from and integration of Nazi perpetrators into the national in-group. In the second example the motif of "American racism" functioned as a means to externalize the issue of racism from the

in-group, while simultaneously employing racist criteria in its construction. Although these are of course only tentative results, it appears that there is a sort of "division of labor" between different forms of prejudice: While racism and antisemitism serve a rather "direct" purpose in national identity construction, e.g. homogenizing and/or glorifying it, anti-Americanism seems to *reflect* on the paradoxes and conflicts which arise from such identity constructions in the context of official anti-racist or anti-anti-Semitic norms. In the examples presented here, anti-Americanism seems to not be concerned primarily with the derogation or dis-

crimination of "Americans" (and a corresponding relative evaluation of the in-group), but much more with "fixing" the problems a nationalist identification creates through its racist and antisemitic expressions. Of course this is not to say that all anti-Americanism will take on such a reflexive function. The empirical examples presented here merely provide a first impression of what a mapping of anti-American speech could look like. Therefore, future research should work towards expanding the qualitative empirical base for theory construction, to broaden our understanding of anti-Americanism as part of everyday ideology.

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How Racist Violence Becomes a Virtue: An Application of Discourse Analysis

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Vol. 7 (1) 2013

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This discourse analytic study examines how violence can be constructed as an honourable course of action, using the example of a leaflet circulated in the loyalist Donegall Pass area of Belfast urging the removal of the minority Chinese population. Starting from the assumptions that racism is an ideological practice that naturalises social categories and devalues members of some of them so that their subjugation and exclusion is legitimised (Miles and Brown 2003; Billig 2002), and that violence is a human activity imbued with meaning through discourse, we applied guidelines set out by Parker (1992) to consider language as a social practice that achieves specific discursive effects by constructing its objects in a particular way. Two interrelated discourses were identified: a community-focused discourse construed the Chinese immigrants as morally and culturally bereft and negated their worth, while a martial discourse focused on defending the locality against foreign invasion. An examination of themes in loyalist culture revealed ways in which the text reconstructed resonant fears, and we argue that the way the in-group constructs its character defines the racist construction of the other.

The currency of "prejudice" as a social scientific construct over the past sixty years owes much to Allport's classic, *The Nature of Prejudice* (1954). The breadth of phenomena that Allport sought to capture with this construct is clear as he set out five ways in which an outgroup can be rejected, placing these on a continuum of increasing intensity from "antilocution" (verbal rejection), at one end, through avoidance and discrimination, to physical attack, and finally extermination at the other.

Yet, it has been argued that scholars have considerably less to say about phenomena at the extreme end of the spectrum. Billig (2002), for example, is sceptical as to whether the dominant cognitive-attitudinal approach can ever comprehend extreme bigotry. He calls instead for language-centred analyses of hate speech, racist humour, and so forth. Other critics maintain that the construct of "prejudice" has frequently been used as a poor theoretical surrogate for rac-

ism (Leach 1998, 2002; Pehrson and Leach 2012; Wetherell and Potter 1992). Whereas prejudice is a property of individuals, racism is an ideological practice that naturalises social categories in a particular way and devalues members of some of these categories such that their inferior treatment is prescribed or legitimised (Miles and Brown 2003). By defining research questions in terms of "prejudice", much of the specificity of racism as an ideological phenomenon is ignored if racial categories themselves are de-historicised, taken for granted, or, ironically, even incorporated into the very theories of prejudice that are meant to explain antipathy between racial groups (Hopkins, Reicher, and Levine 1997; see also Wetherell and Potter 1992).

Both of these lines of critique inform our focus on violent racism, which we conceptualise here as discourse that advocates, celebrates, or excuses direct violence against a racialised "other". We suggest that violent racism is a dis-

crete phenomenon that deserves analytic attention in its own right. From this point of view, a crucial question is how violence comes to be treated as a defensible or even honourable course of action. Using guidelines set out by Parker (1992), we seek to address this question through a discourse analytic study of a leaflet with an explicitly racist content distributed in an area of Belfast, Northern Ireland. This leaflet, printed in black typeface on plain A4 paper and amateur in its presentation, was circulated in Donegall Pass, near central Belfast. A series of violent attacks on the minority Chinese population followed in the locality.

1. A Discursive Perspective on Violent Racism and Racist Practice in Northern Ireland

1.1. A Discursive Perspective on Violent Racism

The current study asks how racist violence is socially constructed and rendered meaningful at a collective level. In various contexts, the words "intervention", "struggle", "resistance", "service", "operation", and "action" may all signify violent means to some end, but in doing so each constructs violence differently, and thus positions its users, targets, advocates, and opponents in qualitatively different ways. Our primary interest is in language-in-use (Taylor 2001). Central to this is the idea that language is constitutive. Thus, when studying texts (which may include interview transcripts, political speeches, leaflets, etc.), discourse analysts are not seeking knowledge about some reality that lies behind language by regarding it as a description of people's thoughts and feelings or of events that they have experienced. Rather, the situated use of language is itself the phenomenon of interest. Violence is a human activity imbued with meaning, which is not inherent but is acquired through discourse. Thus, we analyse language not as a window on emotions but as a social practice that achieves specific discursive effects by constructing its objects in a certain way. We argue that the psychological processes of moral disengagement (Bandura 1999), "eulogising inhumanity as the defence of virtue" (Reicher, Haslam, and Rath 2008), contempt (Tausch et al. 2011), dehumanisation (Haslam 2006), and even "sidestepping inhibitory mechanisms" (Moghaddam 2005) are not just things that happen privately inside the heads of individuals but are active social practices, or "coherent system[s] of meanings" (Parker 1992) aimed at the mobilisation of

others, the management of blame and responsibility, and so forth. Language is a central part of the phenomenon in its own right, and not just a medium through which to examine cognitive, perceptual, or emotional mechanisms.

"Race talk" has been one of the most popular topics for discourse analysts (e.g. van Dijk 1992, 1993; Wetherell and Potter 1992; Durrheim and Dixon 2000; Verkuyten 2001, 2003; Condor 2006). One of the key contributions of this line of research has been to demonstrate how people manage and counteract potential accusations of racism whilst still naturalising racial categories and characterising the "other" as problematic or inferior. Scholars have highlighted the communicative ingenuity and creativity involved as people routinely articulate racism whilst simultaneously denying it (e.g. Wetherell and Potter 1992). As such, the empirical and theoretical emphasis has been very much on everyday talk and non-obvious, socially acceptable varieties of racism. By comparison, there has been less attention on what Billig (2002) calls "extreme bigotry": discourse that actively revels and delights in hatred. In examining such discourse, we seek to explore the possibility that extreme bigots are as ingenious, flexible, and creative in their discursive practices, and just as acutely attuned to their audiences, as everybody else. Through approaching the issue from Parker's discourse analytic point of view, we focus squarely on how the legitimisation and celebration of racist violence are achieved within a specific text. This affords an account of how such violence is rendered morally appropriate. Parker provides a working definition of discourse as "a system of statements which constructs an object", meaning that the task of the analyst is to alert readers to the effects of description that create a particularised and powerful way of speaking. Thus, our approach is centred precisely on this active process of construction of the object under analytical scrutiny: violent racist discourse in practice.

1.2. Racist Violence in Northern Ireland

The research context of the current study is Northern Ireland, a place best known to social researchers for the period of violent conflict between the late 1960s and mid-1990s known as "The Troubles". Despite the decline in wide-scale violence following the paramilitary ceasefires in 1994, the

years since have seen a significant rise in the number of hate crimes. Racist crimes in particular have caught the attention of the media and academics (McVeigh 2006; McVeigh and Rolston 2007; Connolly and Khoury 2008; Knox 2011), earning Northern Ireland the moniker, the "race hate capital of Europe" (Chrisafis 2004). Attacks have targeted ethnic minority communities, notably the Chinese community which first arrived in Northern Ireland in the 1960s. Many of these incidents have occurred in Protestant working-class, loyalist areas that remain a focus for ongoing low-level violence. It was from within these communities that loyalist paramilitary organisations, such as the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), were formed in the early years of the conflict as an explicit and violent response to (or, in the case of the UVF, in anticipation of) the militant campaign of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) to bring about a united Ireland. Both the UDA and UVF are complex organisations often united by little other than their opposition to Irish republicanism and a fragmented and loose series of alliances, structures, and political convictions. The interests gathered under the umbrella term "loyalism" have also driven internecine violence as well as ongoing animosity directed towards their perceived political allies within within the unionist and British political parties who have been regularly accused of betraying working-class Protestants.[1]

Despite the ceasefires and the eventual decommissioning of UDA and UVF arms in 2010, loyalist paramilitary organisations have remained an active presence in their communities. This paper focuses on a provocative leaflet distributed among local residents in the Donegall Pass area, calling them to "resist" the "invasion" of Chinese immigrants. Whilst this settled minority ethnic group constitutes approximately only 0.8 per cent of the population of Belfast (NISRA 2011), a Chinese immigrant presence is evident in the micro-geographical composition of the area as a number of businesses in close proximity are managed

by members of this migrant group, in a locality otherwise dominated by the paramilitary presence of the loyalist UVF. The Donegall Pass is a main thoroughfare connecting arterial routes into Belfast city centre and has a distinct visual appearance in a city often characterised solely by the visual emblems of the conflict between Irish nationalist and loyalist paramilitary groups.

Although UVF representatives claimed to the authors of this paper that the leafleteer had no official approval and was later expelled from the organisation, violent attacks on Chinese, African, and Pakistani families and business owners living in the vicinity belie the argument that the sentiments were maverick and isolated. Indeed such was the extent of the intimidation, physical assaults, pipe bomb, petrol bomb, and paint bomb attacks, that Patrick Yu, head of the Northern Ireland Council of Ethnic Minorities (NICEM), reported a widespread feeling within many minority ethnic groups that "after the ceasefires we became the next target" (Boycott 2006). This particular leaflet therefore constitutes an appropriate text for analysis of racist discourse in a setting where overt hostility and violent attacks were very much in evidence.

2. Method

The particular form of discourse analysis used in this research is based on the guidelines set out by Parker (1992). Parker specifies seven criteria to guide a process that has been theorised as intuitive (Potter and Wetherell 1987; Holloway 1989) and aims to reveal "implicit themes" (Billig et al. 1988): "A discourse is realised in texts; it is about objects; it contains subjects; it is a coherent system of meanings; it refers to other discourses; it reflects on its own way of speaking; it is historically located" (Parker 1992). Parker cautions that these should not be treated discretely as a series of stages or a "method", but rather as part of a recursive process of sense-making. The criteria are described as "necessary" but the researcher should also seek to consider the role of institutions, power, and ideology when describ-

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1 Whilst both the Unionist political parties and the loyalist organisations want to maintain the Union with Great Britain, loyalists generally believe that mainstream politicians do not represent the interests of the working-class loyalist community.

ing discursive systems. Parker urges analysts to identify institutions which are reinforced or attacked when discourses are employed, by identifying "discursive practices" (Foucault 1972) that can be meanings, expressions, physical changes, or systems (Harré 1979). He also asserts that as discourses reproduce power relations (Foucault 1980) analysts should look at who stands to gain or lose from the discourse and identify who would seek to either promote or dissolve it. Finally, in agreement with Billig's theoretical approach (1991; Billig et al. 1988), he urges analysts to consider that discourses have ideological effects, but in contrast to Foucault's insistence that ideology presupposes truth (1980), analysts should attempt to show how ideological discourses can be employed to justify oppression and silence those who use subjugated discourses.

The researcher is considered a creator of a unique text, working with potentially infinite forms of texts and multiple forms of knowledge. Once analysts begin to describe or systematically classify the original text by identifying discourses, the work moves beyond its authorial or structural intention. This kind of elaboration thus incorporates both methodological and researcher reflexivity as an intrinsic aspect of the analytical procedure. Parker further states that discourse analysts should explore "connotations, allusions and implications" (1992, 7) evoked by a text and that this exploratory process of associations should ideally be a communal exercise. The authors of the current paper, comprising a group of social and political psychologists and a political scientist, collaborated to reproduce and create meaning within this interpretative framework using an inter-disciplinary approach congruent with this idea.

3. Analysis

The text calls for a violent expulsion of Chinese immigrants from the locality as a reasonable and virtuous response to their presence. This outcome is achieved by two discourses that support the practice of the legitimisation of violence as an honourable and morally appropriate subject position. These discourses, which refer to and

support each other, were identified as *community-focused and martial.*

3.1. Community-Focused Discourse

From the beginning of the text the Protestant community in Donegall Pass is presented as subjugated and powerless, facing an overwhelming threat:

> YELLOW INVASION[2]
>
> WHO'S "PASS" IS IT?
>
> Donegall Pass is no longer a Protestant/loyalist area, it is commonly known as "Chinatown" throughout our city and the people of the Pass are in the midst of losing the already small foothold they have in their community forever.
>
> The Protestant people are rapidly becoming a minority in their own community.
>
> If you walk from one end of the Pass to the other you would see the hoards of Chinese immigrants not to mention the vast amount of Chinese restaurants, wholesalers, travel-agents, garage, bookies and even a Chinese solicitors.
>
> Apart from all these premises they own a substantial amount of land ready for future development.
>
> This is not to mention the community building they have in the Gasworks site.

The title "YELLOW INVASION", a dehumanising metaphor reminiscent of the "Yellow Peril" theme evident in American war movie culture, evokes an image of an alien force. The territorial construction of place as exclusively a Protestant and loyalist area renders the Chinese immigrants' presence analogous to a flood that cannot be stemmed: later described as an "influx" which has the effect of "eroding … Britishness and Ulster Protestant culture". The loyalist community appears to be drowning in pathos: stranded on a tiny island, helplessly watching the surrounding deluge and "losing the already small foothold they have … forever". The historical institution of Northern Ireland as dominated by Protestant rule is paradoxically subverted. The subject position of the working class loyalist within twenty-first-century unionism becomes one of victimhood, powerless against international migration.

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2   All errors reproduced from the original.

The Chinese immigrants are further characterised as an "overwhelming mass … hoards … a vast amount … a substantial amount". The allusion to the communist east is reiterated; a faceless and multitudinous force is rendering Ulster Protestants a "minority". Immigrants are construed as pillaging essential resources: further alluded to in the leaflet as "occupy(ing) a vast amount of our houses", owning "land ready for future development … driving our youth to move out … tak(ing) from our community". They are constructed as inferior in intellect and reason. The phrase "even a Chinese solicitors" is rhetorically presented as a statement of incredulity: the idea of the immigrants entering the legal profession seems an impossibility, but it may be interpreted as a sign of anxiety that the Chinese community holds their own defensive strength as "they" are legally and financially more powerful than the loyalists via business and professional status.

The idea of community thus becomes exclusivist and oppositional. Any possible inclusivist definitions of participation are negated by a powerfully constructed racist ideology which totally negates the worth of the migrants' presence:

> The Chinese only take from our community and provide nothing for it. These foreign immigrants have no sense of Christian values or decency and have no respect at all for our community.

The author uses the triad "nothing … no … no respect at all" to emphasise a perceived void in community values, morality, and religious belief amongst the Chinese people. Despite the overwhelmingly secularist nature of the loyalist paramilitaries, the evangelical tradition has a strong influence within mainstream loyalist culture, with its references to purifying images and its intolerance for ecumenism (Todd 1987, 1998; Mitchell 2006a, 2006b; Spencer 2008), and this particular aspect of Protestant religiosity may permit the construction of the Chinese community as entirely without the values espoused by this form of Christian virtue.

Indeed, the idea that any sense of community should be fostered amongst the immigrants is treated as incomprehensible. The Chinese population is depicted as without culture or values: the word "community" is broadly defined in mainstream discourse as wholly virtuous, applying only to the Protestant population, and it is this community exclusively that signifies all that is civilised. The immigrants' achievements and contributions to community life in the "Pass" count for nothing. The only subject position offered to Chinese immigrants in relation to the heritage of the community is one of ahistorical and moral vacuity. Those who possess a different culture and lifestyle to the presented discourse of loyalist identity are not only excluded from the hegemonic institutions but also dehumanised by the employment of this system of meanings that negates the worth of their existence.

By rhetorically constructing the immigrants as utilitarian invaders, the loyalist community is counter-constituted as deeply tribalised, localised, and characterised by insecurity and fear of loss, defined around place and the territorial safeguarding of an exclusive form of Protestant culture, reinforced by notions of exclusivity and segregation. These narratives become delineated by this construction of the term "community":

> These Immigrants occupy a vast amount of our houses stopping any Protestant families moving in that would be more beneficial for the betterment of our community in all aspects of community life. The overwhelming mass of Chinese immigrants in Donegall Pass are driving our youth to move out of the area where they were reared, because they see no future for them in the Chinatown/Donegall Pass.

In fact, the word "community" is repeated nineteen times in the text, yet the Chinese themselves are never described in this way. "Community" is normalised within the text as a taken-for-granted good; the Chinese populace are potentially a threat to virtue, and something despicable whose removal is essential. This existential threat is constructed as a conflict between defenders of decency and civilisation and barbarians who lack these values. The subtitle "Who's 'Pass' Is It?" uses rhetorical questioning to bring the idea of a Chinese invasion into direct opposition to the loyalist conceptualisation of the area. This is exemplified in the construction of a Chinese community centre as an extreme case formulation:

> They have access to *Our* community centre … more than we have access to it. … The Chinese are now in the process of

building their own community centre – I wonder will the
Donegall Pass community get offered the use of their facilities.

The pronouns "Our … we … their" promote a discourse of
Chinese people as the other, and the questioning suggests
that the new facility will compound the idea that the Chi-
nese people are more factionalist, separatist, and opposi-
tional than the community that has reluctantly hosted
them. The "community" aspect of this discourse appears
deliberately partisan: in all other instances the Chinese
people in the Pass are referred to as "The Chinese" or
"these foreign immigrants". The new community centre is
imagined as an enclave; the idea that the Chinese immi-
grants should be able to form something mimicking the
idea of communal life is presented as ridiculous, with the
sneering tone berating the idea that the immigrants could
share resources. The concept of diversity is entirely absent
from the system of meanings used to construct the *commu-
nity-focused* discourse.

3.2. Martial Discourse
The martial discourse is situated within the historical nar-
rative of defence against the militant paramilitary organi-
sation, the IRA. Migrant settlement is constructed as
having caused unprecedented cultural damage to the area,
greater even than the Protestant community suffered dur-
ing almost thirty years of sectarian violence and bloodshed;
this is the rhetorical force which constructs the Chinese
immigrants as the other:

> The influx of the yellow people into Donegall Pass has done
> more damage than 35 years of the IRA's recent campaign of
> republican propaganda and violence waged against the Protes-
> tant community of Donegall Pass.

> It is eroding the Britishness and Ulster Protestant culture and
> heritage from our area – more than the IRA could have ever
> hoped to do.

It is within this construction of loyalism as an institution
subject to cultural annihilation that the Protestant commu-
nity is regarded as requiring defence. The ideological effect
of this discourse that constructs the immigrants as an

object of foreign invasion is to show that there is only one
morally correct subject position for the Protestant commu-
nity, bound to the rhetoric of honour and duty. This is to
uphold the practice of the defender:

> I firmly believe that it is our duty to defend our community and
> our Protestant way of life within it.

A martial form of action against the Chinese immigrants
is further constructed as righteous by referring to both
the emotionally laden recent memory of sectarian viol-
ence during "The Troubles" and other historical nar-
ratives of militarism which have resonance with loyalist
culture:

> The men and women of Donegall Pass have maintained a brave
> fight down through the years against republicanism, yet they let
> foreign immigrants take over their area without even so much
> as a protest. The forefathers of this community shed their Ulster
> blood on foreign battlefields in two world wars and at home in
> present day conflict to keep their communities free from foreign
> invasion, while we are now giving our community away to these
> Chinese immigrants. *SHAME ON US!* …

> … The time has come to fight back before it is too late. Rid our
> community of these Chinese immigrants and clear the way for
> Protestant families to move in and our young people to remain
> and contribute in helping to make our community a better
> place to live.

> *Reclaim your area – give the Pass its Protestant and Ulster culture
> and heritage back.*

The symbolism is typical of loyalist narratives, which
manifest a strong identification with British military
engagements, with the commemorative culture of the
Battle of the Somme in particular representing an enduring
aspect of its modern iconography (Shirlow and Graham
2006; Brown 2007; Orr 2008).[3] The tone moves from
pathos to shame, berating loyalists for cowardice and the
dereliction of duty. The "Yellow Invasion" has been accom-
plished without armed resistance, in strong and direct
contrast to the actions of the community's predecessors.
The only correct subject position for the Donegall Pass
loyalist is clearly stated: "Rid our community of these Chi-

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3   Loyalist narratives self-identify with the mytho-
logised role of the 36th Ulster Division at the Battle
of the Somme during the First World War that

advanced ahead of other British units and captured
a German redoubt, but were ultimately condemned
to slaughter by overwhelming enemy forces in front

and the failure of British reinforcements to match
their advance behind (Orr 2008).

nese immigrants." Within this localised construction of military history, inaction against the "Yellow Invasion" is regarded as shameful. Alternative subject positions for members of the loyalist community towards the object "duty" are silenced. This call to militant action creates an ideological framework where the forcible removal of Chinese immigrants is constructed as a virtuous act. The idea of prioritising community resources for white "Protestant" youthful "families", combined with the allusion "clear the way" invokes a quasi-religious image of the "unrighteous" being cut down. This reluctantly reminds the reader of the imagery employed by the German National Socialist movement whose ideology was also presented as a virtuous and moral project, where the vision of a community that was constructed as ethnically superior would be realised by service to a cause which included the cleansing of social elements regarded as impure and an existential threat (Kooonz 2003; Reicher et al. 2008).

3.3. Relations Between the Two Discourses

The future for the loyalist community is constructed as realised within only one of two conflicting power relations: either a dystopian nightmare where the "yellow people" will complete their takeover of the district, or the Protestant people of the Pass will *"Reclaim"* the area in the name of the community-focused discourse that constructs discursive objects such as loyalty, family, morality, and history through a particular and coherent way of speaking about them. The rhetorical effect is so complete and exclusive that the Chinese immigrants are constructed as entirely alien to the loyalist viewpoint. Regardless of wider community opinion, the rhetoric of the *community-focused* discourse defends this position as correct:

> By now you would think that we would have got used to the anti-Protestant propaganda from the press but we still squirm in fear of being branded a racist – if a racist is someone who puts their own people, culture and heritage first with a will to preserve their community … then we should be proud to be branded a racist, for this is our duty.

There is no opportunity afforded for tolerance, with engagement in wider UK debates about integration, assimilation, and multiculturalism made irrelevant by the discourses employed. The *martial* discourse of invasion,

defence, and duty, and the dehumanisation of the Chinese immigrants through the *community-focused* discourse work together to support the exclusion and removal of the Chinese as a moral duty; the eradication of the out-group is deemed necessary to the defend the virtue of the defined community group (Reicher et al. 2008). The label "racist" in this construction, becomes a badge of honour to those who would wish to preserve their community values from annihilation. A call to violence is thus constructed as an appropriate, and indeed virtuous, response.

4. Discussion

Our analysis of hate speech focused on the productive and constitutive power of language in creating coherent systems of meanings or *discourses* (Parker 1992), with the specific purpose of showing how violent racist discourse can be legitimised. The sophisticated use of rhetorical language in the leaflet constructs a viewpoint which presented violence as a virtuous response. A community-focused discourse constructed the Chinese immigrants as morally and culturally bereft and dehumanised them by negating their worth. Community life in the Donegall Pass was presented as something exclusive to the loyalist population and under threat of destruction. This justified the martial discourse which focused on defending the locality against foreign invasion and situated the racial cleansing of Chinese immigrants as a defence against extreme threat. Inaction was constructed as shameful and a dereliction of a duty.

One benefit of a discursive approach is its sensitivity to the specific meanings implicated in violent action in a given time and place. While one can point to general features shared across diverse instances of dehumanisation, to take one example, dehumanisation is always actually achieved within unique contexts. Thus, we may deal theoretically in universals and generalities, but empirically we are presented only with specific cases. As Tajfel put it: "The general case is an impossible myth" (1972, 74). In discourse analysis, the specificity of our data becomes a strength because we are able to examine how particular constructions and ways of talking that are available and meaningful in a given local-historical context achieve a more general end such as the legitimisation of violence. In this way we can study phenomena that are of broad social significance, such as

racism, without flattening out the diversity of specific local settings, which is after all where racists are actually at work.

This idiographic methodology turns away from measures of the extent to which these discourses may be socially shared within a community. Further, we do not seek an explanation of causal links between phenomena, nor do we wish to ruminate on the extent to which the discourses at work contributed to actual attacks. Instead, we interrogated discursive practices as a means of understanding how such violence may be rendered morally appropriate within a localised and historical context. The analysis demonstrated that discourse can legitimize extreme bigotry associated with a racist ideology (Billig 2002). We also note that hate speech may potentially influence material conditions. For example, the expulsion of the leafleteer, discussed in the introduction, linked the production and distribution of the written propaganda to seemingly contrary forms of discursive practice. Pro and counter forms of action such as the increase of forms of violent intimidation versus in-group acts of severance, serve to highlight the complexities of making cause-and-effect judgements concerning attitudes of former paramilitary combatants and their supporting communities towards racialised out-groups. It is worth reflecting that the expulsion of a UVF member was allegedly ordered by a paramilitary elite who presided, quite literally, over life and death amongst the populace during the conflict. It is because of this highly specific context that the amateur processes of the production and distribution of the leaflet were neither ignored nor casually ridiculed. This should serve to accentuate the intricate political complexities at work *in situ*, and hint at powerful social and cultural forces that are not addreesed within an alternative empirical model proposing direct links between attitudes and action, where language is conceived merely as a mediating tool.

This analysis may also be regarded as a caution against discourses which often construct group-level violence, whether on the streets of Belfast, London, or elsewhere, as "senseless", thereby demeaning processes of sense-making within marginalised or non-normative social groups. Given the impact of violent group behaviour, we would suggest that this disengagement is a perilous stance as it fails to

consider the social construction of reality through meaningful speech acts that may impact by mobilising groups and instigating shared social practices though a rhetorical justification of violence. This radical reconceptualisation of language analysis within social psychology has been documented by discursive and rhetorical psychologists as part of the "turn to language", within the discipline which has directly informed our focus on language in use (e.g. Potter and Wetherell 1987; Billig et al. 1988; Parker 1992; Wetherell and Potter 1992).

The idea of cultivated rhetoric making hate speech appear virtuous is linked not only to this process of argumentation but to specific and localised meanings. In addition to drawing upon overt references to the IRA's campaign, the Battle of the Somme, and the world wars to construct a martial discourse of defence as honourable, an examination of themes in loyalist culture reveals ways in which the text draws upon anxieties that are politically, historically, and geographically located. For example, in many area of Belfast, individual housing estates and streets have become paramilitary fiefdoms: from the onset of "The Troubles" local rivalries led to the division of territory between the UVF and the UDA (Bruce 2004), with activity in the Donegall Pass being co-ordinated by the former. This profoundly localised sense of identity, where loyalist morale is tied to the defence of physical spaces, is a part of the system of exclusivity represented in the *community-focused* discourse. An understanding of this territoriality demonstrates that the discourse of the leaflet operates as a coherent and rich system of meanings that would make sense to its intended audience.

These issues also raise questions about the positioning of the researchers in relation to the communities under investigation (see also Billig et al. 1988; Holloway 1989; Billig 2002); unlike investigations in communities where violent collective action by civilians is consensually considered non-normative (e.g. Tausch et al. 2011), some specific communities and research contexts create more difficulty in separating the dichotomous distinctions between "normative" and "non-normative" actions. In Belfast, this is most visibly manifest in the phenomenon of "Peace Walls", which separate loyalist and nationalist communities in

many parts of the city where civil disturbances have become part of the fabric of life.[4] This construction of "Peace" in many areas of Belfast as the absence of violent attacks through physical separation makes a case for the use of qualitative methodology so that specifically located communities can be studied within their own contexts rather than using the lens of other, "external" normative frameworks. It also furthers the argument for the incorporation of context into social science investigations, and the active promotion of empirical work that arises out of deliberately selected environments.

Indeed, many researchers argue that racism is always a situated phenomenon (e.g. Lentin and McVeigh 2002) and that to claim otherwise essentialises perceived race differences. In Northern Ireland, a combination of ongoing political instability and geographical isolation led to the experience of race relations following a different trajectory from the rest of the United Kingdom. Northern Ireland's political status has been contested since partition in 1921: the unionist majority population wish to maintain links with Britain, whereas nationalists desire unification with the Irish state. Political polarisation is reflected in the continued maintenance of distinct identities between the Protestant and Catholic communities, separation in housing and education (e.g. Campbell, Cairns and Mallett 2004), and preferences for limited contact (e.g. Tausch et al 2007). Commentators have asserted that this has resulted in the marginalisation of the needs of minority ethnic communities and a denial of racism in both social and political arenas (Hainsworth 1998; McVeigh 1998) not least evidenced in the late arrival of the Race Relations (Northern Ireland) Order, in 1997, thirty-three years after the Race Relations Act (1974) was applied in England, Scotland, and Wales.

After the 2004 enlargement of the European Union Northern Ireland experienced an unprecedented increase in migration, coinciding with the transition from "the Troubles" that claimed over three thousand lives to a period of relative stability following the signing of the Belfast

Agreement. In common with the Republic of Ireland but unlike many other UK regions, Northern Ireland had not previously experienced immigration on a significant scale. Gallaher's political analysis (2007) showed that industrial decline and the movement of middle-class Protestants from the city into suburban areas left homes available to immigrant families, and claimed that a number of orchestrated incidents against racial minorities led to a climate of fear in the area, and it was in this climate in 2004 that the "Yellow Invasion" leaflet was distributed in Donegall Pass.

To understand the importance of this specificity, it is worth exploring some resonant and dissonant themes in the wider United Kingdom literature of "race", ethnicity, and "whiteness". In the current analysis, the *community-focused* discourse constructed a system of meaning connected with the preservation of loyalist virtue; in analyses of working-class English populations, indigeneity and respectability have also been associated in language use (Ware 2009; Rhodes 2011; Evans 2012). The idea of "community" and its allusions to all that is good, constructed in the moral and economic climate of post-Thatcherite Britain, has its opposite in the discourse of "community breakdown" associated with claims of working-class degeneracy, stasis, and failure, linking the phrase "white-working class" with the pejorative (Rogaly and Taylor 2009; Edwards, Evans and Smith 2012). Whilst these analyses may invite a form of reasoning that the white, Protestant loyalist narrative explored is not exceptional, it is worth noting that the specificity of Parker's methodology has allowed us to explore a different frame of reference outside of British multiculturalism, often interpreted within "white" communities as resource competition: working-class populations in the urban conurbations of England have sought to construct a recondite form of racialised group identity in relation to the ethnicised other, whilst denying racism (Gilroy 2005; Rhodes 2010; Evans 2012; Smith 2012). By contrast, our analysis demonstrated that in a very different part of the United Kingdom, ideas of *martial* defence, rather than competitive multiculturalism, constructed specific nar-

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4   The Peace Walls, official concrete and wire barriers separating communities in conflict, are currently being mapped out by the Belfast Interface Project and have actually increased in number since the Belfast Agreement of 1998 (see Jarman 2005, 2008).

ratives of resource competition closely aligned with interpretations of the history of Ulster in the twentieth century, permitting the discursive construction of "racist" as a term of honour, respectability, and virtue.

This construction of the "racist" in this Ulster narrative raises the question, what associations exist between sectarianism and racism? Brewer (1992) has noted parallels: both processes may lead to discrimination, inequality, and conflict. McVeigh (1998), discussing the different aspects of racism experienced by the Traveller community in Northern Ireland as resulting from community division, interpreted the influence of sectarianism upon racism as situational, where both emanate from the politics of difference. If answers to this kind of question are to move beyond the level of description, the determinants must be appropriately and empirically investigated. The current study appropriately acknowledges the complexity of answering this or any other question that would postulate a link between complex and politically contentious social psychological phenomena.

5. Conclusions

We have demonstrated that the performative act of writing and disseminating text is a means of maintaining and creating a psychological environment that affects how discursive objects, such as "community" and "violence", are structured and evaluated, making an empirical contribution towards developing a psychology of bigotry (Billig 2002). In particular, the current study has demonstrated the ingenious ways in which "offensive", rather than "defensive", racism (Hopkins, Reicher, and Levine 1997) may be reconstructed as a virtue, furthering the argument that the power of this type of discourse should not be underestimated or consigned as a relic of the past.

We are mindful that this type of analysis, which does not take quantitative account of group norms, nor explore individual subjectivity or group dynamics through quali-

tative accounts, may invite or reinforce further discourses that may stereotype populations in Northern Ireland as insular and bellicose, and entrench existing impressions and opinions of loyalism as unreconstructed in its social and political outlook following the Belfast Agreement of 1998. Attention should also be drawn, for example, to other martial discourses employed as a reconciliatory, rather than socially divisive tactic, with some notable reconciliation initiatives by prominent ex-paramilitaries centring around attempts to educate Catholics and Protestants about the contribution of Catholics during the two world wars;[5] and in a social psychological study of Northern Irish Protestants' attitudes to migrants, van Rijswijk, Hopkins, and Johnson (2009), noted that another series of leaflets were distributed by local paramilitaries in a nearby district, detailing the contribution of Polish airforce pilots in the Second World War to counteract the xenophobic image of loyalism. Nonetheless, we argue that the discourses explored here allow for a broad investigation of the composite effects of history, ideology, institutions, and power (Parker 1992), contributing to the psychological literature to date that has explored intergroup dynamics concerning immigrants in Northern Ireland by considering the effects of context (van Rijswijk, Hopkins and Johnson 2009) and history (Pehrson, Gheorghiu and Ireland 2012) upon majority attitudes.

We would like to make one final but crucial point concerning a theoretical implication for inter-group research: our analysis concurs with Reicher, Haslam, and Rath (2008), who have argued that the way the in-group is defined precedes the racist construction of the other. Working from the social identity perspective within social psychology, they consider the construction and championing of a uniquely virtuous in-group as the form of social identity to which out-groups may then be construed as an existential threat. This model implies that if we are to understand phenomena such as racist violence, we need to attend not only to how people view the targets of violence,

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5   Such as that of the International Peace School in Derry/Londonderry, headed by Glen Barr, a former UDA political advisor and Vanguard Assemblyman. The School has focused on reconciliation through
cross-community commemorations of the contribution of Catholics and Protestants in the two world wars of the twentieth century.

but also how they understand themselves as a group: that is, representations of "us" are at least as important as representations of "them". The language of the leaflet analysed here constructed a deixis where the label "racist" became an honour to the loyalist rather than an insult, but this recreates the deep insecurity within a community that characterises itself as a victim under siege and threat of destruction.[6] The "hot surplus variety" of "ethnic nationalism" identified in Northern Ireland by Billig

(1995) is abundant, but couched in a carefully argued morality that is justified by appealing to past historical events and an imagined flourishing future. This study of the rhetoric of the "Yellow Invasion" leaflet, targeted at a racialised group, confirms the theory that in-group emotion is a socially constructed phenomenon (Billig 2002) that in this specific location reinvents anxieties, creating new narratives and discourse from a combination of current fears and past events.

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6 The discursive context of the text created a form of meaning, or deixis, of the word "racist" that gave it a contextually positive connotation. See Billig's classic social psychological study (1995) that considered how a deixis of nationalism is constructed and communicated in the British newsprint media (93–127).

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Dealing with Discrimination and the Struggle for Social Advancement in Migrant Families: Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of a Study on Adolescent Generational Dynamics in Turkish Migrant Families Subjected to Marginalization

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Vol. 7 (1) 2013

Dealing with Discrimination and the Struggle for Social Advancement in Migrant Families: Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of a Study on Adolescent Generational Dynamics in Turkish Migrant Families Subjected to Marginalization

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What are the effects of experiences of discrimination on the adolescent process of detachment from the family? What strategies and forms do migrant families develop to deal with discrimination and how do parents' ways of contending with discrimination affect those of their sons? Those are the central questions addressed by this study of the educational careers and adolescent detachment processes of sons from Turkish migrant families. Foregrounding the theoretical and methodological approaches, the study examines how the strategies handed specifically to sons influence their personal and educational histories. One of our findings is that the ways adolescents are able to address experiences of discrimination are heavily influenced by intergenerational communication processes.

Youths from Turkish immigrant families in Germany are disadvantaged both within the educational system and on the job market; they are frequently addressed as outsiders to German culture and – similar to their parents, in part, yet different from them – find themselves in many respects marginalized, even in the face of concerted efforts to integrate and advance in the new culture. In particular, those migrant families living in ethnically segregated quarters of large German cities experience specific forms of discrimination. What are the effects of these experiences of discrimination on the adolescent process of detachment from the family? What strategies and forms do migrant families develop to deal with discrimination and how do parents' ways of contending with discrimination affect those of their sons? These are the central questions of our study on the educational careers and adolescent detachment processes of sons in Turkish migrant families. We focus on the intergenerational communication of mechanisms for dealing with discrimination between parents and sons and how different means of communication influence the sons' adolescent biographies and educational careers. In the process, we offer insights into the study's methodological and theoretical framework.

The various mechanisms employed by parents in dealing with discrimination and marginalization were identified and categorized through case reconstruction. Such qualitative methods allowed us to examine the complexity of *intergenerational* relationships and the resulting conditions for adolescent transformation in the subsequent generation. Indeed, one parallel concern of our work is to identify which methods are most viable for a differentiated analysis of migrant families' distinct biographical and familial forms of contending with marginalization, stigmatization, and discrimination.

The results of our study show interdependencies between the parents' means of acknowledging and productively dealing with the painful aspects of migration and experiences of marginalization, on the one hand, and the leeway allowed for intra-familial, intergenerational differences and adolescent transformation, on the other. Differences in the degree to which parents are able to accept and process losses, crises, and conflicts arising from migration can be characterized in terms of distinct *family cultures*. In the best case, potentially productive strategies for dealing with discrimination and marginalization develop out of these family cultures, which, in turn, generate space for adolescent transformation. The intergenerational effects will be illustrated through the comparison of generations within two families of our sample.

1. Young Turkish Men in the Family and German Educational System – Open Questions and Methodological Approaches

Empirical studies reveal that students from immigrant families have lower chances of successfully completing their education than natives and, additionally, that male youths in this group on average perform worse than females. Young Turkish males, who also represent the largest immigrant group in Germany, constitute a particularly disadvantaged population (Deutsches PISA-Konsortium 2001; Ackeren 2006; Stanat and Christensen 2007; Crul 2011). As a result of their everyday exposure to intense racism, these members of the second and third generation of Turkish immigrants "frequently [grow] up with discriminating practices, with the experience of being treated as 'strangers' and with public discussions about 'foreigners' that do not integrate and have a disposition to violence and delinquency" (Schramkowski 2007, 54, translated). Our study – funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) – traced the development of formally successful and less successful educational careers of male adolescents from Turkish families living in large German cities (King et al. 2011; Koller et al. 2010). To examine the causes of their divergent educational developments, we performed a comparative analysis of the young men's biographies, specifically with regard to the dynamics within the family and the intergenerational relationship between parents and sons. In addition to the educational institution, the family constitutes a key factor explaining the degree of educational involvement and success of subsequent generations (Boudon 1974; Zhou 1996; Alba and Waters 2011a). While numerous studies show that educational resources and, to some extent, ambitions are handed down intergenerationally (Steinbach and Nauck 2004; Ditton et al. 2005; Terrén and Carrasco 2007; Alba and Waters 2011b), it remains unclear precisely how this intergenerational transfer takes place (Becker and Lauterbach 2010, 18–19). Our goal, then, is to describe how, during the process of adolescent transformation, experiences in the family are processed by its members and how the frames of reference specific to the family culture or milieu are in turn handed down to subsequent generations and modified. The complexity of our research question demanded as precise an examination of this dynamic as possible using qualitative reconstructive design in the form of a differentiated analysis of the distinct biographical (and intergenerationally communicated) mechanisms migrants use to contend with marginalization, stigmatization, and discrimination. For example, what distinguishes forced processes of conformity, in particular, is that they are hardly recognizable as such but rather are "normalized". Reconstructive methods of social research have proven particularly well-suited for bringing into focus not only these "normalizing" constructions, these dynamics of conformity and the associated mechanisms of concealment, but also the dynamics of rebellion, resistance, and other strategies for dealing with conflict, and, more significantly, they enable us to examine the complex forms of intergenerational transfer of experiencing and dealing with the negative aspects of migration. The process of migration, separation from the country of origin, and relocation to a foreign country, can be accompanied by improved living conditions and greater contentment, but also by loss, a sense of failure, and seemingly insurmountable social boundaries. While some of these dynamics can be clearly observed and identified in the parent-child relationship, others remain entirely masked, even desymbolized, inarticulable.

Our study is guided by the observation that educational careers are decisively influenced by the way these young men deal with the dual challenges of adolescence and immigration (King 2005; King and Koller 2009). Our research question focuses on the reciprocal effects of two dynamics: educational development under circumstances of immigration and adolescent transformation. Adolescent detachment is understood, here, as the potential redefining of the parent-child relationship toward greater emotional, cognitive, and behavioral leeway (see Steinberg 1966), which must be preceded by the processing and reconstructing of familial experience. Migration and the necessary separation and reorganization within the immigrating family and its members create specific conditions for the processes of transforming childhood relationships, of separation and adolescent restructuring. From this perspective, potential resources and strains of adolescence within the context of migration can be closely examined with regard to the respective familial, educational/institutional, and societal conditions of the receiving

country *beyond* culturalizing and ethnicizing reductions. Therefore adolescence within the context of migration must be examined with regard to these conditions and not from a culturalizing or ethnicizing perspective. What scope of opportunities is available under what circumstances for the adolescents to deal with their biographical experiences and to construct life concepts? And which forms of dealing with marginalization and discrimination are developed in the process?

Youths in immigrant families experience adolescent transformation under special conditions, insofar as they are usually labeled "outsiders" in contrast to the "established" (in the sense of Elias and Scotson 1965) within entities, such as peer groups, school, or public life, that take on greater significance in the course of adolescence (see also Juhasz and Mey 2003; Ceylan 2006, 32). These special conditions include living in ethnically segregated quarters, a phenomenon which can be observed frequently in large German cities. In "Western Germany's large cities by now a large part, in some cases *already the majority of the younger generation*, lives in poor quarters with a high share of foreigners" (Strohmeier 2006, 16, translated, emphasis added). Such quarters must be considered problematic, as they are characterized by difficulty accessing higher education and, often, higher levels of discrimination (ibid., 38). Subjectively, these factors also transform themselves, "for the persons concerned[,] into a feeling of being excluded from the social world" (Tietze 2006, 147, translated). As Tietze (2001) described in her study on young males from immigrant families in Parisian suburbs and in Hamburg's Wilhelmsburg, which is known as a problem area, the *stigma* of one's home (in the sense of Goffman 1963) subtly merges with the adolescents' self-perception. The question arises, then, which strategies are developed by the concerned persons to deal with these experiences of marginalization proactively and constructively. According to a further thesis, to be addressed later in greater detail,

adolescents' ability to and strategies for facing such experiences are largely determined by intergenerational communication processes.

2. Intergenerational Facets of Social Mobility and Immobility in the Context of Migration and Marginalization

The social situation of young men and women who are born in the country to which their parents have migrated and whose parents are typically employed in lower-status jobs is peculiar and, in some respects, paradoxical. Although they never migrated themselves, they are addressed as immigrants in many contexts. Even if they have been educated in Germany and speak only German, they are still considered foreigners. And as much as they may try to adapt, as "visible minorities" (Benbassa 2010; see also Mecheril 2000) they are still discriminated against, perceived as different, and marginalized on the labor market, in the educational system, in the housing market, and in the media. Discrimination, here, must be understood as more than merely individual remarks or actions "directed at members of certain groups with the intention to demean or discriminate" (Hormel and Scherr 2010, 7, translated) but as the marginalizing effects of structural and institutional conditions.[1]

To experience this sort of discrimination means that the sons and daughters of immigrants in the social position of being "different" are confronted, as the French migration researcher Sayad (2006) emphasizes, with the far-reaching consequences of *heteronomous* conditions, that is, of decisions they did not themselves make. Their life history's central experience of feeling different or not belonging is, on the one hand, the result of structurally, institutionally, and economically discriminating conditions and effects of prejudices within the society of the country to which the family immigrated, which affect even personal relations in everyday practices. Yet, children of the second or third generation face the consequences of a migration that is not

1   Within the scope of our study's qualitative empirical design, we have elected not to objectively determine the discrimination our subjects experienced, but instead focused our efforts on tracing which experiences of discrimination the subjects themselves choose to share and how they narrate these experiences. As our first case study demonstrates, this approach excludes forms of *indirect* thematization, i.e. the description of experiences that are discriminatory but which are not perceived or described by the subject as such. The interviews made reference to explicit and implicit discrimination in various spheres and at various levels, both in everyday situations at school or work and in the neighborhood, as well as structural discrimination within the educational system or housing and job market.

their own and that was undertaken for reasons and contexts from which they remain in a sense cut off, but which still influence their process of socialization and development and are conveyed to them largely by their parents.

It is paradoxical that parents, who sometimes moved great distances to escape from suffering or to seek social and economic advancement often seem to become locked into the circumstances they initially establish upon arrival. As a rule, many of these very mobile parents, who sometimes took great risks during the migration process, find little success in climbing the social ladder or to moving away from a quarter that, while it offers the companionship of other immigrants is, at the same time experienced negatively as a ghetto or symbol of social marginalization. The migrating, parental generation appears to be extremely mobile and immobile at once. It has crossed borders only to find itself entrenched, sometimes even entrapped, in conditions characterized by social restriction and marginalization. Great hopes or expectations that the children might be able to transcend these limitations are, however, widespread in many immigrant families. But due to institutional discrimination in the educational system and on the labor market these expectations are objectively difficult to realize and, subjectively, often ambivalent and associated with great potential for disappointment, guilt, and shame within the generational relationship. Therefore, the specific tension between social (and psycho-social) mobility and immobility characterizing the parents' life generates, in a modified way, a basic tension in the lives of their children. This tension experiences its pivotal climax in the adolescent educational and developmental process. Not only might it be difficult for the children to develop and define their own wishes and goals in relation to the expressed or unexpressed aspirations of their parents, but, in addition, the aspirations of the parents and the wishes of their adolescent children to transcend borders by way of social advancement harbor an enhanced risk potential due to unfavorable conditions in the receiving society (King 2005). "Detachment from one's family," as Tietze points out, "results in an increased exposure to general societal rejection. For young people from immigrant families, therefore, acquiring autonomy vis-à-vis their parents and their social environment is accompanied by a certain

ambivalence and an increased degree of social vulnerability. This is illustrated by a special kind of sensitivity towards social marginalization not developed in the same way by non-immigrant young adults" (2006, 159, translated). Thus, these risks and specific vulnerabilities, the intergenerational entanglements, ambivalences, and obstacles must also be taken into account in our analysis in order to adequately capture the dynamics and the sometimes complicated personal histories of efforts toward advancement and educational development. Additionally, this raises the important risks, ambivalences, and obstacles connected with and conveyed intergenerationally by the position of being different.

3. Methodological Design – Object and Method

To examine the contexts described above, data was collected using narrative interviews with twenty young men between the ages of 19 and 24, with formally successful and less successful educational careers, as well as with their parents (when possible with both parents, otherwise with at least one). Interviewing both young men and their parents enabled us to consider the views of both generations in our interpretation of the narratives, allowing us, in turn, to decipher intergenerational processes. "Formally successful" refers to those adolescents who have achieved university-entrance qualifications (Abitur). "Less successful" are those with poor educational achievement or none at all. All families interviewed live in large German cities, many of them in disadvantaged neighborhoods.

The special character and everyday nature of "story telling" makes narrative interviews especially well-suited to reveal the gradual layering of biographical experiences, even beyond consciously available self-representations. An interview guide was developed for post-interview questioning to address potentially unanswered questions concerning our object of study. Sons, fathers, and mothers were interviewed separately. The majority of interviews were held in German, and a small number of parents requested to be interviewed in their native language.

Analysis of the transcribed interviews was performed using methodological triangulation, employing the method of sequential analysis modeled on the objective hermeneutic

(Oevermann 2000),[2] as well as narration analysis following Schütze (1983).[3] Objective-hermeneutic sequential analysis provides precise access to the difference between the subjective meaning and the latent objective meaning structures of selected text passages, while the procedure of narration analysis allows for the interpretation of the narrative structures in the text as a whole. To meet the requirements of reflexivity (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1996; King 2009), our analysis also takes into consideration the design of the research situation, as well as the allocation of roles and "positioning" of family members in the respective settings.

In order to illuminate the adolescent detachment process, the following issues were given particular attention in the evaluation of the interviews with the sons:

1. how differences and similarities between the lifeworld of the family of origin and the educational background of the parents, on the one hand, and the lifeworld of the sons, who are part of the German educational system, on the other, are represented;

2. how parents' wishes and plans for their sons' lives appear in the narratives of the young men.

With regard to the relation of formal and semantic aspects of subjects' statements, relationships were identified between narrative style and the specific modes of representation of corresponding content (e.g. idealization or devaluation of self and/or others, forced emphasis on closeness or distance, minimization or harmonization vs. orientation on conflict, etc.) and analyzed as forms of expression of the configurations of adolescent detachment processes. Following the analysis of all interviews, portraits of the participating families were prepared as a starting point for the development of a typology through systematic case comparisons.[4] By way of type construction varying patterns of

relationships between adolescent detachment processes and educational careers were developed, from which, in turn, conceptual and theoretical conclusions were drawn.

The interplay between the quality and dynamic of the parent-child relationships and experiences specific to migration, on the one hand, and the adolescent detachment processes and educational career, on the other, is conveyed in a variety of ways. Operationalizations suited to register only the subject's explicit attitudes and self-constructions easily miss the complexity and subtlety of family dynamics and the ways family members deal with these dynamics in the course of adolescent development. More precise information, beyond interviewees' subjective interpretations, on the effects of the qualities of the parent-child relationship can be gathered through more detailed case analyses that allow us to reconstruct, as precisely as possible, the processes of development and the subjects' methods of dealing with dynamics in the family. As such, detailed case analyses better reveal the various interplays between the factors examined in our study, namely, family dynamics, processes of adolescent development, and educational careers.

4. Familial Resources and Strategies for Dealing with Marginalization

Several studies have examined the social (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1990) or biographical capital (Bertaux 1997) necessary for migrant families to improve their social status under conditions of discrimination and marginalization. Above-average parental aspirations for their children regarding education and advancement have been identified internationally, in many cases even for migrant groups possessing low levels of economic and cultural capital (for example Kurz and Paulus 2008, 5501). While such ambitions may be considered a positive resource, they can only partially be

2   For more on the methods and logic of objective hermeneutics, see Reichertz: "Objective hermeneutics proceeds from the singular (reconstruction of the structure of single cases) to the general statement (generalization of structure) by means of the principle of falsification; reconstruction of structure and generalization of structure are conceived of as the outer poles of a targeted research process in which the results of a number of single-case structural reconstructions are condensed into a more general structure. A case structure, once reconstructed, may be used in the interpretation of further examples of the same type as

a heuristic to be falsified. … If, in the course of the analysis of the text, a location can be found which contradicts the structural description previously spelled out, then the hypothesis may be said to be falsified. The goal of structural generalization is always the discovery and description of both *general* and *single-case specific* instances of rule-governedness, the so-called generative rules … With the aid of this positive knowledge of the general and the single case soft prognoses for the future of an action system should be set up. Precise deterministic statements are, however, impossible: one can only indicate the scope

for transformations. …The procedure of objective hermeneutics is currently viewed as one of the most widespread and reflective approaches in German qualitative research" (2004, 292).

3   For more on narration analysis in the context of biographical research, see the overviews by Apitzsch and Inowlocki (2000) and Riemann and Schütze (1991).

4   For more on the logic of type construction following Weber's construction of the ideal type and the associated form of generalization, see the in-depth work of Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr (2008, chap. 6).

realized by the children, or only with difficulty. Another study concerning the social capital of immigrant families (Delapierre 1993) focused on the specific ability of fathers to act socially and politically and, thus, to attain *social power*. "Social power refers to the ability of the head of the family to become part of the community or other wider networks …, to become aware of information which will be relevant for their children, and to transform this information into strategies of action" (Delapierre 1993, 173, translated). Delcroix's study (2000) was mainly concerned with biographical capital (following Bertaux 1997). As a main result of her study Delcroix pointed out that the narrative transfer of life stories and migration biographies allows children to develop a more explicit, more conscious, and, in turn, more self-conscious examination of their own identity concepts. These results already point to the centrality of intergenerational dynamics and the need for analysis of children's concepts and social positioning in relation to familial and parental capacities and social placement. They also indicate, in particular, the significance of the often neglected dimension of *symbolizing* the experiences of migration and the capacity for creative ways of addressing the conflicts arising from migration. According to our thesis, decisive are not the biographical narratives as such, but the *quality*, i.e. the degree to which parents authentically represent their struggle to surmount the migration experience – including dealing with discrimination and the patterns of interpretation associated with it. For idealizations or other forms of skewed representations of the parental generation's means of dealing with migration are more likely to create unfavorable preconditions for the children's ability to deal with the same phenomena.

In our research we encountered numerous examples of narratives in which parents related a story that did not have the effects described by Delcroix. Upon closer examination, we determined that it is rather the degree to which parent's

stories convey the reality of their experience, in other words, whether it reflects the father's (or mother's) grappling with the difficult aspects of his (or her) own biography, that proves to be significant – specifically, that is, the extent to which parents are able to directly address separation anxiety and loss, discrimination and the shame and hurt associated with it. This becomes apparent when, potentially painful, difficult aspects of migration and the related emotions are acknowledged in such narratives and interview statements rather than suppressed, trivialized, or glamorized, or if mainly idealizations and debasements (of self or other) constitute the central focus. As also shown by recent results of narrative research (Habermas 2011) and narration analysis, clues for the undigested – and therefore especially enduring within generational dynamics – aspects of life histories can be found particularly in the formal features of narratives. For example, narrative suppressions and distortions indicate that, within the dynamics of intergenerational exchange, unresolved issues and aspirations of the parents might be handed down, binding subsequent generations, who blindly adopt them. In another context, Bude describes this mechanism of binding vividly, following Faimberg (1987), as "identificational capturing" *(identifikatorische Gefangennahme)* (2010, 273, translated). Aspects of the parental generation's biography with which they could not cope and which elude symbolization in the stories available to them are integrated into the children's own histories, so that "there is no space for the discontinuity of experience between the generation of parents and children" (ibid., translated). In contrast, the parental generation's capacity to symbolize and integrate even the painful aspects of the migration process (such as experiences of separation, loss, and unfulfilled hope, but also of marginalization, discrimination, and rejection) opens up potential for the proactive and constructive management of conditions in the receiving country, as our research shows.[5] In the following, we provide an outline of

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5   To avoid any misunderstanding, we would like to emphasize that we are not concerned with judging the parenting styles of the families we interviewed, or promoting any particular kind of behavior within these families. This would, indeed, be flawed, if for no other reason than because our examination of the intergenerational dynamics is concerned to a large extent with unintentional parenting "styles." The quality and content of familial

interaction and communication represent much more the expression of specific patterns of managing that arise from a certain constellation of resources, constraints, and the methods of processing the immigrant experience. We are concerned, here, with fleshing out the relationships between the sons' educational histories and the means by which parents process their own experience within the context of immigration. To that extent, it also bears

emphasis that "coping strategies" in the narrower socio-psychological sense referring to various attempts to reduce and manage stress and conflict (see the overview by Weiss 2005 as well as Glassl 2008 and Hack-Polay 2012) are not the focus of this study. Our study is concerned much more with the reconstruction of variants of the relationship between parental processing of the migration experience and the resulting generational dynamic.

some of the results of our study. Space precludes offering a detailed case analysis or a presentation of the study results in their entirety (for this see Zölch et al. 2009; Koller et al. 2010; King et al. 2011). By way of illustration, we will instead outline the characteristics of two family types in condensed form, describing cases whose analysis was especially instructive regarding the questions and theses under discussion.

5. Forced Integration of Parents – Unfocused Rebellion of Sons: The Yıldırım Family

The case studies were typologized using the method of Przyborski and Wohlrab-Sahr (2008, chap. 6). A total of six different variants, or types, of relationship between the educational careers of the sons and their detachment processes during adolescence was determined and analyzed with regard to generational relationships and the processing of the family's migration history.[6] The Yıldırım family can be categorized as a type characterized essentially by *forced integration and the parents' denial of discrimination*; in turn, the *sons*' educational success is put persistently at risk by destructive and boundless forms of unfocused *rebellion*. How can the background of this type be analytically categorized? Analytical categorization of this type of background derives from an understanding of hyperadaptation as a strategy for dealing with disadvantage, marginalization, and discrimination (Goffman 1963). The greater the pressure to eliminate social difference, the greater the effort to escape the disadvantage or risk of marginalization resulting from it through the most perfect possible integration. The differentiated methodological approach of our study brings clearly into focus the costs of such forced integration: the masking and communicative and interactive desymbolization of hardships and aggressive feelings on the part of parents; the subsequent difficulties of the sons to appropriately conceptualize disadvantage and marginalization for themselves; and, finally, the often unfocused, explosive forms of rebellion that throw the sons off the track of educational success and successful "integration" into the educational system. This dynamic is well illustrated in the case of the Yıldırım family.

Mr. Yıldırım was born in a major German city as the son of immigrant workers. The first six years of his life, however, he lived with his grandparents in Turkey. After returning to Germany, he quit middle school *(Realschule)* without any sort of diploma, despite two years of repeating grades, and began to work in his father's store. In the course of his preparations for marriage, he attended night school to earn his secondary school certificate *(Hauptschulabschluss)* at the age of seventeen. After attending trade school he completed a technical apprenticeship that made it possible for him to pursue a career at the level of lower management. *Ms. Yıldırım* was born in a major city in Turkey, also lived initially with her grandparents, and was brought to Germany at the age of school entry by her parents. She obtained a secondary school certificate *(Realschulabschluss)* and completed training as a physician's assistant. She was active in this profession at the time of the interview.

Their son *Şevket* was 19 years old at the time of the interview. He was born in Germany, visited kindergarten and grade school there and achieved the grades to attend high school *(Gymnasium)*. After twice having to repeat a year, he left school at the age of 18 without any formal qualification.

The *parents'* narratives present a migration history in which discrimination and marginalization seem to play absolutely no role. According to their representation, they had always been integrated, so there was never a reason to set them apart as "other." Any apparent doubts, even in their retrospective narration, are quickly dismissed. The following passage is exemplary of this narrative tension. Asked directly whether she had experienced discrimination, Ms. Yıldırım responds: "No. Definitely not. Definitely not. Not a bit. (1) In no way. I work, as I said, in a doctor's office (inhales). Quite the contrary, there, I am (.) Maybe also because of the language. Maybe it's age, in the meantime, because at the beginning (hesitantly and then in softened tone of voice) no, there was nothing, no

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6 For more on our typology, see appendix, as well as King et al 2011. A total of six types were developed, descriptions of which are provided in the appendix. The Yıldırım family has been designated Type III.

not at all. No, absolutely not. If you have a (.) good pro-
nunciation and can (hesitantly) argue convincingly and
talk to people, no. (1) No, I can't say that."[7] Both parents
draw clear boundaries between themselves and other
immigrants. Mr. Yıldırım: "If I, eh? Eh, I don't know,
would run around with a beard and a turban and things
like that, if everyone would look at me, then it would be no
wonder, I'd say, uh, as opposed to uh now how I walk
around more Western. Or, behave like a Westerner, you
know what I mean?"

According to their narratives, the basis of their success is
their abilities, which exceed even those of native Germans –
in that sense this depiction constitutes a hidden thematiz-
ation of discrimination which does not appear to them as
such. Mr. Yıldırım: "Because for me it's clear, you're a
foreigner? (…) Eh so. When you (.) apply at a company, eh
you're a foreigner, but I have to stand out with my qualifi-
cations so they say 'Well, that's the kind of foreigner I defi-
nitely need to get to know!' That's the way I saw it, the way
I think. I say, you have to stand out among the masses by
having, well, with a good diploma, you know? My name
isn't Hans Meier, after all. So eh, that was for me the most
important thing and that's what I did." Insofar as the par-
ents "hyperadapt" and appear to identify entirely with
social majority, to the point of complete self-denial; insofar
as they deny or ignore any form of discrimination, but also
the aggression necessarily associated with such extreme
conformity, the sons' experiences of discrimination can
hardly be dealt with appropriately. In cases of this type, the
rebellion of the sons is not directed explicitly against
migration-specific discrimination, but rather more dif-
fusely against everything in school that is experienced as
injustice, discrimination, and arbitrariness. Corresponding
forms of boundless rebellion and destructive aggression
can go so far as to put educational success permanently at
risk, whereby sons are perceived even by the parents as
uncontrollable, seething pressure cookers. The extent to
which parents are able to identify with their sons' anger is
expressed in Mr. Yıldırım's palliative descriptions of
"Şevket's shortcoming" that "he is not the kind of person

who swallows and says, yeah, it's okay and so on" and his
description of his son's educational success or failure as
dependent solely upon the teacher's good will. The con-
sequences for the son of this parental behavior are that he
experiences himself chiefly as powerless – and that means
he is at the mercy of both his teachers and his own emo-
tions. Thus, Şevket relates that his math teacher promised
him a "2" [B] on his report card, but then he actually got a
"4" [D]. When he approached her about it, Şevket said she
responded: "'No. That is definitely correct.' I thought, no
way, I'm going to complain. And then she said, 'Yeah, go
ahead, go and complain.' And she laughed and walked
away. She laughed at me. There, something like that can
make me flip out; I'm a very temperamental person."

Şevket describes school, and the behavior of teachers in
particular, as inexplicable, arbitrary tyranny that no one
can escape – without, however, making any connection to
the notion of discrimination against migrant children.
Case reconstructions of the family show that Şevket got no
support from his parents – who deny or ignore the price of
their conformity, as well as every form of discrimination –
in dealing with or appropriately understanding the dif-
ficulties with which he was confronted as a result of his
being a young male Turkish immigrant. He perceives him-
self as an "equal" among Germans, who is, at the same
time, particularly in school, subject to a constant and agon-
izing despotism against which he must rebel again and
again with ferocity, which, in turn, has disrupted his edu-
cational career.

6. Parents' Open Confrontation with Marginalization – Sons' Greater Leeway: The Güngör Family

In contrast to the Yıldırım family, the case of the Güngör
family represents a typical migrant family constellation
which, despite significant crises and conflicts, manages to
develop an open and productive way of dealing with
experiences of discrimination and, thus, to offer their off-
spring means of constructively processing their specific
situation as sons of Turkish migrants. In families of this
type, the son is not only educationally successful; he even

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7 (1): pause of one second; (.): pause of less than
one second.

manages during adolescence to develop an independent, detached life concept. First, a brief outline of the Güngör family's migration history:

The father of 25-year-old Engin migrated as a guest worker to Germany about thirty-five years ago and did not achieve what he had hoped for through migration. Engin's mother followed her husband to Germany after their wedding. She emphasized during the interview that she lost career options available to her in Turkey as a result of her migration. Because of the disappointing course of the migration project for themselves, Engin's parents developed high aspirations for their two sons, calling implicitly upon their children to prove the success of the migration project after all through their own educational success. These high expectations also derive from the assumption that a respectable social status will protect the children against similar experiences of discrimination. Thus, educational success seems to be a joint project: For long periods of time the focus is not on the sons' wishes, but rather on a larger group ("we") that has this end in view. It is, therefore, the sons' task to achieve success on behalf of the family.

This description outlines a common constellation typical for many of the interviewed families. What is more, the family lives in Wilhelmsburg, known as one of the problem areas in Hamburg, which is – as clarified by Tietze (2001) – "not the worst example within the city of Hamburg," but has a particularly "bad reputation."[8] As Tietze reports, merely stating their address decreases young people's chances of obtaining a job. Mr. Güngör also describes such a situation regarding the allocation of university places: "If someone from Wilhelmsburg, if makes an application, then this happens: Oh, his postal code is Wilhelmsburg, (smiles) well, (…) In this case, we rather let it drop, don't we? So, the other one comes in. Yes, it has happened, we have already seen this thing happen, from one or the other, haven't we? Or, okay, we can't prove it, but (.) we had a lot of difficulties to get in at first."

Many inhabitants of this quarter – like Mr. and Ms. Güngör – refer to the sense of solidarity among immigrant families and criticize what they see as unjustified stigmatization. At the same time, many of them feel virtually trapped by the exclusion and marginalization by a society that did not receive them as accepted members, since these dimensions of "social inequality are not only about the question of lower or upper class, but about being insiders or outsiders" (Bude and Willisch 2006, 8, translated). They amount to a social exclusion "from the recognition and affiliation contexts dominant in our society" (ibid., translated; see also Hills and Agulnik 2002) and determine the experiences of those excluded, who are trapped in their life circumstances. The fact that Wilhelmsburg is an island underscores the imagery of imprisonment and exclusion, as well as the sensed social prejudices and hostility of the majority society, as illustrated by the following quote. Ms. Güngör: "Um yes. Yes, uh because um Wilhelmsburg is an island, an island two and three times over, meaning once with water around it, once the industry and … we are slowly but surely being poisoned here, because the air is very bad here. … It's really bad here. And um (.) the children didn't want to leave, that's why I have stayed, I didn't want to take away the children's friends, that's why I have stayed, otherwise I would have moved away long ago. Yes, and because the people, they are okay, really nice people, really nice inhabitants uh and elsewhere they say differently, but I know the people here personally and therefore I have completely different opinion. Of course there are rotten apples everywhere, sure, but basically they are really nice people and I am trying to give something."

Ms. Güngör's descriptions accentuate the powerlessness and aggression, distress and ambivalence of a housing situation resulting from exclusion and the tension between mobility and immobility – to have travelled far and to be now virtually trapped and marginalized in a "triple" island status. At the end, she mentions her own commitment, which refers to the urban quarter as well as to her sons – she is "trying to give something." Both parents describe

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8   Wilhelmsburg is characterized by social housing; its share of social housing is nearly three times the Hamburg average (31.2 percent compared to 11.1 percent). Regarding income, the high percentage of unemployed between the age of 15 and 65 (10.8 percent), and recipients of welfare benefits (26.5 percent) is remarkable (average: 6.3 percent and 11.6 percent respectively) (Statistisches Amt für Hamburg und Schleswig-Holstein 2010, 52f).

themselves as being active within their quarter and in school. In addition, they try to create a supportive environment for their sons, for instance, by using the quarter's support programs. They talk to the teachers and, despite their language difficulties, even act as parents' representatives. You could say: Within the island of the excluded, whose living conditions affect them seriously, they provide with great diligence, with commitment and *social power* (Delapierre 1993), the conditions for their sons to manage the leap away from the "island," from the place and symbol of their distressing stigmatization.

With regard to the sons' development, the described constellation, typical for immigrants, contains considerable risks. The burden of achieving educational success in place of their parents, or of compensating the parents' distressing experiences of discrimination and, further, of having to achieve the success of their parents' efforts, can potentially complicate the children's detachment process. The particular, paradoxical tension between mobility and immobility can also be found within the objectives of the sons, who are supposed to be socially mobile and to achieve advancement without moving too far away from the parents. The sons of this family and of this type of family, however, manage to recognize their parents' great share in their educational project and yet to follow their own path in the end. In the case of Engin Güngor, the son interviewed in our study, his particular way of dealing with the parents' educational mission can be described as adopting it at first, but adapting and varying it during adolescence. One decisive factor for this is that the parents are able to articulate their suffering explicitly for themselves and do not need to suppress it. Despite the restrictions related above, there are still sufficient options available within the family's generational relationships for the sons to develop independently. The parents adopt a rather reflective attitude and offer space for independent decisions. An equally significant factor is the secure emotional foundation of their relationship, which promises the necessary support to implement these decisions, which cushions distances between parent and child which may arise from advancement, and offers space for adolescent development. During the interview, Engin emphasizes that his path was rougher due to the multiple disadvantage of being a young person

in a migrant family living in the socially segregated "bad neighborhood" of Wilhelmsburg, but that he nevertheless managed to rise above his circumstances in an exceptional way. With his high grade on the final exams he was able to surpass the elite of German medical students, a fact that further elevates his victory and gives him a thorough satisfaction perceptible in his narrative. Thus, his parents' attitude and his educational success allow Engin to balance aggressive impulses resulting from the discrimination he experienced as a result of his migration background and to harness them for himself.

In summary, this family type shares the following characteristics: their common background is painful experiences in the context of migration; the costs of emigration are to be compensated for by the success of the children; and the parents themselves structure their lives as engaged and proactive members of their community who confront discrimination. Thus, the painful experiences of migration remain representable and communicable. The parents do not turn their backs on others from their migrant group, as with the Yıldırım family, but rather act in solidarity with them, as much as possible within their means, to represent the interests of migrants and their children. They also attempt "to give." The son of the Güngör family, too, has chosen a path upon which he, as a result of his success, very clearly distinguishes himself from his peers in the migrant community; at the same time, however, he continues to be, in a figurative sense, "the advocate of Turkish immigrants."

7. Conclusion

Immigrant families living in ethnically segregated quarters of large German cities experience specific forms of discrimination. Both families examined, here, reside in neighborhoods affected by local segregation, i.e. in a so-called problem area with a large immigrant population and low socio-economic status. But while marginalization and discrimination tended to be denied in the interviews with the parents of the Yıldırım family, the Güngör family's experiences of social marginalization and stigmatization resulting from their migration background and the neighborhood they live in constitute a central element of the interview. One characteristic of the Güngör parents is that, despite their clearly expressed feelings of anger and disappointment, they

do not sink into in passive resentment. Instead, they deal actively with the problems of coexistence and are strongly involved in the neighborhood. Engin Güngör, the son, also experiences discrimination in his school and neighborhood. But due to the proactive and productive way his parents deal with those problems, he – in contrast to Şevket, the Yıldırıms' son – manages not to be limited by them in the course of his education. Instead, he uses his educational success to balance his aggressive feelings emanating from the experience of discrimination and to make use of them.

Qualitative case reconstruction allows us to point out that the ways adolescents are able to address experiences of discrimination are also heavily influenced by intergenerational communication processes. In our project, for instance, interdependencies appeared between the way the parents are able to acknowledge the painful sides of migration (not only the inevitable separations and losses constitutively associated with migration, but also the experiences of marginalization that are created by society and vary depending on social conditions) and to deal with them productively, on the one hand, and the leeway allowed for intra-familial, intergenerational differences, on the other. In this sense qualitative reconstructive methods allow us to describe significantly differing family cultures that are characterized by the degree to which losses, crises, and conflicts can be accepted and confronted. These family cultures produce potentially productive strategies for dealing with discrimination and marginalization, which generate potential space for adolescent transformations. This is not to say that such intergenerational dynamics are the sole determinant of how the younger male generation deals with experiences of discrimination. Further studies are required to determine the meaning and significance of the

dynamics we discuss here within the totality of possible influencing factors. The factors that need to be taken into account include structural conditions like type of immigration, citizenship regime, educational system, labor market, and local context (see Alba and Waters 2011a), but also strategies developed by migrants or migrant families. Thus, the second of the types discussed above (the Güngör family) can be interpreted as a variation of "selective acculturation" as a strategy through which both parents and children adapt themselves to the society of the country to which they immigrate, yet, at the same time, remain embedded in their ethnic community to a certain degree (ibid., 2–4). Portes and Rumbaut (2001) emphasize that such "dual strategies" are particularly relevant for members of discriminated groups. Our results show how such dual strategies – targeting advancement into the social majority, yet acknowledging in both word and deed the relationship to one's country of origin and admitting experiences of discrimination – can be expressed in intergenerational dynamics.

Focussing on intergenerational dynamics, our study shows that experiences of discrimination and marginalization take effect on several levels: They can motivate advancement and, thereby, have the converse effect of creating intergenerational tension by passing on the task of compensating parents' failed aspirations to the children. They can also impede detachment because the family is experienced as the only place of shelter and safety. Conversely, proactive and constructive ways of dealing with discrimination and disadvantage on the part of parents may also build bridges to support the struggle for adolescent self-positioning *both* in relation to the family *and* to extra-familial relationships.

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Appendix: Typology

Interdependency between adolescence and educational career	Less successful educational careers	Successful educational careers
Weak adolescent transformation	Type I: "Failure in mission"	
	Type II: "Orientation difficulties"	
	Type III: "Rebellion"	Type IV: "Dependence"
		Type V: "Conformity to mission"
Developed adolescent transformation		Type VI: "Appropriation and variation of mission"

Type I: High parental aspirations for children's education, serving to fulfill parents' own needs; the difference between the generations is symbolized in a weak manner; fragile relationship with regard to recognition – aspirations remain external for sons and cannot be appropriated. Attitudes toward experiences of discrimination vary according to situation.

Type II: Inconsistent parenting (e.g. changing or absent primary carers) and incoherent parental aspirations for children's education. This coincides with a merely superficial detachment, so that orientation difficulties arise. Inconsistent means of dealing with discrimination within the family.

Type III: Hyperadaptation and denial of discrimination by the parents; the sons' educational success is put permanently at risk by destructive and boundless forms of rebellion.

Type IV: Sons' prolonged educational careers tend to sustain dependency and defer conflict-laden, divisive decisions within the family (e.g. return to country of origin).

Type V: The parents have explicitly high aspirations associated with a tendency to perpetuate intimacy and close ties in the family; very limited tolerance of separation; sons have a greater tendency to conform to the aspirations handed down to them from their parents and to stay close to them; passive resignation as a family strategy for dealing with discrimination.

Type VI: Enabled by parents' behavior during the difficult process of detachment, the sons get the chance to map their educational career and to define their own life path. Active, constructive approach to dealing with discrimination in the family.

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Economic Prosperity as "Narcissistic Filling": A Missing Link Between Political Attitudes and Right-wing Authoritarianism

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Vol. 7 (1) 2013

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An expanded analysis of the origin of the correlation with economic deprivation found in the authors' representative surveys of right-wing extremist attitudes (such as racism, anti-Semitism, and chauvinism), focusing on the underlying dynamics in Germany and the historical aspect of National Socialism. The growing prosperity of the West German "economic miracle" of the 1950s served a psychosocial "filling function" to block the narcissistic damage caused by confrontation with past crimes and the sense of the nation's loss of greatness. As this prosperity vanishes for many people during the current economic crisis, the filling comes out and the narcissistic wound opens up. What emerges is both what lies underneath and what has been serving as a defense against it, which involve authoritarian dynamics. Initially, the metaphor of "narcissistic filling" will be developed through our analysis of group discussions conducted as part of our qualitative study (of 2008). The developed hypotheses will thereafter be introduced to our following representative survey (of 2010) and confirmed by means of quantitative methods.

The relation between relative deprivation and antidemocratic attitudes has been thoroughly confirmed by means of empirical studies. Increasing right-wing extremist attitudes in Germany and other European countries have been discussed in connection with experienced or anticipated loss of economic status (Heitmeyer 2010; Küpper and Zick 2010; Decker et al. 2012; Zick 2010; Decker et al. 2012). At the same time, these studies illuminate the potentially integrating function of economic participation and on the other hand the loss of legitimacy of democracy in the event of economic crisis and deprivation (Heitmeyer and Endrikat 2008). Whether measured as "fascism," "right-wing-extremism," or "authoritarianism," this loss of legitimacy is accompanied by ideologies grounded in resentment and prejudice (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Cohrs and Ibler 2009). Experience of deprivation is closely connected with denouncement of the fundamental principles of democratic cooperation and denial of recognition of "the other." This holds not only for economic deprivation but also for political and social deprivation (Decker et al. 2006). As there is extensive empirical evidence for this connection, it has a strong influence on research on right-wing-extremism, especially in Germany (Heitmeyer 1994; Endrikat et al. 2002; Schmidt et al. 2003). Unsurprisingly, "deprivation" has been considered a "key concept of social psychology" (Pettigrew 2001). Ever since the notion of "relative deprivation" was introduced to social research by Stouffer and his colleagues (Stouffer et al. 1949), it has been broadly applied and adapted in the field of social psychology (Smith et al. 2011). However, different means of measurement produce divergent outcomes (Rippl and Baier 2005) and raise the question, what exactly is being measured by whom.

Although some effort has been made to integrate theoretical conceptualizations (Rippl and Seipel 2002), the discussion lacks a thorough understanding or explanation of the connection between deprivation and so-called right-wing attitudes. Although one of the central tasks of social psychology lies in analyzing the mediating processes between societal conditions and their individual effects, this task has not entirely been mastered. In spite of refined concepts such as the differentiation between "individual" and "fraternal deprivation" (Runciman 1966), empirical

research has paid little attention to the question why. Yet, social psychological research has a rich history of theorizing on this question.

Analyzing the relationship between the individual and the society was the focus of the "studies on the authoritarian personality" (Adorno et al. 1950), which are considered a "milestone of empirical social research" (Fahrenberg and Steiner 2004). What is more, not only did the Critical Theorists of the Frankfurt school combine quantitative and qualitative approaches to describe the conditions that transport the threat to democracy, they also sought a profound critique of those conditions (Habermas 1968; Rook et al. 1993). In terms of a Weberian ideal type, the "authoritarian personality" has a high price to pay for participating in the societal and economic power of authority by submitting. If this account remains unbalanced, his/her aggression will be directed against representations of the society that demands submission. However, with the cognitive turn the paradigms have shifted in the scientific community. As a result, "critical theorizing" of coercive socialization seems to have lost its legitimacy, and interpretive approaches in social psychology research are still rare. Although the empirical results of the "studies" are still being confirmed, they are simply labeled as "authoritarianism." The "authoritarian personality" seems to have become as obsolete as psychoanalysis as a theory of socialization that allows the individual to be conceptualized as embedded in societal structures (Marcuse 1963; Decker 2010).

For understanding prejudice, models of social cognition in group processes, such as information processing and the intergroup conflict paradigm, have become dominant (Mummendey 1985). Ever since the model of realistic group conflict (Sherif and Sherif 1979) was reformulated towards conflict being understood as the result of mere categorization (Tajfel and Turner 1979), the theory itself has been repeatedly modified and complemented. For instance, motivational assumptions added to Turner and Tajfel's theory of social identity have led to the idea of an individual's need for positive (group) identity and self-enhancement. This need requires a relation and therefore entails in-group favoritism and discrimination against the out-group. As a

consequence, it is only by devaluating the "other" that the in-group and therefore the individual gains in self-esteem (Zick 1996).

According to Terror Management Theory, these processes become even more pronounced under mortality salience, where an awareness of death primes individuals to regulate their self-esteem (Greenberg et al. 1997). This statement is not only in accord with the correlation of cognitive rigidity with self-enhancement (Stangor and Thompson 2002) and with ego involvement (Schultz et al. 1997); it might also illuminate parts of the connection between deprivation and right-wing extremist attitudes. In their experiments in Germany, Jonas and Fritsche demonstrate that under conditions of mortality salience, participants were more likely to choose the Deutschmark as a symbol of cultural identification than a control group (Jonas and Fritsche 2005). Consequently, an economic token helps people to cope with a threat to their self-esteem. In the following we will connect the threads of theory and research as described so far.

One of the central ideas underlying the "studies on the authoritarian personality" was coined by Erich Fromm, who proposed that authority served as "prosthetic security" (1936, 179) and could therefore adopt a regulating function in situations of threat. Even earlier, Georg Simmel pointed out that people willingly subordinate themselves to authority (1908). In Freudian terms the authority serves as a substitute for the individual's ego ideal and the members of a group identify with each other (Freud 1921). Desires for grandeur and power can be satisfied by means of "narcissistic compensation" (Fromm 1936, 179). Hence, prejudice is always related to regulation of self-esteem, which shall therefore serve as a starting point for our exploration of the connection between deprivation and right-wing extremist attitudes.

1. Our Studies on Right-wing Extremism in the Center of Society

The "center studies" are based on representative surveys on political attitudes conducted every other year since 2002, with between 2,500 and 5,000 participants in each wave (Decker et al. 2003; Decker and Brähler 2005; Decker et al. 2006; Decker and Brähler 2008; Decker et al. 2012). In addition, we conducted a study based on group discussions

in 2007 and 2008, whose participants were recruited from the 2006 survey.

This paper presents findings from a "mixed method" study combining quantitative and qualitative methods. Rather than distinguishing approaches hierarchically, for example by reducing the function of qualitative data to explorative purposes, we emphasize a methodological triangulation in the strict sense (Flick 2010) as has proven productive in studies on prejudice (Flecker et al. 2005; Krüger and Pfaff 2006). With Dilthey, we posit the primacy of understanding the subject matter over separating methodological approaches. Our research aims at understanding the connection between deprivation and right-wing-extremism, assuming that we are dealing with historically variable phenomena.

1.1. Qualitative Design: Theme-centered Group Discussions

On the basis of the 2006 representative survey on right-wing extremist attitudes (Decker et al. 2006), we conducted group discussions throughout Germany with participants who we categorized as right-wing extremist, partly right-wing extremist or not right-wing extremist according to the survey data. The study aimed to analyze in detail the psychosocial genesis of political attitudes (Decker et al. 2008). Our methodology was based on a combination of qualitative social science methods and psychoanalysis. We developed a concept of group discussions building on Leithäuser and Volmerg (1988) and their conceptualization of "theme-centered group discussions," as well as on the approach by Ralf Bohnsack (2007) who developed the notion of "collective patterns of orientation" (1997, 495, translated).

Our approach to interpreting the transcripts uses psychoanalytic methods by transferring the analysis of counter-transference (Devereux 1967) and "scenic understanding" (Lorenzer 1973) to psychosocial research (see Bereswill et al. 2010 for an English introduction to the method). However, while clinical psychoanalysis seeks to (re)construct biographical and individual forms of conflict and defense, the subject matter of social research is the general in the particular. Psychosocial research deals with the way forms of conflict and defense are repeated unconsciously in the setting of the investigation and always (also) have a "collec-

tive" meaning. Access to this level of meaning can be gained via the analysis of transference and counter-transference in the research process and via "scenic understanding." Transferring Lorenzer's concept to psychosocial research, the setting of a qualitative investigation can be regarded as an ensemble of "scenes" in which both participants and researchers become involved, and which are also motivated by unconscious conflicts and defenses against them. They are "(re)mis en scène," i.e. partly (re)produced in their original unconscious formation. Psychoanalysis has long been based on this phenomenon of reproduction, the idea having been introduced by Freud (1914) who contrasted the notion of an unconscious repetition and enactment of conflictual psychic material to remembering. Group discussions stimulate such (re)productions, as well as the development of relations of transference. In addition, a group setting produces scenes that transcend the individual. Access to unconscious forms of conflict and defense that are (re)produced in the group discussion and interview settings can be gained via exploring the researcher's own irritations, affects, and associations in response to the transcripts/texts. But how to grasp the conflicts and defenses on a "collective" level, given that they are always intertwined with the individual and neurotic? The interpreted scenes might be referred back to the research question. "The scenic interpretation is in itself a way of validating statements" (Lo chel 1997, 69, translated) while at the same time, those interpretations have to be continually validated by the transcript. To analyze our data we formed a group that met at least once a week to discuss individual interpretations. To further intersubjectively validate our findings, we were supervised by the psychoanalyst Elfriede Löchel, Ph.D.

Altogether we conducted twelve group discussions in nine regions throughout Germany with participants who, we categorized as right-wing extremist, partly right-wing extremist or not right-wing extremist in their attitudes on the basis of the survey. Initially we had planned to form groups with homogenous political attitudes from the survey sample. Due to a low response rate however, we were unable to recruit enough participants with right-wing extremist attitudes. We therefore directly recruited two groups that were considered right-wing extremist by local social workers. The number of participants varied between

three and six. The participants were of various age groups (range 18–89 years) and had different social and educational backgrounds. As the introductory "theme," they were asked by two facilitators to discuss amongst themselves how they experienced living in their town or region. The facilitators did not intervene much during the following conversation, except to stimulate further discussion. At some point they introduced the period of the discussants' childhood (unless they had already brought it up themselves).

1.2. Quantitative Design: Representative Surveys
On behalf of the University of Leipzig, the polling firm USUMA (Berlin) conducted surveys on the distribution and influencing factors of right-wing extremist attitudes since 2002. The data presented below (see section 2.2) is based on face-to-face interviews conducted at 258 sample points (N = 2,411) in 2010.

The core of the studies is the scale on right-wing extremist attitudes, comprising "approval of right-wing dictatorship," "chauvinism," "racism/xenophobia," "anti-Semitism," "social Darwinism," and "relativization of National Socialism." Each of the six dimensions comprises three items, so participants were asked to respond to eighteen items on a five-point Likert-scale (between "I strongly agree" and "I strongly disagree"). To give a few examples, one of the items measuring xenophobia was "Foreigners only come to this country to take advantage of the welfare state" (our translation). Chauvinism was measured by items such as: "What we need in our country is to forcefully and aggressively assert German interests towards foreign countries" (our translation). (See Annex 1 for a complete list of items).

Several items on the estimation of the economic situation and different forms of deprivation were correlated with the right-wing-extremism scale in order to assess their impact as influencing factors. In order to estimate individual economic deprivation, we assessed the subjective experience of loss of prosperity as well as concerns about the individual employment situation (Decker et al. 2012).

Experience of unemployment and the level of income were used as markers of the objective economic situation. How

participants assessed the current state of the economy served as an indicator of economic deprivation at a collective or societal level. Since individual economic deprivation is likely to be accompanied by social deprivation, i.e. experiences of loss in social life, the latter were also assessed. Furthermore, we tested the impact of political deprivation, i.e. the feeling of powerlessness related to participation in democracy, on the development of right-wing extremist attitudes.

In our 2006 surveys all measures of deprivation proved to have a strong impact on the endorsement of right-wing extremist statements (Decker et al. 2006, 122–27). It still remains open how this influence might have changed given the current economic crisis. In addition, our 2010 survey includes socio-economic factors as moderating variables. We calculated two linear regression models. The first model comprises markers of economic, social, and political deprivation; the second includes the variables of educational background, age, and gender as socio-structural variables and possible moderating factors (see section 2.2).

2. Findings
Building on the findings of the preceding representative survey that confirm a correlation between economic deprivation and political attitudes (Decker et al. 2006), the group discussions allow a more detailed exploration of the individual and collective meanings ascribed to those experiences. We now explore how participants discuss prosperity and trace the historical roots.

2.1 Material Prosperity as a Core Issue of the Group Discussions
Without having been asked by the interviewers, participants brought up the topic of prosperity as a core issue in eight out of twelve group discussions (Decker et al. 2008). The topic was mentioned with explicit reference to the "economic miracle" of the 1950s and, as such, contrasted to the immediate post-war period. Some of the participants experienced this period themselves, while others talked about their parents' experiences. In order to analyze in detail different aspects of the experience of prosperity and economic decline or the anticipation of economic decline, we selected one group discussion (in the major western German industrial city of Dortmund) for the pur-

pose of this article. We chose the Dortmund discussion because it includes vivid accounts of the experience of prosperity, a first-person narrative of the transition from the war to the postwar period, and indications of intergenerational aspects (for analysis of the other discussions see Decker et al. 2008).

Firstly, we quote and summarize how the issue of prosperity is discussed and then contextualize the statements with regard to the group dynamic as well as to their individual and intergenerational meanings: how do the participants situate the issue in their individual and family biographies? Which individual and collective meanings are ascribed to experienced or anticipated economic decline?

2.1.1. Generations
"And that's another issue of the parents' generation, who defined themselves by it – my parents as well"

Two men and two women participated in the Dortmund discussion, three of them in their sixties, one in her forties. The discussion is shaped by significant differences in economic and social status between the discussants, since two of them (Herr Wernecke and Frau Wagner, see below) have more education and a significantly higher income than the other two (Frau Meier and Herr Winkler). Correspondingly, Herr Wernecke and Frau Wagner attempt to document higher status and subtly exclude the other two participants.

In response to the question regarding what life is like in Dortmund, the participants begin discussing shopping opportunities in the Rhein/Ruhr region. Their discussion about participating in material consumption and access to material commodities refers indirectly to the shared experience of prosperity. Subsequently, they touch on intergenerational aspects by speaking about their childrens' generation(s) and by discussing symbols of status. Frau Wagner notes the pressure of stigmatization on children whose parents cannot afford to buy them brand clothing:

Frau Wagner:[1] Now, that's an issue amongst kids of poor people and of rich people, right. Those of the rich people suppress the poor kids: "Oh, look at your clothes!" or ⌐[2]those

Herr Wernecke: └Yeah.

Herr Winkler: Those, who don't have anything, they try to – if, for example, there is a weak guy – they will try to steal his clothes, 'cause they themselves don't have anything. That's one of those things.

Frau Wagner: That's not the child's issue though, that's an issue of self-confidence, I can

Herr Winkler: No, no, that's an issue of the pare- (.) yeah, sure.

Frau Wagner continues exploring the parents' responsibility to help their children gain self-confidence without the use of material status symbols.

Frau Wagner: And that's another issue of my parents' generation, who defined themselves by it. My parents as well. My mother would be like "look, Aigner, Joop"! She wanted other people to see: "hey, └we succeeded in life," right.

Herr Winkler: └ Not -.[3] No. No.

Frau Wagner: I'm just saying, if I had the Prada label on the back or whatever, that would be my business. I'd know I have a cashmere sweater but that would be enough. Whereas for my mother, being a member of the other generation - - it's important for her, that other people also see how she succeeded (L1460–1491[4]).

Frau Wagner is speaking as a product of the "economic miracle" in the West Germany of the 1950s and therefore emphasizes that she differs from her parents, who grew up during wartime (L1324). She also contrasts her experience with the "problems […] of kids kids nowadays" (L1325). This background frames the issue of prosperity as well as the significance of its documentation. Current experiences of deprivation are indexed historically, with prosperity being contrasted with the immediate post-war period. At the same time, Frau Wagner alludes to the necessity to reassure oneself and others of participation in prosperity; she locates the wish to document prosperity in her parents as well as in her children. Although she claims not to need the mirroring of others, she does articulate her enjoyment of the goods and symbols of prosperity.

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1 All names are anonymized.

2 Speaking simultaneously.

3 "-": pause or interruption.

4 "L": Line number in the original transcript.

Herr Wernecke joins the discussion of historical references initiated by Frau Wagner.

Herr Wernecke: That's correct. On the other, on the other hand, when I went to school at the end of the forties, or the early fifties, the social divide was immense. There was a high unemployment rate, there were the so-called newly rich, who by 1948, uhm, became rich very quickly. And who are supposed to be the norm for the normal public, who - ? Prosperity or well-, well-being was not the standard before the second half of the 1950s. Then, in the 1960s, ok, I must say, the economic miracle uhm had an impact (L1573–1580).

Herr Wernecke describes the economic divide before the "economic miracle" of the 1950s and 1960s as pronounced. Only then would many Germans in the former West Germany be able to participate in societal prosperity, as expressed in the slogan "Prosperity for all" ("Wohlstand für alle") coined by West German Economy Minister Ludwig Erhard in 1957 (Erhard 1957). It marks the political promise of economic participation that Herr Wernecke (together with other participants) considers fulfilled in the time period of the "economic miracle". Once more, the end of World War II as a historic event frames the topic of economic prosperity.

2.1.2. The Promise of Prosperity

Frau Meier refers to the era of the "economic miracle" as a period of "construction," *(Aufbau)* in an almost nostalgic way.

Frau Meier: Right, especially, 'cause back in the day, everything was being rebuilt. It was like, let's say, it wasn't like you could uhm, that you could uhm – . Especially, you wouldn't have a car, like –. My father bought his first car in the sixties and uhm (3),[5] then it just went – since then, things were in the flow even more, right (L1158–1169).

The discussant describes how, in the 1960s, her father apparently bought a car as a symbol of prosperity. Her phrasing, that "things were even more in the flow," alludes to the reconstruction (of Germany after World War II) as an "automatic process" bringing prosperity into the family.

Frau Meier from Dortmund is a highly engaged discussant, both quantitatively and affectively. Later in the discussion she will introduce the "issue" of "foreigners," with the effect that the group, whose members were categorized as "non-right-wing extremist" (according to our survey data), takes an unexpected turn. But before analyzing how statements on the economic situation connect with xenophobic or racist sentiments, let us turn to Frau Meier's biography. After the other participants have introduced themselves, Frau Meier joins in with a relatively long answer to the facilitators' question, what life was like in Dortmund. She introduces herself as a "displaced person" ("Vertriebene," L125) and describes how she experienced severe poverty at the end of the war and during the family's flight "from the Russians" when her hometown Breslau (Wrocław since 1945) was liberated. While her father was serving as a soldier, her mother took her and her siblings westwards. Her sister was temporarily lost during their flight.

Frau Meier: And then we arrived at my aunt's house in uhm Torgau. Wegot two small rooms there, but at least we had a roof over our heads. And the winter was so hard back then, and we collected every piece of wood – although we were not allowed to do that – just to get it warm in there. (...) You know, we had nothing, we had no money, nothing at all, and uhm, my mother was glad to get something from the farmer once in a while. Well, and then, at some point my father came from captivity, and it was like: where is my sister. And my father had the Red Cross search for her (1), and she was found (L125–148).

Telling her story, Frau Meier is intensely involved emotionally, thus marking her early experiences of the post-war flight as still highly meaningful today. This passage forms a significant contrast with that of the newly acquired quality of life quoted above, on both the thematic and the affective level. In addition, her family's gain in prosperity was followed by Frau Meier's own moderate economic ascent, as she married and created her own business with her husband (L1063–1083).

In the discussion Frau Meier introduces her father as a key figure in her life and family, and confirms this when speaking about his parenting style.

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5 (n) Length of pause in seconds.

Frau Meier: And I got my driver's license and I had to - or rather my father told us what to study. My brother had to become an electrician, although he wanted to do something totally different and so did the other brother. My sister wanted to become a hairdresser, but had to go to housekeeping school, and I had to become a saleswoman, though it didn't suit me, but what could I do. Oh well, and then I went into training for three years and (3) well, it went on like that (L1049–1056).

With the father not taking into account his children's career wishes, this description already illustrates an authoritarian parenting style. As Frau Meier relates, this also included severe physical punishment. Except for Frau Wagner, who is about twenty years younger than the others, the participants share similar experiences. All three of them report and legitimize, in hindsight, how parents and teachers beat them severely.

Frau Meier: But did it do any harm to anybody? No, it didn't. And nowadays, (...) whenever any father or mother beats their child – I mean, nobody beats a child without reason, right (L1244-1256).

Whereas the other participants distance themselves to some extent from their parents' disciplinary practices in the course of the discussion, Frau Meier remains highly identified with her father. The father of the period of economic growth demanded submission and is still obeyed to this day. Although alluding to her own desires and expectations for life, Frau Meier does not acknowledge them, nor does she express any anger at her father or any feeling of disappointment. However, she is highly enraged and aggressive when she expresses resentment towards "foreigners":

Frau Meier: Now we've got a lot of Turks in Dortmund. I've got nothing against foreigners, no matter where they come from, black or white. But they dare to do things that we mustn't. They park in the middle of the street, they yak at the corner, [she hits the table repeatedly], they stop and talk, and when you honk your horn, they get sassy. When the police get called and they see the Turks, they run away. And it's really terrible in our city, they run rampant, they buy up every shop, they buy every house that gets empty. I'd say, we'll reach 80 percent Turks soon. (1) One shouldn't tar them all with the same brush, but it's not nice anymore. They live in uhm, uhm, real ghettos, and they think

they got rights everywhere, and uhm they can get away with anything. If we wanna go to their country, we have to adjust to them. If we did what they dare to do, ☺I believe we'd end up in jail☺[6]. And they always draw their knives and shit. (2) Well yeah, and yeah, it's us here today (7) (L187–203).

Throughout the group discussion Frau Meier repeatedly bursts out in hatred and, as if evoked by her strong affect, she seems to motivate the other participants to express resentments as well. A xenophobic consensus is successively created.

Frau Meier: But I keep wondering – the Turks around here, they never go to work, I always see the same lot on the street, morning, noon, and night. They don't go to work. But then she drives a big BMW. He drives a big Mercedes. They got a house. I don't know how they do that, how they get that money - whether it's all by selling pot and whatnot, I don't know (...) Yeah, it makes you wonder sometimes └ how those nationalities do that, right.

Frau Wagner: └ Yeah.

Herr Winkler: └ That was a Polish guy.[7]

Frau Meier: They don't go to work. Just hang around in the pedestrian precinct. Starting at

Frau Wagner: dubious business

Herr Wernecke: Right.

Frau Meier: 9 am └ , there's only Turks in the café or outside on the street. It's insane!

Herr Winkler: └ It's the Mafia, slip me something, and then they have to

Frau Wagner: protection money (2) right.

Herr Winkler: Yeah, yeah (L815–836).

We understand this strong affect as envy that is displaced onto "the Turks" and other groups of people, who are associated with what Frau Meier has wished for herself. She therefore represents the experience of deprivation. In the group discussion we can observe an authoritarian dynamic in the classic sense of the term: identification with economic well-being as a powerful authority or ideal, while, at the same time aggression is played out against minorities, who are, in turn, fantasized as powerful. As indicated above, the other participants join Frau Meier in expressing

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6 ☺: Laughter

7 Frau Meier and Herr Winkler know each other personally.

resentment against migrants, especially against Muslims ("those wearing headscarves," Frau Wagner) whom they differentiate from other groups of immigrants that are supposedly closer "to us" (L1527–1579). Adorno coined the image of "bicyclist characters: 'above they bow, they kick below'" (Adorno et al. 1950, 422, footnote 25). By supporting Frau Meier's rage against migrants that she fantasizes as powerful and wealthy, the other participants join her and thus create an authoritarian group dynamic.

Another remark shows how the rage is directed at whoever is suspected of leading "the good life without working" and who is imagined to possess property, cars, money, and drugs and be free to do whatever they want:

Frau Meier: The standard of living got more expensive for us, the – for the little man, who only got a few Deutschmarks. But not for th- the ones up there,[8] who earn thousands of bucks a month. On top of that, they get free prescriptions of Viagra from their doctors and they get like - [heavy breathing] (L663–666).

Authoritarian aggression seems to emerge whenever the promise of prosperity is unfulfilled.

2.2. Economic Prosperity as "Narcissistic Filling"
In order to elucidate the relation between deprivation and right-wing extremist attitudes, we suggest understanding prosperity as serving the psychosocial function of a "narcissistic filling." The term was coined by Morgenthaler (1976, 1988) as part of his theory of perversion, which "fills – somewhat like a dental filling – a cavity in the regulation of self-esteem acquired in childhood" (Morgenthaler 1976, 170).

With this metaphor we also refer back to Alexander and Margarethe Mitscherlich (1967), who "diagnosed" the majority of non-Jewish Germans after 1945 as incapable of mourning. Their "diagnosis" builds on the psychoanalytic understanding of response to a significant loss of an authority and its correlation with the loss of self-esteem. Deploying the Freudian concept of "mourning" versus

"melancholia" in social psychology, they bring to light processes effective in the majority of Germans after 1945. Following Freud, they describe the functional response to a significant loss, e.g. of a beloved person, as "slowly detaching oneself from lost object relations" (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1975, 66). Working through this process of mourning means to finally accept "definitive change in reality brought about by the loss of the object." (ibid., 64). Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich transfer the notion of the response to an individual object loss to the collective level by combining it with Freud's analysis of mass or large group processes: "The individual gives up his ego ideal and substitutes for it the group ideal as embodied in the leader" (Freud 1959, 78 [org. 1921]). According to this analysis, for the majority of Germans in National Socialism the "Führer" Hitler represented a "grandiose self" image with which they identified. He replaced the ego ideal of every individual who identified with the National Socialist idea of "German greatness," and by following the "Führer" they realized parts of this ego ideal (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1975). "He was the object on which Germans depended … and … represented and revived the ideas of omnipotence that we all cherish about ourselves from infancy; his death, and his devaluation by the victors, also implied the loss of a narcissistic object and, accordingly, an ego- or self-impoverishment and devaluation. (ibid.: 26). With the victory of the Allies and the collapse of the construct of the "Third Reich" they lost (the identification with) the collective ideal and therefore the grandiose "self".

With their theorizing the Mitscherliches illuminate the connection between a defense against a narcissistic damage and the reconstruction of Germany after the war. The narcissistic loss could have led to collective melancholia (Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich 1967, 1975). Yet, instead of recognizing the loss of an ideal grandiose self, the majority of Germans not only covered over this loss, but also replaced it by means of "narcissistic filling." What is more, they would also have had to recognize the guilt of the war

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8 This is the only moment in the discussion that Frau Meier (or anybody else) points at those "up there" as the privileged. She might be indirectly alluding to the two participants whose higher economic status is higher than hers.

of annihilation and the Holocaust, organized by Germans. Instead, according to Mitscherlich and Mitscherlich (1967, 1975), they withdrew all the psychic investment with which they had adored Hitler and done their "duty." They disavowed the crimes, derealized their experiences and externalized the guilt, for example by displacing it onto Hitler, or by weighing their guilt against the guilt of others and identifying as wrongly accused victims, or, on the other hand, by identifying with the victors. As Rothe shows in her qualitative interview study on the aftermath of the Holocaust in several generations of non-Jewish Germans, even in the second and third generation after National Socialism, defense processes against narcissistic damage are induced whenever the Holocaust is evoked. According to Rothe's analysis via "scenic understanding" (see above) the core scene that is "(re)mis en scene" or (re)produced in the interviews is a confrontation with the crimes of the Holocaust (Rothe 2009, 2012) and as such relates back to the confrontation by the Allies. The participants (who were either children during National Socialism or born afterwards) spoke as if accused of participation, which can only be understood if processes of intergenerational transmission and identification with the construct of the nation are taken into account.

Coming back to the thesis developed above, the "collective narcissism" that was massively damaged by the breakdown of National Socialism was replaced by the economic boom, by the "feeling of 'how competent we are'" (Adorno 1986, 122). Democracy was accepted because life can be easy in democracy (ibid.), but it was neither lived nor internalized.

2.3. Deprivation and Right-Wing Extremist Attitudes in the Representative Study

In order to test the findings of the group discussions by means of a methodological triangulation, we correlated parameters of economic deprivation and other possible impact factors with measures of right-wing extremist attitudes by means of two regression models (see section 2.1.2.). We hypothesized, firstly, that endorsement of right-wing extremist statements increases if the individual's economic situation deteriorates, both objectively (assessed by the level of income) and as subjectively experienced. Secondly, we posited that this holds true not only for the

individual economic situation, but also for the assessment of the German economy as a whole. (See Annex 2 for the distribution of right-wing extremist attitudes in 2010; see Annex 3 for perceived social and political deprivation over time). As we developed in our analysis of the group discussions, we assume that (especially) in (West) Germany identification with prosperity replaced identification with the "Führer" and a collective fantasy of grandiosity and consequently served (and might still serve) the function of "narcissistic filling" after the defeat of National Socialism and the confrontation with its crimes.

The regression model reveals a surprise with regard to the impact of the economic situation. The factors of "income" and "experience of unemployment" have no impact on the right-wing extremism scores. Relative individual deprivation does not correlate significantly with the scores on the right-wing extremism scale; other moderating factors prove to be more influential. However, the first model does show a significant impact of the estimation of the German economy as a whole. This significant impact of "collective" economic deprivation can still be shown after controlling for the socio-structural variables of educational background, age and gender. Since including the moderating variables increases the explanatory power from approximately 8 percent to 10 percent, we shall focus in the following on the second model.

Table 1: Economic deprivation in Germany (West and East)

	Model 1	Model 2
Income	**–0.061****	–0.026
Experience of unemployment	–0.003	0.002
Concern about current employment	–0.025	0.025
Individual economic deprivation	–0.010	–0.015
Collective economic deprivation (Germany)	**0.120****	**0.111****
Political deprivation	**0.116****	**0.094****
Social deprivation	**0.182****	**0.179****
Education		**–0.109****
Female		**–0.051***
Age		**0.095****
Constant	23.869**	26.362**
Adjusted R^2	0.081	0.103

*p < .01 **p < .001; N= 2,195
Source: Decker et al. 2012.
Standardized beta coefficients

First of all, the Table 1 shows that all three socio-structural variables (education, age, and gender) have a significant impact on the scores on the right-wing-extremism scale. Whereas education correlates negatively with right-wing-extremism, age correlates positively. Women tend to score significantly less than men; this gender effect remains even after controlling for measures of economic, social, and perceived political deprivation.

As already mentioned, the variables of objective and subjective economic situation – as assessed by level of income and experience of unemployment – do not have a significant impact on the right-wing-extremism scores. Neither experience of personal economic deprivation nor concerned about employment correlate significantly with right-wing extremist attitudes. Consequently, the subjective estimation of an individual's economic situation does not have a significant impact on right-wing extremist attitudes. However, the measures of deprivation at the "collective" or national level do show a significant impact; i.e. the higher the level of deprivation, the more likely an endorsement of right-wing extremist statements. Experiencing the of prosperity seems to be more meaningful at the national or "collective" level than at the individual level. This result corresponds with the

findings of Rippl and Baier regarding the impact factors of ethnocentric attitudes: "feelings of deprivation at the group level that remain meaningful independently from individual deprivation" (2005, 662, translated).

If calculated separately for eastern Germany (the former German Democratic Republic) and western Germany, the model reveals significant differences. First of all, the explanatory power rises from approximately 10 percent to 20 percent. What is more, differentiating between eastern and western Germany shifts the levels of significance. While for the western states the pattern of influencing factors is similar to the model as a whole (see Table 1), in the former GDR individual income shows a highly significant impact on right-wing-extremism (see Table 2); concern about employment nearly reaches the threshold of significance. We thus gain the impression that the impact of the individual economic situation is greater in eastern than in western Germany, especially with regard to the level of income. This might be related to the fact that in eastern Germany the job market is more insecure than in the west and the unemployment rate is higher. However, the perception of the overall economic situation is not correlated significantly with right-wing extremist attitudes.

Table 2: Economic deprivation in East Germany

	Model 1	Model 2
Income	**–0.209****	**–0.159***
Experience of unemployment	–0.089	–0.094
Concern about current employment	**0.139****	**0.154***
Individual economic deprivation	–0.092	–0.086
Collective economic deprivation (Germany)	0.075	0.069
Political deprivation	**0.237****	**0.211****
Social deprivation	**0.222****	**0.221****
Education		**–0.160***
Female		–0.022
Age		–0.015
Constant	29.160**	36.719**
Adjusted R^2	0.192	0.206

*p < .01 **p < .001; N= 2195
Source: Decker et al. 2012.
Standardized beta coefficients

In model 2 for eastern Germany alone, the impact of collective economic deprivation vanishes. We therefore posit that the individual economic situation is more important in the former GDR than in the former West Germany. As much as participation in prosperity is desired at an individual level in eastern Germany, a collective identity regulated by identification with "national" wealth (as symbolic of power) is more pronounced in western Germany.

Let us return to the impact of the level of income: whereas its impact remains statistically insignificant in model 2 (see table 1), income does have a significant impact in model 1 (which excludes the socio-structural variables of age, gender, and education). Thus, the effect is overpowered by other variables in the second model. Since income and education are highly correlated, we conclude that education trumps the impact of income. The effect of political deprivation is similar to the effect of collective economic deprivation. Holding a fatalistic worldview, according to which the individual has no impact on politics, is a strong predictor of right-wing extremist attitudes. Social deprivation proves to have the greatest impact of all the investigated variables.

3. Discussion

By means of a methodological triangulation we analyzed in detail the connection of economic deprivation and right-wing extremist attitudes. We interpret the function of prosperity as a collective object serving the regulation of self-esteem. In times of economic decline or crisis this integrating potential loses its cohesiveness and right-wing extremist attitudes become manifest. We suggest grasping the psychosocial function of prosperity with the metaphor of "narcissistic filling." In post-war (West) Germany the "filling" replaced the "collective" identification with greatness as embodied in the image of the "Führer". The collective meaning of the object of a "strong economy" has been transmitted intergenerationally. Whenhe wealth crumbles, as many people are experiencing for instance during the current economic crisis, the filling comes out and the deficits in democratization become apparent. Furthermore, the loss of the object of identification leads to an increase in authoritarian aggression. The Authoritarian Personality described by Fromm and Adorno is ambivalent towards

authority: the idealization of the authority allows for feelings of greatness and power, but it also involves submission which in turn motivates aggression that he or she displaces onto less powerful objects. If the idealized object loses power, the authoritarian personality is narcissistically hurt and responds with intensified anger. The same authoritarian dynamic can be observed with regard to the idealized "object" of the economy.

Although additional impact factors influence right-wing extremist attitudes (Decker et al. 2006), the regression analysis allows our findings of the group discussions to be specified. Whereas in eastern Germany individual access to commodities, ergo individual prosperity regulates "collective" identifications and self-esteem, in western Germany they are regulated by identification with (a flourishing) economy. Conceivably, "eastern Germans" are less identified with the economic structure, whereas in western Germany the post-war identification with the "hard Deutschmark" might still prevail even in times of economic crisis.

Durkheim's studies on the impact of religious beliefs on individual socialization have already indicated how historical traditions influence cultures of everyday life, even if the majority is not religious (1997, 164). His theory of anomy also elucidates our thesis on the psychosocial function of wealth. When the regulating function of (individual and collective) self-esteem through religion decreased, the significance of economics took over (Weber 2000; Parsons 1940). More recently, Deutschmann (1999) and Türcke (2002) explored the religious underbelly of economy; and with their analysis our metaphor of "narcissistic filling" also gains in sociological significance. We do not suggest that the economy only began to serve the function of a collective ego ideal after World War II, nor that it only served this function in Germany. However, we assume that the cultural connotations and meanings have developed differently in other countries with different histories. Talcott Parsons and more recent studies in the United States (Kintz 1997) might be a starting point for further analyses.

In any case, our metaphor of "narcissistic filling" might be useful to help grasp the meaning of global or collective

experiences of deprivation; our findings are in accord with other studies on the connection between deprivation and right-wing-extremism. They also resonate with Tajfel and Turner's theory of social identity as well as with the understanding of cultural artifacts as "anxiety buffers" (Greenberg et al. 1997; see also Jonas and Fritsche 2005) in Terror Management Theory.

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Annex

Annex 1

The Leipzig scale on right-wing extremist attitudes

For the national interest a dictatorship is the best form of government under certain conditions. (1)*

If it were not for the extermination of the Jews, Hitler would be regarded as a great statesman. (6)

Germany needs a strong single party that represents the ethnic community as a whole. (1)

We should have a leader who rules Germany with an iron hand for the greater good. (1)

As in nature, in society the fittest should win. (5)

Foreigners only come to this country to abuse the welfare state. (3)

Jews still have too much influence. (4)

It is about time that we regained a strong sense of patriotism. (2)

In fact, the Germans are naturally superior to other ethnic groups. (5)

When the unemployment rate rises, foreigners should be sent back home. (3)

Jews play more dirty tricks to achieve their goals than other people do. (4)

The crimes of National Socialism have been highly exaggerated in historiography. (6)

What we need in our country is to forcefully and aggressively assert German interests towards foreign countries. (2)

The primary goal of German politics should be to give Germany the power and prestige that we deserve. (2)

There is worthy and unworthy life. (5)

Foreigners dangerously pollute Germany. (3)

The Jews are just peculiar and don't really fit in with us. (4)

National Socialism had its positive aspects. (6)

(Numbers in parentheses indicate the dimension on the right-wing-extremism scale, see Annex 2).

Annex 2

Right-wing-extremist attitudes in western and eastern Germany, 2010 (in percent)

	Germany	Western (N=1,907)	Eastern (N=504)
Approval of a right-wing dictatorship (1)*	5.1	4.6	6.8
Chauvinism (2)	19.3	19.2	19.8
Xenophobia (3)	24.7	21.9	35.0
Anti-Semitism (4)	8.7	9.0	7.7
Social Darwinism (5)	4.0	3.4	6.2
Downplaying of National Socialism (6)	3.3	3.7	1.8
Right-wing-extremist world-view	8.2	10.5	7.6

Average agreement per item > 3.5 on five-point scale ("1" = "I totally agree", "3" = "partly agree/ partly disagree", "5"= "I completely agree")

Annex 3

Perceived social and political deprivation over time (in percent)

	Germany		Western		Eastern	
	2006	2010	2006	2010	2006	2010
People like me don't have any impact on the government anyway.	78.9	79.4	76.7	78.5	87.6	82.9
I think it's useless to engage in politics.	68.8	70.9	66.8	70.2	77.3	73.5
There are not enough people who accept me the way I am.	19.1	19.5	19.3	19.1	18.2	21.3
I don't feel good and safe in my personal environment.	12.9	13.3	13.3	13.4	11.3	12.8

Percentage who "agree" or "totally agree"

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"I Am First and Foremost a Man of Logic" – Stereotyping, the Syndrome Character of Prejudice, and a Glance at Anders Breivik's Manifesto

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Vol. 7 (1) 2013

"I Am First and Foremost a Man of Logic" – Stereotyping, the Syndrome Character of Prejudice, and a Glance at Anders Breivik's Manifesto

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Attitudes, stereotyping, and prejudice are often conceived of as *inner*, mental or cognitive processes. Drawing on discursive psychology and critical theory, this article proposes a language-based understanding of stereotyping and the "syndrome character" of prejudice that is able to avoid certain epistemological shortcomings and connect social-psychological and sociological research. Stereotyping is outlined as a *relational* concept that denotes a *linguistic* mode of relating to the world, whilst the syndrome character of prejudice is conceptualized as a phenomenon that *shows* in particular stereotypical speech acts, but does not completely coincide with them. The impact of this conceptual figuration is empirically illustrated using Anders Breivik's manifesto.

Introduction

The concept of a syndrome character of prejudice has long been a subject of quantitative and qualitative research on prejudice (Adorno et al. 1950; Heitmeyer 2002; Zick, Hövermann, and Krause 2012). The essential core of approaches that use this concept is probably that if a person is prejudiced against one outgroup, they are most likely to be prejudiced against other outgroups as well. Whilst the substantiality of the syndrome character of prejudice has been proved by long term quantitative empirical research (Heitmeyer 2012), less attention has been paid to the theoretical derivation of the concept . Theodor W. Adorno and colleagues noted the interconnection of different prejudices in their study on the Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al. 1950), arguing that unconscious, deep-rooted character traits may be responsible for this stereotyped devaluation of various outgroups. Thus, they dislocated the object of their interest to a place where it cannot be observed, at least not directly: the minds of their subjects.

In the following I will outline a relational concept of stereotyping. By locating the process of stereotyping in language, it will be possible to avoid shortcomings associated with approaches that conceptualize stereotyping as a primarily "inner" or "mental" occurrence. Because the researchers of the Frankfurt School themselves partly applied an epistemologically and methodically problematic differentiation between "inner" phenomena and their outward appearances, I will in a first step illustrate the approach of discursive psychology to problems of social psychology (1.1.). Subsequently I will show that the Dialectic of Enlightenment (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997) includes considerations on stereotyping as a linguistic phenomenon that may shed new light on the notion of a syndrome character of prejudice as it is applied in the Authoritarian Personality as well as in contemporary research on prejudice (1.2.).[1] Then I will illustrate the impact of this approach using the manifesto of Anders Behring Breivik, the Norwegian mass murderer (2.). In a last step, I will outline theoretical and methodological consequences of this approach (3.).

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[1] It is not my intention to present a new interpretation of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* or the *Authoritarian Personality*. Rather, I would like to show that if one shifts the focus of the interpretation of those classical texts from 'inner' processes to language, certain problems of the conceptualization of stereotypes and the syndrome character of prejudice vanish.

1. The Concept of Stereotyping

1.1 Discursive Psychology and the Study of Attitudes and Stereotypes

What is the medium of stereotyping? According to Gordon Allport, a stereotype is "an exaggerated belief associated with a category" and an aspect "of a complex mental process" (1958, 187). A stereotype may influence what we are able to perceive, but the stereotype itself is never directly observable, and we can only indirectly infer from behavior or language that a stereotyped *mentality* exists. The same goes for his concept of attitudes, which, according to Allport, "are never directly observed, but, unless they are admitted, through inference, as real and substantial ingredients in human nature, it becomes impossible to account satisfactorily either for the consistency of any individual's behavior, or for the stability of any society" (1935, 839). Stangor admits that nowadays there are "tens, if not hundreds of definitions in the literature, although they are mostly based on the general idea of stereotypes as knowledge structures that serve as mental 'pictures' of the group in question" (2009, 2). Accordingly, the main problem concerning the understanding of stereotypes is not so much whether the approach is a social psychological or sociological one, whether it is quantitative, experimental, or qualitative.[2] Rather, the problematic aspect that seems to provoke the multiplicity of definitions is the location of stereotypes, that is, whether they are conceived of as hidden inner states that are not directly observable or as a linguistic phenomenon. Thus, I will not give a review of definitions, which has been done elsewhere (Ashmore and Del Boca 1981, Miller 1982), but outline what could be meant when we speak of "stereotypes." Given that the concept originally meant a printing plate used in the publishing industry and was – as far as we know – first borrowed for the social sciences by Walter Lippmann (1949), its metaphorical character becomes immediately clear. Its original, non-metaphorical meaning was "a relief printing plate cast in a mould made from composed type or an original plate,"[3] and in the following we will take a closer look at what it could reasonably mean if we switch

the focus of research from unobservable inner processes to language as the *medium* of stereotypes.

For several years, discursive psychology led the way in challenging this conception of attitudes, stereotyping, and prejudice as ostensibly inner and *nonverbal* processes or structures that somehow *attach* to language, leaving language as mere *trace* for those unobservable processes or structures. As Billig puts it: "Thus, much of social psychology, especially cognitive social psychology, has objects of study – whether 'attitude systems', 'social identities' or 'cognitive schemata' which are presumed to be internal processes and, as such, hidden from view. These objects are the focus of considerable social psychological investigation, but are ghostly essences, lying behind and supposedly controlling what can be directly observed" (2001, 210). To avoid dealing with those "ghostly essences" and to put (social) psychology on a discursive/rhetorical basis, extensive research has been done, for instance in the field of attribution and the psychology of memory (Edwards and Potter 1992), racism (Wetherell and Potter 1992), or nationalism (Billig 2006). The common ground most studies in discursive/rhetorical psychology share is

a) A far-reaching critique of approaches that conceptualize attitudes, prejudice, stereotyping, or ideology as somehow or other "inner" states or processes. If, it is argued, words have no objective or intrinsic meaning, but acquire their meaning only in concrete social *contexts*, then such approaches miss their goal of discovering basic mechanisms of the human psyche. Ironically, this happens in the course of efforts to ensure access to those mechanisms, assuming that only a language "sanitized and shorn of context and usage" (Edwards and Potter 1992, 157) will bring this result.

b) Based on this, a concentration on everyday language. If, in and by the medium of language, the individual does not express a mentality or an inner psychological

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2 The authors of the *Authoritarian Personality* – albeit rather relying on Freudian psychoanalysis – very similarly distinguished between the "surface" of language and underlying personality traits and needs (Adorno et al. 1950, 2ff.).

3 Oxford Dictionaries, "stereotype," http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/stereotype.

dynamic, but first and foremost "discourse is actively constitutive of both social and psychological processes" (Wetherell and Potter 1992, 59), then studying everyday language must be the priority of psychology.

The goal of rhetoric and discursive psychology is not to *deny* that there are inner processes happening in the human mind or to assert that all psychological problems could be reduced to language problems. Rather, the focal point of attention is turned from language as a trace of *inner* processes to language as a kind of *action* that first and foremost socially *constitutes* activities like "remembering" or "hoping." Let us examine what it means when we, for instance, say that "I hope that X will arrive today." If someone asks us how we could know that we hope that X will arrive today, we will not somehow "turn inside" and reveal an inner process of "hoping," but perhaps say something like "Well, I'm pretty nervous; I can't concentrate; I'm looking out of the window pretty often; I'm pondering if I should buy the ingredients for X's favorite dish, just in case she arrives today" and so on. That is to say, a discursive understanding of "hoping" does not *deny* that there may be inner processes that go along with "hoping" (such as being nervous, unable to concentrate, etc.), but it does deny that there is a distinctive mental process of "hoping" going on and, thus, we rather have to take a closer look at the various speech acts that may be connected to "hoping" in everyday language: "When I think in words, I don't have 'meanings' in my mind in addition to verbal expressions; rather, language itself is the vehicle of thought" (Wittgenstein 2009, 113). Consequently, "hoping," "remembering," "believing,"etc. are no longer seen as hidden individual mental processes, but as *social activities* (Billig 2001, 213), and in the following we will further examine what that could imply for "stereotyping."

Despite this view of language as a social praxis, discursive psychological research often leaves the interconnection between society and language, between social power relations and individual attitudes, relatively dim and frag-

mentary, concentrating on the qualitative empirical study of the communicative construction of attitudes or prejudices in interviews, newspaper articles, or focus groups. Billig (1991, 8), following Roland Barthes, suggests that this is not a simple power relation between the dominant and the dominated class, the former dominating the language and therefore the thoughts of the latter. Rather, he writes that "the speaker simultaneously is in charge of language and is captured by it," and that the speaker "can be portrayed as both master and slave" (ibid.). He or she is at the same time a slave of language, because he or she has to use and "recycle" (Billig) a preexisting language which he or she did not influence, and a master because he or she is able to (at least partly) creatively combine and change this given language. This implies that stereotyping and prejudice can be conceptualized neither as mere indoctrination by dominating classes (as in some Marxist approaches) nor as phenomena that are solely due to the individual (as in some psychological approaches). Language, in short, mediates the social and the individual; it is the *medium* in which society and the individual meet. For when we speak, we make use of words that already exist and have been used over and over again; that convey a particular content which may have changed over time and certainly is – at least to a certain extent – variable, but nonetheless necessarily refers to a past and present social context. Therefore, language is essentially social and cannot be reduced to the individual – we cannot reasonably think of a private language (Wittgenstein 2009, 98ff.).[4] Thus, if we do not think of stereotyping as an "inner" or mental process, but as a process that happens in the medium of language, what, then, is it?

1.2. Critical Theory and Its Concept of Stereotyping
Critical Theory, in some of its most famous studies, offered a theoretical approach that enables us to conceptualize language as the medium of stereotypes and simultaneously as the medium where the individual and the social meet. That may surprise the reader, for the critical theory of the Frankfurt School has seldom been read as a *philosophy of*

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4 It is not my goal to examine the compatibilities and incompatibilities of discursive/rhetorical psychology and critical theory. However, while critical theory is a theory of the totality of society, discursive psychology does not build on this kind of philosophical and sociological thought. This may point to a possible fruitful combination of the two theories, as I will show at the end of the paper. As far as the philosophy of ordinary language is concerned, Schatzki (1996) and Winch (1990) elaborated its relation to sociology and social science.

language, and in Habermas's *Theory of Communicative Action* (1986) and the ensuing discussion it was criticized as an old-fashioned piece of social ontology. In the following I will show that *reading* the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as a theory that comprises a philosophy of language allows us a productive new insight into the *Authoritarian Personality* and stereotyping in general.

It was especially the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* fragment "Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment" and in particular the notion of "ticket thinking" that sparked controversy concerning its impact for research on anti-Semitism and prejudice. The concept of ticket thinking, in short, denotes a way of thinking that has deteriorated so much in the process of enlightenment that stereotyped thought:

> is all that remains. A choice is still made, but only between totalities. Anti-Semitic psychology has been replaced by mere acceptance of the whole fascist ticket, … Just as on the voting papers of the mass party the elector is given names by the party machine to vote for en bloc, the basic ideological elements are coded on a few lists.
>
> (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 200–201)

Thus, Horkheimer and Adorno assume a thinking that has lost the ability to judge by individual categories – all that remains is "blind subsumption" (ibid., 201) – and, therefore, even anti-Semitism as a distinct prejudice has come to an end: "But there are no more Anti-Semites" (ibid., 200). Especially with respect to the ticket thesis, Rensmann and Schulze Wessel wrote that Adorno and Horkheimer abandoned the possibility to understand specific historical mechanisms of prejudice, its specific functions and cultural embedment (Rensmann and Schulze Wessel 2003, 124). This may hold true if ticket thinking is conceptualized as a kind of mentality. But we will see that it is fertile to accentuate the role of *language:* in a deteriorating language Horkheimer and Adorno saw the ability to make distinct judgments supplanted by merely stereotyped thinking:

> In the world of mass series production, stereotypes replace individual categories. Judgments are no longer based on a genuine synthesis but on blind subsumption. At an earlier stage of history judgments were based on hasty distinctions which gave impetus to the process, and in the meantime exchange, circu-

lation and legal precedents and convention have contributed their share. The process of judgment passed through the stage of weighing up the relative merits of individual cases, which gave the subject some measure of protection against brutal identification with the predicate. In late industrial society, there is a regression to illogical judgment. When fascism replaced involved legal procedures by an accelerated form of judgment and retribution, the up-to-date were economically prepared for this new development; they had learned to see things through the conceptual models, the *termini technici*, which remain as the iron ration when language disintegrates. The perceiver is no longer present in the process of perception. He no longer uses the active passivity of cognition in which the categorial components can be appropriately formed from a conventionally pre-shaped 'given', and the 'given' formed anew from these elements, so that justice is done to the perceived object. In the sphere of the social sciences, and in the world of individual experience, blind observation and empty concepts are grouped together rigidly and without mediation. In the age of three hundred keywords, the ability to make the effort required by judgment disappears, and the distinction between truth and falsehood is removed.

> (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 201–202)

Thus, it is *not* primarily a certain character structure or mentality that is dealt with in the relevant fragments. Rather, in the fragment on the "Elements of Antisemitism" in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* language is the *mediator* of the social and the individual and the medium of stereotypes. Apparently, in this excerpt the notion of "judgment" is used in two senses: On the one hand, its *literal* sense, describing the difference between a "fair" trial in which the accused had the chance to be judged fairly in their own right in a process "of weighing up the relative merits of individual cases." In a *metaphorical* sense, this idea of an appropriate judgment is transferred to perception (and vice versa): Just as fascism transformed fair process into a propaganda trial where a pre-existing judgment was merely executed, the (potentially) fascist perceiver is no longer able to do justice to the perceived object. This is not because – in a first step – his or her ability to perceive somehow deteriorated, but *because* he or she "had learned to see things through the conceptual models, the *termini technici*, which remain as the iron ration when language disintegrates," his or her perception deteriorates. That is to say, what we are able to perceive is due not to the "ghostly essence" of an antecedent inner state or structure, but to the language that we have at our disposal. The "up-to-date" are not prepared for fascism *because* they are fascists or have an antecedent fascist character structure which somehow attaches to lan-

guage, but the other way around: because their language and, therefore, their *thinking* and feeling has already disintegrated to the "iron ration," they are susceptible to a fascist world view, to fascist ideology. *Real* living perception is an active-passive process: We perceive through our language, but unless we are able to enact a process of "doing justice" to the perceived object, we fail to perceive it in a fair, emphatic sense. But how can we comprehend this process? Language, as it is conceptualized in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, is two-sided, as it is especially evident in the fragment on "The Concept of Enlightenment" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 4ff.). By the means of language we are on the one hand able to fix an object and, thus, to build a distance between subject and object. If we are not able to *name* distinct objects, we are not able to make differences, and everything remains chaotic. Using a language is an act of freedom, for it frees us from the chaotic and immediate proximity of objects. But on the other hand this is an act of alienation and dominion. Giving attributes to an object is at the same time (at least temporarily) abstraction from and abandonment of other qualities of this object. Simultaneously, language is a means that inherently offers the possibility to serve up justice for the object: By the means of language, we are not only able to fix the object, but also to "express the contradiction that something is itself and at one and the same time something other than itself, identical and not identical" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 15). That is, we are not necessarily able to express the non-identical, but we are able to express this contradiction as well as to reflect what we *do* with our words and concepts (Plug 2010, 57–58). And it is exactly in this sense that the abovementioned excerpt from the "Elements of Antisemitism" can be understood: Stereotyping in its most advanced form is the complete lack of this kind of reflection and passive-active perception. The stereotyping subject is not able to use his/her language in that two-sided manner; s/he uses language to fix, but not in a way where the categorial components "can be appropriately formed from a con-

ventionally pre-shaped 'given', and the 'given' formed anew from these elements, so that justice is done to the perceived object." All that remains is the pre-shaped given. Thus, proper judgment vanishes and gives way to fascist judgments, in perception as well as in the fascist trial. It was Zygmunt Bauman who pointedly recapitulated this notion of language for his diagnosis of modernity:

> Ambivalence, the possibility of assigning an object or an event to more than one category, is a language-specific disorder: a failure of the naming (segregating) function that language is meant to perform. The main symptom of disorder is the acute discomfort we feel when we are unable to read the situation properly and to choose between alternative actions. It is because of the anxiety that accompanies it and the indecision which follows that we experience ambivalence as a disorder – and either blame language for lack of precision or ourselves for linguistic misuse. And yet ambivalence is not the product of the pathology of language or speech. It is, rather, a normal aspect of linguistic practice. It arises from one of the main functions of language: that of naming and classifying.
>
> (Bauman 1991, 1)

For Horkheimer and Adorno, this necessity of the ambivalence of language at the same time comprises the possibility of a perception where subject and object are properly mediated – a just reflection that is able to likewise self-consciously reflect on its own (necessary) stereotyping: "Only in that mediation by which the meaningless sensation brings a thought to the full productivity of which it is capable, while on the other hand the thought abandons itself without reservation to the predominant impression, is that pathological loneliness which characterizes the whole of nature overcome" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 189). Language itself inherently and necessarily involves both possibilities (and, for Horkheimer and Adorno as well as for Bauman, this is no *failure* of language but marks the possibility of freedom): an ultimately stereotyped language that solely fixes its object with rigid notions, and a living language of fair perception.[5] Those possibilities are evidently not clearly separated or separable

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5   And in this respect, the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* encompasses a *dialectical* philosophy of language. Horkheimer and Adorno qualify the *essence* of language, of conceptual thinking and speaking, as permitting oppression as well as liberation. And insofar as each and every concept *fixes* its objects as

well as potentially serving as the starting point for real living perception, it is the *praxis* of language that either allows the struggle for fair perception or makes it impossible. For Horkheimer and Adorno, it is National Socialism that is the point of culmination of a reification of language, a point where

the fixed and fixing parts of language prevail. National Socialist domination and reification of language and the whole of society are the ultimate attempt to make everything conform absolutely.

sides of language, one evil and one sound. For if we use concepts we *do fix* objects in the first place. It is rather a constant effort of critical reflection on the possibilities as well as on the futility of language (Plug 2010) that breaks the spell of stereotyping, and in this respect the concept of ticket thinking denotes instead an ideal-typical extreme of a *continuum.*

That implies on the one hand that the fight against stereo-types can never come to an end: Stereotyping does not depend entirely on a certain social organization, but inheres in language. On the other hand, Horkheimer and Adorno conceptualized the process of enlightenment as a process of increasing freedom as well as a process of dis-integration of reason in the medium of language and thus, in society, where "in the sphere of the social sciences, and in the world of individual experience, blind observation and empty concepts are grouped together rigidly and without mediation." This disintegration marks the influence of an increasingly deteriorating society on lan-guage, for language and social development are irrevocably intertwined. Enlightenment, which "has always aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sover-eignty" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 3) *must* fail, para-doxically, if it does not reflect on its own impossibility. For if enlightenment is basically the effort of understanding and, thus, conceptualizing ever increasing parts of our social and natural world, then we could say, following Bau-man, that it coincidentally and inwardly produces ambiva-lence. This relationship constitutively affects all fragments of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, and in this respect, the fragment on "The Culture Industry" deals with the link between a general decline of language and the rise of fas-cism. It is not so much a deliberate mass deception that the authors fear from the rise of culture industry, not in the sense that, for example, we are all manipulated in a well-thought-out manner by advertising. Rather, the com-modification of culture hastens not only cultural standardization, but likewise the standardization of lan-guage and perception:

> The blind and rapidly spreading repetition of words with special designations links advertising with the totalitarian watchtower. The layer of experience which created the words for

their speakers has been removed; in this swift appropriation language acquires the coldness which until now it had only on billboards and in the advertisement columns of newspapers. Innumerable people use words and expressions which they have either ceased to understand or employ only because they trigger off conditioned reflexes; in this sense, words are trade-marks which are finally all the more firmly linked to the things they denote, the less their linguistic sense is grasped.

> (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 165–66)

Culture, in short, "now impresses the same stamp on everything" ("Kultur heute schlägt alles mit Ähnlichkeit") (ibid., 120). In other words, due to capitalist com-modification not only of culture, but basically of all areas of life, it is not only objects that are subject to compara-bility and reproducibility, but every kind of social relations as well as the subject itself. Ticket thinking, in this sense, does not denote a mental process, but a *conceptual praxis* of judging the world with precast categories. Thus, this kind of praxis would mean the end of particular perception and of the perception of the particular. It is this completely stereotyped language and therefore completely stereotyped mode of thinking that brings about an accomplished objectification of the subject, because the subject:

> is no longer able to return to the object what he has received from it, he becomes poorer rather than richer. He loses the reflection in both directions: since he no longer reflects the object, he ceases to reflect upon himself, and loses the ability to differentiate. Instead of the voice of conscience, he hears other voices; instead of examining himself in order to decipher the protocol of its own lust for power, it attributes the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion" to others.

> (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 189–90)

Far from being a mere critique of modern culture, the frag-ment on culture industry debates the link between the essence of our language, its disintegration in a process of enlightenment that lacks critical self-reflection, and a sub-ject that turns more and more into a potential fascist because s/he becomes increasingly unable to accomplish fair and emphatic judgments.

1.3. "Stereotyping" as Relational Concept

In this respect, the *Authoritarian Personality* can be read as an empirical litmus test for those theoretical consider-ations. To read the *Authoritarian Personality* as a mere piece of individual psychology that may have the ambition to

include contextual factors, but fails in its implementation (for example Zick 1997), means to desist – at least partly – from its theoretical embedment. Of course, the *Authoritarian Personality* is basically a psychoanalytically inspired empirical study that offers traces of the above-mentioned theoretical fragments rather than systematically building upon them. Of course it can be read as a study on the authoritarian *character* or personality, but it likewise offers hints for a re-interpretation inspired by a critical philosophy of language:

> This [manipulative] syndrome, potentially the most dangerous one, is defined by stereotypy as an extreme: rigid notions become ends rather than means, and the whole world is divided into empty, schematic, administrative fields. There is an almost complete lack of object cathexis and of emotional ties. … However, the break between internal and external world, in this case, does not result in anything like ordinary "introversion," but rather the contrary: a kind of compulsive overrealism which treats everything and everyone as an object to be handled, manipulated, seized by the subject's own theoretical and practical patterns. … The ingoup-outgroup relationship becomes the principle according to which the whole world is abstractly organized.
>
> (Adorno et al. 1950, 767–68)

It is obvious that Adorno et al. conceptualize this "potentially most dangerous" syndrome in line with the reflections in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. They do not describe a *character structure* that *shows* itself in language (even if, once again, this excerpt can be read as such a description). But, clearly, the stereotyping *itself* happens in language, in "rigid notions" and "empty, schematic fields." This empty language works in two directions: One direction is what can be described as perception of the outside world. Because we perceive and interpret the outside world by the means of language, rigid notions are not able to trigger the perception of anything new or ambivalent. Stereotyping, thus, is to identify something or someone with precast and rigid concepts. The other direction is inward: Exactly *because* the subject is not able to really *perceive*, s/he "becomes poorer rather than richer. S/he loses the reflection in both directions: since he no longer reflects the object, he ceases to reflect upon himself, and loses the ability to differentiate" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 189) – s/he lacks the "emotional ties" and therefore the ability to feel empathy.

But this most "advanced" form of stereotyping does not imply a lack of specificity in the analysis of stereotyping. That would only be true if we conceptualize ticket thinking as a mentality or an inner state of mind; for as such it would be invisible and, thus, basically inexplicable. In today's research on prejudice, it is common ground that prejudices against different out-groups are very likely not to occur *separately* (for example, a person is prejudiced against Turkish immigrants, but not against any other groups), but are embedded in a syndrome of somehow interrelated prejudices: If a person is prejudiced against one out-group, s/he is most likely to be prejudiced against other out-groups as well. Recently, Zick and colleagues reconfirmed this hypothesis on a European level (Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 2011). Their argument is that different prejudices share a common core, which they (following Heitmeyer 2002) identify as "an ideology of unequal status" (Zick, Küpper, and Hövermann 2011, 38). With regard to the *Authoritarian Personality*, we can now add a decisive hypothesis to the research on the syndrome character of prejudice: If prejudice is a phenomenon that is not *antecedent* to language, but *inheres* and happens within language, then its syndrome character must be identifiable in language as well. Thus, if we figure our concept of "stereotyping" as a linguistic phenomenon, the relationship between stereotyping, ticket thinking, and the syndrome character of prejudice can be grasped coherently: stereotyping is a matter of language. It happens when the fixed elements of language prevail over its possibility to enable – in an act of active-passive reflection – the subject to open up different (ambivalent, non-identical) facets of the object, that is, to perceive in an emphatic and just sense and, thus, to do justice to the object. This function of fair judgment comes to an end in ticket thinking, which is a metaphor used to illustrate an absolutely stereotyped, therefore reified and reifying language. The syndrome character of prejudice is the conceptual and empirical result of these considerations, for if the world is perceived in "empty, schematic, administrative fields," the particular necessarily vanishes for the benefit of *mere* stereotypy. The finding that a person "who is hostile toward one minority group is very likely to be hostile against a wide variety of others" (Adorno et al. 1950, 9) follows from that, because if stereotyping is the general mode of perception there is no room for individual judg-

ments. People are not judged individually, but ordered, for example according to antecedent ingroup-/outgroup differentiations. Nonetheless, ticket thinking is *specific*, for a general tendency in thinking and speaking has to *appear* in *particular* phenomena; otherwise we would not be able to speak of a general tendency. For Adorno, Horkheimer and the authors of the *Authoritarian Personality*, ticket thinking is both: It is a *general* social phenomenon that nonetheless *shows up* in *specific* manners, for example the stereotypical view of "the Jews" is different from that of "the Irish," but the *overall* mechanism is that of rigid notions.

I began by outlining basic assumptions of discursive psychology. Instead of searching for the "ghostly essences" of mental or somehow "inner" states, it was argued, attention has to switch to discourse, to everyday language and the specific context in which it is situated. I showed that the fragments of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* are centered on a concept of language that allows us to understand the dialectic of enlightenment as a history of an increasing social disintegration that accompanies and is interdependent with a decline of language. Ticket thinking can be understood as the triumph of a blind enlightenment that left nothing but stereotyped language: "empty schematic fields" and, therefore, "blind observation." This process is associated with an inner exhaustion of the individual, for its inner richness or poorness, its ability for recognition (Honneth 1996) and empathy are essentially linked to the way it may or may not perceive the social world. However, if stereotyping is not bound to a specific form of social organization, but inheres in language, it is not (only) the fight against all reifying and totalitarian tendencies that protects against it, but constant critical self-reflection: "We are wholly convinced – and therein lies our *petition principii* – that social freedom is inseparable from enlightened thought" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, introduction, xiii). In this respect, the manipulative syndrome, as depicted in the *Authoritarian Personality*, is the opposite of enlightened thought: It is conditioned by compulsive overrealism which "treats everything and everyone as an object to be handled,

manipulated, and seized by the subject's own theoretical and practical patterns" (Adorno et al. 1950, 767).

So far, two conceptions of stereotyping have been discussed: The idea of a somehow "inner" state or mentality that attaches to language and, likewise, the idea that stereotyping could be identified in *single* notions or words. For if stereotyping is a particular linguistic mode of relating to the world, it becomes rather problematic to speak of *a* stereotype. Stereotyping denotes a relation to the world where we "do not first see, and then define, [but where] we define first and then see" (Lippmann 1949, 81) what we already defined. That is, if we do not conceptualize stereotyping as a "mental state of readiness" (Allport), but as the linguistic *modality* in which a person relates to someone or something, the focus of research switches from "inner" states to language. Thus if stereotyping denotes a *process* where *X relates to Y in a stereotyped mode*, stereotyping has no existence beyond language, but *happens* in and by language. It seems to be a particularity of the concept of stereotyping that it *strongly* refers to discourse. For whether someone relates stereotypically to persons, things, or groups can only be decided on the basis of his or her *speech*, the *mode* or the *way* in which s/he speaks. Inasmuch as this concept of stereotyping refers to discourse, critical theory and the *Authoritarian Personality* seem to be systematically adaptable to discursive and rhetorical psychology, though it is not the aim of this paper to accomplish that task.

In a second step, I will now illustrate this relational concept of stereotyping and the syndrome character of prejudice using a concrete example, the manifesto of the Norwegian mass murderer Anders Behring Breivik.

2. Ticket Thinking in Breivik's Manifesto
Studying Anders Breivik's Manifesto is a weird task. Not only are there hundreds of pages of quotes, mostly from Islamophobic and conspiracist weblogs.[6] One way of doing research on the text would certainly be to take definitions

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6   Pantucci (2011) draws on the manifesto to discuss lone wolf terrorism. Just (2011) examined what he called Breivik's parasitic use of other texts, and

Sandberg (2013) analyzed the manifesto in terms of narrative criminology.

of several prejudices and to apply, for example, a qualitative content analysis method to it. But besides a compilation of the prejudices the text contains, what would be the result? I already argued that ticket thinking is conceptualized in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* as extreme stereotyping in the sense that "rigid notions become means rather than ends"; ticket thinking itself is primarily a matter of language and only subsequently a matter of psyche. Therefore, we are not so much concerned with a set of completely different stereotypes, but with a common and very general *form* of speaking, a *syndrome* that shows itself in specific and varying stereotyped *content.*

Whilst a lot of the manifesto consists of quotations, of all kinds of references to other authors and bloggers, at least the interview (that Breivik apparently did with himself) seems to stem solely from his authorship. The interview covers not only his attitudes towards immigration, European politics, and so forth, but also contains episodes about his childhood, friends, private life, etc. In applying a distinction between the general phenomenon of ticket thinking and its content, I will argue that the decisive feature of the manifesto is not the amount or intensity of stereotypes and prejudice that it holds, but the mode in which they are presented. I will use Breivik's manifesto "2083 – A European Declaration of Independence," which he published online under the name of Andrew Berwick (Berwick 2011), and which is available on the *Washington Post* website. I will take a closer look at three aspects of the interview: Breivik's position towards other movements, towards certain social groups, and towards the Holocaust.

2.1. Other Movements in the Self-Interview
Breivik places special emphasis on National Socialism, anticipating that following the attacks the media would consider him a Nazi terrorist. For him National Socialism is a "dead ideology" because:

> The ideology was defeated in WW2 but many right wing individuals still refuse to let it go. By doing so they are effectively undermining CURRENT concerns and needs of our time. There are currently so many defensive mechanisms in place in Western European societies against National Socialism that any attempt to resurrect the ideology will be counter-productive
>
> (Berwick 2011, 1367).

Thus, Breivik draws a line between himself and supporters of National Socialism not because of their inhuman ideology, because the genocide of six million European Jews, but because to him National Socialism is an old fashioned ideology that activates defense mechanisms in society and is therefore counter-productive in the current struggle. Instead, the "cultural conservative movement" he claims to be a member of is designed "to resist these defensive mechanisms or 'baits' if you will" (ibid.). His approach to Nazism is instrumental: because it is a taboo, it is useless in today's struggle and an obstacle to the victory of cultural conservatism.

One of the other groups he discusses is Odinists. On the one hand, he argues, he is extremely proud of his "Odinist heritage" "as it is an essential aspect of my culture and my identity" (ibid., 1360). But at the same time he rejects the idea that Odinism and Odinist symbols can serve to unite Europe to defeat cultural Marxism and Muslim immigration:

> There are pragmatical considerations Odinists have to evaluate as well. Do they really believe the symbolism of Mjollnir (Thors [sic] hammer) has the potential to unite the Nordic peoples against the forces we are facing? Do they really believe Odinistic symbolism would be more suitable compared to the uniting force of Christendom's symbolism and that of the cross? Anyone with half a brain will know that only the symbolism of the cross (which is a part of all the Nordic flags btw with the exception of Germany) has the potential to unite us for this cause.
>
> (ibid., 1360–61)

The form of the argumentation is the same as on Nazism. Odinism is discussed not in terms of its *content*, but according to considerations of instrumental reason: Is Odinism an ideology that may serve to unite "us" against "our" enemies?

2.2. Breivik's Position Towards Other (Minority) Groups
In fact, Breivik vehemently tries to avoid the impression that he is (at least in an essentialist sense) a racist. He does not tire of asserting that other cultural minorities have the right to live in Europe (as far as they "assimilate") and that cooperation with other (non-Muslim) countries is desirable:

support the continued consolidation of non-Muslim Europe and an unconditional support to all Christian countries and societies (Israel included), in addition to continuing our good relationships with all Hindu and Buddhist countries. As such, I don't support the deportation of non-Muslims from Europe as long as they are fully assimilated (I'm a supporter of many of the Japanese/Taiwan/South Korean policies/principles).

(ibid., 1384)

The relation to other cultures remains fixed: If minorities inside Europe fully assimilate (and therefore vanish), they may be welcome, but not in too large numbers. If they do not, they will be deported. The whole set of possible cross-cultural relationships is subordinated to one single issue: do these cultures "fit" to our culture? If they do not, they are enemies or, at least, must be kept out of Europe. Islam is and will forever be the main enemy, because it is a culture fundamentally opposed to the European, as Breivik argues at length in large parts of the manifesto: "The Islamic world on the other hand should be completely isolated and Islam reclassified and banned as a fascist/imperialistic and genocidal political ideology" (ibid., 1384).

A second group he deals with is women. Several times in the text he describes himself as a pragmatic and rational individual: "I am first and foremost a man of logic." (ibid., 1404). Nonetheless, even if he endorses a society that is built upon those principles, there is one exception: women. For if women fully adopt rationality and logic, a problem may emerge: "I support the propagation of collective rational thought but not necessarily on a personal level. Because, if a woman was purely rational, she would choose to not have babies at all, and instead live her life in a purely egotistical manner." (ibid., 1386). That is, men like him may adopt rationality and the collective. But in order to secure the reproduction of the (European) society, women must be exempted. Once again, individuals are subordinated to groups and groups are subordinated to their function for a "cultural conservative" Europe.

2.3. The Holocaust in the Self-Interview
Even if Breivik might not be a Holocaust denier, he certainly relativizes it. The European "multiculturalist elite," he writes, uses the "Jewish Holocaust" to relativize "other Holocausts" like, in particular, the "Islamic Holocausts" of Christians and Hindus (ibid., 1366). According to his

account, Islam has "slaughtered 300 million people since its creation" (ibid., 1366), and appears as a much worse ideology than Nazism. By completely abstracting from the Nazism ideology, the circumstances and particularities of the genocide of the European Jews, he manages to make the Holocaust appear a minor incident in world history. But the decisive argument is, once again: How can we deal with the Holocaust so that it may serve today's struggle against Islam and "multiculturalism"?

The "holocaust religion" has grown into a destructive anti-European monster, which prevents nationalistic doctrines from emerging. And without nationalistic doctrines, Europe will wither and die, which we are seeing today. It's quite ironic that Even Israel would appear to have become a victim of it. Needless to say, while I am a strong supporter of Israel and of all patriotic Jews I acknowledge that the anti-European holocaust religion must be deconstructed, and instead replaced with an anti-Islamic version. (ibid., 1366)

Thus, history must be re-written: In order to encourage European youth and strengthen their self-awareness, the Holocaust has to be put in its "right" (and therefore minor) place. Like everything, the interpretation of the Holocaust is not about truth, but about instrumentality. *Of course* the Germans wrong were to kill the Jews. But the main issue now must be to "deconstruct" this "Holocaust religion" in order to back European nationalism.

3. Stereotyping in Breivik's Manifesto and the Syndrome Character of Prejudice
Regarding those thoughts of Anders Breivik, it is clearly not the *amount* of different and separate prejudices towards other outgroups that is their decisive feature, but the stereotypical interconnection of different social groups and sectors like politics, minorities, and (potential) allies. Every single group, every single world view is subordinated and judged according to one single principle: the instrumental practicability of installing a culturally "pure" Europe rid of competing world views (in particular: "cultural Marxism") and cleansed of all traces of Islam. The overall goal of all ideological fragments developed in the manifesto is homogeneity at all points. That is, it is not a *particular* logic that each prejudice follows, for example an anti-feminist, anti-

Semitic, anti-multicultural, or anti-Islamic. Conversely, every single issue is ordered according to the "pre-shaped given," and that is Breivik's fixed worldview. In his ideology, anti-feminism has no discrete logic, but conveys the overall logic of this single idea that is applied to each and everything: "It seems plain that what one has to deal with here is not a single specific attitude but a *system* that has content, scope, and structure" (Adorno et al. 1950, 42), and both "ingroups and outgroups are thought of in the same general terms; the same evaluative criteria are applied to groups generally, and a given characteristic, such as clannishness or power, is good or bad depending on what group has it" (ibid., 44) In this respect the authors of the *Authoritarian Personality* – by their concepts of stereotyping and the syndrome character of prejudice – described a way of stereotypically *relating* to the world, a linguistic mode of relation. That also implies that figuring out the *content* of this mode is the task of empirical social research; for if there is no stereotype in the sense of an inner entity or mental structure, but "stereotyping" is a metaphorical way of describing a linguistic relation, the content of this relation may vary. In Breivik's worldview, everything is subordinated to his concept of a cultural "pure" Europe, and *applying* this ticket, this pre-shaped concept of purity, to everyone and everything is *his* particular stereotyped way of relating to the world. Thus, the *particular* syndrome character of Breivik is this particular linguistic mode of relation – the syndrome character of prejudice *may be* an ideology of unequal status (Zick, Küpper and Hövermann 2011), but that is a particular *content* that may vary. And what is more, the syndrome character is not limited to prejudices against outgroups. For if the concept denotes a stereotypical relation to the world, it may by definition affect not only outgroups, but government, religion, family issues, and so forth.[7] The special contribution of Horkheimer, Adorno, and colleagues therefore is to identify a social process that enforces this deterioration of language – which would mean, in the sense discussed in the present paper, a general tendency of stereotypically relating to the world, to outgroups, politics, and so forth.

Finally, I want to outline at least three methodological consequences that the precedent thoughts may imply for research on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination:

a) If stereotyping does not happen *inside* and *hidden*, but in language, researching stereotypes does not mean searching for traces of an unobservable mentality or cognitive structure. What prevails in Breivik's language is "blind subsumption" and the "iron ration" that remains "when language disintegrates" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, 201–202). Breivik is not able to see the individual because he pre-judges everything with fixed notions. And likewise, because by this he is not able to perceive anything new, anything individual, the process of perception as a whole comes to an end: "He no longer uses the active passivity of cognition in which the categorial components can be appropriately formed from a conventionally pre-shaped 'given', and the 'given' formed anew from these elements, so that justice is done to the perceived object" (Horkheimer and Adorno 1997, l.c.). That is, ticket thinking leaves its bearer as empty as his/her perception of the world. This, needless to say, does not argue against a (social) psychology of stereotyping, but stresses the role of language as both mediator and medium of psychological traits. Analogously to the example given at the beginning, concerning how we know that we hope, one could explain how we know that someone has a stereotyped world view. We would for instance say that s/he relates in the same way to everyone, that s/he – in behavior as well as speech "impresses the same stamp" on everything and everyone. But figuring out what exactly the *stamp* is remains a task of critical social research. For the Anders Breivik's Manifesto I showed that it may be an idea of homogeneity, but likewise we could conceive of an idea of productivity to which the whole society and its members are subsumed, or of obedience/disobedience to authority as the overall logic of a syndrome.

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7 It seems reasonable to assume that this may also be why Adorno and colleagues never offered a *definition* of authoritarianism, but rather thought of it as a conglomerate of different facets (Adorno et al. 1950, 255ff.) that may vary in scope and content from respondent to respondent.

b) If there is no antecedent psychology that *expresses* itself in language, but language forms and mediates individual psychology (and therefore turns it into a *social* psychology in the first place), then the study of a syndrome character of prejudice is primarily a study of language. The syndrome character of prejudice is not identical with devaluing a couple of outgroups. Rather, it is a second level that *shows* in particular stereotypical speech acts, but does not completely coincide. For the case of Breivik's manifesto, I have shown that that this second level is a political idea of homogeneity that is stereotypically applied and *constitutes* the general coherence of the particular syndrome, or to put it in another way: it is a specific *form* of thinking and speaking that shows itself in specific stereotyped *content*. Thus, a qualitative and mixed method research on stereotyping has to do research on stereotypes in their particular *contexts*, for example in texts or everyday language.

c) Our conception of what stereotypes really *are* influences the way we try to fight them. If the problem is not a prejudgment that can be easily corrected by, for example, telling prejudiced people that "we are all equal" and they do not have to be afraid of outgroups, or that the Jewish religion is nothing to bother about by showing them a synagogue, then education on stereotyping has to change. Adorno clearly saw that and, in his haunting text on "Education after Auschwitz" (2005, 28), outlined an educational program that sets out first and foremost to instill reflection the self and the social mechanisms he identified as partly responsible for the emergence of the manipulative type:

> For this disastrous state of conscious and unconscious thought includes the erroneous idea that one's own particular way of being – that one is just so and not otherwise – is nature, an unalterable given, and not a historical evolution. I mentioned the concept of reified consciousness. Above all, this is a consciousness blinded to all historical past, all insight into one's own conditionedness, and posits as absolute what exists contingently. If this coercive mechanism were once ruptured, then, I think, something would indeed be gained.

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International Journal of Conflict and Violence

The Dynamics of the Creation, Evolution, and Disappearance of Terrorist Internet Forums

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The Dynamics of the Creation, Evolution, and Disappearance of Terrorist Internet Forums

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An examination of the organizational nature of the threat posed by jihadi terrorism, supplying quantitative and qualitative data on the dynamics behind the creation, evolution, and disappearance of the main jihadi Internet forums during the period 2008–2012. An analysis of the origins and functions of the forums, their links with terrorist organizations, their internal structures, and the processes accounting for their stability in cyberspace shows that far from representing a horizontal structure where the main actors are a network of followers, the terrorist presence on the Internet is in fact a hierarchical organization in which intervention by formal terrorist organizations plays a crucial role.

Recent years have witnessed a very interesting theoretical debate on the organizational nature of jihadi terrorism and its evolution over the past decade. Center stage in the discussion has been occupied by two American academics: Marc Sageman (2004, 2008) and Bruce Hoffman (2008). Whereas the former argues that the post-9/11 counter-terrorism response has resulted in effective control of terrorist actions passing to the grass-roots level, giving rise to a *leaderless jihad* in which terrorist groups play a secondary role, the latter argues that formal organizations, particularly Al Qaeda Central, continue to exercise a substantial degree of strategic and operational control.

Supporters of both arguments have analyzed terrorist plots executed or foiled in recent years and arrived at contradictory conclusions with respect to how terrorist cells are formed, their links to organizations, and the main profile of the terrorist threat in the West, namely, whether it comes from independent cells and imitators (*bunch of guys and wannabes,* to borrow Sageman's terms) or from the actions of formal global organizations.[1]

This article contributes to the academic debate by providing quantitative and qualitative data on jihadist Internet forums, offering new elements for consideration in the debate on the organizational nature of the jihadi threat. Few monographs have examined the functioning of jihadi forums by measuring their main data (Kimmage and Ridolfo 2007; Kimmage 2008; Zelin and Borow 2013). The present contribution also seeks to fill some of the gaps by undertaking a descriptive analysis of the dynamics explaining the creation, evolution, and disappearance of these sites.

The internet has become the main resource in jihadi communication strategies (Kohlmann 2006). Terrorists make extensive use of technology for communication purposes, as well as for recruitment, propaganda, fund-raising, and training (Weimann 2006a). Jihadist activity on the internet has evolved over the years. Initially, the web activities of terrorist organizations took the form of top-down websites (Zelin 2011): a series of platforms created to disseminate doctrinal materials and propaganda. Participation by internet users was restricted to consumption of said content and assistance in its

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1   Many authors have since underlined the mixed or multifaceted nature of global terrorism (Reinares 2008, 2010), the complementarity of the views of Sageman and Hoffman (Neumann, Evans, and Pan- tucci 2011; Jordán 2012), and – after detailed study of its organizational evolution – Al Qaeda Central's capacity for survival and self-regeneration (Gunaratna and Oreg 2010).

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dissemination through distribution in different formats. Following the September 11 attacks, the websites created and administered by these groups were no longer allowed to operate with impunity and they began to disappear due to continuous harassment by security forces, intelligence services, and hackers. Jihadi organizations abandoned their aspiration to maintain "official" websites as a point of contact between the group and its followers. By way of alternative strategy, they switched their attention to an apparently more horizontal and diffuse internet presence. Internet forums drawing their inspiration from the "Web 2.0" philosophy are the main manifestation of this new erainternet: a new generation of web portals based on virtual social communities and a range of services that encourage collaboration and flexible exchange of information among users. Internet users leave behind their previous status as passive consumers of online materials (Web 1.0) and participate in a virtual community, also producing content themselves.

In appearance at least, the jihadist presence on the internet has moved away from a structure of "official" websites controlled by the propaganda apparatuses of hierarchical organizations (Torres, Jordán, and Horsburgh 2006) towards a network in which the lead role is played by a mass of radical supporters with only tenuous ties to formal groups. However, as I will argue, the current structure of jihadi internet forums is only viable on the basis of their active links with "formal" terrorist organizations, which make them interesting and attractive to a broad community of followers. In order to reach this conclusion we will examine the origins and functions of such forums, the manner in which they forge links with terrorist organizations, their internal structure, and the processes accounting for their stability in cyberspace.

1. Methodology and Information Sources

The data used in the article were obtained through detailed monitoring of the main jihadi internet forums between January 2011 and June 2012 (inclusive). The qualitative data are derived from a content analysis of the materials available on the forums and a quantification of the development of the number of users, discussion topics, and

posts. In order to offer a perspective over a longer timeframe, information was drawn from Internet Archive,[2] the comprehensive virtual library of all websites that have been available at some stage on the internet. However, it should be noted that the information offered by the Archive is derived from random, unsystematic captures that preclude quantification of certain dynamics. Accordingly, only data from the aforementioned eighteen-month period of direct observation was used to measure these aspects.

In selecting sites for analysis, attention focused on forums (mostly in Arabic) constituting the "inner circle" or core of the jihadist internet presence (see Table 1). This elite group is formed by websites with the largest followings and greatest influence among the jihadi cyber-community. Forums that host radical content but can be considered secondary because they tend merely to re-post content from other sites (as opposed received directly from producers) were therefore excluded from our detailed examination. Nonetheless, by way of additional input to the study, occasional reference will be made to data from these "concentric rings."

Table 1: Forums Analyzed (January 2011 – June 2012)

Name	Description
Atahadi: http://www.atahadi.com/vb/index.php/	General forum in Arabic. Also features subdirectories in various European languages.
Al Jahafal: http://al-jahafal.com/vb/	General forum in Arabic. Focuses particularly on issues concerning the jihad in the Maghreb.
Al Amanh: http://www.al-amanh.net/vb/	Forum in Arabic focused on the jihad in Palestine/Israel.
Al Qimmah: http://alqimmah.net/	Forum mainly in Somali and, to a lesser extent, Arabic. Largely focused on the jihad in Somalia.
Al Jahad: http://www.aljahad.com/vb/	General forum in Arabic. The youngest forum in the selection.
Al Shamukh: http://www.shamikh1.net/vb/	General forum in Arabic. Considered the most influential.
Ansar Al Mujahidin Arabic Forum: http://as-ansar.com/vb/index.php	General forum. Also has English version.

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2   http://archive.org/index.php

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Additional data were obtained from forums such as Al Faloja,[3] Al Hesbah,[4] and Al Ekhlaas,[5] which were no longer operational at the time of the research but played a leading role in the jihadi internet community for many years.

2. Origin and Functions of Jihadi Internet Forums

According to Anne Stenersen (2009): "the early history of jihadi websites remains very poorly understood. Most of us started studying them too late." By the time these spaces began to attract the attention of security agencies and the specialist community, they were already a key component of the terrorist presence on the internet.

Stenersen cites an article by an influential jihadist ideologue briefly outlining the history of jihadi forums, the origins of which can be traced back to a series of Islamist-inspired websites from the late 1990s.[6] Although the topics covered were not exclusively jihadist, the sites included information and user comments on violent conflicts involving Muslims. The 9/11 attacks spawned a group of forums whose content clearly supported Al Qaeda terrorism. The most prominent was Al Tawhid, which featured contributions from leading terrorist jihad ideologists and preachers, including the London-based Jordanian Abu Qatada and Egyptian Abu Hamza, and is still active today.[7] Despite being a "traditional" website full of doctrinal materials for downloading, it also contained a forum allowing interaction among readers.

The first jihadi forum used by a terrorist organization as a primary propaganda channel was Muntada Al Ansar Al Islami (Islam Supporters Forum),[8] which appeared at the end of 2003. The site achieved considerable public impact due to the contributions of one particular user, Abu Maysara Al Iraqi, the official spokesman of Al Qaeda in Iraq. The organization, founded and led by Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab Al Zarqawi, gave up its efforts to maintain an official propaganda website after constant cyber-attacks.

Distributing materials to a website not formally affiliated to the organization ensured it a continuing presence in cyberspace. Thus began a symbiotic relationship between a terrorist group and a radical website, which saw the former greatly enhance its communications capabilities and the latter earn prestige and influence on account of its privileged ties with the mujahideen. This model was subsequently emulated by other groups and terrorist networks that had encountered similar problems in seeking to maintain an effective internet presence. In May 2004 the forum was knocked offline by a cyber-attack after it posted a gruesome video of Zarqawi's beheading of American contractor Nicholas Berg. It quickly returned, although as a security measure no longer offering open access to all internet users and instead requiring registration to view content. The forum had, however, become the de facto official website for Al Qaeda in Iraq, which made it a prime target for actors seeking to neutralize the group's presence on the internet. It disappeared soon thereafter, although its work was to be carried on by other leading forums such as Al Ekhlas ("Sincerity").[9]

Jihadi groups concluded that if they sent their materials exclusively to a single forum, it would eventually disappear since it would become identified as an extension of the group and would fall foul of the same pressure suffered by official sites. Accordingly, they opted to send materials simultaneously to several trusted sites, thus blurring the links between the mujahideen and internet platforms. Redundancy of content meant that distribution was maintained even if certain sites disappeared.

The decision by jihadi groups to focus on internet forums was driven by the aim of ensuring a more stable cyberspace presence (Torres-Soriano 2009), but also brought with it a range of additional advantages, including:

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3   http://faloja1.com/vb (defunct).

4   http://www.alhesbah1.net (defunct).

5   http://www.al-ekhlaas.net/forum/ (defunct).

6   Mihdar, "Jihadist forums, pros and cons. Historical analysis" (in Arabic), *Medad Al Soyoof Net-*

work, http://www.almedad.com/vb/anoiy-aaa-caeiu/9915-caaaeeiice-caiaciie-ac-aac-aeac-uaiac-eiaia-eaniii-sscaa.html (accessed 03/03/2009, now defunct).

7   Pulpit of Monotheism and Jihad (in Arabic): http://www.tawhed.ws/.

8   http://www.al-ansar.biz (defunct).

9   http://www.al-ekhlaas.net (defunct).

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a) *Ease of use.* It is considerably easier to design and administer a forum than a conventional website. Most are based on commercial applications that require no programming skills.[10] Users merely fill in blank fields to input content into a structure whose design and basic functions are pre-established. The software does allow certain customization options, particularly graphics, but the platform architecture is rigid. This explains the great similarities in the organization, functioning, and even visual appearance of the various forums.

b) *Reinforcing global jihad rhetoric.* On a single site, forum users can access materials supplied by groups operating in very different regions such as the Philippines, Chechnya, Pakistan, Indonesia, Algeria, etc. Bringing all such propaganda under one roof gives followers the impression that the actions of the different jihadi groups form part of a single conflict in defense of Islam that has no national borders or divides.

c) *Encouraging a sense of belonging to a single community.* Forums have become a virtual meeting and interaction space for people who share the same radical beliefs. Such individuals may find that their ideas and attitudes are a minority position or rejected in their immediate social circles, and this might weaken their convictions (Jordán 2009). internet forums allow them to counter that isolation by connecting them to thousands of web users worldwide who share the same set of beliefs and attitudes. This virtual socialization function has acquired increasing importance as jihadi networks have seen their visibility in the physical world diminish as a result of repression by police and the courts (Vidino 2011).

d) *Facilitating communication and creating networks.* Forums facilitate the creation of links between isolated individuals who do not know each other personally, and provide them with instruments for private communication via chat rooms, restricted-access posts, and IP telephony. These interactions may lead to real-world contact between the individuals concerned.

e) *Strengthening virtual recruitment.* Virtual activities cultivate users' reputations as supporters of the jihad. The volume and quality of their contributions constitute an important indicator for recruitment by terrorist groups and individuals seeking to set up operational networks. Recruitment can be more effective if targeted to individuals whose track record as users of jihadi internet forums demonstrates their receptiveness.

3. Forum Creation and Operational Dynamics

The jihadi forum universe is a clearly hierarchical one. At the top of the pyramid are a small number that stand apart from the rest, receiving materials directly from organizations that perpetrate acts of terrorism and from renowned ideologists. This privileged status makes such forums a point of reference for others, which merely replicate content that originally appeared in these top-level websites.

Cooperative ties with terrorist organizations are in themselves sufficient reason to explain the success or failure of the platforms. Forums benefiting from "patronage" can attract considerably more internet users than others. Supporters of the jihadi message on the internet generally choose to participate in virtual communities that can demonstrate that they are trusted by the mujahideen. Admission and growth dynamics can be explained by Metcalfe's law,[11] according to which the usefulness of a network increases at an accelerating rate as each new user is added. Endorsement by a formal organization allows swift and sustained growth in the number of registered users (see Figure 1).

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10 The most widely used forum software is VBulletin, which is also used by many jihadi forums.

11 A principle coined by Bob Metcalfe, the inventor of the Ethernet protocol used to network computers.

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Figure 1: Membership of Main Jihadi Internet Forums (Annual Average, 2008–June 2012)

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
ATAHADI	395	2,450	5,271	9,560	
AL JAHAFAL			2,730	5,651	7,899
AI AMANH	600	1,009	1,860	2,471	2,528
AI QIMMAH	264	490	4,454	15,537	24,309
AL JAHAD				739	1,889
AL SHAMUKH		7,249	11,577	14,693	17,064
ANSAR AL MUJAHIDIN	373	837	4,365	7,888	

Forums that replicate propaganda from other websites find it extremely difficult to offer a differentiated "product" that is attractive to radical internet users. Despite replicating considerable volumes of material from other sites, some websites are unable to attain the minimum threshold of users required to establish a virtuous circle.[12] Ties with terrorist organizations are essential to generate the critical mass of committed users needed to guarantee future viability.

Links between formal terrorist organizations and internet forums are based on relationships of mutual trust. Due to the risk that a virtual community may have been infiltrated by intelligence agencies or other actors with hostile intentions, jihadi groups are constantly suspicious and few forums succeed in forging collaborative ties. The links

between forums and organizations tend to arise in three different ways.

First, the administrator or administrators may have formal links with the terrorist group and operate the forum as part of those activities. The forum is not the group's official website, however. Rather it is a self-appointed initiative in support of all mujahideen. One such case is the Saudi citizen Walid bin Muhammad Al-Sama'ani who, prior to his death in 2005, combined membership of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula with his activities as the founder and administrator of the Al Ekhlaas forum (SITE 2007).

Secondly, forum members may be individuals who, although not formally part of a terrorist organization, pos-

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12 One example of the difficulties involved is provided by the Arabic forum Shabaka Al Haqiqa Al Ikhbaria (Truth Information Network) (http://www.thetruthn.com/vb/). The site was run from Spain by Moroccan Abdellatif Oulad Chiba,

until his arrest in August 2011. During its three-month existence, it managed to attract only thirteen registered users despite having more than 7,800 discussion threads and 10,000 posts from other sites, which were uploaded daily by the site administrator.

See Audiencia Nacional (Juzgado Central de Instrucción nº 3), "Diligencias previas 126/2011," August 20, 2011. http://www.elpais.com/elpaismedia/ultimahora/media/201108/20/espana/20110820elpepunac_1_Pes_PDF.pdf

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sess a network of social relations that facilitate contact. Such cases include individuals who travel to areas where jihadi groups operate openly and visibly (for example Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) but fail in their attempts to join the armed struggle. Nonetheless, their credibility and network of contacts mean that their online activism is endorsed by their collaboration with formal groups. Examples include the members of the Global Islamic Media Front propaganda platform who were arrested in Canada, Austria, and Germany (Torres-Soriano 2012a).

Finally, a forum may initially operate without collaboration from terrorist groups, yet over time acquire credibility that attracts interest from formal groups, which take the initiative in proposing collaboration. By way of example, the technical expertise demonstrated in various forums by UK-based cyber-jihadist Younis Tsouli brought him to the attention of the media spokesman of Al Qaeda in Iraq. The organization initiated close cooperation with the young Moroccan, whose internet pseudonym was Irhabi 007 (Terrorist 007). Even though no face-to-face contact ever took place between Tsouli and the Iraqi group, his internet credibility made him a key link in the group's online propaganda (Labi 2006; O'Neill 2007).

The relationships described above have been affected by the emergence of a new player acting as an intermediary between jihadi forums and terrorist groups: jihadist media distributor networks (Rogan 2007). The mission of these organizations is to assist with the dissemination of propaganda prepared by the mujahideen and their ideologists. Their roles include editing raw material sent by terrorist organizations, subtitling and translation, and designing website infographics. However, their most important role is to authenticate the propaganda of the terrorist groups and act as intermediaries between the organizations and internet forums. Administrators therefore need to develop relations of trust with the media organizations that monopolize the dissemination of "official" propaganda. The role of these organizations has become increasingly important in the aftermath of the damage caused to the credibility of the jihadi message by the appearance of fake communiqués.

The most important of the aforementioned media organizations is the Al Fajr Media Center, an unofficial distributor of Al Qaeda propaganda. When Al Fajr chooses to cooperate with a forum, radical users understand that the website in question has the seal of approval of the mujahideen and its content is therefore to be trusted.

4. Content

Jihadi forum content is divided into sections and sub-sections, the most frequent being "Statement section" and "General section." The first contains communiqués released by terrorist groups. Users are not normally able to post contributions in this section, which is reserved for the authorized spokespersons of the various jihadi organizations. The "General section" tends to be the most active since participation is open to all users to share news, opinions, and links regarding any jihad-related issue.

Other typical sections include history, Muslim family, translations into other languages, and "members only" training sections supplying information on bomb-making and weapons.

Administrators often give prominence to particular content by inserting banners, large-font texts, and animations at the top of the forum site. Only administrators can insert these elements, which are designed to draw attention to content of special importance, such as that messages from jihadi leaders or ideologists, images of major terrorist actions, or urgent statements. The banners are usually standardized and disseminated to a number of forums on which the statement or media release is posted (Musawi 2010). Occasionally, they are placed before the material itself is even uploaded in order to generate expectations ahead of the release of a video, audio recording, or written statement.

Each directory or sub-directory in turn comprises a group of discussion threads (Figure 2) allowing users to post comments within a thread (Figure 3). However, not all the topics generate a truly collective debate. Data from the studied forums show that a topic attracts an average of 4.3 posts, with considerable differences between subjects. As with "conventional" internet forums, only certain posts will generate up to one hundred responses, (here usually those from terrorist organizations or ideologists) while other topics (for instance, those started by low-profile users) may fail to attract even a single response.

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Figure 2: Jihadist Forums – Average Number of Threads per Year

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
ATAHADI	524	3,023	14,475	15,346	
AL JAHAFAL			3,331	20,120	23,660
AI AMANH	1,098	2,405	6,010	10,021	11,086
AI QIMMAH	1,048	7,208	17,284	21,727	24,731
AL JAHAD				7,004	11,588
AL SHAMUKH		33,880	62,411	105,380	149,215
ANSAR AL MUJAHIDIN	1,120	5,099	17,759	34,969	

Note: 2012 based on data up to and including June.

Although the internet forums allow users to upload photographs and text, jihadi propaganda increasingly takes the form of sophisticated video and audio statements. This requires significant data storage and transfer capabilities that the forums are often unable to supply. To evade data restrictions, jihadists resort to the same websites used to illegally download movies, music, software, and child pornography: document-sharing and file hosting websites (Torres-Soriano 2009). To attract clients, these web services offer free limited use, but to upload larger files, users have to pay for a premium version. Jihadists have simply used stolen credit cards to pay for these services, or hacking software to evade the limitations imposed on free use (Krebs 2009). Among the contributions most appreciated by virtual communities is the ability to download jihadist videos and communiqués and rehost them on cloud computing services, thus ensuring the files are always available (via new download links if necessary).

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Figure 3: Jihadist Forums – Average Number of Posts per Year

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
ATAHADI	1,795	13,220	63,764	76,174	
AL JAHAFAL			37,378	70,356	80,889
AI AMANH	4,552	9,063	23,818	38,578	43,325
AI QIMMAH	2,684	14,741	33,0498	41,060	48,243
AL JAHAD				21,299	25,850
AL SHAMUKH		185,854	372,549	829,256	1,350,304
ANSAR AL MUJAHIDIN	2,699	14,704	61,919	163,604	

Note: 2012 based on data up to and including June.

5. Population and Internal Structure

Dutch intelligence estimates the number of regular followers of jihadist websites to be approximately 25,000 individuals in around one hundred countries (AIVD 2010). These individuals usually participate in several forums at the same time, using different aliases for security and anonymity.

The population of the forums comprises a three-tiered hierarchy, each with clearly demarcated functions:

a) *Administrators:* Administrator status is held by a small number of activists situated at the pinnacle of the platform. Only the administrators know the forum management passwords. Administrator privileges give access to all the functions offered by virtual platforms: overall forum design, content management, admission or rejection of members, access to user profiles and navigation habits, etc. Control over these functions accords administrators an advantageous position with respect to online recruitment.

b) *Moderators:* This is also a small group, albeit larger than that of the administrators. The moderators' job is to monitor compliance with forum rules, ensuring ideological coherence of the texts and materials posted on the websites. They have the power to delete content considered counter-productive or hostile to the jihadist message. Moderator status is granted by administrators to the most active users and therefore represents a promotion within the forum structure.

c) *Users:* This group represents the overwhelming bulk of forum participants. Once they have registered and been admitted by the administrators, users are entitled to view content and post messages, responding publicly to other users or even contacting them directly by private message, on-line chat, or IP telephone calls.

By keeping track of member activity and interaction, the platform is able to establish a numerical system of promotion and distinction based on level of activity and quality

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of participation. Profile information on each user is accompanied by a series of indicators relating to the number of topics and posts published, the frequency with which the individuals thank other authors for their posts, or the thanks they receive from others for their own contributions. This system seeks what some have called "gamification" (Brachman and Levine 2011), a term used to describe game-like attributes applied to non-game activities. The website creators factor in a strong element of competition to encourage greater participant involvement. By being more active, users earn "rewards" that impact positively on their self-esteem or on scope of accessible forum functions. For example, attaining a given level allows the user's name to be associated with "ranks" or "labels" such as senior correspondent, warrior, martyr, emir, sheikh, etc. that publicly attest to their reputation and commitment. Other types of reward include entitlement to use an exclusive avatar or animation that draws attention to that particular user's contributionsahead of those of others. Promotion also gives access to forum content reserved for members with proven credibility and commitment. The most usual reward takes the form of access to restricted subdirectories containing sensitive information such as bomb-making instructions, use of weapons, cyber-crime manuals and software, etc.

This automatic system of promotion, which is also used in other types of forum, does also have counter-productive effects, however. The majority of posts on these websites are designed to achieve rapid and effortless promotion on the forum ladder and hence take the form of useless or insignificant comments such as brief thanks expressed to other users, or expressions of joy, support, or piety. In other cases, comments are plagiarized from other jihadi forums and do not contribute in any way to enriching the jihadist discourse (JWMG 2012). As a result, the main forum "rewards," such as designation as a moderator or

administrator, cannot be earned automatically. Only the individuals responsible for the forum have the power to recruit users to roles crucial to its proper functioning.

Although forums do allow members to be upgraded to content-producer status, in reality the vast majority of members are best described as "passive consumers" or "silent observers" (Kohlmann 2010), who merely browse available content but do not contribute to the site. As with other internet forums, only a small group of registered users play an active and continuous part in jihadi forums (Ducol 2012; Awan 2007). In the case of the forums studied here, active users represent on average just 11 percent of the total user population, reflecting the 90-9-1 rule of participation inequality in online communities (Kimmage 2009). Said rule holds that 1 percent of users (active members) are responsible for 90 percent of postings, 9 percent (members) are responsible for 10 percent of postings, and 90 percent (visitors) are "lurkers" who read available content but post nothing themselves.

Although the number of users who play a very active part in these forums is small,[13] not all can be classed as true "producers" (AIVD 2012), in the sense of individuals whose knowledge and experience equip them to contribute relevant posts on matters of doctrine or strategy, technical information, or operational guidelines. This elite group would also include users who act as "correspondents," writing from a conflict zone in which jihadist organizations operate openly. Their contributions are particularly appreciated by users since they describe the life and experiences of the mujahideen fighting the enemy directly. Some of these authors subsequently join a terrorist organization after building themselves a solid track-record as cyber-activists that affords them iconic status in these virtual communities.[14] A prime example is the Jordanian phys-

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13 A prime example of a committed user is the Saudi national Muhdar Hussein Almalki, who was arrested in Valencia (Spain) in March 2012. He was dubbed "Al Qaeda's librarian" by Spanish police due to the massive amounts of jihadi propaganda he stored and shared with others on the Internet. Investigators discovered that he had achieved moderator status on some of the main jihadi forums, to which he devoted eight to fifteen hours daily. His exceptional level of activity is attested by two thousand posts on

the Shamukh forum and seven thousand on Al Faloja. See Audiencia Nacional (Juzgado Central de Instrucción nº 5), "Diligencias Previas 26/2011," March 30, 2012. http://ep00.epimg.net/descargables/ 2012/03/30/d61bac3fc1fa90da6d87e2edd6e1fbe4.pdf. See also Internet Haganah, "In search of al-Qaida's naughty librarian [Muhdar Hussein Almalki]," Internet Haganah, April 2, 2012. http://forum.internet-haganah.com/show-thread.php?774.

14 As is the case for the Jordanian cyber-jihadist known on the Internet as Abu Kandahar Al Zarqawi. After serving as administrator and moderator of the Al Ekhlaas and Al Fallujah forums, he joined Al Qaeda in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, from where he continued to participate in the sites, posting stories about and eulogies for his fallen colleagues. The forums in which he participated later publicized details of his own death in December 2010 (Flade 2010).

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ician and suicide bomber Hammam Khalil Abu Malal al-Balawi who blew himself up inside a CIA base at Khost, Afghanistan, on December 30, 2009, killing seven CIA employees and contractors and a Jordanian intelligence officer (Warrick 2011). He was a prolific blogger and, for a time, a moderator on the jihadi Al Hesbah internet forum.

Jihadi internet forums operate in a hostile environment. In recent times, various intelligence services and hackers have engaged in actions designed to infiltrate and block these spaces (Hegghammer 2010) and have succeeded in provoking mutual accusations among the different radical websites (Weimann 2006b). Administrators are suspicious of new users who quickly appear highly aggressive or express a clear interest in contacting forum members in person. Some platforms have implemented stricter self-protection measures such as making their entire content available only to registered users, stopping admission of new members, or accepting only new users who have been endorsed by a current member. However, these steps have triggered controversy within the jihadi internet community between those favoring greater security and ideological homogeneity, even at the risk of becoming increasingly closed and opaque groups, and others who fear the jihadi movement will turn so inward it will eventually become irrelevant (Torres-Soriano 2012b).

6. Stability and Disappearance of Jihadi Forums

Jihadi forums adopt different strategies to guarantee their continuity in cyberspace, including hosting content simultaneously on over a dozen synchronized mirrors (Prucha 2008). Thanks to the interconnection between these sites, when one goes offline its traffic is redirected automatically to others offering identical content.

Despite achieving greater stability, the forums have been nonetheless affected by numerous temporary disruptions and definitive disappearances. During the eighteen-month period examined in detail here, each forum suffered an

average of 3.1 "outages," after which they were inaccessible for an average of 24.6 days per incident.

Forums may be hit by specific disruptions that do not affect other sites, or by a common cause triggering a simultaneous outage. By depriving it of trustworthy propaganda dissemination mechanisms, these general disruptions silence the terrorist message on the internet. The period between 2006 and 2012 saw five major simultaneous outages, each averaging one week.[15] It is extremely difficult to identify the causes of these incidents. Forums tend not to openly disclose the reasons for disruption, nor do government actors that launch covert offensives without claiming responsibility (Nakashima and Warwick 2012). However, information obtained from various open sources helps us identify the following as the main causes of interruptions to service:

a) *Maintenance:* Administrators suspend website access temporarily in order to undertake a thorough review of membership and content. This activity tends to be triggered by a suspicion that the site has been infiltrated. Administrators expel members suspected of being hostile and delete their contributions. "Cleaning" tasks have become increasingly necessary as a result of public and private initiatives aimed at undermining the jihadi discourse (Pantucci 2011; Ashour 2009). One of the most famous examples is the Saudi Sakinah deradicalization campaign (Boucek 2008), which saw volunteers register on the sites concerned in a bid to engage in dialogue with members to persuade them that their beliefs were misguided from the Islamic point of view.

b) *Cyber-attacks:* The forum is rendered inoperative through hostile action perpetrated via cyberspace. Administrators cannot restore the site until they manage to neutralize the cause of the technical failure. Paradoxically, cyber-attacks bolster a site's popularity in the community of supporters of jihadi terrorism, whereas

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15 Flashpoint Global Partners, "Major Jihadi Web Forum Service Outages – 2006–2012," April 2, 2012. http://www.flashpoint-intel.com/images/docu ments/pdf/0307/flashpoint_forumoutages.pdf

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stability is perceived as a proof of its connection with members of intelligence services (Musawi 2010).

c) Arrest or disappearance of key members: A temporary "switch-off" is often ordered to prevent enemy access and identify the security breaches that led to arrests. An example of this scenario is the shutting down of the Ansar al Mujahadin Arabic Forum in August 2010, immediately after the arrest of one of its main administrators, the Moroccan Faical Errai, in a small town in Alicante (Spain).[16] This police operation was a serious blow to the website, which remained out of action for the next seven months. It has also been speculated that the general outage that occurred in April 2012 was triggered by the arrest of a prominent member of the main forums (also in Spain) (Levine 2010; Abend 2012).

d) *Preventive shutdown:* Websites voluntarily decide to suspend access temporarily to prevent cyber-attacks or other hostile actions anticipated after a particular incident or on the anniversary of important dates. Examples include the suspension of activities by the Ansar Al-Mujahideen and Al-Faluja forums a few days before September 11, 2009, in order to avoid attacks similar to those that silenced jihadi forums in previous years, including in September 2008 when Al Qaeda was unable to disseminate its 9/11 commemorative video on time (JWMG 2012).

Following a cyber-attack, the websites reappear having been purged of all users and content considered hostile. During the period studied here, administrators expelled an average of 0.6 percent of users after an outage. While the figure is not particularly high, it is very revealing that an average of 7 percent of topics and 9.5 percent of posts were removed, which would indicate that the expelled users were far from "silent observers" but rather had been extremely active on the sites, initiating and participating in discussions.

There is a primary cause that explains the definitive disappearance of such sites: a loss of trust on the part of the terrorist organizations that supply the website with propaganda materials. The real attraction of these sites is their ability to serve as an authentic source of mujahideen material. Radical users are drawn to the prestige of sites that have earned the approval and trust of jihadi organizations. The loss of these ties sparks a mass exodus by followers, who seek out alternatives not suspected of enemy infiltration or sabotage.

One example of the aforementioned dynamics can be seen in the events that triggered the demise of the influential Al Faloja forum (Torres-Soriano 2012b). In the summer of 2010, the website posted the first issue of *Inspire*, the English-language jihadist magazine published by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. However, the pdf file was corrupted and only the first few pages of the magazine were viewable. The forum rapidly filled with panicked comments by users speculating that the website may have been compromised. Moderators warned users to take precautions such as deleting private messages and changing their passwords. The panic dominated the discussions and a short time later the website crashed. Although it returned again after a few days, the Al Fajr media platform, which distributed statements from Al Qaeda and its affiliates, stopped supplying it with materials. The questionable handling of the crisis and sudden disappearance had damaged terrorist organizations' trust in the forum. After a month during which Al Faloja displayed no original materials, it put up a message announcing its permanent closure without any further explanation. A year later, it was disclosed in the media (Gardham 2011) that the panic in the jihadi internet infrastructure had been caused by a cyber-attack by Britain's MI6 intelligence service, which had replaced some of the pages of the original magazine with garbled computer code prior to its release on the web.

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16 Audiencia Nacional (Juzgado Central de Instrucción número 2), "Diligencias Previas 120/09-F. Faical Errai," August 31, 2010. http://estaticos.elmundo.es/docu-mentos/2010/08/31/auto_audiencia_nacional.pdf

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7. Conclusions

Internet forums play a crucial part in jihadi terrorism's communications strategy. The reasons for the keen interest shown by terrorist groups in these platforms include the growing obstacles to their attempts to operate in the "physical sphere." Increased persecution of jihadists and their support networks in the wake of September 11, 2001, has seriously undermined their capacity to attract, radicalize, and train new members (Filiu 2010). However, the new opportunities afforded to terrorism by Web 2.0 are accompanied by new vulnerabilities. Far from enjoying a cyberspace sanctuary from which they can operate unhindered, the terrorists are subject to constant harassment.

Although the forums were initially seen as exemplifying the transformation of terrorist organizations into horizontal structures lacking a clear hierarchy and connected only by a common ideological discourse and plan of action, the fact of the matter is that these websites could not exist without the intervention of formal organizations. A lack of ties to a formal organization is in itself sufficient reason for a forum to fail. In reality, the websites do not conform to the Web 2.0 philosophy on which they are allegedly based. Radical forums have not operated as collaborative spaces in which internet users participate and contribute content spontaneously. Quite the contrary: they are extremely hierarchical and governed by numerous mechanisms designed to control the actions of users and prevent ideological heterodoxy.

The three core characteristics that distinguish a network from other forms of organization (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008) are noticeably absent in the case of jihadi internet forums.

Firstly, what distinguishes networks from other forms of hierarchical organization is the capacity of low-level units to have multiple relationships with higher-level centers, as well as lateral links with units at the same organizational level. The redundant design of a network allows its functions to be performed by multiple members and thus the disappearance of the most important units does not compromise overall functioning. In jihadi forums, however, a small number of nodes exclusively centralize the vast

majority of relations between the members of the community, and the forums are therefore strongly hierarchical. This type of organization is extremely resilient to random attacks but vulnerable to targeted ones. This explains why a jihadi forum is less resilient than other illicit networked structures. Its instability is a good indicator of the existence of a marked pyramid structure, which means that the site becomes compromised every time a central operative is captured. The lack of equal relations among forum members and constant suspicion concerning attempted infiltration mean that replacement of said key figures does not occur naturally among the members of these virtual communities.

Secondly, networks are open to the incorporation of new members, provided they share common identity traits or interests. However, jihadi forums are increasingly reluctant to admit new participants due to the constant threat of infiltration. The actions of some sites may even be in open contradiction to their proselytizing goals, in that they restrict registration of new members or seek to survive solely on contributions from users with proven credibility. Thus, the communities end up becoming very inward-looking and are unable to reproduce and perpetuate themselves by reaching out to their target audience.

Lastly, relations within networks tend to be informal and loosely structured, unlike in hierarchical organizations, which rely on rule-governed impersonal relations. The lack of a central authority and rule-guided functioning means that decision-making and coordination in networks tend to be based on consensus and mutual adjustment. In jihadi forums, however, a clear system of rules regulates members' capacities and contacts. A higher-level authority oversees all interaction and has the power to reward or punish members, while decision-making is the preserve of a restricted group of members, who neither inform nor consult other users. In fact, jihadi forums are based on the same software applications used by other internet forums, which helps explain the considerable similarities between all of them as regards administrator powers, forum rules, type of interaction between users, etc. However, in adopting this format the aim of the terrorists was not to widen the opportunities for interaction with followers but simply

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to increase the audience for the propaganda generated by the leaderships of their organizations.

The jihadists' presence on the internet exhibits few similarities with the characteristics normally associated with a network. However, despite sharing features with hierarchies, the jihadi forums have been unable to exploit the primary benefits of such structures. The lack of direct personal contact between members of the communities, coupled with the constant threat of enemy infiltration, generates what can turn into incapacitating mistrust within the group. Despite having thousands of members with different profiles located in dozens of countries worldwide, the forums are unable to fully exploit the possibilities of this vast human potential. Cyber-jihadists are aware that their contributions are closely monitored by an unknown number of intelligence services, journalists, and public and private analysts. This uncomfortable reality impacts negatively on the spontaneity of user participations and lessens the attractiveness of forums as platforms through which terrorist operations can be planned and coordinated securely. However, the main blow to the forums' credibility is the permanent suspicion that some of the sites may have

been infiltrated or indeed are controlled directly by the enemy. Recent years have seen emerging confirmation, as opposed to mere suspicion, that some virtual platforms are part of "information operations" launched to undermine the jihadi message. Furthermore, radical web users are conscious that the internet is responsible for many recent arrests of jihadists, which reinforces their belief that cyberspace – and the internet forums in particular – have become dangerous territory. Although in recent times terrorists have turned to other types of internet-based platform for content dissemination and other interaction purposes, including YouTube, Daily Motion, Facebook, and – increasingly – Twitter, these continue to pose many of the same problems encountered in internet forums (Meleagrou-Hitchens, Maher and Sheehan 2012). But in the absence of a viable alternative, for the moment at least, jihad supporters have little choice but to continue to use forums.

In conclusion, the analysis of the functioning of jihadi internet forums provided here adds weight to the argument that formal terrorist organizations continue to play an important role in coordinating and encouraging terrorism.

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The Effect of Youth Demographics on Violence: The Importance of the Labor Market

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The Effect of Youth Demographics on Violence:
The Importance of the Labor Market

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Recent uprisings in the Middle East have increased interest in the roots of moderate as well as severe political and social conflicts. One popular explanation for upticks in violence is the "youth bulge," the presence of disproportionately large youth cohorts. We refine that model using a panel dataset that includes more countries and years than previous literature and implement new measurement techniques to capture the relationship between large youth populations and violence. Contrary to prior literature, we find that the mere presence of a "youth bulge" is not enough to generate violence, but instead the causal roots of violence lie in the pressure youth cohorts exert on the total labor force. We use a new variable, the Youth Risk Factor (the ratio of the youth population to the total labor force), to measure the stress youth cohorts exert on labor markets, and find a significant and large effect on violence. These results have policy implications for countries that currently face large youth cohorts and help explain why conventional policy measures such as increasing educational access are likely not the answer to reducing violence.

The demographic trend of increasingly large youth populations in the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa is a cause for concern among academics, policymakers, and governments (Zogby 2011). Youth now represent a disproportionately large fraction of total populations in much of the developing world and will continue to do so as countries complete the demographic transition with fertility rates declining to match already low death rates. This well-documented phenomenon appears to be accelerating among developing nations, and as a consequence, youth are playing an increasingly important role in society and politics. Iran's experience, where the fertility rate fell from 7.0 births per woman in 1979 at the onset of the revolution to around 2.1 in 2000, epitomizes the transition (Abbasi-Shavazi, McDonald, Meimanat 2003). The speed of change is unprecedented, especially when compared to the several-century transitions of Western nations (Van de Kaa 2002). As a result, the swelling youth populations pose an increasingly large problem and almost every country has experienced, is currently experiencing, or will experience a ballooning youth population.

Policymakers' concerns over the demographic transition arise from the suggested link between large youth populations and conflict. While Richard Easterlin published much of the original work on the sociological and economic implications of cohort crowding, more causal links to violence appear only in more recent work (Easterlin 1978, 1980). With a greater focus on the developing world, contemporary literature suggests that large youth populations alone are enough to increase the likelihood of violence and conflict (Kaplan 1994; Marcus 2008; Urdal 2004). Sociologists, anthropologists, and economists pose various hypotheses as to why violence is more prevalent in nations experiencing large youth bulges, but few seem to doubt the trend. Hudson (1999) expresses the now prominent idea that youth disproportionately participate in extreme behavior because of a lack of developmental maturity; therefore, a population with more youth is inherently more volatile. A corollary argument states that when young populations vastly outnumber older generations, the older members of society are unable to control and discipline the more unruly youth cohort (Hart, Atkins, and Youniss 2005). Others believe that the young, commonly con-

sidered "revolutionaries," are easily won over by charismatic leaders and convinced to take part in radical movements (Hudson 1999) or that perhaps youth have lower opportunity costs of violence because of typically having lower wages and fewer opportunities than other members of society. Regardless of the theory, two measurements are predominantly used to capture the tension created by the youth bulge in society: the ratio of 15- to 24-year-olds to either the 15-plus population or the total population. We argue that these rough indices less accurately capture the effect of youth than other potential measures, and thus have led to incomplete results.

Additionally, historical evidence shows some of the most violent periods of unrest in human history are linked to the presence of large youth cohorts and times of generational instability. Youth demographics have grown in importance recently after links were made between youth bulges and periods of severe conflict related to independence in countries such as Algeria and El Salvador (Kahl 2006). Mayer has argued that the French Revolution and the "year of unrest" in 1848 may also have roots in ballooning youth populations (Mayer 2002). Regardless of these correlations, the effects of youth bulges are still largely unknown, and contradictory research is emerging about possibly positive side-effects of large youth cohorts (Bloom and Williamson 1998 ; Laipson 2002; Urdal 2006). Using the term "demographic dividend," Bloom and Williamson (1998) argue that youth populations played an important role in the success of the Asian Tiger economies. The term "demographic dividend" indicates that economic growth occurs within youth-heavy populations because they contain a large productive labor force relative to a small group of dependent young and elderly. Bloom, Canning, and Malaney (2009) attribute one-third to one-half of East Asian growth to favorable demographics. And Bloom and Finlay (2009) show that the large positive impact remains true when the data are extended through 2005.

In response to the seemingly contradictory results, Urdal (2006), Barakat and Urdal (2009), and Marcus, Islam, and Moloney (2008) argue that the presence of youth alone does not generate violence, and place a renewed emphasis on the social, economic, and political factors surrounding

the successes and failures of countries experiencing large youth cohorts. Marcus, Islam, and Moloney (2008) scrutinize other demographic factors such as the size of the elderly and the extremely young population cohorts in an attempt to find a more nuanced relationship between demographics and violence. However, their reasoning follows earlier theory based upon the premise that the 15- to 24-year-old age group being inherently unruly without other parts of the population serving as a balance mechanism. Barakat and Urdal (2009) promote the idea of increased access to education and argue that large male youth cohorts increase the likelihood of conflict when their level of education is low, but our results do not support their theories. Additionally, they begin to consider the idea of measuring the size of the youth cohort in different ways with a relative youth cohort size variable.

While good scholarly work exists, there is a need for continued research, and our paper adds to the literature in three important ways: larger sample sizes, additional control variables, and a measure of youth population more closely tied to the labor force. To address sample size, contemporary works like Barakat and Urdal (2009) and Marcus (2008) include data for about 120 nations and only seven years (using annual data or, at times, data in five-year increments). We improve upon this with 166 countries and annual data from 1996 through 2010, representing a substantial increase in data points. Furthermore, we work with more recent data that is relevant to present policy formation and more accurate because of advances in data collection techniques and measurement (World Bank 2007). Furthermore, we found that the results from several previous models did not hold for our expanded dataset, which raises doubts about the robustness of the main effects. Additionally, these models omit important control variables, in particular natural resource wealth, trade openness, and education.

Our last contribution is to capture more accurately the causal effect of youth on violence by employing a new variable called the Youth Risk Factor (YRF), which is the ratio of the number of 17- to 26-year-olds to the size of a country's total labor force. This ratio measures the relative stress a youth cohort exerts on labor markets as they look to become employed. Our theory is that youth, regardless

of education level, cause increased violence as the ratio of youth 17 to 26 to the total labor force grows, indicating the strain exerted on labor markets and governments. As far as we are aware, no empirical research has measured a youth cohort in this manner. Prior research has focused on younger age groups that are less likely to seek full time employment, and also not directly compared the size of a rising youth cohort to the size of the labor force. We compare this age group with the labor force, rather than the general population, in order to more directly capture the labor-force-related stresses young individuals experience in moving toward independence. We also attempt to account for the phenomenon of large groups of "idle" youth exiting the labor force out of discouragement, and potentially turning their frustration into violence.

An expansion upon our theory and model, as well as a more in-depth look at youth labor markets, follow in section 2. Section 3 addresses the details of our dataset along with our econometric techniques. Section 4 discusses results and countries with high Youth Risk Factor values, and we close with conclusions and policy implications in Section 5.

1. The Difficult Transition into the Labor Force

The difficulties youth encounter upon entering the labor force is not a new topic of research, which makes its absence from the study of youth demographics and conflict surprising. Bloom, Freeman, and Korenman (1987) as well as Korenman and Neumark (1997) provide the most detailed discussion of youth labor markets and demographics with several key points. Bloom, Freeman, and Korenman (1987) claim that members of the baby boom generation in the United States and other large youth cohorts after World War II faced reduced wages and high rates of unemployment because of the stiff competition among individuals within a large age cohort. Similarly, Korenman and Neumark (1997) report in their preferred regression results that unemployment increases for members of large youth cohorts. We wish to take their cohort crowding theory one step further and apply it to the concept of violence. Not only do unemployment and underemployment rise for members of large youth cohorts, potentially increasing violence, the number of idle youth also rises as a result of large youth cohorts (International

Labor Organization 2012). These youth exit the labor force out of frustration, so they are not captured in employment data, but only through the use of demographic data, which we implement in the Youth Risk Factor.

Barakat and Urdal (2009) try more explicitly than Korenman and Neumark (1997) to connect the size of youth cohorts to conflict, but focus on education as a mediator and potential solution to the problem of youth-created unrest. They theorize that decreased levels of education lead to a higher likelihood of conflict and while they mention the possible difficulties of transition from education to the labor market, they do not attempt to measure the problem or test it. They do address the possibility mentioned by Gurr (1970) that increased educational opportunities might increase grievances and frustration among the youth unable to find jobs, but find no evidence for the theory. They instead primarily argue that higher education levels among youth increase the opportunity cost of violence and should therefore lead to decreased levels of violence. This research implicitly assumes that people with more education will be better able to find jobs, which is not presently the case in a number of economies, especially in the developing world. Furthermore, there is evidence that increased access to educational opportunities has no positive effects on wages or poverty reduction in developing countries (Fazih 2008; Assaad and Roudi-Fahimi 2007). Additionally, the transition from the educational world to the labor force is not seamless. Therefore, we control for education and use a measure of youth relative to the labor force to account, however imperfectly, for the stress a demographic cohort places on the labor market.

1.1. Youth Risk Factor Defined

As previously stated, our Youth Risk Factor is the ratio of the 17- to 26-year-old age cohort to the size of the total labor force. This measurement is a departure from previous literature and youth bulge measurement in several respects. First, we have shifted the age group to an older section of the population to compensate for the later entrance of youth into the labor force among current generations. Fewer 15-year-olds than in previous generations are expected to have finished school or vocational training, or to hold consistent full-time employment (Donahue and

Tienda 1999). Donahue and Tienda (1999) also argue that the expectation of stable employment does not begin until the late teens or early twenties, with important implications. In general, 15-year-olds unable to find jobs may be frustrated but do not expect to be fully employed or feel that unemployment prevents them from achieving future goals. Only in older age groups would unemployment prevent youth from achieving social independence, contributing substantially to their communities, and achieving the financial independence to marry, which are the most frustrating side effects of youth unemployment, especially in the Middle East (Kent and Roudi-Fahimi 2007; Assaad and Roudi-Fahimi 2007; Watkins 2011). Consequently, 17 years of age is a more appropriate age to target as the beginning of a demographic measure. Estimation results support this idea.[1] As the age group is shifted to represent an older portion of the youth population, our results indicate that the older age-cohorts have a larger effect on violence.

Next, we compare this youth cohort to the size of the total labor force in order to measure the pressure on the labor market to absorb these youth, which we think is an important determinant of whether conflict will occur in a country experiencing a relatively large group of 17- to 26-year-olds. We hypothesize that the greater the size of the youth cohort relative to the size of the total labor force, the greater the likelihood of conflict because ultimately youth need jobs to put food on the table, marry, and progress into adulthood. The labor force is equal to the sum of unemployed plus employed persons, but many members of the youth cohort have little to no attachment to the labor force. This idleness leads to discouragement and frustration, and thus, violence can emerge among youth when labor markets are unable to absorb them.

When number of jobs needed to absorb a rising youth population is large, youth face underemployment, unemployment, and many simply leave the labor force altogether (International Labor Organization 2012). This is why youth unemployment rates, even if available,[2] would not adequately capture the effects on violence. We therefore use demographic and population measures to capture these "idle and discouraged" youth who are absent from the labor force.

The traditional youth bulge measurement can differ dramatically from this Youth Risk Factor variable in certain countries. Take Tunisia over last decade as an example: the typical youth bulge measurement, the ratio of 15- to 24-year-olds to the population older than 15, hovers around the world average of 0.27 and dips below it in recent years. However, the Youth Risk Factor for Tunisia has been more than 1 standard deviation above the world average for most of the past decade and especially recently, which is particularly noteworthy in light of the recent political unrest in Tunisia. This trend is true for many of the countries that have entered into conflict since 2010, where our data end, thus the events that have transpired are consistent with the basic premise of our model.

1.2. Model Development
Our model rests on the assumption that we can measure not only cases of severe conflict but also low-level violence, protests, and tensions between different groups. We did not use the Uppsala PRIO datasets of conflict, which have been a common source in prior literature (Marcus 2008; Barakat and Urdal 2009). For the most part, these conflict indices are more suited for capturing large-scale incidences of violence because of the requirements that there must be battlefield deaths and government involvement in the conflict. Furthermore, they fail to capture the intensity of conflict accurately as they only rank conflicts in terms of deaths and use 1,000 deaths as the divider between severe and minor conflict, which is a blunt cutoff.

We desired a broader measure of conflict and therefore, following Marcus, Islam, and Moloney (2008), constructed a conflict index compiled from the *Conflict Barometer* reports published by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK). HIIK is associated with the Department of Political Science at University of Heidelberg and concentrates on the documentation of intra-

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1   The coefficient for the Youth Risk Factor grows steadily larger as we move the lower bound from 15 to 16 to 17 to 18, before leveling off at a fairly consistent value. We believe these results further support our theoretical reasons for raising the lower bound of the demographic measurement.

2   Youth unemployment data is at this point unavailable or not accurate enough to use in a study that includes developing countries.

and interstate conflicts. Their results are published annually in the *Conflict Barometer* which reports current global conflicts, their escalations and de-escalations, coups d'état, protests, and terrorist attacks. HIIK provides detailed coverage of these events listing state and non-state actors, duration, historical analysis, and most importantly, intensity of conflict. They define conflict as "as the clashing of interests and values of some duration and magnitude between at least two parties whether they be organized groups, states, groups of states, or other organizations," making it a highly detailed and comprehensive dataset of conflict. HIIK separates conflict into five categories: latent conflict (defined as a dispute), manifest conflict (a non-violent crisis), crisis (involving sporadic periods of violence), severe crisis (which is limited war), and war (which indicates a full-scale conflict). These categories are scored from one to five, with latent conflict counting as one up to war counting as five. A country's *total* conflict score, our dependent variable, is the sum of all conflicts a country is involved in over a calendar year. This delineation is particularly helpful when considering the political unrest and violence that is attributable to youth because it covers a much broader range of conflict than just civil war.

As an example, we will demonstrate how we coded Uganda's conflict score for 2009. HIIK discusses three internal conflict disputes as well as three external conflicts. The Ugandan government was involved in an active but non-violent dispute with the puritanical Muslim Allied Democratic Forces over the legitimacy of the government's rule, which received a score of two. Simultaneously, the Buganda kingdom, a southern region claiming autonomy, opposed the authority of the Ugandan government over their territory and a series of occasionally violent conflicts erupted in September 2009. The most violent day was September 11 with twenty-seven protester deaths and eight hundred arrests, causing the conflict to receive a score of three. Earlier in 2009, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), now famous because of Joseph Kony's leadership, entered northern Uganda and spent almost six months in an ongoing struggle with Ugandan government forces, which caused the conflict to receive a conflict score of four because of the high death tolls and sustained conflict. As for interstate conflicts, Uganda was involved in minor dis-

putes with Sudan in the north and Rwanda in the south over natural resources that each received the designation of latent conflict and the score of one. Lastly, Uganda entered into several heated diplomatic exchanges with the DR Congo over Lake Albert, creating an additional conflict that was scored as a two. Therefore, Uganda's conflict score for 2009 was thirteen (2+3+4+1+1+2). We chose Uganda as an example to demonstrate the varieties of conflict as well as the comprehensive coverage by the *Conflict Barometer*. We used a similar coding technique for all countries from 1996 through 2010 to form the dependent variable.

1.3. Model Specification

Given that the dependent variable takes on a value of 0 for many of the country-year observations, we estimate random effects Tobit models of the following form:

$$Conflict^*_{it} = \gamma_1 YouthRiskFactor_{it} + \gamma_2 YouthBust_{it} + x'_{it}\beta + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

$$\text{and} \quad Conflict_{it} = max(0, Conflict^*_{it})$$

where i indexes countries and t indexes years, $\quad$ are country random effects, and idiosyncratic error $\quad$. The index $\quad$ may be thought of as a latent variable measuring the propensity for conflict in a country. Observed level of conflict, $conflict_{it}$, takes on non-negative values. Figure 1 indicates that in approximately 36 percent of country-year observations there is no conflict, with positive values roughly following a normal distribution.

Figure 1: Distribution of conflict intensity, 1996–2010

Distribution of Conflict Intensity, 1996 – 2010

The primary coefficients of interest are γ_1 and γ_2 which capture the effects of the demographic ratios, Youth Risk Factor and Youth Bust, on conflict. Youth Risk Factor is related to similar variables in prior work, but different as explained above. Following prior research, Youth Bust is the ratio of the number of 0 to 14 year olds divided by the number of 15 to 24 year olds. It is sometimes also referred to as the Relative Youth Cohort. The vector of covariates x_{it} includes variables to control for the effects of technological development (number of telephone lines), macroeconomic situation (GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, inflation, trade openness), country characteristics (total population, number of ethnic groups, number of bordering countries, length of borders, land area, and natural resource rents), opportunity cost of engaging in conflict (gross enrollment rate in secondary education), a measure of the rule of law, and prior level of conflict.

Several variables in our model are new to demographic conflict research, and thus deserve further discussion. We introduce three control variables neglected in prior conflict literature. First, trade openness has been shown to reduce intrastate conflict and, in certain conditions, reduce interstate conflict as well (Barbieri 1996). The logic behind the reduction in intrastate conflict is the rise in opportunity cost of unrest if substantial revenue comes from trade with multiple other countries or just strong bilateral trade relations. Leaders know this revenue will most likely be lost upon entering into substantial conflict, so they hesitate to initiate conflict, especially if they are part of the ruling group. The reduction in interstate conflict follows much the same logic suggesting that countries strongly connected to bordering nations through trade agreements will suffer more economically from conflict with those nations (Martin, Mayer, and Thoenig 2008).

Next, we add a variable for natural resource dependence because of recent evidence indicating a "Natural Resource Curse" whereby natural resources actually hurt growth and increase the likelihood of violence (Auty 2007). The theory cites a number of different possible motivations for the Paradox of Plenty, but ultimately concludes that extensive natural resources hurt long-term economic growth because of internal disputes over rents that create further conflict.

Lastly, we include a variable to control for education, gross enrollment rates in secondary education, which is absent from some studies but the main focus of others (Barakat and Urdal 2009; Marcus, Islam, and Moloney 2008). We use two additional measures of educational attainment, and these variables also cause significant changes in the size and sign of the coefficients of the traditional youth bulge variable.

2. Data Description

As reported in Table 1, the average level of the conflict, ConflictSum Index, is 3.16 but there is extensive variation around this mean indicated by the large standard deviation of 5.19. The average Youth Risk Factor is 0.44, which indicates that the 17 to 26 age group is approximately equal to 44 percent of the total labor force, a large percentage. The data sources are listed in the Annex.

There are several points to make beyond the summary statistics in Table 1. First, we provide more information about the population data from the International Data Base (IDB) of the U.S. Census Bureau because of the central role it plays in our dataset. The IDB data is quite detailed, with populations broken down into narrowly defined age cohorts as well as gender. It is also accurate because of their population cohort method, which incorporates exogenous factors that influence demographics into their projections. They account for the timing and demographic impact of certain events like wars, famine, immigration, and natural disasters, which often change the demographics of a country but are rarely accounted for in population data. Furthermore, the U.S. Census Bureau updates the information twice each year and is often cited by policymakers and researchers who utilize international demographic data. They work "with a precision exceeding that of other online resources for international demographic data" (U.S. Census Bureau).

Table 1: Summary Statistics

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Min.	Max.
Conflict Dummy (dumSII)	0.511	0.499	0	1
ConflictSum Index	3.163	5.194	0	61
GDP Growth	4.316	5.915	–41.3	106.279
GDP per Capita	9.954	16.800	0.072	138.774
ICRG Rule of Law	0.632	0.221	0.08	1
Inflation	22.35	510.328	–16.117	24411.03
Lag of Conflict Dummy (dumSII)	0.503	0.500	0	1
Lag of ConflictSum	3.027	4.983	0	61
Land Area	7.241	19.130	0.0002	163.768
Length of Borders	2.783	3.433	0	22.117
Natural Resource Rents as percent of GDP	9.830	18.537	0	214.49
Number of Bordering Countries	3.468	2.625	0	14
Number of Ethnic Groups	3.576	1.818	1	10
Number of Telephone Lines per 100	19.703	20.101	0.0057	90.366
Total Population	35.133	128.629	0.0311	1330.141
Trade Openness	88.365	50.589	14.932	445.911
Traditional Youth Bulge	0.272	0.081	0.109	0.418
Youth Bust	1.686	0.407	0.791	2.750
World Bank Gross Enrollment Rates	73.624	31.356	5.168	162.348
World Governance Indicators Rule of Law	–0.073	1.001	–2.21	2.01
Youth Risk Factor	0.444	0.143	0.166	0.908

3. Results

Table 2 presents the regression results. Model 1 is representative of work by Marcus, Barakat, Urdal, and Bloom, which utilized fewer countries and worked with data in five-year increments. In this model, the youth bulge, as traditionally defined, has a significant positive effect on conflict, although the standard error is relatively large. Additionally, the youth bust does not have a statistically significant effect in this model, although some research and a few of our subsequent models found a significantly negative effect. Several other variables are significant determinants of conflict and have the expected signs. Total population and number of bordering countries increase the intensity and likelihood of conflict. However, the magnitude of both variables is fairly small and suggests that small-scale changes will have a relatively small impact on overall conflict. Rule of law, as measured by the World Governance Indicators, and GDP growth are significantly negative, as expected, and diminish a country's conflict score. These signs match previous findings in the literature. The only unexpected sign is the positive significance of telephone lines per 100 people, which we would expect to be negative. However, Model 1 is the only model with this result.

In Model 2, we apply our expanded dataset to Model 1 and the significance of the traditional youth bulge variable vanishes, although the significance of the other main variables holds. This loss of significance shows the high sensitivity of the traditional youth bulge variable and the weakness of its prior significance. Model 3 includes three important control variables that have typically been left out of previous literature: trade openness, gross secondary enrollment rate, and natural resource rents. All have the expected signs, but are insignificant in this model. Youth bulge remains insignificant, actually changing sign, which calls into question earlier theories that the mere presence of large youth cohorts incites conflict. Additionally, the argument supplied in earlier literature, that older populations help temper the strong emotions of youth and prevent violence from occurring, does not to hold for our larger sample and time period, suggesting the causal roots of youth violence lie elsewhere.

Table 2: Youth Demographics and Violent Conflict Regression Results

Dependent variable is: Explanatory Variables	Model 1 ConflictSum	Model 2 ConflictSum	Model 3 ConflictSum	Model 4 ConflictSum	Model 5 ConflictSum
Traditional Youth Bulge	3.766*	0.966	-0.0284		
	(2.021)	(1.513)	(1.888)		
Youth Risk Factor				1.489**	1.833**
				(0.652)	(0.744)
Youth Bust	-0.537	-0.186	-0.301	-0.419	-0.594*
	(0.300)	(0.211)	(0.305)	(0.285)	(0.331)
Total Population	0.00217**	0.00253***	0.00309***	0.00318***	0.00273***
	(.000849)	(0.000557)	(0.000687)	(0.000690)	(0.000725)
Number of Ethnic Groups	0.0613	0.0687**	0.0828**	0.0958**	0.0836*
	(.0414)	(0.0325)	(0.0391)	(0.0396)	(0.0476)
GDP per Capita	0.00608	0.00181	0.00160	0.00465	0.00656
	(.00853)	(0.00500)	(0.00591)	(0.00601)	(0.00761)
GDP Growth	-0.0367**	-0.0223**	-0.0118	-0.0123	0.00188
	(0.0171)	(0.0111)	(0.0152)	(0.0154)	(0.0188)
Telephone Lines	0.0150**	0.00281	0.00129	0.00336	0.00109
	(0.00767)	(0.00598)	(0.00683)	(0.00649)	(0.00702)
Rule of Law – WGI	-0.390***	-0.205**	-0.171	-0.129	
	(0.146)	(0.104)	(0.136)	(0.138)	
Rule of Law – ICRG					(0.00702)
					(0.492)
Total Land Area	(0.146)	0.00864*	0.00968*	0.00907*	0.00815
	(0.00750)	(0.00460)	(0.00552)	(0.00554)	(0.00591)
Length of Borders	-0.00379	0.00815	-0.0209	-0.0110	0.00753
	(.0472)	(0.0367)	(0.0430)	(0.0435)	(0.0468)
Bordering Countries	0.0882**	0.0152	0.00974	0.00491	-0.00637
	(0.0389)	(0.0291)	(0.0348)	(0.0348)	(0.0377)
Gross Enrollment Rates			-0.00359	-0.00342	-0.00575
			(0.00438)	(0.00432)	(0.00509)
Natural Resource Rents			0.00460	0.00313	-3.41e-05
			(0.00523)	(0.00529)	(0.00590)
Trade Openness			-0.00236	-0.00253*	-0.00234
			(0.00154)	(0.00155)	(0.00171)
Inflation	6.69e-05	-3.08e-05	-0.000116	0.000145	0.000451
	(0.00271)	(8.95e-05)	(0.00187)	(0.00189)	(0.00196)
Lag of ConflictSum	0.909***	0.937***	0.951***	0.948***	0.958***
	(0.0236)	(0.0117)	(0.0152)	(0.0154)	(0.0167)
Constant	-0.545	0.106	1.048	0.487	0.895
	(0.588)	(0.451)	(0.897)	(0.810)	(0.982)
Observations	650	1.715	1.270	1.250	1.034
Countries	134	166	159	157	128
Chi squared value	2570	11176	7589	7451	6479
Log-likelihood	-1281	-3769	-2831	-2794	-2350

***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.

Model 4 replaces the traditional Youth Bulge measure with the Youth Risk Factor variable. Youth Risk Factor is positive and statistically significant with a p-value of 0.022. This strong result supports our argument that the real impetus for conflict in societies with large youth cohorts is the frustration that results from the pressure exerted on the labor force by the rising generation.[3] Larger youth cohorts relative to the labor force are associated with significantly higher conflict scores.[4] Interestingly, education is insignificant in all variants of our model, including in later robustness checks, supporting our hypothesis that education does not change the plight of youth entrants to the labor force. An interaction effect between education and Youth Risk Factor was not significant in any model, indicating that the effect of Youth Risk Factor does not change with increased enrollment rates.

To assess the magnitude of the Youth Risk Factor effect, a 0.1 unit increase raises conflict on average by 0.15 units of the HIIK conflict index. There are several countries that are more than two standard deviations away from the mean Youth Risk Factor of 0.44. Thus, for these countries, demographic change of the Youth Risk Factor can lead to nearly a half point change in conflict on an annual basis. This magnitude shows the importance of demographics in the study of conflict.

Trade openness is significant in Model 4 and its inclusion lowers the point estimates for rule of law and GDP growth, which were significant in the prior Model 3. Finally, gross secondary enrollment rate and natural resource rents maintain the expected sign yet remain insignificant.

3.1. Robustness and Subsequent Observations
To further validate our findings, we did extensive robustness testing. In Model 5 (see Table 2), we substituted the International Country Risk guide's measurement of rule of law for the World Governance Indicator's measurement. The results did not change substantially, with the significance and size of Youth Risk Factor actually increasing. In addition, using primary enrollment rate or primary education completion rate as the measure of education did not alter the main results. Like gross secondary enrollment rate, these coefficients were insignificant, while the Youth Risk Factor remained significant. An interesting result of our robustness testing is the negative and significant effect of youth bust in Model 5. This indicates that more youth under age 14 is associated with less conflict.

Table 3 reports results for models where the dependent variable is a dummy indicating a conflict score above 1. We chose 1 as the dividing line because there are numerous cases in the data of a country receiving a conflict score of 1. In other words, such "minor" conflicts are common.[5] In logit, probit, and generalized least squares estimations, the youth bust variable is strongly significant in all three.

We also investigated how the coefficients of interest changed as the time period changed. Marcus, Islam, and Moloney (2008) utilize data from 1998 to 2005. Our dataset includes 1996 to 2010. The Youth Risk Factor remains significant if the years are restricted to 1997 to 2005 and also if they are restricted to 2006 to 2010. The traditional measure of youth bulge was not significant when estimated using data that included the years 2006 to 2010, as reported in Model 2 (see Table 2).

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3   This result is not a function of the time period, as it is statistically significant when the sample is restricted to 1997–2005, as in prior literature, and also for the 2006–2010 subperiod.

4   With regard to the type of conflict, it is possible to identify whether a conflict is inter- or intra-state. The results do not differ markedly when the dependent variable is based solely on intra or solely on inter-state conflicts. Furthermore, the results are not driven by a series of small conflicts. In our dataset, only five observations have more than three level 1 conflicts in a given year.

5   The results hold if the dependent variable is alternatively defined as a dummy indicating conflict greater than 2, or greater than 3. If the dummy indicates conflict greater than 4, then the magnitude of the coefficient is similar, but not significant at the 0.10 level.

Table 3: Regression Results for Binary Indicators of Conflict

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Dependent variable is 1 if ConflictSum exceeds 1	Logit	Probit	FGLS
Explanatory Variables	dumSII2	dumSII2	dumSII2
Youth Risk Factor	3.589**	1.966**	0.199**
	(1.420)	(0.782)	(0.0913)
Youth Bust	–1.676***	–0.935***	–0.0844**
	(0.602)	(0.331)	(0.0400)
Total Population	0.0170***	0.00917***	0.000939
	(0.00587)	(0.00314)	(.000865)
Number of Ethnic Groups	0.156*	0.0864*	0.00777
	(0.0871)	(0.0479)	(0.00545)
GDP per Capita	0.0142	0.00836	0.000838
	(0.0109)	(0.00597)	(0.000838)
GDP Growth	–0.00963	–0.00708	–0.00108
	(0.0238)	(0.0131)	(0.00215)
Telephone Lines	0.0207	0.0111	0.00173*
	(0.0133)	(0.00731)	(0.000906)
Rule of Law – WGI	–0.987***	–0.547***	–0.0767***
	(0.280)	(0.156)	(0.0194)
Total Land Area	0.0136	0.00803	0.000643
	(0.0140)	(0.00768)	(0.000772)
Length of Borders	–0.0789	–0.0459	5.89e-05
	(0.0904)	(0.0496)	(0.00606)
Bordering Countries	0.0649	0.0401	0.00266
	(0.0755)	(0.0413)	(0.00487)
Gross Enrollment Rate	–0.00951	–0.00507	–0.000556
	(0.00816)	(0.00449)	(0.000603)
Natural Resource Rents	0.0119	0.00638	0.000119
	(0.00974)	(0.00522)	(0.000739)
Trade Openness	–0.00471	–0.00261	–0.000552**
	(0.00333)	(0.00180)	(0.000216)
Inflation	0.00130	0.000870	1.52e-06
	(0.00469)	(0.00267)	(0.000263)
Lag of Conflict Dummy	3.143***	1.818***	0.681***
	(0.251)	(0.143)	(0.0201)
Constant	–0.584	–0.360	0.253**
	(1.549)	(0.858)	(0.114)
Observations	1.250	1.250	1.250
Countries	157	157	157
Chi squared value	308.5	371.3	1843
Log-likelihood	–408.4	–407.9	–332.2

***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.

4. Case Studies: Arab Spring Focus

The significant coefficients for Youth Risk Factor support our theory that the causal root of youth violence arises from the stress placed on the labor force to absorb relatively large youth generations. To further illustrate this point, we discuss several countries that have high Youth Risk Factor values in 2010, the last year of our data, and have also experienced political unrest and violence in 2011 and 2012, as part of the Arab Spring.

Tunisia, the first country to experience tumult in the Arab world, had an average Youth Risk Factor value of 0.60 over the last decade, with the highest value reaching 0.63, which is nearly one and one-half standard deviations above the Youth Risk Factor mean of 0.44. These relatively high scores indicate the Tunisian labor force was under considerable pressure to absorb young workers. And in 2011, considerable unrest rocked the country with the Jasmine Revolution. The United Nations estimates more than three hundred individuals died and close to seven hundred were injured during the month-long uprising from December 2010 to January 2011 (Zagger 2011). In comparison, Tunisia's youth bulge score is 0.27 over the last decade, equal to the cross-country mean, indicating the mere presence of young people or the size of older populations was not a main reason for the unrest.

Egypt's figures look similar, if not more pronounced, over the last decade. The average Youth Risk Factor value for Egypt is 0.68, with several values around 0.72 in the late 2000s that are fully two standard deviations above the Youth Risk Factor mean. We believe this high Youth Risk Factor value is consistent with recent events where approximately 850 people died in the Egyptian uprisings (El Deeb 2012). The average traditional youth bulge value is only 0.32, well within one standard deviation of the mean of 0.27, once again indicating the importance of the size of the labor force in determining levels of youth frustration and subsequent violence.

The story extends to one of the most violent conflict areas in the world, Syria where death estimates are as high as eighty thousand (Associated Press 2013). Syria posts several of the highest Youth Risk Factor values in our sample.

Syria's average Youth Risk Factor score over the last three years of our data is an astronomically high 0.85 with its highest score coming in 2010 at 0.88, more than three standard deviations above the mean. Syria averaged a Youth Bulge value of 0.34 over the same time period, less than a one standard deviation above the mean. To give a sense of scale, in 2010 the 17 to 26 population group was the equivalent of 88 percent of the labor force. Figure 2 shows the absence of a traditional "youth bulge" in Syria's population pyramid.

Figure 2: Syrian Population Pyramids by Gender

Source: International Data Base, U.S. Census Bureau.

The demographic impact on conflict is illustrated in Figure 3, which plots the Youth Risk Factor value against conflict. As the Youth Risk Factor value ascends, the conflict score also rises and rather radically at that. Although these values are not holding constant the control factors as in a regression model, they do illustrate the basic positive correlation between Youth Risk Factor and conflict.

Figure 3: Youth Risk Factor and Scaled Conflict Score for Syria 1998–2010

In addition, the reverse relationship appears to hold. For example, Morocco and Qatar are two states that have stayed relatively calm with limited violence while having Youth Risk Factors comfortably within one standard deviation of the mean, even though Morocco has traditional youth bulge values similar to the other countries experiencing unrest. The correlation appears not to apply only to the onset of violence either. Over the last decade Iraq, for example, has only been about one standard deviation above the mean for the traditional Youth Bulge but has the highest Youth Risk Factor score in our sample at 0.91, showing the possible importance of demographics on the conflict in Iraq.

Numerous other factors have played important roles in these uprisings. Such things as police brutality, important historical events, new social media, and social tensions have all been important at times. However, the Youth Risk Factor is a potentially key determinant of subsequent violence.

5. Conclusion and Policy Implications

Following these case studies, the logical question is where conflict will strike next. Several countries yet to experience conflict are more than two standard deviations above the mean Youth Risk Factor value of 0.44, which places them in a range of high risk. Other countries in the Middle East appear to be in jeopardy, most notably Jordan and Algeria.

Both have seen an uptick in their Youth Risk Factor score with values hovering above 0.8 for Jordan and above 0.7 for Algeria, which are more than two standard deviations above the mean. Two other countries that score highly are Swaziland in southern Africa and Iran. Both have experienced relatively little violence but have Youth Risk Factor scores above 0.7 over the last decade. Several other countries like Pakistan, Nigeria, and Sudan have high scores, but continued violence in those nations would not be surprising.

For nations currently experiencing or sure to face large youth cohorts in the future, the Youth Risk Factor measure shows the importance of labor market reform and creating effective ways for youth to be absorbed into labor markets. Potential policy options for these nations would be to subsidize and invest in apprenticeships, trade schools, and internship systems to help make the transition into the labor force more gradual and less frustrating for youth. Even if they are not highly paid, making a path to future work might be enough to ease frustration and build the labor force, while avoiding violence. Also, the significantly negative effect of rule of law shows the importance of protecting intellectual property rights and allowing entrepreneurial gains to be safe from government appropriation. Additionally, the insignificance of education in all of our models and secondary regressions shows that blanket increases in access to education do not consistently lead to reduced conflict. More emphasis can be placed on helping youth make a successful transition into the labor force, regardless of their educational backgrounds,. While the developed world devotes at least marginal attention to the transition into the labor force, much more extensive work is required on the transitions taking place in the developing world.

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Annex

Description of Variables and Data Sources

Variable Description	Data Source
Conflict Dummy (dumSII) – binary dummy indicating whether a country had conflict (ConflistSum score>1) or no reported conflict	Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict (HIIK) Research, Germany
ConflictSum – a composite index formed as the sum of interstate and intrastate scores formulated from HIIK Conflict Barometers 1996–2010	Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict (HIIK) Research, Germany
GDP Growth – annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars	World Development Indicators – World Bank
GDP per Capita – gross domestic product divided by midyear population	World Development Indicators – World Bank
Rule of Law (PRS)	International Country Risk Guide
Inflation – measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services	World Development Indicators – World Bank
Land Area – land area is the aggregate of all surfaces delimited by international boundaries and/or coastlines, excluding inland water bodies	The World Factbook – CIA
Length of Borders – length of all land boundaries	The World Factbook – CIA
Natural Resource Rents as percent of GDP – the sum of oil rents, natural gas rents, coal rents (hard and soft), mineral rents, and forest rents	World Development Indicators – World Bank
Number of Bordering Countries	The World Factbook – CIA
Number of Ethnic Groups – number of major ethnic groups within a country	The World Factbook – CIA
Number of Telephone Lines per 100 people	World Development Indicators – World Bank
Total Population	International Data Base – U.S. Census Bureau
Trade Openness – the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product	World Development Indicators – World Bank
Traditional Youth Bulge – age group 15–24 divided by Population>15	International Data Base – U.S. Census Bureau
Youth Bust – age group 0–14 divided by age group 15–24	International Data Base – U.S. Census Bureau
Gross Enrollment Rates – the total enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official secondary education age	World Development Indicators – World Bank
Primary Education Completion – total enrollment in primary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the population of official primary education age	World Development Indicators – World Bank
World Governance Indicators Rule of Law – captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence	World Governance Indicators
Youth Risk Factor – age group 17–26 divided by size of total labor force	International Data Base – U.S. Census Bureau