# International Journal of Conflict and Violence

# Editorial

Letter from the Editors

Dear Reader,

As quite some time has passed since the release of our last issue we are very pleased to present the latest International Journal of Conflict and Violence.

The focus section, guest-edited by Laurent Fourchard (CERI, Sciences Po, France) and Aurelia Segatti (University of the Witwatersrand, South Africa), offers analyses on the understanding of xenophobic violence, based upon extensive empirical research undertaken over the past four years across three countries (Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa) and employing historical and ethnographic methods. The collection shifts our understanding of xenophobia, as the systematic construction of strangers supposedly threatening a local or national community, by focusing on local and urban scales.

The Journal's open section again features articles dealing with aspects from the whole range of topics of conflict and violence. Starting with an analysis of intrastate conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa, the section then turns to the discussion of the antecedents of group-based compunction and anger and how they connect to colonial-related collective experiences. The subsequent contribution illuminates the specific issue of extremely violent behaviour by reconstructing its social shaping. And last not least the final paper in this issue discusses the acceptance of modern myths about sexual aggression in Greece, testing and validating the standard social psychological instrument for this phenomenon.

We hope you enjoy reading as much as we do!

March 2016

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# Xenophobic Violence and the Manufacture of Difference in Africa: Introduction to the Focus Section

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# Xenophobic Violence and the Manufacture of Difference in Africa: Introduction to the Focus Section

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Over the past decade, the exploration of xenophobia, particularly of the violence xenophobia may unleash and its related effects on citizenship outside of Western Europe, has been limited. If there is a large body of research on autochthony and xenophobic practices in a number of African countries, much less is known on the outcomes of xenophobic violence and how it reshapes the making of authority, the self-definition of groups making claims to ownership over resources and the boundaries of citizenship. Analyses of collective violence in Africa have devoted much attention to conflict over land ownership, civil wars or vigilantism while quantitative studies have placed much emphasis on putative difference between labelled groups in the production of "ethnic violence". In this issue, we understand autochthony, nativism and indigeneity as local concepts used by actors in situations of xenophobia. Xenophobia is consequently understood as the systematic construction of strangers as a threat to the local or national community justifying their exclusion and sometimes their suppression. Drawing on extensive empirical research undertaken over the past four years across three countries (Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa), this issue intends to offer renewed analysis on the understanding of xenophobic violence focusing on local and urban scales using historical and ethnographic methods. Focusing on micro-level qualitative research helps avoid reflecting a monolithic image of the "state", "society" or "community" and underestimating internal struggles among elites in the production of violence; it also helps contesting analyses which exclusively look at violence inflicted on behalf of a group claiming to share an exclusive identity; it eventually allows to reconsider how processes of violent exclusion are contested, disputed, ignored or fought against by a number of actors.

The outbreak of xenophobic violence in South Africa in May 2008 left sixty-two dead, seven hundred injured and over one hundred thousand displaced. The targets of the violence were mainly foreigners from other African countries, although South Africans made up one-third of the dead. The violence started in Alexandra township in Johannesburg before spreading to other townships, mainly in the province of Gauteng and in and around the cities of Cape Town and Durban. Many of the 140 affected areas were townships and so-called informal settlements. However, the 2008 xenophobic riots are best understood if envisaged as a specific moment of crisis along a broader continuum of low-intensity violence emerging in the mid-1990s and manifesting itself regularly after 2008: in 2010, 2013 and again in March and April 2015. This now seemingly deeply-rooted expression of rejection has lead some analysts in South Africa to consider xenophobic violence as one idiom in the growing repertoire of protest (Von Holdt and Alexander 2012). Cases of mass violence against groups considered as foreign to the national body or the local community that have emerged in several other African countries (Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Kenya) have been labelled not as "xenophobic" but rather as pertaining to "ethnic cleansing", "religious riots", "communal clashes" or "autochthonous or indigenous conflicts". These different labels, which reveal the multiple manners in which citizenship, state institutions and social relationships have been historically constructed in different countries, need to be interrogated. Viewed from outside the continent, envisaging these manifestations of group violence could lead to an analytical bias: the risk of considering the continent (except for its most industrialised countries like South Africa) as more prone to a specific type of belonging divorced from other historical trends; in other words, as a continent domi-

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nated by "ethnic", "religious" and "first-comer claims" rooted in the past as opposed to other regions, mainly the West (and South Africa), characterised by nationalism and "non-ethnic" citizenship associated with territory through place of birth and/or residence (Zenker 2011). There is thus a need to return to the meanings of the words as well as questioning the continent's supposed differences.

The word "xenophobia" is understood as the systematic construction of strangers as a threat to society justifying their exclusion and at times, suppression. It often refers to discourses and practices that are discriminatory towards foreign nationals. Wimmers (1997) sheds light on the existence of deeper political struggles for the collective goods of the state and the building of structures of legitimacy in accessing those. This is especially the case in times of social conflicts: the appeal to the national community aims at securing the future by safeguarding the rights and privileges of the indigenous whom the state is supposed to protect. Xenophobic discourses define those who deserve to be cared for by state and society and those who should be excluded. Xenophobia is an integral part of the institutional order of the nation-state (ibid., 32). It is inexorably linked with the historical formation of the state.

Renewed academic interest in xenophobia in Europe should first be understood in the framework of the resurgence of right-wing nationalist parties and their increasing popularity in European countries in the last twenty to thirty years (France, Switzerland, Denmark, Italy, and, since the end of the Cold War, in Eastern Europe and Russia) (Taras 2009, 2). Surveys indicate a substantial increase in anti-foreigner sentiment in the two last decades of the twentieth century that is more pronounced in places with greater support for extreme right-wing parties (Semyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006). The radical right possesses a "common core doctrine", a distinct ideological platform that distinguishes it from other political parties and movements in contemporary liberal capitalist democracies. As suggested by Betz (2003), "its main characteristic is a

restrictive notion of citizenship, which holds that genuine democracy is based on a culturally, if not ethnically, homogeneous community; that only long-standing citizens count as full members of civil society; and that society's benefits should be restricted to those members of society who, either as citizens or taxpayers, have made a substantial contribution to society".

While these parties are perceived as challenging the foundations of post–Second World War democracy in Europe (Brems 2002), this is only one side of the story. In recent years xenophobic speeches in the media and on the internet have reduced tolerance towards foreigners and refugees in many countries (Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'Homme 2014). The decade that followed September 11, 2001, was marked by the constitution of an international body of popular literature against Islam that has experienced an unprecedented level of success for its genre and contributed significantly to the dissemination of nationalist and popular xenophobic representations of Islam and the Arab world (Vitale and Cousin 2014).[1] Several studies have also shown the prevalence of mundane xenophobic practices and racist stereotyping located within state institutions (for instance racial profiling in the police in France, the United Kingdom and the United States, see Fassin 2011; Jobard and Levy 2009; Waddington, Stenson, and Don 2004) and the persistence of discrimination against minorities or foreigners in the housing and job markets, in access to credit and in consumer interactions (Beauchemin, Hamel, and Simon 2015; Pager and Sheperd 2008; Ross and Turner 2005).

While xenophobia has historically received much attention in Europe and the United States, far less is known of the indigenous paths it has taken in developing countries. Now faced with the same issues as their Northern counterparts, in terms of both accommodation of diversity and mobility and of concentration of often underprivileged populations in large urban centres devoid of employment-led growth, governments and societies in the South are slowly facing

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**1** Oriana Fallaci in Italy, Éric Zemmour in France, Ayaan Hirsi Ali in the Netherlands, Thilo Sarrazin in Germany, Bruce Bawer in Norway, Melanie Phillips in the United Kingdom, Mark Steyn in Canada, Glenn Beck and Brigitte Gabriel in the United States.

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up to this new challenge. The tensions associated with the management of strangers within their midst have often led to violent exclusion and various forms of discrimination. For the relatively better-off emerging countries, increased mobility is often happening concurrently with the emergence of more redistributive social support systems based on citizenship. An influx of economic and political migrants often exacerbates or revives ancient divides and rhetorical constructions of otherness.

Like in Europe, the word xenophobia in Africa refers to discourses and practices that are discriminatory towards foreign nationals. Kersting suggests that most xenophobia in Africa is Afro-phobia: although there is xenophobic discrimination and violence towards non-African minorities such as Chinese and Indians, violent xenophobia is mostly oriented towards migrants from other African nations (Kersting 2009). The most frequent occurrence of the word in the continent is found in post-apartheid South Africa. It is more rarely used in post-colonial Gabon, Botswana and Nigeria, where other words are more prevalent in the media and the academia (autochthony, indigeneity, ethnicity) (Gray 1998; Dijk 2003; Nyamnjoh 2006).

In many African countries autochthony, which expresses the claim "to have come first" or "to be rooted in the soil" (Geschiere 2009, 28), is the preferred term. Its renaissance in the last twenty years is largely linked to the 1990s democratization and decentralization processes, which had the paradoxical effect of triggering an obsession with belonging. In addition, in situations of war or conflict (Ivory Coast, Eastern DRC, Rwanda), exclusion and mass violence have been used to distinguish citizens according to their supposed ancestral origins rather than to their belonging to the nation state which might explain why xenophobia has been of limited use. (Banégas 2006; Cutolo 2010; Chrétien and Kambenda 2013; Jackson 2010). In most cases, however, differences between xenophobia and autochthony are blurred in the literature and it is often hard to find a conceptual difference between them. There are even instances where they could well be two sides of the same coin, as in emerging debates on "local beneficiation" in economic development policies, where local infrastructure or property development projects are increasingly expected to benefit

"local" populations over others, leading to unresolved dilemmas regarding the definition of "local" in polities that guarantee equality of treatment to all citizens. These "local beneficiation" policies have been shown to sometimes lead to a reinforcement of autochthonous tendencies, as in the case of mining projects in Guinea (Bolay 2014).

While it makes sense to explore the terms most commonly used by actors in different African contexts (xenophobia, autochthony, indigeneity), autochthony and indigeneity are historically and theoretically loaded and therefore require cautious use (Fourchard and Segatti 2015). Discourses of indigeneity and autochthony are highly politicized, subject to local and national particularities, and produce ambivalent, sometimes paradoxical, outcomes (Pelican 2009); they place the researcher at the heart of power struggles (Geschiere 2011, 212). Autochthony as a claim made by first-comers to secure privileged access to state resources and land is sometimes hard to distinguish from far-right political agendas in Western Europe, which can be reduced to a slogan – "Our own people first" – and a demand – "national preference". Contemporary xenophobia in Western Europe is very much about exclusionary welfarism and the wish to protect the fiscal and national integrity of the welfare state through highly exclusionary immigration policies (Betz 2003). Xenophobic discourses in South Africa are, at least partly, a wish to retain a relatively new privileged access to an emerging welfare state for South African nationals. This welfare state has been historically constructed against black South Africans who fought for decades to have the same political and social rights as the white minority (Seekings and Natrass 2006). In this context international migrants might be perceived as being beneficiaries of this emerging welfarism without having participated in the historical struggle against racial discrimination (Monson 2015). But exclusionary welfarism is only one side of contemporary xenophobia and cannot in itself encapsulate the different meanings of xenophobia. This is the reason why it might be worth considering autochthony, nativism and indigeneity as local concepts used by actors in situations of xenophobia.

If there is a large body of research on autochthony and xenophobic practices in a number of African countries,

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much less is known on the outcomes of xenophobic violence and how it reshapes citizenship. Analyses of collective violence in Africa have devoted much attention to conflict over land ownership (Lund 1998; Chauveau 2000; Kuba and Lentz 2006; Bøås and Dunn 2013; Lund and Boone 2013) and civil wars. The sociology of conflict has shifted the lens from looking almost exclusively at ethnic tensions to the modalities of conflicts, the complexity of motivations, the uneven rationality of actors and situations of "no war, no peace" (Marchal and Messiant 1997; Debos 2013; Richards 1997). More recent research has focused on less obvious forms of political violence such as vigilantism (Veit, Barolsky, and Pillay 2011), a body of research which has helped to document the ways in which performance of violence shapes insider/outsider boundaries within various groups and communities (Anderson 2005; Fourchard 2011; Higazi and Lar 2015; Last 2008; Maupeu 2002; Pratten 2008; Kihato in this issue).

While the work presented here is resolutely qualitative in nature, it is not oblivious of some of the key questions raised by quantitative studies of conflict and violence which have included African empirical data. Authors such as Brubaker and Laitin have showed that work on ethnic and nationalist violence has essentially emerged from two largely non-intersecting literatures: studies of ethnic conflict and studies of political violence. Only recently did these studies start converging, the former attempting to understand the political dynamics of violence and the latter focusing on its ethnic component. As Brubaker and Laitin show, such studies essentially rely on three strands of work: inductive work at different levels of aggregation, trying to understand the mechanisms behind such violence; theory-driven modelling, essentially derived from game and general rational action theory; and finally, culturalist approaches looking at the symbolic, discursive and ritualistic dimensions of such violence (Brubaker and Laitin 1998). Of particular interest to our work is the effort of a smaller group of these researchers, more preoccupied with spatialised and, in particular, urban conflicts, to theorise the structural conditions conducive to spatially limited and chronologically short outbursts of violence. Among others, Laitin and Putnam have insisted, albeit with different emphases, on the role played by socio-cultural features in

fostering homogeneity or heterogeneity as a key factor in conflict processes (Laitin 2007; Putnam 2007). Whether trying to understand the contextual determinants of strong or weak "social capital" (ibid), or the unfolding of riots and their key triggers (Horowitz 2001), scholars usually study difference and "ethnicity" not as cultural traits but rather as historically constructed features of groups and of their power relations with others. In most definitions, the "putative" difference is central to planned targeting processes and violence codification and legitimisation. Yet, how "ethnic" difference combines historically and spatially with other contextual dimensions propitious to inter-group violence is acknowledged as one of the main challenges in this research area (Putnam 2007). This is where more micro-level qualitative research can bring added value to the discussion. In this vein, some fewer studies examine the local and urban configuration of autochthony claims, mundane practices of xenophobia and very localized outbreaks of xenophobic violence and its related effects on citizenship in African polities (in Nigeria: Higazi 2007, 2015; Douglas 2002; Akinyele 2009; Fourchard 2009; and Adunbi 2013; in Kenya: Lonsdale 2008; Médard 1996; Smedt 2009; in South Africa Wa Kabwe-Segatti 2008; Misago et al. 2009; Landau 2011; and Monson 2015). This nascent body of research suggests that episodes of extreme violence reshape both the making of authority, the self-definition of groups making claims to ownership over resources, and the boundaries of citizenship (Adunbi 2013; Hilgers 2011). Several African countries thus offer an ideal lens through which to take these analyses further as they combine, on one hand, a variety of xenophobic mobilizations and on the other, a set of common features: colonially crafted ethnic divides in diverse societies, increasingly acute inequalities, and rapid and jobless urbanization. The three countries selected for this issue (South Africa, Kenya, Nigeria) have all witnessed recent outbreaks of collective violence combined with supporting discourses against groups identified as "strangers" to the polities and communities in which violence erupted.

Unlike studies of national contexts, our work focuses on local and urban scales because xenophobic and autochthonous practices, by definition, rely on struggles over local political leadership, claims to localized resources and competing definitions of belonging to a certain territory. Our

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focus is on violent exclusion and its effect on statecraft, sovereignty and citizenship. The issue documents how processes of violent exclusion based on religious, ethnic, national and local forms of belonging are contested, disputed, ignored and fought against by different actors.

This issue draws on three years of extensive empirical research across three countries. Each research project involved months of fieldwork in the specific localities affected by these forms of violence, in most instances over several years before, during and after the events in question. In all three countries, researchers have systematically explored the historicity of patterns of xenophobic exclusion and the spatialization of such mobilizations. This particular ethnographic and historical approach may help avoid two shortcomings in analysing violence. First xenophobia cannot be presumed from the mere fact of the existence of discrimination concerning foreigners (Miles and Brown 2003). Focusing on the sociology of actors is an antidote to a monolithic image of the "state", "society" or "community" and underestimating internal struggles among elites. An overhasty presumption of xenophobia among administrative, political, professional and intellectual elites may result in other more subtle, complex or underlying forms of social and political discrimination being overlooked (Deplaude 2011). There is thus a need to clearly dissociate actors in situations of xenophobia from institutions promoting xenophobic apparatuses and their role in triggering violence (for example the police in South Africa, discriminatory access to state resources in Kenya and Nigeria).

Secondly, violence can be inflicted on behalf of a group (nationals against foreigners, indigenous against non-indigenous) but the claim to share an exclusive identity is not sufficient explanation: not all members of the group resort to violence. It is therefore necessary to constantly steer away from any analysis that accepts the "common identity" illusion (Bayart 1996): on the contrary, identification with a group is always contextual, relative and multiple (ibid., 98). Microsociological and microhistorical approaches help avoid such pitfalls and have been favoured in this issue.

The papers focus on three main overlooked processes on the continent. The first is the sociology of perpetrators and key actors of xenophobic violence, looking at invisible gen-

dered dynamics of spatial urban exclusion (Caroline Kihato in Nairobi; Kihato 2015). Kihato's article interrogates how social constructions of manhood and womanhood influenced violent mobilizations in Kenya's most notorious slum, Kibera, after the 2008 national elections. She shows how gender roles shape the nature of conflict and conversely, how engendering conflict shifts the assumptions made about gender roles in society. A situation of violence changed roles in society: instead of being criminalised as usual, the violence of young idlers became a celebrated resource, while women were integral to the production of violent exclusionary mobilizations as perpetrators of violence (assaults and murders), but also through mundane everyday practices (pushing their husband to fight, supplying food and cooking for the fighters, and so on).

Secondly, the issue turns to mobilization and exclusion techniques. Daouda Gary-Tounkara examines one of the most massive expulsions in the history of post-colonial Africa: the expulsion of three million West African nationals by the Nigerian state over a few months in 1983 (Gary-Tounkara 2015). This exceptional event against the so called "undocumented aliens" should be placed at the intersection of three political, social and economic processes: a deep economic crisis leading to massive unemployment since the early 1980s, the political calculation of President Shagari to weaken his opponents' supposed electoral base in the forthcoming election, and the resurgence of a nationalist discourse based on revenge for Ghana's expulsion of Nigerians in 1969. This event reveals the density of the political crisis of the Second Republic and its very short-lived democratic experience before the military coup in 1983.

The issue then moves on to the South African context of the late 2000s and its xenophobic tension and violence. Tamlyn Monson revisits the understanding of xenophobia in South Africa by shifting to the micro-local scale and historical observation (Monson 2015). In doing so, she builds on the discovery of a significant association between informal residence and the incidence of "xenophobic" violence. This exploration of contemporary and historical insurrectional citizenship in a South African locality, drawing on a case study built over several years, is heuristically powerful in

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shedding light on otherwise seemingly irrational or one-dimensional analyses of the 2008 riots. Lydie Cabane adopts a very different angle to examine this time of crisis in South Africa by looking at state response, and more specifically at mechanisms, discourses and mobilisation strategies designed and produced by the South African state to protect victims of xenophobic attacks (Cabane 2015). Cabane shows how the treatment of the crisis as a "disaster" has both allowed state mobilisation but also constrained its ability to address the deeper causes of violence in the longer term.

This special issue makes no claim to being the definitive answer to the question of the relevance of xenophobia in African contexts. It merely hopes to broaden possible readings of the phenomenon, through several national case studies and multidisciplinary approaches. In particular, the collection of articles presented here taken as a whole or individually documents how violent xenophobic expression, in Africa as elsewhere, constitutes one of the repertoires of nation-building and exclusive citizenship.

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# "Go Back and Tell Them Who the Real Men Are!" Gendering Our Understanding of Kibera's Post-election Violence

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# "Go Back and Tell Them Who the Real Men Are!" Gendering Our Understanding of Kibera's Post-election Violence

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Using a gendered analysis, this article examines the post election violence (PEV) in Kibera, Kenya, between December 2007 and February 2008. Through in-depth interviews with Kibera residents, the article interrogates how gender influenced violent mobilizations in Kenya's most notorious slum. Most scholarly analyses have tended to understand the post-election violence as a result of politicized ethnic identities, class, and local socio-economic dynamics. Implicitly or explicitly, these frameworks assume that women are victims of violence while men are its perpetrators, and ignore the ways in which gender, which cuts across these categories, produces and shapes conflict. Kibera's conflict is often ascribed to the mobilization of disaffected male youths by political "Big Men." But the research findings show how men, who would ordinarily not go to war, are obliged to fight to "save face" in their communities and how women become integral to the production of violent exclusionary mobilizations. Significantly, notions of masculinity and femininity *modified* the character of Kibera's conflict. Acts of gender-based violence, gang rapes, and forced circumcisions became intensely entwined with ethno-political performances to annihilate opposing groups. The battle for political power was also a battle of masculinities.

*If there are no elections we are friends, kama ndugu na dada, like brothers and sisters.*

*With elections we are enemies.*

Stall owner in Laini Saba, Kibera

Broaching the subject of the 2007/8 post election violence (PEV) in Kibera with residents who lived through it inescapably changes the mood of the conversation. Heads shake, eyes drop, and a silence engulfs what might have been a lively and vigorous discussion. When people begin to talk again, it is in halting whispers. "Mimi siwezi tamani kua hivyo tena": I would not wish to go back to that again, a businesswoman in Laini Saba, one of Kibera's thirteen villages said to me.[1] I heard this refrain again and again.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, about 1,200 Kenyans were killed, 300,000 displaced, and millions of Kenyan shillings worth of property and goods destroyed during the 2007/8 PEV. Kibera, which lies five kilometers from Nairobi's city centre, was one of the worst-affected areas. A survey undertaken in the slum showed that as many as sixty people lost their lives in the violence – almost half the total for the whole of Nairobi (de Smedt 2009).[2] Even more live with scars of rape and forced circumcision (Musau 2011). Millions of shillings worth of property was looted and burned as ethnic militias rallied behind their leaders: Raila Odinga, the Luo leader of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), and Mwai Kibaki, the Kikuyu founder of the rival Party of National Unity (PNU). The violence only ended after a peace agreement between the two leaders in February 2008.

After February 2008 Kibera's households organized themselves into ethnic enclaves, with each of the slum's villages

1 Kibera's villages include Kianda, Soweto West, Raila, Gatwekera, Makina, Kisumu Ndogo, Kambi Muru, Kichinjio, Mashimoni, Laini Saba, Lindi, Soweto East and Silanga

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becoming even more ethnically homogenized (Waki et al. 2008). One interviewee explained it as follows:

> Mashimoni is considered a Luo place, Kisumu Ndogo is Luo-dominated but also has other tribes like Luhyias. Makina is where you find a majority of Nubians, and Laini Saba has Kikuyus and Kambas. Luos live in Gatwekera and Olympic. It didn't used to be like this, we were all mixed. But since the elections, we have developed ethnic strongholds in the slum.

The ethnic enclaves were practical for those who lived in Kibera, and made business and safety sense. If a Luo landlord had rental housing in Kikuyu-dominated Laini Saba, they sought Kikuyu tenants to safeguard their investments in the event of political violence. Across the settlement, landlords and tenants negotiated swaps to move people to areas where their ethnic group was the majority. This formula worked for everyone: landlords protected their investment and tenants and their neighbors were safer. As one Luo, a single mother who rents out eight rooms in Kikuyu-dominated Laini Saba, put it:

> I rent my rooms out to Kikuyus, that way I know my business is safe. No-one pushed me to go and live in Mashimoni and pay rent there even when I own houses in Laini Saba. But I did it because I knew I would be safer and my property would be safer in case violence broke out again. It was our only guarantee, to be in a place where the majority are your tribe.

This article uses a gendered lens to understand the conflict that led to the ethnic enclaving of Kibera after the PEV. It explores the ways the social construction of masculinities and femininities shaped the production of the violence. It describes how gender *necessarily* intersects with ethnic, political, and class identities during times of conflict. The modes of violence manifested in Kibera after the elections cannot be explained by ethnic/political identities alone. By looking at gender, we can understand why men, who would not ordinarily go to war, are obliged to fight to "save face" in their communities. Similarly, the narratives of Kibera residents illustrate how integral women are to the production of violent exclusionary mobilizations. I argue that if

we ignore gender, we cannot fully understand why forced circumcisions and rapes became part of the machinery of violence. Indeed, we cannot disentangle gender norms from ethnic and political identities in Kibera's 2007/8 PEV. The ways in which gender-based violence occurred illustrates the desire to annihilate the ethnic and political integrity of opposing groups.

The research is based on in-depth interviews with Kibera residents conducted between February 2012 and April 2013. The interviews were held with men and women from different ethnic, class, and educational backgrounds. The author also sat in meetings of organizations that were active in preventing a repeat of the PEV in the 2013 presidential race: Peacenet, Community Housing Finance, and Kenya Tunauwezo.

## 1. Kibera – the Background

Established around one hundred years ago, Kibera began as a settlement for aging Sudanese Nubian *askaris,* members of the British army's King's African Rifles.[3] The Nubians were settled on land that was then a military training ground, as a reward from the British government for their loyalty and service protecting the railway line that linked Uganda to the Kenyan coast (Parsons 1997; de Smedt 2011). What started out as a settlement for aging Sudanese veterans and widows soon expanded with the migration and integration of local populations. Although the Nubians were the original settlers of Kibera they never acquired legal title to the land. The British were reluctant to grant them legal ownership because of the value of the land, and racial tensions with neighboring Europeans.

As Nairobi city grew, so too did Kibera. As one of the few places where Africans could live close to the city, it attracted ethnic groups from all over the country because of its proximity to the industrial area, city center and neighboring middle-class housing estates. Kibera's population figures are highly contested. Kenya's 2009 census counted 170,070 inhabitants, significantly lower than ear-

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2  Athough the word "slum" is sometimes considered derogatory and inappropriate amongst development practitioners and academics, I use the term in this

article because it is how Kibera residents refer to their settlement.

3  For a comprehensive historical analysis, see (Parsons 1997; Williams 2011; de Smedt 2011)

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lier estimates of 700,000 to 1,000,000 (Research International 2005; Desgroppes and Taupin 2011). Although Kibera's population is ethnically mixed, it is easy to see how group imbalances fuel ethnic and class tensions within the settlement (De Smedt 2009). Recent statistics show that Luos comprise 36 percent, Luhya 27 percent, Kamba 15 percent, and Nubians only a small fraction (Marx, Stoker, and Suri 2015). Although Kikuyus are the majority ethnic group in the country, they form only 6 percent of the population of Kibera. Nevertheless, they wield enormous economic power as one of the main structure-owning groups (together with Nubians they represent 55 percent of landlords) (Marx, Stoker, and Suri 2015; Joireman and Vanderpoel 2010).

To add to the precariousness generated by ethnic and class inequalities, neither tenants nor landlords possess legal title to land. Although there is a robust land and property market (Syagga, Mitullah, and Karirah-Gitau 2002), Kibera's land is legally owned by various Kenya government departments and parastatals (Williams 2011). Any land transactions and ownership claims in the settlement are therefore outside of state laws and regulations. This uncertainty only exacerbates ethnic tensions. When questions of indigeneity arise, the fissures between groups intensify: Nubians as the "original" settlers versus all "other groups"; long-standing communities like the Luo and Luhya versus "recent" migrants; landowners versus tenants, and so on. These structural insecurities only worsen what is already a fragile social, political, and economic situation.

### 1.1. The "Stolen" 2007 Elections

Witness accounts of the PEV violence across Kenya describe a series of phases (Waki et al. 2008). Interviewees in Kibera distinguish two. Violence first broke out after the electoral commission announced the victory of Mwai Kibaki on 30 December 2007. "People didn't believe it", a woman in Mashimoni village told me.

Kenya's 2007 elections were indeed different from previous ones. In an effort to promote transparency, the electoral commission broadcast the results live on television as they came in from constituencies across the country. The televised counting showed Kibaki's rival Raila Odinga in the lead in many constituencies. "Something didn't add up" said another respondent, "the elections showed Raila winning, and [this] we could see live on the television. So when Kibaki was sworn in, people got angry, that is when the violence started."

Kibera is a Raila stronghold, and the initial unrest was related to the frustration of Raila supporters who believed the election had been stolen. The violence began in Toi market at the northern end of Kibera, where discontented Raila supporters destroyed three thousand stalls belonging to traders from different ethnic backgrounds (Waki et al. 2008). Although accounts differ slightly between different parts of Kibera, the majority of those I spoke to said that the early unrest seemed "random". In other words, businesspeople of all ethnic backgrounds suffered losses and damage to property when what people saw as a legitimate protest against election rigging turned into vandalism and theft.

### 1.2. The Ethnic Turn

It was what respondents called the second phase that introduced a violent *ethnic* aspect into the conflict and resulted in the systematic carving out of ethnic enclaves. Although the ethnic partitioning of Kibera does not easily fit the xenophobic framework of discrimination against foreign nationals, it points to the multiple repertoires of violent mobilization against "the other" in contemporary African cities. After a week of violence triggered by the announcement of the election results, people began to rebuild their businesses and prepare for the beginning of the school year believing that the unrest was over (Kihato 2013). Then, in mid-January, what respondents describe as ethnically-driven revenge attacks began. According to interviews, this round of violence was triggered by the killing of Kikuyus in a church in the Rift Valley a few hundred miles away. "That is when Luos and Luhyias in Laini Saba [a Kikuyu stronghold] were targeted by Kikuyu militia, the *Mūngiki* and flushed out", said one Luo respondent who owns rooms for rent in Laini Saba and was herself "flushed out".[4] Barely a kilometer south of Laini Saba, in the Luo strongholds of Gatwekera and

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**4** For more on the Mungiki and its formation see Anderson (2002) and Wamue (2001).

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Kisumu Ndogo, Kikuyus were flushed out of their homes in apparent revenge for the evictions in Laini Saba. The murder of a prominent member of Raila Odinga's Orange Democratic Movement later in the month only escalated the ethnic character of the violence (de Smedt 2009; Waki et al. 2008). So a process triggered by a national political event took on a causality of its own, producing multiple forms of violence that became deeply contextualized to Kibera's local socio-economic and political dynamics.

### 1.3. Kibera: A Microcosm of Kenya's Gendered Ethno-politics

Kenya's history of politicized tribalism and patrimonial politics dates back to colonial rule (Lonsdale 1992). Decades of colonial and post-colonial rule have encouraged a system which links the distribution of national resources to ethnicity. During elections, as the quote introducing this article indicates, ethno-political identity is heightened as national politicians exploit ethnic differences. In the PEV there is both firm and anecdotal evidence that "Big Men" paid youth groups and gangs in Kibera to fight opposition groups there (Waki et al. 2008; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights 2008; Odallo 2010). One interviewee stated: "I know some guys who were getting paid one hundred shillings to kill people. Can you imagine what can you do with one hundred shillings? Yet these guys would take people's lives".

Nestled tightly between middle-class estates, Kibera has attracted significant scholarly attention because of its position as an opposition stronghold and its patron, the prominent political leader Raila Odinga. To explain Kibera's PEV and ethnic "flushing", some scholars point to the failure of the Kenyan state and the patrimonial nature of its politics (Branch 2008; Klopp and Kamungi 2008). These state-centered analyses show how the state's long history of oppression, its inability to address regional (ethnic) inequalities, its links to gangs, and its failing countervailing institutions foment violence and exclusionary politics at a local level (Klopp and Kamungi 2008; Cussac 2008; Maupeu 2008; Lafargue and Katumanga 2008). Yet while the Kenyan state is complicit in the production of an exclusionary and often violent politics, state-centered analyses fail to take into consideration the emergence of insurgent local political groups that seek to command and control local resources through networks of patronage and viol-

ence (Médard 2008). Although these groups may have links to leaders at the national level for example Mungiki to Kikuyu leaders, Taliban to Luo leaders (Anderson 2002), their goals are rarely to take over the state, but rather to control local resource allocations. Other scholars point to the unequal impact of global economic and development processes. Tutzer (2010) argues that while a weak state and patrimonial politics may have kindled ethnic conflict, the negative economic effects of structural adjustment programs resulting in income inequalities have left national leaders little choice but to compete for ever-dwindling resources along ethnic lines.

### 1.4. Intersecting National and Local Political Agendas

While broad structural processes can provide an understanding of the context within which violence can occur, it is the ways in which these intersect with local dynamics that explains why a place like Kibera might be particularly susceptible to violence. One group of authors looks at how class, historical processes of exclusion, the mobilization of gangs, and local governance structures provide a context for violence in Kibera (Shilaho 2006; Dimova 2010; Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero 2012). Shilaho argues that the unequal nature of land allocations in Kibera fed into the violent conflict (2006) while Médard points to the emergence of local militias (2008). De Smedt highlights the limits of national patronage systems and the importance of local class dynamics in fuelling the violence in Kibera (2009).

Perhaps one of the clearest examples of the way local and national struggles intersect is the landlord/tenant relationship. Kibera is a political stronghold for Raila Odinga, and his Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) has a significant following there. Kikuyus in Kibera are in the minority, yet are seen as a wealthier business community. These class differences increase local ethnic and political tensions. When, in a bid to gain votes for the 1992 presidential election, Raila Odinga supported a Luo rental boycott, Kikuyu structure owners and Nubian landlords were hard-hit (de Smedt 2011). With the "Big Man's" protection, Luo tenants felt emboldened to stop paying rents to their largely Kikuyu landlords. While this helped Raila garner votes in Kibera, it also suited local actors who felt exploited by the high rentals of poor-quality housing – providing an outlet for class ani-

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mosity. The tension between tenants and landlords continues to play a part in the local struggle for power and resources, and a race for national political office often exacerbates it.

Whatever their merits, the analyses of PEV in Kibera remain gender-blind. They ignore the ways gender roles shape the nature of conflict and conversely, how gendering conflict shifts the assumptions we make about gender roles in society. Most analyses fail to tell us how the distribution of power, resources, and access to governance structures at global, national, and local levels differentially affects men and women. So while we have knowledge of how inequalities between ethnic, class, and political groups influence the nature of conflicts, we have far less insight into how gender, which crosscuts all these groups, produces and shapes conflict (Byrne 1996). The following sections explore this dimension in the context of Kibera and seek answers to the following questions: How did being a man or woman in Kibera during the PEV impact upon ethnic and political identities? How did discourses of masculinity and femininity as understood in Kibera's context influence the way women and men participated in (or abstained from) the conflict? How did gender modify the nature of the violence?

## 2. The Art of War and the Politics of the Mundane

Kibera's violence illustrates how decisions that are often considered personal and apolitical become highly significant in the context of unrest. Aside from the fear and the brutal nature of the violence, what people remember most is the hunger they experienced. At the time, walking through Kibera – whether by day or night – was almost literally a matter of life and death. Militias from different groups guarded the entrances to the slum and cordoned off the settlement. A man in Gatwekera said:

> You walked through Kibera holding your ID high in your hand. If you were in dangerous territory you would be pleading for your life. If you were in a place with your own tribe, you spoke the language loudly so that the gangs would know who you were.

In Laini Saba, Kikuyu militias set up roadblocks to vet who came in and out. Luo or Luhyia were likely to be assaulted or murdered. The Luo Taliban militia manned entrances into Mashimoni, and Kikuyus passing through would be assaulted or murdered. These roadblocks meant that few

people could leave the slum to buy food and no supplies could come in. Those who had food supplies in their shops were too frightened to open them for fear of their lives and property. When they did open, they sold their produce through a small window for no more than ten or twenty minutes at a time. "We had money but it was useless because we could not buy food", said one woman in Olympic neighborhood. "Cabbage was ten shillings [approximately 14 US cents] before the violence" a second-hand clothes seller in Laini Saba related, "but during the violence it went up to seventy bob [seventy Kenya shillings, approximately one US dollar at the time). Cooking oil was too expensive for me to afford at that time."

With growing hunger, decisions about food – finding it, cooking it, and who would eat it – became the main preoccupation of Kibera's residents. The fixation on food was important not only for physical survival, but also for the survival of the factions fighting in the unrest. We know from contexts of war in Africa, South-East Asia, and Latin America that women play an indispensable part in its production (Cock 1991; Enloe 2004; Afshar 2004; Thompson 2006; El-Bushra 2004). In Kibera food, and with it women, became an integral part of the violence because the militias needed to eat in order to the secure their territories. Women in Kibera were expected to cook for the gangs who secured the perimeters of their enclaves. Some of the women I interviewed said that they were forced into this role and had no choice. Others understood it as a kind of barter: "Our men were out there fighting for us, we needed to feed them and make them strong so that they could protect us and our property," said a businesswomen in Laini Saba. In one section of Laini Saba, where business owners had millions of shillings worth of goods to lose in the violence, neighbors organized around tasks like cooking:

> One person would volunteer their house to cook and we would contribute what we had to cook for the neighbors and the men. Let me make it clear, there was no planning that we are going to fight. It just happened randomly after the announcement of the results from the media.

There were areas in Kibera that were not as organized, where cooking was less communal. Nevertheless, militia youth in these areas would demand food from houses

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where women were cooking. "You understand that you cannot cook in Kibera without your neighbor knowing?" said a woman living with her three children in her one-hundred-square-foot room in Gatwekera:

> Even though we have our own homes, we live on top of each other. If I had little food to cook for my children, I could not hide it from others, and the gangs would always know where the food was. We were forced to feed them. What could I do? They were keeping us safe.

"Sometimes it was a matter of choosing whether you would go hungry or you would feed the men," said another woman who lives in Kibera's Soweto section. "I remember many nights when I had to decide who to feed – my hungry and crying child, or my husband who was out all night fighting? Can *you* make that choice?" The presence of the militia was also important for those with business and property in Kibera who had managed to leave after the violence broke out. "The business people paid youth to protect their property. You have to be preparing food for these people to make sure they were able to protect." Kibera's women are not alone: women's roles in war are far-ranging, from supportive roles as care-givers, nurses, cooks (that reinforce their gendered roles) to combat fighting alongside men. In Thompson's words, "[women] are an integral part of the political economy of war and the financing of war" (2006, 348).

Once food supplies ran out in a household, someone had to try to find sustenance. That task sometimes fell on women because they seemed more likely to be able to plead for sympathy if they encountered opposing gangs. One Luhyia woman described her fearful encounter with *Mungiki* in Laini Saba while carrying vegetable oil.

> I had to cross Laini Saba to go to Mashimoni where, as a Luhyia, I was safer … I met a group of Mūngiki. They were a few men, I can't remember how many, but I recognized one of them. He is elderly and lives down the road here. I know him and his wife well. I was so scared. I had bought cooking oil in town and was carrying it in a paper bag. The younger *Mūngiki* man, the leader, took my cooking oil and said to me: "These are the women who cook for their men so that they can beat us up. We need to teach you people a lesson". I pleaded with him, crying to let me go. "I am a mother", I said to them, "I have no problems with anybody."

The woman eventually escaped unharmed after her Kikuyu neighbor vouched for her, and the gang allowed her to continue to Mashimoni with her cooking oil.

If women's decisions around cooking and food provision were politicized during the violence, so too was sleep. In Laini Saba, groups of neighbors organized to protect their lives and property. At night, women and men would form security groups on their streets and take turns sleeping. "Sleep became a luxury" one Kikuyu businesswoman said to me. "First of all you were scared to go into your house to sleep in case the Luo gangs came. Second, if you were seen to be sleeping too much, your own people would begin to say that you were not helping to keep property safe". Another businesswoman in Laini Saba said: "We were not sleeping at night, we would huddle together and protect our property."

Commonplace assumptions tend to make women invisible in war times. Even where they are acknowledged as actors in a conflict, they are understood as playing "supportive" roles to men who fight or design war strategies. This perspective not only devalues women and validates certain acts of war over others, but is blind to the ways in which conflict is produced and reproduced. If we understand conflict and its production as broader than the moment of violence, as incorporating spaces beyond the battlefield, and as integrating a diverse cast beyond soldiers, generals, or gangs – we begin to see its long production line and the multitude of actors who facilitate its progression (Enloe 2004).

### 3. Scrambling Gender Roles in Kibera's Conflict

If taking a step back from the battlefield allows us to see how women play a part in facilitating the manufacture of violence, zooming out even further allows us to look at the ways male and female socialization shapes conflict. Consciously or unconsciously, society tends to stereotype women as violence-loathing – the peace-loving weaker sex in need of protection – while men are seen as aggressive with an appetite for war and violence (White 2007; Enloe 2004; Giles and Hyndman 2004; Cock 1991).

Kibera's conflict both reinforced and disrupted these stereotypes. Byrne suggests that conflict creates highly volatile and

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fluid spaces which allow us to problematize the "unquestioning and fixed notions of masculinity and femininity at a time when gender identities and relations are, as a result of conflict, in a considerable state of flux" (Byrne 1996, 31).

When I asked groups of men and women in Kibera what social expectations they experienced, they gave standard responses: people should be God-fearing and hard-working. Men are responsible for supporting their families financially and women for taking care of the home, preparing meals, and nurturing children. Yet respondents were quick to admit that even in "normal times" these idealized notions of masculinity and femininity rarely stood up to the realities of everyday life. A casual walk through the slum reveals women hard at work in stalls and hair salons while young men hang out on street corners. When asked about violence, the stock response was that men were prone to violence, but not women. "Women are peaceful. They don't like fighting," was a typical response.

But these commonly held beliefs about male and female roles became scrambled during the conflict. In fact, contrary to political and scholarly assumptions that women are peace-loving and generally absent in war, there is evidence that women *actively* took part in Kibera's 2007 post-election conflict in a variety of ways. Many interviewees said that women acted as spies, identifying "enemy homes" which would then be looted, burned, or forcefully occupied. One Luhyia woman in Mashimoni said:

> Women were generally the ones who pointed out Kikuyu homes in this area. It is because as women we are the ones who know our neighbors and who lives where in the area. They would point to the homes of other tribes.

A Luo woman in Gatwekera related how:

> We women would find stones and fill buckets. By this time, we had left our children [safe] with relatives outside the slum. Women and men – we would all sleep outside. When we heard [the call] *mawe!* stones! we would get the stones from our compound and supply the men who were guarding us.

### 3.1. "Men Who Behave Like Women"

I was sitting at a makeshift stall along the train tracks in Laini Saba talking to a group of women gathered in heated conversation. The six women were from diverse ethnic

groups, and were talking about "men who behave like women", referring to men who stayed at home during the unrest. There was laughter as they talked about some men's cowardice, and the way some of them had taunted their partners to go out and fight. The conversation continued with women making jibes that so-and-so's husband is not a real man because he would not go out to fight.

> My neighbor was telling me how she tried to chase her husband out of the house. Other men were fighting and hers was just sitting in the house complaining he was hungry.

Another added:

> Even me I told mine to stop sitting in the house like a coward, "go and fight like a man" I said to him, "stop being a woman!"

A gendered approach allows us to analyze these conversations and understand how aggressive militarized masculinities become the ideal in times of violent conflict. The jibes at "men who behave like women" are aimed at men considered too weak and cowardly to fight. These "feminizing" insults not only draw attention to how women contribute to fuelling violence even when they are not actively involved in it themselves; they are intended to emasculate these "cowardly" men. The slights go right to the heart of understanding how gender influences the production and reproduction of violence. Jacklyn Cock describes how white women in apartheid South Africa socialized boys into aggressive masculinities, all the while maintaining their gendered roles as peace-loving mothers (1991). When we look at gendered relationships in a society, and expectations of men and women, we see how men, who might ordinarily not go to war, can be pressured to do so. Coulter points out how: "Men who refuse to fight will often be ridiculed, jailed, or even killed for their cowardice, or lack of manliness" (2008, 57).

> Masculinist notions also serve as a powerful tools for making men into soldiers because military forces encourage aggressiveness and competitiveness while censuring emotional expressions and denouncing physically weak soldiers as effeminate. (White 2007, 866)

In a militarized context, being a "real man" is associated with aggression and a capacity for violence. Yet the meaning a "real man" is not static. It shifts during times of conflict and in "normal" times. When discussing the 2007/8 viol-

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ence, few interviewees fail to mention the "idlers", the young men with no jobs who spend their days sitting around street corners. These idlers, I was told, are violent and dangerous – vagrants in the day, muggers and thieves by night. The idlers' aggression is criminalized in normal times, when gendered roles in Kibera are normalized, because it is targeted at ordinary citizens trying to make an honest living. However, their violence is a celebrated resource during times of conflict because it protects families and neighborhoods from opposing ethnic factions. This distinction between "good" and "bad violence" seems contradictory. Wamucii and Idwasi point to the distinction between legitimate security and delinquent violence in Nairobi slums (Wamucii and Idwasi 2011). When I posed the question why aggression was rejected during times of peace and demanded, even celebrated, in times of conflict, the responses from men and women of all ethnicities and social groups were similar: while violence was unwarranted during times of war or peace, many argued that wartime aggression was socially sanctioned. In the words of a mother whose son participated in the violence, "the men were fighting for the tribe …to protect the community, they were doing good. If they were not there, the Kikuyu gangs would have come here." As Coulter (2008, 55) points out: "War is not a-social, but it creates its own social orders …" In a militarized context, new norms and values determine acceptable and unacceptable modes of action and interaction. In times of conflict the ideal model of manhood is a militarized one – intricately intertwined with violence and obligations to protect the community and fight the enemy other.

### 3.2. Masculinized Women
If "feminized" men were ridiculed for being cowardly and effeminate, "masculinized" female killers instilled horror. A Luhya woman who owns a hair salon in Laini Saba told me she witnessed Kikuyu women kill a young man.

> It was very difficult for me, very difficult. It is hard to see someone, a young boy, being killed. But let me tell you, it is harder when it is women who are doing the killing. A woman like me. That is not how women are supposed to be.

These destabilizing acts allow us to see masculinity and femininity as characteristics that can be attributed to both male and female biological categories. The Kikuyu women's

machine attack on the Luo boy can be seen as a gendered act, one that projects domination over the emasculated and subjugated other. Conflict scholars have written about the importance of separating sex from gendered notions of masculinity and femininity. Bohan makes the point that "the factors defining a particular transaction as feminine or masculine are not the sex of the actors but the situational parameters within which the performance occurs" (1997, 39). In other words women can *perform* masculinity in the sense of power, domination, and violent subjugation. West and Zimmerman suggest that gender is an act, a social interaction that is separate from sex or sex category (1987).

Kibera's post election conflict reveals the fluidity of gender roles and obligations. The conflict illustrates the fiction of ideal gender types, because it disrupts commonly held assumptions that men are inherently war-loving and women inherently peaceful. Gender roles and responsibilities are socially constructed, localized, and subject to change depending on the context. The male/war female/peace binaries are not fixed to a biological category. Paying attention to gender in times of conflict allows us to think of gender as actions – as enactments of masculine and feminine traits that are independent from biological sex. As such, women can take on masculine aggressive and domineering traits and men stereotypically feminine – caring and submissive – characteristics. Kibera's example allows us to understand masculinity and femininity as linked more to power (or its absence) than to biological attributes.

To acknowledge men and women's complicity in conflict, however, is not deny that they are victims. To be sure, both women and men can be victimized and empowered by war (Zarkov 2001). At a policy level, gendering conflict is important in devising appropriate responses that recognize both men and women's agency and victimhood in times of war and peace.

### 4. "Go Back and Tell Them Who the Real Men Are" – the Battle for a Hegemonic Ethno-masculinity
The previous section unsettled the idea of fixed binaries between men and women. The scrambling of genders allows us to understand that characteristics ascribed to men and women are social constructions and not inherent

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in their biology. Women can enact "masculine" traits just as men can perform "feminine" ones.

This section extends the analysis by arguing that notions of masculinity and femininity attach not only to individuals but to political, ethnic, or religious *groups* (Skjelsbaek 2001). This proposition provides a compelling framework for explaining the nature of Kibera's conflict and the reasons it manifested in widespread incidents of gang rapes and forced circumcision. Although there is legal contestation as to whether acts like forced circumcision comprise sexual violence, I agree with Skjelsbaek that acts such as "rape, forced prostitution, forced marriage, forced circumcision and forced nakedness" are sexual violence (Skjelsbaek 2001, 212–13; also Carpenter 2006).

At a women's hospital in Mashimoni, Kibera, a nurse recounted how widespread forced circumcision was during the PEV.

> We knew that women could be raped and many, many women I know were raped during that time. But in Laini Saba, men were being killed. They said they were circumcising them, but they would tell our men to put their penis' on the railway line. Then they would cut them. They called it circumcision, but how do you cut a man's penis in half and say that is circumcision?

Witnesses told the Waki Commission (established by the Kenya government to investigate the PEV) of similar incidents of forced circumcision and mutilation. A doctor testifying to the commission said that what he witnessed was "pilary amputation" where his patient had his "whole penis actually cut" (Waki et al. 2008, 258). A Luo woman in Huruma estate, north-east of Nairobi city center, said:

> I heard many people outside saying that "even here there are some ODM people we want to circumcise" They were many and were making a lot of noise. They pushed the door saying that "Kihii [Kikuyu for uncircumcised man] you are the ones troubling us"(Waki et al. 2008, 259)

Why were forced circumcisions part of the ethno-political battle in Kibera? What social relationships and processes

made the performance of this act such a significant part of an ethnic and political conflict? Within the context of political and ethnic strife, gender allows us to see the forced circumcision of Luos by Kikuyu gangs as an act of domination.

To provide some context: Unlike the Kikuyu, Luo men do not traditionally get circumcised but have other coming-of-age-rituals. Conversely, male circumcision is an important marker of adulthood in Kikuyu tradition, signifying the transition from boy to man. Within Kenya's political context, circumcision has been appropriated as a symbol of political power and wealth and an assertion of Kikuyu superiority over Luos (Ahlberg, Njoroge, and Olsson 2011). The political rivalry between the Luo and Kikuyu, and the accompanying ethnic chauvinism, has a long colonial and post-colonial history (Atieno-Odhiambo 2002). Kenya's first president, Kenyatta, extolled the virtues of circumcision, and the Kikuyu elite frequently insist that they cannot be ruled by "boys" (Ahlberg, Njoroge, and Olsson 2011; Kamau-Rutenberg 2009). This hegemonic masculinity is not simply an elitist attitude towards the other, but an endemic feature of Kikuyu discourse (Mucheru-Oyatta 2007; Corey-Boulet 2011). Popular Kikuyu musician Kamande wa Kioi's song, *Uhuru ni Witu* (Uhuru is ours, referring to Kenya's fourth president Uhuru Kenyatta) puts it this way:

*Wegutha githuri na hiiki kai kiigi iri ya nyukwa?*

You thump your chest about Hague,[5] is Hague your mother's?

*Ni kuri kirumi kia Jehova, riria ombire thi na iguru*

There is a curse from Jehova when he created heaven and earth

*Abiristi mataruaga matigaathe Isiraeli*

Philistines who do not circumcise cannot rule Israel

*Iburahimu agia Jehova, erirwo athii akagirimwo*

When Abraham gave Jehova trouble, he was told to get circumcised,

*Nawe General wa Migingo ruhiu no ruraria thio*

And you General of Migingo [referring to Raila Odinga] your knife is being sharpened.

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**5** Referring to the International Criminal Court in the Hague where Uhuru Kenyatta had been charged for crimes against humanity and his role in the PEV. The charges were dropped.

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Wa Kioi was charged for hate speech, but the idea that Luos cannot lead Kenya because they are uncircumcised remains a feature of Kenyan political discourse. Seen in this context, the penis mutilations asserted the dominance of Kikuyu masculinity – intricately intertwined with politics – over Luos as a group. The accompanying spectacle and performance – demanding that a man strip, jeering at his penis, pulling his foreskin, ordering him to place his penis on the railway line, and mutilating it with a panga (machete) – was a message, not just to the uncircumcised man, but to the ethnic and political group he represented. Forced circumcisions projected a hegemonic Kikuyu masculinity and this gendering act symbolized the Kikuyu's assertion of power and domination over their Luo rivals.

If we treat ethnic and political groups as gendered, we can understand the *character* of this violence. Here, the perpetrator's ethnic group is perceived as masculine, powerful, and composed of "real" men. The victim, the uncircumcised man and his group, are emasculated through the forced circumcision. The victim is not considered a real man because he is not circumcised, and his manhood is further devalued in the domineering and subjugating act of forcibly "circumcising" him. He and his ethnicity are feminized in this gendered act. Hague (1997) examines gendered acts of feminizing and masculinizing group identities in the Bosnia-Herzegovina war. He shows how the masculine attributes of domination, violent subjugation, and power were attributed to the national identity of "Serb" and "Bosnian Serb" (Hague 1997). Similarly, Skjelsbaek points out that "the victim of sexual violence in the war-zone is victimized by feminizing both the sex and the ethnic/religious/political identity to which the victim belongs, likewise the perpetrator's sex and ethnic/religious/political identity is empowered by becoming masculinized" (Skjelsbaek 2001, 225).

The nature of the beatings and circumcisions in Laini Saba prompted retaliation in Luo-dominated areas of Kibera. Luo members of the Taliban admitted that they used rape to send a message to their Mungiki rivals. Kikuyu factions were as guilty of rape as other factions in Kibera, but the following story, told by a woman of Kamba origin (seen as Kikuyu allies), illustrates particularly sharply how the strat-

egy of rape became a way of recovering Luo masculinity threatened or weakened by the conflict:

> I was coming back from Ukambani where I had gone to vote. I didn't know that there was any problem in Kibera so me I was just passing through to get home. I had not walked very far into Kibera when I met a group of youth. At first I did not even notice that they were all Luo. "Where are you going?" they asked me. They started to behave very aggressively towards me. I don't remember what happened next, but I was raped by all of them. You think we are not men? You think we are not men? That is what they said to me. When they finished they said to me "go back and tell them who the real men are".

Conflict authors write about the use of spectacle in violent acts in times of war as separating everyday sexual violations from wartime acts (Sharlach 2000; Carpenter 2006; Gerecke 2010). Although there is gender-based violence in Kibera during "normal times," it is important to note that the incidences of gang rapes and forced circumcisions increased dramatically during the political crisis (Waki et al. 2008). These sexual acts of violence are deeply embedded in the ethnic and political conflict.

Gang rapes like the one described by the Kamba woman were not simply an act against the woman, but against the ethnic group she represents. In times of conflict rape has a significance that moves beyond the subjugation of women: it becomes a deliberate strategy to decimate the opposing side (Holmes 2013). "Rape is used to rip apart the fabric of society not only by undermining women but also their men" (Afshar 2004, 48). Indeed rape had multiple consequences on individuals, families, and communities in Kenya during the 2007/8 PEV. The Waki Commission found that rape had resulted in men leaving their wives. Women were traumatized not only by the physical violation and their exposure to sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS, but also the disintegration of their families and the hostility they faced in some of their communities (Waki et al. 2008). And this is precisely why rape became such an important strategy in the conflict: it became a means of breaking down, feminizing, the other side. The ringing words of the rapist gang "go back and tell them who the real men are" encapsulate this battle of masculinities. Through the spectacle of the rape, the Luo gang members were asserting their hegemonic masculinity over the Kikuyu and their Kamba allies.

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## Conclusion

Gender and accompanying notions of masculinity and femininity help explain aspects of Kibera's conflict that remain inexplicable in the dominant political, class, and ethnic frameworks. Using a gendered analysis reveals how gender intersects with political affiliation, class, and ethnicity to produce a violent exclusionary politics. Looking closely at what happened in Kibera disrupts fixed binary conceptions of gender roles and reveals how the hegemonic construction of masculinities and femininities fueled the conflict and shaped its outcome. As the violence unfolded it became clear that the battle for political power was also in fact a battle of masculinities between the Kikuyu and Luo groups and their allies. What was at stake was not only the loss of a national election, but the loss of an ethnic machismo, the loss of manhood. We see this in the acts of violence and the accompanying discourses of "real men" versus "boys". Indeed Kibera's PEV shows us how gender was at the very heart of the violence – its inscription into Luo and Kikuyu political identities reveals a frightening yet illuminating aspect of the conflict.

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# A Reappraisal of the Expulsion of Illegal Immigrants from Nigeria in 1983

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# A Reappraisal of the Expulsion of Illegal Immigrants from Nigeria in 1983

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In recent years, Nigeria has been quietly expelling more and more immigrants from Niger, Mali, Chad and Cameroon. These foreigners – migrant workers or small traders – face the reinforcement of migration control and the blind fight of the government against Boko Haram. Despite its political instability, Nigeria remains a major immigration destination in West Africa. In this article, I analyze the "undocumented" expulsion of aliens in 1983, officially three million people. I argue that the expulsion was due to the economic crisis but also to a nationalist revenge against Ghana and a political calculation of President Shagari. This implies the exclusion of foreigners from the national labour market and the weakening of the supposed electoral base of his opponents.

*In memory of Dennis D. Cordell and Diouma Gary-Tounkara*

By virtue of its exceptional historical and political trajectory, Nigeria symbolises multidimensional violence also extending to other African societies. Since 1953 and the Kano riots against citizens from the Eastern Region (Albert 1993), the country has seemed to evolve in a cycle of violence. The media analysis of its political outcomes remains blurred by an interpretation that lays emphasis on mobilisations that are regionalist, religious or ethnic in nature. The North/South, Muslims/Christians, Yoruba/Ibo/Hausa antagonisms overshadow other forms of socio-political exclusion that obstruct the reappraisal of internal conflicts in Nigeria (Falola 1998; Fourchard 2007; Higazi 2007). This was the issue with the expulsion of two and half million illegal immigrants, citizens of Chad, Cameroon and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, or the Community) in 1983. This represents almost 3 percent of the country's population (Russell and Teitelbaum 1992, 20). Yet, one of the objectives of ECOWAS, created in Lagos five years after the end of the Biafra civil war (1967–1970), was to prevent conflicts and to contribute to the coming together of different peoples for regional integration. In this scheme and through various protocols, member states

agreed to liberalise the movement of people and goods as a means of transcending the divisions inherited from colonial administration. Faced with scale of protests from neighbouring countries, President Shagari pointed to unfavourable economic conditions and popular demands:

> Many such illegal immigrants were tolerated by Nigeria for humanitarian reasons, but it soon became clear that the activities of many of these immigrants ran counter to the national interest of Nigeria. Besides, the fact that many of them were taking up cheap menial jobs, to the detriment of many Nigerians, and also engaging in criminal and anti-social activities detrimental to the interest of the nation. Many were also engaged in smuggling Nigerian food and other goods to their home countries. It was soon discovered that most of the workers in our factories were illegal aliens. The trend was extended into many professions including teaching, to such an extent that within a short period, even the roadside mechanics, tailors and domestics servants were largely illegal aliens. There was public outcry about this alarming development and the government had to do something at once to control the situation (Shagari 2001, 330).

To what extent are these affirmations tenable? How could one explain that, in one section of public opinion, the purpose of the order to expel illegal immigrants seemed to be to hunt for all the foreigners living in the country, especially Ghanaians? Many works have explored this event and

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pointed out, rightly, the importance of the deterioration of economic conditions in the president's decision (Philippe 1983; Gravil 1985; Falola and Ihonvbere 1985; Afolayan 1988). This article revisits the expulsion of foreigners from Nigeria in 1983, examining its hitherto poorly documented nationalist, symbolic and identity dimensions. After the spectacular expulsion of its nationals from Ghana in 1969, Nigeria retaliated by repatriating Ghanaians in return. It is often overlooked that this event falls within the continuum of a rivalry between the two countries dating from the colonial period. Because their country was modernised earlier socio-economically, the Ghanaian elites acquired a sense of superiority with regard to their Nigerian counterparts.[1] After independence, this feeling was fuelled by strong competition on the African diplomatic scene, with Ghana the first independent sub-Saharan country proclaiming itself the representative of the continent on foreign affairs and reducing its Nigerian rival to an idol with feet of clay. To worsen the matter, during the Biafran war that threatened the very existence of Nigeria, not only did Ghana accord early recognition to the secession, but also did not hesitate to expel 140,000 Nigerians within that same period (Aluko 1976, 227, 240). Under these conditions, I argue that the 1983 expulsion proceeds not only from economic crisis but also contains elements of nationalist vengeance and a transposition of the rivalry between the president and his opponents from the political arena to the social sphere. By nationalist vengeance, I mean a symbolic triple revenge of Nigeria on Ghana: teach the good pupil of the former British West African a lesson, sanction her in retaliation for the 1969 expulsion, and affirm the authority of a state whose interest in the rest of Africa was being challenged. Furthermore, at the internal level, the confrontation between citizens and foreigners also doubled as an indirect con-

frontation between the president and the opposition because of the rumour that Ghanaian illegal immigrants were supposedly being prepared for presidential elections scheduled that same year: "It was reported that Nigeria's opposition parties were registering Ghanaian residents to vote for them in the forthcoming elections."[2] The historian Louise White (2000) has already shown the effects of rumour on *vox populi* in the colonial East Africa and described the deformed, even fantastic, image of whites that settled there. This analysis could be applied to the Nigerian case, where rumour and suspicion constitute one of the driving forces behind popular mobilisations. Again recently, in April 2013, there was a rumour in Lagos that members of Boko Haram were preparing bombings, aided by migrants from Chad, Niger or Mali (Ojo, Suberu and Murtala 2013). These collectively constituted the third (albeit largely unknown) foreigner community in the country after Ghana and Benin, (Afolayan 2009, 15).[3] With the public expression of xenophobia changing according to period and circumstances, I propose to analyse the expulsion of 1983 with a double comparison: between the Ghanaian and Malian immigrants on one hand, and on the other, the mechanisms of expulsion using the foreigner label in Nigeria and in Côte d'Ivoire.

Adopting a socio-historical approach to the management of migration, this study relies mainly on fieldwork conducted in Nigeria and a critical analysis of post-colonial archives.[4] Reinserted within the context of debates on the use of the label "foreigners" as a resource of political legitimisation (Bayart, Geschiere, and Nyamnjoh 2001; Whitaker 2005), it reveals the differentiated handling of foreign communities living in Nigeria during that time, while taking into consideration their numbers and their socio-economic positions.

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**1** By reason of an early start in higher education, professional training and the attainment of national independence: "The Gold Coast leaders felt superior to the Nigerians for three main reasons. Firstly, the Gold Coast had the advantage of higher education earlier than Nigeria. Secondly, most of the Nigerians trading and working in Ghana till the early fifties were largely uneducated and unskilled labour, and 'farm hands'. Thirdly, the faster rate of the decolonization process in the Gold Coast, which started with the 1946 constitution, made its leaders feel more important than the Nigerians. The result of all this

was that the Gold Coast did not want to be in any position subordinate to Nigeria" (Aluko 1976, 65).

**2** *International Herald Tribune*, 4 February 1983, quoted by Gravil (1985, 528). "It had also been widely believed that some rival parties had distributed voter's cards to 'aliens' and others were organizing alien-gangs to disrupt the elections or cause violence after elections" (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 214).

**3** Afolayan quoted: Development Research Centre on Migration, 2007, *Global Migrant Origin Database*, Development Research Centre on Migration Globalization and Poverty, March, Version 4.

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## 1. "Aliens Must Go!" The Nightmare of "Brethren" from ECOWAS and the Legitimacy Crisis of the State

To understand the modalities of the expulsion of 1983, one ought first to explain the conditions that led to the arrival of migrants from ECOWAS, from Chad and from Cameroon during the oil boom of the 1970s, which was marked by annual growth close to 10 percent (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 83). Their presence did not receive much attention in public debate, even after the crisis of international overproduction of oil in 1981. This was followed by a fall in price and a rise in urban unemployment, which affected two thirds of urban workers (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 98).[5] Close to the presidential election of August 1983, in order to hide the mismanagement of resources from oil operations, President Shagari, campaigning for reelection, tried to acquire a new legitimacy by accusing the illegal immigrants and the opposition. The politicisation of the presence of illegal immigrants reached its peak in 1983.

After the civil war, within a context of growth stimulated by crude oil exportation and a rise in the oil price between 1973 and 1981 (Bach 1989, 220), migratory movement from the rest of West Africa towards Nigerian cities intensified. Through the pull effect, oil revenue financed and revitalised the development of public works and light industry sectors (Philippe 1989, 107–8). Consequently, the local labour market expanded in the area of commercial activities and urban services. This created professional and employment opportunities for migrants coming from the North or from the Sahel, during one or several dry seasons. The great drought that occurred in the Sahel in 1973 intensified the influx. Many of these people lacked identity cards or passports, as President Shagari lamented:

> The problem of illegal aliens has been with the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the advent of the "oil boom", in the early 1970's, when large number of immigrations from neighbouring West African countries started to enter the country, mostly illegally, in search of jobs. The drought of between 1973 and 1974; also brought in a new wave of refugees and destitutes, moving in

from the Sahelian region of West Africa (Niger, Mali, Chad, Mauritania, and many others), into Nigeria (Shagari 2001, 330).

Thanks to the rise in the oil price in 1973, Nigeria paradoxically escaped the global economic slowdown that followed. But from 1981 it suffered from the subsequent fall in the oil price caused by overproduction. This was the first downturn for a middle class that had been getting accustomed to a favourable environment (Monnoyer and Philippe 1988, 82). The country embarked on an IMF Structural Adjustment Programme in 1983, with budgetary restrictions and unpopular cuts in social spending. Quickly, general discontentment arose. The social consequences of the structural adjustment resulted in a political crisis (Philippe 1983, 119) against the backdrop of corruption scandals affecting members of state institutions (Joseph 1987). Because of its role as an oil producer, Nigeria was soon exposed to a reversal of its situation: Whereas the populace was hoping that oil revenues would be used to improve living conditions and fund a necessary diversification of the economy, instead petrodollars were used to finance an unproductive and clientelist system benefiting the president and his political allies from the National Party of Nigeria (NPN). Cost inflation became the rule in the attribution of public offers and the importation of goods (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 107–8). This added to the disarray of excluded businesspersons and their outsourced agents.

Public opinion could not comprehend how the state had missed such a good opportunity to make the country "take off". On the other hand, poverty and a high cost of living were the daily fate of the ordinary citizen. In May 1981, at the insistence of the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) – comprising 44 professional bodies – a general strike paralysed the whole country, notwithstanding police and judicial repression (ibid., 99 and 159). In the political arena, mobilisations against President Shagari were organised simultaneously, as the opposition united under the coalition of the Progressive Parties Alliance now comprised of

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**5** According to the Nigerian Labour Congress, 20,000 textile workers were fired between 1979 and 1982, and in October 1982 alone there were 1,000 redundancies in the chemical industry, 2,000 in the furniture and woodwork sector, 3,000 in the food, drinks and tobacco industry, and 2,000 in the petroleum industry (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 150).

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the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) of Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the Great Nigerian People's Party (GNPP) of Alhaji Shugaba Darman and the National People's Party (NPP) of Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe (ibid., 75). On the eve of a rather challenging electoral period, the president had lost all legitimacy and his chances of being re-elected were compromised by growing social inequalities and a determined opposition. What followed was a deleterious election where the government used all available resources (financial, judicial, media) to disqualify the leaders of the Progressive Parties Alliance.

The decision to collectively expel an estimated three million illegal aliens occurred within this chaotic pre-electoral context. On 17 January 1983, President Shagari announced that all foreigners residing illegally in the country were being asked to either leave or get administratively regularised within two weeks, extended to a month for the more qualified like secretaries and nurses (Afolayan 1988, 20). By expelling foreigners, the objective was to reduce unemployment among Nigerian citizens and to stifle a major source of smuggling and criminality. The targeted foreigners were those engaged in informal professional activities without working permits and unlicenced traders. These groups were in in fact engaged in unfair competition with unemployed Nigerians (Afolayan 1988, 18). Beggars

and prostitutes were in a different category of foreigners. It is common knowledge that in countries experiencing immigration and having difficulties dealing with crisis and unemployment, some political leaders try to scapegoat foreigners and tighten conditions of residence. This is a means of acquiring legitimacy, as observed in Côte d'Ivoire (Marshall-Fratani 2006). Nigeria is no exception. According to the president, foreigners had abused the hospitality of Nigerians, and were urged to go back to their countries (Shagari 2001, 333).

The government relied on its own legislation and that of the new Community. The people targeted by the expulsion order had violated the provisions on residence under the 1963 law and under the terms of the Community, which require individuals to regularise their administrative situation when their stay in a member state extends beyond three months (Afolayan 1988, 18). In reality, the government contributed to transforming the expulsion operation into a disorganised and chaotic enterprise. All foreigners, including those that were already regularised, were asked to visit the immigration service at their place of residence. In a press release, the Ogun state immigration office asked for three passport photographs, a copy of the residence permit, and an attestation from the employer.

### A press release in Ogun state about the order of registration of the citizens of ECOWAS, Cameroon and Chad[6]

The Immigration Department in Ogun State has appealed to aliens from ECOWAS countries, Republics of Chad and Cameroun living in the state legally to show up and register.

A statement by the department in Abeokuta announced that registration had commenced throughout the state, and that registration centres were at the state headquarters of Immigration Department at 58B Oko-IIewo, in Abeokuta and other immigration control posts in the state.

Among other registration centres, according to the announcement, were Idi-Iroko, Ifon-yintedo, Ijoffin and Imeko towns.

All aliens who entered and lived in Nigeria prior to the coming into force of the immigration Act of 1963 and all aliens holding

valid residence permits were required to register, the statement said.

The applicants are expected to bring along three passport size photographs, original copy of residence permit and a letter of introduction from their employer, in respect of those who are employees in private or public sectors.

The statement emphasised that aliens affected and who were employed in the public sector, would only be registered after having their stay in Nigeria regularised.

It called the employers of aliens to apply for regularisation on behalf of their employees, and announced that the registration exercise would be a continuous one.

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6 "Register Now, Aliens Urged", *Daily Times*, February 16, 1983.

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In the public perception, this directive contributed to creating confusion between legal and illegal foreigners, including the refugees whereas the central government was targeting the undocumented. Amidst growing confusion, the government felt compelled to specify that Ghanaian and Chadian political refugees were exempted from the order of expulsion.[7] Besides, the government seemed not to have considered the technical and organisational means required for gathering, feeding and transporting an estimated three million deportees. It had Ghanaians conveyed on regular flights of Karbo Airlines, Inter-Continental Airlines, Ghana Airways, Swissair, KLM, Air India and Nigeria Airlines. Nevertheless, that was not enough: "hundreds of illegal aliens [were] stranded at the transit camp and the departure hall of the airport".[8] In 1970, Côte d'Ivoire had also expelled poor and handicapped migrants on special flights (Gary-Tounkara 2008, 243). According to the president, the government released one million dollars to assist the home countries of the repatriated (Shagari 2001, 331), but it is most likely that this money never reached the victims. The government was overwhelmed by events running out of its control (ibid.).

Repatriations were constant, creating a lasting trauma among Ghanaians. They tried to take as many of their belongings as they could gather. The Ghanaians were an epitome of humiliation and violence against foreigners. One can observe three types of violence in this unequal confrontation between individuals and state apparatus. Firstly, there was the disarray of long-settled migrants who were suddenly forced to pack their belongings, without an option of judicial appeal. Many, incredulous at first, ended up pleading, in vain, for an extension of the three-month deadline.[9] Some who had ongoing activities and contracts, were afraid of losing everything. O. Stephen, a tailor from Ghana, complained: "I have paid a year's rent in advance to my landlord in Ibadan. Because of the agreement entered into, I cannot get it back from him again."[10] Stephen was also under pressure from his clients,

because "since the Federal government's order a few days [earlier], a number of customers have besieged his shop forcibly demanding their clothes."[11] Another form of violence lies in the modalities of waiting and evacuation at the makeshift camps set up at airports, for the luckiest, the borders with Benin or the Apapa port for others:

> They arrived in hundreds and thousands, from all the nooks and corners of the country where they lived. They landed at Apapa inside trippers, the kind of transport not used in carrying human beings in Nigeria but for transporting goods and animals – cows to be precise.[12]

Travellers waiting for transportation were treated as social outcasts, also in transit countries on their way to Ghana, Benin and Togo.[13] They suffered inextricable dehumanisation and appeared more than ever as stateless persons. By 15 February 1983, at the peak of the expulsion exercise, about one and half million foreigners had officially left the country: 700,000 Ghanaians, 180,000 Nigeriens, 120,000 Cameroonians, 150,000 Chadians, 5,000 Togolese, 5,000 Beninese, "and a host of others."[14] According to Minister for Internal Affairs Alhaji Ali Baba, Ghanaians, Togolese and Nigeriens had been the aliens most involved in criminal and malicious acts in Lagos for over three years.[15] He was silent about the role of Nigerian citizens, thus suggesting that criminality was an imported phenomenon. According to Ali Baba, there was a national reduction in crime of about 60 percent during the expulsions.[16] In the fight against unemployment, the departure of Ghanaian teachers also released teaching positions in Lagos state, as remarked by a state executive, Dr Olawal Idriss:

> Defending the employment of the illegal immigrants in the first place, Mr. Idriss said that the State Schools Management Board had been forced to take on qualified Ghanaian teachers because at that time, Nigerian graduates were unwilling to accept teaching jobs. "But right now", he added "there are many of them who have been interviewed and are on the waiting list ready to work.[17]

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7 "Refugees", *Sunday Sketch*, January 30, 1983.

8 "Airlines, Airlift Aliens", *Daily Times*, February 3, 1983.

9 Tunji Adedigba, "Aliens Ask for More Time", *Sunday Sketch*, January 23, 1983.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 "Agony of Waiting for the Black Star Line", *Sunday Concord*, January 30, 1983.

13 "Benin, Nigeria: Border closed", *Sunday Sketch,* January 23, 1983.

14 Wole Odunaike, "1.5m Illegal Aliens Gone Home", *Daily Times,* February 15, 1983.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Tunji Adedigba, "Aliens Ask for More Time", *Sunday Sketch*, January 23, 1983.

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The public expression of rejection was focusing on Ghanaians. It is pertinent to draw a comparison here with the Malians, who were less visible but well integrated through longstanding cultural and economic ties. From 1970 to 1984, the number of legal Malians increased from 85,000 to 113,000,[18] compared to Nigeriens, Chadians or Cameroonians and Ghanaians, who were the elites of migrants due to their professional qualifications. Most of the Malians residing at Lagos were security guards, artisans, carriers or hawkers. The Yorubas in Lagos, who were better educated and trained, alongside migrants from the Eastern Nigeria, had abandoned these sectors (Sada and Adegbola 1976, 192). Quite different from Ghanaians of Fanti or Yoruba cultures, the Malians were not in direct occupational competition with Nigerians from the South. The Malian migratory model differs from that of Ghanaians, who were brought to Nigeria by the British authorities as clerks. At least since the middle of the nineteenth century, young herdsmen or farmers had moved freely between Timbuktu and Lagos, where they either worked or sold their livestock for kola nuts or imported goods before returning to their place of origin. In the course of the travel and according to the opportunities, the *baragnini* or "job-seekers" (in the Bamana or Bambara language) (Gary-Tounkara 2008, 179) looked for the quickest possible ways to reconvert to petty-trading, a very popular activity that gave substantial income. Most of them were Songhai, Tuaregs, Fulanis or Dagons, alongside Bambaras, Malinkes and Soninkes. In the countries to the south of Mali, from Côte d'Ivoire to Nigeria, this seasonal migration also occurred towards the riverine areas. As such, the equivalent of *baragninis* in Kano were referred to as *cin rani* (Mahadi and Inikori 1994, 67) or as those who "eat in dry season" in the Hausa language. In 1959, the geographer Mansell Prothero recorded the mobility of *cin rani* in Sokoto state, as well as peddlers of kola in Western Nigeria and Gold Coast, alongside migrants from Niger and other French territories.[19] According to Prothero, the number of migrants from French colonies settled in Sokoto state increased by 250,000 between 1931 and 1952 (1959, 8). In the remaining parts of the North, one could observe a movement of peasants to and from cities in search of paid work, like Chadians sojourning in Maiduguri in Borno State where they were either house-helps or artisans. Some of these migrants, from different origins, continued their journey towards southern cities, such as Ibadan where they came together in quarters initially reserved for migrants, the *sabo* (Fourchard 2009, 195).[20] In Lagos, the quarters of Ajegunle, Agege, Yaba, Obalande and Lagos Island have high concentrations of migrants from the Nigerian Sahel and Francophones: "The low-income northerners consist chiefly of livestock dealers. Among them were also kola nut traders in Agege who settled in kola growing and collecting centres of the metropolis" (Sada and Adegbola 1976, 196–97). Because of this close interaction within *sabo*, reinforced by historical, cultural and symbolic ties, Malians were often confused with the Nigerian Hausa-Fulani.[21]

To add to the confusion, Nigeria had no system of national identity cards (Matthews 2002, 53), unlike their Francophone neighbours that had inherited an overbearing spirit of administrative control from the colonial authorities. It was therefore not so easy to identify undocumented Malians. The situation was the same in the places of departure of migrants because of the inefficiency of the civil registration system. The irony of history was that in some cases, as that of Shugaba, as we will see later, the court had used the colonial-era criteria for individual identification. Thus, in 1980, to establish the Chadian ascendance of Shugaba at Maiduguri, Alhaji Maitama Yusuf, the then Minister of Internal Affairs, brought a retired Chadian of Banana (or Masa) origin to testify. The latter affirmed that the mother of Shugaba was Chadian because she had a pierced tongue and pulled out teeth, tribal marks peculiar to the Bananas of pastoral tradition:

**18** *Census of Nigeria*, 1970–84 ; Federal Ministry of Labor, *International Labor Statistics, Lagos*, 1970–1980, quoted by Arthur, 1991: 74.

**19** Mansell Prothero was one of the proponents of the theory of push and pull of migrations, en vogue in the academic circle between the 1950s and 1970s.

L. A. Kosinski and R. M. Prothero, eds., *People on the Move: Studies on Internal Migration* (London, Methuen: 1974).

**20** "In Ibadan, the density of migrants is undoubtedly much greater in the districts of Sabon Gari and Mokola, where the Hausa, Nupe and other

Northern peoples live, than in the other parts of the town" (Prothero 1959, 44).

**21** Interview with Oumar Maiga, a Malian born in Abidjan in 1971, dealer in semi-precious stones, Ibadan, 26 November 2012.

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She had both her lips pierced and those holes were visible to anyone looking at her. Also as a Banana woman, two of her teeth in the lower jaws had been removed (Ajayi 1981, 46).[22]

Three years prior to the expulsion of undocumented aliens, these methods of identification already underscored the inadequacies of some state services and the repressive strategy of the president with regard to his opponents. As it were, Malians did not consider themselves strangers in Nigeria, or *Nizeriya* in Bamana language, even though the situation changed at the beginning of 1983. Abdoulaye Dabo, a transnational seller based in Ibadan, was transporting cloths when the order for expulsion came:

I was at Mokwa [Niger State] that day. I was coming from Lomé on my way to Kano. Ha! That was serious. Because when I had heard that, I was with my luggage. I needed to go to Kano and sell. I sold my goods: I came to Mokwa. I learnt at Mokwa that no one could cross [the border] with money because there were policemen fighting immigration…[23]

Abdoulaye reacted in order to avoid having to carry liquid cash. He bought aluminium there at Mokwa, which he resold at Parakou in the Republic of Benin. Unlike thousands of his fellow citizens, according to available statistics, he escaped the expulsion.[24] As for Abdoulaye and others like him, they got no support either from the Malian government, nor from its consulates. From Parakou, he travelled to Lomé to wait for the situation in Nigeria to calm down. He later returned to Ibadan and settled in *sabo*.

In practice, the whole operation of identification, regrouping and expulsion of the undocumented turned out to be chaotic because the immigration service and the police were unprepared and there was no coordination with the migrants' states of origin. People neither had the time to be

regularised nor to prepare for their sudden departure. Despite the chaotic situation, a number of foreigners escaped being expelled with the help of Nigerian neighbours or friends. Some got their papers by marrying a Nigerian woman, others sought the support of their employers to obtain legal status.[25] Some others, finally, were probably hidden and protected by their neighbours.

## 2. Between Nationalist Vengeance and Domestically Driven Political Calculation

How does one interpret the expulsion of foreigners from the rest of the Community, Chad and Cameroon? What were its consequences in Nigeria's relationship with neighbouring countries? The matter quickly acquired a political dimension at both the international and local levels, but with different effects according to the nature of bilateral relations with the undocumented migrants' countries of origin. Concerning the Ghanaians, this will be shown further in this section. The eviction of foreigners isolated Nigeria within the Community, because it sent a negative signal concerning the regional integration policy, in which Nigeria was seeking to play an important role. The neighbouring states criticised the violation of the protocol on free movement of persons, which had been approved just three years earlier in the bid to set up the Community (Afoyolan 1988, 5). Little appreciated by Shagari, Liberian President Samuel Doe, stated that Nigeria could incite reciprocal expulsions: "We are concerned about the plight of those displaced West Africans and the repercussion it would have on millions of Nigerians living outside their country, many of whom are doing so illegally."[26] Firmly in control of Ghana since the coup of 1981, Jerry Rawlings, another rival of Shagari, called on his fellow citizens to return to Ghana in order to build an egalitarian society.[27] However, some Ghanaians preferred to go to Côte d'Ivoire, the richest country in Francophone

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22  For more details about this group, read: Dumas-Champion, Françoise. 1983. *Les Masa du Tchad. Bétail et société*. Paris: Maison des sciences de l'homme.

23  Interview of 24 November 2012 at Ibadan. Abdoulaye is the president of Malians in Oyo State, attached to the Council of Malians in Nigeria with its headquarters at Lagos. Among his duties, he takes care of the relations between the members of his community and their neighbours and authorities.

24  "Les expulsions de Maliens en Afrique", *Jamana* [Bamako], July–October 1987, 59. This number was probably underestimated. The counting of border crossing of persons on the frontiers of Upper Volta is broken down as follows: 1048 persons for the segment of Koro-Bankass, 254 for Tominian-Mandiakuy, 26 at Koury. Through Niger Republic, 92 and 5, 313 persons crossed through the posts of Ménaka and Labézanga respectively. Archives of the Ministry of Territorial and Local Government

Administration (AMATCL), a reflection on the problem of refugees and the turning back of citizens by other countries, September 1983.

25  "Aliens Resort to Deals to Stay Put in Nigeria", *Sunday Concord*, January 23, 1983.

26  "Nigerians in Ghana Advised", *Sunday Concord*, February 6, 1983.

27  Ibid.

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West Africa and the major host country of Malians, or trying their luck again in Nigeria once the tension calmed down.[28] The media publicity of the conditions of arrival of the repatriated shaped the reaction in the Francophone countries. The Republic of Benin protested against the influx of Ghanaians at its eastern borders and bemoaned the saturation of public intervention system. In Mali, the government remained discreet; the arrivals were taking place in the regional peripheries of Gao and Timbuktu. Criticised by African public opinion, Nigeria lost credibility in its role as the locomotive of the Community.

The expulsion of foreigners from Nigeria sparked off criticism from Western Europe. Pope John Paul II was deeply touched.[29] In the United Kingdom, the leader of the opposition, Michael Foot, denounced the expulsions.[30] This criticism did not go down well with a section of Nigerians, including those opposing the expulsion, who underlined the historical responsibility the United Kingdom in drawing the borders and, therefore, dividing African peoples, brothers and cousins whose political destiny diverged on the account of colonialism.[31] Faced with such a scale of protest, Nigerian diplomats were having a hard time remaking the image of the country in the international community.[32] They took cover behind the law: the repatriated had neither documents nor legal status and shifted responsibility for the situation to the bad will of the state of origin in receiving their citizens. The three million people (the largest expulsion in Africa) represented a negligible proportion of the Nigerian population, but this was not the case for the countries of origin (Okafor and Mac-Anigboro 1990, 59). The power relations imposed by Nigeria on its neighbours were untenable.

In Nigerian society, there was heated public debate between proponents and opponents of the expulsions: "The Nigerians received the news of the expulsion of aliens with mixed feelings. Some felt happy over it, others unhappy.

Some showed pity for the aliens, others were lukewarm, and those who employed illegal aliens bemoaned the collapse of their business."[33] Supporters adopted the official posture, with financial considerations in mind. They saw themselves neither as nationalists nor as selfish, because Nigeria remained the biggest contributor to the institutions of the Community (Afolayan 1988, 15). And the slowdown of economic activity affected them first. In these conditions, they felt that national resources derived from oil production should benefit Nigerian citizens and not the Community via foreigners residing in the country, and who had no papers. It was as though, within the framework of the Community, Shagari had adopted the popular formula of Margaret Thatcher against the European Economic Community in 1979: "I want my money back!" This position calls to mind that of Côte d'Ivoire under Félix Houpouët-Boigny in 1958, when French West African (AOF) colonies obtained internal autonomy within the Franco-African Community. Côte d'Ivoire, where there were many migrant workers from the rest of AOF (from Upper-Volta and from French Sudan mainly), successfully opposed the retaining of a federal political structure desired by Senegal and French Sudan. It wanted to prevent a federal political entity from accessing its own commercial profits. One of the results of this decision was an exacerbation of nationalism and the expulsion of Dahomeans and Togolese, and a minority of Ghanaians and Nigerians of Yoruba origin, mistakenly identified as Dahomeans (Gary-Tounkara 2008, 130). In 1960, AOF disappeared, to the satisfaction of Côte d'Ivoire and France. Later, in 1975, France expressed its reservations on the creation of the Community under the auspices of Nigeria, whose influence in its former colonies it wanted to curtail (Adesina 2007, 40).

From the perspective of score-settling, some Nigerians regarded the expulsion as a response to the expulsion of their fellow citizens from Ghana in 1969 (Afolayan 1988, 19). ). This was a sentiment that was shared by the Gha-

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28  Soji Ajayi, "Second Coming of Aliens", *Sunday Sketch*, June 26, 1983.

29  Kayode Soyinka, "Expulsion of Aliens: Nigerians Diplomats Fumble Abroad", *Sunday Concord*, February 13, 1983.

30  Ibid.

31  Ola Balogun, "Illegal Aliens Issue: Pandering to Mob Xenophobia", *Sunday Concord*, January 30, 1983.

32  Kayode Soyinka, "Expulsion of Aliens: Nigerians Diplomats Fumble Abroad", *Sunday Concord*, February 13, 1983.

33  "Reactions: Mixed Feelings", *Sunday Concord*, January 30, 1983.

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naians suffering in transit camps, as was widely carried by the press: "Although the general feeling among Ghanaians was that Nigeria was retaliating for what happened to its citizens thirteen years previously in Ghana, when the Busia regime sent them packing, their main anger – specially as the days dragged slowly by, leaving them still waiting at the harbours and airports – was against their government and leader, Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings, whom some described, with disgust, as 'an idiot,' 'a soldier who does not behave like one,' and a 'coward.'" [34] In 1969, Nigerians living in Ghana for several generations had been deported in brutal and dehumanising conditions (Olaniyi 2008, 12, 19). They returned to a country that they hardly knew and that was in the heat of a civil war, which Ghana had contributed indirectly to sustaining by according temporary recognition to the secessionist Republic of Biafra. Possessing strong academic, cultural and entrepreneurial capital, the repatriated were able to settle down or socially integrate. The economic growth that oil production stimulated from 1973 and the active support of the local authorities of Lagos and the Western State facilitated their reintegration. [35] Nevertheless, the sudden return of Nigerians from Ghana in 1969 was deeply engraved in the collective memory, and one of the interpretations of the 1983 expulsion was that Nigeria had taken its revenge on its historical rival. This major factor, from a psychological perspective, represents a desire to settle scores with the Ghanaian rival as an expression of nationalist vengeance. This took the form of a triple sanction: to remind Ghana of the pain of having to suddenly take care of one's citizens, to exacerbate Ghana's political difficulties, and to cut to size a country that was considered presumptuous and had since 1957 proclaimed itself the representative of sub-Saharan Africa. Shagari, conscious of this latent feeling of humiliation, made use of it to send a message to his own army, some of whom might have been

inspired by the charismatic model of Rawlings (Philippe 1983, 120). Subsequent events proved that he was not completely wrong as he was overthrown by General Buhari in December 1983, plunging Nigeria into a long period of military regimes.

On the other hand, a portion of public opinion, intellectuals and opponents of the government, criticised the expulsion. The condemnation were based on four points: the difficulty in identifying and differentiating foreigners from citizens, the breakdown of diplomatic relations, the diversion strategy of the president, and the reactivation of internal opposition among Nigerians, between indigenes and non-indigenes, which could weaken the new unity of the country. For the NPP of Dr. Azikiwe, on which the peoples of the Middle Belt – Anambara, Imo and Plateau States – placed their hopes during the general elections of 1979 (Joseph 1981, 31), Shagari pointed to foreigners because he needed scapegoats to make people forget the failure of the fight against unemployment (Afolayan 1988, 19), an argument that was relayed in Western Europe. [36] Alhaji Shugaba Darman, a leader of the GNPP, the dominant party in the House of Representatives of both Gongola and Borno states, underlined the risk of retaliation on Nigerian emigrants and the difficulty identifying foreigners in Borno, a border state to Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroon:

> The deportation order would cause a lot of problems in Borno since it would not be easy to identify the aliens in certain parts of the state, especially at the border. He advised that caution should be exercised to avoid wrong deportation especially of Nigerians who do not have identity cards. [37]

Shugaba was talking with facts because he had been unjustly expelled to Chad three years earlier (Ajayi 1981).

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**34** May Ezekiel and Michael Awoyinfa, "Exodus: Ghanaians Go Home", *Sunday Concord*, January 30, 1983.

**35** "A leading example of the deported entrepreneurs from Ghana was Chief David Adebayo Amao Alta who was honoured with the title of *Babalaje* (leader of business tycoons) of Ogbomosoland in recognition of his commercial contributions. He was a successful businessman and pioneer of manufacturing industries in Ogbomoso whose conglomerate

employed over 10,000 workers and agents between the 1970s and 1990s. He was educated at C.M.S Central School, Onisha and Commerce College, Kumasi Ghana. After his deportation from Ghana, where he had spent twenty-four years, Amo Alta served as co-founder of the union in Ogbomoso" (Olaniyi 2008, 25).

**36** "In the Western world many believed that the quit order on foreigners was motivated by political considerations. They believed the action was timed

for an election year as a vote-catching stunt by an incumbent government which has suffered criticism at home especially on corruption and mounting unemployment." Kayode Soyinka, "Expulsion of Aliens: Nigerians Diplomats Fumble Abroad", *Sunday Concord*, 13 February 1983.

**37** "Shugaba Warns on Deportation Order", *Sunday Sketch*, January 30, 1983.

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On 24 January 1980, the Minister of Internal Affairs accused him of being a Chadian and of having planned the assassination of members of the NPN of President Shagari in Borno State with the help of Chadian migrant workers. The GNPP representative was summarily expelled to a country that was in the middle of a civil war: Chad. Though his passport had been taken from him, he managed to get back to Maiduguri via Cameroon on 13 March, and argued his case at a judicial proceeding instituted under public pressure by the President. Shugaba won the case and got back his full rights as a Nigerian citizen. The case had been organised by the leaders of NPN of Borno, as stated by Justice Patrick Chukwuma Akpamgbo during his judgement in Maiduguri on 25 July.

> The applicant belongs to the GNPP according to his evidence and he is the Leader of the House. The NPN is their rival according to the evidence before me in this state and applicant's counsel has asked me to take judicial notice which I shall take that the 1st respondent, the Minister of Internal Affairs and the 3rd respondent His Excellency the President of Federal Republic also belong to the NPN the ruling party at the Federal level in Lagos. I cannot in this case before me rule out political victimisation from the evidence before me as I have reviewed that it was this political victimisation that led to the deportation of the applicant who has been in parties since 1951 starting with NEPU then NPC. The mother said that the applicant went to Mecca with Sardauna as she put it. (Ajayi 1981, 156–57)

One can make an instructive comparison with the use of Ivoirity in Côte d'Ivoire in the case of Alassane Dramane Ouattara, which occurred a decade later (Gary-Tounkara 2010). Considered as a Burkinabe, Head of State Henri Konan Bédié prevented him from standing in presidential elections from 1995. In Côte d'Ivoire, although foreigners had had the right to vote in elections from 1960 to 1994, the two Dramanes were accused of not belonging to any national group. They were called upon to prove their identity, including bringing material proof of their maternal links – which led to a DNA test being conducted on the mother of Ouattara. In 2010, after contesting an election with the outgoing president, Laurent Gbagbo, Ouattara finally became president with the help of France and the

UN. Meanwhile, the country had undergone a long period of uncertainty as the doubt on Ouattara's origin insidiously extended to his real and supposed loyalists: the Dioula of the northern part of the country as well as Burkinabes and Malians. In protest at the political and administrative exclusion that ensued, a part of the army rebelled against President Gbagbo, and the country was divided into two from 2002 to 2010 (Soro 2005).

Among the intellectual critics was the writer and filmmaker Ola Balogun, of Yoruba origin. He drew attention to the populist and xenophobic mobilisation of the president: "the much touted expulsion order is no more than the desperate play of a leadership that is incapable of proposing any serious solutions to the current economic crisis in the country."[38] Now, the president himself traced his ancient roots to the Fulani journey from Senegal to Sokoto, prelude to the theocratic revolution of Usman Dan Fodio (2001, 2). In the same way, on the eve of the colonial occupation, the father of Shugaba, born at Chigina in the southeast of present day Chad, had been recruited into the army of Sultan Gauramgama (Ajayi 1981, 81). The formidable conqueror Rebah defeated him in 1893, and he took refuge near the borders of Chad. The Baghirmi (father of Shugaba) then settled at Maiduguri in 1911 and married the mother of Shugaba, a Kanuri woman. Ola Balogun explained that the nature of African boundaries and the existence of transborder communities implied a flexible management of international migration. According to him, neither Nigerian authorities nor those of neighbouring countries respected the rights of citizens to acquire a passport, which thwarted efforts to regularise illegal immigration. He asked a crucial question: after the mass repatriation of foreigners today: Whose turn will it be tomorrow? What if the indigenes of different Nigerian states followed the example of Shagari, but against non-indigenes, on the pretext that they are foreigners to the state? After the anti-Ibo riot of Kano in 1953 and the exodus of refugees during the civil war of 1967 to 1970 (Falola and Okpeh 2008), was Shagari not opening Pandora's box? Balogun queried thus:

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**38** Ola Balogun, "Illegal Alien Issue: Pandering to Mob Xenophobia", *Sunday Concord*, January 30, 1983.

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Do we fully realize the consequences of attempting to make each African state an island unto itself? And how much more time will elapse before each of the 19 states of the federation of Nigeria (or 9 or 65, if the advocates of state creation have their way), enacts a law requiring non-indigenes of each state to return their states of origin?[39]

To preserve national unity and confer equal rights on citizens, Nigeria reached an initial consensus by affirming the federal character of national and regional institutions and the principle of full citizenship in the state of origin. This was a legacy of the British administration that had defined the categories of indigenes and non-indigenes at a particular moment and based on political criteria; the law has continued to wrongly define the indigene. This paved way for new conflicts on the problematic category of strangers. Qualified as "scissiparous federalism" (Bach 1988, 22), the multiplication of states was intended to prevent the supremacy of Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Ibo groups. But it actually perpetuated this supremacy insofar as it shifted tensions over access between indigenes and non-indigenes to economic resources at the local level.

For the Malians, the expulsion was seen as nationalist vengeance in reaction to the expulsion of Nigerians from Ghana in 1969, a sort of jealousy towards Ghanaian managerial staff and a political manoeuvre by the president. Moussa Tounkara, a former *baragnini*, now a seller of semi-precious stones in Lagos, described the tension and the confusion that were in the air at the time of expulsion:

> Anyway, people, they talked a lot. Some said that it wasn't everybody, [it was for] the Ghanaians, some others, they said that Shagari [said] that it is the Ghanaians, they must go back to Ghana. Others, they say that it is for foreigners. But what I told you, at that time, in Nigeria, there [was] a lot of brutality: everybody [was] afraid. That is why everybody, they started to leave, but we, we didn't leave [the country][40].

In other words, the authorities were targeting foreigners, particularly the Ghanaians, even though that was officially denied. The testimony of Moussa Cissé, also a seller at Idumota, was rather more explicit:

What all of us understood was that there were foreigners who voted against Shagari. When Shagari became president, it was to be revoted [*sic*, reelected…]. Some people say other things, which is [*sic*] not the same, that is possible. But what we all followed [understood] was that […] that is to say, there were cases, for example, if you arrive at zone [a place, an area], you can't say the names of people [target them directly]; all the strangers should be chased away, at the same time. Otherwise, Malians are not conscious enough in these zones, as were the Ghanaians, the Beninese and Yorubas.[41]

Cissé, who also escaped the expulsion, believes that the president, campaigning for re-election in August 1983, suspected Ghanaians of serving as a disguised electoral reserve for the opposition, and expelled all the foreigners so as not to reveal his political manoeuvre. Among other things, the GNPP of Shugaba, the NPP of Dr Azikiwe and the Unity Party of Nigeria of Chief Obafemi Awolowo had formed a coalition against the NPN: the Progressive Parties Alliance (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985, 78). Awolowo, Shagari's main rival, depended especially on the electoral support of citizens of Yoruba extraction (Joseph 1981, 30). A rumour circulated that the opposition was intending to have foreigners register and vote fraudulently, especially Ghanaians and Yoruba (Gravil 1985, 528). This explanation, surprising *a priori*, cannot be neglected given the weight of ethnic affiliation in Nigerian political culture and the fact that one could mistake a Ghanaian for a Nigerian from the West, and a Nigerien, a Malian or a Chadian for a northern Nigerian. On transnational communities, Balogun pointed out the historical and cultural proximity of some Nigerians with the illegal immigrants expelled by Shagari:

> In the end, there is no escaping the fact that in the overwhelming majority of cases, we are not dealing with a faceless entity known as "illegal aliens", but with our own kith and kin from other African countries, even if the circumstances of colonial partition of African countries have conferred different nominal nationalities on us for the present.
>
> What is the real difference between a Yoruba man from Benin Republic and a Yoruba man from Nigeria, or a Hausa man from Nigeria and his cousin from Niger Republic? Does a Fulbe pastoralist from the north of Cameroun Republic have different blood in his veins from the Fulani herdsman in Sokoto?

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**39** Ibid.

**40** Interview, November 2012, Lagos.

**41** Interview, 1 December 2012, Lagos.

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> Even more to the point, does the villager from Ogoja necessarily have more in common with his fellow Nigerian citizen from Bornu than with a Fanti tribesman from Ghana, beyond he accident of their having found themselves together or not within the confines of a colonial entity administered as a single unit by Great Britain? [42]

After the political conspiracy against Shugaba, this rumour continued to fuel an atmosphere of generalised suspicion against foreigners at the end of Shagari era. Without being said openly, the expulsion of foreigners in general, and Ghanaians in particular, was aimed at depriving Awolowo of a part of his supposed electoral base. Another event had contributed to questioning the place of foreigners in socio-political life: the Maitatsine riot in Kano in December 1980. This social mobilisation of poor Northern youths, mostly Nigerians, under the guise of religious demands, was led by Muhammadu Marwa, a preacher of Cameroonian origin. It turned into a rebel movement composed of foreigners, who were arrested, tried, convicted and expelled to Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Mali (Usman 1987, 77–80). The political and media handling of the Maitatsine and Shugaba cases by the president therefore contributed in forging a prejudice or feeling that foreigners were a threat to the security of the country and its leaders at the regional level. In a tense pre-electoral context, they equally appeared as riggers who were trying, with the supposed help of the opposition, to influence the choice of citizens by registering illegally to vote. Considering the aftermath of the events of Kano and the expulsion of Shugaba, the persons interviewed in the course of this research drew a link between the expulsion of 1983 and what happened three years earlier.[43] Be that as it may, economic crisis and unemployment found a fertile ground for the public expression of xenophobia.

### 3. Conclusion
Quite brutal in its formulation and implementation, the expulsion of illegal foreign immigrants from the rest of the Community, Cameroon and Chad left an enduring mark in the national consciousness and the local languages. Reinterpreted in the context of post-expulsion, the popular expression "Ghana-must-go" is a proof of this event: since 1983, it refers to the type of bag used by people to transport goods and materials, alluding to the Ghanaians who fled hurriedly from the country, having only bags as luggage.

Beyond being a classical response of a government battling with heavy social effects of economic crisis, the expulsion also reveals another less obvious fact: the use of the foreigner label by President Shagari in trying to disqualify his political opponents or to generate public support. In 1980, in the wake of his election, he caused the deportation of Shugaba, accused of being a Chadian and of having planned the assassination of a representative of his party in Borno. The legal action instituted to clarify facts decided that it was a government conspiracy and rehabilitated Shugaba, who had succeed in coming back to Maiduguri. In 1983, on the eve of a presidential election accompanied by crisis, the expulsion of foreigners emanates from another government strategy, which caused a rumour to circulate that the opposition was planning to make foreigners vote illegally, especially those of Yoruba origin like Ghanaians. This throws more light on the expulsion of 1983, which simultaneously symbolised a confrontation by proxy between the president and Chief Awolowo, his major rival. The xenophobic mobilisation thus crystallised on Ghanaians. In a political society and culture that is still characterised by the weight of clientelism and ethnic affiliations, as well as transnational social links, the expulsion is regarded as the double response of the president: chase away foreigners from the national labour market on one hand, and on the other, weaken the supposed electoral base of his rival. This is not only explained by the number or the social position of Ghanaians but also by the internal political stakes that appear on nationalist and identity terrain, thus creating suspicion against opponents and "bad" foreigners. In its nationalist dimension, the eviction of

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**42** Ola Balogun, "Illegal Alien Issue: Pandering to Mob Xenophobia", *Sunday Concord*, January 30, 1983.

**43** I thank Patrick Oloko for putting me on this track.

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Ghanaians from Nigeria also meant retaliation for the expulsion of Nigerians residing in Ghana in 1969.

The Head of State, who had tried to rebrand his image by expelling illegal foreigners, precipitated his own fall because he was not able to improve the economic situation, which led to the return of the army to power. Despite the context of crisis, migrants represented a useful and sought-after source of labour to Nigerian entrepreneurs and employers, especially in the informal sector, hence the return of migrant workers. In 1985, this time on the initiative of Buhari, half a million illegal residents were expelled again from the country.

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# Collective Mobilization and the Struggle for Squatter Citizenship: Rereading "Xenophobic" Violence in a South African Settlement

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Given the association between informal residence and the occurrence of "xenophobic" violence in South Africa, this article examines "xenophobic violence" through a political account of two squatter settlements across the transition to democracy: Jeffsville and Brazzaville on the informal periphery of Atteridgeville, Gauteng. Using the concepts of political identity, living politics and insurgent citizenship, the paper mines past and present to explore identities, collective practices and expertise whose legacy can be traced in contemporary mobilization against foreigners, particularly at times of popular protest. I suggest that the category of the "surplus person", which originated in the apartheid era, lives on in the unfinished transition of squatter citizens to formal urban inclusion in contemporary South Africa. The political salience of this legacy of superfluity is magnified at times of protest, not only through the claims made on the state, but also through the techniques for protest mobilization, which both activate and manufacture identities based on common suffering and civic labour. In the informal settlements of Jeffsville and Brazzaville, these identities polarised insurgent citizens from non-citizen newcomers, particularly those traders whose business-as-usual practices during times of protest appeared as evidence of their indifference and lack of reciprocity precisely at times when shared suffering and commitment were produced as defining qualities of the squatter community.

In May 2008, violent, collective anti-immigrant evictions broke out in localities across South Africa, leading to sixty-two deaths, the displacement of thousands of people, deployment of the army to curb the attacks, and the erection of tented camps to shelter tens of thousands of victims (Igglesden, Monson, and Polzer 2009). Such incidences of collective violence had happened before, and continue to occur on a sporadic basis (Africa Research Bulletin 2011, 38–41; Commey 2013). Many explanations have mapped the violence onto racial identities (Gqola 2008; Matsinhe 2012; Tafira 2011) or broad economic variables such as poverty, relative deprivation, or competition for resources (IDASA 2008; Human Sciences Research Council 2008; Joubert 2008; Amisi et al. 2011, Gelb 2008). Comparative case studies have highlighted instead the importance of local leadership (Misago 2012) and struggles for citizenship (Von Holdt et al. 2011). Other emerging readings, focusing

on the detail of specific cases, have highlighted "place-based identities" (Kirshner 2014, 6), and complexities in the moral economy of incidents of collective violence (Monson 2012; Kerr and Durrheim 2013; Kirshner 2012). By probing the local logic of collective violence, as other key studies of violence have done (Kalyvas 2009, 6; 26, Mamdani 2001, 8), these studies counteract arguments attributing attacks to a "xenophobic" false consciousness originating from national elites (Hayem 2013; Mosselson 2010).

This paper builds on the discovery of a significant association between informal residence – that is, living in a shack or other untitled dwelling – and the incidence of "xenophobic" violence in South Africa (Fauvelle-Aymar and Wa Kabwe-Segatti 2012). In South Africa, informal residence has historically been concentrated in distinct areas composed of untitled, makeshift shacks on irregularly occupied land.[1] These sites,

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1 The densities of informal housing in the backyards of formal townships are also growing.

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referred to as "squatter camps" or "informal settlements",[2] are often framed primarily in terms of their synonymity with poverty. However, they have also been associated with defiant collective politics throughout the twentieth century and beyond (Bonner 1990; Stadler 1979; Vawda 1997; Van Tonder 1989; Chance 2011; Makhulu 2010; Selmeczi 2012; Pithouse 2014). Given that history, geography ,and politics come together to create the political identities that animate violence (Mamdani 2001), and that place has the power to shape social relations (Gieryn 2000), this article examines "xenophobic violence" through a political account of two squatter settlements across the transition to democracy in South Africa.

The contribution is based on a double-embedded case study of two areas of Mshongo, an informal residential area on the periphery of Atteridgeville, Tshwane, in the province of Gauteng. This is a productive site for a study of the local politics of violence because a large-scale, violent eviction of foreigners resulted in several deaths and major displacement occurred here *before* the nationwide outbreak and snowballing of attacks in 2008, independently of the momentum that a sense of national crisis gave to that period. Mshongo was also an area for which secondary qualitative data was available to bridge the period between the 2008 violence and my fieldwork in 2012. I selected two areas of the settlement as the embedded cases for my study: Jeffsville, founded in 1991 before the advent of democracy, and Brazzaville, founded in 1998, four years into the democratic dispensation (Figure 1). 251658240

**Figure 1: The constituent settlements of Mshongo in Atteridgeville, Tshwane**

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Drawing on Mamdani's concept of political identities as contoured by institutions and practices of the state (Mamdani 2001), and Holston's observations on how marginalization can form the foundation for counterpolitics among those subjected to differential citizenship (Holston 2008; Von Holdt et al. 2011), I used primary data collected in 2012 (forty-four field encounters), secondary data collected by the African Centre for Migration and Society in 2008 (twenty-one interview transcripts), and national, provincial, and local government archives to explore top-down and bottom-up forces that have shaped squatter collective identity and practices both before and after the advent of democracy, and to trace their relationship to violence against foreigners. Following Foucault, I treat these written and spoken texts as an incomplete set of "traces left by the past", which do not add up to a final truth, but can nevertheless be reconstituted in relation to each other (O'Farrell 1989, 62), in order to make other cases more comprehensible.

## 1. Squatter Camps: A Place for the "Surplus" among the Citizens

Mamdani sees political identities as institutionalized through laws, policies, and practices, which can both individualize and collate identities. These group identities "shape our relationship to the state and to one another through the state", becoming the starting point of "our struggles" (Mamdani 2001, 22). In the same way, the political meaning of squatter camps has been shaped by a changing institutional context, moving from deliberate racial and spatial stratification during Apartheid to attempts to address differentiated citizenship with the advent of democracy.

From 1948 to 1994, under the National Party, South Africa was subject to a system of extreme racial and spatial segregation, in which legitimate space in the cities was reserved only for those "black" bodies essential for the servicing of the "white" city; beyond this, all "black" people were deemed "surplus" and barred from cities through a complex regime of "influx control" permit restrictions and limitations on the development and funding of "black" urban residential areas (Maylam 1995, 75–76; Posel 1991). Squatter settlements emerged in defiance of Apartheid's efforts to contain "black" urbanisation, despite the repres-

sive character of legislation and spatial policy, and the forced removal of numerous settlements (Platzky and Walker 1985). Archived Cabinet Committee minutes from the 1980s illustrate, in repeated discussions of the paradigmatic Western Cape case of Crossroads, that squatter territories could exceed the power of the state's coercive forces to discipline them, becoming difficult to police and creating flows of urbanization and heterogeneous communities that proved virtually impossible to reverse (for instance, see Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development 1984, 175; Cabinet Committee for Political Affairs 1985).

The removal of Crossroads became a focus of political resistance and unwanted international pressure on the Apartheid state (Working Group for the Cabinet Committee on Constitutional Development 1984, 191), which helped prompt the liberalisation of explicitly race-based influx controls to apparently non-racial "orderly urbanization" from 1986. However, this was simply a change in the focus of state repression (Booth and Biyela 1988, Huchzermeyer 2003, Hindson 1985), where exclusion moved from a focus on the "black" body in general to the body of the "illegal squatter" as the "surplus" to be excluded from urban space. Whereas existing squatter camps were to be formalized under the new legislation, harsher measures including summary eviction were set in place for any new squatters (Provincial Secretary for the Transvaal 1988, Annexure B; J. C. Heunis – Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning 1988).

In the process of "depoliticising" influx control, the government devolved authority over squatter control to provincial level. In the case of the Transvaal Provincial Authority (TPA), which presided over Atteridgeville before the birth of the Gauteng province in 1994, the repressive provisions of the Act were seen to clash with the realities of urbanisation. As such, the TPA accepted as policy that it was only "concerned with the so-called positive steps in terms of the Act" (Chief Director – Land Use c 1987, November). It explicitly deemed the Act's powers to provide land for the homeless and ensure its gradual, orderly development to be a more appropriate response to squatter settlements (Executive Director: Community Services – TPA c 1987,

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10–11 and 11–13). As such, the TPA turned the exclusionary Act into a mechanism for the transition of both current and future squatters into the formal city. However, this was no easy task given the shortage of viable urban land and ongoing, more subtle restrictions on "black" urbanisation imposed by the national state – such as constraints on housing development, the privatisation of the housing market, and an insistence that already under-resourced townships become self-funding through the imposition of ever higher rentals and service fees.

The contradictions of the time also included gradual political liberalisation and the unbanning of revolutionary organisations while covert military operations were still taking place, leaving activists and returning exiles still at risk from the state (Liebenberg 1994). In Atteridgeville, these socio-historical circumstances would shape squatting as a citizenship-claiming practice in contradictory ways. On the one hand, it shaped a mode of active, "insurgent citizenship" (Holston 2009, 2008) drawing on communitarian forms of social organisation and resources of violence from the national liberation struggle to defend the space squatters made in the city. On the other, it shaped the anticipation of a transition to fuller citizenship and a more passive practice of compliant, institutionalised waiting, particularly after the advent of non-racial democracy in 1994. In the following, I show how the legacy of these social forms, violent resources, and anticipation of a more equal citizenship to come can be traced through the transition to democracy, to post-democracy resistance to evictions in the late 1990s and on to evictions of foreigners in the late 2000s.

## 2. "Living Politics" before Democracy

As state institutions and practices shape counter-political identities (Mamdani 2001, 22), I start by examining the squatter politics that developed in Atteridgeville in response to the definition of "black" urbanites, and later squatters in particular, as an unwanted and forbidden "surplus". In recent studies of the shackdwellers' movement in post-apartheid South Africa, scholars have explored the concept of "living politics", which considers the political meaning of squatters' everyday living conditions, and views the same as the foundation for a form of subaltern political

agency (Chance 2011; Selmeczi 2012). The same construct can be traced in the way in which superfluity or non-belonging was inscribed on "black" subjects through structured distortions of everyday life in Atteridgeville, creating an indivisible unity of the personal and the political.

By the mid 1980s, an average of nine people were dwelling in each of the modest township houses of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) region of the Transvaal, while housing supply was increasing at one third of the speed of population growth (Platzky and Walker 1985, 163). In Atteridgeville, all housing development and expansion of the township had been "frozen" since 1964 (National Archives Repository (NAR) BAO 8/71 A6/5/2/P54/1G-2G 20/2/2/3 1987a). For adequate living space, those with rights to family accommodation would have to return to a state-manufactured ethnic "homeland", or apply for housing in Soshanguve (National Archives Repository (NAR) CDB1768 PB3–2–3–8 c.1987), a township earmarked for inclusion into the "independent" Republic of Bophuthatswana – a process that would require such "surplus" families to surrender their South African (infra-)citizenship. Holding onto their place on the margins of the city of Pretoria meant enduring the mundane consequences of the overcrowding of formal houses, and a proliferation of informal "backyard" accommodation that eventually led to the declaration of Atteridgeville as a housing "crisis area" in 1987 (National Archives Repository (NAR) BAO 8/71 A6/5/2/P54/1G-2G 20/2/2/3 1987b).

Overcrowding and the consequent deterioration of living conditions became a mundane and ever-present inscription on township dwellers of their designation as "surplus" people. A typical expression of the mundane – but deeply political – motivations for squatting in Atteridgeville was conveyed by an early squatter at Jeffsville, who explained that she chose to squat as she was living with ten or more family members in a house with only four rooms:

> I lived in Atteridgeville with my parents. You know, our houses have four rooms, with the whole family living there. There were six children in my family, and two of my siblings had their own kids. (female interviewee, Jeffsville, 4 August 2012)

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Jeffsville founder Jeff Ramohlale highlighted similar problems – such as two brothers and their wives sharing a single room – as the primary force behind his mobilisation of the squatter movement in Atteridgeville (Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12 July 2012). Backyard lodgers struggling to pay rent to their better-established "black" landlords, and, enduring the mundane tensions of landlord-tenant relations, became another group of early squatters (male respondent, Jeffsville, 1 August 2012). This personal politics of everyday hardships – the inscription of national politics on life through suffering – prompted the 1991 land invasion that founded Jeffsville, illustrating the way in which marginalised citizens are able, by virtue of their very marginalisation, to constitute an insurgent counterpolitics (Roy 2009, 8, Holston 2008).

The entanglement of personal and political that is evident in squatters' motivations to illegally occupy land is a first signal of a politics both local and national, in that the squatter mobilisation was a response to the deeply parochial, local manifestations of structural exclusion on the national political stage. It claimed not simply living space but the prospect of formal inclusion, in the context of a notion of squatting-as-transition that had emerged in the Transvaal, as well as to the softening of government policy around the expansion of Atteridgeville (National Archives Repository (NAR) BAO 8/71 6/5/2/P54/2 1986). Even as they opposed the state, enacting an insurgent demand for space through land invasions, and facing a series of evictions and Ramohlale's arrest and detention without trial, squatters were seeking not the overthrow of the state but to secure a rightful place within it. In line with the TPA's tolerance, they held fast to a hope that squatting would facilitate official recognition and a transition into formal housing:

> Some of us we were paying rent, and some were not working and didn't have that money to pay the rent, so we said "No, let's go and start our own houses, shack houses, and maybe the government will provide houses for us" (male respondent, Jeffsville, 17 July 2012)

Through the mobilisation of would-be squatters in response to "living politics" in the township, personal politics also created space for the public (though at the time still largely underground) politics of the anti-apart-

heid resistance movement. From the point of view of struggle activists, the establishment of the squatter camp was to create an "impenetrable" space for the safe return of exiles and the security of "comrades" from revolutionary militias such as Mkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) in the township (male respondent, Jeffsville, 19 August 2012). At the time, the South African government was still engaged in counter-revolutionary activities (Liebenberg 1994), and many anti-apartheid activists and militia members could not risk returning from exile. In this way, the occupation of marginal township space joined the mundane, personal politics of superfluous life with the revolutionary politics of the anti-apartheid struggle, embodying an insurgent claim for the material and political rights of citizenship, articulated at both the local and national levels.

### 3. Repertoires and Resources of Collective Mobilisation and Violence

Squatting, as a practice of insurgent citizenship linked to common personal and public political goals, produced mobilisation infrastructures that served both to defend and reproduce the political subjectivity of an insurgent "surplus" population. This infrastructure helps explain how exclusionary sentiments within squatter camps are able to transform into collective acts of coercion that are less commonly seen elsewhere in the formal parts of South Africa's cities. In this section, I draw on examples from both Jeffsville and Brazzaville to illustrate the repertoires, resources and expertise of collective mobilisation and violence that emerged prior to democracy and have persisted in certain forms up until today.

In the early 1990s, the interface between a more parochial "living politics" and the explicit national political strategies of the African National Congress (ANC) and its allies in South Africa's liberation struggle provided the combination of coercive force and popular consent required to establish Jeffsville as a territory in the political sense of the word: land occupied by violence (Vaughan-Williams 2009, 66). Gathering to build shacks without explicit authority is an oppositional practice through which squatters "collectively mobilize and identify with each other as political communities" (Chance 2011). Repeated eviction, demolition, and confiscation of building materials became a pro-

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ductive form of collective suffering that solidified a sense of micro-political community in Atteridgeville among squatters who, organized by Jeff Ramohlale, set up make-shift shelters overnight numerous times on the east, north, and western peripheries of the township. On 16 September 1991, they "forcefully entered where Jeffsville is now and started squatting" (male respondent, Jeffsville, 4 August 2012) – voting to name the settlement after their leader.

Claiming and defending Jeffsville against the coercive force of the state required a range of repertoires of popular force, which benefitted greatly from resources and repertoires drawn from the infrastructure of the broader liberation struggle. Squatter mobiliser Ramohlale was an ANC activist identified as a "commander" (male respondent, Jeffsville, 4 August 2012) and familiar with the township repertoires of the ANC's campaign of "ungovernability" – designed to frustrate and disable the state's military-security complex (Stemmet and Barnard 2003, 101). Riots and revolutionary activity in Atteridgeville included "threats, intimidation, petrol bombings of officers' homes and assaults leaving police officers in intensive care " (National Archives Repository (NAR) BAO 3/671 A2/17/6/5/A99 Vol 1 1986), depicting a context already replete with violent expertise. The involvement of struggle militias, who provided safe-houses for comrades within the squatter settlement, provided extensive resources for violence. "Comrades" held a stock of illegal weapons, and were familiar with techniques for the elimination of enemies of the struggle:

> It's either petrol bomb – you know, they let you drink petrol, nee, they let you drink petrol, they give you a cigarette and then that cigarette is light. PUMM!!! He go. Or they stone you. There were illegal guns here; a lot of illegal guns. A lot of illegal guns. We were in possession of not only guns, even rifles. We had rifles here. A lot of them. And automatics. (male respondent, Jeffsville, 9 July 2012).

Militaristic strategies were applied to make Jeffsville a virtually autonomous territory. A deep trench was dug around the entire settlement to prevent police vehicles from entering (male respondent, Jeffsville, 12 July 2012). Plots were laid out in narrow alleys to constrain the use of armoured vehicles, and no-one was permitted to erect a fence that might obstruct a "comrade's" escape from police during a chase (male respondent, Brazzaville, 7 August 2012). The narrow lanes and paths through the settlement were left nameless to obstruct attempts by the security services to navigate the settlement (male respondent, Jeffsville, 30 July 2012).

Collective systems of passive and active surveillance and defence were also instituted. With the arrival of "comrades from MK and APLA" to reside among the people, and subsequent attempts by government intelligence operatives to infiltrate the squatter camp, surveillance and counter-intelligence regimens were established (male respondent, Jeffsville, 9 July 2012). These were reliant on the entanglement of the personal and political which provided for the establishment of collective repertoires of security and surveillance. All men were conscripted into night-time patrols, and residents were obliged to report any "new face next door" (male respondent, Jeffsville, 9 July 2012) to the leaders' office so that every resident's identity could be verified through the resources of political organisations. Popular participation did not rely on simple coercion but on solidarity and consent issuing from a sense of shared destiny: "It was a case of EVERYONE must participate because we've got enemies amongst ourselves" (male respondent, Jeffsville, 2 August 2012).

In the virtual absence of the state, patrols functioned to apprehend criminal suspects, and an autonomous people's court in the form of the squatter disciplinary committee produced a localised version of justice in consultation with members of the community. The committee, which comprised ten people who would question an apprehended criminal "like in court" (male respondent, Jeffsville, 12 July 2012), would warn first-timers, or for repeat-offenders decide on the nature of any punishment, usually a number of lashes. If the crime involved theft, the proceedings would also involve reclaiming the stolen items. The system was far from faultless, but arguably kept transgressors in a dialogue with their accusers in a manner that emphasised social bonds and a sense of community. Later, in Brazzaville, a similar disciplinary system and judicial structure were established under a separate leadership. The original structure of Brazzaville's disciplinary system – "the first time, I give you notice; second time, I give you warning; third time, *siyashaya* [we will hit you]" (male respondent, Brazza-

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ville, 9 July 2012) – continues to be evident in today's less organised forms of mob justice, where residents, still using whistles distributed to the community by informal leaders, will tend to give leeway to first-time offenders, while mercilessly attacking offenders who have been arrested on multiple occasions.

At times of protest in Jeffsville's early years, the coercive force of popular politics was evident throughout the social field, from the actions of leaders to the behaviour of local thugs. The indivisibility of the personal and the political was particularly evident at these times, where the labour of each member of the community expressed a communitarian ethos of solidarity and reciprocity, and the collective experience of individual suffering. The decision to march meant staying home from work, with no exceptions. Leaders would issue letters for workers to take to their employers explaining their absence. Transgressors attempting to go to work would be beaten or stripped and forced to walk home naked (female respondent, Jeffsville, 19 July 2012), displaying the shame of their betrayal of the collective project for all to see. Roads were barricaded with burning tyres and buses attempting to transport people to work were "stoned", "burned", or "smashed" (police officer, Atteridgeville, 7 July 2012). Informal shops closed; they were expected to join the protest action "no matter what" (male respondent, Jeffsville, 17 July 2012). "Tsotsis" would target any shop that remained open, and could justify their actions as denunciation for lack of solidarity (male shopkeeper, Jeffsville, 1 August 2012). Importantly, most memories of this kind of enforced solidarity elicited no sign of disapproval from longstanding squatters but were seen as legitimate obligations upon the squatter political community. While this is clearly not a pure form of consensus, this should not disqualify it as a form of popular democracy, if we use the analogy of the democratic state, which also preserves itself through a majoritarian definition of the legitimate use of force (Weber 2002).

A number of the founding actors from Jeffsville's insurgent history remained in positions of informal authority throughout Mshongo in 2008, populating the informal "offices" of Concern, Jeffsville, Mdlalose, Phomolong, and later Brazzaville. Beyond the offices, members of block and street committees that helped organise informal surveillance and policing formed a less visible, latent organising infrastructure through which resources, repertoires, and expertise of mobilisation and coercion remain available for utilisation to this day. This was evident, for instance, when in 2012 a member of one of the settlements' community policing forums met me prior to their community meeting carrying a *sjambok* (leather whip). Thus, although the virtually autonomous exercise of coercive force seen in Jeffsville diminished in the course of the transition to democracy, many of the resources and repertoires of popular action persisted and remain available for utilisation in the service of popular crime control, protest action, and – as I will show later – popular evictions of unwanted outsiders in 2008.

### 4. Insider/Outsider Identities and the Contestation of Space

If the micro-territory of the squatter camp with its collective institutions and practices both expressed and produced a sense of squatter political community backed by violent resources, how was the inside and outside of this micro-political community defined? This is the next step in seeking to understand the link between squatter politics and "xenophobic" mobilization.

In one sense, the early collective struggles and practices discussed above have impacted on squatter identity through a distinction made between those "who fought for that squatter camp to be what it is today" and newcomers who "came as tenants" and "never thought of squatting" (male respondent, Jeffsville, 19 August 2012). Here, we find echoes of autochthony as a measure of "the contribution of a group to the prosperity of a collectivity that resides in a given space" (Hilgers 2011, 38) through the political act of squatting. Rather than being about a primordial connection, it is about political identity: about who "fought for" the settlement, about whose struggle, both political and personal, it embodies. This is not a particularly exclusive identity discourse, for it provides room for new arrivals to build up their own "autochthony as capital" (Hilgers 2011, 38) through involvement in the life of the settlement over time. Yet in the context of historical waiting lists for housing, anteriority was to become a faultline in squatter political identity, founding claims to a hierarchy of priority within the squatter community.

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Brazzaville's establishment eight years after the founding of Jeffsville, and four years into democracy, appears as a key moment in the delineation of insider and outsider identities based on anteriority in the settlement. West of Jeffsville, the settlements of Phomolong and Vergenoeg (see Figure 1) had been established under the leadership of businessman Montgomery Matenji, and in the late 1990s Ramohlale and Matenji were cooperating within a micro-local structure called the Committee of 12, which represented each of the distinct civic structures in the expanding settlement. This was a bottom-up structure unaffiliated with any political party; a form of local "political society" (to borrow a term from Chatterjee 2004). Yet in 1998, contention over a new opportunity for inclusion in the city brought tensions between Jeffsville's more established squatters and Brazzaville's more recent arrivals, as each group sought priority in advancing their claims to space, both seeking relief in the personal realm of daily living conditions.

Until controversy erupted around the shacks west of Vergenoeg that eventually came to be Brazzaville, a sense prevailed of Mshongo as an unbounded site where victims of apartheid's racial and spatial stratification of citizenship could claim a place in the once exclusively "white" cities. Against pressure from the local authorities to strictly delimit the settlement, Ramohlale admitted the scores of people who came to Jeffsville on a daily basis: "There's no way I can chase you away, because you are also struggling the same as I," he said (Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 12 July 2012). Similarly, a retired member of Matenji's committee told me that Brazzaville was formed to create a place for those with nowhere else to go in a country where "black people [were] suffering for a living place" (Morithi Phasha, Brazzaville, 05072012). However, contention emerged between the claims of an ongoing stream of new claimants for informal space in the city, and the aspirations of established squatters for their long-awaited transition to formal inclusion. The problem was that the area where Matenji was allowing new squatters to settle at the western edge of Vergenoeg had been earmarked by the municipality for development and for the rehousing of squatters living in the most geologically unstable part of the settlement in Jeffsville, which was dolomitic and prone to dangerous subsidence and sinkholes.

The dolomitic area in Jeffsville was, of course, a more established area of the settlement with a longer history, where by 1998 many had already waited years for inclusion into the formal city. As we see so often in the literature on autochthony and nativism (Muzondidya 2007; Geschiere 2009), on competing claims to land (Lund 2013), or opportunities for formalisation (Roy 2005), identity politics tends to become salient at times when the distribution of resources or entitlements is at stake. As a consequence, a rift emerged, roughly corresponding to established and outsider/newcomer identities (Elias and Scotson 1965), despite the prior cooperation of the respective leaders. As such, informal leaders in Jeffsville did not support their counterparts in Vergenoeg when the latter – defiantly naming the new territory Brazzaville after the civil war ongoing there at the time – resisted an attempted eviction by the city (male respondent, Brazzaville, 4 August 2012).

The case went to court, and affidavits of the City reveal the discursive construction of two groups of squatters – the "legitimate" squatters waiting for housing allocation under the modern bureaucratic mechanism of the housing waiting list, and the "illegitimate" recent squatters accused of "jumping the queue" for housing by occupying land set apart to transition others into formality (Naude 1988). In an illustration of how state institutions produce legitimate political identities that structure the distribution of the goods of citizenship, the waiting list as an instrument for the validation of claims emerges as a key motif in the state's attempts to render squatters at Brazzaville an illegitimate surplus, disqualified from claims to urban space. The land for development was intended "for residents of Atteridgeville" (Naude 1988), defined as those on the existing waiting list for houses. In this way, the local is emphasised – not as a primordial origin, but as a place in which existing political claims are embedded. The point is made that barring a few "who claim to originate from Atteridgeville and Saulsville" (Naude 1988, 7) the Brazzaville squatters' "specific origins cannot be traced" (Dubazana 1998, 3); therefore, they should return to where they came from. But squatters at Brazzaville, many of whom had moved there from the township's hostels and neighbouring farms, claimed their national entitlement as citizens against this expression of localised entitlements, refusing this as an

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unreasonable imperative to return "to our mothers' wombs!" (male respondent, Brazzaville, 9 July 2012).

The judge ruled that eviction could only be carried out if alternative accommodation was provided. In this way, the court reaffirmed the legitimacy of Brazzaville's squatters as claimants for inclusion, effectively adding them to the lengthening "queue for citizenship". Matenji described the judgement as a victory of democratic process – read as synonymous with freedom of movement and settlement:

> I won that fight. Because I was reasoning: those people vote for ANC, and then when they get the government, the government wants those people to be chased away from Brazzaville. They must go back to where they come from. Why? (Montgomery Matenji, Brazzaville, 5 July 2012)

Brazzaville's victory, of course, was not shared by the Jeffsville residents who, for a short period, stood poised on the threshold of the more complete citizenship represented by formal urban inclusion. In the next section, I will examine the context in which popular evictions of foreign nationals broke out a decade later, and point to legacies of collective identity and practice in this ostensibly "new" phenomenon.

### 5. "Xenophobic" Violence in Mshongo

> It was bad. It was really bad. Xenophobic time. [clears throat] I was there. I was inside the squatter camp. I was watching everything. [pause] You know, a group of people will just enter into a shack, break that shack in twenty minutes. Everything will be taken away in twenty minutes time. […] Spaza shops, ai… they take the whole grocery, they even take the roof. They tell that foreigner "Go!". If he talks they will attack him. The other one died there. They burn him with a [inaudible]. They burn him alive. (male respondent, Jeffsville, 19 August 2012)

I found little evidence of "xenophobic" tendencies against longstanding "foreigners" in Mshongo before 2008. However, on 18 March 2008, evictions of foreigners and looting of foreign-owned businesses began during a protest march in the settlement (Chauke 2008) and continued for about a week, displacing large numbers of people who were subsequently housed in the local community hall and at the Malas shelter, an old municipal tyre warehouse. Numerous informal shops were looted and destroyed, and up to seven people were reported killed. Here, and with all aggregate

fatality rates cited in press coverage, it is worth distinguishing between murders for apparently "xenophobic" motives and deaths by endogenous violence (Kalyvas 2009) and misadventure. In Atteridgeville, the fatality total included two South Africans who suffered fatal accidents while looting, and one who was killed in counter-violence by a foreign national. Nevertheless, the visceral quality of violence is an obstacle to analysis (Kalyvas 2009, Žižek 2008); the intellect balks at the yawning abyss of what could justify burning someone alive. Killing was the most extreme, but also the least prominent form of violence, and hence my primary interest was in the process of forceful eviction, looting, and destruction that predominated.

The 2008 eviction was planned in advance; local residents were aware of it and foreign residents were warned to leave. The precise mechanisms of mobilization were difficult to disentangle, and involved a spillover of the politics of evictions that occurred in the neighbouring settlement of Itireleng, perhaps five hundred metres south of Mshongo. Some of the foreigners displaced in Itireleng had fled to Mshongo, and representatives from Itireleng lobbied Mshongo's leaders and residents to expel them. Despite being refused by more than one settlement leader, the anti-foreigner platform was quickly taken up by residents and spread, apparently by the surveillance networks of block and street committee members, and within social networks. The idea gained widespread popularity (male respondent, Vergenoeg, 3 August 2012; two female respondents, Brazzaville, 1 August 2012; male respondent, Jeffsville, 22 October 2008), such that during the attacks both police and informal leaders felt unable to stand against the community:

> You won't stop them. You must support them. If you stop them, they attack you. How can you stop them? … Because, hey, it was a majority of people, the whole squatter camp. It wasn't like one person, or three, four people there, it was the majority. (male respondent, Jeffsville, 19 August 2012)

As Mamdani reminds us, popular participation in mass violence cannot be reduced to an effect of top-down manipulation (Mamdani 2001, 7). Thus, I am interested in making comprehensible the widespread support expulsions enjoyed in 2008. A closer examination of post-millennial developments in the settlements will provide a context in

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which popular agency in anti-foreigner mobilisation becomes more comprehensible.

First, there has been the emptying out of the idea of a transition. One respondent captured the sense of suspended transition as follows:

> For twenty-two years in this squatter camp. There's no changes. Instead, the squatter camp is growing. It's developing further. And there are people, their lives in the squatter camp … [pauses to search for words]. People there, they live … [searches again, then gives up]. Basic human needs, you understand, they are not catered for. The government is not catering for these people. (male respondent, Jeffsville, 19 August 2012)

If Mshongo was formed as a temporary, local solution to national forces of urban exclusion, and in anticipation of a transition to the equal citizenship of formal inclusion, the long periods involved – in 2012, twenty-one years in Jeffsville, fourteen in Brazzaville – suggest that rather than being an escape route, the squatter camps have become places of permanent temporariness; a new modality for the inscription of superfluity on the bodies of marginalised citizens.

This sense of suspended transition has arisen concurrently with demographic change, as in-migration has continued apace. Population growth has placed untenable demands on the physical and social infrastructure of the settlements, increasing residents' vulnerability even as they attempt to improvise a life in this urban periphery. With time and a growing population, pit toilets have proliferated in the dolomitic soil, posing potentially fatal geological risks: subsidences have seen at least one toilet collapse beneath an occupant. Limited electricity infrastructure necessitates ubiquitous pirating, overloading the transformers and causing regular power outages. These blackouts see multiple homes burn down – either through mishaps with candles while the power is out, or, when it returns, through fires caused by heating appliances that were left switched on at the time of the power failure. Witnessing the smouldering remains of two shacks set alight by a forgotten

candle during a walk with the researcher, Jeff Ramohlale echoed findings elsewhere (Chance 2011) when he insisted on the political meaning of the destruction and suffering, calling it "part and parcel of the struggle" (Jeff Ramohlale, Jeffsville, 30 July 2012).

The settlement – forged through the physical and political collective labour of longstanding residents as an instrument to serve coherent personal and political ends – has grown, and the diversity generated by growth has seen the squatter camp instrumentalised in new ways, giving rise to new social groups with little political attachment to the territory, and a class of tenants whose interests are perceived as being in tension with those of their squatter landlords (male respondent, Jeffsville, 19 August 2012). Foreign nationals have been a substantial, or at least very visible, contributor to the population increase in Mshongo, and are often tenants. Whereas migrants with a long legacy in Mshongo appeared to be seen as locals, residents more clearly identify post-1994 arrivals as "foreigners". These "foreign" newcomers began arriving after 1994, becoming more noticeable from the late nineties and particularly since 2005.[3] These dates correspond roughly to the advent of democracy in 1994, the passing of South Africa's Refugees Act in 1998, and, from 2006 to 2011, the country's transformation into the world's number one host of new asylum seekers (UNHCR 2012).[4] Broadly, this and the corresponding rise in the density of businesses and increased competition for informal trade livelihoods (Abdi 2011), leading to increased precarity for established local traders, were seen by respondents as a very recent phenomenon.

### 6. Precarity, Protest, and the Mechanics of Mobilization

The sense of accelerating precarity and crisis in the settlement appears to have led, around the mid 2000s, to a renewed impetus for collective protest about conditions in the squatter camps, and renewed cooperation between the different parts of the settlement. Leaders of the various informal civic offices – some of them the same experts who participated in the original occupation of Jeffsville and its

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**3** According to 2011 census data, 45 percent of foreign-born squatters arrived after 2005.

**4** Misago et al. report that 2008 did not see an increased influx of immigrants compared to other years, but viewed against this backdrop it is clear

that the increased level of newcomer arrivals would have been sustained over several years in advance of the attacks.

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violent defence – resurrected the old mobilizing techniques to manufacture a faded solidarity and manifest through practice the old squatter-as-insurgent-citizen identity. The old techniques of mobilization, which produced collective identity through collective practice, were used to mobilise the whole settlement to protest rumours of removal and call for basic services, from around 2006:

> We wake up as early in the morning – two-o-clock in the morning and then we begin to barricade all the entrances, you know, because that is where you are going to make sure that you have full participation in your protected action.[…] it stops people from going to work, you know […] we just went there and burnt tyres – the main entrance and all over there, with our sjamboks in our hands. And then when we see you as if you're going to work, you are going to get that punishment. "Where are you going?" […] We sjambok them and they'll go back. And the one who gets sjambokked he is going to make sure that he's also going to sjambok somebody who's also going to work.[…] You know, so that it becomes some sort of a chain. That is how we brought that strong unity about. (male respondent, Jeffsville, 9 July 2012)

This suggests that, leading up to 2008, a renewed importance was placed on political commitment among the squatters, drawing on existing scripts that emphasize communitarianism, and using violence to extort solidarity where necessary. Such practices reanimate communitarian political identities that have faded, emphasizing the necessity of (coerced) consensus and mass participation for the survival of the community, and once again drawing the personal and political together in a way that links political commitment to the prospect of relieving daily hardships and indignities that are the hallmark of squatters' unequal citizenship. As it happened, this resurgence of legacy repertoires of mobilisation, using violence to manufacture solidarity, also began in a year in which humanitarian migration into South Africa spiked dramatically and asylum applications from Zimbabwe grew substantially (UNHCR 2012, 26).

Since 2008, collective violence against foreigners has occurred three more times in Mshongo: in 2010, 2011, and 2015. In the 2010 and 2011 cases that my research covered, there was less widespread participation than in 2008, no evidence of a planned eviction, and only shops were targeted. A key commonality was the proximity of all four

incidences to a protest, given that protest been linked elsewhere to xenophobic violence through the motif of insurgent citizenship (Von Holdt et al. 2011). In the words of a respondent in Brazzaville: "The march is the problem in this area … if you march to Pretoria they will come back and they start that attack, xenophobia … We don't arrange a march anymore because we don't know what's going to start" (male respondent, Brazzaville, 11 July 2012).

It seems that squatter political identity and repertoires of collective practice converge at times of protest, both in their substance and in their performance, in ways that polarise politically committed locals and apparently indifferent newcomers. A useful starting point can be drawn from the literature on mobilisations around autochthony elsewhere in Africa. Geschiere suggests that the power of autochthony appeals might depend on "a concentrating force" that generates "a shared sensorial experience of the world" (2009, 35), and unites diverse individuals in a feeling of "authentic belonging" (2009, 34). Arguably, a demonstration or protest march can serve as such a concentrating force through its dynamic embodiment of the local political community. Marches both articulate and inscribe shared suffering, and often give rise to confrontations with the state that magnify suffering while shutting down avenues for the expression of grievances. First, a protest march explicitly politicises mundane hardships by articulating them publically, initiating a dialogue between the local and the national. It magnifies the stakes of collective action through the linkage to personal suffering, and reproduces the salience of collective action by producing a time-delimited and clearly bounded opportunity for negotiation with the state over issues of great importance to the quality of residents lives. The march that preceded the 2008 attacks in Mshongo was a response to rumours that the land they were living on had been purchased and that the squatters would be forcibly removed to a distant location. The political heritage of this threat of removal to a distant area could also be seen as having a special mobilizing power.

Second, the march stages the shared experience of suffering, demanding that participants, who may be precariously employed, forego work and the money they need to survive. Given the coercive methods used, the "unity" at work

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here is clearly not a natural outgrowth of the now diverse squatter community but to some extent a choreographed performance of solidarity. The march mans the boundary between those caught in the camp – at risk; without protection; lacking agency; unable to escape – and those outside who have the freedom to pursue their individual goals. It thus produces a concentrated embodiment of the experience of surplus personhood and locates the solution in collective action.

### 7. "Living for Free"? Political Commitment and Belonging

Against this backdrop, how do foreigners become the targets of exclusionary mobilization? After all, foreign-run shops often make groceries more affordable and, as tenants, non-nationals pay rent that supports the livelihoods of more established squatters. One of the most prevalent complaints about foreigners focused on their failure to contribute to the collective struggle for better living conditions – a failure considered exploitative since they reap the benefits of social mobilisation along with everyone else:

> Let me explain to you; you see you asked about the meetings but the issue is in terms of attendance. Some of these foreigners would ignore the call for the meetings and continue with their business […] And when things are fixed they would be first felt by those same people yet we are the ones who attend meetings. (male respondent, Mshongo, 27 October 2008)

This emphasis on forms of political commitment and civic labour as the basis of authentic membership was reiterated over and over again by different respondents:

> Speaker 1: [Locals] say these people, when we go to march, they don't go there. They say [foreigners] are not belonging to this [place] … they are here for business.
>
> Speaker 2: Ja.
>
> Speaker 1: They say OK, because [foreigners] are here for business, we are working for them [by mobilising for improvements]. Now we're going to punish them.
>
> (two male respondents, Brazzaville, 28 June 2012)

Indeed, a number of recently arrived foreigners in Mshongo (as well as some South African newcomers) confirmed that they did not attend meetings. Of course, this is to be expected as the local and transnational populations do not share a single political destiny. Not least

because of elements of immigration policy that polarise citizens and non-citizens, recent immigrants have no voting rights at all, nor any claim on the goods of citizenship that local citizens are struggling to secure. Their indifference to related mobilization is thus hardly surprising, but in the eyes of many longstanding squatters it represents an exploitative intention to "live for free" (male respondent, Brazzaville, 20 July 2012) in a context where urban life has for others been achieved at a high price in suffering and collective labour, and continues to exact a price as squatters struggle to secure a more equal citizenship. Complaints that foreigners work for low pay and are willing to accept unfair labour conditions can also be understood as, at their heart, concerns that these newcomers "don't care" about collective goals and values, including the need to engage in mass action to claim the right to housing (female respondent, Jeffsville, 4 August 2012). Unlike more established foreign residents, newcomers are not interested in the political meaning of the squatter camps:

> He didn't want to know why we stay here. It's "*net so lank ek het space*" [just as long as I have space] he stays. And then if you going to him and you tell him what is happening here he don't want to listen [chuckles]. (male respondent, Jeffsville, 1 August 2012)

Returning to the concentrating force of the march, the sense of community produced by a protest has the effect of polarizing the committed and the uncommitted. As we have seen, there are established historical scripts in Mshongo legitimising theft and harassment of "sellouts". As a result, South African-owned shops tend to close during marches, even if the shopkeeper does not actively participate. Foreign-owned shops remain open, and thus open themselves to violent denunciation, which several respondents argued is facilitated by the fact that settlement leaders are otherwise occupied in their capacity as march organisers. There is of course a pattern of instrumentality to such acts: *nyaupe* (narcotic) addicts loot goods to exchange for their next fix, while locals are quick to salvage groceries from evacuated shops before they are destroyed in the melee (male respondent, Jeffsville, 5 August 2012). Business owners were also said to have played a role for the sake of their own business interests.

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However, there is something to the observations of "foreigners" visible disregard for collective priorities that cannot be reduced to these themes of individual interest, and must be read as a political claim that goes beyond the mere jealousy or frustration often used to characterise violence among the poor in South Africa. The claim is magnified against the most successful newcomer entrepreneurs, who are thriving even as their once more established counterparts sink into greater precarity. As Abdi (2011) has pointed out, some foreigners occupy positions of privilege in informal settlements – one shopkeeper who was evicted in 2008 owned one shop in Jeffsville, two in Phomolong, and four in Brazzaville (male respondent, Jeffsville, 5 August 2012). When mobilizing for collective benefits, anger turns on those who gain personal profit from shirking participation:

> If you say people let's go, let's march, let's fight, he going to get cross with foreigners – they are keeping, they're benefiting themselves in shops. (male respondent, Brazzaville, 2012)

The idea that foreign newcomers take from the community without giving, that they benefit without contributing, that they are indifferent to the unfinished struggle of the squatters for citizenship, shows that it cannot simply be ethno-racial hatred that motivates collective attacks on shops, nor simply lack of provenance in the area.

The spark that turns such sentiments into violence appeared from my fieldwork to be the kind of response mass action elicited from the authorities. For instance, leaders found that the authorities seldom respond in the statutory time to applications to march, which can mean marches go ahead without permission, lack adequate regulation, and are subject to all sorts of obstruction and interference, which magnifies frustration and anger in the volatile context of a mass mobilization. State officials commonly obstruct or ignore the proceedings, silencing and disabling the community at the very time it has been mobilized for voice and agency, and rendering the investment of collective sacrifice of time, labour, and income futile:

> We say why did those people stop our buses when we supposed to demonstrate? […] That's where the confusion started, people starting to fight.

(male respondent, Brazzaville, 28 June 2012, speaking of 2010 violence)

> That time people wanted the light, to go to city council, though city council chased the people away. Then the people burned the foreign shops.

(male respondent, Brazzaville, 28 June 2012, speaking of 2011 violence)

Consequently, one leader told me, they no longer call marches because "it ends up harming other people" (male respondent, Jeffsville, 19 August 2012).

As a performative process in which heterogeneous groups are united in their commitment to political action, the march stages the practice of squatter identity-making and simultaneously provides a volatile stage upon which indifferent foreign newcomers unwittingly perform their lack of reciprocity and disregard for the local struggle for equal citizenship. As we have seen, "living for free" is anathema to the squatter identity in which land was occupied at the cost of violent repression; the making of a livable life requires the sacrifice of collective labour; and participation in mass actions is consensually enforced on pain of a flogging. Against this backdrop, lack of commitment appears as a betrayal of the political community, and in the case of shopkeepers or traders, the financial gain that accrues to the uncommitted as a result of their indifference heightens the sense of injustice. This has an interesting resonance with studies suggesting that foreign support for local struggles may prevent "xenophobic" mobilization (Kirshner 2012), and that one of the ways Somali shopkeepers work to avert future attacks is through investments in the life of the local community (Abdi 2011).

## 8. Conclusion

Drawing on the association between informal residence and the occurrence of "xenophobic" violence (Fauvelle-Aymar and Wa Kabwe-Segatti 2012), this paper has considered the historico-political context of the informal settlements of Mshongo, identifying resources for mobilization, including identities, collective practices, and expertise whose legacy can be traced in contemporary mobilization against foreigners, particularly at times of popular protest. I show that the explicit category of surplus person which

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originated in the apartheid era, and has animated collective mobilizations over the last two decades, lives on in squatters' unfinished transition to formal urban inclusion. Its salience is magnified at times of protest not only through the claims made on the state at these times but also through the techniques for protest mobilization, which both activate and manufacture identities based on common suffering and civic labour. In Jeffsville and Brazzaville, it is these identities that polarise insurgent citizens from foreign newcomers, particularly those traders whose exemption from the collective struggle is rendered all the more visible by their business-as-usual practices during times of protest, communicating indifference and a lack of reciprocity at times when shared suffering and commitment are produced as defining qualities of the squatter community.

Nowadays, "informal settlements" are often depoliticised as a problem of development, as containers of social and economic problems in need of "eradication". Yet historically, many settlements like Mshongo have deeply political origins, and in some cases represent fundamentally violent manifestations of the agency of marginalised citizens. This is an important legacy to grasp when considering the emergence of new forms and targets of violence in recent years, both in assessing the extent to which anti-foreigner mobilisation might manifest a subaltern political voice (as suggested by Glaser 2008, Monson 2012, Von Holdt et al. 2011), and in understanding the violent repertoires and expertise that facilitate its expression as violence. It is equally important to consider collective mobilisation against outsiders in the light not just of national identities or the aggregated concept of a broad South African citizenship, but also of the stratification of political identities and citizenship, which has produced particular localised historical struggles that in turn provide a logical structure to what is too easily labelled as the "senseless" pathology of "xenophobia".

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# Protecting the "Most Vulnerable"? The Management of a Disaster and the Making/Unmaking of Victims after the 2008 Xenophobic Violence in South Africa

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# Protecting the "Most Vulnerable"? The Management of a Disaster and the Making/Unmaking of Victims after the 2008 Xenophobic Violence in South Africa

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In 2008, South Africa witnessed a bout of xenophobic violence, requiring the state to declare a disaster to manage a massive displacement of migrants and foreigners. How did the South African state come to care for these populations, whereas it had previously sought to avoid providing protection to foreigners, and was seen as responsible for fostering xenophobia, if not violence? Analyzing the management of the disaster at the local level (in Cape Town), and the various discourses and mobilizations involved in it, this article shows how widespread violence and displacement rendered migrant vulnerabilities visible in the urban space and forced the state to temporarily recognize and protect those who became seen as "victims." It also questions the idea that xenophobia and failure to comply with international norms were responsible for the lack of protection of migrants and foreigners. Rather, it is the kind of protection displayed, restricted to the "most vulnerable," that failed to address the root causes of the violence and envision broader social integration issues. The article provides further theorization on what it means to treat violence as disaster and points out to the need to envisage critically humanitarian and social assistance by including them in broader welfare patterns.

In May 2008, violent attacks against foreigners and strangers broke out in South African townships and informal settlements. Groups threatened, attacked, and killed those who appeared to be outsiders, and looted houses and properties. The violence started on the outskirts of Johannesburg but rapidly spread to the rest of the country, and particularly the major cities. The following two weeks of what soon became known as xenophobic violence left sixty-two dead, hundreds wounded and between 80,000 and 200,000 displaced.[1] This probably constituted the worst episode of collective violence since the end of apartheid, and revealed a deep political crisis: the new democracy and South african society were plagued by failures and fractures produced by persistant racial divisions and social inequalities, blatant xenophobia and political dead ends.

A first set of interpretations, rooted in contemporary studies of migration and the post-colonial critique of race and identities, argues that the making of the new South African democracy went hand in hand with the construction of a national polity exclusive of migrants and foreigners, rooted in racism and exclusionary practices (Neocosmos 2008). The South African state is seen as responsible for the rise of this nationalism, as its discourse systematically favored the making of a political community based on national identity and legitimized practices of exclusion of foreign-born residents (Landau 2012). It was also criticized for its slow and limited reaction to this crisis and general reluctance to tackle xenophobia (Wa Kabwe-Segatti 2008). Indeed, it took more than a week for the government to send the army to pacify the townships and prevent further deaths and violence. The governments of

1  Although the phrase "xenophobic violence" suggests a divide between nationals and foreigners, in fact one third of those killed were actually South African citizens from minority groups: Venda, Pedi, etc. (Misago et al. 2010).

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the Gauteng and Western Cape provinces waited between three and four weeks before officially declaring a provincial state of disaster that would allow them to provide assistance to the displaced populations and set up shelters ("safety sites").[2] The crisis thus revealed a broader failure of the state to protect the populations residing on its territory and to comply with its own democratic institutions (Hayem 2013) – an analysis largely consistent with the rise of a violent democracy in contemporary South Africa (Holdt 2013).

Other authors argue that the turn to violence and the exclusion of foreigners are embedded in a wider set of frustrations, social inequalities, and political relations. Cooper (2009) situates acts of looting in aspirations to social inclusion and "modern urban lifestyles" in a democracy that had failed its poor. Kerr and Durrheim (2013) suggest that xenophobic violence constitutes a response to broader economic transformations, the casualization of labour, and the increased competition created by the neo-liberal capitalist environment. Although these analyses fall short of explaining the specific conditions that lead to violence and why the exclusion of foreigners appears a legitimate answer (Landau 2012; Kirshner 2012), they do suggest the importance of connecting xenophobia to neo-liberalism, social inequalities, and economic relations in the new democracy (Pons-Vignon and Segatti 2013). James Ferguson (2013) provides further theoretical insights in this direction by suggesting how the rise of a neo-liberal capitalist system over the past decades has modified forms of social membership and welfare provision. Casualization of labor produces populations in surplus, which calls into question the inclusiveness of society, and threatens welfare and democratic rights. The more general question at stake here is on which basis welfare should be organized (national membership, democratic rights, vulnerabilities, etc.) and who should provide it (social networks, employers, or the state). This also relates to the question of state formation through inclusion and exclusion of groups of populations in Africa:

Who gets to be included and allowed to benefit from a society and its state (Fourchard and Segatti 2015)?

In this article, I focus on the tensions and the links between exclusion, violence, and xenophobia as produced by the South African state, and broader forms of statecraft, welfare, and political relations between the state and its populations. Rather than opposing these sets of interpretations, I follow Nancy Fraser's justice theory (2011), to combine issues of recognition (through the question of xenophobia and the integration of migrants into South African communities), and redistribution (here, forms of social protection practiced after the xenophobic violence). It is useful here to consider a puzzling shift: after the xenophobic violence, the state did somehow assist the migrants, whereas previously it had generally not done so (Palmary 2002). What can explain this shift? The tension between protection and exclusion of migrants is most explicit in the opening of camps that served as temporary shelters for the displaced: they embodied the incapacity of the state to protect migrants in the townships (Mosselson 2010), yet they also concealed victims in need of humanitarian assistance (Pillay 2013). In this sense, the crisis raised the question of the reach and the extent of the state: how much protection should it guarantee, to whom, and under which condition? More specifically, under which conditions can migrants in South Africa, who are usually invisible, denied rights, and facing xenophobia, come to be recognized and be "in care of the state" (de Swaan 1988)? I argue that such questions emerged with the situation of disaster (generated by the xenophobic violence), that rendered migrants' vulnerabilities visible in the urban space, allowed claims for justice, and forced the state to respond somehow and offer some protection, even if minimal, for a short period of time.

To explore these issues, disaster management at the local level provides a fruitful ground to analyze the possibilities and the limits of the state in its relationship to violence. Examining the political relations implied by the tools and

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**2** Resorting to Disaster Management for a large-scale population displacement after a riot may seem surprising at first glance: although this type of intervention was common under apartheid, it was aban-doned after the democratization. The article will elaborate on the reasons for this choice, but suffice to say for the moment that disaster management's prime function is to coordinate responses to dis-ruptions that exceed a community's capacity to cope, whatever their causes may be (Republic of South Africa 2003).

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practices of disaster management used to manage the xenophobic violence enables alternative interpretations distinct from analyses of state failures to implement international norms of humanitarian protection (that themselves respond to a political project) or the moral implications of disaster and violence (Fassin 2010). It provides an opportunity to go beyond the sole "xenophobia" argument, since the exclusionary visions and practices of the Department of Home Affairs or the police (Wa Kabwe-Segatti and Landau 2008) cannot automatically be extended to other departments. Although Disaster Management was not the only actor responsible for managing these events, it was the one tasked with dealing in the longer term with the internal contradictions of the state – how to care and protect those that the South African state and society are reluctant to accept? Disaster management is an organization whose role is to prevent and respond to disasters (Republic of South Africa 2003). It is composed of three levels, national, provincial, and municipal, charged with coordinating risks assessment and response to disasters. Since the end of apartheid, its missions have largely been desecuritized and reorientated towards development and environmental disasters.

Disaster management in South Africa is firstly a responsibility of local and regional government. Focusing on this level enables tracing the various interventions on the "disaster" scene, and capturing the different layers of the state. National political discourses have to be disentangled from local and provincial governments' responses to the crisis, as the latter are the first respondents and responsible for social integration and the care of displaced populations (Republic of South Africa 2003). Such perspective enlightens the inner workings of the state, and how policies and bureaucrats shape political relations with populations (Chipkin and Meny-Gibert 2012). As Dubbeld (2013) noted, focusing on protests and discourses of state failure may illuminate the limits and malfunctions of the state, but does not suffice to understand the stalemates of South African democratization.

The article draws on interviews, observations, and discussions conducted in 2008 in Cape Town, focusing on the instruments, discourses, and interventions of actors and organizations involved in assistance to the displaced migrants during the six months that followed the episode of violence. Restricting the fieldwork to this setting allows a full grasp of the local dynamics, assessing the political tensions and differences between the national level and the local. In addition, concentrating on the crisis makes it possible to observe the making and unmaking of victims' identities and the first elaboration of modes of (elementary) protection for migrants. Clearly, this methodological choice implies a focus on a very specific moment, which may seem too extraordinary to reflect the everyday exclusion and state disinterest migrants face. Yet, the repetition of this kind of responses during subsequent episodes of xenophobic violence (in De Doorns in 2009 and in Kwa Zulu Natal in 2015) suggests that the case studied here is not unique. It constituted a seminal moment when a form of (precarious) protection was first elaborated, precisely because of the way issues of recognition, justice and forms of the welfare state came to be articulated.

In the rest of the article, I examine what it means for the state to see xenophobic violence as a disaster, how the disaster opened a space to claim assistance and rights, and how the protection set in place failed because of the way the disaster was conceived and managed by the state, eventually leaving migrants unprotected. The article is divided into three sections that follow the temporal dynamics of the crisis: the emergency response in the first days; the humanitarian assistance to the displaced; and finally, the closure of the camps and the reintegration process (Igglesden, Polzer, and Monson 2009).

### 1. "We Would Now Have to See It as a Disaster": Xenophobia, Disaster and the State

The way xenophobic violence came to be seen as a disaster by the authorities was not an obvious process, given the known unwillingness of the South African state to tackle xenophobia and acknowledge its own responsibility in promoting a national polity based on exclusion and inequalities. What constituted the disaster was not any clearer. Was it the political crisis, the violence, the underlying social and political issues revealed by the crisis, the displacement, or the situation of the migrants? The government could have declared a state of emergency (though this was politically

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difficult after apartheid), sent humanitarian assistance without necessarily declaring a state of disaster (using social relief), or done nothing. Declaring a state of disaster addressed the need to order and render legible a complex and problematic situation for the state (Scott 1998). Why then did the state eventually declare a disaster? What are the consequences in terms of framing of the situation?

Violence started in Gauteng on May 11, 2008. The national government soon appeared incapable of exercising political leadership, while local authorities seemed overwhelmed by the situation and were experiencing difficulties controlling their territory and restoring order (Boshoff 2008). Even before violence broke out in Cape Town on May 22, it was already clear that the country was facing a major crisis and local actors were expecting the same to happen in their city. On May 19, the South African Police Service and the Cape Town Metropolitan Police set up a risk management plan, establishing an early warning system (a twenty-four-hour call line) and emergency plans. The Provincial police commissioner, local and provincial government, civil society as well as the Disaster Management Centre established a safety forum on May 21 to ensure security and contain the violence.

Ironically, a meeting intended to prevent protests in an informal settlement (Du Noon) sparked violence when local leaders failed to engage with the population (Cooper 2009). In only two days of violence and protests, about 20,000 persons were displaced from the peripheral townships and informal settlements (Masiphumelele, Kayelitsha, Imazemo Yethu, etc.) throughout the city, taking refuge in community halls, churches, and police stations. The population movement was large in comparison with the violence itself (sixty-five houses and spaza shops were looted or burned, and between one and three persons were killed), reflecting the widespread fear generated by daily xenophobia (Dodson 2010). A rapid evacuation initiated by the authorities contributed to rapidly bringing the situation under control (Igglesden, Polzer, and Monson 2009). However, the expected disaster (the violence) soon revealed what would

become a disaster in itself: the displacement of migrants. It is not self-evident that a large movement of population should constitute a crisis. Indeed, large-scale population movements following a disaster regularly occur in South African cities. During South African winters, floods often displace thousands of people from frail dwellings in the informal settlements. In early July the same year, about 39,000 persons were displaced across Cape Town due to torrential rains (Cape Times, 2008). These movements are routine events that Disaster Management and other emergency services are used to dealing with. Even if their responses are far from perfect and generally fail to tackle the root causes of these disasters (Murray 2009), civil servants know how to supply assistance within hours and deal with thousands of homeless. Violent protests (such as service delivery protests) are also common in Cape Town and routinely dealt with by the police (Alexander 2010; Thomas 2010).

In the case of the 2008 xenophobic riots, several aspects challenged the authorities' ability to assess and manage the situation. First, the displaced population was scattered across ninety shelters set up overnight, rather than gathered in a few community centers (see Figure 1). In addition, despite recurrent acts of xenophobic violence (Palmary 2002), the authorities had previously not recognized this kind of social conflict as a potential disaster, which meant that there was no specific plan to deal with the situation.[3] It was therefore two days before the authorities realized that they would actually have to deal with a disaster – meaning that the disaster management centers would become the coordinating machinery of an official humanitarian response, as the Head of the Provincial Disaster Management Centre explained:

> What happened had never happened before, so to predict that 22,000 people would actually flee their houses, even though there isn't a lot of violence against people, it's not something that could have been predicted. […] Initially, it didn't seem like there were 22,000 people, so once it became clear by Saturday, Sunday that the humanitarian displacement was quite significant, the Disaster Management Centre *would now have to see it as a disaster*. (interview, November 2008)

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**3** One explanation for this lack of planning is that political and social disasters were taken out of the new legislation in the mid-1990s because of their highly political connotation, which led to a focus on reducing risks related to the environment at the expense of large-scale emergency planning and centralized emergency control. Another reason was clearly a general lack of concern for migrants and xenophobia amongst state bureaucrats.

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This quote shows the difficulty of making sense of the situation during a disaster (Weick 1988): assessing the situation is both crucial and difficult given the general uncertainty and the blurring of boundaries (Dobry 2009). As outlined above, producing information about the displacement was made even more complicated because the disaster did not fall easily in any of the usual categories. Yet, these technical impediments interacted with the political question of who was responsible for the migrants and for tackling xenophobia.

**Figure 1: Map of the 2008 xenophobic violence in Cape Town**



The realization that there was a disaster was also a response to the work of civil society groups that supplied the bulk of assistance during the very first days. Because they were close to migrants, churches were able to assess the situation early on, and were thus amongst the first to provide shelters and organize the distribution of food, blankets, and other necessities (interview, programme officer, Shade, September 2008). Various NGOs (Sonke, Passop, South Africa Human Rights Commission, Black Sash, Cape Town Refugee Centre, COSATU) led by the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC),[4] set up a database to dispatch assistance to the displaced and information to government, while calling for a political solution. This work was critical in shaping the terrain of the disaster, as NGOs sought to assert the values of South African democracy (Peberdy and Jara 2011) and to force the state to do "its job": count, assess, provide:

> For three days we almost entirely replaced the role of our incapable state. We built a database of all the refugee sites and shared it with City Disaster Management or anyone else willing to help. And we organised clothes, warmth and food for thousands of people. (Geffen 2008)

Thanks to their more flexible modes of action and extended networks in the communities, civil society groups and volunteers were able to produce (more easily than the state) information crucial to the provision of first hand humanitarian assistance rapidly. In so doing, they greatly contributed to framing the events as a humanitarian problem (Everatt 2011), and the displaced as vulnerable victims, contrasted to the "unruly mobs" of the townships (Peberdy and Jara, 2011). This vision was itself embedded in the social divisions of Cape Town society, torn between the White middle-classes residing in the urban center, and the African poor relegated to the peripheral townships and informal settlements (Hassim et al., 2008). When migrants were displaced right at the heart of White middle-class suburbs and the city center (see Figure 1), state responses were considerably swifter and more significant than when violence and displacement occurred in the townships and informal settlements (Hassim, Kupe, and Worby 2008).

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**4** One of the most prominent South African NGOs advocating access to HIV treatment.

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The state's responses were slow and not all in the same direction, revealing conflicts between the different levels of the state and political parties. The Office of the Premier of the Western Cape soon promoted reintegration at any price to assert the ANC's leadership. The Western Cape is the only South African province where the main opposition party, the Democratic Alliance, is seriously challenging the power of the leading party.[5] To prove the ANC's commitment to the integration of foreigners, fifteen facilitators were sent to the communities as early as 23 May (Provincial Government of the Western Cape 2008a and 2008b), helped by five hundred anti-crime volunteers and two hundred community development workers.[6] Yet, this discourse remained largely ignorant of both local realities and xenophobic discourses at national level, as it tried to force reintegration rather than modify the social structures and tackle the root causes of the problem.

In the meanwhile, field officers from the City of Cape Town Disaster Management Centre were working round the clock to assess the extent of the disaster, gather information, and provide assistance. They were rapidly overwhelmed, given their small number, and had to rely on the help of civil society to get a sense of the situation. Without clear directions from the authorities, disaster managers pursued their routine modes of action: emergency protection. Therefore, when sheltering people in community halls or returning the displaced to the communities proved impossible because of local opposition, local authorities opened emergency camps to protect the displaced and ease the management of the situation by reducing the number of sites, as two disaster management officers explained:

> But what do you do in a situation like this? You've got to make a decision. Wrong or right, it doesn't make a difference; you've got to make a decision. I said it's the furthest point from the informal settlements.[7] Plus the people from the informal settlements don't have cars, they may come in taxis, but at least, *you can protect them*. Because there's only one road, and it's the top road. So you could cut both sides off.

There's a mountain, so they can't get there. And there's only one road going down, *so you could protect the people*. That's why. And that is how all these camps all started in our area. (interview, October 2008)

This quote reveals the kind of protection deployed during the disaster. Indeed, like many of their colleagues, the quoted officers were street-level bureaucrats from the Cape's urban middleclass, far from being liberal and fervent supporters of the ANC. One White, one Coloured, they both saw African migrants and Black South Africans as "Others," populations different from them; as disaster management officers their concern was to apply their professional skills to ensure protection of the displaced.[8] However, what this protection meant for them was largely restricted to security and technical concerns related to their ability to control the situation and assist the populations.

The City Mayor, for quite different reasons, supported the emergency protection hastily set in place. Helen Zille, leader of the Democratic Alliance (the main opposition party) thought that the camps would allow her to call in international humanitarian organizations to manage a situation that the ANC was not controlling, hoping to embarrass an ANC-ruled state (Mail and Guardian 2008). In addition, she did not want to further stretch the city's resources or use its community halls that were needed for all Capetonians, her electors. Her opposition to the Premier of the Western Cape also reflected competing mandates between the city, in charge of response to populations affected by disasters, and the province, tasked with long-term social cohesion. Although the province initially litigated to force the city to open its community halls, it finally agreed to declare a provincial state of disaster on June 3 and to take responsibility for the management of the camps. This also enabled the province to take the lead on its political rival, clarify leadership and responsibilities, make disaster funding available, and respond to the pressure from NGOs. In the end, the declaration of disaster was the result

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5  The Western Cape is the only South African province where the majority of the population is not Black, but is composed mostly of Whites and Coloured. The Democratic Alliance, the leading party in this province, finds its support amongst these groups.

6  These volunteers are regularly active in the townships (Fourchard 2011).

7  In this case, the local community had threatened to set fire to the hall where the migrants were sheltered.

8  The apartheid-era categories of "Black," "White," and "Coloured" remain significant in questions of identity and politics.

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of social mobilization, a technical emergency management led by disaster specialists, and a political fight for power and leadership between different layers of the state.

Despite the declaration of disaster, the situation remained chaotic, as there was general reluctance to take responsibility amongst the various departments. When a state of disaster is declared, leadership normally falls to the department responsible for the cause of disaster. In this case, as it had not been anticipated, there was no obvious candidate, and no-one was showing any will to step up. Accepting leadership means bearing the financial costs of the disaster, and because the law makes it impossible to save unused funds, (Republic of South Africa 2003), disasters always place a strain on current budgets, which departments always seek to avoid at all times, regardless of the nature of the disaster.[9] In addition, nobody wanted to own the xenophobia problem. Just like the rest of the population whose high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment have been regularly surveyed (Crush et al. 2008), civil servants and policy-makers were also prejudiced against foreigners and questioned the legitimacy of their benefiting from state benevolence (Misago et al. 2010). Also, the nature of the problem was not self-evident: the displaced populations comprised refugees, asylum-seekers, migrants, and documented and undocumented foreign nationals, all of whom fell under the responsibility of different departments at national level (Social Development, Home Affairs, Police, etc.) and different local and provincial authorities (responsible for social integration). Finally, politicians did not want to be seen distributing money to foreigners when general elections were planned for the following year (Pugh 2014).

In the end, as "nobody else around was here to do it" (interview, head of the Provincial Disaster Management Centre, Cape Town, November 2008), and because they are a weak body within the South African state, located at the bottom of the hierarchy, without power to negotiate their role (Van Niekerk 2014), Disaster Management centers continued to

coordinate the crisis. Despite the appearance of a "depoliticization" of the problem due to this technical framing, it was in fact a convenient and political choice that framed the disaster in such way that it captured only the vulnerabilities made visible by population displacement in the urban space and limited state responsibilities to minimal protection during a fixed period of time. In other words, it offered a response that tackled the crisis without engaging too much with the issue of xenophobia, which was convenient for both bureaucrats and politicians.

## 2. On Being "Vulnerable": Claiming Rights for Migrants, Reaching Out to the State

After the declaration of a state of disaster, much of the attention focused on the displaced inside the safety sites. In the meantime, most people had reintegrated rapidly: by the first week of June, only eight thousand displaced migrants remained in a small number of shelters and in camps (see Figure 2). Government, international organizations, and NGOs embarked on a six-month program of assistance. The presence of United Nations organizations, most notably the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), was a sign of the focus on the camps and the protection of the vulnerable, as the former do not normally intervene in South Africa, as one of the better-off countries in Southern Africa. Their concern was the level of assistance and protection the state should guarantee to these vulnerable populations. The question of which category formed the legitimate basis for such intervention was again decisive, since each of the possible answer would allow different actors to step in: being a victim of xenophobic violence, being vulnerable in a camp, being displaced, being a migrant, or being a refugee? The question of protection and justice for the "victims" is tightly linked to the issue of recognition and visibility. The organization of assistance and its politics reveals how the disaster transformed the displaced migrants into vulnerable populations in need of care (Revet 2008).

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**9** Disaster management centers are permanently in deficit because of this budget avoidance. On budgetary rituals, see Von Holdt (2010).

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**Figure 2: Number of displaced persons following the May 2008 xenophobic violence (source: UN-OCHA and Disaster reports from the Provincial Disaster Management Centre)**



What does it mean for disaster managers to take care of victims in a camp? As suggested above, the camps were the theatre of emergency protection, in other words a technical fix. It was first and foremost a practical way of addressing a short-term protection need: camps had showers, and were far away and easier to manage. The control asserted by the state was a consequence of the type of protection deployed rather than an initial objective: controlling populations was a technical necessity for disaster manager to process humanitarian assistance. Still, it had two major consequences. First, it is precisely the organization of the protection that made it difficult to go beyond first-hand assistance and ensure that victims would receive proper care. Divided responsibilities between the city and the province, political disagreements between them, and the unsuitability of normal bureaucratic procedures for emergencies meant that disaster managers had a hard time getting all their requests responded to, and thus delivering effective care and protection.

However, far from being only "life technologies" for those living "bare lives" (Redfield 2012), the mundane elements of the safety sites, the blankets, the baby food, and the showers were also the object of intense activism and conflict. Humanitarian assistance was not just a bureaucratic machine. Camps also constituted a very political site where claims of biopolitical citizenship, legal rights, and inclusion could be formulated (Robins 2009). In South Africa, "the state is recognized as the central biopolitical actor, and NGOs and social movements merely seek to nudge this juggernaut into taking specific actions such as providing policies and resources for anti-retroviral therapy, recognizing refugee rights, and providing improved sanitation and so on" (2). Although these mobilizations resemble those in the early 2000s by human rights lawyers for migrants' rights who took government to court to ensure refugees and asylum seekers' access to social relief (Handmaker, la Hunt, and Klaaren 2008, 260), TAC extended this right-based agenda through mobilization on the identification of vulnerabilities produced by the violence.

From June onward, TAC turned its actions towards the promotion of tolerance and social justice. A new organization was launched, the Social Justice Coalition, whose goal was to promote social rights and access to equality and safety (broadly conceived as protection from threats of whatever kind). The safety sites provided an opportunity to advocate a broad-based citizenship based on the protection from risks, in continuation of its mobilization on AIDS and the promotion of a biological citizenship based on access to treatment for all (Robins 2008). TAC used a technical management model borrowed from international organizations to develop a political mobilization around the rights of individuals. To this end, it relied on the *UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement* to identify international norms with which the authorities would be obliged to comply. Rather than focusing on the issue of legal status, it sought to protect "vulnerable" persons from health risks (infectious diseases caused by poor living conditions and overcrowding in the camps; remoteness from health facilities), environmental risks (tents were highly vulnerable to winter storms and floods), and social exclusion due to the isolated locations of the camps (TAC, letter of June 4; 2008).

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To strengthen its position and to address the lack of official response, TAC developed its own monitoring methods to assess the situation, using universal norms to gain more legitimacy vis-à-vis the state (Human and Robins 2012). It monitored the camps with rapid assessments undertaken by volunteers. For example, by June 5, twenty-eight civil society monitors had evaluated no less than 13,041 persons. In early August, TAC and the refugees took the government to court, after a deterioration of health conditions in the camps, demanding the adoption of international camp management standards from the *Sphere Handbook: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response* and other UN guidelines. It is particularly striking that the mobilization adopted the language of risk assessment, rather than addressing xenophobia. In other words, it used the same tools as the state, not just to pressure the latter to act, but to advocate for an alternative, enlarged, and all-inclusive type of protection. These mobilizations led the Provincial Disaster Management Centre to adopt *Guidelines for Humanitarian Situations* on 15 August. Yet, this did not really bring any solutions to the situation of migrants, as the camps were progressively being shut down while remaining populations were gathered at one site, the Blue Water Camp, at the far end of the Cape Flats, separated from the city by an empty piece of land and facing the ocean (see Figure 3).

For the displaced in the camps, being labeled vulnerable created a tension between their bodies, reified by risk assessments and politics beyond them to vulnerable objects, and their own strategies, that used multiple identifications (Fassin 2010) and political subjectivities through mobilizations (Segatti and Polzer 2012). The displaced were a relatively heterogeneous group, consisting of populations with different statuses (documented and undocumented migrants, refugees, asylum seekers). For many, their uncertain (il)legal situation was the main problem, as it deprived them of an official existence, and thus of the possibility to integrate fully into South African society. Many would have preferred resettlement to a third country through the intervention of UNHCR, as they wished neither to return to their own (Zimbabwe, Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo, etc.) nor to stay in a country that did not welcome them. This aspiration created incentives to remain in the camps, in the hope that the visibility of their vulnerability would lead international organizations to intervene: "For them, the rudimentary shelter was not an act of desperation and fortitude but a place of opportunism and conspiracy" (Desai 2010, 101). This solution was highly improbable given that in South Africa the state is the sole authority to recognize refugees (unlike many African countries where UNHCR manages refugees camps), and UN organizations consider South Africa a safe country. Yet, many of the displaced remaining in the camps were in a situation of financial or social fragility. The increased presence of vulnerable migrants relates to shifts in South African migration policy that had recently tightened prescreening at the border, meaning that the most destitute were most likely to enter the country (Hammerstad 2012; Klotz 2012). For lack of a better solution, the remaining displaced hoped to live in the camps, apart from the rest of the population.

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Figure 3: The Blue Water safety site (author's photo)



### 3. "Protecting the Most Vulnerable": The Limits of Statecraft and Citizenship

A few days before the official closure of the Blue Water safety site at the end of November 2008, a strategic planner from the reintegration team of the Department of the Premier visited it. He insisted that the site had to close, and that in any case foreigners were not to live separately from South Africans, as this was the official line of the provincial government. The planner, a long-time comrade (former ANC activist), well versed in conflict resolution and security issues, felt sorry and upset at the same time. He appeared to understand the plight of the displaced, but considered that the state had done its job by offering six months of social relief, and that from now on, the nearly five hundred remaining displaced persons would have to reintegrate into communities by themselves, before the police evicted them for unlawful use of public space. In a last gesture of compassion, he asked the volunteers, who were still distributing food on a daily basis, to compile a list of the twenty or so "most vulnerable" persons (pregnant women, sick and old persons, etc.) whom the government would take responsibility for, while the others would be required to vacate the site before an official evacuation order would be given. The volunteers refused and said they would not choose some displaced over others. In the end, the government did nothing more, and relied mostly on the funds provided by UNHCR to help migrants reintegrate and the reintegration work undertaken by various NGOs. As the planner explained later:

> Well, that's the real challenge because we also knew that the significantly small percentage of people who were left – a thousand, maybe two thousand of them – were before, during, and will remain after this, acutely desperate and in need. And desperate in a number of senses, not financially maybe, but lacking what you and I may take for granted, which is a social support structure. They're not tied into any broad network of people who care for them. And again, *it's not a government job. If you look for government to do that, it's going to fail … you know. Government cannot provide people with social networks.* (interview, October 2008).

His position was ambiguous, as he assumed that the responsibility to integrate fell on individuals while partially acknowledging that some migrants were not really in a position to integrate. In his view, care and protection should come first through the community and the family ("social networks") while the state was not there to provide universal and permanent protection; its role was to offer

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care when no other alternatives were available. In practice, it could not be said that the state had done its "job" in protecting the displaced as, at every level of government, it had not worked out the deep issues that had given rise to the crisis in the communities (Sinwell 2011). Most prominently, the question of legal status and the difficulty for asylum seekers and migrants to get documentation for more than a few months had not been addressed. In addition, he was asking the displaced to return to face the very danger that had made them leave their communities in the first place, regardless of their status and relations with the communities. He neglected the fact that integration is not only an individual responsibility but also requires a political acknowledgement (through legal status) and cohesive communities – none of which existed in the fragmented nationalist South Africa. Thus, there could not be any promises of safety.

These conceptions were highly consistent with the post-apartheid justifications of the provision of welfare by the state (Seekings 2009; Ally 2009). They revealed more broadly why the state appeared to fail to protect the migrants, despite providing six months of assistance and promoted reintegration (at least in Cape Town). The problem was not only (or not really) the level of assistance, but rather, forms it took, which focused mostly on protecting a few of the "most vulnerable" to the detriment of broader forms of social integration.[10] As Firoz Khan suggested, the South African "government's exclusive social assistance focus on the relative neglect of social insurance and/or the evacuation of the latter from the policy agenda figure prominently in fueling and deepening both poverty and inequality" (2013, 575). This point is equally present in the political imagination and justification of welfare in disaster management. Indeed, the South African disaster management law reveals a limited conception of the vulnerable populations in need of protection that finds its roots in the political values of the elite as well as bureaucratic complexities. Tellingly, when the legislation was being discussed

in parliament in 2003, a deputy from the ANC stressed that the Act "is aimed at enabling our communities to mitigate the severity or consequences of disasters" (Republic of South Africa 2002). The state did not set out to take the lead on protecting individuals, but instead to "enable" communities, social networks, and individuals to do so by themselves. This limiting conception of state intervention stemmed from a belief in individual responsibility ambiguously rooted in empowerment thinking and neo-liberal influence (Pons-Vignon and Segatti 2013; Van den Heever 2011). Financial constraints and the incapacitation of bureaucracies resulting from new public management policies (Chipkin 2011) led to limits on the extent of disaster management, so that it would not have to take responsibility for all the causes of disasters that generally lie in combinations of poverty, inequality, social disintegration, poor housing, low income, etc. Despite its progressive and developmental intentions, the state would provide *a posteriori* protection and mitigate the possible outcomes, but would not be responsible for transforming the distribution of vulnerabilities and risks in society. What is at stake is the reach of the state: it prefers to empower local actors to reduce their own vulnerabilities rather than require government actors to take responsibility for fighting social inequalities. The state would nonetheless provide assistance, but only to the most vulnerable and deserving – the elderly, the sick, and children (Seekings 2009), and in exchange for the wielding of control over individuals (Ally 2009). Consequently, responding to xenophobia as a disaster may never bring the state to tackle the root causes of the problem, only its visible surface.

The reintegration plan developed by the Premier's office stated that the objective was "a community that respects and protects all its inhabitants" (Provincial Government of the Western Cape 2008b), rather than have the state ensure protection. State and international organizations considered reintegration as a problem of (dis)incentives (access to state benefits, social disintegration, financial

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10  An observer from OCHA pointed out that the level of assistance was much higher in South Africa than in many refugee camps elsewhere in Africa (interview, December 2008).

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resources etc.): they hoped that financial help would suffice to encourage migrants to return to the communities – the supposed locus of protection. Still, some migrants refused to accept the money distributed by UNHCR, as it would not have solved their problem (acceptance and recognition within the community), and might even have put them in a situation of increased danger by identifying them as recipients of public benevolence – which is precisely what South Africans also desperately seek from their state. As one migrant woman said to me, one day after being given these choices and not being ready to leave the Blue Water site: "they don't understand, it's not a matter of money." What she hoped for was political recognition through legal identification by the state and recognition of her right to be protected from the risk of violence in the communities where she was supposed to live. In the end, the only option for the remaining migrants was to find a solution on their own; in other words, to disappear from the camps and become invisible again or resist the order to vacate. After six months, when the disaster was officially declared over,[11] four hundred still remained at the Blue Water site, but were now treated as illegal occupiers of a public facility. The tents were finally destroyed by the police in 2010.

**Conclusion**

To sum up, being labeled as vulnerable provided displaced migrants with a possibility to reach out to the state and access its protection. However, it also meant reaching the limits of a state protection restricted in space, time, and situation. All those who reintegrated once again became invisible to state benevolence, while subjected to continuous violence and xenophobia in communities that often rejected attempts at reintegration (Desai 2010). Despite the slowness and reluctance of the state to tackle these issues, the disaster situation enabled vulnerable persons displaced to access social relief – a benefit otherwise unattainable for migrants. Yet, the kind of protection provided by the state (and international organizations) was not only limited, but also very ambivalent. It signaled a form of recognition through the temporary victim status that gave access to forms of protection, but restricted it to vulnerabilities made visible by the disaster. Humanitarian assistance sought by no means to engage with larger issues of distribution of inequalities, risks, and vulnerabilities, as well as

recognition of difference and long-term inclusion of foreigners in the communities.

The making of victims as vulnerable displaced persons explains how the limited engagement of the state – typically seen as a failure – paradoxically resulted in creating exclusion and necessity to care for at the same time. The bureaucratic and political constraints of disaster management prevented migrants from fully accessing recognition and produced more inequalities, while at the same time opening a terrain for contestation. The power of the state was thus ambivalent, functioning as a source of both control and protection. It added to the tension between protection, defined by the state as assistance to the most vulnerable, and the biopolitical citizenship promoted by NGOs, using vulnerability as a pillar for substantive care to be offered to all individuals, whatever their legal status. Thus, the way the disaster was managed prevented the root causes of the violence being addressed by focusing on the "most vulnerable" rather than on widespread xenophobia and violence.

This mode of response to xenophobic violence was later institutionalized and became a routine mode of action. After the 2008 crisis, the Western Cape Provincial Disaster Management Center recognized a new risk ("social conflict"), and developed a Social Conflict Emergency Plan and a Social Conflict Emergency Committee responsible for this kind of disaster. Although it acknowledged the possibility of violent conflict because of xenophobia, it restricted it to visible and major violence susceptible to disrupt the urban order, leaving invisible violence and daily xenophobia untackled. Therefore, when xenophobic violence happened again a year later in the rural town of De Doorns, the same kind of responses were put in place. Protests in the community led to the displacement of the Zimbabweans who had come to work in the farms; a tent was set up on a field sport and served as a temporary shelter for more than a year as the situation was equally intractable. Since then, xenophobic violence continues to happen on a regular basis. Again, during spring 2015, after six persons were killed in Durban (News24 2015a), disaster management opened temporary shelters and deployed humanitarian assistance (News24 2015b).

To conclude, focusing on migrants' rights may be necessary but does not prove sufficient to solve the issue of xenophobia in South Africa. Understanding the forms of protection, rather than just the failures of the state, is important to suggest that more protection is not always a straightforward and obvious answer. Treating xenophobic violence as a disaster brings a response only to a part of the problem and creates other problems. It rendered migrants visible and in need of care, while relegating them outside of the spaces of daily urban life. Looking at what protecting vulnerable displaced migrants meant brought attention to the fact that the way the state protects populations is both necessary and part of the problem. The perspective of vulnerability and visibility, rather than just rights, calls for a better articulation of issues recognition and forms of social protection, in tackling violence and xenophobia. Therefore, the treatment of xenophobic violence cannot be separated from a broader debate on larger forms of inclusion, social membership, and welfare provided by the state, but also by NGOs. Such a perspective calls for further research on the treatment of violence and disaster that pays a critical attention to the forms of protection implied by disaster management, and not only to the level of protection.

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11  Social relief for disaster is by law restricted to a period of six months.

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# The Domestic Democratic Peace in the Middle East

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# The Domestic Democratic Peace in the Middle East

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The democratic peace theory has two complementary variants regarding intrastate conflicts: the "democratic civil peace" thesis sees democratic regimes as pacifying internal tensions; the "anocratic war" thesis submits that due to nationalism, democratizing regimes breed internal violence. This paper statistically tests the two propositions in the context of the contemporary Middle East and North Africa (MENA). We show that a MENA democracy makes a country more prone to both the onset and incidence of civil war, even if democracy is controlled for, and that the more democratic a MENA state is, the more likely it is to experience violent intrastate strife. Interestingly, anocracies do not seem to be predisposed to civil war, either worldwide or in MENA. Looking for causality beyond correlation, we suggest that "democratizing nationalism" might be a long-term prerequisite for peace and democracy, not just an immediate hindrance. We also advise complementing current research on intrastate and interstate clashes with the study of intercommunal conflicts and the democratic features of non-state polities.

Kant's vision of moving "toward perpetual peace" stands at the crux of liberal thought in International Relations (IR), positing democracy, open trade, and international institutions as peace promoters. Though these liberal mechanisms intertwine (Doyle, 2005), democratic peace theories (DPT) now constitute "a powerful discursive core of contemporary conflict research," quantitatively dominating this field (Sillanpää and Koivula 2010, 148).

Can the contemporary realities of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) inform this rich research program? Recent surveys among North American IR scholars reveal that while DPT is overwhelmingly considered the most productive IR research program (Maliniak et al. 2007, 29), MENA, though held as the most strategically important area to the United States, receives the least published attention in the field (Maliniak et al. 2011, 459). MENA appears to defy many political theories, and coupling DPT with MENA, the least democratic region of the world, seems senseless.

The Arab Spring, however, calls for rethinking (Gause 2011). Whatever its causes and outcomes, the regional turmoil is likely to further an already remarkable "electoralization," resulting in the holding of more and more fair and free elections. Indeed, while MENA has been all but absent from the third wave of democratization, in the past generation it has gone through seeming liberalization and intense electoralization ([pic]Brynen et al. 1995; Lust-Okar and Zerhouni 2008). Evident setbacks in the late 1990s notwithstanding, recent years have seen an unprecedented number of fairly fair and free elections in the region, ostensibly giving voice to the people through votes and highlighting the need to reassess the possible relationship between ballots and bullets in the region.

This paper focuses on one particular aspect of DPT: its application to the domestic sphere. Domestic democratic peace theories (DDPT) examine whether the pacifying effects of democracy apply not only in the interstate sphere but to the intrastate sphere as well. Several authors suggest that democracy provides peaceful ways of ameliorating domestic tensions before they escalate to violence, engendering a "democratic civil peace" of sorts ([pic]Krain and Myers 1997; Rummel 1984; Rummel 1985; Stockemer

2010). Others submit that democratizing (anocratic) states breed violence, due to nationalism (Mansfield and Snyder 2005). Either way, DDPT seems especially relevant to the study of MENA, for the main source of political violence in the region does not lie in interstate strife. To wit, we seek to analyze the applicability of DDPT to MENA, not to establish the possibility of domestic democratic peace itself.

We show that rather than producing a "democratic civil peace," democracies in MENA seem statistically disposed to greater domestic political violence. Contrary to the "anocratic thesis," semi-democracies in the region do not show a significant propensity to domestic violence. We suggest that "democratizing nationalism" might actually be a long-term prerequisite of democratic peace, not just an immediate hindrance. We also advise transcending the statist perspective that underlies the typical DPT typology of interstate and intrastate conflicts, in order to examine intercommunal conflicts as well as the democratic features of non-state polities.

### 1. Democratic Peace Theories

DPT is one of the more prolific and high-profile political theories of our time, and has made substantial strides since its inception, becoming more nuanced, robust, and diverse (Chan 2009). DPT's "T" now stands for a plurality of often-conflicting theories. Its research program deals with both interstate and intrastate relations and spans three prominent models: monadic, dyadic, and anocratic.

Monadic DPT holds that democracies are more pacific (Ferejohn and McCall Rosenbluth 2008) and less likely to engage in severe war (Rummel 1995) or to initiate and escalate military threats (Huth and Allee 2002, 281) than other non-democratic states. Conversely, dyadic DPT holds that it takes two to tango the democratic peace, as democracies rarely, if ever, fight one another ([pic]Ray 1995; Russett 1993; Weart 1998). Even if extended beyond large-scale wars, to both crises and militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) (Beck et al. 1998), dyadic DPT seems robust ([pic]Dafoe 2011; Oneal and Russett 2001). However, recent studies cast doubt as to whether it is democracy that causes peace or in fact the other way around, or both (Rasler and Thompson, 2005); perhaps the link is spurious,

and militarized rivalry and severe territorial disputes hinder both peace and democracy ([pic]Gibler and Tir 2010; Miller and Gibler 2011).

DPT's third and youngest progeny is the anocratic model. Anocracies are in-between regimes, neither autocracies nor democracies. In *Electing to Fight*, Mansfield and Snyder (2005, 76–77) follow the Polity Score (see below) to identify as anocratic those regimes where the constraints on the executive are "more than 'slight' but less than 'substantial,'" often with "dual executives, in which a hereditary ruler shares authority with an appointed or elected governing minister." They are specifically interested in democratizing anocracies, whose transitions they measure over a five-year period, and propose that because emerging democracies tend to engender strong nationalism and weak political institutions, they engage in political violence more frequently than either democracies or autocracies (see also Sandeep et al. 2009). Although heavily contested (for example Narang and Nelson 2009), anocratic DPT is widely noted and highly influential.

DPT's three main models are predominantly about interstate relations (Hook 2010). However, responding to the saliency of non-interstate violence, scholars increasingly extend the DPT research program to intrastate conflicts. DDPT imports insights from the interstate models into two main theses. The "democratic civil peace" thesis, reflecting dyadic and monadic rationales, postulates that democracies are much less inclined to descend into civil war ([pic]Gleditsch et al. 2009; Krain and Myers 1997; Rummel 1984, 1985; Stockemer 2010).

The "anocratic war" thesis holds that anocracies are the most prone to suffer from internal, as well as external, violent strife. While some scholars go so far as to argue that elections may fuel political violence in both democratizing and well-established democracies (Rapoport and Weinberg 2001), most scholars connect internal violence only to incipient democracies. Snyder (2000) submits that when "liberty is leading people," intrastate violence often follows: premature democratization ignites nationalism and consequently political violence, frequently ethnic and civil wars. As in the interstate version of anocratic DPT, here too nationalism reigns as the violence-inducing factor.

These two compelling theses are part of a rather coherent research effort, and are not mutually exclusive (for a thorough review of the literature, see Gleditsch and Hegre 2014). They can effectively converge on a joint question: Does democratization breed or stem internal political violence? Is there a threshold beyond which democratization stops yielding anocratic violence and starts fostering civil democratic peace? Hegre et al. (2001, 44) hold that "if we focus on countries that are at least half-way toward complete democracy, the prospects for domestic peace are promising" (see also [pic]Cederman et al. 2010; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). However, the nature of this "magical mid-point" remains elusive.

There are partial remedies. For example, not all civil wars are the same, and governmental/territorial motivations may correlate distinctively with regime type. Buhaug (2006, 691) finds that "the reputed parabolic relationship between democracy and risk of civil war only pertains to state-centered conflicts, whereas democracy has a positive and near-linear effect on the risk of territorial rebellion." Gleditsch et al. (2009) confirm this proposition, and persuasively show that democracies are less prone to violence, also due to higher income and stable institutions.

The linkage between anocracy and political instability is pivotal. When the latter is controlled for, some studies evince the parabolic relationship between democracy and risk of civil war (Hegre et al. 2001). However, since political instability could be a consequence of anocracy and a mechanism for explaining conflict, it may not be appropriate to control for it (Gleditsch et al. 2009). Generally, studies omitting political instability show a positive relationship between anocracy and conflict.

### 2. Votes and Violence in the Middle East

Can various DPT models, DDPT included, apply to MENA? Few studies attempt to look at DPT, let alone DDPT, from a regional perspective (cf. [pic]Gibl, 2012; Gleditsch 2002; Kacowicz 1998), and fewer focus on MENA. There seems to be good reasons for this. Prime facie, DPT and MENA are a highly unlikely match. After all, in a region largely inhospitable to democratic ideas and practices, chances for democratic peace seem slim. Up until the

Arab Spring, Arab authoritarianism – whether autocratic or monarchic – had withstood domestic challenges for four long decades, making MENA an attractive "control case" for theories of democratization ([pic]Anderson 2001; Saikal and Schnabel 2003) but an unlikely candidate for testing DPT.

DPT, as an increasingly statistics-driven research program, typically finds data on democracies in MENA a non-starter for dedicated research: "[T]he small variance in the independent or explanatory variable (the democratic nature of regimes) hinders our ability to estimate the effects on the dependent variable (conflict or cooperation)" (Solingen 2003, 44). Democratic peace per se appears irrelevant to MENA's history. Thus, most scholarship addressing democracy and MENA sidesteps DPT and prefers to explicate the "democracy lag/gap/deficiency ([pic]Brynen et al. 1995; Springborg 2007) or its flipside, "enduring authoritarianism" ([pic]Bellin 2004; Schlumberger 2007).

There are few exceptions to this rule. Several scholars and regime-type datasets note MENA's modest liberalization/electoralization from the mid-1970s until about 1993 ([pic]Brynen et al. 1995; Ehteshami 1999; Freedom House 2014; Salamé 1994). This trend (Figure 2 below) and the heyday of the Arab-Israeli peace process toward the mid-1990s produced some optimistic assessments. Maoz (1995, 179) argued that "levels of hostility in the Arab-Israeli conflict are affected by changes in domestic political systems. The move toward democracy by these states reduces the intensity of conflict interaction." Tessler and Grobschmidt (1995, 163) even predicted that "the overall effect of political liberalization and democracy would be much more positive than negative with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict." If so, Russett (1993, 134) noted, MENA is one place in particular where a "threat to the theory and the reality of 'democracies don't go to war with each other' lurks," since once Arab states achieve democracy, the Arab-Israeli conflict may eclipse, and thus theoretically challenge, dyadic DPT.

Conversely, Hudson (1995, 217) held that "the Arab (and Arab/Israeli) cases do not clearly indicate a clear relationship between regime structure ('democracy') and foreign

policy behavior [...] to the extent that there might be such a relationship, these cases suggest that 'democratic' structures might be less 'peace-prone' than authoritarian structures." Similarly, Solingen (2003, 58) concluded that "even a minimalist, relaxed version of the democratic peace hypothesis cannot explain the big strides toward a more peaceful region made in the early 1990s."

The scarcity of DPT scholarship on MENA is unfortunate. After all, it "make[s] more sense to study the causes of war and peace among dyads in war-prone parts of the world" (Goldsmith 2006, 547). In particular, the interplay between votes and violence in MENA during the last generation presents fascinating challenges and opportunities for dedicated DPT research on the region. As the least democratic and nearly the most violent region worldwide, a democratizing MENA may put DPT to an important test – and may call for theoretical and methodological rethinking. While democratic peace may be missing from MENA, MENA is conversely, and regrettably, missing from theorizing on democratic peace. Coupling these theories with regional practice, while taxing, may benefit our understanding of both. Ultimately, for DPT to inform Mideast studies, Mideast studies must first inform DPT.

A brief exposition of conflict and democracy in MENA should help set the stage for the statistical investigation. Historically, MENA has been a violent neighborhood. Although the worldwide drop in the number of conflicts began in MENA at the beginning of the 1980s, it remains (increasingly), one of the most politically violent regions in the world. Among the world's twenty-five most war-prone countries since 1946, eight are Middle Eastern. Since the 1980s, MENA battle-deaths (as opposed to number of discrete conflict) have been on par with the most deadly zones, Central and Southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, with the latter becoming the most conflict-prone and deadly by the turn of the twenty-first century. Likewise, since the 1980s MENA has shared with Southern Asia the first place among regions plagued by political terror (Human Security Centre 2014).

Recently, the situation has further deteriorated. "The Middle East/Persian Gulf and Latin America lead all other regions both in terms of total attacks and fatalities, while the former has replaced the latter as the most active terrorist region in the world over time" (Hewitt et al. 2010, 22). From 2002 onwards, there was a sharp increase in violent campaigns against civilians in MENA, notably in Sudan, Iraq, and Syria. The other regions showed no clear trends. MENA's share of worldwide non-state conflict battle-deaths has increased substantially, now amounting to about a quarter of the total deaths due to non-state conflicts (Harbom and Wallensteen 2009). The Arab Spring has accelerated the rise of political violence in MENA along three fronts: fighting between government forces and rebel groups *(state-based conflict)*, clashes between non-state groups *(non-state conflict)*, and deadly assaults against civilians *(one-sided violence)*, such as the violent suppression of protests and demonstrations (see Figure 1).

**Figure 1: Reported deaths from organized violence in the Middle East and North Africa, 1989–2011**



Source: Human Security Centre 2014, 82.

MENA's surfeit of political violence is matched by its dearth of democracy. In assessing the Mideast democratic gap, datasets generally converge. Freedom House (FH) (2014) regards Israel as the only "free country" in MENA since 1976; in 2014, six countries (Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Turkey, and Tunisia) were ranked as "partly free," while the rest of the MENA states (66 percent; 83 percent of the population) are "not free," significantly surpassing sub-Saharan Africa (with "only" 41 percent of countries,

and 35 percent of the population, denoted as "not free"). The overall average score of FH for MENA (on a 1 to 7 scale, 1 being the most free) has changed little since the index began in 1971. The decline in autocracies from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s (and again in the mid-2000s, and in the wake of the Arab Spring) mainly bred anocracies, not democracies.[1] MENA also remains the stronghold of hereditary monarchies. The Arab Spring has thus far yield a similar effect (see Figure 2).[2]

**Figure 2: Trends in freedom in the Middle East and North Africa, 1974–2014**



Source: Freedom House 2014.

*The Economist*'s *2012 Democracy Index* (2013) suggests that in 2012 Libya, Egypt, and Morocco transitioned from authoritarian to hybrid regimes, but twelve of twenty MENA countries are still ruled by authoritarian leaders. The Polity IV Index (Marshall and Jaggers 2010) likewise ranks MENA as the region with the lowest share of democracies (currently, Israel, Lebanon, and Turkey), the highest number of autocracies, and about the same proportion of anocracies as in Central and Southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. According to the *Minorities at Risk* project,

discrimination inevitably follows: "For most of the last half-century a larger proportion of minorities has suffered from governmentally sanctioned discrimination in MENA than in any other world region […] What is especially unique in this region is the lack of any real movement toward remedial actions for disadvantaged groups" (Marshall and Gurr, 2005, 42).

### 3. Testing Domestic Democratic Peace in the Middle East

Sørli et al. (2005) provide the most comprehensive attempt to-date to quantitatively explain MENA's patterns of war and peace. Testing the various hypotheses of the Collier-Hoeffler model of civil war in MENA (1960–2000), the authors also pay attention to regime-type. They confirm the curvilinear relationship democracy and conflict (both internal and internationalized internal), suggesting that "the high level of authoritarianism cannot by itself account for the high level of conflict in the Middle East" (Sørli et al. 2005, 156). Our study, which is dedicated to the effects of regime-types, complement this important work by updating it (up to 2007), thus including key recent events – such as 9/11, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process – and their vast implications on both "electoralization" and domestic violence in the region. We also include additional variables, such as the incidence (not only onset) of civil wars, and test democracy with another dataset (Freedom House).

Scholars still dispute the best way to estimate the effect of regime type on the probability of conflict. We used binary logistic cross-sectional time-series analysis for our dataset (employing AR1). Beck et al. (1998) propose that binary time-series cross-sectional studies should create a variable of the years elapsed since the last dispute. We also follow the GEE method advocated by Oneal and Russett (1999, 2001), and Carter and Signorino (2010), in incorporating squared and cubed polynomials for peace years.

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1  According to Freedom House, MENA autocracies becoming "partly free" include Algeria (1989–1992), Bahrain (1976–1993), Egypt (1975–1993), Iran (1979–1981, 1984–88), Jordan (1985–2010), Kuwait (1992–), Lebanon (1976–1989, 1992–95, 2006–), Libya (2013-)-, Qatar (1977–1989, Sudan (1979–1989) Syria (1978–1980), Tunisia (1979–1993, 2012-.), UAE (1977–1990), (North) Yemen (1984–1993).

2  Figure 2 excludes Polyarchy, as the latter lacks full data on some countries (such as Lebanon, Yemen), and does not go beyond the year 2000. Compared to FH, in Polyarchy the anocratic fluctuation is more moderate; about 85 percent of MENA countries are consistently autocratic.

The selection of datasets for investigating DDPT is quite intricate. Both Polity IV and Correlates of War (COW) currently seem to provide sub-optimal data for this analysis. Scholarship is increasingly critical of Polity's "serious endogeneity and measurement problems" (Cederman et al. 2010, 377), holding that "skepticism as to the precision of the Polity democracy scale is well founded" (Treier and Jackman 2008, 201). Polity's faults are particularly troubling in the case of anocratic DPT and DDPT (Vreeland 2008).

In light of Polity's problems, we opted to use two alternatives: Freedom House and Vanhanen's (2000) Polyarchy (version 2.0). We recoded FH composite ranking of political rights and civil liberties (each scoring 1 to 7, jointly 2 to 14), so that our ranking starts with a composite score of 1 (the least democratic) to 13 (the most democratic), following the customary categorization of autocracy (1–4), anocracy (5–9) and democracy (10–13). Our categorical coding of Polyarchy follows Ristei Gugiu and Centellas (2013). We added Mideast variables: first, a dummy variable ("MENA"), coding Mideast states;[3] second, dummy variables for the three main regime-types (Democracy, Anocracy, Autocracy); third, a continuous variable coding MENA countries' FH and Polyarchy score ("Democracy MENA"; 0 for non-MENA states).

For the dependent variable of civil wars, UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset v.4-2011, 1946–2010 (Themnér and Wallensteen, 2011) is preferable to COW. While COW focuses on interstate disputes (including wars) and large-scale intrastate wars (excluding other types of violent conflicts), the UCDP/PRIO dataset includes all armed conflicts resulting in at least twenty-five battle-related deaths. We coded, as binary variables, both the onset and the incidence of civil war. Recent works reasonably focus on onset, since causes for the initiation and the duration of such conflicts are arguably different (Gleditsch et al. 2009).

We followed Stockemer's (2010) analysis of regime-type and civil wars from 1990 to 2007 on a state-year basis. Beyond the independent and dependent variables, this dataset controls for time, employing the technique proposed by Beck et al. (1998); GDP per capita measures, taken from the World Bank data (in constant 2005 US dollars ); national GDP (in billion US dollars); the number of ethnic, religious, and/or linguistic groups constituting 5 percent or more of the population; income inequality (based on Gini coefficient and clustered as a categorical variable, coded 0 for low inequality, 1 for medium-high inequality, and 2 for the most unequal countries); and a dummy variable for small states (coded 1 for a country with a population of 1.5 million or below). We hypothesize that the richer the country is, the fewer civil wars it experiences; that societal cleavages and inequalities increase the likelihood of internal unrest and political violence; and that small states, which are often more easily governed, are less prone to civil war (Stockemer 2010).

Cederman et al. (2013, 205) find that "access to state power is a pivotal factor strongly influencing both the risk for conflict and its duration." Overall, exclusion from state power and horizontal inequality increase the risk of civil war onset. We thus added a control variable, coding the political exclusion and relative size of minorities, drawing on the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (Wimmer et al. 2009). Following Gleditsch et. al. (2009), we did not control for political (in)stability.

We conducted two logistic regressions, using both regime-type dummy variables (Table 1) and the degree of democracy as a continuous variable (Table 2). In both tables, model 1 presents findings regarding world data and model 2 controls for MENA. In both tables, MENA is a binary variable, coded 1 for MENA countries. In Table 1, MENA Democracy and MENA Anocracy are binary variables, coded 1 only for Mideast democracies and anocracies, respectively. In Table 2, MENA Democracy is coded 0 for non-MENA countries and spans the regime-type scale for MENA states. The Democracy variable applies worldwide, and is binary in Table 1 and continuous in Table 2.

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**3** MENA states include Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

**Table 1: Logistic regression for the incidence and onset of civil war, 1990–2007**

| | Incidence | | | | Onset | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Freedom House | | Polyarchy | | Freedom House | | Polyarchy | |
| Variable | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1[a] | Model 2 |
| Democracy | -.317 (.5317) | -.365 (.5073) | -.131 (.4549) | .043 (.4052) | –1.031** (.4812) | –1.006** (.4215) | –1.212** (.5464) | –1.057** (.4671) |
| Anocracy | .275 (.2854) | .083 (.2612) | .160 (.4256) | .147 (.3677) | -.362 (.3017) | -.417 (.2850) | -.963 (.6700) | -.953 (.6539) |
| Small state | .297 (.3516) | .150 (.3091) | .416 (.3784) | .131 (.3520) | -.295 (.3963) | -.279 (.3849) | -.274 (.4595) | -.320 (.4623) |
| Number of ethnic groups | .103 (.0695) | .103 (.0692) | .064 (.0970) | .131 (.3520) | .179** (.0893) | .165 (.0859) | .071 (.1149) | .072 (.1114) |
| Discriminated groups | .468 (.5307) | .719 (.5703) | .720 (.6660) | .932 (.6633) | .303 (.4642) | .311 (.4475) | -.025 (.6357) | .007 (.6283) |
| Income inequality | .016 (.1476) | .040 (.1355) | .003 (.1560) | .064 (.1527) | -.100 (.1246) | -.099 (.1243) | -.202 (.1522) | -.195 (.1501) |
| GDP | –3.663E-6 (1.0472E-5) | –5.612E-6 (1.0817E-5) | –1.029E-5 (1.2945E-5) | –1.491E-5 (1.3041E-5) | 5.253E-6 (1.7116E-5) | 2.550E-6 (1.6347E-5) | –1.884E-5 (2.4780E-5) | –2.080E-5 (2.4703E-5) |
| GDP per capita | .000* (6.8590E-5) | –5.072E-5* (2.8661E-5) | –9.857E-5 (7.4593E-5) | –4.646E-5 (3.1802E-5) | –6.892E-5 (5.1425E-5) | –5.046E-5 (3.3306E-5) | –2.474E-5 (3.4030E-5) | –2.025E-5 (2.9280E-5) |
| Peace years | -.900*** (.0988) | -.857*** (.0986) | -.960*** (.1424) | -.981*** (.1472) | -.337*** (.0764) | -.347*** (.0737) | -.387*** (.0948) | -.389*** (.0944) |
| Peace years$^2$ | .043*** (.0054) | .040*** (.0052) | .048*** (.0088) | .049*** (.0089) | .016*** (.0043) | .016*** (.0041) | .019*** (.0056) | .019*** (.0056) |
| Peace years$^3$ | -.001*** (7.4445E-5) | -.001*** (7.1823E-5) | -.001*** (.0001) | -.001*** (.0001) | .000*** (6.0858E-5) | .000*** (5.9812E-5) | .000*** (8.5932E-5) | .000*** (8.5367E-5) |
| MENA | 1.089 (.4661) | | .503 (.5091) | | .247 (.4565) | | -.031 (.5508) | |
| MENA democracy | 2.724** (1.0669) | | 2.585*** (.8674) | | 2.787*** (.9153) | | 2.062* (1.0570) | |
| MENA anocracy | -.044 (.8769) | | .478 (.8618) | | -.584 (1.2787) | | | |
| Constant | .047 (.4943) | .084 (.4634) | .252 (.5226) | .184 (.4882) | –1.886*** (.5513) | –1.775*** (.5167) | –1.114 (.8102) | –1.120 (.7732) |
| N | 2071 | 2071 | 1221 | 1221 | 1773 | 1773 | 1034 | 1034 |

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
[a].The variables MENA anocracy and MENA autocracy were omitted from this model because Hessian matrix singularity is caused by these parameters.

**Table 2: Logistic regression for the incidence and onset of civil war (degree of democracy as a continuous variable), 1990–2007**

| | Incidence | | | | Onset | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Freedom House | | Polyarchy | | Freedom House | | Polyarchy | |
| Variable | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 1[a] | Model 2 |
| Democracy | -.012 (.0522) | -.029 (.0484) | -.001 .0186 | .009 (.0155) | -.086* (.0481) | -.082* (.0421) | -.048** (.0223) | -.037** (.0185) |
| Small state | .196 (.3014) | .066 (.2761) | .402 .3731 | .140 (.3513) | -.345 (.3662) | -.353 (.3642) | -.263 (.4663) | -.313 (.4671) |
| Number of ethnic groups | .101 (.0675) | .105 (.0682) | .057 .0964 | .075 (.0947) | .166* (.0902) | .167* (.0892) | .075 (.1104) | .080 (.1074) |
| Discriminated groups | .557 (.5509) | .693 (.5744) | .745 .6561 | 1.000 (.6597) | .328 (.4713) | .332 (.4619) | -.118 (.6587) | -.025 (.6466) |
| Income inequality | -.024 (.1469) | .020 (.1338) | -.005 .1565 | .059 (.1519) | -.111 (.1236) | -.103 (.1254) | -.194 (.1520) | -.176 (.1499) |
| GDP | −4.759E-006 (9.6781E-006) | −4.053E-006 (1.0510E-005) | −1.125E-005 (1.2988E-005) | −1.533E-005 (1.3304E-005) | 9.703E-007 (1.5028E-005) | 3.641E-006 (1.5866E-005) | -1.656E-005 (2.4438E-005) | −1.901E-005 (2.4009E-005) |
| GDP per capita | .000** (5.5157E-005) | −5.496E-005* (2.9786E-005) | .000 (8.4403E-005) | −5.584E-005* (3.3189E-005) | -6.743E-005 (4.5345E-005) | −5.509E-005 (3.6612E-005) | -2.161E-005 (3.5854E-005) | −1.927E-005 (2.8430E-005) |
| Peace years | -.897*** (.1001) | -.850*** (.0985) | -.946*** (.1432) | -.986*** (.1491) | -.340*** (.0788) | -.349*** (.0742) | -.381*** (.0994) | -.399*** (.0985) |
| Peace years$^2$ | .043*** (.0054) | .040*** (.0052) | .047*** (.0088) | .049*** (.0090) | .016*** (.0045) | .017*** (.0042) | .019*** (.0059) | .020*** (.0058) |
| Peace years$^3$ | -.001*** (7.5422E-005) | .000*** (7.1391E-005) | -.001*** (.0001) | -.001*** (.0001) | .000*** (6.5990E-005) | .000*** (6.1238E-005) | .000*** (8.9362E-005) | .000*** (8.8584E-005) |
| MENA | .250 (.6876) | | .322 (.5766( | | -.909 (.7663) | | -.338 (.6410) | |
| MENA democracy | .222* (.1225) | | .081** (.0317) | | .288** (.1317) | | .087** (.0346) | |
| Constant | .237 (.5026) | .257 (.4910) | .283 (.5502) | .128 (.5132) | -1.575*** (.5739) | | -1.029 (.7899) | -1.109 (.7491) |
| N | 2071 | 2071 | 1221 | 1221 | 1773 | 1773 | 1034 | 1034 |

\* p<0.1 \*\* p<0.05 \*\*\* p<0.01

Our findings – across all models, datasets, and tables – suggest that being a MENA democracy makes a country more prone to the onset and incidence of civil war, even if democracy is controlled for, and that the more democratic a MENA state is, the more likely it is to experience violent intrastate strife (Table 2). Conversely, with both FH and Polyarchy, democracies worldwide are significantly less prone to civil war onset, in either a binary or a scale measure (Tables 1 and 2). Anocracies do not seem to be predisposed to civil wars, either worldwide or in MENA (Table 1).

To further validate our surprising findings regarding the anocratic effect on civil war, we inserted the control variables to the statistical models incrementally. With FH, the anocratic effect is insignificant throughout, even in the univariate model (with just the anocracy variable). With Polyarchy, controlling for time dependency by peace-years polynomials eliminates the significant effect of anocracy. The discrepancy with previous studies (see above) might be the result of the latter using Polity, not FH and Polyarchy, as well as of our control for time dependence using peace-years polynomials.

## 4. Discussion

MENA's apparent aberration is rather easy to dismiss. First, these findings do not statistically refute the global observation. Second, MENA's (and Israel's) alleged exceptionalism is readily available to explain away this outlier. Supposedly, since this region is so out of sync with the rest of the political world, its apparently odd behavior should come as no surprise and have little theoretical or methodological bearing on DPT. It is thus rather safe to "save" DPT from MENA anomaly.

However, such "defensive" moves expose DPT's theoretical fragility, evincing yet again that "no experimental result can ever kill a theory: any theory can be saved from counter instances either by some auxiliary hypothesis or by a suitable reinterpretation of its terms" (Lakatos 1970, 116). Choosing a less safe path, however daunting, may be more rewarding – to both DPT's research program and its actual utility. While we may settle for ad hoc "defensive" solutions to apparent outliers, we should consider "progressive problemshift," breaking new theoretical and methodological ground when empirically needed. Below, we provide two suggestions on how to draw upon DPT analysis of MENA to enrich both our theoretical tools and our empirical understanding.

### 4.1. The Vices and Virtues of Nationalism

The statistical findings above suggest, and the Arab Spring clearly demonstrates, that popular calls for democracy, even the execution of free and fair election, do not guarantee civil peace, and often precipitate violence. The puzzle, however, is causation, not correlation. Mansfield and

Snyder (2009, 381) explain that "nationalism is a key causal mechanism linking incomplete democratization to both civil and international war." This inference is not without merits, but we argue that it might go the other way around: the subversion of nationalism, from within and without, can turn democratization violent.

MENA regimes have since the 1950s invested heavily in "state-building," especially in the bureaucracy and the coercive apparatus (Ayubi 1996). Much less attention was giving to "nation-building," fostering civil solidarity, and making the "the people" as the paramount source of political legitimacy (Connor 1972). However, when state-building comes at the expense of nation-building it may breed rather than hinder violence. Moreover, a viable nation, not just state, is often a prerequisite for progressive democratization: turning a procedural democracy (holding a free and fair election) into a substantive democracy (allowing for peaceful ousting of powerful incumbents), though not necessarily a liberal one.

While some anocracies go to war, others do not. Indeed, as Mansfield and Snyder (2009, 383, 381) acknowledge, "numerous countries have democratized peacefully over the past two decades in Eastern Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and South Africa." What then makes certain democratizing states violently unstable? They point to two sources: strong nationalism and a weak state. "The combination of increasing mass political participation and weak political institutions creates the motive and the opportunity for both rising and declining elites to play the nationalist card in an attempt to rally popular support against domestic and foreign rivals." They define nationalism as a doctrine that "holds that the people as a whole have the right to self-rule," and that, as such, "can be used to convince newly empowered constituencies that the cleavage between the privileged and the masses is unimportant compared to the cleavages that divide nations, ethnic groups, or races" (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 2).

This description drives prescription, which stands at the core of the ongoing dispute regarding the US's democratization policy in MENA and beyond ([pic]Savun and Tirone 2011; Wittes 2008). Since coherent institutions, such as a

functioning bureaucracy and a sound legal system, enable states to democratize more peacefully and successfully, Mansfield and Snyder (2007, 5) hold that "efforts to promote democracy should try to follow a sequence of building institutions before encouraging mass competitive elections. Democratizing in the wrong sequence not only risks bloodshed in the short term, but also the mobilization of durable illiberal forces with the capacity to block democratic consolidation over the long term." Furthermore, since "democratizing nationalism" paves the "pathways to war," taming, and if possible terminating, nationalism is key to peace ([pic]Mansfield and Snyder 2009; Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 260). Only after these two projects of state-building and nation-taming succeed should we advance along the democratization sequence and encourage mass political participation and elections.

Mansfield and Snyder's rationale is wanting. First, most autocrats are reluctant to encourage the building of institutions that may eventually cause their downfall. To be sure, Tilly's thesis of the "bellicist" origins of European state-building carries considerable weight in the postcolonial world as well. Threats to regimes, either from ongoing interstate rivalry (Thies 2004) or from homegrown transnational insurgent groups (Kisangani and Pickering 2014) have motivated regimes to invest in certain aspects of state-building. The emerging state institutions, however, are often not particularly conducive to democracy. As Carothers argues (2007a, 19–20; see also 2007b): "Outside East Asia, autocratic governments in the developing world have a terrible record as builders of competent, impartial institutions . . . if the higher standard is indeed the controlling one, India probably still belongs in the sequentialist waiting room, not yet ready for elections. So too, for that matter, does Italy – a rather curious result."

Second, Mansfield and Snyder seem to argue that anocracies in particular are prone to dangerous greed (that is, actors utilizing weak institutions to gain domestic dominance) and creed (actors leveraging nationalism to wage diversionary war). To the extent that anocracies are the least stable regime-types (Gurr 1974), they obviously present political agents with structural opportunities to wreak havoc. It is not clear, however, whether democratization

drives anocracies' seeming instability, or whether the latter is simply a feature of some of these in-between regimes (see above). After all, a politically unstable regime is often a violently unstable regime. Moreover, as Narang and Nelson (2009, 360) argue, incomplete democratizers with weak institutions should ostensibly be too weak to initiate or participate in interstate wars, and are thus prone to imploding, not exploding. Still, as Hegre et al. (2001, 33) note, "intermediate regimes are most prone to civil war, even when they have had time to stabilize from regime change."

Third, taming nationalism may backfire. Granted, nationalism has often been abused as a modern call to arms. However, modern nationalism's core values can provide common moral ground for managing and resolving disputes. Modern nationalism subscribes to "the people" as legitimating both polity and authority through the prescriptive principles of self-determination and popular sovereignty, respectively (Yack 2012). We may debate whether the rise of the Rousseauian social contract at the expense of the Hobbesian has benefited world order and peace, but either way that national genie has long been out of the bottle.

The clash between the state Leviathan and the will of "the people" is not inevitable – nations have engendered states as much as the other way around. Still, numerous peoples worldwide have come to believe that there is a mismatch between the borders of their state and the boundaries their nation as well as between their regime's interests and their own.

Ethnicity plays a key role in these dynamics. If a multi-ethnic society comes together as "a people" and then a nation, prospects for state-building, democracy, and domestic peace are promising. If, however, nationalism is largely ethnic, then "the existence of a core ethnic group that had served as the basis for a relatively long-standing political community in the past" may become paramount in state-building (Taylor and Botea 2008). Moreover, without such a demographically dominant and highly politicized ethnic core, democratization may unleash ethnic rivalries that will undermine it. A middle road of a multi-

ethnic but nationless state, which allows for power-sharing between its groups, is appealing. So far, however, its record, especially in MENA, has been quite poor (see Lebanon, Iraq). It fostered meager state-building, democracy and domestic peace.

Against this background we should realize why "state-to-nation imbalance" – the incongruence between state borders and national, often ethnic, boundaries – has often precipitated both external and internal violence (Miller 2007). Importantly, how violent the national quest to resolve this mismatch would be is up to the concerned societies – regimes and peoples alike – and the international (or rather interstate) society at large. Taming nationalism – through coercion, expediency, and propriety – may turn it violent, but does not indicate that nationalism itself is.

Finally, nationalism's call for popular sovereignty may often be a socio-moral precondition for fostering viable democracy. Undermining the national project, even if possible, also undermines the existence of "a people" on whose behalf the call for political participation and representation is made – indeed, on whose behalf the state, in the first place, exists. This realization drives Rustow's (1970, 350) well-known yet still often overlooked conclusion that democratization is predicated on "a single background condition – national unity . . . the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to." Mansfield and Snyder (2005, 4) begin their *Electing to Fight* by drawing on Rustow's seminal article, lamenting that his ideas "have not, however, played a central role in much subsequent scholarship or public policymaking on democratic transitions." Curiously, they then misinterpret Rustow's key argument as "democratic transitions are most successful when strong political institutions are developed before popular political participation increases" (Mansfield and Snyder 2005, 3).

Rustow's emphasis, however, is on national identity, not on state institutions. Indeed, in a later article (1990, 82) he again insists that "an unquestioned sense of national and territorial identity is a highly favorable precondition" for democ-

ratization. Possibly, then, it is precisely the incongruence between state borders and national (often ethno-linguistic) identities that has hampered democratization in Africa and the Arab Middle East: "The colonial boundaries inherited by tropical Africa have created few states with linguistic unity or even linguistic majorities; and amid this scarcity of clear territorial-national identities it is no coincidence that Africa is the region where progress toward democracy has remained most precarious" (Rustow 1990, 84).

Until the Arab Spring, "democratizing nationalisms" in MENA arose largely outside the Arab world – in Turkey, Israel, and Iran. It remains to be seen whether the Arab Spring will usher in long-term "democratizing nationalisms." This much may be hinted by the demonstration's popular slogan: "The people *want(s)* bring down the regime." While most observers have focused on the slogan's ending – the negative (de)legitimation of the regime – we must also be attentive to the seemingly redundant but possibly pivotal preceding words: the positive affirmation of "the people," as a singular agent, with the right to tell, morally and politically, right from wrong (Abulof, forthcoming). This may, in the long run, engender sustainable democracies in MENA. The key question is whether progressive "democratizing nationalism" will be better served by keeping states like Syria and Iraq intact or by allowing them to dissolve, "desecrating" the century-old borders charted by Britain and France.

### 4.2. From Interstate and Intrastate to Intercommunal DPT

Scholarship on DPT has made important strides, and its ongoing controversies reflect its vitality. Until recently, however, DPT scholarship was "caught in the 'territorial trap,'" as both democracy and war/peace are understood in terms of the territorial sovereign state (Barkawi and Laffey 1999, 413; see also Barkawi and Laffe, 2001). Fortunately, new interventions reveal the merits of group-level research on intrastate conflict ([pic]Buhaug et al. 2014; Cederman et al. 2013). Our study underscores this move, demonstrating the importance of non-statist accounts.

DPT's statism engenders two acute problems. First, transposing interstate DPT to civil wars hardly exhausts the many variations of non-interstate violence. This is of par-

ticular importance in MENA, where many non-interstate armed conflicts are cross-border and the warring parties are often not the citizens of the same state, or are even stateless (for example the PLO-Hamas rivalry. These violent clashes defy the neat typology of interstate and intrastate conflicts; they are better depicted as intercommunal conflicts. Even datasets with nuanced typology occasionally misclassify or overlook these conflicts. The UCDP/PRIO armed conflicts dataset, for example, classifies the 2006 Lebanon War as an "internal armed conflict," similar to the violent clash between the Egyptian government and al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, the radical Islamic opposition group in the country. However, whereas the latter was a clear domestic clash, the 2006 Lebanon War was waged between the state of Israel and a paramilitary organization based in an adjacent country, which became involved in the warfare. Conflation of the two blurs important conceptual boundaries. The UCDP/PRIO dataset also omits the September 1970 clash between Jordan and the PLO and the 1982 Lebanon War – both resulted in thousands of casualties – perhaps due to a lack of a fitting category.

Second, DPT's extension to civil wars focuses on regime-type, but does not address the democratic nature of the conflicting domestic parties. In other words, studies on the "domestic democratic peace" typically mix the levels of analysis, examining the effect of a state's regime type on internal clashes rather than examining the democratic merits of the domestic rivals themselves. This preference is understandable, since most DPT literature is heavily quantitative, and until recently there were no reliable datasets regarding the level of democracy of domestic political movements. Measuring this variable without referring to formal state institutions and laws is a daunting task. However, considering that the most robust DPT model is dyadic, not monadic, transposing its logic to the domestic level in a monadic form and on an incongruent level of analysis is odd. Few studies have evinced dyadic DPT's merits for analyzing the relations between non-state actors, even before modernity (Crawford 1994; Ember et al. 1992). The time has come to take up this challenge to contemporary politics.

The Minorities at Risk Project (2008) has recently undertaken to chart just that, beginning in MENA. According to

its data, the number of ethnic organizations in MENA has grown steadily since the early 1980s, from about forty to about one hundred since the year 2000; and ideologically, since the early 1990s there has been a steady increase in the proportion of democratic organizations, emphasizing electoral politics and protests. While suffering from various typological faults (for example coding the Hezbollah as advocating "democratic forms of government" for its participation in the Lebanese elections), this project opens new venues for future quantitative examination of DDPT.

## 5. Conclusions

Statistically testing DDPT in the MENA context, this paper showed that democratization has failed to bring domestic peace the Middle East. However, we proposed that "democratizing nationalism" might actually be a long-term prerequisite for democratic peace, not just an immediate hindrance, and that DPT needs to transcend the statist perspective in order to examine intercommunal conflicts as well as the democratic features of non-state polities. This paper also sought to encourage future mixed-method research in DPT scholarship, not least regarding MENA. Synthesizing quantitative and qualitative methods may pave paths to enrich DPT scholarship, improving our grasp of its definitions, data, and causation.

This article offered no definite answers, but put forward puzzles and guidelines to questions that are worth pursuing. Postulating nationalism as a possible precondition to viable democratization raises a thorny question: Do values function as an intervening variable between votes and violence, and if so how? The role of liberalism in facilitating the democratic peace has been richly studied (for example, [pic]Friedman 2008; Owen 1997). Conversely, nationalism, to the extent that it figures in DPT literature – mainly in the anocratic models – is typically regarded as hindering peace, which overlooks the potential pacifying role of national ideas and ideals.

To put it differently, in terms of Isaiah Berlin's (2002) famous distinction between negative and positive liberties: Should the pacifying role of negative liberties (such as freedom of speech, press, and assembly) be complemented with

that of positive liberties, mainly popular sovereignty and the right of peoples to self-determination? Can a mutual adherence to the latter partly explain why democratic dyads are able to peacefully resolve their territorial disputes? And, when such normative common ground is lacking in countries holding free elections, can this lack partly explain their failure to reach a utilitarian middle-ground, or even their resort to a coercive battleground? Answering these questions, via discourse and content analyses as well as public opinion polls, may prove pivotal to advancing our understanding of DPT's causality.

Finally, we may also want to look for answers to the big counterfactual questions that DPT models raise. Although the typical presentation of quantitative DPT studies is correlational – seeking robust "covering laws" – the search for causality perforce presents us with "what if" queries: For example, would a democratic Egypt have refrained from launching a surprise attack against Israel in 1973? Such counterfactual investigations are all the more important if we are to assess, and warily predict, how the changing political tides in the Middle East affect the region's prospects between war and "perpetual peace."

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## Supplemental Data and Results

### Odds Ratios Findings

Table 3: Odds ratio from logistic regression for the occurrence of civil war on the basis of regime type (semi-democracies as omitted group), comparing MENA and the World.

| VARIABLES | World | World/MENA |
|---|---|---|
| Democracy[1] | 0.290*** | 0.303*** |
| | (0.119) | (0.126) |
| Autocracy[1] | 0.884 | 0.775 |
| | (0.217) | (0.181) |
| Small state[1] | 0.172*** | 0.193*** |
| | (0.0846) | (0.0968) |
| Income inequalities | 0.996 | 1.032 |
| | (0.114) | (0.120) |
| Ethnic groups # | 1.146** | 1.201*** |
| | (0.0786) | (0.0773) |
| GDP | 1.473*** | 1.399*** |
| | (0.131) | (0.117) |
| GDP per capita | 1.000*** | 1.000*** |
| | (8.10e-05) | (7.86e-05) |
| MENA[1] | | 2.124 |
| | | (1.889) |
| Democracy MENA[1] | | 7.409** |
| | | (7.341) |
| Autocracy MENA[1] | | 1.219 |
| | | (1.156) |
| Peace years | 0.141*** | 0.145*** |
| | (0.0380) | (0.0389) |
| Constant | 1.488 | 1.211 |
| | (0.598) | (0.439) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 369.90 | |
| Log likelihood | –587 | –574 |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.488 | 0.499 |
| Observations | 2,711 | 2,711 |

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. For space reasons estimates of splines are not presented.
[1]dummy variable

Table 4: Odds ratio from logistic regression for the occurrence of civil war on the basis of regime type (democracy degree as a continuous variable), comparing MENA and the world.

| VARIABLES | World | World/MENA |
|---|---|---|
| Democracy | 0.908** | 0.917** |
| | (0.0352) | (0.0389) |
| Small state[1] | 0.164*** | 0.185*** |
| | (0.0812) | (0.0928) |
| Income inequalities | 1.006 | 1.037 |
| | (0.118) | (0.127) |
| Ethnic groups # | 1.144** | 1.205*** |
| | (0.0781) | (0.0773) |
| GDP | 1.437*** | 1.391*** |
| | (0.140) | (0.125) |
| GDP per capita | 1.000*** | 1.000*** |
| | (8.50e-05) | (8.17e-05) |
| MENA[1] | | 0.856 |
| | | (0.603) |
| Democracy MENA[1] | | 1.262* |
| | | (0.155) |
| Peace years | 0.138*** | 0.143*** |
| | (0.0371) | (0.0382) |
| Constant | 2.180* | 1.550 |
| | (0.884) | (0.570) |
| Log likelihood | –594 | –581 |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 364.32 | 361.27 |
| Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.482 | 0.494 |
| Observations | 2,711 | 2,711 |

[1]dummy variable

Column 1 in Table 3 shows that when we do not account for regional differences, the incidence of intrastate war in a democracy is one third as likely as the incidence of such a war in an anocracy (other things being equal). Autocracies, on the other hand, are not significantly (at 0.1 significance level) less prone to war than anocracies. This pattern is preserved when MENA variables are introduced in column 2.

When non-MENA states are considered (MENA = 0) the odds for a democratic state to be involved in a civil war is 0.303 that of an anocratic state. Contrary to the worldwide tendency, however, MENA democracies are far more prone to intrastate wars than MENA anocracies. These results do

not change dramatically when the level of democracy is measured as a continuous variable (Table 4). The interaction term in Table 4 is less significant (0.1 level), but this result still supports the conclusion that the relation between intrastate wars and democracy is positive in MENA states.[4]

### GEE Findings:

Oneal and Russett argue that using general estimating equation (GEE) is preferable to Beck Katz and Tucker's method. The results below show that using GEE with adjustment for first order autocorrelation (AR1) does not

alter significantly the findings presented in the article. In addition to the AR1 adjustment, I also included the variable Year centered around 1885 in first two tables and around 1990 in tables 3 and 4.

**Table 3: Logistic regression for the occurrence of civil war on the basis of regime type (semi-democracies as omitted group), comparing MENA and the World.**

| VARIABLES | World | World/MENA |
|---|---|---|
| Democracy | 0.576** | 0.533** |
|  | (0.152) | (0.162) |
| Autocracy | 1.163 | 1.049 |
|  | (0.201) | (0.195) |
| Year | 0.963** | 0.968** |
|  | (0.0163) | (0.0157) |
| Small state | 0.0910*** | 0.113*** |
|  | (0.0497) | (0.0619) |
| Income inequalities | 1.025 | 1.046 |
|  | (0.162) | (0.173) |
| Ethnic groups # | 1.126 | 1.182** |
|  | (0.0832) | (0.0877) |
| GDP | 1.116 | 1.053 |
|  | (0.101) | (0.0965) |
| GDP per capita | 1.000* | 1.000 |
|  | (8.25e-05) | (9.04e-05) |
| MENA |  | 1.732 |
|  |  | (1.625) |
| Democracy MENA |  | 229.3*** |
|  |  | (237.9) |
| Autocracy MENA |  | 1.461 |
|  |  | (1.064) |
| Constant | 0.316*** | 0.266*** |
|  | (0.126) | (0.110) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 67.11 | 612.66 |
| Observations | 2711 | 2711 |

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

**Table 4: Logistic regression for the occurrence of civil war on the basis of regime type (democracy degree as a continuous variable), comparing MENA and the world.**

| VARIABLES | World | World/MENA |
|---|---|---|
| Democracy | 0.904*** | 0.892*** |
|  | (0.0341) | (0.0389) |
| Year | 0.964** | 0.967** |
|  | (0.0163) | (0.0155) |
| Small state | 0.0981*** | 0.112*** |
|  | (0.0538) | (0.0620) |
| Income inequalities | 1.028 | 1.061 |
|  | (0.163) | (0.175) |
| Ethnic groups # | 1.124 | 1.194** |
|  | (0.0845) | (0.0905) |
| GDP | 1.121 | 1.111 |
|  | (0.1000) | (0.0905) |
| GDP per capita | 1.000* | 1.000* |
|  | (8.01e-05) | (8.04e-05) |
| MENA |  | 0.473 |
|  |  | (0.468) |
| Democracy MENA |  | 1.422** |
|  |  | (0.222) |
| Constant | 0.553 | 0.425** |
|  | (0.226) | (0.177) |
| Wald $\chi^2$ | 63.96 | 74.93 |
| Observations | 2711 | 2711 |

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

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**4** Here too, I used Norton et al.'s (2004) inteff procedure to assess the significance of the interaction. The results show that the interaction effect is positive and significant for nearly the entire sample. The interaction is negative only for states with probability of around 0.9 of engaging a civil war and for a very small proportion of states with probability of less than 0.1.

# International Journal
# of Conflict and Violence

# Group-based Compunction and Anger: Their Antecedents and Consequences in Relation to Colonial Conflicts

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Group-based emotions can be experienced by group members for the past misdeeds of their ingroup towards an outgroup.. The present study examines distinct antecedents and consequences of group-based compunction and anger in two countries with a history of colonization (Portugal, *N* = 280 and the Netherlands, *N* = 184). While previous research has focused mainly on ingroup-focused antecedents of group-based emotions, such as ingroup identification and perceptions of responsibility, our research also analyzed outgroup-focused variables, such as outgroup identification and meta-perceptions. Multiple group structural equation modeling showed that group-based compunction and group-based anger have similar antecedents (exonerating cognitions, collectivism, outgroup identification and meta-perceptions). Furthermore, the results showed that the two emotions have distinct but related consequences for the improvement of intergroup relations (compensation, subjective importance of discussing the past and forgiveness assignment).

Conflict and group violence are pervasive phenomena worldwide. We argue that, given the widespread existence of conflict and group violence, we still need to address past colonial conflicts, in order to understand present day phenomena of violence, discrimination, and structural disadvantage involving former colonizer and colonized groups. Previous research has focused on the need for groups to address past transgressions, analyzing instances of conflict and the associated emotions, perceptions, and consequences (Doosje et al. 1998; Doosje et al. 2004; Smith 1993; Tajfel and Turner 1986).

In the present article we analyze two contexts of colonization that ended with violent conflicts over independence: the Portuguese and the Dutch. Through this cross-national replication using multiple group structural equation modeling, we investigate the similarities and differences between these countries regarding the experience of two group-based emotions – compunction and anger – and their antecedents and consequences.

After the Second World War there were significant changes in the status of colonial relations and powers, with many countries recognizing their colonies as independent states. By various routes, many countries in Africa gained full independence in the late 1950s and 1960s, but despite the United Nations and international pressure, Portugal refused to concede its colonies the right to self-determination. Between 1961 and 1974, there were wars of independence in Angola (started in 1961), Guinea-Bissau (started in 1963), and Mozambique (started in 1964).

By 1974, war had devastated the countries of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau, and caused many casualties on both sides (the Portuguese Armed Forces alone suffered approximately 8,200 casualties). Finally, on April 25, 1974,

the peaceful Carnation Revolution, led by military officers, overthrew the New State dictatorship. By 1975 all of Portugal's former African colonies were independent.

In turn, the Dutch colonial conflict with Indonesia occurred after the Second World War, when the Dutch tried to regain control of the Indonesian archipelago, after the surrender of the Japanese. While on August 17, 1945, Sukarno and Hatta proclaimed the independence of Indonesia and created the Central Indonesian National Committee, the Dutch tried to reassert their power over the country and the conflict continued until 1949. In January 1949, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution demanding the restoration of the republican government and the Dutch were pressured to recognize Indonesia as an independent country. Finally, on December 27, 1949, sovereignty was formally transferred to the republican government of Indonesia.

Until the present day, the Netherlands have never officially apologized or compensated Indonesia for the conflict (Doosje et al. 2004). Nevertheless, the diplomatic relations between both countries are positive and the Indonesian community living in the Netherlands is considered the biggest minority group in the country (Multicultural Netherlands, 2010).

Drawing from social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1986) and from the theory of intergroup emotions (Smith 1993) we aim to understand the ways in which people can experience emotions as group members, due to appraising an emotional event in terms of their group membership, and the potential consequences these emotional processes have for intergroup relations.

Therefore, we aim to analyze less studied antecedents of group-based emotions, as well as their under-investigated consequences. More concretely, we focus on the way that more distal antecedents of emotions (i.e. self-investment) and more proximal antecedents of emotions (i.e. exonerating cognitions, collectivism, outgroup identification and meta-perceptions) affect the experience of two negative group-based emotions - compunction and anger towards the ingroup. In addition, we examine the consequences of these emotions for compensatory behavioral intentions, subjective importance of discussing the past and forgiveness assignment.

We propose to divide the antecedents of group-based emotions into two different categories. Ingroup-focused antecedents are conceptualized as being directly related to the ingroup and the ingroup's experiences regarding the emotions analyzed (i.e. self-investment, which is conceptualized as a distal antecedent of group-based emotions; collectivism; and exonerating cognitions). The second set of variables focuses on the relationship between the ingroup and the outgroup, and therefore they are more outgroup-focused than ingroup-focused (i.e. outgroup identification; and meta-perceptions).

Group-based compunction refers to an intertwined experience of guilt and self-criticism/shame due to the misdeeds committed by the ingroup, namely during the colonial period and the conflicts over the colonies' self-determination. In the past, Devine and colleagues (1991) have shown that, at the interpersonal level, individuals might feel negative affect in the form of compunction following from a transgression of standards. Furthermore, Zebel and colleagues (2007) have shown that when one's family is being associated with immoral aspects of the colonial past, individuals experience compunction. In this line, we argue that, at the group-level, individuals who are confronted with immoral actions committed by their national ingroup against other groups are expected to experience group-based compunction. Furthermore, while many authors have analyzed the role of group-based guilt in intergroup relations (Branscombe and Miron 2004; Doosje et al. 1998; Iyer, Leach, and Crosby 2003; amongst others), we propose to analyze group-based compunction instead. The distinction between group-based guilt and group-based compunction rests on the fact that the latter also contains a component of self-criticism (in this case, ingroup-criticism; Devine et al. 1991; Stephan and Stephan 1996).

In turn, group-based anger refers to a negative ingroup-focused emotion that involves the awareness that the ingroup has committed wrongful acts against another group. This emotion is characterized by a high level of readiness for action and previous research has shown that group-based anger directed at the ingroup leads individuals to make amendments for past misdeeds and take action to improve the outgroup's conditions (Gordijn et al.

2006; Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel 2007; Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen 2006).

Previous research has also shown that, although group-based anger and other group-based emotions, such as guilt and shame, are related to each other, they do have independent consequences for intergroup behavior (Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel 2007). Therefore, in this study, we analyze the potentially different role of group-based compunction and group-based anger for different forms of intergroup behavior after historical colonial conflicts, such as compensation, forgiveness assignment or the willingness to publicly discuss the past.

By now, it is well documented that ingroup identification is an important antecedent of different group-based emotions (Doosje et al. 1998; Leach et al. 2008; Mackie, Devos, and Smith 2000; Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan 2006).

The self-investment dimension of ingroup identification, as defined by Leach and colleagues (2008), refers to a sense of satisfaction, solidarity, salience and importance derived from being part of a group that the individual values, and is usually associated with lower levels of negative group-based emotions (Leach et al. 2008). We aim to understand in which way ingroup self-investment, as a distal antecedent (see Branscombe, Doosje, and McGarthy 2002; Branscombe 2004; Cehajic et al. 2009; Iyer and Leach 2009; Leach et al. 2008; Wohl and Branscombe 2008) of group-based emotions, may affect (either positively or negatively) more proximal antecedents of group-based compunction and anger.

Furthermore, when a group membership is relevant to individuals, they may tend to avoid negative information about the groups they belong to and value. Exonerating cognitions refer to ingroup favoring biases, which are beliefs that can help the individual to exculpate or absolve the ingroup for the harm committed. These biases can occur either by minimizing the negative actions through selective comparison with other perpetrator groups (Marques, Paez, and Serra 1997) or by blaming the victims in order to maintain a positive view of the ingroup (Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan 2006). Hence, we expect that through the use of exonerating cognitions, individuals may mitigate the experience of group-based compunction and anger.

In addition, we analyze how ingroup self-investment associates with collectivism and how, in turn, collectivism relates to group-based emotions. In Triandis and Gelfand's (1998) conceptualization, collectivism refers to a worldview whereby individuals value their group memberships and tend to hold the norms and values of the groups they belong to as relevant to their self-definition. We anticipate ingroup self-investment and collectivism to be positively associated, because we argue that both variables reflect an individual's level of association and commitment to the ingroup.

Additionally, we believe that collectivism may play an important role in the experience of group-based compunction and anger. If individuals value their ingroup identities and their belonging to the group, they tend to be more affected by the negative actions committed by the ingroup and, therefore, experience higher levels of group-based emotions. In this line, collectivism is conceptualized as a positive orientation towards different ingroup memberships, but also towards other groups. Thus, we conceptualize it as a proximal antecedent of group-based emotions, because it relates not only with the ingroup, but also with a general positive orientation towards life in groups.

In the present research, we also investigate outgroup identification, a variable that reflects a sense of connectedness with the outgroup and a concern for its welfare. We expect this variable to be positively associated with group-based anger and compunction (Figueiredo, Doosje, Valentim, & Zebel 2010), because outgroup identification reflects an individual's orientation towards outgroup members and the desire for positive relations with such an outgroup (Figueiredo, et al. 2010).

We propose that, when individuals perceive that they share a bond with the outgroup, they will experience more negative group-based emotions, because they understand how the outgroup has been victimized by the perpetrator ingroup and understand their past suffering.

Meta-perceptions, the ingroup's beliefs regarding the outgroup's perceptions of it, have shown to be negatively related to group-based guilt (Figueiredo et al. 2010). When individuals believe the outgroup has a positive perception

of the ingroup, they may think there is no need to feel bad about the past misdeeds between both groups (Figueiredo, et al. 2010). We argue this will be the case because holding positive meta-perceptions may signal that the intergroup relationship is positive in nature and, therefore, ingroup members do not need to feel negative emotions and redeem for their past negative transgressions anymore.

In terms of action tendencies, we predict that negative group-based emotions are related to the desire to make reparations due to the ingroup's negative behavior. Therefore, we analyze three potential consequences of negative group-based emotions: compensatory behavioral intentions, subjective importance of discussing the past and forgiveness assignment.

Much research has shown (Doosje et al. 1998; Mallett and Swim 2004) that group-based guilt is associated with a desire to make amendments and compensate the victimized outgroup. In the present research, we expect group-based compunction (but not group-based anger) to be associated with compensatory behavioral intentions. We argue that this is the case because previous research (Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen 2006) has shown that guilt and shame are usually more associated with passive means of compensation, while group-based anger is mostly associated with social change strategies that are more proactive in nature.

A study by Figueiredo and colleagues (2010) has shown that individuals who feel more group-based guilt give more importance to the discussion of the negative events of the colonial past in the public sphere. Since the negative emotions felt must be dealt with, one good way of resolving the negative feelings due to the misdeeds of the ingroup, may be through the public acknowledgment and discussion of such negative past events. In the present study, we predict that when both group-based compunction and anger are under analysis, only group-based anger will be associated with subjective importance of discussing the past. Since the latter emotion has a higher level of action readiness, we expect that anger is more associated with dynamic ways of coming to terms with an immoral past than group-based compunction. Because of the experience of group-based

anger, individuals may desire to acknowledge what happened in the past and to discuss openly the morality of such events. This discussion may, in turn, lead to the creation of better intergroup relationships (Kanyangara et al. 2007).

Another important consequence of group-based emotions is forgiveness. Much research has focused on forgiveness from the victimized group's perspective and has shown that, in fact, the transgressor's group emotions may influence the willingness of the victimized group to forgive the perpetrator's group (Brown, Wohl, and Exline 2008; Cehajic, Brown, and Castano 2008; Tam et al. 2007; Wohl and Branscombe 2005). Though we believe this line of research is highly valuable, we think it is important to investigate forgiveness not only from the victim's perspective, but also from the perpetrator's perspective. Specifically, we address the following issues: Do members of the perpetrator group, who were not involved in the harm done, feel they should be forgiven by the victimized group? What are the conditions influencing the ingroup's desire (or even need) to be forgiven by the outgroup?

Accordingly, we analyze forgiveness assignment, a variable which we conceptualize as the desire of the ingroup to be forgiven by the outgroup for the negative actions this ingroup has committed against the victimized group in the past. We expect group-based compunction and group-based anger to be negatively related to forgiveness assignment. This argument stems from the idea that when individuals experience high levels of negative group-based emotions, they feel that the situation between the groups is still not resolved and, therefore, the ingroup should attune for the negative misdeeds. This would mean that ingroup members believe that forgiveness is still not attainable and thus, the ingroup should not be forgiven yet.

Summarizing, in the present paper we propose to analyze how the intensity of group-based compunction and anger will be determined by two different categories of antecedents - ingroup-focused antecedents and outgroup-focused antecedents of group-based emotions – and how these emotional experiences differentially affect compensatory behavioral intentions, the subjective importance of discussing the past and the desire of the ingroup to be forgiven,

within two contexts of colonial conflicts. For this purpose we will use multiple group structural equation modeling (MGSEM).

The main hypotheses of our study are: H1: Ingroup self-investment (ingroup-focused distal antecedent) is significantly and positively related with exonerating cognitions and collectivism (ingroup-focused proximal antecedents) and with outgroup-identification and meta-perceptions (outgroup-focused proximal antecedents); H2: Exonerating cognitions are negatively related to group-based compunction and anger; H3: Collectivism is positively related to group-based compunction and anger; H4: Outgroup identification is positively related to group-based compunction and anger; H5: Meta-perceptions are negatively related to group-based compunction and anger; H6: Group-based compunction is positively related to compensatory behavioral intentions and negatively related to forgiveness assignment; H7: Group-based anger is positively related to subjective importance of discussing the past and negatively related to forgiveness assignment.

Importantly, we expect differences between the Portuguese and the Dutch samples regarding Hypothesis 1. We expect to only find significant associations between ingroup self-investment and outgroup identification and meta-perceptions in the Portuguese sample.

We argue that the differences between our samples regarding H1 are due to the *luso-tropicalist* representation in Portugal, by which the Portuguese are believed to have an inherent ability for miscigenizing biologically and culturally with the populations from their former colonies (Valentim, 2011). This general tendency is also reflected in the supposed lack of racism among Portuguese people, allowing them to have positive relations with the native populations of their colonies (Vala et al., 2008). Meanwhile, in the Dutch case, colonization did not reflect a strong ideological desire to control or evangelize the native populations of the colonies, but instead focused on the creation of trade roots. For example, in Indonesia, the Dutch made little effort to introduce their national language and their religion (Oostindie 2008). Hence, we argue that, in Portugal, *a luso-tropicalist* representation of the relations

between the Portuguese and the people from the former colonies, allows for a perceived connection and positive relations between former colonizer and colonized groups (Vala, Lopes and Lima 2008; Valentim 2003, 2011), while this is not the case in the Dutch context. In terms of the other hypotheses, we expect similar results between the Portuguese and the Dutch samples.

## 1. Method
### 1.1. Participants
Two hundred and eighty Portuguese University students and one hundred and eighty four Dutch University students were recruited for this study. 88.6% of the Portuguese participants were female (age $M = 20$ years, $SD = 3.42$; range 17–50), while this percentage was 70.1% for the Dutch sample (age $M = 20$ years, $SD = 4.71$; range 17–45).

### 1.2. Design and procedure
The present study had a correlational design: predictors and dependent variables were assessed using a questionnaire.

In Portugal, the questionnaire was administered at the University of Coimbra at the beginning or at the end of classes and participants took about half an hour to complete it. There was a tacit informed consent, and participants who did not want to participate in the study were allowed to leave the room, while the ones remaining filled in the questionnaire. It was explained that the study aimed to examine the perceptions people have about the Portuguese colonial period and about the Portuguese colonial war. Several demographical variables, such as age, gender and nationality of the participants and their parents were also covered in the questionnaire and anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed.

In the Netherlands, the questionnaire was administered during the "TestWeek" at the University of Amsterdam, in which students had to participate in several research projects for course credits. At the beginning of each session, participants had to sign an informed consent for their participation in the data collection sessions. At the beginning of the questionnaire it was explained that the study aimed to examine the perceptions people have about the Dutch

colonial period in Indonesia. Demographical variables, such as age, gender and nationality of the participants and their parents were also present.

All items used in the present study were measured on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*).

### 1.3. Measures
*Ingroup self-investment*. The composite measure of self-investment was adapted from Leach and colleagues (2008) and had 10 items focused on centrality, satisfaction and solidarity (Portuguese Cronbach α = .88; Dutch Cronbach α = .90). Example items are "I often think about the fact that I am Portuguese/Dutch" [centrality], "I am glad to be Portuguese/Dutch" [satisfaction], and "I feel a bond with the Portuguese/Dutch" [solidarity].

*Collectivism*. This measure had 8 items (Portuguese Cronbach α = .75; Dutch Cronbach α = .53), as created by Triandis and Gelfand (1998). Example items are "I feel good when I cooperate with others", "To me, pleasure is spending time with others" and "It is important to me that I respect the decisions made by my groups". Although this measure presents a low alpha for the Dutch sample, we nevertheless decided to maintain its original structure, while being aware that this may cause the multiple group structural equation model to present lower fit indices.

*Outgroup identification*. Participants were asked to indicate their level of identification with the outgroup by means of 5 items ("I identify with Africans from the former colonies/Indonesians", "I feel a bond with Africans from the former colonies/Indonesians", "I feel strong ties with natives/individuals from the former colonies", "I am similar to the natives of the former colonies" and "I feel solidarity with the natives from the former colonies"), which were derived and augmented from the measure used by Valentim (2003) (Portuguese Cronbach α = .89; Dutch Cronbach α = .92).

*Meta-perceptions*. We used a bipolar scale consisting of 9 items, partially derived from Valentim (2003). Examples are "In general, I think the Africans think the Portuguese are

unkind-kind [unfriendly-friendly] [lazy-hard workers]" (Portuguese Cronbach α = .93; Dutch Cronbach α = .87).

*Exonerating cognitions*. This measure was derived and augmented from Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan (2006) and had 11 items (Portuguese Cronbach α = .74; Dutch Cronbach α = .70). Example items are "The Africans from the former Portuguese colonies/Indonesians must take responsibility for what happened in their countries", "Portugal/The Netherlands had a right to maintain its colonies in Africa/Indonesia" and "The Africans from the former colonies/Indonesians are responsible for the negative consequences of the colonial war".

*Group-based compunction*. This scale was derived from Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988) and was comprised of 6 items: "I feel [guilty] [remorseful] [ashamed] [humiliated] [regretful] [disgraced] for the behavior of the Portuguese/Dutch during the colonial war" (Portuguese Cronbach α = .81; Dutch Cronbach α = .89).

*Group-based anger*. This measure consisted of 3 items that were derived from Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988): "I feel [angry] [outraged] [furious] for the behavior of the Portuguese/Dutch during the colonial war" (Portuguese Cronbach α = .80; Dutch Cronbach α = .90).

*Compensatory behavioral intentions*. Four items derived from Doosje and colleagues (1998) were used (Portuguese α =.85; Dutch α = .79) and example items are "I think the Portuguese/Dutch owe something to the people from the former colonies because of the things the Portuguese/Dutch have done" and "I think I should make more efforts to improve the position of people from the former colonies/Indonesians because of the negative things the Portuguese/Dutch have done".

*Subjective importance of discussing the past*. Participants were then asked about the importance of remembering the positive and the negative aspects of the colonial period in the media and the school curriculum, through 4 items previously used by Figueiredo and colleagues (2010). We first aggregated the two positive items and the two negative items and then the negative items were subtracted from the

positive items to create a composite measure for perceived importance of remembering *negative* aspects of the colonial conflict (Portuguese α = .77; Dutch α = .80). This measure had possible values ranging from -6 (discuss the positive aspects of the past) to +6 (discuss the negative aspects of the past). Example items are "How important do you think it is for the media to give attention to the positive aspects of the Portuguese/Dutch colonial period?" and "How important do you think it is for the school curriculum to give attention to the negative aspects of the Portuguese/Dutch colonial period?".

*Forgiveness assignment*. Five items addressed the degree to which participants feel that their ingroup should be forgiven for their past misdeeds during the colonial war (Portuguese Cronbach α = .66; Dutch Cronbach α = .68).

Example items are "The Africans/Indonesians should move past their negative feelings towards the Portuguese/Dutch for the harm they inflicted to them during the colonial war" and "Portuguese/Dutch today cannot be held accountable for what their ancestors have done to Africans/Indonesians during the colonial war". Although this measure presents a rather low alpha for both samples, we decided to maintain it, as we believe that these items strongly reflect the construct under analysis, although this may cause lower fit indices in the multiple group structural equation model for the two samples.

## 2. Results
### 2.1. Correlations and means
The correlations between all the variables under analysis are presented in Table 1.

**Table 1: Correlations (*r*) among the variables in the Portuguese (upper part) and the Dutch (lower part) samples**

|  | Ingr. SI | Collectivism | Outgr. Id. | Meta-percept. | Exon. Cogn. | Compunction | Anger | Compensation | Negative Info | Forgiveness |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ingr. SI | -- | .29* | .17* | .13** | .22* | -.03 | -.09 | -.08 | -.21 | .06 |
| Collectivism | .26* | -- | -.01 | -.01 | .02 | .10 | .16* | .03 | -.16* | .13** |
| Outgr. Id. | .02 | .06 | -- | .17* | -.16* | .34* | .27* | .42* | .01 | -.25* |
| Meta-percept. | .11 | .14 | .30* | -- | .04 | -.10 | -.14** | -.03 | -.02 | -.06 |
| Exon. Cogn. | .22* | -.13 | .01 | .12 | -- | -.30* | -.39* | -.36* | -.28* | .36* |
| Compunction | .06 | .21* | .40* | .03 | -.07 | -- | .70* | .40* | .13** | -.27* |
| Anger | .01 | .15** | .37* | -.07 | -.03 | .87* | -- | .38* | .21* | -.21* |
| Compensation | -.21* | -.04 | .34* | .01 | -.08 | .43* | .49* | -- | .13** | -.33* |
| Negative Info | -.17** | -.06 | .09 | -.08 | -.30* | .20* | .19** | .05 | -- | .12 |
| Forgiveness | .20* | .03 | -.06 | .06 | .28* | -.42* | -.46* | -.53* | .06 | -- |

* $p < .01$ ** $p < .05$

### 2.2. Multiple Group Structural Equation Model
To investigate the structural relations between the variables under study, we tested a multiple group structural equation model (MGSEM), using AMOS (see Figure 1). The model included hypothesized paths from the distal antecedent ingroup self-investment to the more proximal predictor variables (i.e. exonerating cognitions, collectivism, outgroup identification and meta-perceptions). Additionally, we included paths from the proximal predictor variables to the emotional measures (i.e. group-based compunction and

group-based anger) and from the latter to the outcome variables (i.e. compensation, subjective importance of discussing the past and forgiveness assignment). Finally, given that we wanted to explore the potential relationships of the four antecedents (exonerating cognitions; collectivism; outgroup identification; and meta-perceptions) with the three theorized consequences of group-based compunction and anger (compensatory behavioral intentions; subjective importance of discussing the past; and forgiveness assignment), we also included these paths. In the analyses, every

time the estimates of association between the different antecedents and consequences of group-based emotions were not significant and the modification indexes suggested their removal, we made the suggested change, in order to achieve the most comprehensive model.

Given the strong correlation between the two emotional variables, we also allowed for their error terms to correlate. In order to compensate for the small sample size and the high number of components existent in the model, we conducted the Maximum Likelihood (ML) bootstrap method with 90% confidence interval, as described in Byrne (2010).[1]

The resulting hypothesized model fits the data moderately. The $\chi^2$ value was small but statistically significant: $\chi^2$ (44, $N$ = 280) = 155.64, $p$ < .01; $\chi^2$/df ratio = 3.54, not falling below the critical ratio of 2.50. The other model fit indexes suggested an adequate fit: Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .90, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .90, Normed Fit Index (NFI) = .87, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .07.

According to the modification indexes, we allowed for three correlations among item errors, namely between: a) exonerating cognitions and outgroup identification; b) outgroup identification and meta-perceptions; and c) compensation and forgiveness assignment. The resulting hypothesized model fits the data well. The $\chi^2$ value was small but statistically significant: $\chi^2$ (38, $N$ = 280) = 73.66, $p$ < .01; $\chi^2$/df ratio = 1.94, thus falling below the critical ratio of 2.50. Good model fit was also suggested by a wide variety of fit indexes: Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .97, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .97, Normed Fit Index (NFI) = .94, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .05. Parameter estimates for our final unconstrained model are shown in Figure 1. We further compared our unconstrained model with the fit of a model in which all regression coef-

ficients were constrained to be equal across the samples. This model proved to have a worse fit than our hypothesized unconstrained model: $\chi^2$ (60, $N$ = 280) = 131.35, $p$ < .01; $\chi^2$/df ratio = 2.19, below the critical ratio of 2.50. Lower model fit was also suggested by other fit indexes: Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .94, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .94, Normed Fit Index (NFI) = .89, RMSEA = .05.

Finally, we tested whether the indirect effects were significant using the Maximum Likelihood (ML) bootstrap method with 90% confidence interval. The values were calculated from the unconstrained model (separately for each national sample). The indirect effects of self-investment on group-based anger and compunction were as follows (standardized regression coefficients, 90% confidence intervals and $p$-values): Portugal, anger: -.01 (-.08 to .06), $p$ = .80; compunction: .02 (-.05 to .08), $p$ = .64; the Netherlands, anger: .03 (-.06 to .10), $p$ = .61; compunction: .04 (-.04 to .11), $p$ = .40.

For Portugal, the indirect effects of the antecedents of our emotional variables on compensatory behavioral intentions were as follows: self-investment: .00 (-.06 to .06) $p$ = .99; exonerating cognitions: -.06 (-.10 to -.03), $p$ = .00; collectivism: .03 (.01 to .06), $p$ = .02; outgroup identification: .08 (.04 to .12), $p$ = .00; meta-perceptions: -.03 (-.07 to -.01), $p$ = .01. For the Netherlands, the indirect effects of the proximal antecedents of our emotional variables on compensatory behavioral intentions were as follows: self-investment: .01 (-.07 to .06), $p$ = .89; exonerating cognitions: -.01 (-.06 to .03), $p$ = .65; collectivism: .07 (.03 to .12), $p$ = .01; outgroup identification: .15 (.09 to .22), $p$ = .00; meta-perceptions: -.04 (-.09 to .00), $p$ = .08.

In the Portuguese sample, the indirect effects of the proximal antecedents of our emotional variables on subjective

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1 We also performed MGSEM using latent variables that reflected our constructs of interest. Once again, to compensate for the small sample size and the high number of parameters in our model, we used the ML bootstrap method with 90% confidence interval. Each item was allowed to load only on its designated latent factor and items' errors were allowed to correlate only if they belonged to the same latent factor. With this analysis, we wanted to understand how

well our model fitted the data, if we allowed for the measurement error to be included in the model. The resulting model fits the data moderately. The $\chi^2$ value was quite high and statistically significant: $\chi^2$ (3234, $N$ = 280) = 5274.46, $p$ < .01. Nevertheless, the $\chi^2$/df ratio equals 1.63, thus falling below the critical ratio of 2.50. The other fit indexes showed a lower fit of the model, in comparison with the model using observed variables: Comparative Fit Index (CFI) =

.86, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .86, Normed Fit Index (NFI) = .71, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .04. These results lead us to conclude that including the measurement model in our analysis diminishes the model fit. Nevertheless we argue that the ratio between the Chi-square value and the degrees of freedom, along with the RMSEA's value, give us confidence regarding the validity of our hypothesized model.

importance of discussing the past were as follows: self-investment: .10 (.05 to .17), *p* = .00; exonerating cognitions: .06 (.02 to .11), *p* = .02; collectivism: -.03 (-.06 to -.01), *p* = .02; outgroup identification: -.04 (-.08 to -.01), *p* = .02; meta-perceptions: .03 (.01 to .06), *p* = .02. For the Dutch sample, the indirect effects of the proximal antecedents of our emotional variables on subjective importance of discussing the past were as follows: self-investment: .10; (.04 to .16), *p* = .01; exonerating cognitions: .00 (-.03 to .02), *p* = .76; collectivism: -.03 (-.08 to -.01), *p* = .03; outgroup identification: -.08 (-.15 to -.03), *p* = .01; meta-perceptions: .04 (.01 to .09), *p* = .01.

For Portugal, the indirect effects of the proximal antecedents of our emotional variables on forgiveness assignment were as follows: self-investment: .04 (-.01 to .09), *p* = .18; exonerating cognitions: .01 (-.04 to .05), *p* = .77; collectivism: .00 (-.03 to .02), *p* = .81; outgroup identification: -.04 (-.08 to -.01), *p* = .06; meta-perceptions: .01 (-.01 to .04), *p* = .41. For the Netherlands, the indirect effects of the proximal antecedents of our emotional variables on forgiveness assignment were as follows: self-investment: .04 (-.01 to .10), *p* = .01; exonerating cognitions: .01 (-.05 to .07), *p* = .01; collectivism: -.09 (-.15 to -.04), *p* = .00; outgroup identification: -.21 (-.31 to -.13), *p* = .04; meta-perceptions: .08 (.02 to .15), *p* = .21.

**Figure 1: Figure 1: Multiple group structural equation model testing antecedents and consequences of group-based compunction and anger for the Portuguese and Dutch samples (upper line: PT estimate [lower and upper bound at 90% confidence interval]; lower line: NL estimate [lower and upper bound at 90% confidence interval]).**



*Note:* Standardized parameter estimates; *p < .05. Below are the correlations between error parameters which are not represented in the Figure for reasons of simplification: Exonerating cognitions r Outgroup identification: PT = -.21*; NL = -.03*; Outgroup identification r Meta-perceptions: PT = .16*; NL = .31*; Group-based anger r Group-based compunction: PT = .63*; NL = .85*; Compensation r Forgiveness assignment: PT = -.15*; NL = -.45*.

To further assess our hypotheses and the validity of the theorized model, we tested three other MGSEM models in which we explored the role of the different group-based emotions under study. In the first model, we included only group-based compunction, in the second only group-based anger and in the third we included both group-based guilt and shame separately[2] (i.e. we subdivided the items of group-based compunction into two measures: group-based guilt and group-based shame) and anger. We used the Maximum Likelihood bootstrap resampling method with a 90% confidence interval, as previously used for our hypothesized model (Byrne, 2010).

As shown in Table 3, except for the model containing only group-based compunction, no other model proved to have a better fit to the data than our hypothesized model. Even though the model in which we only include group-based compunction has a good fit, it does not provide an improvement regarding our hypothesized model, since the fit indexes are very similar and mostly lower. Therefore, we can conclude that the results fit our theoretical model well.

**Table 3: Fit indexes of hypothesized and alternative MGSEM**

|  | Chi square | $p$ | NFI | CFI | IFI | RMSEA | AIC |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hypothesized model | $\chi^2$ (38, N = 280) = 73.66 | < .01 | .94 | .97 | .97 | .05 | 257.66 |
| Only Compunction[1] | $\chi^2$ (34, N = 280) = 67.40 | < .01 | .90 | .94 | .95 | .05 | 215.40 |
| Only Anger[2] | $\chi^2$ (34, N = 280) = 104.40 | < .01 | .84 | .88 | .89 | .07 | 252.40 |
| Guilt, shame and anger separetely[3] | $\chi^2$ (42, N = 280) = 84.69 | < .01 | .95 | .97 | .97 | .05 | 308.69 |

[1]Results of MGSEM analysis including the measurement model (using Maximum Likelihood bootstrap method with 90% confidence interval): $\chi^2$ (2910, N = 280) = 4724.82, $p$ < .01; $\chi^2$/df ratio = 1.62, thus falling below the critical ratio of 2.50; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .86, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .87, Normed Fit Index (NFI) = .71, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .04.

[2]Results of MGSEM analysis including the measurement model (using Maximum Likelihood bootstrap method with 90% confidence interval): $\chi^2$ (2600, N = 280) = 4219.18, $p$ < .01; $\chi^2$/df ratio = 1.62, thus falling below the critical ratio of 2.50; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .87, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .87, Normed Fit Index (NFI) = .73, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .04.

[3]Results of MGSEM analysis including the measurement model (using Maximum Likelihood bootstrap method with 90% confidence interval): $\chi^2$ (3234, N = 280) = 5621.84, $p$ < .01; $\chi^2$/df ratio = 1.74, thus falling below the critical ratio of 2.50; Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .84, Incremental Fit Index (IFI) = .84, Normed Fit Index (NFI) = .69, and Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) = .04.

## 3. General Discussion

From the resuts of our study, we can affirm that, for most part, our hypotheses were corroborated, in terms of the hypothesized antecedents and consequences of group-based compunction and anger.

### 3.1. Antecedents of group-based compunction and anger

We found that ingroup self-investment is significantly related to exonerating cognitions and collectivism in both samples. Past research (Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan 2006) has shown that, indeed, individuals who identify more strongly with their ingroup are more defensive of the morality of the ingroup (see also Doosje et al. 1998), thus exculpating the ingroup for its past misdeeds, a pattern that was also obtained in our results.

Regarding the association between ingroup self-investment and collectivism, we propose that both variables can be con-

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**2** We have conceptualized compunction as an emotional experience encompassing feelings of guilt, regret and self-criticism, but our measure of such an emotion is composed by items which are traditionally associated with the experience of shame.

Many researchers have made efforts to disentangle the distinctive role of shame and guilt for improving intergroup relations (Brown and Cehajic 2008; Brown, Wohl, and Exline 2008; Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel 2007; Lickel, Schmader, and Barquissau 2004).

Given that our items may be interpreted in terms of shame, we have conducted analysis distinguishing these items, according to the presentation of the results.

ceptualized as membership relevance factors and, thus, they are inherently associated. While self-investment is more focused on the positive aspects of feeling a bond with a group, collectivism represents a broader group-orientation of individuals. However, one may wonder why would a higher level of ingroup identification lead to more exonerating cognitions being reported but, at the same time, also lead to higher levels of collectivism, although these two variables are inversely related to the experience of negative group-based emotions?

We argue that this dual role of ingroup identification may be related to the nature of collectivism itself. While ingroup identification is, of course, expected to be positively related to exonerating cognitions, the first variable is also associated with collectivism, because both variables represent a sense of satisfaction and enjoyment derived from group life and spending time with ingroup members. However, while ingroup identification is more connected with image concerns of the specific ingroup, collectivism's conceptualization as a positive general orientation towards group life, may explain such a pattern of results. If one adheres to a worldview by which group life is important, negative group-based emotions may rise when individuals are confronted with their ingroup's misdeeds. Given that this variable does not reflect ingroup-image concerns (as ingroup identification does), then we may comprehend why it predicts positively group-based compunction and anger. This interpretation is further supported by the significant negative links between collectivism and exonerating cognitions in both our samples.

As expected, we found significant relations between ingroup self-investment and outgroup identification for the Portuguese sample, but not for the Dutch sample, a pattern we believe is linked to the concept of *luso-tropicalism*, which is a social representation of the Portuguese nation emphasizing the unique relationships Portugal had with its colonies and the special positive way with which Portuguese dealt with people from different cultures and the lack of prejudice among the Portuguese (Vala, Lopes, and Lima 2008; Valentim 2003, 2011).

Our second hypothesis was only partly confirmed, because the links between exonerating cognitions and group-based compunction and group-based anger were only negatively

significant in the Portuguese sample. For the Portuguese sample, the pattern of correlations was consistent with the work done by Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan (2006). Furthermore, for the Portuguese sample (but not for the Dutch sample), exonerating cognitions were significantly and negatively related to compensatory behavioral intentions. Perhaps, for the Portuguese sample, those who endorse more exonerating cognitions feel there is no need to compensate the outgroup, via a direct cognitive path, but also through feeling negative group-based emotions.

We found evidence, in both samples, that exonerating cognitions are negatively related to the subjective importance of discussing the past and positively related to forgiveness assignment. Interestingly, we found evidence that, for the Dutch sample, there is no indirect effect of exonerating cognitions on forgiveness assignment via group-based compunction or anger. We argue that individuals who use exonerating cognitions are not so open to negative information about their ingroups' history and, therefore, do not want to discuss the immoral aspects of the past, while feeling that the ingroup should be forgiven for the misdeeds of the past. This pattern of results reflects a kind of moral disengagement from the ingroup's wrongdoings, beyond the indirect effects of exonerating cognitions through group-based compunction and anger, which were found for the Portuguese sample (Barkan 2000; Kanyangara et al. 2007). New venues of research should tap into the question of whether exonerating cognitions may present direct consequences for intergroup relations, independently of the emotions that ingroup members may feel due to past wrongdoings.

The results from the Portuguese and the Dutch samples show support for Hypothesis 3, being that collectivism is positively related to group-based compunction and group-based anger. We believe that a more collectivistic orientation may lead individuals to feel higher levels of group-based emotions, because this general group-focused orientation is relevant for the emotional processes involving their group membership and its associations with other groups.

Collectivism is also negatively associated with subjective importance of discussing the past in the Portuguese sample. This double role of collectivism in the Portuguese

sample may be related to the fact that, for the Portuguese participants, feeling negative emotions about the past does not necessarily mean there is a need to redress this negative past by discussing its negative consequences. Further research should explore this tentative explanation. Moreover, in the Dutch sample, we found that collectivism does not associate directly with the importance of discussing the negative aspects of the past, but that the first variable has an indirect effect on the latter, via group-based anger. Further research should shed light into the role of collectivism as a potential predictor of forgiveness assignment and other hypothesized consequences of emotions for intergroup relations, above and beyond the connections this variable has with group-based emotions.

We were able to show, in both samples, that outgroup identification is positively related to group-based compunction and anger (Hypothesis 4). The more individuals feel a bond with the outgroup, the higher are their levels of group-based emotions deriving from the ingroup's past misdeeds. This pattern of results is in line with the argument of Baumeister, Stillwell, and Heatherton (1994), stating that when there is a damaged relationship with a relevant person or group, individuals will feel stronger emotions than when the other is not relevant to the person or group who committed the wrongful actions.

We argue that outgroup identification is a relevant variable for the improvement of intergroup relations, via its links with group-based compunction and anger, but also through its direct association with the desire to compensate the outgroup, which can be considered a more instrumental way of dealing with past conflictual intergroup relations. Finally, for the Portuguese sample, outgroup identification is also significantly and negatively associated with forgiveness assignment, while this is not the case for the Dutch sample. It seems that, for the Dutch sample, the association between outgroup identification and forgiveness assignment is fully mediated through group-based compunction and anger. Further research should try to understand if this variable may be conceptualized as a direct antecedent of forgiveness assignment rather than an antecedent of negative emotions felt on behalf of the ingroup in different intergroup contexts.

Finally, we found evidence for Hypothesis 5: meta-perceptions are negatively related to group-based compunction (Portuguese sample only) and anger (in both samples). It thus seem that, in general, the more individuals believe that the outgroup has a positive perception of the ingroup, the less they show negative emotions regarding past events involving the two groups, perhaps due to a feeling of restored balance in the intergroup relation at stake, as it was previously found by Figueiredo and colleagues (2010).

### 3.2. Consequences of group-based compunction and anger

In terms of the hypothesized consequences of group-based emotions, we were able to show that group-based compunction predicts compensatory behavioral intentions and group-based anger is positively related to the subjective importance of discussing the past. As hypothesized, group-based anger is more relevant than group-based compunction for predicting how important people feel it is to discuss the negative aspects of the colonial past. This result is consistent with research by Leach, Iyer, and Pedersen (2006) in which they show that, due to the higher readiness for action derived from feelings of anger, this group-based emotion is strongly related to actions aimed at changing intergroup imbalances and improving the outgroup situation. In comparison, group-based compunction is an emotion with a lower level of action readiness and is, in general, more related to efforts of compensation that are more passive in nature. We can argue that, in fact, subjective importance of discussing the past is a more direct way of improving intergroup relations in the present day, than are compensatory behavioral intentions, a variable that describes a general wish to compensate for the ingroup's past misdeeds.

Regarding the more novel theorized consequence of group-based emotions, our results show that, for the Portuguese sample, group-based compunction relates negatively with forgiveness assignment and, for the Dutch sample, both group-based compunction and anger negatively predict this variable. We argue that the dynamics of group-based emotions might influence the ingroup's perceptions regarding whether they should or should not be forgiven for negative actions that occurred in the past: the more individuals feel negative group-based emotions, the less they feel the ingroup should be forgiven. In this line, forgiveness assign-

ment can be conceptualized as an important determinant of the quality of intergroup relations after a negative past.

It is important to acknowledge that, although many researchers have made efforts to disentangle the distinctive role of shame and guilt for improving intergroup relations (Brown and Cehajic 2008; Brown et al. 2008; Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel 2007; Lickel, Schmader, and Barquissau 2004), in the present research we used a measure that aggregates self-criticism (conventionally conceptualized as shame) and guilt – group-based compunction. We argue that our conceptualization of compunction is suitable for several reasons: 1) our measure of compunction did not refer to any reputational aspects of shame and thus, can be conceptualized as ingroup-criticism based on a negative image of the ingroup (for further details on the distinction between guilt and shame in relation to reputational aspects see Brown and Cehajic 2008) much of the research conducted on group-based guilt and shame has reported very strong correlations between them (Branscombe, Slugoski, and Kappen 2004; Lickel, Schmader, and Barquissau 2004; Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel 2007; Brown et al. 2008). Our data actually concurs with most of the aforementioned results and further shows that analyzing the items measuring guilt and self-criticism (conventionally called shame) together provides a better understanding of the results obtained. Nevertheless, further research could benefit from analyzing the subtleties between group-based shame, guilt and compunction.

In our studies, group-based compunction and group-based anger were also strongly related to each other, although we showed that they have different consequences for intergroup relations. In the future, understanding in which ways the strong association between different negative group-based emotions might influence intergroup relations affected by a past or present conflict should also be addressed.

### 3.3. Limitations of the present research
We were able to corroborate most of the hypothesized relations between variables. However, we acknowledge that this study has a number of limitations to consider. First, we must underline that some of the antecedent variables (i.e. exonerating cognitions, collectivism and outgroup identification) had direct associations with the consequences of

group-based emotions, thus showing that these variables have not only an indirect effect via the emotions studied, but also through a direct link with the hypothesized consequences of feeling group-based anger and compunction. This may pose an issue in the interpretation of such variables solely as antecedents of group-based emotions. Second, we must consider that group-based anger and compunction are strongly related with each other in both samples, thus allowing the tentative explanation that many times individuals may confound both types of emotions in self-reported measures. Third, the variables collectivism (for the Dutch sample) and forgiveness assignment (for the two samples) presented rather low alphas and we believe that this may have caused lower fit indexes in our MGSEM analysis, when we included the measurement models in the analysis. One may argue that these constructs were not fully validated in our measurement models and thus pose a threat to construct validity. Nevertheless, from a theoretical perspective, we argue that maintaining these variables in our analysis allowed us to better understand the potential associations of these variables with the group-based emotions analyzed. Further research should pay attention to these issues, when examining such variables and their connection with emotions. Forth, even though our sample sizes are reasonable, they are only representative of university students within the social sciences and therefore we cannot make generalizations of our results towards other social or age groups. Fifth, throughout our discussion section we have presented some tentative explanations for some of the results we found. However, these have not been tested and further research should examine such potential explanations.

### 3.4. Further research
Given our results, but also the limitations of the present research, we believe it is important that future research explores other variables that may affect the experience of negative group-based emotions, such as other outgroup-focused variables like perceived legitimacy of compensation claims by the outgroup or the influence of chronological and subjective time for the relations between the ingroup and the outgroup. Second, we propose that the field of intergroup relations will certainly benefit from the analysis of other ingroup-based emotions, such as pride and humiliation, but also from other emotions that are not ingroup-

critical, such as empathy or contempt towards the outgroup. Third, further research should address the role *of luso-tropicalism* in the Portuguese sample, as well as other social representations of the colonial past that may exist in different countries and that may affect the way people perceive this past. We believe this may be an important variable for understanding the perceptions of the relationship between the Portuguese and the people from its former colonies. More importantly, we believe that understanding if *luso-tropicalism* is a specificity of the Portuguese context or if it is a more general trend in intergroup relations marked by a colonial past is an important venue for future studies.

Furthermore, we argue that further research should shed light into the dynamics of forgiveness assignment from the ingroup's perspective. We believe this to be an important step in understanding when or why individuals feel their group has to do more before being forgiven or when the efforts (or lack of perceived need of them) made by the ingroup have been enough for forgiveness to occur. At the same time, ultimately, it is up to the victimized group to decide whether or not they think the perpetrator group should be forgiven.

### 4. Conclusion
We have shown that group-based compunction and group-based anger are two related yet distinct emotions involved in the dynamics of intergroup relations following a conflict between groups. The present research has shown that ingroup-focused antecedents are important in determining the degree to which individuals feel group-based compunction and anger in relation to past colonial conflicts but, in a more novel line, we were able to show that outgroup-focused antecedents can also predict the degree to which individuals feel these emotions. Furthermore, we have concentrated our efforts in understanding the (different) consequences of negative group-based emotions in terms of compensatory behavioral intentions, perceived importance of information and forgiveness assignment. In the future it would be important to analyze other potential consequences of negative group-based emotions for the dynamics of intergroup relations marked by conflict.

The work presented proposes several theoretical advances within the domains of intergroup relations, conflict and group violence that may benefit our present and future work, of most relevance: 1) the inclusion of more outgroup-focused and relational variables in our understanding of intergroup relations; and 2) a refinement of the conceptualization of different group-based emotions and their associated appraisals and potentially distinct consequences for intergroup relations.

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# The Secret Society of Torturers: The Social Shaping of Extremely Violent Behaviour

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# The Secret Society of Torturers: The Social Shaping of Extremely Violent Behaviour

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How do normal people become able to torture others? In order to explain this puzzling social phenomenon, we have to take secrecy – the characteristic trait of modern torture – as the lynchpin of the analysis. Following Georg Simmel's formal analysis of the "secret society", the contribution reconstructs structural and cultural aspects of the secret society of torturers that generate social processes that allow its members to behave extremely violently, forcing individuals to turn into torturers. The contribution argues that the form of social behaviour that we call torture is socially shaped. It goes beyond social psychology to develop an explanation from the perspective of relational sociology.

When it comes to torture, nothing is as horrifying as realising what people are capable of doing unto others. It is virtually impossible to understand how torturers can physically and/or psychologically abuse or even kill while at the same time being caring fathers and loving husbands (Browning 1992; Conroy 2000). However, as with war criminals or terrorists, neither generally declaring the perpetrators insane psychopaths or sadists nor searching for their individual motives or interests enables us to fully explain this deeply puzzling social phenomenon. Rather, we will only be able to understand torture if we perceive it as a consequence of the social shaping of interactions within a specific social form. Interactions create social forms that in turn shape behaviour. This is the case in families, friendships, clubs, and associations, and even in nations. The same applies to the creation of groups of torturers that shape the behaviour of those who do the "dirty work". In this sense, torture is not anti-social but brought about by the social form that torturers are actively involved in.

In order to develop an approach that may explain the social shaping of torturers' extremely violent behaviour, the present article restricts the analysis to torture executed "in the name of a state" as an instrument of "state terror" (Sluka 2000).[1] We can conceive torture as a form of collective violence; a purposive act performed by coordinated social actors in order to gather information, to make individuals betray alleged co-conspirators, partisans, etc. Rather than being executed for its own sake as pure "excesses of violence" (Sofsky 1997), we can therefore define torture as "(a) the intentional infliction of extreme physical suffering on some non-consenting, defenceless person; (b) the intentional, substantial curtailment of the exercise of the person's autonomy (achieved by means of (a)); (c) *in general,* undertaken for the purpose of breaking the victim's will" (Miller 2008).[2]

In the context of cycles of political attention, torture has been a widely discussed topic in sociology for some time now. Examining torture regimes in South America and

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**1** Here, I do not discuss the violent behaviour of individuals acting alone that is sometimes portrayed in movies. See, *inter alia,* John Schlesinger's *Marathon Man* 1976, Quentin Tarantino's *Reservoir Dogs* 1992, or Michael Haneke's *Funny Games* 1997.

**2** Evidently, extreme psychological abuse also belongs in this brief definition.

southern Europe, Jan Philipp Reemtsma (1991a) outlined a research programme on torture as a social phenomenon, while detailed case studies exist for countries such as Argentina (Feitlowitz 1998; Lewis 2002), Chile (Ensalaco 2000), Brazil (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002), Greece (Haritos-Fatouros 2003), and Cambodia (Chandler 1999). In recent years, systematic torture in the so-called "war on terror" has triggered debates not only in the United States (Cohen 2005; Hersh 2004; Jaffer and Singh 2007; Koch 2008; Mayer 2008; McCoy 2006). In comparative studies, Cohen and Corrado (2005), Greenberg and Dratel (2005), Einolf (2007), and MacMaster (2004) have analysed torture as a means of domination in Western democracies; further, Linklater (2007) has contextualised torture within the general process of civilisation, while Reemtsma (2012) discusses in detail extreme violence as perpetrated by torturers as a basic constituent of modernity itself. The consequences of torture for the victims is the main focus in Asad (1996), Conroy (2000), Hooks and Mosher (2005), and Sofsky (2005), while recently von Trotha's (2011) outline of a "sociology of cruelty" and Inhetveen's (2011) study of a sociology of the body have opened up new perspectives for a sociological debate on torture.

The present article contributes to this important debate from the perspective of a relational sociology. It argues that in order to explain what enables individuals to behave extremely violently and turns them into torturers, we have to do more than provide highly interesting insights from experiments in social psychology – illustrating the trait of unquestioning obedience (Milgram 1974) – or examine the social system/hierarchy within which they act (Zimbardo 2009). Obviously, social psychology stresses factors that have a direct effect on the individual, such as being trained, indoctrinated, or selected, examining both the ability to torture and the situation of torture itself. The present article goes a step further, and argues that we have to take into consideration the wider social relations affecting torturers, the critical factor being that their social

organisation can be defined as a *secret society*. In order to integrate torture as a tool of power with an explanation of the shaping of torture as a form of social behaviour, I depart from the basic assumption that *secrecy* is the most significant aspect of torture as a modern phenomenon that generates opportunity structures for this form of social behaviour.

To develop this argument, the article begins with a closer look at different aspects of secrecy, before briefly outlining Georg Simmel's classic analysis of "The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies" (1906). By applying this formal and relational approach to the *secret society of torturers*, *secrecy* becomes the lynchpin of the present analysis,[3] which discusses both cultural and structural traits of this form of association. Against this background, it finally explains the social shaping of torturers' behaviour.

### 1. Four Aspects of Secrecy

With regard to the nexus between torture and secrecy, we have to distinguish at least four aspects. *First*, as Foucault (1979) has generally shown, unlike historical forms of martyrdom that were practised in public, "modern torture" is executed in secrecy (Grüny 2003, Rejali 2007). However, Reemtsma (1991b, 253) has pointed out that this generalised and often-mentioned aspect holds only for the public martyring that was practised to serve as a deterrent and to demonstrate the unlimited power of secular and religious authority.

*Second*, and more recently, non-democratic and democratic states alike attempt to conceal torture as a tool of power. In its latest report, Amnesty International (2014) shows that people are tortured in 141 countries.[4] None of these societies' governments would openly admit to using or condoning torture. Either citizens are not really aware of what is happening, as in Chile under the Pinochet regime: "Abducted prisoners were taken to one of a number of secret detention centers, where they were held incommunicado and interrogated under torture" (Ensalaco 2000, 90).

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**3** A number of scholars refer to secrecy, concealment or stealth (Rejali 2007) with respect to torture. Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo

(2002, 49 ff.) refer to Simmel but it is not central to their analysis.

**4** http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/ ACT40/004/2014/en/96fde57f-61d9-487b-90dc-7d a21c6c505d/act400042014en.pdf.

Or, as occurs all over the globe, non-democratic, authoritarian, or military regimes let their citizens know to some extent what they are doing to their opponents in order to cause anxiety among the entire population. Although torture may be an "open secret" in such cases, we know from countries like Argentina that it may require pressure – as exerted by social movements such as the "Madres de Plaza de Mayo" and others – to finally reveal the facts (in that case the existence of approximately five hundred secret torture prisons) (Feitlowitz 1998). In the modern age, all regimes draw a veil of secrecy over acts of torture.

*Third*, this applies in particular when it comes to torture in democracies. Here secrecy becomes obligatory, since by using torture democratic states knowingly violate their own moral foundations (cf. Rejali 2007, 16 ff., 569). This "dark side" of democracies is manifested in two forms. On the one hand, democracies may torture people themselves, as the United States did in Germany after World War II (McCoy 2006), in Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and the CIA's secret prisons in Poland, Romania, and Lithuania; France in the wars in Algeria (Vidal-Naquet 1963, Fanon 1963) and Indochina; the United Kingdom in the conflict with the Irish Republican Army (Conroy 2000) and as the ruling power in Kenya (Benenson 1959); or Belgium in the Congo (Van Reybrouck 2014). On the other hand, democracies may accept and support torture by non-democratic regimes (McCoy 2006), even when their own citizens become victims. Germany provides a striking example. In May 1977, a young German citizen, Elisabeth Käsemann, was accused by the Argentine junta of being a terrorist. The innocent woman was abducted, raped, tortured, and finally killed on 24 May. While the military regime claimed her death occurred in a clash between armed guerrillas and the military, in fact the military killed a group of defenceless prisoners including Käsemann. Unlike the United Kingdom, France, or Austria, which intervened forcefully and successfully in cases of their own, the German government

did not intervene to save her life, although the German ambassador and politicians were aware of what was happening. To this day, neither the foreign minister at the time, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, nor the Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, have been willing to speak openly about why they sacrificed a young woman to *realpolitik* by silently and knowingly supporting (and benefitting economically from) a military regime that violated human rights.[5] Thus, as a *tool of power*, democracies and non-democracies alike are interested in keeping torture secret.

*Finally*, and this is the essence of the present article, a genuine explanation of how and why people are able to torture others has to take seriously the social relations within groups of torturers. Without any doubt, recruitment processes, schooling, and ideological indoctrination are of utmost importance (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 160–91); however, I argue, explaining the social shaping of torturers' violent behaviour has to address the way this form of behaviour is triggered under conditions of secrecy, within the social context of a secret society. To introduce this argument, I will first briefly outline Georg Simmel's (1906) formal and relational account of secrecy as a sociological fact.

## 2. The Formal Analysis of the Secret Society

Georg Simmel's analysis of the *secret society* enables us to explain and understand both the way groups of torturers are organised and how this affects the behaviour of their members. In order to understand how and why torturers behave extremely violently, we have to perceive the formation of any secret society as a type of association *(Vergesellschaftung)*, based on a shared secret that is fraught with consequences: "So soon, however, as a group as such seizes upon secrecy as its form of existence, the sociological meaning of the secrecy becomes internal. It now determines the reciprocal relations of those who possess the secret in common" (Simmel 1906, 470). The idea of reciprocity is critical as it makes the social relations of actors

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**5** The case of Elisabeth Käsemann was brought back to collective awareness recently by Eric Friedler's 2014 documentary *Das Mädchen – Was geschah mit Elisabeth K.?*

the basis of the analysis and the starting point for examining the dynamics of the social processes that characterise these relations. Against this background, Simmel differentiates between two forms of secret societies that both point to specific features of this type of association:

> Its elements may live in the most frequent commerce, but that they compose a society – a conspiracy, or a band of criminals, a religious conventicle, or an association for sexual extravagances – may remain essentially and permanently a secret. This type, in which not the individuals but their combination is concealed, is sharply distinguished from the others, in which the social formation is unequivocally known, but the membership, or the purpose, or the special conditions of the combination are secrets. (470–471)

But why do secret societies emerge? Why do people turn to secrecy and why is the idea of secret societies of interest for an analysis of modern torture? Interestingly, Simmel not only refers to a "band of criminals", but also formulates the general proposition that "the secret society emerges everywhere as correlate of despotism and of police control. It acts as protection alike of defence and of offense against the violent pressure of central powers" (472). And, importantly, Simmel further qualifies this, contending that whatever these bands do, we always observe a distinctive "radical break with moral imperatives" (473).

Simmel's argument is "bottom-up", describing criminal bands acting against a central power, thereby violating existing law. However, although this may apply to any kind of secret society, it is another matter altogether when it comes to torture as a means of rule of the central power itself. In this case, we need to take a "top-down" look, where the central power (or parts of it) itself turns into a criminal band that practises torture as a tool of power against its own citizenry and other individuals, thereby violating moral imperatives. In the case of a "secret society of torturers" organised within a state's institutions, both forms that Simmel distinguishes are bound together: when it comes to torture, we neither know (or will know) about the secret society of torturers itself, nor do we know (or will know) who its members are – although in some political regimes torture is a kind of open secret. We might guess only that groups of torturers are at work, but do not know who belongs to them. In other regimes, we see members of

the police, military police, or military, but have no idea about the existence of a group of torturers within their ranks.

### 2.1. Secret Societies as Associations

Any association, be it secret or not, is characterised by a certain *purpose* of association and relies on a number of tenets of faith. In many cases, there is no reason to keep the purpose secret. For example, national communities are based on a sense of national belonging, political parties are built on shared political convictions and programmes, while the European Union claims to be founded on a common project. However, in the case of secret societies, their purpose can have crucial consequences: Given that a criminal band's purpose is characterised by dissociation from the moral convictions of the wider society and deliberately breaking its shared moral rules, there are two vital aspects to keeping its purpose secret. First, the social relations of the secret society's members must be based on confidence. Second, *confidence* is indispensable since the purpose of secrecy leads to the *protection* of both the secret society as a whole and its individual members (see Simmel 1906, 470). Obviously, to be so extremely dependent on the confidence of all members of a secret society is a double-edged sword. Over time, members of a secret society might become disappointed or even horrified by the violence of their acts and disclose the secret, thereby betraying the secret society. The indispensable confidence that guarantees secrecy turns out to be the secret society's Achilles heel:

> The keeping of the secret is something so unstable, the temptations to betrayal are so manifold, in many cases such a continuous path leads from secretiveness to indiscretion, that unlimited faith in the former contains an incomparable preponderance of the subjective factor. (473)

It turns out that secret societies are based on a precarious balance. While concealing their existence and purpose of association, they depend on the discretion of their members as the only possible protection; betrayal potentially threatens their existence. Just how dangerous it will be for a secret society to be either betrayed or discovered depends on both the interest of association and the precautions taken in order to stabilize the social relations within it.

The necessary stabilization of such a secret society results from two principles that are implemented into its organisational structure in order to oblige its members to adhere to the purpose of association: *hierarchy* and *rituals* both play a crucial role. Structurally, at least three elements create a clearly defined hierarchy in a secret society: the process of successive recruitment, a division of labour, and a rationalist structure. Culturally, however, for Simmel, a plurality of rites and formulae sets a secret society apart from open society:

> That which is striking about the treatment of the ritual in secret societies is not merely the precision with which it is observed, but first of all the anxiety with which it is guarded as a secret – as though the unveiling of it were precisely as fatal as betrayal of the purposes and actions of the society, or even the existence of the society altogether. (480)

These forms of rituals within the secret society generate what Simmel calls "a well-rounded unity" (481) that both structurally and culturally influences its members' behaviour. This impact is critical as it triggers specific demands upon the individual.

Finally, unlike ordinary life in open society, the "secret society must seek to create among the categories peculiar to itself, a species of life-totality" (481). Both content and form have to be kept secret "because only so can a harmonious whole come into being, in which one part supports the other" (481).

This typical trait of the secret society has consequences for its members, since:

> "One of its essential characteristics is that, even when it takes hold of individuals only by means of partial interests, when the society in its substance is a purely utilitarian combination, yet it claims the whole man in a higher degree, it combines the personalities more in their whole compass with each other, and commits them more to reciprocal obligations, than the same common purpose would within an open society." (481)

This is a form of idealisation of the secret society. By detaching itself from the wider society and closing itself off, the secret society develops its own structures and rituals, and defines itself as much more significant than any other area of the lives of its members. This situation generates a specific structure of social relations that triggers

complex and contradictory codes of conduct for members that cannot be reduced to individual dispositions or beliefs.

### 2.2. Social Closure: The Secret Society as a Counterpart to the Official World

From the perspective of closure theory, a form of association without any processes of social closure is inconceivable (see Weber 1967; Mackert 2012). Hence, the closure of the secret society to outsiders is a necessary and characteristic feature. Rituals such as taking an oath or vow, or making a pledge of loyalty serve to reinforce and confirm its purpose. Therefore, we can define these as the vital mechanisms of social closure that increase the level of concealment and advance processes of closure against the wider society, with crucial consequences:

> Moreover, through such formalism, just as through the hierarchical structure above discussed, the secret society constitutes itself a sort of counterpart of the official world with which it places itself in antithesis. Here we have a case of the universally emerging sociological norm; viz., structures, which place themselves in opposition to and detachment from larger structures in which they are actually contained, nevertheless repeat in themselves the forms of the greater structures. (Simmel 1906, 481–82)

Although closure leads to the development within the secret society of structures that correspond to those of the wider society, it is decisive that the closed secret society seeks to be an "antithesis" to the official world enclosing it. In the case of a secret society of torturers, the idea of antithesis refers to the breaking of the basic rules and norms of the wider society under the shelter of secrecy. This link is central: it allows for an emerging freedom of the individual that transcends all moral and lawful regulation of behaviour:

> Whether the secret society […] complements the inadequate judicature of the political area; or whether, as in the case of conspiracies or criminal bands, it is an uprising against the law of that area; or whether, as in the case of the "mysteries," they hold themselves outside of the commands and prohibitions of the greater area, in either case the apartness (*Heraussonderung*) which characterizes the secret society has the tone of a freedom. In exercise of this freedom a territory is occupied to which the norms of the surrounding society do not apply. The nature of the secret society as such is autonomy. It is, however, of a sort which approaches anarchy. Withdrawal from the bonds of unity which procure general coherence very easily has as consequences for the secret society a condition of being without roots, an absence of firm touch with life (*Lebensgefühl*), and of restraining reservations. (482)

This point cannot be overemphasised, as it is key to understanding the ways in which social relations transform the conditions of individuals' behaviour by providing opportunities for a kind of behaviour that was previously inconceivable. The aspect of freedom is pivotal, as the release from moral and lawful constraints of the wider society resulting from the secret society's closure and detachment in fact generates autonomy for a band of criminals, which can trigger violence and lead to anomic features (Mestrovic and Lorenzo 2008). This process has further consequences: closure against the wider society has follow-up costs for the individuals involved, such as feelings of uprootedness, a lack of stability, and the loss of normative support. But even in this case of tension between freedom and normative constraint, Simmel argues that the secret society's rituals may have a compensatory and stabilising function: "With the ritual the secret society voluntarily imposes upon it a formal constraint, which is demanded as a complement by its material detachment and self-sufficiency" (Simmel 1906, 483).

### 3. The Secret Society of Torturers

Against the background of Simmel's formal analysis of the secret society, the analysis assumes that the "secret element in societies is a primary sociological fact" (Simmel 1906, 483). Secrecy not only has consequences for social relations within the secret society but also provides opportunity structures that channel its members' behaviour into torture. This is not to argue in a structuralist vein but to stress the social shaping of a specific behaviour as a consequence of interaction *(Wechselwirkung)*.

### 3.1. A Dual Purpose

As an association organised within institutions of the state apparatus like the military, the military police, or the regular police, the secret society acts in secrecy in a twofold sense: neither the group itself nor its members are known to the wider society. This acting in secrecy follows from the *purpose* of a secret society of torturers, since as an instrument of state terror, it has a dual purpose: first, to force victims to reveal everything they know about membership, strategies, tactics, and objectives of organisations and groups; second, to break the will of those defined as enemies:

> The purpose of torturing is to get their responses. It's not something we do for the fun of it. […] Another purpose is to break them (psychologically) and to make them lose their will. It's not something that's done out of individual anger, or for self-satisfaction. (*S-21 Interrogator's Manual of the Khmer Rouge*, cited in Crelinsten 1995, 35)

While both purposes violate basic moral principles and standards codified in both national and international law (McEntee 1996), torture itself is extremely destructive in a double sense. First, it affects a person's dignity in a way that disrupts his or her relationship to the world:

> Whoever has succumbed to torture can no longer feel at home in the world. Trust in the world, which already collapsed in part of the first blow, but in the end, under torture, fully, will not be regained. That one's fellow man was experienced as the antiman remains in the tortured person as accumulated horror. (Améry 1980, 40)

Second, as we know from the long-term consequences in countries that suffered excesses of state terror, torture is a social phenomenon that triggers a collective trauma which Erickson defines as a "blow to the basic tissues of social life that damages the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of community" (1994, 233).

Consequently, not only the abstract violation of norms, values, or laws by state institutions but also torture's concrete destructive effects on individual victims and the wider society make it necessary to keep the dual purpose secret. The extreme assault on both individuals' lives and the social fabric of a society thus poses an enormous challenge to the members of the secret society of torturers with regard to the degree of mutual confidence its members have to establish and maintain to protect the secret society and themselves.

### 3.2. Hierarchy, Ritual and Violence

In the face of this double assault and given the fact that violence is constituent for the secret society of torturers, not only will enormous confidence among the secret society's members be necessary to offer protection for members and association alike but, in the face of the sheer brutality involved, violence will also be a crucial means to subjugate the torturers themselves and avoid betrayal. Thus, while following Simmel's idea that the precarious

balance between mutual confidence and the risk of betrayal will be stabilised by *hierarchy* and *rituals*, we necessarily have to add *violence* as a third critical element.

*First*, the significance of both hierarchy and the principle of order and obedience is self-evident, as we know from analyses of military or police organisations (Jannowitz 1971; Bröckling 1996; Apelt 2012). This is not only true within these normally legitimated institutions within which the secret society of torturers operates but also with regard to illegitimate secret societies of torturers that reproduce these structural traits within themselves.

A secret society of torturers will also include people in top positions in the state and wider circles of secrecy (Cohen 2005; Greenberg, and Dratel 2005) such as both national and "helpful" foreign secret services, as seen in Brazil under the military regime. Secrecy within these criminal bands is critical well beyond the inner circle: "[It was] interesting, provocative – everything […] had to be kept secret. […] The man in the secret service is very important to the state. We kept in touch with […] [American] consuls – [particularly] those who were CIA agents" (interview in Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 96–7).

*Second*, rituals related to inclusion or specific activities commit members to one another and institutionalise regularities, reinforcing both their ties and their mutual monitoring. Initiation rituals are of utmost importance in order to bend recruits to obey their superiors and to subjugate them under military discipline, as reported by former torturers of the Greek military junta:

> It started with an initiation ceremony on the first day of arrival at the ESA [Greek military police] training camp. After an initiation beating inside the cars taking the recruits to the camp and upon entering the camp, recruits were asked to swear allegiance to the totemic-like symbol of authority used by the junta, promising, on their knees, faith to their commander-in-chief and to the revolution. (Haritos-Fatouros 1988, 1114)

*Third*, as initiation rituals are often already violent, violence and threats become typical of the personal situation of those who are part of a secret society of torturers at the lower level doing the dirty work. The recruits:

> had to endure torture as if it were an everyday "normal" act. They all described a daily routine of flogging in which they were often forced to run to exhaustion, fully equipped, and were beaten at the same time. […] Older servicemen flogged and degraded the freshmen, in preparation for the recruits' task of torturing that was soon to follow. Older servicemen were never forced to do so, but they often used degrading remarks as negative reinforcements for the young soldiers to produce the desired effect. (Haritos-Fatouros 1988, 1116–17)

As well as the experience of violence, threats against servicemen and their families are also used as instruments to stabilise the secret society as a whole. As one reported, "an officer used to tell us that if a warder helps a prisoner, he will take the prisoner's place and the whole platoon will flog him. We always lived with this threat over our heads" (Haritos-Fatouros 1988, 1117). Further, peer pressure within the hierarchy, rituals of masculinity such as exposing members to ridicule, and threats were used to stabilise the association: "The day you leave, José, we will cut off your head" (Atkinson 1989, cited in Crelinsten 1995, 59). Thus, within the secret society, a hierarchy associated with the principle of order and obedience, rituals, violence, and threats produces a social situation that is virtually impossible to escape:

> I was trained in interrogation and counterintelligence work. I was then given the job of hunting people down and interrogating, torturing and killing them. Because […] of the situation in which I was living and what I had to do, I reacted and tried repeatedly to leave, but this was impossible, because once you are in you cannot get out. (Plate and Darvi 1983, cited in Crelinsten 1995, 59).

### 3.3. The Consequences of Social Closure

As we have seen, social closure plays a crucial role in securing the existence of any kind of association. In the case of the secret society of torturers, we have seen that closing the association not only detaches it from the wider society but also accomplishes a radical break with moral imperatives. Here, closure has effects that allow a deeper understanding of the secret society of torturers: a self-conception of the secret society as an elite; the significance of supporters who are only partly familiar with the interest of the association; a specific ruthlessness in pursuing its goal.

### 3.4. Elitism

Merely the formal fact of closure within an organisation of specialists in violence such as the military or the police will

lead the secret society of torturers to see itself as elite. This self-conception as an elite holds true for the position within the wider organisation:

> Primary among them was inculcation of the idea that the ESA was the strongest and most important supporter of the regime, which depended upon the army police for its safety and continuation. Recruits were made to believe that an ESA serviceman's action is never questioned: "You can flog a major", they were told. […] (Haritos-Fatouros 1988, 1115)

On the other hand, this effect of developing a self-conception as elite corresponds with processes of degradation and dehumanisation that Asad (1996) claims trigger feelings of omnipotence in the torturers that turn them into *social monsters in a monstrous kind of authority*: "We are everything for you. We are justice. We are God" (Hamburg Institute for Social Research 1987, 24, author's translation).

### 3.5. Supporters

Some sections of the military or (secret) police hierarchy, administrative staff of the institutions, and even members of a government will be only partly initiated into the secret of a secret society. This circle "constitutes to a certain extent a buffer area against the totally uninitiated" (Simmel 1906, 489) and will fulfil an important protective function. While this group communicates with the secret society and knows something about the secret, it also remains detached from it in order to conceal the secret and misinform the wider society, as was the case with Abu Ghraib when the US Administration denied all accusations for as long as possible (including secret CIA prisons in other countries) and began an Orwellian debate on "torture lite" (McCoy 2006). However, in the case of torture, there is also another side of the coin, as the seemingly anonymous top of the hierarchy (namely in the White House and in the Pentagon) was protected by discretion. When the secret society of torturers was uncovered by the Abu Ghraib pictures, these rulers were able to deny any kind of involvement in the operations of torture. Rather, they sacrificed members of the lower levels of the secret society's hierarchy by pathologising and dishonouring them (Hersh 2004).

### 3.6. Ruthlessness

Torturers pursue their purpose extremely ruthlessly within a social and cultural structure that offers no exit option but generates strong conviction on the part of those who actually torture, as illustrated by an interview with a former torturer of the Greek military junta (cited in Crelinsten 1995, 60):

> Q: Are there methods of torture which you on no account would have used? Then? At the time?
> A: At the time? No, I don't think so. We would have been able to do everything. […]
> Q: Even the worst forms of torture?
> A: Yes, regardless.
> Q: Even, let us say […] if they ordered you […] to torture [a victim's] children before his eyes?
> A: Yes.
> Q: Would you have done it?
> A: Yes, definitely."[6]

Not only can we comprehend Simmel's deeper insight that being a member of a criminal band implies a specific freedom from moral bonds, but we can also agree with Collins' argument that "we can find a key to cruelty in the connection between morality and the boundaries of a group inclusion and exclusion" (1974, 18). Given the complex social relations within this secret society, the very fact of radically cutting off the secret society of torturers from the world outside makes possible the degree of autonomy that develops into cruelty on the part of the torturer, as it is "[the] internal security organization's rational rules, hierarchy, and procedures [that] must dictate his occupational behaviour" (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 106).

### 4. Tension of Life and Form: Conditions of Behaviour

In their everyday interactions, individuals necessarily create social forms that are a consequence of creativity, but also constrain their opportunities of behaviour, thereby producing specific opportunity structures. There are three crucial aspects as far as the secret society of torturers is concerned: the decoupling from other associations, domination, and deindividualisation.

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**6** The film *Your Neighbour's Son* also addresses the topic of torturers and victims under the Greek military regime; distributed by Amnesty International.

### 4.1. The Decoupling of the Secret Society from Other Associations

While the wider society (market, state, family, etc.) makes demands on the individual that necessarily generate conflicts and contradictions that have to be solved, the secret society's isolation constrains such problems: "The purposes and programs of secret societies require that competitive interests from that plane of the open society should be left outside the door" (Simmel 1906, 491). This is an important consideration that goes some way towards explaining why psychopathology and charges of barbarianism supply such unsatisfactory answers to the question of how people are able to torture others. People "develop personalities and practices through interchanges with other humans, and […] the interchanges themselves always involve a degree of negotiation and creativity" (Tilly 2003, 5–6). Therefore, we should assume that it is the structural supersession or the secret society's decoupling from all systemic and moral references that make the life of specialists in violence seem detached from "reality". There are no contradictions – just simplicity, no moral considerations – just orders to be obeyed, no reflections on the torturer's personality – just the performance of a single role. Consequently, it is the social form of the secret society of torturers and the way it organises its social relations by detaching both itself and its members from "normal" social life that offer the key to understanding torturers' behaviour.

### 4.2. Domination

Being both detached from the wider society and a secondary structure within an existing hierarchy of the military or (secret) police, the secret society "exercises a kind of absolute sovereignty over its members. This control prevents conflicts among them which easily arise in the open type of co-ordination." (Simmel 1906, 491–92). Again, the form becomes decisive as it shapes members' behaviour as centralisation triggers the emergence of "unlimited and blind obedience to leaders […]. The more criminal the purposes of a secret society, the more unlimited is likely to be the power of the leaders, and the more cruel its exercise" (492). There is hardly a secret society whose purpose is more criminal than that of torturers and there seems no way out once a person has become a member:

Like the violence bureaucrat that he was, Armando describes the Militarised Police as having "a hierarchical regimen." Explaining this further, he argues that "a soldier has to obey the hierarchy and the discipline […]. Whoever has a higher rank in the hierarchy has power" (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 12)

The sociological analysis of the secret society's structure shows unmistakably that while torturers indeed act in a context apparently characterised by unlimited moral freedom, their operations are restricted by an extremely rigid command structure that is of utmost importance, particularly in the case of a band of criminals such as torturers. This enormous extent of enforcement and centralised authority also has far-reaching consequences in the event of the secret society being uncovered, as it shows how centralisation of power can be used to the advantage of those holding power:

Ironically, in the case of state-sponsored violence, it is often only the accounts of a few sacrificed lower-ranked violence workers that enter into public memory. The upper-level facilitators who order and promote torture, and sometimes even carry it out themselves, are able to manipulate and control the definition of truth so that any information that threatens their secrets is labelled "illegitimate" and "against the national interest". (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 27)

### 4.3. Deindividualisation

Finally, the specific form of social relations within the secret society has profound consequences for the individual, as unconditional subordination under a centralised authority implies a process of deindividualisation. Being subjugated under a central authority within a rigid hierarchy, being forced to accept and take part in (initiation) rituals, and being exposed to threats and violence, members of the secret society of torturers turn to simple means to achieve the ends of this association. Self-abnegation and a levelling of individuality are important consequences for torturers: being subjugated as individuals reshapes these people, transforming them into characters who lose all their individuality and whose self-abnegation becomes stronger, while the rulers enforce a levelling of the ruled that emphasises the solidarity of the members (see Simmel 1906, 495). This will finally lead to a complete loss of compassion in the members/torturers and a typical state of irresponsibility for their own actions:

Within such an organizational framework, there was no place for emotionality. The rational violence worker could not have positive feelings for a victim, and he even had to modulate his extreme negative feelings so as not to go "too far" with a victim. (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002, 106)

## 5. Dynamics of Processes within the Secret Society of Torturers

The analysis of the secret society of torturers suggests that torture should be recognised as a consequence of a specific and contradictory form of social relations within the association of the secret society: moral freedom versus strictest regulation; individual freedom versus hierarchy and commitment through rituals; feelings of power and superiority versus anonymous leadership and sub-ordination; omnipotence versus deindividualisation and self-abnegation.

Concealing and detaching the secret society of torturers from the wider society generates an "inner world" that is isolated from the outside world, the consequence being processes of "internal dynamics" *(Eigendynamik)*, a concept that Friedhelm Neidhardt (1981) developed after analysing social processes within the secret society of the Baader-Meinhof group. Complementing Simmel's ideas of interaction *(Wechselwirkung)*, this concept makes it possible to identify the conditions of specific kinds of processes within social systems that are more or less socially closed: first, no external disturbances of the dominant ideas or motives aggravate the secret society's members or confuse the group's world view; second, once the internal dynamics in these closed systems are in motion, none of the members can quit the organisation; third, and probably the most importantly, the members of a secret society permanently push each other to go on with what obviously has to be done, thereby generating motives for the whole process to continue. However, internal dynamics within closed social systems such as groups of torturers trigger readjustments of the group's purpose, leading to paradoxical turns or contradictory developments (see Neidhardt 1981, 251–52).

Nevertheless, as Neidhardt argues, internal dynamics do stabilise a closed social group. As its members are bound to one another by rituals, commitments, a distinct hierarchy, the principle of order and obedience, and the feeling of

being elite and omnipotent, the secret society reconfirms itself, while its members reconfirm each other and remain loyal to their association. As Neidhardt has shown with regard to the internal dynamics within secret societies, these processes cannot be based solely on feelings of loyalty but need a stronger foundation. "Individual motives require mutual support in *systems of meaning* that enable the individual to both interpret his or her world relatively coherently and to legitimise his or her actions for him or herself (253, author's translation). Such constructions of meaning are facilitated by developing an "everyday theory" that explains to the members of the secret society coherently, simply, and consistently why they are doing what they are doing (254).

In order to preserve the conviction that allows the secret society's members to go on, two techniques play a crucial role. First, *techniques of rationalising*, or "neutralizing" (Sykes and Matza 1957), and a specific kind of "responsibility" (Scott and Lyman 1968) enable the members to define their own situation as an emergency and allow for a unitary world view. In this state of mind:

> [to] have a feeling of being at war simply justifies the moral state of emergency and offers relief through reference to analogies provided in abundance by history's battlefields. The opponent is the enemy; killing him is a soldier's duty. Moral consequences can be turned into technical ones. To murder then simply means "to inflict losses". (Neidhardt 1981, 255, author's translation).

Second, *techniques of immunising* allow members to separate off experiences outside the secret society, the consequence being a state of *indifference* towards both the world outside and the victims of torture. The violent attack becomes simply functional.

In the case of torture, we have to add that the members of this secret society pass through a socialisation process, since they are not only taught the techniques of torture. Rather, by intensive instruction and indoctrination (Haritos-Fatouros 1991), they internalise both constructions of meaning that plausibly justify their alleged superior identity and the conception of strict "we-they" dichotomies that are preconditions for devaluation and dehumanisation of their potential victims (Asad 1996).

## 6. Contradictions of Behaviour

In the face of all these processes within the secret society of torturers, those who are subordinated to an anonymous authority now themselves turn into anonymous and absolute rulers;[7] they carry their own experience of deindividualisation and self-abnegation to the extreme in relation to their victims. As the latter are deprived of their individuality, they are no longer perceived as individuals. Humiliation and subordination under an omnipotent and anonymous power generates a far-reaching closed action system that knows virtually no external disturbances. Once again, Neidhardt's analysis helps us to understand how specific internal dynamics are triggered by the way perpetrators and victims are fixated on one another, with neither of them being able to escape from the system, the fatal consequence being that the asserted original motive of gathering information can easily be superimposed by secondary motives such as feelings of hyper-omnipotence or the sense of having the power of life and death. Again, the social dynamics of this situation are crucial for a better understanding of how and why people become able to torture others. Grüny makes this point: the sense of self is:

> highly insecure since it demands a constant continuation of the torture; as soon as it ends, the power of the torturer is terminated. As both the loss of consciousness of the victim and his or her death threaten the possibility of continuing the torture, the perpetrator tries to avoid both these situations. However, since a victim cannot be tortured endlessly, the torturer has to constantly look for new victims. (Grüny 2003, 106, author's translation)[8]

The social situation of torture is thus characterised by highly complex social dynamics: the torturer's self, having been reshaped within the structure and culture of the secret society, is now in a position to reshape the self of the victim in front of him. Thus, we can identify the critical aspects of this situation:[9]

- Absolute power on the part of the torturers corresponds to absolute powerlessness on the part of the victims, indicating the enormous destructiveness of torture: "Among the practices of the modern state, torture is the least understood, one that lures its practitioners, high and low, with fantasies of dominion" (McCoy 2006, 12–13). The intensified asymmetry of power relations between a group of specialists in violence on the one hand and a radically isolated individual on the other opens the door to an extremely destructive form of violence. The victims are unable to defend themselves against their torturers.
- Absolute knowledge on the part of the torturers corresponds to absolute ignorance on the part of the victims. In torture, social relations are no longer aimed at reciprocity and negotiation. Rather, it is the torturers who write the script: "On a tout le temps, dit le commandant, ils sont tous comme ça au début : on mettra un mois, deux mois ou trois mois, mais il parlera" (Alleg [1958a] 2008, 69).[10] It is the torturers who decide what exactly will happen – the victim can only hold out fatalistically.
- Fixed but non-transparent intentions of the torturers are accompanied by victims' efforts to guess these. They think about what will happen next, what the torturers want to know, how they can evade torture, and whether they will survive if they betray others or make false accusations:

> The antagonism between perpetrator and victim indicates the extreme limits of social reciprocity. [. . .] The victim is entirely in the enemy's hand, at the mercy of his rage, lust, and will to annihilation. Violence is unrestricted by any counterforce. Reciprocity is superfluous. (Sofsky 2005, 89, author's translation)

The victims can neither resort to experiences in everyday processes of interaction nor relate these to their current situation. In a radically existential way, the situation of torture is extraordinary.

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**7** We can take this literally, as many victims of torture have to wear hoods for long periods of time and therefore cannot see their surroundings.

**8** This is the very point where torture may turn into an excess, where the torturer knows no limits and sheer cruelty takes over.

**9** See Doerr-Zegers et al. 1992 for a psychological perspective. The authors also define an asymmetry of power, anonymity and obscurity with respect to time and space as crucial elements of the torture situation as well as the psychological aspects.

**10** "'We have time,' said the major. 'They're all like that at the beginning. We'll take a month, two months, or three months, but he'll talk'" (Alleg 1958b, 69).

- Absolute clarity on the part of the torturers corresponds with absolute obscurity on the part of the victims. The victims generally do not know whom they are dealing with, who is standing or sitting opposite them; some do not even know why they are in the hands of torturers. The whole situation remains opaque. Thus, the torturers' domination can be exerted anonymously and becomes infinite:

    "What was the problem that caused them to arrest you?" the interrogator asked.

    I said I didn't know.

    "The Organization isn't stupid," he said. "It never catches people who aren't guilty. Now think again – what did you do wrong?"

    "I don't know," I said again." (Chandler 1999, 77)

- Spatial and temporal orientation on the part of the torturers who have a life "outside" and "afterwards", in other words, move back into a "normal world", corresponds to a purposeful and systematic disorientation on the part of the victims, for whom there is only a "timeless inside" left: "Make sure they never know where they are. It's a disorientation thing. Whenever you're going somewhere, make sure you spin them around and you blindfold them, and you never take them on a direct route" (interview with an El Salvadoran death squad member, cited in Crelinsten 1995, 50). Victims should not know where they are, how long they will be there, or whether they will ever leave again. And this disorientation also applies to the experience of time: "Je dus m'endormir d'un coup, car, lorsque je le revis, j'eus l'impression qu'un instant seulement s'était écoulé. Et à partir de là, je n'eus plus aucune notion du temps" (Alleg [1958a] 2008, 36).[11]

## 7. Conclusion

Stanley Milgram's (1974) well-known experiment shocked the public by showing that two thirds of all participants were willing to torment other persons on the orders of an examiner who told them that the electric shocks (which in reality would have been lethal) were necessary to induce the subjects to behave in a specific way. Far from restricting the results to "normal persons'" belief in authority, Zimbardo (2009) argues that the "system" in which people act causes their behaviour.

Although we have to admit that there will always be sadists and psychopaths among torturers, this contributes as little towards providing a proper explanation as the idea that obedience of authority turns people into torturers (not to mention the fact that laboratory conditions bear no relation to the processes of reshaping self that create ruthless torturers). However, social psychology is extremely helpful in fleshing out details of a proper explanation, as we learn a great deal about socialising processes, atrocity training, and exercises in obedience, etc. (Huggins, Haritos-Fatouros, and Zimbardo 2002) that support the overall argument of people being able to learn to torture others.

Entering a unit of torturers means stepping into a social situation that triggers a process of both suppressing the self-image and reshaping the self that has to adjust to a new kind of environment. In the course of an initiation process the prospective member of the secret society has to undergo, he or she experiences the omnipotent power of the representatives of the hierarchical and authoritarian organisation. It is within this kind of framework that the individual has to act, to build up a new kind of personal identity and follow rules in order to accomplish given objectives. A number of techniques such as degradation, humiliation, being subjected to violence, and maybe even torture characterise torturers' initiation as a process of "disculturation" of the novice.

Within an extreme social situation enhanced by the veil of *secrecy*, the individual is exposed without protection to the emergence of a new kind of identity. However, contrary to Goffman's (1961) conception of a "total institution", there is for the torturer no fundamental barrier between the world

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11 "I must have fallen asleep suddenly, because, when I saw them again, I had the impression that only an instant had passed. And at this point, I lost all idea of time" (Alleg 1958b, 56).

within the secret society and the "normal" world outside. Rather, they live in both worlds and one might argue that only the strict separation of the two worlds with their completely contradictory rules of conduct permits torturers to have a normal life as fathers and husbands, in other words a social environment that offers (maybe unknowingly) support and encouragement for what allegedly has to be done (cf. Lifton 1986).

From the perspective of a relational sociology, all this happens under circumstances that emphasise not only structural and cultural effects that generate opportunity structures for trained torturers but also the crucial social relations within the secret society of torturers. The present article shows that we have to look more closely at the social shaping of extremely violent behaviour in order to fully explain what people are capable of doing to others.

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# Validation of the Greek Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression (AMMSA) Scale: Examining Its Relationships with Sexist and Conservative Political Beliefs

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The Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression scale measures contemporary beliefs about sexual aggression that tend to blame victims and exonerate perpetrators. A Greek version of the thirty-item AMMSA scale was administered to two diverse convenience samples, one in Greece and one in Cyprus. Convergent and discriminant construct validity were assessed via correlations with other constructs that were hypothesized to be strongly related to AMMSA (Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance; hostile sexism) or moderately related (benevolent sexism; social dominance orientation; right-wing authoritarianism). It was found that the Greek AMMSA was unidimensional, highly internally consistent, normally distributed, and showed good construct validity. When sociodemographic data were analyzed, age, gender, and nationality turned out to be significant predictors of AMMSA, with a U-shaped trend for age, higher scores for men than women, and higher scores for Cypriots than Greeks. In sum, the Greek AMMSA scale provides a highly useful instrument for further research on sexual aggression myths, their correlates, and effects on judgment and behavior.

Sexual aggression against women is a persisting global problem (WHO, 2014). Several studies have documented the negative effects suffered by victims of sexual violence (for a review, see Briere and Jordan 2004). Still, sexual violence against women remains one of the most under-reported crimes (Kruttschnitt, Kalsbeek, and House 2014). This also seems to be the case in Greece (Tsigris [Τσιγκρής] 1996), where official statistical data are both scarce and vague (cf. Hellenic Police [Ελληνική Αστυνομία] 2013). It has been suggested that attitudes toward the victims and perpetrators of sexual violence and toward rape in a given culture contribute to the under-reporting of such crimes (Megías et al. 2011). Most importantly, these attitudes also contribute to the perpetuation of sexual violence, causally affecting men's rape proclivity (Bohner et al. 1998; Bohner et al. 2010; Bohner, Siebler, and Schmelcher 2006).

A number of instruments for the assessment of rape-related attitudes have been developed on the basis of the concept of rape myths (Brownmiller 1975), which we will define in the next section. The purpose of the present study was the adaptation and validation of such an instrument, namely the Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression (AMMSA) scale, using two Greek-speaking national samples (Greeks and Greek Cypriots).

### 1. Rape Myths and Rape Myth Acceptance (RMA)

Burt (1980) provided the first social psychological definition of rape myths as "prejudicial, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and rapists" (217). Lonsway and Fitzgerald (1994) argued that Burt's definition was descriptive but rather vague, and they defined rape myths as "attitudes and beliefs that are generally false but are widely and persistently held, and that serve to deny and justify male sexual aggression against women" (134). How-

ever, Gerger, Kley, Bohner, and Siebler (2007) noted that this definition did not address the contents of rape myths; moreover, they argued that being "false" as a defining feature of rape myths is difficult or impossible to determine, and that the prevalence and consistency of rape myths over time should not be included in a definition, but treated instead as issues open to empirical investigation (see also Bohner 1998). Thus, Gerger et al. (2007) adopted a more general definition of rape myths addressing both their content and functions: "rape myths are descriptive or prescriptive beliefs about rape (i.e., about its causes, context, consequences, perpetrators, victims, and their interaction) that serve to deny, downplay or justify sexual violence that men commit against women" (423).

Various scales have been developed and used to assess RMA – that is, the endorsement of rape myths as cognitive schemata that explain sexual violence – including the Rape Myth Acceptance scale (Burt 1980); the Attitudes Toward Rape scale (Feild 1978); the R scale (Costin 1985); the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance (IRMA) scale (Payne, Lonsway, and Fitzgerald 1999). A Greek scale on attitudes toward rape was developed by Gari, Georgouleas, Giotsa, and Stathopoulou (2009). Despite their satisfactory measurement properties, these scales have proven less successful in more recent research, with extremely low scores producing positively skewed distributions. Gerger et al. (2007) argued that these distributions do not necessarily reflect low endorsement of rape myths, but are rather a manifestation of participants' increasing awareness of "political correctness" (note that traditional RMA scales contain explicitly direct items) or a reflection of the modified content of rape myths themselves. Just like traditional racist (Akrami, Ekehammar, and Araya 2000) and sexist (Glick and Fiske 1996) attitudes have evolved into more subtle and discrete versions (Swim et al. 1995), beliefs about sexual aggression also appear to have changed into more indirect, more "appropriate" ones.

## 2. The Acceptance of Modern Myths About Sexual Aggression Scale
In order to address the methodological shortcomings of the "traditional" RMA scales and to capture the more subtly and covertly expressed forms of sexism that emerged during recent decades, Gerger et al. (2007) developed the

Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression scale (AMMSA). This thirty-item scale assesses myths about rape and other, less severe, forms of sexual aggression in a more subtle, less overt manner than previous measures of RMA.

The items of the scale were designed to reflect five content categories: (i) denial of the scope of the problem; (ii) antagonism toward victims' demands; (iii) lack of support for policies designed to help alleviate the effects of sexual violence; (iv) beliefs that male coercion forms a natural part of sexual relationships; and (v) beliefs that exonerate male perpetrators by blaming the victim or the circumstances (for a more detailed description see Gerger et al. 2007, 425).

In order to validate and assess the psychometric properties of their scale, which was developed in parallel in German and English versions, Gerger et al. (2007) conducted four studies with student and non-student samples. In these studies, factor analyses suggested a single-factor structure, and Cronbach's alpha ranged from .90 to .95, indicating excellent internal consistency. Moreover, test-retest reliability was satisfactory, yielding retest coefficients ($r_{tt}$) that ranged from .67 to .88. More importantly, the distributions of participants' scores were found to be symmetrical and close to a normal distribution in all four studies, thus correcting a major deficit of earlier RMA measures.

In recent years a number of studies on perceptions of sexual aggression have employed the AMMSA scale as their basic research instrument. Their findings have confirmed that the scale is highly reliable and valid, that the distribution of participants' scores is very close to normal, and that the scale measures beliefs about sexual aggression in a covert, subtle way (Eyssel and Bohner 2011; Eyssel, Bohner, and Siebler 2006; Temkin and Krahé 2008). A Spanish version of the AMMSA scale developed and validated in two studies with college students (Megías et al. 2011) showed very high levels of internal consistency and construct validity, equivalent to those reported by Gerger et al. (2007). Furthermore, a French short version of the AMMSA scale was successfully used in a study comparing the beliefs of French and German respondents with respect to a highly publicized legal case of sexual aggression (Helmke et al. 2014).

### 3. Validation of the Greek AMMSA Scale

The main aim of the present survey was to validate the Greek AMMSA scale, testing its reliability, convergent and discriminant validity. Following the work of Gerger and colleagues (2007), we used Greek adaptations of the IRMA scale (a previous, more overt measure of RMA, discussed above; Payne et al. 1999); the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI; Glick and Fiske 1996); the Right-wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA; Altemeyer 1996, in Funke 2005); and the Social Dominance Orientation scale (SDO; Pratto et al. 1994).

The ASI scale was developed within the context of Ambivalent Sexism theory, to capture two closely related yet distinct aspects of prejudice against women: hostile sexism and benevolent sexism (see Glick et al., 2000). Hostile sexism is characterized by overt hostility toward women, whereas benevolent sexism identifies more subjectively "positive" views of women and their role in society. However, both forms serve to justify and perpetuate male social dominance. Significant associations between AMMSA and both hostile and benevolent sexism have been found in the literature (Gerger et al. 2007; Megías et al. 2011), although AMMSA's relationship with hostile sexism is significantly stronger than that with benevolent sexism. This difference in magnitude speaks to the AMMSA scale's convergent (high positive correlation with hostile sexism) and discriminant validity (moderate positive correlation with benevolent sexism).

RWA is a personality variable identifying submissive, aggressive, and conventional attitudes (see Funke 2005); SDO is also an individual-difference variable, indicating the extent to which a person accepts hierarchical, unequal intergroup relations. Both constructs have been shown to represent generalized dimensions of prejudice against various outgroups (Duckitt and Sibley 2007). RMA has been shown to correlate with both RWA (Walker, Rowe, and Quinsey 1993) and SDO (Pratto et al. 1994). Moderate positive relationships between AMMSA and RWA and SDO have been established among German-speaking (Süssenbach and Bohner 2011) and English-speaking respondents (Gerger et al. 2007, Study 4), further supporting AMMSA's discriminant validity.

### 4. Research Aims and Hypotheses

In a questionnaire study we set out to validate the Greek AMMSA scale, assessing the scale's reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity, using samples of Greeks and Greek Cypriots. Specifically, we expected to find: (a) a one-factor solution and high internal consistency of the AMMSA scale; (b) strong positive correlations between AMMSA and conceptually similar concepts (IRMA and hostile sexism); and (c) moderate positive relationships with constructs representing attitudes that are related to AMMSA, but conceptually more distinct (benevolent sexism, RWA, and SDO).

Among the demographic correlates of rape myth acceptance, gender is not only the most commonly examined (Lonsway and Fitzgerald 1994), but also the strongest (Suarez and Gadalla 2010). In line with previous findings, we hypothesized to find significant gender differences in AMMSA scores, with men scoring higher than women. However, gender differences reported by Gerger et al. (2007) tended to be in the range of small to medium-sized effects (Cohen's d across studies between 0.18 and 0.49; computed based on Gerger et al. 2007, Table III, p. 432). On the other hand, Süssenbach and Bohner (2011), using a representative sample for Germany, found no gender difference at all on a nine-item version of the AMMSA. Thus, it was thought important to explore whether societies such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, which rank the lowest in terms of gender equality among EU member states (Plantenga and Remery 2013), would show higher rape myth acceptance overall, as well as larger gender differences.

Other socio-demographic variables were included for exploratory purposes, as previous findings have failed to draw a consistent picture (Lonsway and Fitzgerald 1994). Gerger et al. (2007) highlight this shortcoming, arguing for a more systematic examination. Following this proposition, we also assessed age, educational level, place of residence and place of birth (urban vs. rural), employing two national samples (Greeks and Greek Cypriots) including both students and non-students. It is important to note that respondents' place of origin and residence have not previously been explored in relation to AMMSA. Moreover, the relationship between AMMSA and age has been reported to

have an intriguing U-shaped pattern (Süssennbach and Bohner 2011), which we wished to explore. Samples from both Greece and the Republic of Cyprus were used, in order to strengthen the validation of the Greek-language version of the AMMSA scale, because Greek Cypriots' official (native) language is Greek. We also aimed to explore possible differences in the adoption of modern myths about sexual aggression between the two national samples, which might stem from cultural differences, because despite sharing cultural traits in terms of language and religion the two nations have distinct identities: Greek Cypriots are a smaller community living in a post-conflict society, and the majority identify more as Cypriots than as Greeks (Psaltis 2012). Moreover, the Gender Equity Index, a composite measure based on education, economic activity, and female empowerment (0.72 for Greece ranking fifty-second, compared to 0.68 for Cyprus ranking seventieth among 154 countries) (Social Watch 2012), suggests that differentiation of gender roles will be more pronounced in Cyprus than in Greece, which means that we might expect greater acceptance of modern myths about sexual aggression among Greek Cypriots than among Greeks.

Finally, we attempted to examine the relative contribution of socio-demographic versus personality and ideological variables in predicting the adoption of modern myths about sexual aggression.

## 5. Method

### 5.1. Participants

A snowball procedure was used to generate a diverse convenience sample: Questionnaires were distributed to students in Greece and the Republic of Cyprus; the students were asked to complete a questionnaire themselves and to pass on further copies to non-student adults. This resulted in a final sample of 223 native Greeks (88 men and 134 women – one participant did not report his/her gender – aged between 18 and 65 years, $M = 33.54$, $SD = 11.40$) and 132 native Greek Cypriots (73 men and 59 women, aged between 18 and 72 years, $M = 38.09$, $SD = 14.92$), (total $N =$

355, 161 men and 193 women) aged between 18 and 72 years, $M = 35.26$, $SD = 13.02$).

### 5.2. Measures

For each of the scales described below, participants were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement with each statement, using a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), except for SDO, where the endpoints of the seven-point Likert scale were labelled "very negatively" (1) and "very positively" (7).[2] Where necessary, items were recoded. Compound scores were created for each measure, based on the mean of the responses of each participant.

### 5.2.1. Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression (AMMSA)

Participants were asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with each of the thirty items of the Greek AMMSA scale (originally in German and English; Gerger et al. 2007). Following guidelines for the successful translation of instruments in cross-cultural research (Brislin 1970), the items of the English AMMSA scale were translated into Greek by a bilingual social psychologist, who aimed to provide close equivalents of both the concepts and the form of expression. The Greek items were then translated back into English by another bilingual social psychologist, who was blinded from the original scale. Both versions were then reviewed by an expert in the field of sexual aggression, and discrepancies were discussed and corrected by the research team.[3]

The scale includes items such as: "Interpreting harmless gestures as 'sexual harassment' is a popular weapon in the battle of the sexes"; "It is a biological need for men to release sexual pressure from time to time"; "If a woman invites a man to her home for a cup of coffee after a night out this means that she wants to have sex."

### 5.2.2. Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance scale (IRMA)

The IRMA scale consists of forty rape myth items (Payne, Lonsway, and Fitzgerald 1999). Examples include: "If a

woman is raped while she is drunk, she is at least somewhat responsible for letting things get out of control"; "Rape mainly occurs on the 'bad' side of town"; "Men don't usually intend to force sex on a woman, but sometimes they get too sexually carried away". In addition to its forty rape myth items, the IRMA scale also contains five filler items; the latter were excluded from further analyses.

### 5.2.3. Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA)

RWA was measured with twelve items, adapted from Funke (2005). Examples include: "What our country really needs instead of more 'civil rights' is a good stiff dose of law and order"; "It is important to protect the rights of radicals and deviants in all ways" (reverse coded). Cronbach's α for the Greek adaptation of the scale was .80.

### 5.2.4. Social Dominance Orientation (SDO)

For SDO a sixteen-item version of the scale was employed (Pratto et al. 1994). Examples of items from the SDO scale include: "Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups"; "No one group should dominate in society" (reverse coded). Cronbach's α for the Greek adaptation of the scale was .87.

### 5.2.5. Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI)

This twenty-two-item measure was used to assess self-reported sexist attitudes (Glick et al. 2000). ASI incorporates two distinct eleven-item subscales, one for hostile sexism (for example, "Many women get a kick out of teasing men by seeming sexually available and then refusing male advances") and one for benevolent sexism (for example, Women should be cherished and protected by men). Cronbach's α for the Greek adaptation of the scale was .90 for hostile sexism and .87 for benevolent sexism.

### 5.2.6. Demographics

Participants reported their gender, age (in years), occupational status, level of education, place of residence, and place of birth. Nationality (Greek or Cypriot) was established during data collection.

All materials were presented in the following order, which was the same for all participants: RWA, SDO, ASI, AMMSA, IRMA, demographics.

## 6. Results

### 6.1. Exploratory Factor Analyses

### 6.1.1. AMMSA

Although, on the basis of previous research findings, we expected a one-factor solution for the AMMSA scale items, we opted for an exploratory factor analysis because we wanted to examine the factor structure in a different cultural context, represented by Greece and Cyprus. Bartlett's test for sphericity ($\chi^2$ (435) = 4002.80, $p$ <.001) and the KMO test for sampling adequacy (KMO = .93) indicated that it was appropriate to perform this analysis. The analysis yielded seven factors, explaining 59.12 percent of the variance. Eigenvalues for the seven factors were: 9.97, 1.68, 1.44, 1.29, 1.21, 1.12, and 1.01. The ratio between the eigenvalues of the first and the second factor was 5.92 (the first factor explained almost six times the variance explained by the second factor) and the scree plot showed no further sharp angle in the slope after the second component; this led us to adopt a one-factor model for the AMMSA scale (as in Gerger, et al. 2007; Megías et al. 2011). Cronbach's α for the Greek adaptation of the AMMSA scale was .93.

### 6.1.2. IRMA

We followed the same procedure to explore the factor structure of the IRMA scale (Bartlett's test for sphericity: $\chi^2$ (990) = 8583.30, $p$ <.001; KMO = .95). The analysis yielded nine factors with eigenvalues above one (17.69, 2.30, 1.77, 1.42, 1.21, 1.20, 1.13, 1.08, 1.04), which cumulatively explained 64.09 percent of the variance. The ratio between the eigenvalues of the first and the second factor was 7.70; this, along with the inspection of the scree plot, led us to adopt a one-factor solution for the IRMA scale, despite the fact that Payne et al. (1999) reported a seven-factor structure for the English IRMA scale.[4] Cronbach's α for the IRMA scale was very high (α = .97).

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**4** Note that almost all published research has treated IRMA as a uni-dimensional scale (for example Gerger et al. 2007).

## 6.2. Distributions

The distributions of AMMSA and IRMA were both close to normal, $p = .80$ and $.40$, respectively, Kolmogoroff-Smirnov tests. However, the AMMSA distribution had a slight negative skewness of -0.22 ($SE = 0.13$) and a kurtosis of -0.25 ($SE = 0.27$), whereas the IRMA distribution showed a slight positive skewness of $.22$ ($SE = 0.14$) and a kurtosis of -0.52 ($SE = 0.27$). These findings are not in line with previous comparisons between the two scales, which suggested that only AMMSA scores follow a normal distribution, whereas IRMA scores deviate from normality, showing positive skewness (Gerger et al. 2007). Paired t-test analysis revealed a significant difference between AMMSA and IRMA scores, $t(310) = 33.96, p < .001$, indicating that participants generally scored higher on AMMSA ($M = 4.14$) than on IRMA ($M = 3.04$). Thus, replicating previous work, AMMSA scores were closer to the scale midpoint than IRMA scores.

## 6.3. Convergent and Discriminant Validity

As predicted, AMMSA scores correlated highly with IRMA ($r = .83, p < .001$) and hostile sexism ($r = .76, p < .001$), indicating convergent validity (see Table 1). More moderate positive correlations were found between AMMSA and benevolent sexism ($r = .50, p < .001$) , SDO ($r = .43, p < .001$), and RWA scores ($r = .60, p < .001$), supporting the scale's discriminant validity. It should be noted that AMMSA correlated significantly with both subscales of the ASI, but the correlation between AMMSA and hostile sexism was significantly stronger than that between AMMSA and benevolent sexism, $z = 6.69. p < .01$.

**Table 1: Means, standard deviations, and correlations between measures used for testing convergent and discriminant validity**

| | M | SD | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. AMMSA | 4.17 | .90 | .83*** | .76*** | .50*** | .43*** | .60*** |
| 2. IRMA | 3.03 | 1.04 | | .64*** | .43*** | .51*** | .60*** |
| 3. Hostile sexism | 4.48 | 1.15 | | | .43*** | .42*** | .60*** |
| 4. Benevolent sexism | 4.38 | 1.12 | | | | .30*** | .56*** |
| 5. SDO | 2.16 | .78 | | | | | .53*** |
| 6. RWA | 3.62 | .98 | | | | | |

*Note:* N varied between 311 and 338, because of pairwise exclusion of missing values.
**p < .005, ***p < .001.

## 6.4. Influence of Demographic Characteristics

In order to examine gender differences, a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed with AMMSA, IRMA, hostile sexism, benevolent sexism, RWA, and SDO as dependent variables. This yielded a significant multivariate effect of gender, $F(6, 274) = 13.66, p < .001, \eta^2 = .22$. Follow-up univariate analyses showed that men scored significantly higher than women on both AMMSA ($M = 4.51, SD = 0.84$ vs. $M = 3.84, SD = 0.83$), $F(1, 279) = 30.92, p < .001, \eta^2 = .14$, and IRMA ($M = 3.48, SD = 0.96$ vs. $M = 2.65, SD = 0.89$), $F(1, 279) = 48.06, p < .001, \eta^2 = .17$. Additionally, men scored significantly higher than women on RWA ($M = 3.79, SD = 1.05$ vs. $M = 3.45, SD = 0.90$), $F(1, 279) = 8.45, p < .01, \eta^2 = .03$, and hostile sexism ($M = 4.92, SD = 1.10$ vs. $M = 4.10, SD = 1.10$), $F(1, 279) = 37.10, p < .001, \eta^2 = .12$. Gender differences were not significant for benevolent sexism (a finding consistent with previous research; e.g. Glick et al. 2000) or SDO.

Participants with less education ($n = 89, M = 4.55, SD = .85$) scored higher on AMMSA than did those with more education ($n = 243, M = 4.03, SD = .87$), $t(330) = 4.91, p < .001, d = 0.54$. A significant difference was found between Greek Cypriots ($M = 4.72, SD = .77$) and Greeks ($M = 3.85, SD = .82$), with the latter scoring significantly lower on AMMSA, $t(335) = 9.55, p < .001, d = - 1.09$. No significant differences were found between students and non-students, whereas participants living in rural areas ($n = 44, M = 4.77, SD = .67$) scored higher than those living in urban areas ($n = 293, M = 4.08, SD = .90$), $t(335) = 4.90, p < .001, d = 0.87$. Similarly, participants originating from rural areas ($n = 118, M = 4.44, SD = .88$) scored higher than those originating from urban areas ($n = 216, M = 4.01, SD = .88$), $t(332) = 4.25, p < .001, d = 0.49$.

The correlations of AMMSA with all demographic variables (see Table 2) show that being male, older, Greek Cypriot, being born and/or living in a rural area, as well as having a lower educational level, are all associated with greater acceptance of modern myths about sexual aggression.

**Table 2: Zero-order correlations of AMMSA with demographic variables**

|  | AMMSA |
| --- | --- |
| Gender[a] | .34*** |
| Age | .33*** |
| Nationality[b] | -.45*** |
| Place of birth[c] | .24*** |
| Place of residence[c] | .27*** |
| Educational level[d] | -.25*** |
| Student status[e] | -.05 |

*Notes:* a) female = 0, male = 1; b) Cypriot = 0, Greek = 1; c) urban = 0, rural = 1; d) lower (up to high school) = 0, higher = 1 (university degree or higher); e) non-student = 0, student = 1.
***$p$ < .001

Age correlated significantly with AMMSA; this positive correlation indicates that acceptance of modern myths about sexual aggression tends to increase with age. However, this relationship is negative in the younger age group (≤ 30; $r$ (162) = -.20, $p$ < .01), while significantly positive in the older age group (> 30, $r$ (170) = .36, $p$ < .001).[5] This finding suggests a U-shaped relationship between AMMSA and age, similar to the one observed by Süssenbach and Bohner (2011) among German respondents.

## 6.5. Predicting AMMSA Scores

As discussed above, our data suggest a curvilinear relationship between age and AMMSA score. Therefore, we conducted two separate hierarchical regression analyses, one for the younger sample (up to thirty years old), and one for the older sample (over thirty years old). Table 3 presents zero-order correlations between AMMSA and demographic and attitudinal measures separately for each sample, while Table 4 shows the results of the separate hierarchical regression analyses conducted for each sample.

**Table 3: Zero-order correlations of AMMSA with demographic variables, younger and older samples**

|  | AMMSA | |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Younger Sample (age < = 30, N = 170) | Older Sample (age > 30, N = 178) |
| Gender[a] | .31*** | .33*** |
| Age | -.20** | .36*** |
| Nationality[b] | -.38*** | -.54*** |
| Place of birth[c] | .18* | .23** |
| Place of residence[c] | .27*** | .25*** |
| Educational level[d] | -.10 | -.27*** |
| Student status[e] | .12 | n.a.[f] |

*Notes:* a) female = 0, male = 1; b) Cypriot = 0, Greek = 1; c) urban = 0, rural = 1; d) lower (up to high school) = 0, higher = 1 (university degree or higher); e) Non-student = 0, Student = 1; f) only one student in older sample.
***$p$ < .001, **$p$ < .01, *$p$ < .05

### 6.5.1. Younger Sample (age < = 30, n = 170)

To examine the relative contribution of sociodemographic vs. personality and ideological variables in predicting acceptance of modern myths about sexual aggression, we conducted a hierarchical regression analysis with AMMSA as the criterion variable and demographics (gender, age, nationality, place of birth, place of residence, educational level, student status) as predictors, adding RWA, SDO, hostile sexism, and benevolent sexism to the list of predictors in a second step. The additional predictors significantly improved the variance explained by the model ($\Delta R^2$ = .394), $F$(4, 131) = 39.99, $p$ < .001. The final model explained 67.7 percent of the variance, $R^2$ = .677, $F$(11, 131) = 24.99, $p$ < .001.

In the first step, the effects of gender and nationality on AMMSA were significant, while the effect of place of origin was marginally significant. However, the effect of age on AMMSA failed to reach significance – although the bivariate relationship between age and AMMSA was significant –

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**5** We used thirty as the cut-off between older and younger age groups for comparability with Süssenbach and Bohner's (2011) study.

probably due to the significant relationship between age and place of residence ($r = -.182$, $p < .05$, i.e. participants with rural residence tended to be younger). Additionally, the effect of place of residence on AMMSA failed to reach significance – although the bivariate relationship between place of residence and AMMSA was significant – probably because the sample contained more rural resident Greek Cypriots and more urban resident Greeks than would be expected by chance ($\chi^2 = 46.33$, $df = 1$, $p < .001$; $r = -.522$, $p < .001$, for the correlation between nationality and urban vs. rural residence).

In the second step, hostile sexism emerged as the sole significant predictor of AMMSA, while the effects of gender, nationality, and place of origin on AMMSA failed to reach significance. This could be explained by the significant relationship between hostile sexism and (a) gender – male respondents tended to express more hostile sexism than female respondents ($r = .297$, $p < .001$); (b) nationality – Greek Cypriots tended to express more hostile sexism than Greeks ($r = -.464$, $p < .001$); and (c) place of origin – respondents of rural origin tended to express more hostile sexism than those of urban origin ($r = .224$, $p < .001$), as well as by significant relationships between RWA and (a) nationality – Greek Cypriots had higher RWA scores than Greeks ($r = -.553$, $p < .001$); and (b) place of birth – respondents of rural origin tended to express more RWA than those of urban origin ($r = .265$, $p < .001$).

In conclusion, in the younger sample the effects of all demographic variables disappeared when we controlled for the ideological and personality variables, while hostile sexism was the strongest single predictor of AMMSA, followed by RWA, whose effect was marginally significant.

**Table 4. Summary of hierarchical multiple regression for demographic, ideological and personality variables predicting AMMSA, younger and older samples**

| Variable | Younger Sample (age < = 30, N = 170) | | Older Sample (age > 30, N = 178) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1st step β | 2nd step β | 1st step β | 2nd step β |
| Gender | .26*** | .08 | .30*** | .13* |
| Age | -.15 | -.04 | .22** | .20*** |
| Nationality | -.33*** | .01 | -.38*** | -.14* |
| Place of birth | .16+ | -.06 | -.02 | -.08 |
| Place of residence | .00 | .05 | .02 | .08 |
| Educational level | -.03 | -.03 | -.09 | .04 |
| Student status | .03 | .07 | - | - |
| RWA | | .17++ | | -.04 |
| SDO | | .11 | | .04 |
| Hostile sexism | | .56*** | | .52*** |
| Benevolent sexism | | .08 | | .19** |

*Note:*. ***$p < .001$, **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$, + $p = .053$, ++ $p = .056$

### 6.5.2. Older Sample (age > 30, n = 178).

We conducted a hierarchical regression analysis with AMMSA as the criterion variable and demographics as predictors,[6] adding RWA, SDO, hostile sexism, and benevolent sexism, to the list of predictors in a second step. The additional predictors significantly improved the variance explained by the model ($\Delta R^2$ = .259), $F(4, 133)$ = 25.49, $p <$ .001.The final model explained 66.20 percent of the variance, $R^2$ = .662, $F(10, 133)$ = 26.05, $p < .001$.

In the first step, the effects of gender, age, and nationality on AMMSA were significant, while the effects of place of birth, place of residence, and educational level failed to reach significance, although the bivariate relationships between AMMSA and (a) place of birth, (b) place of residence, (c) educational level were significant. This could probably be explained by significant relationships between age and (a) place of birth – respondents of rural origin tended to be older than those of urban origin ($r$ = .283, $p <$ .001), (b) place of residence – rural residents tended to be older than urban residents ($r$ = .194, $p < .01$), and (c) educational level – respondents of lower educational level tended to be older than those of higher educational level ($r$ = -.310, $p < .001$), and also by differences between Greek and Greek Cypriot respondents in terms of (a) place of birth – the sample contained more Greek Cypriots of rural origin and more Greeks of urban origin than would be expected by chance ($\chi^2(1)$ = 27.26, $N$ = 178, $p < .001$; $r$ = -.395, $p < .001$, for the correlation between nationality and urban vs. rural origin); (b) place of residence – the sample contained more Greek Cypriots in rural residence and more Greeks in urban residence than would be expected by chance ($\chi^2(1)$ = 39.22, $N$ = 178, $p < .001$; $r$ = -.469, $p < .001$, for the correlation between nationality and urban vs. rural residence); and (c) educational level – the sample contained more Greek Cypriots of lower educational level and more Greeks of higher educational level than would be expected by chance ($\chi^2(1)$ = 17.55, $N$ = 178, $p < .001$; $r$ = -.315, $p < .001$, for the correlation between nationality and educational level).

In conclusion, for the older sample the effects of gender, age, and nationality remained significant, even when we controlled for the ideological and personality variables. Hostile sexism was the strongest single predictor of AMMSA, followed by age, benevolent sexism, nationality, and gender.

### 7. Discussion

The main aim of the present study was to validate the Greek version of the AMMSA scale, an instrument developed by Gerger and colleagues (2007) to capture the acceptance of subtle myths about sexual aggression exerted by men against women. The AMMSA scale was originally developed in German and English (Gerger et al. 2007), and has been successfully adapted and used in Spanish (Megías et al. 2011) and French (Helmke et al. 2014). Our results replicated the findings of these previous studies (see also Süssenbach and Bohner 2011), suggesting that the Greek AMMSA scale is a valid and reliable instrument for measuring modern myths about sexual aggression.

In accordance with our predictions, the thirty-item Greek AMMSA scale exhibited a unidimensional structure, strong internal consistency, and satisfactory convergent and discriminant validity. Correlation analyses showed AMMSA to be strongly associated with closely related concepts (IRMA and hostile sexism), indicating convergent validity. The AMMSA scale's positive but moderate correlations with constructs tapping conservative ideological beliefs (RWA and SDO), and with benevolent sexism (the subscale of ASI that captures subtle sexist attitudes), provide supportive evidence for AMMSA's discriminant validity.

As discussed earlier, one of the main shortcomings of earlier measures of rape myth acceptance was their blatant, direct wording, which most probably contributed to asymmetrical, positively skewed distributions (Payne et al. 1999). The AMMSA scale has been found adequate in addressing this shortcoming, generating scores close to the

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**6** Student status was excluded from this analysis, because there was only one student in the older sample.

normal distribution (Gerger et al. 2007; Megías et al. 2011). However, in our study both AMMSA and IRMA scales exhibited distributions that were close to normal, with the IRMA scale showing only slight positive skewness, and the AMMSA scale showing slightly negative skewness. Thus, both distributions were relatively symmetrical, with means somewhat higher than those found in the United States and Germany. This suggests that attitudes toward sexual aggression may still be rather traditional in Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, so that even more old-fashioned RMA scales may produce statistically sound data. Nonetheless, participants' AMMSA scores were significantly higher that their IRMA scores; thus, AMMSA scores were also closer to the logical midpoint of the response scale than IRMA scores.

When it comes to the demographic correlates of AMMSA, our findings suggest that being male, older, Greek Cypriot, originating and/or living in a rural area, and having a lower educational level are associated with stronger endorsement of modern myths about sexual aggression (cf. Gari et al. 2009). Interestingly, age and AMMSA were found to exhibit a U-curve relationship, replicating Süssenbach and Bohner's (2011) finding from their representative survey in Germany. Exploring this further, we found that among younger participants the effects of all demographic variables on AMMSA disappeared when we controlled for ideological and personality variables. We believe that this is mainly due to gender and nationality differences in these ideological and personality variables (men scored higher than women on hostile sexism, and Greek Cypriots scored higher than Greeks on hostile sexism and RWA). On the other hand, in the older sample demographics (gender, age, and nationality) had independent effects on AMMSA, along with the two dimensions of ambivalent sexism. Thus, it seems that gender plays an important role in the adoption of modern myths about sexual aggression in societies with larger status differentials between the sexes (in comparison with other EU member states), such as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, larger gender status differentials in the Republic of Cyprus in comparison with Greece might be responsible for the significant effects of nationality on AMMSA. However, the effects of nationality in the present study should be interpreted with caution:

especially among the older sample, the figures for Greek Cypriots of lower educational level, originating from and living in rural areas were disproportionate, so it seems that we cannot draw firm conclusions about gender or cultural effects, because these could be attributed to other demographic variables.

## 8. Limitations

Our study is not without limitations. Our data come from convenience samples, and it cannot be argued that they are representative of the populations. Although a closer look at the demographics reveals a relatively diverse sample, future studies should employ representative sampling procedures.

Moreover, our current data are purely correlational. Future research with the Greek AMMSA scale should thus use experimental designs, following up on work conducted in other cultural contexts. This should provide further evidence for the scale's predictive validity regarding judgments and information processing about rape cases (cf. Eyssel and Bohner 2011; Süssenbach, Bohner, and Eyssel 2012; Süssenbach, Eyssel, and Bohner 2013; Süssenbach et al. 2015), as well as for AMMSA's causal role in predicting rape proclivity (cf. Bohner et al. 1998; Bohner, Siebler, and Schmelcher 2006; for a review, see Bohner et al. 2009).

All in all, in this paper we have provided initial support for the Greek AMMSA scale's adequate psychometric properties, reliability, and validity. Nevertheless, the social psychological study of modern myths about sexual aggression requires further attention and exploration, as rape myths seem to contribute to the perpetuation of sexual violence by serving various psychological functions (Bohner et al. 2009): (1) People in general endorse rape myths as a means to maintain their belief in a just world, by blaming rape victims and exonerating perpetrators (Burt 1980); (2) Women in particular use rape myths as an anxiety buffer (endorsing rape myths supports a belief that rape only happens to other women) (Bohner and Lampridis 2004; Bohner, Siebler, and Raaijmakers 1999; Bohner et al. 1993); (3) Men, finally, endorse rape myths in order to rationalize their own tendencies toward sexual aggression (Bohner et al. 1998, 2006, 2010).

Our very promising results with the Greek AMMSA will allow us to conduct additional studies, both correlational and experimental, within Greek-speaking populations.

These studies will help to shed light on the factors that may strengthen or attenuate AMMSA, but also on AMMSA's role in predicting sexual assault.

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